

PERSONALITY

and Problems of Adjustment

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PERSONALITY

and Problems of Adjustment

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"It is much easier to measure nonsignificant factors than to be content with developing a first approximation to the significant."—Elton Mayo

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To
C. L. D.

PREFATORY NOTE

OVER TWENTY years ago Dean William T. Root and I, then graduate students in psychology, had many agreeable and stimulating conversations about the limitations of intelligence testing—then the educational rage—in the diagnosis of conduct problems of children and adults. We expressed a hope that psychologists and educators would come to reckon with the emotional and social-cultural factors in the making of the personality. Root had arrived at this standpoint from his teaching and wide reading, plus several years of clinical work, I from my reading of Sumner, Cooley, Dewey, and Rivers, and from my contacts with W. I. Thomas and G. H. Mead, who had been my teachers previously. Then, too, my experience at that very time in giving intelligence tests to schoolchildren and to men in the military service further convinced me of the need for this wider view regarding the factors which enter into thought and conduct.

In 1920, at the University of Oregon, I began giving a course dealing with problems of personality and social adjustment in which I drew on pertinent materials from physiology, psychology, psychiatry, and sociology. In those days there were no suitable textbooks, but F. L. Wells's *Mental Adjustments* was used as an introduction to pertinent psychological phases, and the writings of Thomas, Mead, Freud, White, Rivers, and Cooley furnished supplementary reading. Since the attempt was made to link human thought and behavior to the constitutional factors, on the one hand, and to the social-cultural, on the other, the approach was frankly eclectic, and some of my professional colleagues at the time were good-naturedly skeptical of having such a course in the psychological curriculum.

During my fourteen years at the University of Wisconsin this course was frequently revised. Students began coming from other fields than psychology and sociology—from education, economics, journalism, and speech, and even from prelegal and premedical departments. To satisfy the needs of this wider clientele new material was constantly added or old material modified or dropped out. The present book is frankly an outgrowth of this particular course. Into its making have gone not only the questions—personal and theoretical—of the students and many others, but considerable clinical experience, extensive examination of the literature, and, I trust, some serious thought of my own.

The basic standpoint of the book is stated in the opening chapter and is,

of course, elaborated in many places elsewhere. The book is designed essentially to be a college text in courses dealing with the psychology of personality or with problems of mental hygiene, and to serve as an orientation to the interplay of personality, society, and culture. It should also prove to be a valuable supplementary text in social psychology, and in sociology, social work, and education courses dealing with personal adjustment problems. I sincerely hope that the effort to combine the standpoints and data of psychology, social psychology, and cultural anthropology may contribute its quota to the growing rapprochement of these three fields.

The debts I owe to others are too great to be itemized in detail, but, in addition to the influences of the men already noted, in the more particular preparation of this book I wish to thank my former graduate teaching assistants Earl H. Bell, Henry D. Sheldon, Arthur Katona, Paul Glick, Paul W. Tappan, and Wilbur Brookover. As a result largely of their discussions with students they made available many critical comments regarding the mimeographed material which was the immediate predecessor of this book itself. Special thanks are due to my former colleagues, Harry Harlow, S. A. Stouffer, J. L. Gillin, and J. E. Hulett, Jr., whose suggestions were most helpful. My present colleague, Hortense Powdermaker, gave me advice on several chapters also. Hazen Carpenter assisted me in the preparation of certain parts of the manuscript; and Mrs. Fern McCoard, Mrs. Jo Day Hulett, and Miss Kathryn Van Hyning did good work in the typing of the final copy.

Throughout the text, wherever there is a reference to the literature, the practice is to give the author's name and to follow this with the date of the publication of the book or article. The reader will find the full title or source in the Bibliography (pages 825-856). Moreover, to facilitate the finding of these references, the Index of Names is combined with the Bibliography. The numbers in brackets which follow each item in the Bibliography refer to the pages where that particular book or article is mentioned.

CONTENTS

PART ONE: THE FOUNDATIONS OF PERSONALITY

I	What This Book Is About	3
II	Constitutional Foundations of Behavior, Neural and Glandular	15
III	Constitutional Foundations: The Interplay of Heredity and Environment	35
IV	Drives, Cycles of Activity, and Emotions	58
V	Some Aspects of Social Learning	76
VI	Mental Life and Interaction	99
VII	Groups and Culture: The Framework of Personality Development	124
VIII	The Language Development of the Individual	139
IX	The Rise of the Self in Interaction	164
X	Language, Thought, and the Self	188
XI	Methods of Studying the Personality	230
XII	✓Theories of Personality	276
XIII	✓Types of Personality	301

PART TWO: SELECTED PROBLEMS OF PERSONAL ADJUSTMENT

XIV	✓The Induction of the Child into the Family	339
XV	Other Aspects of Fundamental Training	369
XVI	Some Problems of Adolescence and Maturation	402
XVII	Pupil Adjustment to the Learning Process in School	428
XVIII	✓Teacher-Pupil and Teacher-Community Relations	451
XIX	Mental Hygiene for College Students	468

XX	Adjustment in Marriage	502
XXI	The Dissolution of the Family	536
XXII	Adjustment Problems of the Modern Woman	559
XXIII	The Relation of Occupation to Personality Adjustment	591
XXIV	The Personality of the Juvenile Delinquent	622
XXV	The Personality of the Adult Criminal	661
XXVI	Adjustments Associated with Constitutional Deficiencies	686
XXVII	Neurotic and Psychotic Manifestations of Personality	708
XXVIII	The Neurotic and Psychotic in Our Society	739

PART THREE: CERTAIN WIDER IMPLICATIONS

XXIX	Integration and Balance Through Religion, Art, and Avocation	785
XXX	Personality, Society, and Culture	805

APPENDIX: AN OUTLINE FOR WRITING A CASE HISTORY	819
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BIBLIOGRAPHY AND INDEX OF NAMES	825
---------------------------------	-----

INDEX OF SUBJECTS	857
-------------------	-----

Part One

THE FOUNDATIONS OF PERSONALITY

Chapter I

WHAT THIS BOOK IS ABOUT

TO THE man in the street the personality is some special, largely mysterious, quality of an individual which attracts the attention of others. It is imagined to be a particular possession which certain persons have in abundance but which others do not possess or at best have only in a small amount. For example, many would define personality as an "indefinable something" which makes one popular. In any case it is thought to be an important quality in making friends and in influencing others—in short, an aid to becoming successful in business, love-making, or any other person-to-person activity. Popular books and "courses of study" are widely advertised and widely sold to gullible people who wish to develop this mystic thing called *personality*, which, we are led to believe, may be acquired by practice and for a consideration.

The serious and informed student of human behavior recognizes the superficiality and the incompleteness of this man-in-the-street conception of personality. It is clear at once that such notions refer only to particular ways in which people meet each other. True, we cannot understand the personality without considering the give-and-take of individuals. But personality is more than the intense stimulus value of one individual for another. A careful analysis of one's dealings with his fellows shows that aspects other than physique, walk, clothes, speech, and gestures are important. Though the personality certainly has to do with how one individual influences another, to understand the personality we need to discover the internal factors which lie behind his actions. We want to find out his motives or "reasons" for acting, and how he looks upon himself. In short, we study what he does, thinks, and feels not only in regard to others but with reference to himself. This self-reference involves, in turn, how the individual values or interprets his contacts with others. For our purpose at this point we may define personality as the more or less organized ideas, attitudes, traits, and habits which an individual has built up into roles for dealing with others and with himself. These roles, with their supporting ideas, attitudes, traits, and habits, grow out of the individual's participation in various groups. And his roles in turn serve to give him a certain standing or status with his fellows. The aim of this book, in fact, is to examine and interpret the factors which go into the making of the person as he adapts himself to the social world around him.

THREE BASIC VARIABLES

There are three basic factors or variables to be considered in describing and analyzing the personality. These are the internal aspects of the individual or organism; the social and material stimuli or situations exterior to the individual which impinge upon him to modify and direct his impulses or activities; and the reactions or overt conduct which results from the interplay of the individual and the stimuli.

It is at once obvious that everyone possesses certain more or less inherently determined physical features, such as stature, weight, and color of hair, eyes, and skin. Then there are the basic needs or drives of the individual, connected originally with his survival, such as demands to satisfy hunger, thirst, and other bodily appetites or demands to avoid painful and unpleasant situations. But the human individual does not long remain in this "natural" state. From birth on, the baby learns, largely at the hands of others, to modify not only his wants but the manner in which he secures their satisfaction. Thus habit formation comes to aid the process of more adequate adaptation of the individual to the outside world. In time all sorts of ideas, traits, attitudes, and habits emerge, so that the full-grown man or woman—at least at first acquaintance—does not seem to have much in common with infants or children. These changes from infancy to maturity come about because the gradually acquired ideas, traits, attitudes, and habits, in turn, become organized into patterns or combinations which we call roles played in relation to others. These roles furnish the foundation of the self or ego organization, and the self or ego is the core of the personality.

The satisfaction, modification, and extension of an individual's impulses or needs result largely from the stimuli which play upon him. (Since these stimuli usually reach him in some organized form, the term *situation* is frequently used as a synonym for stimuli.) These conditions exterior to the individual are material things and other persons. The growing child not only must learn to manage his toys, his clothes, and, as he grows to adulthood, the tools and machines of his trade, but must above all else come to adapt himself to other individuals. The more or less patterned or organized stimuli of other persons are referred to by the sociologist as *groups* or in general terms as *society*. But the influences of others which pour in upon a growing child are qualified at nearly every angle by what these same persons have in their own lives learned from other people, from books, from pictures, and from other sources. In other words, society imposes upon the individual certain customs, traditions, and more or less accepted ways of doing and thinking which we call *culture*. The hungry child must learn to eat certain foods and not others, and, as the old saying puts it, what's one man's meat is another man's poison. Thus the Jewish

child brought up in the faith of his fathers will eschew the eating of pork; and most Americans would not fancy a dish of locusts and wild honey, about which the prophets of the Old Testament so often wrote. Not only are diet, the wearing of certain kinds of clothes, the use of shelter, mechanical skills, and such habits learned, but those ideas and practices which we consider right and proper, or moral and immoral, as to economic, political, and social practices and values are likewise acquired from our culture. So, too, our conventions or customs in regard to speech, education, art, and recreation are largely determined by the particular culture to which we are exposed.

Yet not all learning is culturally determined, although some social anthropologists believe it to be so. As children develop, they acquire many fundamental emotional sets, many basic traits, such as aggressiveness or submissiveness, and many potent desires, which are qualified, in part at least, by their own constitutional make-up and by the noncultural but nevertheless powerful social forces which play upon them. Thus the mother, in the course of training the child to eat and to establish good habits of bodily care or protection, may impress upon him habits and attitudes which are not necessarily accepted in the culture of that particular group or society. Or children in more or less spontaneously formed play groups develop all sorts of habits, traits, and attitudes that are by no means the direct outcome of cultural training. The sheer difference in age and physical strength between two children at play would make for some distinctions between them in role or habit. In fact, there is much evidence that some of the basic features of the self or ego organization have their inception in these noncultural interactions with others, especially with the parents and playmates in situations not defined by culture. These influences we refer to as *personal-social* to distinguish them from the strictly cultural.

The third variable, the reaction system, represents the externalized activities of the individual in relation to things or persons. It is the individual's response which provides the final standard by which others judge adjustment. But the reactions of an individual must be divided into two classes. There are those involving gesture, speech, and writing, which we may call *communication*. Then there are those involving the larger peripheral muscular system in movement in space, which we may call *overt behavior*. In fact, the relations of words, overt deeds, and the internal aspects of the individual constitute a fundamental problem in personality adaptation. As we all realize, what a man says is not always a very precise indication of what he will do. So, too, even what a man says or does is not always a satisfactory clue as to what he thinks or feels.

Though we must never fail to consider the situations or environment which a person confronts, the central problem before us is the make-up of

the individual himself. The manner in which persons react to social-cultural situations will be determined only in part by the nature of the stimuli. Many crucial factors determining behavior and hence adjustment lie within the individual. There are first of all certain basic original and learned reflexes related to the physiological survival of the person which operate with but slight variation among individuals. Furthermore, because of training, people in a given society or group come to react more or less alike and automatically in a particular situation. Thus in our society an individual is not permitted much variation in matters of moral import. All must wear clothes, for instance, before they dare appear in public; or, in the performance of skilled acts in work or play, success depends chiefly




FIGURE 1, showing schematically the variations in the manner in which an individual may react.

upon more or less identical performance among those who engage in these activities. But in many situations considerable deviation in response to the same stimulus is possible. Thus, children may react in rather diverse fashion to some action of a father, these divergences doubtless being due to differences in the reactive systems of the children themselves. In still other matters we may find a variety of stimuli which induce relatively similar or identical reactions in a group of individuals. For example, an act of delinquency or crime, like truancy or stealing, may be motivated by a wide range of situations in the family, in the school, or in the wider community. Finally, in some instances, we find both a variety of stimuli and a diversity of response within the same total situation. Thus ordinarily the varied conditions of home, school, or community induce a considerable divergence in the reactions of the individuals upon whom these stimuli impinge. Figure 1 indicates schematically the four possibilities in the re-

lations of the situation (S), organism (O), and response or reaction (R).

Not only are these deviations among persons evident, but any given individual—aside from the fundamental physiological reflexes—may vary from one time to another and from group to group in the manner in which he responds to like or highly similar situations. Two aspects of such deviations in conduct are highly important. In the first place, the culture may direct one as to which possible outlet to follow. In our society the moral and legal codes usually leave the individual little or no choice regarding how he should act in such matters as paying taxes, settling contracts, getting a job, undertaking to set up a family, and so on. These we may call the universal cultural definitions of the situation. In many cases, however, the individual has certain culturally permissible ways of acting; and, though culture does define them, within limits there is much personal choice in overt response. In the second place, alongside of, or in opposition to, these culturally defined reactions, the individual may have his own private and unique interpretation of a situation and how to meet it. Frequently these private definitions are closely linked to rather rudimentary but insistent wishes for power or sexual expression which the moral culture of the wider community expects one to repress. Obviously, when these two definitions—one private, the other public or cultural, but both held within one person—come into conflict, he may experience sharp emotional disturbance.

THE INTERRELATIONS OF INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL FACTORS

Since the central concern of personality analysis is the discovery of those modifications within the organism which qualify and direct the course from stimulus to response, we must examine the interrelations of the important internal and external factors. We shall consider first motivation and the cycles of activity which take place in the individual in passing from the motive to the attainment of the goal or satisfying object. We must also describe the manner in which, in the course from drive to goal, the person comes to profit by his experience, that is, comes to internalize his initial overt reactions to stimuli. This internalization, in turn, provides the fundamental elements out of which the self or ego is constructed. Thus we must make note of some of the most significant features of the self as it operates in relation to other selves. Among significant items are these: the rise of roles; the importance of status, security, and other acquired needs of the individual; and the high importance of incipient and anticipatory modes of reaction in predetermining the direction, intensity, and quality of a given social interaction. The degree of consistency of behavior must also be examined, with reference both to motives and to what is expected by other persons. This matter of consistency is clearly fundamental in the

control and prediction of behavior, so essential to societal as well as to individual stability, and, obversely, in dealing with problems of societal and individual change.

One of the most relevant questions is: What makes a person react? What impels behavior or effort at adaptation anyway? In everyday language, why do people do what they do? The impulses to change one's relation to the environment arise originally from alterations within the organism itself or from the experiencing of external stimuli which make change necessary or desirable for survival. The newborn child not only must find air and make bodily adjustments of posture, but soon sets up a restlessness which older persons around him realize arises from hunger, thirst, or other physiological requirements of life. And at the hands of these others he receives the necessary food and liquids. In the case of eliminative or fatigue (rest and sleep) needs, at the outset the activity takes place at the animal level without the intervention of others. But these physiological impulsions to activity or rest soon begin to be altered. It is not long before the infant begins to acquire new ways of satisfying his wants, and, as he grows older, he expands his wants far beyond these rudimentary ones. In time he desires security, power over others, and also companionship. He wishes to conform or to be different. He wants new experience as well as to follow in the grooves of old habit. And the means of satisfying these learned motives may not be entirely material, but may be psychological or social in character as well. Yet, in spite of training, the basic drives are and remain fundamentally physiological in character—a fact which we must never forget if we are to understand our own or others' behavior.

Furthermore, our desires or wishes possess a certain directionality or course from the drive or motive to the goal or end desired. We shall call this the *cycle of activity*. Any given cycle may be thought of as proceeding normally through four stages: (1) the drive itself; (2) the restless seeking of a means of securing the goal or aim; (3) the attainment; and (4) the rise of emotional and feeling tones of pleasure or satisfaction. But, just as the motivation itself may be profoundly altered, so the means of satisfying it may be; and what one person finds satisfying may bore or irritate another. So, too, we must all learn to find substitute outlets—real or imagined—when the movement from desire to goal is blocked.

Though it is true that we begin life with overt acts, the most distinctive aspect of man's adaptive capacity lies in the fact that in time thoughts (broadly considered) may come to qualify, direct, and, what is most important, determine action itself. Thus the growing child, having acquired his first set of overt habits, in time is able to anticipate his actions by "taking thought" of the consequences. And it is the elaboration of this feature of adaptation into symbolic form which sharply distinguishes man from

all his animal relatives. We refer to this shift from external adaptive reaction to capacity to anticipate activity in advance as *internalization of experience*. The initial stage in this process lies in the crying or other gesturing which the child develops when confronted with hunger or other drives. Then, too, he soon learns to cry not only because he is hungry or cold or wet, but because he wants to be picked up by his mother or nurse and gently stroked or kissed, or to receive some other kind of attention from those around him. But the most striking stage in this development evidently depends upon the learning of language. When a child of about a year begins to get names for objects, he has made his first great step toward thinking itself. He thus gets a device by which he can call for toys, food, or other objects not immediately at hand. Another important phase is entered upon later when he is able to rehearse within himself—largely in subvocal talking—the whole drama of contact with others before proceeding to make his wants known to them or to manage his toys or otherwise satisfy his wants. This inner world is the field of mind as the older psychology termed it.

Thus the child learns to hold in check his overt responses, to modify and redirect his habits in order to attain more adequate satisfactions. In other words, he comes to reverse the order of activity, and thoughts do precede speech or overt responses. As the central feature of this process, he comes to play in imagination the roles of those about him. But he acquires this capacity to rehearse his roles in advance much as he learns to adapt himself externally to others. That is, his own habits having been from the outset acquired largely in interaction with others and having become—though at the infantile level of organization—similar to those of the people around him, he comes to play his part in the family drama in ways which others taught him. Not only are his overt responses like theirs, but his speech and voice reflect his social contacts. At the outset, however, his roles change as the situations vary. But after a while, because of the recurrence of the same drives, of the same or similar situations, and of the same means of satisfying them, he begins to get a certain consistency and generality in his reactions. For example, one child, because of his habits of whining, of fearing to attempt some act on his own, or of always seeking out his mother to solve his difficulties, gets labeled by others as always a “sissy,” while his brother and sister come in time to be known as “a little man” and “a nice girl.” And, as he internalizes this overt behavior, his mental organization reflects in large part these social contacts—overt and linguistic.

Two other important aspects of this rise of mind and self-feeling must be noted. The first is the pattern of expectancy. We learn to react in advance—largely at a verbal or thought level—to a given overt reaction. The second is the fact that we develop something of a consistency and regularity

of reactive tendencies. By knowing how consistent another person is, one may be able to tell in advance what he will do. The consistency of others is basic to the development of one's own patterns of valid expectancy. Many of the problems of misunderstanding, maladjustment, or conflict between individuals rest upon the fact that they do not know what to expect of each other. In the process of learning to adapt ourselves to the social and material world around us, then, this matter of anticipation is highly significant. On it are founded the prediction and hence the control of behavior.

We all make mistakes regarding what to expect of others. We know from everyday experience not only that others react differently on one day than on another, even though the situation remains approximately the same, but that their words do not always fit their deeds. We come to know that what a man says does not always match up with what he does. And it is a compliment to tell another that "his word is as good as his bond." A parent who thrashes a child one day but neglects its misconduct the next, or who follows punishment with pleasant rewards, illustrates such inconsistency. A person's adjustment to another is obviously highly qualified by such treatment. Moreover, words and deeds, either dissociated in time or appearing together, may provide no knowledge as to what lies within an individual in the way of ideas, impulses, and feelings. Any marked divergence of words, deeds, and thoughts must be reckoned with if we are to understand the personality. Sometimes one is motivated to perform a given act, but social conventions, that is, culturally determined expectancies, lead him to inhibit overt expression. Or the immediate expectations of others may lead one, sometimes quite unconsciously, to make a promise which he has no intention of fulfilling, or which other intruding motives or circumstances prevent his executing.

A consideration of expectancy and consistency leads directly to the topic of the co-ordination or integration of motives and other internal elements with words and overt acts to form some sort of harmonious totality. The matter of integration may be approached in terms of varied roles in different groups or with reference to the degree of persistence of some more or less generalized pattern from one day to the next in spite of divergence of the groups with which we come into contact. But behind the roles we take there often lie conflicts of motives, of means of attaining the goal, or respecting the nature of the goal to be sought. And such conflicts may be resolved only by repressing or inhibiting one set of motives, attitudes, and traits in favor of another series. But in the individual who has developed a more or less co-ordinated life organization, the attitudes, traits, and habits are not changed chameleonlike at every shifting of the occasion or group. That is, one's life organization or self comes to possess a certain stability and uniformity in spite of divergences in the stimuli, including the ex-

pectancies of certain other persons. When there is a high degree of integration, expectancies and hence prediction can be extended to cover a wide range of relatively diverse situations toward which one must respond.

Yet the divergence of motives or of goals may induce emotional disturbances within the individual, and conflicts may find outlets in all sorts of substitute ways. These may take the form of misconduct or of flight into daydreaming; or they may find culturally accepted forms by manifesting the divergent impulses, say of aggression, with reference to enemy groups toward which we are permitted to respond negatively. In fact, one form of integration or rather balance of an individual's total reactive patterns may be brought about by opportunities to work off his antagonistic drive toward other persons or groups. For example, the opposing, or ambivalent, trends of love and hate may be co-ordinated by intense affection for one's family or nation, on the one hand, and equally strong and violent hatred for another family or nation. Cultural expectancies often provide just such integration for the individual. Thus a social-cultural situation itself may furnish a means of resolving internal conflicts arising in the first instance from powerful but opposing personal motives associated with close contact with members of one's own group.

CHARACTERISTICS OF PERSONALITY

It is, then, from the interplay of internal and external factors of the individual within the larger framework of society and culture—that is, within the environing stimuli or situations—that the self or ego emerges. The self provides the center round which a whole congeries of elements, internal and external, revolve. In dealing with these elements, the social psychologist makes use of such concepts as habits, ideas, traits, attitudes, and frames of reference or value systems. Let us see more closely what these words mean.

We have already noted that *habit* usually refers to the overt, observable behavior of a person in space. It may involve reaction to either material or social objects. (Sometimes the term *habit* is used figuratively to refer to any persistent mental pattern, as when we designate one as "habitually indulging in self-pity" or as "habitually turning to glib sophistry"; but, if the term is used in this sense, its figurative character is usually apparent from the context. These persistent patterns are more accurately designated as traits.) *Ideas* are those internal images or concepts to which names are attached. In a broad way they represent the memory and associative effects of past experience. Thus our idea of our family includes elements drawn from a wide range of actual contact with parents, brothers and sisters, and others. So, too, our ideas of an animal species or of truth and beauty arise from combinations of phases of experiences with a variety of specific animals, from contacts with other persons, or from the pleas-

ant and unpleasant reactions to physical objects or persons. By *traits* we mean more or less general and persistent aspects of reactivity, such as neatness, punctuality, aggressiveness, and submissiveness. The term *attitude* refers to a combination of some idea and some reaction tendency for or against, favorable or unfavorable, with respect to some material or social stimulus. Thus we speak of a man's attitude toward war or peace, toward communism or fascism. By *frame of reference* we refer to the more or less organized patterns of ideas, traits, and attitudes which aid us in defining and judging situations and in determining their essential meaning or value to us. To know a person's habits, ideas, traits, and attitudes gives others a clue as to what this person will say and do with respect to his friends, his enemies, members of his family, his business or recreational associates, and others throughout the whole range of his social contacts. Moreover, the problem of consistency and of generality or specificity in these elements is a central one in the psychology of personality.

There has been extensive discussion as to whether people develop generalized ideas, traits, and attitudes toward the objects of their attention and experience. Or do people always act in a particular way to a specific situation? Is there little or no carry-over from one situation to another until some uniformity emerges? Clearly these are questions similar to those noted above, except that there they are approached from the structural features of the personality, rather than in terms of the roles which one plays in any given social interaction. In the course of our treatment of the personality under various social-cultural conditions we shall try to demonstrate that there is for most persons a scale ranging from rather highly specific responses and accompanying ideas, traits, and attitudes to generalized patterns of thought and reactivity. Moreover, we shall attempt to show that society and culture themselves provide the framework in which degrees of specificity or generality operate. Thus toward what are considered the fundamental values of a society—its moral code, its chief emphasis as to what makes for success, its basic ethos, if you will—most individuals through their training develop a solid foundation of general habit, idea, trait, and attitude. For instance, in our own society, the taboo on taking another's life (except under rather carefully circumscribed provocations), the necessity of paying one's debts, and the adherence to the codes of monogamous sexual morality may be taken for granted in the vast majority of persons because their cultural training has been extended to cover all the possible circumstances under which divergent behavior in these matters might occur. On the other hand, we may be permitted more or less individualized and specific habits, ideas, traits, and attitudes toward a wide variety of situations. (See Figure 1, above.)

Another important problem in this connection has to do with individual differences and the uniqueness of the personality as over against the pos-

sible classification of individuals into types. Are persons unique, so distinctive that to place them in some convenient and usable general categories befores any scientific consideration of them and their behavior? As we shall see, there are two schools of thought about this matter, just as there are two viewpoints regarding specificity as against generality of reactions. Some students of personality resent any attempt to pigeonhole individuals into such classifications as introvert and extrovert—to mention a current practice in some quarters. These investigators contend that to do so distorts the concrete facts and glosses over the essential individuality of every person when compared with another. On the other hand, many investigators take the position that it will be impossible to move on to any adequate scientific analysis of personalities until we are able somehow to classify people into sound categories, that only then may we be able to predict and hence control their behavior. For instance, we do make classifications and typifications in order to deal more efficiently with children in the home, in school, in their play, or with reference to their misconduct in the community at large. We are also constantly classifying adults for all sorts of utilitarian purposes. In fact, the social roles of specific individuals are often combined into some sort of working categories, as when we speak of the businessman, the medical man, the minister, and the politician. But whether one accepts one standpoint or the other at the outset, as we proceed we shall become aware of the difficulties involved in complete adherence to either standpoint to the exclusion of the other.

These are not simple questions, and we shall show that the standpoint from which scholars approach their human materials has much to do with the manner in which they treat these topics. Moreover, the interpretation is not unrelated to the use of statistical or other methods of studying individuals. Hence, as an aid in treating concrete problems of adjustment, we shall review the principal methods which have been used by social psychologists, psychiatrists, and others in trying to describe and analyze personality more adequately.

PROBLEMS AND IMPLICATIONS

Following our discussion of the fundamentals of personality, we shall undertake a description and interpretation of a selected list of specific topics having to do with personal adaptation. This material comprises Part Two. The book will close with two chapters (Part Three) devoted to certain wider implications of our subject matter.

Since the basic elements of personality are determined in the earliest years, we shall necessarily consider the growth of attitudes and habits within the family and other primary groups. Then, too, the critical years of adolescence, with their important problems of emancipation from the home, the emergence of love patterns for the opposite sex, and the coming

of mature freedom and its accompanying responsibility, must be discussed if we are to understand many of the features of adult adaptation. Moreover, since the school looms so large in our society, its function with reference to personal development must be examined. For the adult there are a variety of difficulties in marriage and interspousal relations which demand consideration. And closely related to these are the mental conflicts, common to many women in our society, arising from the desire for vocational (economic) independence and the wish for a satisfactory love life. These matters must be delineated and interpreted. So, too, the sense of security or insecurity is so closely linked to earning a living that we must give some attention to the place of occupational attitudes and habits in the individual's life organization. Attention will also be given to maladjustments associated with constitutional deficiencies and to those adaptations which are designated as delinquent, criminal, neurotic, and psychotic—all of them illustrating forms of personality manifestation although variously defined in terms of social-cultural values.

In the final division of the book, we shall first discuss some of the patterns of our culture, such as are found in religion, art, and the avocations, which provide people with certain nonutilitarian aids to the integration or balance of their varied wishes and satisfactions. And in the concluding chapter we shall sketch some of the broader implications of the relation of culture to personality structure and function, indicating how divergent value systems and their associated habit-attitude patterns make for a flexible and growing or a fixed and static life organization as the case may be.

Chapter II

CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF BEHAVIOR, NEURAL AND GLANDULAR

OUR PROBLEM is the adaptation of the human individual to his material and social environment. Although we are chiefly concerned with the growth of the personality and with the individual's role and status in society, we must take into account the constitutional foundations of his activity. No matter how much importance we attach to the social or cultural environment in governing behavior, we must never forget that the individual is first of all an organic system, a member of an animal species. The biological factors are important for at least two reasons: (1) only through organic structures does behavior take place; and (2) while the individual always expresses himself largely through socially and culturally acquired patterns, the constitution sets certain significant limitations to such learning. Hence, as a background to our subsequent discussion, we must discuss the structures and functions of the human organism as they facilitate or impede adaptation to the world.

The adaptation of the organism to its environment may be viewed as a dynamic relationship between energy systems within itself and forces or energy changes outside. Life consists, at the physiochemical level, of a continuous series of internal changes leading to adjustment to the external world. For the individual these relationships operate through the living cells or protoplasm organized in certain forms and performing particular functions. As A. V. Hill (1926, pp. 256-257) well puts it, "The living cell is not so much a thing as a process; a chain of chemical events organized in a peculiar way."

The essential attributes of protoplasm with which we are concerned are (1) differential receptivity to stimuli from outside or from other parts of the organism, (2) ability to respond or react to these stimuli, and (3) plasticity or modifiability of the protoplasmic organization. This capacity for the modification of tissue makes possible alterations in subsequent contacts with the environment. That is, it permits learning. For us, then, the capacities of receptivity and modifiability are the most significant aspects of organic energy systems. In order to form a picture of the organism living in an environment, let us first note the principal structures which are fundamental to the adjustive processes.

THE SUSTAINING SYSTEMS OF THE ORGANISM

One's adaptation to his surroundings depends upon the entire organization of structures and functions which make up the body or constitution. The basic adaptability is physiological in character, that is, it takes place through the operation within an environment of certain sustaining systems of organs of long racial or species history. The fundamental sustaining systems are the *digestive* system, which has to do with the ingestion and chemical breakdown of solid food and liquids; the *respiratory* system, which controls the initial intake of oxygen and the expulsion of carbon dioxide; the *circulatory* system, which carries the oxygen through the blood vessels to the capillaries to bathe the cells and, in turn, to take up the gaseous waste products and return them to the lungs; the *eliminative* systems, which carry the waste products from the bowels, from the kidneys, and from the skin through the sweat glands; and the *reproductive* system, which is necessary to the propagation of the species. But all these systems are themselves interrelated in various ways through the operation of two others: the *nervous* and the *endocrine*. The nervous system makes possible the *selective reception* of stimuli and transmits these effects through its central co-ordinating structures to the muscles, tendons, and glands. Assisting the operations of the nervous system, as well as those concerned with the life continuity of the individual and of the race, is the system of ductless glands, which give off powerful though minute amounts of chemical substances facilitating or inhibiting growth and activity or in numerous other ways qualifying the disposition of energy within the body.

All these organizations of protoplasm, supported as they are by the bony framework, make up the total individual, and these systems are continually or intermittently active with reference to the world outside. But the environment is not static; it in its turn profoundly influences the organism. The physical environment varies from effects which are relatively constant, such as those of air, water, minerals, and food, to those which are changeable, such as the seasons, variations in the amounts of the fundamental elements available for body use, and "accidental" factors like the cataclysms of nature. And the social-cultural environment, so important to our study, likewise ranges from relatively fixed to highly variable features.

In the course of racial evolution the sustaining systems have developed a certain rigidity, due in part perhaps to certain fixed aspects of the environment. (See Chapter III.) The organism needs relatively constant amounts of food, liquids, fresh air, mineral salts, and so on. Nevertheless, in the physiological adjustment of the organism to the external environment, there is also a considerable flexibility. On a hot day one requires more water than on a cool day; so, too, the elimination of liquid wastes through

the skin or through the urinary tract varies with temperature changes. When one undertakes strenuous exercise, the heartbeat, the respiration rate, and the release of energy within the body are all altered to provide for more adequate overt adaptation. In fact, careful experiments confirm our everyday experience in showing that, when we increase our energy output by heavy work or play, we step up the whole rate of living in the organism, which in turn influences structure itself. A boy soon discovers that he cannot develop strong biceps or legs by daydreaming, but only by vigorous muscular activity. And the same general principle regarding the effects of practice holds equally well in mental functions.

But parallel to the rigidity of structure and function of the sustaining systems, which is essential to the preservation of life, as we go up the animal scale we find evidence of the increasing importance of flexibility. In man this is absolutely fundamental to his social life, to his building and continuing of his culture. And it is in connection with the neurological system that this flexibility is most significant. The simple reflexes, in which specific response follows specific stimulus rather directly, as in activities such as breathing, digestion, excretion, and the avoidance of noxious stimuli, do not furnish the basis for any very complex form of adjustment. We need a neural mechanism that permits an ever-wider range of shuntings or modifications between stimulus and response. Moreover, we require a wide repertoire of response outlets. It is this which the higher centers of the nervous system provide. In other words, this is the foundation of the third item noted above, that is, plasticity or modifiability of the neural protoplasm, which in turn influences both stimulus and response functions. In short, the higher animals and especially man are a somewhat curious mixture of permanence and change, fixity and flux, stability and instability. This fact has an important bearing on the more complex forms of personal adaptation which it is our principal purpose to examine.

It must not be forgotten that all these systems operate together, but, in a discussion of the adaptation of the organism to its external surroundings, the neuromuscular and endocrine systems are most important. In this chapter we shall review the chief features of these two systems. In the next we shall examine some of the dynamic relations of the organism to its environment—relations in which neural and endocrine processes play important parts. These two chapters, in turn, will furnish a basis for our discussion of the motivations or drives of the individual, so important in understanding his continuing adaptation.

THE NERVOUS SYSTEM

The nervous system, made up of nerve cells and their connecting fibers, is the principal co-ordinating agency for all the other bodily organs. It is principally concerned (1) with the co-ordination of the sustaining systems,

(2) with learning or habit formation, and (3) with making possible reflective thought and planned adaptation.

The central nervous system is composed of the spinal cord and the brain. The latter is divided into three major sections: the hindbrain or brain stem, the midbrain, and the forebrain. The most important portion of the forebrain consists of the cerebrum. From the brain and spinal cord various major nerves reach out over the entire body. Besides the brain and spinal cord there is the autonomic division, consisting of a double chain of nerve ganglia and nerve fibers extending on both sides of the backbone from the base of the brain to the end of the vertebral column. Other masses of neural tissue scattered throughout the body are connected with the autonomic system.

There are two great motor systems in the central nervous system: the somatic or skeletal, and the visceral or autonomic. Both of these systems have connections with the brain and spinal cord and with the peripheral nervous system—that outside the brain and spinal cord. As the names imply, the somatic system controls the movements of the skeletal or striped muscles, and the autonomic controls the contraction of the visceral, unstriped muscles, and the secretion of glands.

Both the somatic and the visceral motor systems have centers of control lying within the central system proper. These centers make possible an ever-increasing complexity of response and organization. The somatic division is widely represented in the cerebral cortex, making possible a high degree of voluntary control of the skeletal muscles. The primary centers of autonomic control lie in the hypothalamus (subcortical area of the midbrain), although there is slight representation of these centers in the cerebral cortex also. This may well be related to the fact that, though the visceral reactions are chiefly involuntary, a certain degree of voluntary control over these activities may be attained.

The skeletal muscles are innervated through a single source of nerve supply (the final common path) which is always excitatory in character. If this neural stimulation ceases, the muscle becomes limp and without tone. The visceral effectors, on the contrary, are usually innervated by two nerves, one from each of two divisions of the autonomic. (See Chapter IV.) One of these is excitatory, the other inhibitory. But, before discussing their particular functions, we must take note of the three functional units of the nervous tissue.

Behavior is controlled through the co-ordination of three fundamental types of nerves and related structures: (1) the receptors and the sensory nerves connected with the receptor organs, (2) the connecting, adjustor, central, or associative neurons, and (3) the efferent or motor nerves which end in muscles or glands. In spite of some criticism *reflex arc* still remains a useful term to cover the fact that the reception of stimulation, the central

connection, and passage through the effectors to response belong together in a co-ordinated whole.

The receptors. On the basis of structure and function in the living organism, physiology and psychology classify the receptors into four sorts: (1) exteroceptors, (2) interoceptors, (3) proprioceptors, and (4) nociceptors. The following table, adapted from Sherrington (1906, pp. 316-322) and Dashiell (1937, p. 225), embodies a convenient classification of the principal receptors and their stimuli:

TABLE I
A CLASSIFICATION OF RECEPTORS AND THEIR APPROPRIATE PHYSICAL
AND CHEMICAL STIMULI

		STIMULI	RECEPTOR ORGANS
1. <i>Exteroceptors</i>	{ Stimulated by energy changes in environment, e. g.	{ Light Sound Heat and cold Pressure Chemicals Chemicals	Visual (in eye) Auditory (in ear) Temperature (in skin) Pressure (in skin) Smell (in nose) Taste (in tongue)
2. <i>Interoceptors</i>	{ Stimulated by organic changes in internal organs, e. g.	{ Emptiness or fullness of in- ternal organs, chemicals	Systemic (in viscera): e. g. linings of the ali- mentary canal
3. <i>Proprioceptors</i>	{ Stimulated by changes in posi- tion and movement in body, e. g.	{ Movement or postural changes	Kinesthetic (in muscles) Static or vestibular (in semi- circular canals)
4. <i>Nociceptors</i>	{ Stimulated by any en- ergy changes which tend to immediate in- jury of tissue, e. g.	{ Any of above stimuli which injure tissue	Pain senses (in skin and in nearly all important or- gans of the body)

Although this classification is by no means adequate, the important fact is that the receptors are the selective and discriminative means by which the organism comes into contact with, and helps to adjust itself to, its environment. Yet even the mature individual is not aware of all the stimuli which influence him. Some of the most important effects are perhaps those which reach one below the level (limen) of consciousness. For example, very often the movements of objects or persons, many light pressure stimuli, and frequently the interoceptive and proprioceptive stimuli affect us without our consciously knowing it.

The central or adjustor processes. The neurons which lie within the spinal cord and the brain constitute an important link between the sensory process, receiving as they do the stimuli, and the motor or effector neurons, which carry the nervous energy to the muscles and glands. In the spinal cord and the lower brain centers these connecting neuron groupings are relatively simple in form, and they doubtless do not greatly change the course of neural "messages" from sense organs to muscles or glands. The functions of these neurons are illustrated by the simpler reflexes. It is in the upper brain centers that the connecting neural organization becomes important. All the more complex acts of the individual are dependent upon these neuron patterns, and learning is made possible by changes which go on in the cerebrum especially. The effects of the activity of these adjustor neurons on behavior will be more evident when we discuss conditioning and learning. (See Chapter V.)

The effectors. Action itself is finally brought about when the neural energy is transmitted to muscles and glands. The muscles are of two sorts, the unstriped and the striped. The former make up in large part the tissues of the organs of digestion, respiration, elimination, sex, and glandular action. The latter make up the skeletal muscles, that is, the muscles of the arms and legs, of the torso, face, and other peripheral parts of the body. The effector neurons are carried from the somatic and visceral systems to the entire body in various large nerve bundles.

In considering the sensory-muscular-glandular system, however, we must always bear in mind that the whole process of adaptation takes place in an organized fashion, and, although the reflex arc has long provided psychology with a convenient concept to describe the functioning unit, actually, of course, the mechanics of bodily sensitivity and activity is a highly co-ordinated matter involving tremendously complex reflex systems, both learned and unlearned.

The cerebrospinal system. A large part of the cerebrum is taken up with association neurons and their nerve fibers in a great network of interrelations. The receptor neuron is a single conduction path which leads into a vast system of conductive paths made up of central neurons. In contrast with the receptor schema, the central neurons may be said to be a system of multi-pathways made possible by a rich array of synaptic connections. The potential connections of this central or cortical system are manifold to an extent little realized. From the receptor neurons the impulses may radiate in many directions. Thus, in convulsions induced by strychnine poisoning, the impulses discharge into practically every effector organ in the body. Ordinarily the irradiation is limited to the bodily areas controlled by native and especially by acquired connections. It was once thought that various sections of the cerebral cortex were highly specialized as to function. But, though there is some localization of function, as is shown by clinical data

on aphasias, the present evidence seems to indicate that the whole cerebrum operates in most complex behavior with focal centers varying at any particular time or in reference to particular situations.

The cerebral cortex is the seat of learning. The receptor and effector ends of the arc are perhaps not modified greatly, but the direction of the efferent impulses may be strikingly controlled by changes made in the central system. We know that all neural functions are facilitated by repetition. This is the physiological basis of habit. It is clear, too, that the residual effects of repeated reactions register themselves more particularly in some manner in the cerebral cortex or central adjustor system. These effects have been called neurograms or engrams.

Correlated with the associative-learning and retentive function of the cerebrum is the important inhibitory function. The lower reflex levels of behavior may be termed impulsive. When the cerebral cortex operates, the behavior is indirect and controlled. The function of the cerebral cortex is, then, not only to give more adequate direction to response by means of associative mechanisms but to inhibit the more impulsive, rapid responses of the lower centers.

The cerebral cortex is particularly concerned in the higher functioning of the organism. Social experience and the building of culture are absolutely dependent upon the operation of the higher brain centers. Throughout the whole range of materials dealt with in this book it must be recognized that our social behavior could not go on without the existence of the human brain. Thus, even though the action of the basic reflex arcs can be mediated through the lower brain centers and the spinal cord—such activity as is involved in hunger, thirst, sex, crying, and emotional responses in fear and anger—still these activities are modified, held in check, and integrated with learned behavior through the function of the cerebral cortex.

Man's superiority over the lower animals and over his environment, therefore, rests upon the heightened organization of behavior made possible through the cerebral cortex. On the side of original tendencies man does not differ greatly from his mammalian forebears. But the cerebral cortex makes possible extensive and long-continued learning. Man inherits the fundamental reflexes, as do other animals, from his ancestors. Social-cultural experiences come to him through acquisition or learning. In other words, not biological, but social-cultural heredity dominates man to an ever-increasing extent. Hence whatever there is of social and cultural change depends, not on alteration of the spinal reflexes, but on modification and elaboration of reflexes controlled by the central neuron system. (See Chapter V.)

Nevertheless, the sustaining systems lie at the basis of all this modification and elaboration. We cannot understand man's social interaction or his

culture, which is a precipitate of that, without taking into account his fundamental biological urges or bodily demands. These functions are controlled by the autonomic nervous system in collaboration with the central system. Whatever we may say of the profound modifications in man's nature due to social and cultural training or experience, we must remember that he still remains an animal with appetites or urges which require satisfaction. These processes are basically related to the autonomic system.

The autonomic system. As we have already noted, the autonomic system may best be considered as the motor-visceral section of our total nervous organization which controls the responses of the viscera and glands. Its functions are not entirely independent of those of the somatic system. In fact, it is essential to somatic reactions at various levels; for example, it controls the supply of blood and the elimination of waste, and many spinal reflexes are correlated with its action. So, too, it interacts with the functions of the midbrain, as witnessed by postural changes which set up tensions in the viscera. It even has relations to the learning of skilled acts which depend fundamentally upon the cortex, for, as we shall see, feeling-emotional toning is closely bound up with much of our learning. (See Chapter V.) Thus, while the reactions of the autonomic system are largely those of internal tensions rather than of posture and peripheral movement, the two systems co-operate together in bodily adjustment.

It should also be noted that stimuli from any group of receptors may activate responses over the autonomic as well as the somatic system. Thus external stimuli as well as internal will set up visceral reactions. Painful and emotional stimuli are particularly likely to produce drastic changes in the viscera; but it must not be forgotten that these responses are very frequently initiated by external stimulation.

There are two major divisions of the peripheral portion of the autonomic system: the sympathetic, and the cranial-sacral or parasympathetic. Each of these divisions consists of a series of related neural processes, leading to and from the visceral organs, but connected to the cerebrospinal system.

(The *sympathetic* division is made up of ganglia and autonomic fibers associated with the spinal nerves found in the thoracic and lumbar regions. These nerves control the sweat glands, the hair of the body, and the peripheral blood vessels. Others are connected with the heart, the lungs, and the digestive tract and other visceral organs. Some sympathetic fibers also run to the organs of sex and elimination. The sympathetic system operates chiefly by speeding up the heart action, constricting the blood vessels, inhibiting the digestive processes by constriction of the smooth muscles, and stopping the flow of digestive glands. This system plays a distinctive role in the emotions of fear and anger. An unpleasant organic toning tends to be associated with its operation.)

The *parasympathetic* division is made up of fibers and associated ganglia connected with the cranial and sacral segments of the spinal nerves. The fibers of the cranial segment run to the eyes and salivary glands, through the vagus nerve to the heart, bronchial tubes, stomach, liver, pancreas, kidneys, and small intestines, and to certain mucous membranes of the cranium itself. The fibers of the sacral section connect with the organs of defecation, urination, and sex.

Moreover, the parasympathetic division operates in antagonism to the sympathetic. When this division is in operation, the sympathetic is inhibited. When the sympathetic comes into play, there is a blocking of the cranial-sacral division. For instance, in fear, the sympathetic may serve to release the sphincter muscles controlling defecation and urination, just as it acts, in an opposite manner, to inhibit the digestive processes. The cranial-sacral division is related in function to hunger, sex, and bodily elimination; the sympathetic to the fundamental emotions of fear and rage. The former set may be considered positive and pleasant in functions, the latter negative or protective and unpleasant. We shall return to this matter in our discussion of the emotions. Figure 2 gives a schematic view of the distribution of the autonomic system in relation both to the central nervous system and to the various internal organs which it controls.

It must not be forgotten that the autonomic and cerebrospinal nervous systems function together. For example, a stimulation of the ear by a loud sound leads over a central reflex arc to produce movement of the head, arms, legs, and trunk, but at the same time it sets in operation the sympathetic division of the autonomic system and produces those bodily changes which are evidenced in crying, blanching of face, inhibition of the digestive processes, and alteration in heart action and in respiration. Any peripheral or internal stimulation, in fact, has possible autonomic connections with the visceral system. Throughout our entire treatment of social behavior we shall see how the cerebrospinal and autonomic functions are correlated.

In summary, then, we must first note that no major action takes place in the body which is not mediated through the nervous system. Secondly, as we shall see, the fundamental drives or tendencies to behavior rest in the vegetative, that is, the sustaining, system, in which the autonomic plays a large part. However remote our behavior may seem from this substratum, in the last analysis no description or interpretation of social behavior is complete which ignores this fact. Though there is much evidence that the autonomic functions may be conditioned, modified, and partially controlled by the action of the cerebrospinal system, it is not altogether certain that the central system is clearly dominant over the functioning of the autonomic system. In other words, social as well as biological evidence supports our fundamental thesis that emotions, feelings, and in-

instinctive or prepotent drives are the cornerstones of behavior on which the superstructure of human personality is constructed. Man is always a feeling and emotive being. Only secondarily is he an intellectual, rational, and deliberative individual.

Though the neurological system is a fundamental organic fact with which we must reckon in studying the manner in which a person makes his adaptation to his material and social environment, before going on to trace some features of this adaptation we must examine the place of certain




FIGURE 2, showing schematically the relation of the central and autonomic nervous systems, as illustrated by the efferent innervation of some of the viscera by the latter. The thoracolumbar autonomic nerves are shown on the left, the craniosacral on the right. Note that each organ receives a double innervation and that the action of the two nerves is opposite in each instance. (Figure reprinted from A. J. Carlson and V. Johnson, *The Machinery of the Body*, 1937, p. 377, by permission of The University of Chicago Press, publishers.)

chemical products called hormones which also profoundly influence behavior.

THE ENDOCRINE SYSTEM

In adaptation to the external environment, variations within the organism are important. It was the eminent French physiologist, Claude Bernard, who called our attention more specifically to the importance of what he called the *milieu intérieur*, that is, the internal environment, so basic to the vital processes. He says (1878-79, p. 112):

"For the animal there are really two environments: an external environment in which the organism is placed, and an internal environment in which the cells live. Life goes on, not in the external environment, air, fresh water, or salt water, as the case may be, but in the liquid internal environment composed of the organic circulating liquid which surrounds and bathes every cell. This medium is composed of the lymph and the plasma, the liquid portion of the blood, which in the higher animals penetrate the tissues and make up the totality of the interstitial liquids. These are the instrument of all the local nutritive processes, the source and confluence of the exchanges of the cells. A complex organism must be considered as a union of simple beings, its cells, which live in the liquid internal environment.

"The constancy of the internal environment is the condition of free and independent life. The mechanism which makes possible this constancy assures in the internal environment the maintenance of all the conditions necessary to the life of the cells. . . .

"The constancy of the environment presupposes such a perfection of the organism that at every moment external variations are compensated and equilibrated." (Quoted by Henderson, 1926, pp. 177-178.)

Most of the active body cells give off directly certain chemical substances which aid in the maintaining of a balance between the inside and the outside aspects of the total adaptive process, for example, histamine, which influences the supply of oxygen to the cells. Other important chemical elements which activate the cells are produced by specialized organs, the glands. The chemical substances of the digestive glands pass by means of ducts into the various organs of the body. Those of the tear and sweat glands pass directly to the outside surfaces. Still other glands with a specialized structure empty their substances directly into the blood or lymphatic systems. These are the ductless or endocrine glands. None of them lead to the outside of the body.

The substances from the ductless glands are known as hormones. The word *hormone* is derived from the Greek word *hormao*, meaning "I excite" or "I set in motion."¹ A hormone may be defined as a specific chem-

¹ Strictly speaking, the word *hormone* is not quite correct, since not all substances from the ductless glands have a stimulating effect. Some of them act as depressors of activity. More technical discussions use the term *chalone* to denote those endocrines which have an inhibitory effect, and the term *autocoid* to refer to those which have a regulatory function, whether

ical product produced in one part of the body—usually in a specialized gland—and transmitted by the blood or lymph to other parts of the body, the structure or functions of which are thereby altered or modified. Endocrine substances influence growth and metabolism, play a part in emotions and in drives or instinctive impulses to activity, affect sexual functioning in profound ways, and doubtless influence mood and temperament.

The recent and important advances of endocrinology (the science of hormone actions) have been so striking and in so many instances so revolutionary and significant for human health and disease that an enormous amount of popular and pseudoscientific literature has been written about the miracles effected by even slight amounts of hormones. Much of this is dangerously misleading. As Hoskins (1924) puts it, "A large body of literature has accumulated which, for its vagaries, fantastic exuberance and wholesale marvel mongering is perhaps without a peer in the history of modern science."

Chemical regulation of bodily functions seems to precede neural control, both in the species and in the individual. The sustaining systems of digestion, elimination, and reproduction are all profoundly affected by chemical control, as are the early stages of growth. In this control, which operates through the internal chemical environment of the cells, the endocrines have a definite place.²

There have been three traditional methods of securing information as to the particular effects of hormones upon structure and function: (1) by the injection of the extracts of various ductless glands into the bodies of experimental animals and into man, or by the transplantation of glandular tissue; (2) by the surgical removal of certain glands and the observation of the growth and behavior changes in the animals following this operation; and (3) by the clinical study of human beings in whom ductless glands are known to be underactive or overactive. In some instances no active chemical substance has as yet been derived from the particular ductless gland. In these cases, evidences of effects are much less reliable than where the nature of the hormone has been chemically determined. Because for certain ductless glands the specific hormone and its function have not been determined, we must remain skeptical of many of the claims made by extremists regarding the nature and function of these organs. In the discussion which follows we shall note only briefly the data on some glands—parathyroids, pineal, thymus, and pancreas—and pay more attention to others—thyroid, adrenals, pituitary, and sex glands.

excitatory or inhibitory. But common usage has more or less accepted *hormone* as the general term for the endocrine products, and we shall so use it.

² It is significant in this connection that the hormones seem to be completely interchangeable no matter from what animal species they may be derived. This fact is highly important both for experimentation and for medical aid to persons in need of endocrine therapy.

The function of the *parathyroids*, *pineal*, *thymus*, and *pancreas*. The *parathyroids* are four minute organs lying embedded in the tissue of the thyroid proper. The removal or malfunctioning of these glands results in hyperexcitability of the entire neural system, spasmodic and often painful cramps, a condition of tetany or tonic contractions of the muscles (not to be confused with tetanus), and, in severe cases, convulsions. These glands also apparently influence metabolism, especially that of calcium. Recently one active hormone, *parathormone*, has been segregated for the *parathyroids* which evidently regulates the calcium metabolism. (It had previously been shown that the injection of calcium salts helped to alleviate the malfunctioning of these organs.)

The *pineal* gland, a small cone-shaped organ weighing about two grains, is suspended from the roof of the third ventricle of the brain. The precise function of this gland is not fully known because no specific hormone has been isolated and because the experimental and clinical work on this gland is confused and equivocal. We do know that it reaches its maximum size at about seven years of age and that from then on it undergoes retrogressive changes in which the *pineal* cells proper diminish in number. It is believed to influence the rate of bodily growth in some manner or other.

The *thymus*, consisting of two irregularly shaped lobes lying near the apex of the chest, is another gland about which much has been written but about which there is considerable uncertainty. No specific chemical substance from this organ has been discovered. The gland attains its maximum size at about two years of age, and in man after about the age of thirteen it declines in relative weight. Apparently the thymus acts to retard too early sexual development. Thus the continuing effects of the thymus are sometimes correlated with the persistence of infantile physical characteristics—the cherubic roundness of the Della Robbia figures. This lends support to the belief that the gland has a depressant influence on sexual development. Such an effect, however, may not be dependent upon the thymus alone, but upon interaction of various glands. Hyperthyroidism, adrenal deficiency, and gonadal undersecretion may all accompany enlargement of the thymus.

The *pancreas* produces important chemical aids to digestion. But its classification as an endocrine gland arises from the fact that the islets of Langerhans, which lie embedded within the pancreatic tissue, give off a hormone known commercially and medically as *insulin*.

Deficiency in the normal amount of insulin results in the appearance of *diabetes mellitus*, a condition marked by excessive hunger, thirst, muscular weakness, polyuria (excessive excretion of urine), and general emaciation. These symptoms are produced by excessive loss of blood sugar (glycogen) and by changes in metabolic functions influencing the efficiency of respiration. The fundamental cause is the failure of the organism properly to break down carbohydrates; and the administration of

insulin, though not restoring the normal functions, does serve to supply the necessary quantity for proper metabolism.

Various other digestive organs give off not only chemical aids to digestion but also hormones which aid in the process. Thus the stomach gives off *gastrin*, which when thrown into the blood seems to aid in stimulating the flow of the gastric juices proper. Other hormones are *secretin* and *pro-secretin*, which aid in stimulating the pancreatic juices. There is also evidence that the tissues of the stomach and upper intestine produce a hormone, *cholecystokinin* (gall bladder mover), which influences the activity of the gall bladder in the excretion of bile.

There are doubtless still other hormones given off by various organs or tissues which must influence the physiology and anatomy of the body. But the precise function of many of these has not yet been determined. When we turn to examine the operation of the thyroid, adrenal, pituitary, and sex glands, however, we are on somewhat firmer ground.

✓ **The thyroid.** This gland, of which so much has been written, lies astride the windpipe. The thyroid of an adult may vary in size, but its average weight is somewhat less than an ounce. It is richly supplied with blood vessels—an indication of its important place as a chemical regulator. Though much clinical and experimental work had been done over a long period, it was not until 1914 that E. C. Kendall, a research worker at the Mayo Clinic, isolated the active principle of the gland. This bears the name *thyroxine*—a substance which is about 65 per cent iodine.

Though this organ is unknown among the invertebrates, it apparently arose early in the evolution of the vertebrate species. In the human embryo it is one of the first organs to become structurally distinct, appearing during the third week of life. Without doubt it is one of the most important contributors to the internal liquid environment in which the body cells live. It has evident relations to the growth of many tissues. There are a number of experiments showing, for instance, how young tadpoles which have been fed on thyroid increase in bodily growth to such an extent that they turn prematurely into frogs, and how one species of Mexican salamander which as an adult still resembles a tadpole living in a stage of thyroid deficiency may be brought to completion of its cycle of growth by the administration of thyroid, resulting, as Hoskins (1933) says, in "nature's handiwork" being "thus completed."

The isolation of thyroxine has made possible invaluable quantitative studies and clinical observations among human beings. It is clear from studies on hypothyroid subjects (those lacking normal amounts) that in the adult body there exists, outside the gland itself, about one fourth of a grain of thyroxine. Approximately one hundredth of a grain a day is required for normal health—physical and mental. Hoskins (1924, p. 263) remarks, "It is startling to contemplate that about three and

a half grains of this substance a year is all that stands between any of us and imbecility." Thyroxine administered medically has definite effects upon metabolism. Daily doses of two milligrams may raise the basal metabolism of the normal individual as much as 20 or 30 per cent.

Thyroxine appears to stimulate bodily growth: the short stature of certain hypothyroid individuals, commonly called cretins, has been strikingly overcome by thyroxine treatment. But the principal function of the gland, as Hoskins says, is doubtless that of "a slowly acting regulator of energy discharge," aiding the animal to adapt itself to its environment.

The principal biological functions of the thyroid may be noted as follows: (1) It affects basal metabolism, especially as concerns proteins and fats. (2) It influences bodily growth. (3) It stimulates various internal organs. It helps, for example, to control the action of the kidneys and sweat glands, thus affecting the elimination of waste. And it is well known that any shifts in thyroxine level in the system affect the liver, the pancreas, the pituitary, and the adrenal glands. (4) Also the nervous system is closely bound up with the operation of the gland. Not only do the nerve cells need their ration of thyroxine, but the changes in nervous tensions set up by thyroid malfunctioning are evidence of close linkage of the neurological and glandular systems. The details of this interaction remain to be uncovered. So, too, the pituitary influences the thyroid.

The adrenals. These glands, which in both size and shape resemble large beans, lie on the anterior poles of the kidneys. Although in the adult human being they make up but 0.01 per cent of the total body weight, they are absolutely essential to the continuance of life. Although anatomically a unit, in origin the gland develops from two distinct embryonic structures and shows two kinds of influence. The inner core of the adrenal, the *medulla*, arises from cells which develop from the neuroblasts, the nerve cells from which the sympathetic ganglia also arise. Thus in embryonic growth these medullar cells apparently have a close connection with neural development. The outer layer of cells of the adrenals, the *cortex*, is formed from the mesoderm cells of the primitive genital ridge, from which the sexual organs also develop.

The medulla of the adrenals produces a potent hormone, *adrenine* (also called *adrenaline* or *epinephrine*). The administration of this hormone produces effects throughout the body similar to those arising from the stimulation of the sympathetic division of the autonomic nervous system, except that adrenine, apparently, does not influence the action of the sweat glands, while the sympathetic system does. We know that the autonomic nervous system acts upon our involuntary vital processes—respiration, digestion, elimination, etc., and it also stimulates the release of glycogen or blood sugar from the liver, and in general energizes the system. It is of interest to know that even small doses of adrenine produce like effects. Adrenine causes increase in arterial blood pressure, raises the pulse rate, augments the action of the heart, and stimulates increased and deeper breathing. It also causes the "hair to stand on end" and dilates the pupils of the eyes. It aids in the coagulation of the blood,

and apparently stimulates release of additional blood from the spleen. In contrast, it inhibits digestion and brings about the contraction of the sphincter muscles.

This interplay of the sympathetic nervous system and adrenaline has been most carefully worked out by Cannon (1929, 1939) and others. On the basis of his work Cannon has developed the so-called "emergency theory" to account for this supplementary function of adrenaline.

The organism tends to meet some unusual situation by a rapid mobilization of energy. We know that under conditions of great physical exercise, under conditions of pain, asphyxia, exposure to cold, general anesthesia, and under emotional states of anger and fear, the sympathetic nervous system brings about an energizing of the skeletal muscles and of the involuntary processes necessary to survival. It also depresses the activity of the digestive, respiratory, and eliminative systems. Apparently adrenaline supplements this action. It is further apparent that, though organically these critical conditions have to do with bodily survival at the organic or biological level, through social and cultural conditioning many crises arise which set up similar energizing. Thus, in spite of such learning, the constitution remains essentially prepared to meet a crisis by heightened overt action. And while fatigue, cold, fire, or flood might set up intense muscular reaction in the organism (aided by the sympathetic nerves and adrenaline), the fear of an examination, the fear of loss of prestige, or the anger set up by threat of social deprivation of some sort brings about similar if not identical physiological effects. In short, the impress of emotional and social-cultural experiences with reference to all the critical situations in life is linked up definitely with the function of those two systems, one neurological, the other chemical. (See the discussion of motivation and emotions in Chapter IV.)

The precise function of the adrenal cortex is not fully known. But within recent years a definite hormone, *cortin*, has been segregated, although its exact chemical nature is not yet determined. Yet we do know that the adrenal cortex is absolutely essential to the continuation of life itself. The most outstanding symptoms of cortin deficiency are fatigue, lethargy, changes in basal metabolism, especially as concerns sugar, and general loss of resistance to heat.

Evidently the adrenal cortex influences sexual development. Experimentation on lower animals demonstrates that sexual precocity may result from feeding suprarenal glands to the young. Also tumors on the adrenal cortex are associated with unusual growth of the sexual organs and with a distinct tendency toward masculinity in female patients. But it must be borne in mind that similar tumorous disturbances of other glands, notably the pineal and gonads, as well as overactivity of the anterior pituitary, also result in sexual precocity. There are clinical records of male children who at such early ages as four, five, and six years show completely mature sexual functions and corresponding changes in bodily build and even advanced mental capacity. So, too, apparently normal girls who developed tumors on the adrenal cortex have been known to take on masculine traits accompanied by an almost complete reversal of their normal sexual roles. But clear-cut biological facts in these cases are not at hand, and it is easy to let wishful speculation run far beyond the valid findings.

The hypophysis or pituitary. This gland, about the size of a bodily and weighing usually about ten grains, lies at the base of the brain. It has really four sections: (1) the anterior lobe, (2) the middle lobe or *pars intermedia*, (3) the *pars tuberalis*, formerly thought to be a part of the middle lobe, but now known to be histologically and developmentally different, and (4) the posterior lobe. The pituitary without doubt is exceedingly important in health, but the exact nature of its products, either from the prepituitary (anterior lobe) or the postpituitary (middle and posterior lobe) is not known. In fact, there are probably not two, or four, but eight or even more different hormones. Those from the anterior lobe influence chiefly growth, bodily temperature, and basal metabolism. Those from the posterior, or perhaps from the posterior lobe and *pars intermedia* (discharged through the posterior), affect water retention, metabolism of fats, temperature, blood pressure, and parturition. The function of the anterior lobe is also closely related to the operation of the thyroid, adrenals, and sex glands. There is an abundance of data, both experimental and clinical, on the functions of the pituitary.

Extirpation of the anterior lobe in experimental animals showed arrest of normal growth and the persistence of infantile features, including the failure of the sex organs to grow to maturity. In human beings showing lack of pituitary, as a rule, bodily temperature is depressed and the rate of basal metabolism is lowered.

The effect of overactivity of the anterior pituitary among human beings is graphically apparent in the physical abnormalities commonly known as gigantism and acromegaly. The former is a condition of anterior lobe disturbance occurring in the early years before the growth of the long bones has ceased. The latter, which arises after normal growth has ceased, is marked by the gradual growth of the fingers, hands, feet, and head bones, and a general thickening up of the skin and of the muscles. (See Chapter XXVI.)

When the anterior pituitary is overfunctional for a fairly long period of time, sexual vigor decreases instead of increasing. Especially in gigantism, the adults are likely to exhibit a loss of potency and of sexual desire. It has been assumed that the sexual life cycle is speeded up in such cases, so that maturity and the beginning of involution are alike reached much more rapidly than is normal.

Personality changes other than those directly associated with sexual disturbances also are present in oversecretion of the anterior gland. Clinical reports mention gradual decline of intellectual acuteness, loss of memory, growing apathy, and drowsiness. Sometimes there is a condition of stupor not unlike that of catatonia.

One kind of dwarfism is also apparently associated with pituitary deficiency. This is not to be confused with the sort found in childhood myxedema or cretinism (due to thyroid deficiency), but rather characterizes midgets, who for the most part remain small in organs and limbs, but retain relatively normal bodily proportions. Individuals of this type are of slight build and show definite sexual retardation, and, although some have children (who may be normal in size), many of them are sterile.

The pituitary is distinctly bound up with the functioning of the adrenals, the thyroid, and the sex glands. Hence its specific activity must always be studied with this fact in mind. Then, too, the gland is closely connected in structure and function with the hypothalamus of the brain. It is well known, for instance, that injuries to the hypothalamus produce symptoms like those of Fröhlich's disease—obesity, abnormalities of sugar metabolism, and excessive production of urine. Also established is the fact that the pituitary influences the metabolism of proteins, carbohydrates, and fat as well as that of water. It promotes growth, and it has a clear influence upon sexual functioning and upon the production of milk during lactation.

The gonads or sex glands. The differentiation between the somatic or body cells and the sex or reproductive cells takes place very early in the cellular development of the individual. The rudimentary sex organs also appear relatively early in prenatal life. It is well known that the sexual glands produce not only the necessary cells for reproduction (the male, the spermatozoa; the female, the ova) but also important hormones, which are connected not only with sexual functioning but with growth and perhaps with motivation and temperament as well.

The male gonads evidently produce hormones which influence the bodily changes at puberty (the coming of sexual maturity), including the secondary sex characteristics—pubic hair, changes in voice, and general masculinization of the organism. Evidence for this is both experimental (on lower forms) and clinical (from human beings). Male gonad deficiency leads to a retention of infantile characteristics: the voice remains childlike, the beard fails to develop, pubic hair is scanty and tends to resemble the female pattern of distribution, and the primary sex organs themselves remain underdeveloped. Surgical removal of the testes of the adolescent or adult male also results in changes marked by a tendency toward an intermediate form between male and female. Yet the personality changes occurring in castrated males would depend in part on how such a condition was interpreted by others. For example, the cultural acceptance of eunuchs would doubtless produce a very different set of attitudes than we should find in a society which looked upon the emasculated individual as inferior. (For a review of the literature on the effects of castration on the adult male, see Tauber, 1940.)

The clinicians have also given us some light on *hypergenitalism*, a condition of precocious sexual development and activity. Thus Hoskins (1933) describes a case of a boy of four years who had the bodily development of an eight-year-old and the sexual maturity of an adolescent of sixteen.

Female sexual life is more complex than that of the male. The female sex hormones are connected with menstruation, gestation, childbirth, and lactation, as well as with pubertal changes. Moreover, other glands, especially the pituitary, play a definite and important role in female sexual life. In recent years great strides have been made in the study of the female sex hormones, and the results of research are being turned rapidly to therapeutic uses.

The early removal of the ovaries leads to the persistence of childlike bodily and mental features, except that the body growth equals or may even exceed that of the normal person. Evidently the secondary sex characteristics depend for their development and for their functioning upon the ovarian hormones. The ovary produces not only the female sex cells, ova, but two important hormones, *theelin* and *progesterin*. It is believed that theelin is formed throughout the whole life period from the fetal stage until the menopause. Progesterin is produced only during the years of reproductive capacity. The former acts as a general sex stimulant and, in animals, induces the oestrus (comparable to human female menstruation). The latter furnishes a secondary stimulation that acts to prepare the uterus for the reception of the fertilized ovum. It also regulates various processes of pregnancy. Ovarian hormones have a function in the emotional life of women comparable to those of the sex hormones in men.

But sex functioning itself seems to be affected by a form of "remote" control from the hormones of the anterior lobe of the pituitary. In addition to other hormones, the anterior lobe gives off one or two additional substances that stimulate the sex glands, termed *prolan A* and *prolan B*. If we assume the duality of this hormone (which is not entirely certain), it is said that prolan A causes the ovary to produce theelin while prolan B stimulates the secretion of progesterin. Prolan B is effective only in ovaries which have first been influenced by prolan A. Clearly the pituitary and ovarian hormones produce effects which are largely identical. In view of its intimate regulatory influence the pituitary is often called "the motor of the ovaries." The interaction of the ovarian and pituitary hormones is witnessed in the fact that, although prolan brings about a secretion of the sex hormones in increased amounts, the sex hormones, in turn, depress the secretion of prolan. "Thus a pituitary graft from a castrated animal is more potent in causing gonad secretion than is one from a normal animal." (Hoskins, 1933, p. 222.) Also it has been reported that under certain conditions the growth hormone of the pituitary can be changed into a sex-stimulating hormone. (For a review of research on sex glands, see E. Allen, 1939.)

This somewhat amazing interrelation of the sex and pituitary glands is further complicated by the evidence from genetics that maleness or femaleness is determined by the presence or absence of a certain gene organization. (See Chapter III.) Yet, in the higher animals and in man, sexual development and capacity are dependent upon the influences of the gonad hormones, which in turn are affected by the pituitary. Moreover, the central and autonomic nervous systems play a part in sexual activity. In fact, not only is there here an interplay of various glands, but the effects of the latter interact with neural stimulation and response.

Various tissues associated with pregnancy also produce hormones important in the process of prenatal life. For example, the placenta secretes a theelinlike body, another called *emmenin*, and a third somewhat like the sex-stimulating hormone of the anterior lobe of the pituitary. The first apparently is important in the period of gestation, the second seems to affect the production of theelin, and the third appears to stimulate sexual maturation.

Interrelationships among the endocrine glands. The following quotation from Hoskins (1933, p. 331) summarizes some of the important facts on the manner in which various glands activate others:

"The evidence is rather respectable that removal of the thyroid gland causes enlargement of the pituitary and, presumptively, increase of its secretions. Destruction of the pituitary in turn results in depression of the activity of the thyroid. . . . Sharpey-Schafer cites this train of events: the thyroid by its internal secretion stimulates the adrenal medulla; the increase of adrenine thereby caused provokes the liver and other cells to discharge their glycogen into the blood as glucose, and the elevation of the blood sugar thus produced stimulates the islands of Langerhans to secrete insulin; this in its turn facilitates carbohydrate metabolism and affects the nutrition and activity of most of the tissues and organs of the body. If the secretion of the anterior lobe of the pituitary fails, the functions of the gonads are depressed. Removal of the gonads in turn causes a change both in the structure of the anterior pituitary and in its hormone content.

"In some instances hormones seem to interact to promote a given end. For example, thyroxine and adrenine cause an increase in the rate of oxygen consumption. Theelin and progestin apparently coöperate to stimulate the walls of the uterus but progestin in other respects counteracts the theelin, either in its production or in its influence. Thus while the ovary contains active corpus luteum tissue both ovulation and estrus are kept in abeyance."

The effects of the endocrines upon personality must be considered in relation to other constitutional factors. There is much nonsense about the manner in which hormones directly affect behavior. The matter is not so simple as some assume. The effects of the endocrines upon personality are chiefly indirect, the glands operating as they do through the whole constitutional system. We shall return to comment on the alleged and actual influences later. (See Chapters XIII and XXVI.)

Chapter III

CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS: THE INTERPLAY OF HEREDITY AND ENVIRONMENT

IN ORDER to understand the structure and function of the constitution, we must take into account the genetic and historical factors in organic growth since the whole process of development and of living is a dynamic relationship between energy systems whose beginnings of order and unity lie in the racial or phylogenetic sources of the living cells or protoplasm. (See Child, 1924.)

We have to deal with three concepts here: heredity, environment, and maturation or growth. *Heredity* is not some mystic force, power, or magical "thing," although it is so used in popular speech. (It is such a tricky word, in fact, that some writers go so far as to suggest our dropping it entirely from our biological vocabulary. See Woodger, 1929.) But it is a handy word to state the fact that certain features in cellular life are carried over or transmitted from parents to offspring. As Thomson writes (1907), "Heredity is . . . a convenient term for the genetic relation between successive generations." As we noted in the previous chapter, *environment* is of two types, internal and external. The former is intraorganic; the latter may be defined as those dynamic forces, situations, or stimuli external to the organism which influence its development and modify its responses. *Maturation* or growth refers to the biochemical and physical modifications of tissue and of the organs of the body which occur as the individual gets older but which take place without direct evidence of external stimulation. Unfortunately this word has been reified, as were the earlier terms *heredity* and *instinct*, into some sort of sacred principle which somehow operates mysteriously to bring about alterations in the structure and function of the body. But maturation must take place through some determinable antecedent changes due to the interplay of cells and internal environment. Just what indirect effects external stimuli may have upon maturation are not yet clear to us.

In the present chapter we shall first take up briefly but critically some particular features of the mechanics of heredity. Second, we shall review other data bearing on the interplay of the external and internal factors which is so important in the development of the individual organism. Then we shall review critically some aspects of human heredity. The chapter will close with a discussion of the rise of behavior patterns of the indi-

vidual. With this background material at hand the reader should be better prepared to understand the beginnings of behavior in the human being after birth, which is the chief concern in the chapters which follow.

MECHANISMS OF HEREDITY

For our purposes we need but note certain general features and problems connected with the topic of heredity. (For detailed discussions the student may consult Guyer, 1927; and E. G. Conklin, 1930. For more critical analyses see Woodger, 1929; Weinstein, 1928, 1933; Goldschmidt, 1938; and Scheinfeld, 1939.) Most of our data on heredity come from observations and experiments on plants and animals, and we must draw upon these data in order to understand the important features of genetics. There is an astounding lack of reliable and valid data on human inheritance.

As we know, the body contains two kinds of cells, the somatic and the sexual. The former are highly organized and specialized in structure and function and are the basic units of the bodily organs. The sexual cells remain relatively simple and more primordial in form and come into play in the mating of male and female in the production of new individuals. According to geneticists the basic unit or element in heredity is the *gene*. Genes are minute particles of organic matter lying within the nuclei of the sex and somatic cells. There are literally thousands of them. These tiny units of living matter are probably large molecules whose essential activity is chemical in character.

In the sex cells the genes are organized into larger units called *chromosomes*. As the genes of the two parents are united following fertilization of the female ovum by the male sex cell, they serve to start the new individual on the path of his own development. The most satisfactory way to understand the thousands of genes within the sex cells is to consider them as indicators of what is to come later in the course of bodily development. And, as we shall see, environmental forces may and do play a distinctive part in this growth.

The students of genetics have worked out many details respecting the manner in which the genes and chromosomes combine and recombine in a mechanical way following the union of the male and female sex cells. (See Morgan, 1928; E. G. Conklin, 1930.) From these data several laws of biological inheritance have been worked out. One of these, that of dominance, rests upon the fact that, in crossing or mating, certain biological traits, or "characters," appear to be dominant over others, called recessive. Thus, when animals of white and black color, respectively, are mated, the offspring will tend to be black or dark in color. Yet the recessive traits may reappear in subsequent generations, as when the individuals of the first mating are crossed among themselves. The appearance of the dominant and recessive traits in this second group of offspring tends to follow rather definite arithmetical proportions: one quarter will be pure dominant; one quarter, pure recessive; and

one half, though possessing overt evidences of the dominant trait, will be found if mixed again in subsequent generations to carry the latent recessive feature as well.

Another law, that of independent segregation, indicates that a biological trait is often transmitted in more or less unitary fashion without respect to other closely associated traits. Thus height may be found to be independent of color, and is found to be passed on in certain rather definite arithmetical proportions. Yet in some instances traits may blend. Thus a feature like length or height may be found in a mixture of tall and short parents to be "intermediate" between the extremes of the parents. Still another law appears to control the inheritance of male or female sexuality. The presence or absence of a particular combination of chromosomes will determine whether a given offspring will be male or female. Moreover, some organic tendencies are evidently linked to one sex and not to the other. These are referred to as "sex-linked characters." Hemophilia, the tendency to profuse bleeding following tissue injury, will serve as an example. In this instance the trait is transmitted from mother to son; from son, in turn, to daughter, who does not show it overtly, but who will pass it on to her sons, who do.

It must never be forgotten that biological characters are not the products of single genes but of combinations and recombinations of them. Muller thus cautions us (1929, p. 485): "So complicated is the manner in which the products of the different genes react to each other that no final product and no characteristic of the adult body is due to any specific gene, but in the production of every organ, tissue, or characteristic, numerous genes take part." Thus in the *Drosophila* (a fruit fly studied by Morgan and others) eye color alone is reported to depend on over forty pairs of genes.

Moreover, in the process of breeding new generations, changes sometimes occur in the genes themselves which result in altering the characters of the individual. These are called mutations. Weinstein (1928, p. 3) remarks, "A mutation, being an alteration of a gene, may alter any or all of the characters that the gene affects; it may modify them in any direction and to any extent." Such unpredictable modifications in the individual are believed to have played an important part in the evolution of plant and animal species. Morgan and his coworkers have discovered hundreds of mutations in their long-continued experiments in breeding fruit flies. The appearance of mutants, as these deviants are called, is apparently dependent on chemical and perhaps mechanical shake-up following fertilization and takes place in the course of the interplay of organic or intrinsic factors and those of the environment as order and unity emerge. (The experimental induction of mutations will be discussed below.)

In spite of the mutations which appear from time to time, the genes represent certain relatively stable and fixed chemical and physical items in cell life and its reproduction. And this is as true of the higher animals and man as it is of the lower. First, the structure and function of the basic sustaining systems are evidently determined by genetic influences. Even the endocrine glands, so important for later growth, are themselves more

or less dependent upon inherited determiners. Second, the species or racial, that is, hereditary, factors set more or less definite limits to maturation and to learning capacity. That is, inheritance delimits the range of one's learning ability or intelligence, the physical basis of which depends upon the modifiability of the nervous system. The constitution not only furnishes the basis of individual differences in intellectual and emotional maturity, but tends to predetermine how far they may be altered through learning which results from contact with the social and material environment.

Yet these constant factors do not operate independently of an external environment, and present biological theory and experimentation recognize the fact that growth depends upon the conjoint operation of both intrinsic and extrinsic forces.

THE INTERPLAY OF EXTRINSIC AND INTRINSIC FACTORS

Some of the determinants of structure and function are intrinsic to the protoplasm or cells, and in this sense are at the outset dependent on heredity. But extrinsic forces also play upon the protoplasm. What Sharp says (1926, p. 58) about cell life in general applies here:

"... The cell should not be thought of as a static thing with a permanent physical structure. It is rather a dynamic system in a constantly changing state of molecular flux, its constitution at any given time being dependent upon antecedent states and upon environmental conditions."

These molecular interactions within the cell, in fact, may be considered a sort of intracellular set of forces, and in the relation of cell to cell, and of organizations of cells or systems to each other, we have an intraorganic or intraindividual environment. Some features of this internal environment we have already discussed in reference to the endocrine glands. (See Chapter II.) Hence, in studying organic development, we must consider a double set of forces: (1) those within the organism, that is, within the cells and between the various cellular systems, and (2) the forces external to the organism. Growth is not a mere unfolding of either hereditary or environmental forces, but a construction of a newly organized system of protoplasm brought about by these two sets of forces operating together. Some investigators of individual development have stressed the importance of intrinsic changes within the tissues, others the extrinsic forces which play upon the organism. In fact, two somewhat opposing theories have arisen as a result of these studies, but, as we shall see, both sets of factors are important.

The appearance of new structures and functions has been described by the term *emergence*. Yet in using this concept we must guard against thinking of emergence as something supernatural. It is but a term to de-

scribe certain stages in development. The emergence of a new pattern can be understood only by a study of the historical or previous developmental factors and of the present configuration of forces. In fact, the sudden appearance of functions which we sometimes observe actually results from modifications within the organism that have been going on previously, unobserved.

External effects on the order and unity of the organism. That there is a close relation between the organism's structure and its external environment is evident in even the most rudimentary cell life. We know, for instance, that in one-celled animals the external layer or membrane which is in contact with the external environment is different in appearance and physical consistency from the interior. And, as soon as we pass beyond the most rudimentary living protoplasm, we find an order and unity, or pattern, among structures and functions. Two items in this are *polarity*, an arrangement of parts with regard to a longitudinal axis, and *symmetry*, an arrangement of parts in directions away from this axis. Some animals, like the starfish, are radially symmetrical; others—both invertebrate and vertebrate—are more or less bilaterally symmetrical. It is evident that the energy changes within animal protoplasm—the rate of living measured by such items as oxygen consumption, electrical potential, and susceptibility to certain drugs—vary greatly in terms of the polarity or basic structure. In fact, these variations in rate of activity may be considered to exist in a graded series or *gradient* from a high rate to a low. Moreover, it has been clearly demonstrated that the environment has a definite place in determining the basic features of these patterns of polarity, symmetry, and gradient. In the bisymmetrical forms the highest gradient lies in the head end of the organism and the lowest in the tail and in the supporting structure, such as the bony framework or the carapace. Thus in the animal the contact regions develop a head section for the intake of food, liquids, and oxygen.

Many changes in the rate of living in animals may be experimentally set up by chemical and mechanical agents. Thus alterations in temperature, light, electrical charge, pressure, and chemical agents, including anesthetics and poisons, may in their turn produce all sorts of deviant forms. In this way we may get animals with one eye or without any eyes, with large heads and brains or with small and imperfectly developed heads and brains. Bilateral animals may be made asymmetrical, and even polarity and symmetry may be obliterated and the animal made to return to a spherical form with only minor differences between periphery and interior. Child (1925, p. 137) goes so far as to remark: "In short, by altering the physical or chemical environment of the developing individual in certain ways we can produce forms which would be regarded as belonging to very different species from the normal individuals if we did not know their origin. Moreover, these experimental results are not at random and occasional, but we can predict and control to a large extent the character of the result in a particular case."

Experimental production of mutations. Some of the most interesting confirmations of this work of Child are found in the experimental induction of mutations. We have already noted that in the period of gene combination and recombination noticeable changes in biological characters appear. Since the genes are chemical in make-up, research workers proceeded on the assumption that any influences that may alter their chemical properties will affect their structure and function. In other words, man himself learned to produce mutants, that is, deviants from the normal species form. Thus, by shooting X rays or infrared rays into the fertilized cells at certain stages of their growth, all sorts of mutations have been produced. Muller (1929, p. 491), writing of investigations with flies, comments:

"All types of mutations, large and small, ugly and beautiful, burst upon the gaze. Flies with bulging eyes or with flat or dented eyes; flies with white, purple, yellow, or brown eyes; flies with curly hair, with ruffled hair, with parted hair, with fine and with coarse hair, and bald flies. . . . Big flies and little ones, dark ones and light ones, active and sluggish ones, fertile and sterile ones, long-lived and short-lived ones. . . . They were a motley throng. . . ."

Changes in temperature of the cells also cause modifications, as do alterations in the chemical make-up of the liquids in which the individuals develop. Stockard (1931), by exposing the eggs of a marine fish, *Fundulus*, to sea water to which had been added certain magnesium salts and some other substances, obtained developing young who possessed not two eyes, as was "normal," but one eye. (See Hoyt, 1923.) Gudernatsch (1914) fed very young tadpoles pieces of thyroid gland, and they quickly changed into frogs. Some of the mature frogs were no larger than ordinary flies. In contrast, other tadpoles, which were fed thymus tissue, grew to be large, dark-colored tadpoles, but did not develop into mature frogs at all.

These experimental findings should make us extremely cautious regarding any easy mechanistic interpretation of heredity. From the very inception of the new organism there is an interplay of intrinsic—properly speaking, hereditary—factors and external forces. Yet we must not imagine that the cells and their genes are capable of indefinite and unlimited alteration or that an organism once set out on a course of development in a certain direction can be completely modified later. There are definite constancies as well as variabilities, and it is one of the tasks of scientific research to discover their existence and relative effects on development. The facts of dominant-recessive relations, of independent segregation, and of sex-linkage demonstrate such limitations. So, too, not only do we find unity and order arising in the maturing organism, but every fundamental change sets the stage for the subsequent alterations. Thus some tissue transplantation at certain stages does not affect the species pattern even though the issue lives in a new intercellular relation. For example: "In

one experiment the ovaries of a black guinea pig were grafted into the body of a white guinea pig; but despite the white environment the eggs (when fertilized by sperm from a white male) developed into black offspring." (The black color was dominant, of course.) (From Weinstein, 1928, pp. 65-66.) We have again to reckon with the facts of fixity and rigidity on the one hand and of flexibility and variation on the other. (See Chapter II.)

Certainly, so far as the operation of the gene is concerned, it has, in the words of Weinstein (1928, p. 72), lost its former "position of splendid isolation" as the sole determiner of structure and function, as some *thing* itself unaffected by inside or outside forces. The hereditary factors—however we may conceive of them—do not function in a vacuum. The genes not only are chemical in nature, but are influenced in their activities by other genes and by the environment external to the cells in which they exist. It is not that hereditary, that is, genetic factors, are not important. They are. But they are significant only within the interactional configuration of the organism and its environment. As Child (1925, p. 151) says, "Any particular individual represents only a small fraction of the hereditary possibilities of his protoplasm."

Gradients, internal environment, and dominance. We have already referred to the high importance of the internal environment, the *milieu intérieur* which the physiologist Claude Bernard stressed so much. (See Chapter II.) Moreover, Bernard emphasized that this internal environment has become highly standardized and regular and that it has an important place in determining the reaction of the cells to each other and to outside forces. Child has called particular attention to the importance of the interprotoplasmic reactions as well as the external factors in the development of the gradients. The physiological gradient largely determines the fact that the intraindividual environment will be different for the various regions of the body. Thus the peculiar functions of the sustaining systems are the result of the long embryonic and fetal changes in which specific structures are built up in terms of gradients, polarity, and symmetry.

Moreover, the organs of highest energy change—the top gradients, as it were—tend to dominate the activities of the lower levels. When we say that all living protoplasm is sensitive or marked by irritability, we mean that its rate of living is capable of temporary increase by action of energy from other cells or from the outside. The gradient of an organism may, in fact, be stated in terms of a range of organs or functions which are differentially excitable by the transmission of energy to them. Moreover, the very process of transmitting energy from one sector of the organism itself develops in time a gradient. This is exactly what we find in the emergence of the central nervous system. Child (1925, p. 143) remarks:

"The protoplasmic gradient is the most generalized form of the reflex arc." And the brain itself represents the highest gradient in this transmissive system. (See below on Kappers, Holt, *et al.*) This particular system becomes dominant over all the others. It acts to integrate and co-ordinate all other organic activities into that more or less total pattern which *is* the individual. (See C. J. Herrick, 1924.)

Polarity, symmetry, and gradients of activity represent for the individual an increasing stability of form and function. No matter how identical two pieces of protoplasm may be at the outset (say two cells of the body), in time, because of the variations set up by physiological processes involved in adaptation, they may become highly different in character and function. In other words, though in the earliest stages the simplest cells are practically interchangeable as to form and function, later this interchangeability tends to disappear. Every alteration lessens the original identity, and each stage of development sets the stage for the next. Hence the strictly original genetic factors decline in importance, and the modifications of the constitution constantly predetermine the subsequent modifications. (See Woodger, 1929, Chapter IX.) As Child (1925, pp. 140-141) puts it:

"Whatever the nature of the environmental action which originates the gradient, the protoplasmic constitution will determine its final form: its height, length, steepness, etc. In other words, polarity and symmetry and individual pattern result not simply from differential action of environment on protoplasm, but from the reaction of the protoplasm to the external differential. The character of this reaction must depend on the constitution of the protoplasm. In short, the uniformity of protoplasmic constitution in each species counterbalances in some degree the variations in environment."

Another important factor to be taken into account in considering the growth of the individual is what Child terms "the standardization of developmental environment for each species." Fertilization, egg-laying, and embryonic development take place under more or less uniform conditions for each species. As we move up the evolutionary scale from simple to higher forms, these standard conditions appear to be "progressively more exactly determined." In the mammals and in man the embryonic and fetal development within the maternal body represents the end product of this evolutionary pattern of standardized environment. While variable conditions after birth profoundly alter the detailed features, the basic structures and functions are developed within relatively fixed limits. Thus the hereditary constitution of the protoplasm and the facts of internal and external environment operate together to produce uniformity and constancy. It is within this larger framework that gradients, dominance, and specialized structures and functions arise.

The student will realize at once that we are back to the fundamental

matter of fixity of the organism which was discussed in the previous chapter. These uniform and constant features are obviously of first importance in reference to the sustaining systems and the basic stimulating, conducting, and co-ordinating nervous and endocrinological systems. In his sustaining systems man remains—in spite of all social-cultural learning—closely akin to his animal ancestors, and these systems furnish definite biological limitations to his flexibility and learning.

It is also apparent that, whatever mutations may be introduced along the course of development, those which occur at the time of fertilization or shortly thereafter are more likely to persist through hereditary transmission than those which arise later as a result of the type of exposure to environmental conditions which Child, Stockard, and others have noted in nature or which they have induced experimentally.

HUMAN HEREDITY

When we bear these fundamental facts in mind, the problem of human heredity, especially as it influences social adjustment, becomes obviously very complicated. Though some significant work has been carried on regarding the transmission of obviously biological features, such as skin color, weight, height, and longevity (Davenport, 1911; Herskovits, 1928), when we study the problems of mental inheritance, the difficulties are great indeed. Most of the early work on family inheritance by Galton (1869), H. Ellis (1904), Woods (1906), and others is highly equivocal and confusing because the factors in the social and cultural environment were in no way properly controlled.

But the study of twins has offered some useful data on this problem. Twins are of two types: fraternal and identical. The former are regarded as the product of two ova (female sex cells) and of two spermatozoa (male sex cells). Thus, from the standpoint of heredity, they are no more alike than ordinary siblings, though the fact that they develop together *in utero* at the same time may make for certain uniformities or differences not found in usual singleton offspring. Identical twins are believed to result from one fertilized ovum which in the early developmental stage splits into two homologous halves, each of which becomes a separate individual. From the standpoint of genetic theory, then, the latter twins should possess many more traits in common than do fraternal twins. Investigations tend to bear out this hypothesis. Thus Newman, Freeman, and Holzinger (1937, p. 97) reported that the measurement of physical features, such as head length, head breadth, cephalic index, and finger ridges, of fraternal twins showed correlations of between .46 and .69, while the correlations for measurements of the identicals range from .91 to .95.¹ In another sample, McNemar (1933) found like differences in motor co-ordinations.

¹ A coefficient of correlation is a statistical index of the closeness of the association of two traits or features. Thus, if one twin of a pair were placed in one group, and the other twin in another, and the measurement of any given trait in one group had a perfect correspondence

The results from comparing such complex functions as intellectual performance, temperament, and social adaptation of fraternal or identical twins are not so clear. It is very difficult to control the environment with any degree of certainty. For example, many studies of siblings, of fraternal twins, and of identical twins proceed on the false assumption of a constant physical and *social* environment, which a careful analysis of the facts does not warrant. Thus over and over again it is taken for granted that children reared in the same home actually have the same or even identical family environment—an assumption palpably false. And certainly a school or orphanage is not the same to one child as to another. Mere age difference, to say nothing of differential treatment of children by parents, teachers, and others, profoundly modifies the nature of the social stimuli which impinge on the child. Nevertheless, the investigations have some merit in demonstrating possible genetic factors.

Thus a number of educational and intelligence tests administered to samples of children show a declining correlation between siblings as we examine the results on identical twins, where the coefficients range around .90, to fraternal twins, where it is about .70, to ordinary brothers and sisters, where it hovers around .50. Furthermore, the correlations between tests of children and those of their parents or cousins are usually about .30 or even lower, while the coefficients between test performances of grandparents and those of children are below .20, and between unrelated children of a zero order—that is, they show no significant relations at all. (For a review of this material see Murphy, Murphy, and Newcomb, 1937, and Dashiell, 1937.)

Still other attempts have been made to keep the heredity relatively constant but to observe the individuals in divergent environments. Identical twins reared apart show widely varied results in tests of intelligence and of interests and in social-emotional traits and habits. (See Newman, Holzinger, and Freeman, 1937.) In some instances striking resemblances appeared, in others striking differences. But most significant is the fact that there was no constant tendency toward any particular distribution of like or different characteristics in either twin. In some cases close likeness was found in intelligence test performance of both, but in other pairs similarity was found in temperament; still other pairs were alike even in the history of their diseases. In some pairs there was close resemblance in all traits tested; other pairs were alike in some traits but differed sharply in others. Still others were distinctly unlike in all features.

The studies of children brought up in foster homes show much the same results. If the members of the twins in the second group, the coefficient of correlation would be called positive, expressed as 1.00, or complete agreement between the measurements of each series. If, however, for every measurement of one twin, another twin in the other group showed just the opposite, then the correlation between the two groups would be completely negative, expressed as -1.00. If the members of the pairs show no correspondence either positive or negative, the correlation is zero, expressed as .00. See Chapter XI for further comments on statistical devices as methods of study.

same variability. Research has shown that the intelligence quotients (I.Q.s)² of children are influenced by the level of intellectual ability in the foster parents. Thus siblings of equivalent capacity at the outset, adopted into different homes, some of high quality, others of low, later showed noticeable average differences; those of high-level foster homes had an average I.Q. of 95; those of low-quality homes, 86. Moreover, the younger the age at which children are adopted, the more, apparently, will they be influenced in the direction of the level of the home life as measured by intelligence quotients. (See Freeman, Holzinger, and Mitchell, 1928; F. N. Freeman, 1930; and R. L. Thorndike, 1940.)

Other investigations of children whose cultural divergences are even more distinct confirm this same sort of finding. Sherman and Key (1932) in their analysis of the intelligence test performance of children brought up in isolated mountain communities in the South in comparison with children of the same general white stock who had been exposed to modern culture and education demonstrated that opportunity and cultural stimulation play a definite part in determining intellectual levels. In the same vein there are a wide variety of studies of children of different social strata and of different racial stocks which show that cultural influences play a decided part in fixing the intellectual attainment possible to all children of normal physical make-up. (See Gordon, 1923; Garth, 1931; and Klineberg, 1935, 1940.)

Although environmental factors clearly play their part in human mental achievement as measured by intelligence and educational tests, it must not be forgotten that the constitutional conditions—some of which certainly depend chiefly on hereditary factors—operate to limit the extent to which cultural and societal conditions may modify the organic tissue, or in other words bring about learning, since, if intelligence means anything, it must, at least, include the capacity to learn. The basic difficulty in trying to deal with the relative importance of hereditary as against environmental factors arises largely from the sharp and rather faulty dichotomy drawn between the effects of heredity and those of environment. As Weinstein (1928, pp. 68-69) aptly says:

"It is obviously impossible in general to compare heredity and environment by expressing them in common units. Some statisticians have therefore sought to avoid the difficulty by measuring the extent to which variation of a character is correlated

² An intelligence quotient, or I.Q. as the familiar abbreviation has it, is a convenient index of intellectual ability as measured by the Binet-Simon mental tests and others. An I.Q. of 100 is said to be normal; as one falls farther and farther below that, he is considered increasingly subnormal; as persons get indexes above that figure, they are considered to be increasingly supernormal. The bulk of urban American school children of white parents have intelligence quotients ranging between 90 and 110, which may be considered a convenient standard of normality. (The interested student may consult Terman and Merrill, 1937; F. N. Freeman, 1926; or Dearborn, 1928.)

with its variation in parents and with differences in the environment. There are, however, two difficulties with this method. In the first place, the correlation between traits in parents and offspring is not necessarily a measure of the strength of heredity: the correlation between the language of father and son would be very high, but it is due to similarity of environment. In the second place the result holds only for the range of heredity and environment studied: even if it be demonstrated that existing differences in environment do not alter a character more than a certain amount, it does not follow that the character cannot be altered further by other environmental differences. Before the antitoxin treatment of diphtheria was discovered it would have been correct to say that no environmental agent was known to be capable of preventing the disease; but it would have been fallacious to infer that diphtheria could not be prevented by environmental agents as yet unknown, and to conclude that only by breeding for a hereditary immunity could it be stamped out.

"The argument can, of course, be reversed. The fact that a particular effect has not been brought about by mutations or recombinations of genes does not enable us (in our present state of knowledge) to predict that its occurrence as a result of such changes is impossible. The realization of this has given rise to eugenics, which aims to improve the qualities of mankind by altering its heredity. This might be done by selecting mutations that have desirable effects, or by making new combinations of genes already in existence. *For accuracy in such a procedure a far greater knowledge of human heredity is necessary than we have today*, but doubtless our descendants will ultimately possess this knowledge. Perhaps a greater difficulty in the way of a eugenic program is the great diversity of opinion as to what qualities are desirable; unfortunately most persons who call themselves eugenicists have attempted to evade the difficulty by setting up their own prejudices as standards." (Italics not in original.)

It is evident that hereditary and environmental factors operate conjointly in the production of the new individual. It is a logical fallacy to consider them in an additive relation; that is, there is not so much of something called "heredity," H , to which something else called "environment," E , is added. The individual is not the sum of two variables, $H + E$, but their product, $H \times E$. As Carmichael (1925, p. 257) well says:

"The fact as it appears . . . is that no distinction can be expediently made at any given moment in the behavior of the individual, after the fertilized egg has once begun to develop, between that which is native and that which is acquired. The so-called hereditary factors can only be acquired in response to an environment, and likewise the so-called acquired factors can only be secured by a modification of already existing structure, which in the last analysis is hereditary structure. Facts too obvious to bear citation show that the somatic structures that can develop out of a fertilized egg are in some measure dependent upon the physical and chemical structure of the given germ itself. The characteristics which develop out of such a germ, nevertheless, are not predetermined. They are, on the contrary, determined by an environment acting upon the present nature of the individual at every stage of development from fertilization to death." (Italics in the original.)

FETAL DEVELOPMENT

The rise of individual behavior patterns. While it is evident that structural organization and internal physiological functions arise together on the foundation of transmitted protoplasm and the forces which play upon it in the course of development in a more or less standardized environment, overt movement itself—what the psychologist calls “behavior”—also emerges in certain more or less distinctive stages ranging from rudimentary to complex and co-ordinated patterning. The scientific observations of Coghill (1929) on the beginnings of muscular movement in lower forms are highly suggestive for students of human behavior. Using a species of salamander, *Amblystoma punctatum*, Coghill studied its development from the earliest tadpole stage to maturity.

He has demonstrated that the first movement of the salamander is the bending of the head to one side because of a contraction of the muscles just behind the head. In the course of a few days this movement gives way to one which involves the whole trunk. Moreover, general bodily behavior begins at the head end and progresses toward the tail. The initial contraction, say to the left, is followed by another to the right; and as a result we get an S-shaped pattern that in time becomes the swimming movement itself. Later, movements of the developing limbs of the salamander appear. The forelimbs begin reacting with reference, however, to the total trunk movements of the swimming sort. Later the hindlimbs show a co-ordinated response to this torso movement and to the movement of the forelimbs. As Coghill puts it (1929, p. 19), “It is obvious, therefore, that the first limb movement is an integral part of the total reaction of the animal and that it is only later that the limb acquires an individuality of its own in behavior.” The course of development, according to Coghill, follows the general principle from large mass reactions to movements of the special organs or segments of the total. Thus elbow flexion comes after the limb movement as a whole, and wrist and finger responses in turn after elbow flexion. All these together give rise in time to locomotion movements necessary for walking.

In somewhat the same manner feeding reactions are developed. Beginning with the larger movement of the trunk, including a certain lunge at the object of food, in time the specific movement of jaws and muscles of biting and swallowing develops. Coghill is so impressed with this serial feature of development that he is convinced that organic development in general operates on such a principle. He says (1929, p. 38), “Behavior develops from the beginning through the progressive expansion of a perfectly integrated total pattern and the individuation within it of partial patterns which acquire various degrees of discreteness.”³

Other studies—many of them on higher animal forms—tend to bear out Coghill’s observations. For example, studies of the fetal cat reveal much of the same patterning from general and diffusive to specific and co-ordinated behavior as that found in the tadpole of the salamander.

³ Both quotations from Coghill, *Anatomy of Behavior*, are by permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers.

(See Carmichael, 1933, for a review of these and other studies.) Thus Coronios (1933, p. 363), whose contribution is one of the best, summarizes some of his findings on the development of fetal cats "of various gestation ages":

"In the early stages the behavior is diffuse, variable, relatively uncoordinated, and weak. With the increase in gestation age, the reactions become more vigorous, more regular in their appearance, less variable, individualized, and better coordinated. These qualitative changes do not occur abruptly but are continuously progressive modifications in the quality of the observed reactions. Moreover, these qualitative changes do not, as it were, 'invade' the total organism at once. Rather they seem to follow a general course in their development beginning at the head region and progressing toward the tail."

These findings regarding the development of movement from uncoordinated mass form to an individuated and integrated type do not contradict but supplement those of Child and others who emphasize the place of extrinsic influences on development. The fact that the differentiation of movement itself progresses from mass activity and from head region to extremities seems to bear out the very principle of the gradient which Child has emphasized.

Although the experimental work on lower animal forms seems to the naive person rather remote from man, the student should realize at once the well-recognized principle of physiology that the operation of animal protoplasm is everywhere essentially the same and that developmental changes follow somewhat the same patterns in all the higher forms of animal life. Though man is highly complex in comparison with these experimental animals, the data we have on his individual development tend to confirm what research workers have found out about lower forms, and vice versa. The newborn child is not something mysteriously produced by heredity and at birth suddenly thrown into the world of people and things. He is already the product of a relatively long and certainly important period of prenatal growth.

When we turn to the fetal development of human beings, we have no such sound experimental data as we have regarding lower forms. For purposes of observation and comparison the development of the human being *in utero* is conventionally divided into three periods: (1) the germinal stage, the first week or two following conception; (2) the embryonic period, from the second or third week to the fifth or sixth week; and (3) the fetal, from about the sixth week to birth. (See Feldman, 1920.) The data which we shall review relate only to the last period, and concern chiefly the materials on motor and sensory development.

Strict experimentation with mothers and babies is out of the question, and we must depend on introspection of pregnant mothers, on reports of examining physicians, and on clinical observations of prematurely born

babies or of babies removed surgically from their mothers. (For a review of the literature, see Carmichael, 1933.) In the case of man the neural growth must be inferred from such data and from the general principles of development derived from experimental studies made on lower forms.

The fetal development of sensory and motor capacities. All but the very simplest motor responses depend for their initiation upon sensory stimulation, and it is during the prenatal period that the essential sensory-motor patterns are established. From various investigations of the cutaneous receptors it is evident that motor reactions to pressure are elicited fairly early in the fetal stage, but that they are, at first, rather general in their effects. That is, they tend to be arrhythmic and unco-ordinated. Yet, in the words of Minkowski (1922), "There are no isolated reflexes." Rather the responses are highly variable and tend to spread over the whole body, a fact which led Minkowski (1922, p. 723) to make a generalization that "each skin area may serve as a reflexogenic zone for various reactions which have a tendency to irradiate more or less over the entire fetal organism." (See Irwin, 1932.) With growth and use these reactions become gradually more specific and co-ordinated. But in any case it is apparent that many fundamental responses later associated with sucking, the cremasteric (sexual) reflexes, and certain abdominal reactions are initially set up from cutaneous and pressure stimulation, *in utero*.

Among the important receptive patterns that are developed during the prenatal life we may note the responsiveness to warm or cold stimuli, rudimentary taste and smell, and the development of the auditory and visual senses. There is evidence from prematurely born babies that the iris reflex occurs some time before normal delivery. So, too, the muscular apparatus of the eye and eyelid are developed prior to birth. In the later stages of fetal growth the nociceptors or pain senses also begin their operation.

Pregnant women have reported that between the fourteenth and seventeenth weeks the fetal heartbeat is detectable. So, too, rhythmic contractions of the fetal thorax and movements of the chest, fundamental to true breathing later, have been observed. By the fourth month muscular reactions of the fetus become much more specific and more vigorous. By the fifth month the spinal cord and medulla areas are operating to facilitate co-ordinated movements, and by the seventh month such complex motor reactions as abdominal reflexes, knee jerk, plantar reflexes, and corneal responses are evident. During the last six weeks or two months the higher brain centers are apparently beginning to play their part in controlling basic action patterns. There is a close correlation between neurological development and emerging specificity and integration of responses. (See below.)

Certain observers even report fetal crying, and from his studies of pre-

maturely delivered infants Minkowski (1922) states that crying occurs as early as the sixth month after conception. These vocal expressions, of course, are no more significant than any other muscular responses. It is only important to note that the mechanism for such behavior is developed previous to birth.

Likewise the systemic or organic senses appear in the later months of fetal life. Movements of the digestive organs have been observed, and some investigators believe that peristaltic reactions begin before birth. If this proves to be correct, we may say that the foundation of the hunger drive is laid down in this period. (Premature babies show, as a rule, less well-developed hunger patterns than do normal-time infants.) In fact, many of the general bodily movements already noted seem related to this hunger "drive."

According to Minkowski, facial reactions begin in the early weeks of the fetal period, and there is no reason to doubt that during the subsequent weeks the facial muscles get considerable "practice." Some of those who have worked with fetuses are also convinced that states of fatigue are entirely possible. It may even be that the quiescent periods in prenatal life represent what has been called "fetal sleep."

All these prenatal features are, of course, closely bound up with the operation of the nervous system, and we must now review some important items in the development of this system.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NERVOUS SYSTEM

The nervous system, so important to co-ordinated adaptation of the organism to its environment, also passes through important changes in prenatal life. There is a considerable difference of view as to just how this neural development occurs. But from the work of Coghill it is evident that in the early stages of embryonic and fetal development, as in the lower forms of life studied by Parker (1919) and others, muscular response comes about through direct chemical or mechanical stimulation of the muscles. Only later, in the course of maturation and learning, do the neural fibers in the muscles get hooked onto those of the sensory system. In the non-motile stage of the growth of the salamander *Amblystoma*, although both the sensory and the motor neurons are present, no connection exists between them. The muscles will respond to direct mechanical stimulation, but not when tactile or even chemical stimuli are applied to the skin. The ability to respond to tactile or chemical stimuli to the skin is dependent upon the growth of a third series of cells, which bridge the gap between the sensory and the motor patterns. These are the rudimentary "adjustor" neurons. The first to develop lie, says Coghill (1929), "in the floor plate of the medulla oblongata and the upper part of the spinal cord." In the non-motile stage these cells are unipolar, and the one pole extends either to

left or to right toward the motor cells. In the process of becoming bipolar the newly developing pole extends to the sensory cells and thus completes a neural pathway from the sensory to the motor cells. It is in this fashion that the reflex arcs are first formed. Coghill (1929, p. 13) states:

"When they [the cells in the central neural chain] become bipolar they complete the path from the sensory field to the muscle; and this path leads to the muscles of the opposite side from the stimulus because the conductors from the sensory field pass across the motor path of the same side to establish synapses with the dendrites of the commissural cells of the floor plate. . . ." ⁴

It is generally agreed that this sort of change goes on in all the species which have co-ordinated nervous systems, but there is no complete agreement as to the exact factors in this development. Some writers have tended to stress the intrinsic factors, others the extrinsic.

One of the most commonly held views is that the adequate functioning of the sensory-adjustor-motor system depends upon the growth of the axons and dendrites (connecting fibers) and of a differing threshold of stimulation at the synapses between neurons. (See Sherrington, 1922; C. J. Herrick, 1924; Lillie, 1932.) The interpretations of Bok (see Holt, 1931) and of Kappers (1917) will serve to illustrate this standpoint. The former has described the growth of the axons (nerve fibers) as taking place along the main axis of the developing neural system itself. (The central nervous system itself emerges from early differentiation of cells from the ectoderm, or outer layer of embryo.) Bok's theory (called "simulogeneous fibrillation") holds that developing neurons send out axons along, and at right angles to, the main axial gradient. Obviously this is closely related to Child's theory of polarity and the growth of axial gradients. (See above.) The neurons and their fibers which grow along the central axis form in time the connecting and co-ordinating neural centers; the fibers which grow from rudimentary neuroblasts outward and at right angles become the sensory and motor neurons. It is further evident that the development of these neurons and their fibers is influenced by the physiological activity which takes place in the tissue around the cells. The earliest cells, developing as they do from the rudimentary neural gradient, send axon fibers downward along the axis. These top and first-developing cells, in fact, become in time the dominant and directing neurons. Now when the growing fibers become active in the tissue near a still undifferentiated or rudimentary neuroblast, there is a stimulation of either chemical or electrical sort set up in the neuroblast. The latter begins to send out axons of its own, first in the direction *away* from the point of active stimulation from the fibers of the axial gradient. Later the developing neuroblast

⁴ From Coghill, *Anatomy of Behavior*, by permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers.

sends out fibers—called dendrites—*toward* the stimulating bundle of axial fibers until a definite connection is set up between the two. (It is believed that the impulses are electrically negative with respect to the dendrites toward which they move and that the dendrites grow contracurrently.) This latter process Ariens Kappers called *neurobiotaxis*. Briefly stated this hypothesis or “law” of growth is that dendrites grow toward an active neuron or bundle of nerve fibers if the neuron from which the dendrite emerges and the neuron toward which it grows are in simultaneous or close successive excitation. Eventually, in many cases at least, the neural cell body itself may migrate in the same direction as its extending dendrites.

Figure 3 is a schematic sketch of the principle of growth according to Bok and Kappers. It shows that the nerve fibers of the central axial gradient,




FIGURE 3, showing schematically the probable development of neurons and their connections. The arrows indicate the direction of nervous excitation. Note that the uppermost neuron, which has been activated by the stimulating current produced by the axial bundle for the longest time, is the most developed. In contrast, at the bottom of the figure is represented a neuroblast about to be affected by the current. (Modified from Kappers, 1917, p. 268, and from Warren and Carmichael, 1930, p. 21.)

when active, tend to set up growth in the neuroblasts which lie along the tract itself. The long arrow indicates the gradient stimulation downward in the axis; the short arrows at right angles show the stimulation to the neighboring nerve cells. Thus at the bottom of the figure a neuroblast is about to be activated, while at the top of the figure is placed a neuron with more or less fully developed axon and dendrite connections with the axial gradient, on the one hand, and with another neuron process or end organ of some sort, on the other.

Holt (1936), accepting Kapper's thesis of neurobiotaxis, is convinced

that the development of the neural organization in the embryo and fetus depends upon the growth of the neuroblasts, stimulated by growing nerve fibers, and upon extrinsic stimulation that brings about dendritic growth. He contends that the basic reflex arcs are themselves not inherited but "are learned, that is, conditioned (prenatally)" according to what Bok called the reflex-circle principle. The reflex circle is initially found "in the process by which a motor neuron gains connection with its muscle" (Holt, 1936, pp. 27-28). Following this concept of Bok, Holt believes that this principle or "law" of the reflex circle not only operates during the early development of neural patterns but holds throughout life. He contends that it is through this circular reflex process (to use another and common phrase) that random and mass-activity reactions become fixed or canalized and co-ordinated. The development is described by Holt (1931, 1936) as taking place in the following fashion:

(1) Any given nervous excitation—due to energy changes within or stimulation from without the organism—reaching the central neural system seeks an outlet of least resistance and purely accidentally finds its way into the motor neuron of some particular muscle or other.

(2) There follows a "random" contraction of the muscle.

(3) Proprioceptors within the muscle itself are stimulated by the contraction of the muscle fibers and send a return excitation along their afferent (sensory) nerves into the central nervous system proper.

(4) But this proprioceptive stimulation arrives only a second or so after the initial random impulse has found or is still finding an outlet from the central nervous system to the muscle in question.

(5) This incoming but return excitation from the proprioceptors of the muscle will spread out until at least a part of the neural energy will "eventually come to those nerve paths over which the impulses passed which have just contracted the muscle" (Holt, 1936, p. 26).

(6) The "newly arriving" excitations, in turn, will travel readily along the "open" pathways to the contracted muscle and will thus serve to reinforce its contraction.

(7) Once again, however, this will cause a further stimulation of the sensory processes of the muscle, which will return excitation again to the central system and out once more to reinforce still further the contraction "and so on, round and round."

(8) Moreover, "during this process all of the synapses traversed by the impulses from the sense-organ round to the muscle are in a condition such that the dendrites at these synapses will be, by the law of neurobiotaxis, stimulated to (a slight) growth. For the oncoming sensory impulses are of course, at every synapse, electrically negative with regard to the dendrites toward which they are moving; and these dendrites will grow (contracurrently)." (Holt, 1936, pp. 26-27.)

Holt believes the circular reflex to be the fundamental principle of the law of association or conditioning. This view obviously demands that the reflex arc and the synapse be considered basic features in the learning

process, since changes in the junction of the dendrites and axons would seem to be involved in this process of learning. But Lashley (1924), among others, doubts that we should consider the synapse as the only explanatory factor, at least in certain changes in behavior. (See also Wheeler, 1929; Irwin, 1932.)

Others have maintained that neural functioning depends on the myelinization of the nerve fibers, that is, on the growth of a fatty sheath around the nerves. But this, too, has been open to criticism, since some animals, notably the opossum, are capable of highly co-ordinated reflexes before myelinization has taken place (Langworthy, 1928). Still other writers hold that the time sequence of activation of the neural arcs is most important, especially in view of the obvious effects of stimulation of the peripheral neurons. Others again hold that there is a very definite interrelation of metabolic changes, blood conditions, stimulation, and subsequent growth of neural tissues. (See Carmichael, 1933.)

At any rate, so far as the operation of the nervous system as the receiver of stimuli, co-ordinator, and controller of motor responses is concerned, both chemical and mechanical effects from within and from without the organism seem to precede in time the neural controls proper. As to the opposing theories, (1) whether intrinsic or extrinsic factors play the leading role, and (2) whether at the outset generalized mass activity precedes specific reflexes, it seems reasonable to strike a compromise or balanced view of the matter.

In interpreting these data we run the grave danger of falling into the error of *particularism*, which is the common tendency of writers to find simple and single explanations or causes for complex phenomena. In approaching the problems of development, learning, and social adaptation we have no reason to assume that the diverse causal factors which have been suggested are mutually contradictory. The particular scientific premises, the nature of experimental techniques, and above all else the logical frame of reference and the purpose of the study must be taken into account. The chemist and the physicist may find certain facts and make certain interpretations, while the biologist, the psychologist, and the sociologist may find other facts and other interpretations, depending upon the purpose and standpoint from which they approach their data. This criticism must be borne in mind in discussing complex social behavior as well as in treating the constitutional factors basic to individual behavior.

Coghill, Irwin, and Wheeler, among others, hold firmly to the view that all behavior develops from large, undifferentiated, unco-ordinated activity, from what Irwin well calls "mass activity," to specific, individual responses of single areas and single organs or segments of the organism. These writers defend what is commonly called the "organismic" thesis of development. Sherrington, Kappers, Holt, Herrick, and others, in con-

trast, have approached their data largely from an analysis of the development of the structure and function of particular reflex systems. Both "schools" recognize the biochemical and mechanical foundations of earliest activity in lower species and in embryonic and fetal stages of the higher forms of animal life, but the latter group scout the easy assumptions of some sort of original total organic behavior until we have examined more closely the specific sensory receptors and action patterns which arise in various parts of the body in its attempt at adjustment to its environment.

The fundamental neurological development, especially the co-ordination of sensory with muscular patterns, depends upon the growth and extension of nerve fibers and upon dendrite-axon connections arising with the bipolar development of neural cells. Moreover, mass activity due to irradiation and lack of connections of central neurons may well precede more specific linkage of stimulus-response mechanisms in specialized areas or limbs. Finally, co-ordination and integration depend upon an interplay through the central neurons of proprioceptive, interoceptive, exteroceptive, and nociceptive stimulation. But this does not, it seems to me, completely wipe out the importance of the *reflex arc* as a convenient concept. We need not and do not hold to a principle of mere addition of one reflex to another and so on until larger total patterns arise. The reflexes are co-ordinated through the central or adjustor neurons. The extremes of the reflex-arc school perhaps reflect the overemphasis upon the mere stimulus-response study of behavior fostered so ardently by J. B. Watson (1919) and his disciples. As Carmichael (1933, pp. 141-142) well states:

"... The explanation of behavior will hardly be advanced by saying that the 'nervous system operates as a whole.' Unquestionably, in the human fetus as in the human adult there are functions which can never be understood in isolation, but by looking at the *totality* alone the specific long, short, homolateral, and heterolateral skin reflexes, the face, hand, and foot reflexes, the mucous-membrane and tendon reflexes, the proprioceptor and static reflexes, and the many other specific responses of the fetus will never be scientifically explained. Because an early concept of the reflex was inadequate seems to be no reason to assert that there is no truth in the general view that behavior involves relationships between stimulation and response, some of which are more variable and some more specific than others.

"Certainly there have been ill-judged efforts to make behavior seem simpler than it is. . . . It seems at present . . . that so far as the fetus is concerned there can be little doubt that an adequate explanation of its behavior at every stage in its development must be given in terms of the dynamics of its total organization. Such dynamics, however, can be expressed only in terms of as adequate a knowledge of the relevance and particular structures and functions of the organism as possible. Any response can be understood only if it is recognized that it may not be the result alone of the most obvious stimulus that is apparently calling it out, but rather that it may be a resultant of the total interoceptive, proprioceptive, and exteroceptive stimulation of the moment."

In short, behavior patterns may develop from general mass behavior of certain large regions of the body to more specific patterns; yet the reflex arc may still be used as a basic and useful concept in studying sensory-motor activity. The use of the reflex arc is not to deny patterning or organization of various arcs, nor need it ignore changes due to internal maturation. Thus Holt's contention that development depends upon specific linkage of motor with sensory neurons into a reflex arc does not seem to run counter to Minkowski's report that early fetal movements are asymmetrical, arrhythmic, and unco-ordinated. The increasing specificity of responses may be viewed as an evolution of the centrally integrated linkages of motor and sensory neurons. The more specific patterns may at first not appear, but repeated interplay of sensory and motor processes *through the central* neurons may bring such specificity into existence.⁵

It is also evident that the older concept of a certain static, mechanical relationship between something called heredity and something called environment is not an adequate manner of viewing either prenatal or post-natal life. Hereditary potentialities may be many, and an individual represents but a fraction of all the potentialities of his original protoplasm, but "environment is an essential factor in determining what part he does represent" (Child, 1925). We are thus forced back to a clearer recognition than ever of the need to consider genetic and external factors as operating conjointly in the whole of life, but perhaps with differing importance in terms of organs of the body and of functions, and with varying effects in terms of age. That is, the influences of heredity are doubtless more significant for the human being during the germinal and embryonic period than in the fetal, and before birth than after. Development from conception through uterine life to birth, and from birth on to senescence and finally death, is always a dynamic altering relationship between various internal states of the individual and the changing external environment. Each plays its part in learning and in maturation. In fact, it is often difficult to determine where maturation or internally induced changes leaves off and learning due to external influences begins. Holt (1931, p. 12) puts the matter well in these words: "The notion of growth as a mere unfolding is to be abandoned. And further, the process of functional construction which is so largely sustained by outside, environmental agencies is

⁵ There is considerable evidence that the increasing specificity in responses may well be made possible by the maturation of the long inhibitory pathways in the central nervous system. Thus certain of the components of the lower reflexes originally antagonistic to smoothly co-ordinated and highly specific responses come to be inhibited, and an increasing degree of precision is thus effected. Embryological data on the maturation of the long pathways and physiological data on the transection of the spinal cord attest to the soundness of this hypothesis. (See Langworthy, 1928.) We know from surgical and clinical cases as well as from laboratory experimentation that spinal shock will destroy—at least temporarily—the specificity of reactions and reduce the organism to more rudimentary forms of mass behavior.

not different in principle from the process that we call 'learning.' " (Italics in the original.)

In other words, it is just as false to take the extreme position that all activity and all growth are initiated from within as to hold that order, unity, action patterns, and co-ordination depend entirely upon external effects. As we shall see in the next chapter, the motives or drives to behavior seem to depend upon both internal and external influences. In the same way, both internal and external stimuli appear to be important to embryonic and fetal growth. It is upon this receptor, central, and effector development in the embryo and fetus that the *neonate*, the newly born, continues his development. The infant at birth brings with him many structures already practiced in function; for example, muscle flexion and extension, grasping, sucking, and plantar reflexes. (See Pratt, Nelson, and Sun, 1930.) In short, the baby comes into the world *ready* to carry on certain adaptive functions. Of course, he is not fully equipped for adult adjustments. The more discriminative and selective mechanisms must be learned. And it is in relation to this learning that the care of other persons—mother, nurse, and other adults—is necessary. These other persons make up a *social* environment. Moreover, they begin from the day of birth onward to influence and to direct his learning or adjustment along lines laid down by the culture which they possess. The child has no human nature nor culture at birth. He has certain rudimentary patterns of stimuli and response and an amazing flexibility of neural system. And upon them the social world may build a wide variety of habits, attitudes, traits, and ideas which will carry him through life.

Chapter IV

DRIVES, CYCLES OF ACTIVITY, AND EMOTIONS

ON the basis of our discussion so far, we may characterize the individual at the biological level (1) as protoplasm living in a liquid environment in a state of changing disequilibrium and equilibrium; (2) as organized protoplasm concerned with such fundamental sustaining processes as those of digestion, respiration, circulation, and elimination—all controlled and coordinated by the neuromuscular and glandular systems; (3) as structuralized bodily systems which constantly interact on each other in the process of adaptation to internal changes and to changes reaching them from the outside environment; and (4) as a total organism concerned with adaptation to or survival in this external environment. With reference to 3 and 4, the conjoint processes of internally initiated modifications (maturation) and externally stimulated alterations (learning) are highly important.

Yet the external environment is not purely material or static; it is made up of persons who carry with them habits, attitudes, traits, ideas, purposes, ideals, values, and other products of their social interaction and culture. Hence, no matter how much we must attend to the organic make-up, we must realize that, in the process of adaptation, the individual, to be successful, must relate his living to that of his fellow human beings. For our purposes, then, the constitution of the individual must always be discussed with reference to the social-cultural milieu in which it operates. And, in order to understand how one acts in this social-cultural world, we must review certain facts and theories of motivation and mechanism of behavior.

DRIVES OR MOTIVES

In the previous chapters we not only described the structure of the organism, but repeatedly stressed the importance of function or activity. But, coming at the whole problem of action more definitely, we may ask, "What makes the organism go?" "How is it aroused to activity?" Or, put otherwise, "What motivates or drives it on to adaptation?"

Following the lead of the students of animal behavior, earlier psychologists tried to answer such questions by referring to "instincts" or "instinctive tendencies." Thus William James (1890), the chief figure in early American psychology, posited a large number of instincts, ranging from what

we call simple reflexes like sneezing to such complex motives as "constructiveness" and "curiosity." To account for man's motives McDougall (1908), a British social psychologist, suggested a list of eight or more inherited instincts, including such matters as pugnacity, flight, and mating, with their corresponding emotions such as anger, fear, and love. But, largely because of loose usage, the term *instinct*, at least as applied to human behavior, has fallen into disrepute. (For review of various criticisms of the concept, see K. Young, 1927b.)

If, however, we lay aside the theories about instinct and look to the accumulated data on animal behavior for a key answer as to the forces motivating behavior, it is evident that all sorts of factors, internal and external, play a part in activating the organism. Both chemical and mechanical stimuli are important. Alterations in the internal environment, such as that produced in the process of metabolism, bring on changes in activity. For instance, it has been shown that the injection of blood from a starving dog into the blood stream of a dog which has just been well fed induces in the latter hunger contractions of the stomach—reactions which normally mark the onset of hunger. So, too, a large number of studies have demonstrated definite relations between certain endocrine substances and the inception of sexual and related behavior. Thus Richter (1932) has shown that the spontaneous activity of female rats, which he measured by means of a cyclometer attached to a revolving cage, is closely correlated with their oestrus (sexual) cycle. The peak of their activity coincides with ovulation. Also, Nissen (1929) showed that mate-seeking among white rats was stimulated by the injection of sexual hormones, and Riddle, Bates, and Lahr (1935) have reported that the injection of prolactin in quantities sufficient to repress ovarian activity and stop the growth of the egg cells induced the so-called "nesting instinct" or broodiness among domestic fowls. Per contra, it has been demonstrated again and again that the removal of certain endocrine tissue may retard, if not eliminate, certain forms of activity. Thus the spontaneous activity of male rats was greatly reduced following castration (Hoskins, 1933), and the removal of the important pituitary tissue made Richter's (1932) experimental rats almost "totally inactive." Richter also showed that severing "of the pituitary stalk, and partial or total removal of the thyroid" affect the rat's appetite, as measured by the daily food intake. (For a review of the extensive literature on this whole topic, see Hoskins, 1933, and Murphy, Murphy, and Newcomb, 1937.)

But we should not imagine that activity in animals is set up solely from internal changes within the body. Animals likewise react to certain intensities of light, sound, temperature, smell, and taste stimuli, to various poisons, and to injury to the skin, muscles, or other tissue. That is, external situations also induce activity. In short, the motivations to behavior are both intrinsic and extrinsic: the former concern the maintenance of the sustain-

ing systems exemplified in hunger, thirst, and sexual satisfactions, temperature regulation, air-getting, and the elimination of waste products; the latter not only concern the sustaining systems directly, as just noted, but profoundly influence the adaptation of the organism to the external world.

Such physiological and mechanical factors operate in man as well as in animals. From clinical observations we know that the endocrine substances not only affect bodily growth and structure but also profoundly influence appetite, sexual activity, emotional life, and other responses. (See Chapters II and XXVI.) Likewise, man reacts to all sorts of external forces about him. Hence, on the basis of the observations on animals and on human beings, and because the concept of instinct carries misleading connotations, psychologists have introduced the term *drive* to describe such basic stimuli to behavior.

The nature of drives. The term *drive* has certain advantages over the word *instinct* as a convenient verbal short cut for classifying the impulses to activity. So far it has escaped the mystical qualities which sometimes surrounded the earlier concept, although the Freudian writers have proved a handicap to this hope. Moreover, the high importance of internal stimuli—biochemical and neural in character—in starting behavior is implied in the very word itself. If we accept Coghill's statement that "the individual acts on its environment before it reacts to its environment," we must recognize that fundamental activity begins within the individual. If this be so, the interoceptors are of great importance in our initial motivations. Only later in the course of development would outside influences themselves set up activity. Certainly at the time of birth the exteroceptors are prepared for operation, and the newborn infant can and does respond to external stimulation. Nevertheless, though we must not neglect the influence of extrinsic factors, we must also not forget that the responses thus set up are always greatly affected by the internal condition of the organism at that particular time.¹ The state of the organism is the fundamental determining factor in adaptation.

Another matter is important. The term "drive" does not imply hereditary innateness. It is the resultant of the processes of heredity, maturation, and acquirement. (See Chapters III and V.) Moreover, after birth, drives may be further modified by learning; that is, the results of external stimuli upon the organism tend to persist and hence to alter the adaptive processes themselves.

In short, we may define the drive as a certain state of disequilibrium of the organism, set up from within or from without, which profoundly in-

¹ Although we might introduce another term to describe or characterize original or learned activities stimulated from the outside, we shall follow the usual practice and use the term "drive" to cover the basic facts of motivation, recognizing, however, that activity may be set up from changes inside or outside the organism.

fluences or directs the course of response, leading usually to a state of equilibrium and adaptation. This equilibrium, of course, is dependent both upon the play of intraindividual forces and upon the relation of the organism itself to the outside environment.

The so-called "unlearned" drives which have been listed by various writers include such items as air-getting, temperature regulation, hunger, thirst, sexual responsiveness, "eliminative tensions," "tissue injury." (Shaffer, 1936.) Others mention activity as such, rhythmic responses, sensory responses to color, tones, tastes, smells, and a generalized "mass activity" emotionality. (See Murphy, Murphy, and Newcomb, 1937.) But to attempt to list and classify all the items apparent even in infants is extremely difficult, and in doing so one is likely to fall into the same error as the earlier writers who used the blanket term *instinct* to cover the original impulsion or "causes" of behavior.

The difficulties of arriving at any entirely satisfactory short classification of the drives at birth rests upon the fact that specific studies of the activities of newborn babies are not complete, although there is an enormous amount of literature on the topic. (See, for example, K. C. Pratt, 1933, who lists 188 papers, monographs, or books in his review of the literature on the newborn; or Hurlock, 1933, who refers to sources in her review of the same topic.)

In one careful review of the responses of the newborn infant—covering only literature dealing with the first ten days of life—and from observations made in maternity wards in hospitals, Dennis (1934) has attempted a tentative classification into twelve general categories. Within these he lists 78 more or less specific reactions. The major types of response are as follows:

- | | |
|---------------------|---|
| 1. Eyelid | 7. Neck and head |
| 2. Pupillary | 8. Hand and arm, |
| 3. Ocular | 9. Trunk |
| 4. Tear secretion | 10. Sexual |
| 5. Facial and mouth | 11. Foot and leg |
| 6. Throat | 12. Co-ordination of many bodily reflexes |

In commenting on these research data Dennis criticizes those who would completely neglect the factors of prenatal maturation in determining many of the structures and functions essential to these reactions. Moreover, he doubts the assumptions of those who consider the responses of the newborn infant as "unorganized, chaotic, unspecific, and random." There is definite evidence that at least fifteen different "total bodily responses," or co-ordinated patterns, are evident. "This is in striking contrast to the young *Amblystoma* which possesses only the locomoter and the feeding reactions as general responses." (See Coghill, 1929.) Thus, while there is much behavior to be designated as "random" or of a "mass activity" character, the neonate does possess a large number of differentiated reactions related to certain integrated or organized needs essential to survival.

Obviously, we are not yet ready for more than the most tentative and broad classification of the rudimentary tendencies. But for working pur-

poses some of the more significant groupings of organic needs may be made, especially of those which bear directly upon certain matters of personality development. (Obviously some of the specific reactions noted above are related to more than one category listed below.)

A. *Physiological needs—drives from within*

1. Needs related to respiration and temperature regulation
2. Hunger and thirst
3. Eliminative needs
4. Fatigue; and sleep
5. Sex impulses (which mature after puberty)

B. *Physiological needs—drives determined by external contacts*

6. Avoidance of pain, discomfort, or cold—marked by withdrawal reactions
7. Seeking of comfort, warmth, or pleasant stimulation—marked by approach to the stimulus
8. Specific pleasures derived from operation of food appetites
9. Erogenous (sexual) zone pleasures

C. *Expressive reactions*

10. Random vocalization
11. Random movements of arms and legs, and other associated gross bodily activities, related doubtless to postural tensions as well as to inner-stimulation
12. Expression of feelings and rudimentary emotions (associated closely with many of these other activities)

Acquired and organized motives. The physiological drives with which the newborn infant begins become greatly altered in the course of his exposure to his material and social-cultural world. The infant rapidly modifies, qualifies, and extends his drives and his responses. (See below and Chapter V.) Man in time acquires wishes, desires, wants, or needs—call them what you will—which seem remote indeed from the strictly bodily requirements which we have noted. One of the purposes of the present chapter and the next two, in fact, is to review the manner in which these learned motives or drives are built up.² Before going on to this review, how-

² Shaffer (1936) distinguishes between *drive* and *motive*. The former term he applies only to the physiological impulsions, which he describes largely in terms of tissue tensions induced by internal or external stimuli. Motives arise out of learning to adjust to the demands of the organism and of the external environment. The reduction of the physiological tension (*drive*) is brought about by "an acquired response" which he terms *mechanism*. Motives arise when specific objects become essential to the reduction of the tension, and these are chiefly socially acquired. In other words, motives imply direction and values.

But the term "drive" is often used to cover both the original impulsions and those which are learned. And, since the meaning or interpretation which people put upon even their physiological processes depends so thoroughly upon social-cultural training, it is difficult to distinguish so sharply between original and learned impulsions. *Drive* and *motive* will be used interchangeably, although the context should make it clear whether the discussion bears on the more basic impulsions or not. The terms *incentive* and *aspiration* will be introduced later in discussing the function of the goal or end which is learned.

ever, let us note some of the familiar listings of adult drives or motivations, innate and acquired.

One of the early attempts of an American psychologist to escape the "instinct hypothesis" is illustrated in the listing of fundamental motives by Dunlap (1923), who used the term *desire*. He gave us a "tentative list" of "nine desires": (1) alimentary; (2) excretory; (3) rest; (4) activity; (5) shelter; (6) amatory; (7) parental; (8) pre-eminence; and (9) conformity. Shaffer (1936), representing a more recent attempt, notes the following motives: (1) subsistence, such as food-getting, provision for shelter, and the like; (2) mastery, the desire to dominate a person or situation; (3) social approval; (4) conformity; (5) sexual; and (6) mixed motives including various combinations of the others. *He also points out that habits themselves may serve to motivate activity over a wide range of situations.* He also strongly stresses the role of the emotions in motivation. Thus rage plays an important part in the desire for mastery; love in the demand for social approval, and in sex; fear is a strong component behind the conformity motives. Another writer, Prescott (1938), has combined unlearned and acquired motives or needs into three large classes: *physiological, social, and egoistic*. The first has to do with physical demands of bodily survival: air, food, elimination, shelter, avoidance of disease and danger, activity and its counterpart rest, and sexuality. All these may be more or less influenced by learning. The group of social needs are chiefly those of affection, "belongingness" or participation, and "likeness to others." Finally, the ego needs are concerned with the organization of selfhood and have to do with such matters as adequate contact with material and social-cultural reality and a satisfactory degree of harmony therewith, including adequate realization of the "authority" of things and persons. Furthermore, selfhood involves the increased "symbolization" or meaningfulness of experience, "self-direction" of one's activity, a capacity to effectuate "a fair balance between success and failure," and an attainment of adult individuality or that unique integration of self which operates to make adaptation particularly one's own yet efficient with reference to the obligations to others.

The psychoanalyst Freud (1920) simplified the drives unduly. He gave but passing reference to the demands for subsistence and concentrated his attention—on the basis of his medical practice—largely on the place of sexuality in motivating human activity. He has from time to time modified the earlier concepts, and he and his followers now postulate two major trends: the "life instinct" and the "death instinct." The former is linked up with the emotions of love and sympathy and sex; the latter with man's aggressiveness, his selfishness, his ego development. Others, like Adler (1925), once a follower of Freud, posited one major impulsion, the desire for power. Still other psychiatrists have worked out other listings, chiefly dependent upon their academic training and the empirical demands of their work for some sort of convenient categories by means of which they might classify their clinical data. Thom (1932) notes five basic drives: (1) desire for food, drink, and bodily comforts; (2) intellectual curiosity; (3) lust for power; (4) desire for recognition by others; (5) desire for security.

The name of W. I. Thomas (1923) has long been closely associated with his schema of four wishes: (1) the desire for new experience; (2) the desire for security;

(3) the desire for (intimate) response; and (4) the desire for recognition. And Sayles (1928), a student of child behavior problems, notes the fundamental "emotional needs of the child" as (1) demand for security; (2) need to grow into independence of personality; (3) need for a concrete and more or less attainable ideal or goal; and (4) the desire for companionship, with parents and with others of about the same age.

Merely for purposes of description we may classify the more important motives as follows: (1) the fundamental physiological ones, no matter how they are qualified or altered by experience; (2) the social-cultural motives, especially desires for power or mastery and consequent recognition by others, and for companionship, and for sexual interstimulation and response; (3) curiosity or inventiveness and the related exploratory patterns, in which habits acquired from culture play a definite part; and (4) goal-seeking itself, which covers acquired needs for aims, ideals, or patterns of behavior projected into the future. In this last class sheer habits of activity—perseverative trends—may play a large part in keeping the individual going.

It is apparent that there is no end to the making of such lists, just as there was formerly no limit to classifying original instincts. At best these lists are convenient descriptive categories; at worst they attempt to "explain" behavior; that is, they are employed as "causes." Actually, of course, we must avoid this latter inclination if we are to proceed beyond mere description of personality. Yet these concepts do provide a convenient beginning toward a more satisfactory classification of motives and hence aid us in getting beyond the merely unique and individualized activity of the moment. (See Chapter XI.) But possible listings aside, we must turn to examine other features of motivation, especially the time relation between the inciting drive and the attainment of the end or goal. This we shall treat as a cycle of activity.

CYCLES OF ACTIVITY

Although the more rudimentary reflexes, such as the dermal, eyelid, pupillary, and knee jerk, operate segmentally and somewhat independently to provide rather immediate adaptation to some external stimulus, many reflexes, both those that concern the internal sustaining systems and those that influence overt adaptation, operate as larger organizations or patterns. It is to one aspect of the activity of these more complex and associated reflexes that the concept "drive" is applied. "Drive" is but a convenient term to describe a certain early temporal phase of the adjustive activity going on in the organism between a state of disequilibrium and one of balance. The end processes themselves may be considered as "goal" or "object" toward which the organism strives or away from which it moves. Between the drive and the goal intervenes more or less extensive activity involving neuromuscular-glandular processes, to say nothing of the changes in the sustaining systems themselves. The attainment of the goal by the reduction of the tension, or, put otherwise, the satisfaction of want, need, or drive

leads ordinarily to a state of equilibrium, accompanied by a sense of well-being or pleasure.

All sorts of long-time and more or less automatic adjustive patterns develop which keep the organism going and which serve as a constant foundation for the cyclical or recurring alterations in the adaptive reactions. In these basic physiological adaptations, of course, the internal biochemical processes play the major part. We must never entirely forget that these essential functions of the sustaining systems lie behind many of the motives, habits, and goals which characterize one's daily adjustments.

The drives and cycles of activity. The cycle of activity may be divided, for convenience of description and analysis, into four stages: (1) need, want, drive, or physiological tension resulting from disequilibrium set up by internal or external stimuli; (2) initial seeking of the stimulus or situation which will satisfy this need—or, *per contra*, striving to avoid a stimulus if it blocks satisfaction—in short, preparatory effort of some sort; (3) final securing of, or avoidance of, the stimulus or situation, often referred to as consummatory activity; and (4) the sense of satisfaction, or release of tension or relaxation, associated with the state of equilibrium resulting from the attainment of the goal or end.³

The whole cycle may be thought of as a method of releasing tensions, and such release occurs through the consummatory or final response—an integrated activity of the highest importance to the balance of the organism. This freedom from strain is a pleasant, serene state, a sort of complacency in the organism which persists until a new cycle ensues. Much of the problem of maladjusted personality rests in the failure of the basic organic tensions to find socially acceptable releases. The partial response is unsatisfactory. Frequently a more or less complete blocking of the releasing responses leads to pathological developments.

In some drive-to-goal relations there is essentially an effort to continue to secure more and more of the satisfying stimulus until release of the disturbing tension is attained, that is, until satiation or consummatory response is reached. Such drives have been characterized by the term *adient*, from *adience*, which means the impulsion to go toward an object or goal. (See Holt, 1931.) Thus, in the taking of food or liquids, the organism, though incited by disturbing tensions or drives which we call hunger or thirst, by the processes of reflex circular action (see Chapter III) continues to absorb more and more of the stimulus, often until the hunger or thirst is more than appeased. So, too, the whole range of love reactions takes on this character, from the tactile stimulation of the erogenous areas of the

³ This scheme of fundamental animal activity was suggested by Craig's (1918) theory of appetites and aversions as dynamic forces in behavior, the appetites or aversions depending for their inception on the physiological drives. Dewey (1925) employs the three concepts *need*, *effort*, and *satisfaction* as the stages in any cycle. See also Raup (1925).

body to the acquired items in the love life of adolescents or adults. In the same way training in social contact leads to continued desire for companionship, or for prestige and power, or for new adventure, or for security, or for any number of other things about which it may be said, in the jargon of the street, that "the more we get, the more we want." It is, in fact, just this sort of repetition of activity which is termed in psychology *perseveration*. In general, these adient drives include the whole range of adaptation by approach to, or appropriation of, the stimuli.

But, as noted above, in other cycles from drive to goal the organism, from the outset, is concerned with escape or withdrawal from the unpleasant or distressing stimulus which sets up the need or drive in the first instance. These latter may be called *avoidant* drives. With reference to physiological tensions nearly all the basic drives are thus avoidant. Certainly hunger, thirst, elimination of the bowels or bladder, and the primary sexual impulses could be considered avoidant in the sense that tensions in the organs and glands lead to efforts to find a release or an escape from the distressing states of tissue pressure involved. From this standpoint only such stimulation as mild tickling or touch or stroking the skin would be adient at the physiological level. All the internally initiated drives and those arising from painful stimuli outside would be avoidant at their inception. But with learning many of the avoidant and unpleasant physiological drives become adient. It is only because man is socially and culturally influenced by his fellows that the Roman poet Martial could safely say, "Man is the only animal that drinks without being thirsty and makes love at all seasons." A difficulty may arise, of course, as to when to designate an activity as adient or avoidant. Certainly, once learning sets in, it seems more in keeping with the facts to classify those drives which lead normally to further effort to secure an enhancement of the stimuli in terms of amount or intensity as adient, even though the drive itself depends upon disequilibria induced from unpleasant effects within or without the organism.

For instance, drives for the elimination of bodily waste from the bowels or the bladder may be called avoidant in the sense that throughout the aim of the organism is to get rid of a disturbing stimulus. So, too, noxious substances and tissue-injuring stimuli, such as sharp objects and excessive heat or cold, set up withdrawal reactions. Moreover, through training many other avoidant patterns arise. Thus we may learn to avoid speaking to a particular individual, or to retreat from social contacts which injure our self-esteem, or to turn in anger against persons of another race, class, religion, or nationality. That is to say, from our experience in society we acquire a large number of both adient and avoidant drives.

Yet the matter is not so simple as all this. Even the most attractive stimulus loses its appeal with persistent presentation and absorption. There is an original organic and later an acquired limit to how much one can

eat or drink. One palls in time at love-making. Repeated contact with crowds or even with a friend may lead to a certain state of surfeit, and one wants to do something else or be with someone else or even to be alone for a time. In short, the satiation of an adient drive may lead to indifference, or to a shift from adience to avoidance. There is a limit to the perseveration of any stimulus-response relationship. This important fact in behavior will be treated under the concept of ambivalence. (See Chapter VI.)

Likewise, what are originally more obviously avoidant reactions may change their meaning for the individual. Thus, in the very process of voiding the bladder or lower bowel, an individual may get a certain pleasure even though the inception of the activity may be designated as avoidant and unpleasant. Then there are such striking instances as where individuals have been known to "enjoy" pain and suffering. Such were evidently the Christian martyrs who gave their lives for a cause; such were the flagellants who enjoyed beating each other severely for the sake of their salvation; such are the performers at many religious-magical rites in which the participants dance on burning coals or thrust sharp instruments into their flesh, obviously with pleasure and often with no serious organic aftereffects. In other words, drives which at the original physiological level may be classed as avoidant may by learning become adient.

It must be emphasized throughout that the stages of cyclic activity apply equally well to the basic physiological and to the more "human" and habituated motives. Moreover, society and culture constantly interfere and qualify the cycles. First, social-cultural forces provide the individual with new drives and with new goals. Desires for mastery and ego satisfaction, for new experience and curiosity, for aesthetic stimulation, and many others arise from learning in large part. Second, there occurs through learning a certain reduction in the elements in the cycle itself. That is, habit as such comes to operate as an impulsion, and we often move almost automatically from drive to goal without the usual conscious restlessness or seeking of solutions. This reduction in the cycle is highly effective in adaptation. As a consequence of this reduction of the elements and of the time involved, the cyclic nature of much behavior is lost to awareness. Furthermore, it is often difficult to alter the deeply perseverative character of many of our learned patterns even though they may rather obviously prevent an efficient adaptation to a particular situation. The inertia of old habits is all too evident: it typifies the place of *fixity* as against *flexibility* in the adaptive process. (See Chapters II and VI.)

There are obviously various time sequences in activity cycles. Some of these are limited distinctly by basic physiological changes. For example, those concerned with food, sleep, elimination, and immediate survival are necessarily short-circuited as to time, although they are capable of modification through learning. The sex cycles may be sublimated or controlled

for much longer periods, but, as Freud and others have shown, not infrequently with rather serious results to the normal man or woman. But the socially acquired cycles looking to vocational preparation and accomplishment, successful marriage, good citizenship, and religious or moral life may extend over years.

There are two other important aspects of the cycle of activity which we must examine. First, no discussion of motivation would be adequate without reference to feelings and emotions. The basic physiological drives—connected as they are with the sustaining functions of respiration, circulation, digestion, elimination, sex, and other organic processes—are linked with pleasant or unpleasant feelings and with various emotional states. Moreover, in the striving to attain the goal, or in failure to secure it, the feelings and emotions play important parts. And certainly the sense of release or relaxation which follows the consummatory responses may be defined in terms of feelings. Second, it is clear that the course of events from drive to goal may be greatly influenced by experience, or, more technically, by learning. Not only may the drives be modified, elaborated, or acquired by conditioning, but the course of activity from drive to consummation is highly qualified and altered by what we acquire in the way of habits, attitudes, and ideas. Likewise, the goals at which we aim are also profoundly changed and expanded by learning. This chapter will close with a discussion of feelings and emotions; learning and the related factors of interaction will be treated in the next two chapters.

FEELINGS AND EMOTIONS

Common-sense observation of themselves and of others led people long ago to draw a distinction between mental and bodily states which they call "emotional," "excited," "depressed," or "full of feeling" and those which are called "intellectual," that is, which appear as calm, unruffled, and unmarked by noticeable bodily or mental disturbance. People refer to some experiences as intensely pleasant or unpleasant and as marked by fear, rage, love, sorrow, joy, and the like. Other experiences do not seem characterized—at least to any marked degree—by emotions or strong feelings.

The term *feeling* has been used (1) for the experience of pleasantness or unpleasantness; (2) as a descriptive term for mild emotional experiences themselves; and (3) as a term to describe vaguely perceived sensations which do not have the clearly defined qualities that accompany full perceptions, as when we speak of a feeling of insecurity or a feeling of emptiness. We shall use the term only in the first sense, to refer to the state or experience of pleasantness or unpleasantness.

Emotion may be considered as the sum total of experiences during any period of stirred-up bodily changes induced by "startle," "upset," and the

like. There is usually a condition of poorly co-ordinated responses, denoted by terms like "surprise," "amazement," "start," or "shock." Moreover, these emotional states not only are introspectively evident but are "expressed"—and hence observable by others—by such manifestations as alterations in pulse and breathing rates, changes in skin color, trembling of hands or feet, appearance of perspiration, changes in digestive and eliminative activities, and facial, manual, and other bodily gestures.

There are many theories of feelings and many attempts to link the feelings with neurological functions. Thus F. H. Allport (1924) has presented a theory of feelings which would correlate states of pleasantness with the operations of the parasympathetic or cranial-sacral division of the autonomic system, and unpleasantness with the activities which involve the sympathetic or thoracic-lumbar section of the autonomic.

Allport's theory is suggestive and valuable as an attempt to link up feelings with bodily reactions. Certainly pleasant feelings accompany the satisfactions of hunger, thirst, sexual urge, and sensitive zone reactions, such as tickling and laughter—all which activities are accompanied by parasympathetic innervations in the autonomic system. As we grow to maturity, moreover, these activities become distinctly associated with ego- or self-expansion and sociability. In contrast, unpleasant feelings most often seem associated with rage, fear, pain, and associated inhibitive, protective, and withdrawal reactions of the organism—all linked to the sympathetic section.

So, too, there have been many theories of emotion. The best-known of these is that independently enunciated by William James and Carl Lange. The James-Lange theory—as it came to be called—held that emotions as experience arise from the bodily changes themselves and denied the common-sense interpretation that bodily states follow upon the perception of emotion itself. As William James put it, we are afraid because we run; we do not run because we are afraid; we are sorry because we cry, not vice versa. Although this theory needs considerable modification in the light of experimental findings and clinical observations, the importance of bodily states which James and Lange emphasized cannot be gainsaid.

Nature of feelings and emotions. When we turn to the physiologist or experimental psychologist for a satisfactory description and definition of feelings and emotions, we are impressed by the fact that, while they can provide us with an elaborate array of experimental findings and many interesting clinical observations, they still fail to give us a very satisfactory definition of these terms, nor do they provide us with a well-rounded and well-substantiated general theory of the feelings and emotions—their relation to each other, to the intellectual processes, and to the whole broad matter of adaptive reactions. Yet, in spite of these handicaps, both physiology and psychology have much to contribute to a fuller understanding of the place of feelings and emotions in the total picture of behavior.

The manner of testing and reporting feelings and emotions varies. We have to depend first of all largely upon the verbal report of ourselves or others, that is, upon introspection. But such reports are always open to criticism because they are so intimate and personal and because the words we use to describe these states are usually not carefully defined. Second, various physiological tests have been devised for getting at measures of organic changes in heart action, blood pressure, respiration, perspiration, and the like. But these criteria of emotions, as Landis *et al.* (1925) have shown, give rise to many difficulties for want of standards for correlating the physiological changes with introspective reports and with the type of situation in which the individual tested finds himself. So, too, countless studies have been made of so-called "expressive" movements, especially of the face and hands, with the aim of determining in this manner some standard criteria of feeling and emotion. But neither do these seem entirely satisfactory. As a matter of fact, the whole literature on feelings and emotions is in a somewhat confused and equivocal state. Yet no matter how equivocal and unsatisfactory the detailed data may be, all agree that feelings and emotions exist and that they play a very large part in the activity of the individual. (For discussion of emotions and feelings and difficulties of interpretation, see Bard, 1934; Landis, 1934; and Ruckmick, 1936.)

We know from studies of infants that such stimuli as dropping the child, producing loud sounds in his presence, shaking him when he is asleep, or stimulating him with painful or noxious substances produce changes in behavior which spread over the entire body and are marked by violence of response, crying, and other movements; or that stroking, patting, or stimulating the erogenous zones produces widespread expansive cooing and evidently pleasurable responses. J. B. Watson (1924) designated the former as fear and rage, the latter as love. In criticism, M. and I. Sherman (1928) have ably demonstrated that these early responses are not clear-cut and that adults vary greatly in verbally defining these activities of infants. The Shermans believe that these reactions are adaptive, but they scout the idea that we should designate them as specific emotions. They point out, moreover, that sudden, unexpected, and intense stimuli are doubtless more significant than is the nature of the stimulation itself. These early responses are rather generalized, unco-ordinated, and nonspecific. G. M. Stratton (1928) and K. M. B. Bridges (1932), among others, have chosen to designate these early responses by the term *excitement*. And as Harlow and Stagner (1932) have contended, this sort of reaction is probably to be thought of as a phase of feeling rather than as emotion proper. Bridges (1932) holds that it is from this primary excitement that differentiation of response into "distress" or "delight" gradually takes place: the former furnishes the basis of fear, anger, avoidance, and aggression; the latter of love, joy, and pleasant, sympathetic responses. (See also Landis and Hunt, 1939, on the nature of the basic startle response.)

With reference to feelings and emotions, therefore, as to many other patterns of bodily activity, development seems to proceed from generalized mass activity to specific, differentiated patterns of response. Assuming this principle of growth to be sound, we should say, then, that early states of feeling—excitement, pain, and pleasure—become through learning differentiated into such commonly named emotions as fear, rage, love, joy, and sorrow. It seems reasonable, therefore, to consider the foundation of both

feelings and emotions as a general bodily and mental state of startle, upset, or excitement which possesses negative or unpleasant and positive or pleasant qualities. In the course of experience these generalized states—with their accompanying organic changes in heart action, respiration, blood pressure, digestion, and so on—become specifically linked to perceptive objects or stimuli. Hence it is not until the discriminating factors of perception, which involve the cortical centers, come into play that we get emotions as the growing child and adult know them.

Such a view also correlates with a current theory of emotion—largely the outcome of Cannon's work—which departs considerably from the James-Lange thesis. This theory contends that there is a close correlation between the perceptive (meaningful) features of emotion and the bodily changes, and that emotion does not consist merely in a perception of the bodily changes themselves. Rather it is through the co-ordinating function of the thalamus or diencephalon—an all-important relay station between the lower and upper brain centers—that the perceptive features of emotions are linked with the bodily states. In brief, there is ample evidence that animals and men experience emotions even when the autonomic and lower control centers which mediate the bodily changes are put out of commission and when all, or nearly all, visceral sensations have been eliminated. Thus the severance of the nerves leading to the cortex from the autonomic centers in experimental dogs and cats did not prevent these animals from showing emotional states. (See Sherrington, 1906; and Cannon, 1929.) Likewise, the clinical observations of human subjects by Head (1920) and Kinnier Wilson (1924, 1929) demonstrate that patients with neural disorganization involving the autonomic system still experience emotions. (For a review of this literature see Bard, 1934.)

This theory does not deny the importance of bodily changes, but it indicates how the peculiar quality of emotional experiences is added to the perception of the object which sets up the experience. It is not that the thalamus is "the seat of the emotions," but that it operates to co-ordinate the relations of perception and meaning with the bodily changes. It also provides a means for understanding how learning may enter into the whole situation since the inhibitory influence of the cortex over the thalamus makes it possible to block or to facilitate the outflow of impulses from this center to the viscera and skeletal muscles. In other words we may say that the cerebral cortex is the dominant gradient in the inception and control of emotions.

A realization that the specific emotions are really learned on the basis of the primary constitutional states of excitement or upset, with their qualities of pleasantness or unpleasantness, and that the cerebral processes act to inhibit or facilitate overt expression of these affective states, makes it possible to understand the wide variation in emotional responses among people of divergent classes and societies in terms of their cultural and social training. It also provides a means for understanding the wide divergence in verbal reports about emotional states from the man in the street and the human subject of laboratory experimentation. Since human learning takes place in a social milieu, it is evident not only that the emotions in one sense

are learned responses but that they are *socially* determined. F. Brown (1934, p. 453) has stated a theory of emotions which takes this into account:

"We will regard emotional behavior as that type of behavior which arises whenever an individual is confronted with a *situation* to which he is unable to react in accordance with the principle of minimal action (traversing the shortest path in the shortest time).⁴ As a consequence of such a predicament the normal machinery of the body initiates changes in available energy which should enable the individual to overcome whatever obstacle blocks free movement. Tension (between organism and obstacle) increases with accumulation of energy until the organism breaks through the barrier (which may be actually physical, such as placing an individual in a cage, or else social, where the wishes, aims, or goals of the individual are interfered with). Fruitless attempts to surmount the obstacle may result in exhaustion of available energy generated by the situation. *The situations giving rise to such surcharged reactions determine to a very great extent what the emotion shall be called*, and since there is a wide range on the curve of normal distribution for average reactions, many types of situations have become so familiar in the experience of the race that they are labeled with standardized names such as love, fear, hate, anger, and so forth." (Italics in original.)

The emergence of specific emotions from a fundamental mass-activity basis in excitement or upset is represented schematically in Figure 4. On the broad base of excitement or startle the primary division is that between pleasantness or "delight," to use Bridges' term, and unpleasantness or "distress." Then upon these feeling-emotional fundamentals the linkage of specific objects of attention or the situation gives rise to particular emotions which we learn from others to label "anger," "fear," and "love." From these again would arise still more specific emotionalized responses, such as grief, filial affection, pity, and various degrees of anger, such as irritation or indignation, or of fear, such as strong or mild anxiety. All these latter take on meaning only by their association to objects or ideas or attitudes which carry with them socially acquired labels or words. There is a rough dimension of time indicated on the left of the figure which would represent genetically the development from the generalized feeling-emotional states of infancy to the more specific and highly intellectualized emotions of maturity. Yet it must also be borne in mind that under great stress or crisis rudimentary fear, rage, or love may be invoked or that with still greater crisis the individual may be thrown back to a very infantile mass-activity state of excitement. This is evident in neurotic and psychotic persons; it is evident in whole masses of people in the face of flood, fire, or earthquake. It is seen in the violence of mob members or in the panic of any group in the face of untoward physical danger with which the members do not know how to cope.

⁴ "The principle of minimal action must be viewed as a relative concept when applied to human behavior. What is minimal action for one individual may be maximal for another and vice versa. Considerable variation with regard to minimal action probably occurs in the same individual's behavior." (Brown's footnote.)

The emotions and associated feelings of pleasantness and unpleasantness have a remarkably wide range of effects upon the ideas, attitudes, and habits of the individual. Apparently love and its emergent specific emotions of sympathy, pity, and parental, filial, and sexual affection serve to facilitate social interaction as well as all sorts of learning processes. So, too, anger reactions become definitely associated with frustration of impulse toward a goal in the struggle for power or prestige. These are often considered the




FIGURE 4, showing schematically the development of feelings and specific emotions from the primary basis of states of excitement or startle. (The highly specific emotions, such as various forms of love, of anger, and of fear, are merely illustrative of many others. Moreover, many specific emotions are compounds involving linkages of more rudimentary emotions of anger, fear, and love.)

core emotional state in aggression. Fear, too, may arise as a result of the blocking of an ongoing activity. Certainly fear is the great inhibitor of action and is linked to avoidance and submission. But its effects are not altogether deleterious for the individual.⁵ It serves useful functions in developing caution in hazardous situations and has its place—at least at sublimated levels—in fostering co-operation and mutual aid and thus in assisting love reactions in binding groups of individuals together.

But the feelings and emotions do not stand alone; they are important

⁵ Shaffer (1936, p. 368) goes so far as to state, "Fear seems to be the one human trait of which the complete elimination would be most desirable." Founded as fear is upon constitutional factors, there does not seem much likelihood of Shaffer's pious wish being fulfilled. In fact, in his own discussion Shaffer recognizes certain utilities in fear responses.

components of much of our behavior associated with the fundamental drives and processes of adaptation to society. Let us look more closely at their connection with the cycles of activity.

Feelings and emotions and cycles of activity. As we have already noted, the drive—or, if you will, physiological tension, need, want, desire, or impulse—arises from a state of disequilibrium within the organism or from changes in balance brought about within the organism by outside stimulation. The incitement to activity constitutes a crisis in the life of the individual demanding some sort of adjustment, and needs or wants are clearly associated with or accompanied by feelings and emotions. Often, if not always, there is a sense of strain or stress which is unpleasant or painful. In view of this imbalance the organism is faced with possibilities of failure. One may draw again upon the Cannon theory of emergency to help describe the process of adaptation. (See Chapter II.) The nervous system and the adrenals and other glands evidently play a definite part in preparing the organism for meeting the changes involved in drive or need or want. The organism, in short, is energized to meet its difficulties.

Then, as the organism goes on into the second stage of the cycle to seek some stimulus which will provide satisfaction, or to avoid the unpleasant stimulus which threatens it, the feelings and emotions act as a constant “reminder” that the consummatory reactions are not yet at hand. In other words, feelings and emotions form a substratum to the whole series of overt trials or to the subjective, internal, or anticipatory processes which characterize the second stage of any cycle. Put otherwise, feelings and emotions tend to accompany all overt learning and all the so-called intellectual processes—themselves concerned fundamentally with instrumenting the organism to some sort of final and consummatory adaptation. In fact, what we recognize as the “cold,” that is, intellectual, processes, to use Cason’s (1933) expression, are usually accompanied by some of the “warm” ones—feelings and emotions. Even the most abstract thinking of logician or scientist is doubtless kept alive by these substrata. *In this sense the feelings and emotions must be considered basic to all drives and to all cycles of activity.* They represent the fact that the organism remains constantly in a state of disequilibrium until the solution of the problem or the satisfaction of the need is at hand. It must be recalled again that fundamental physiological drives have a *characteristic unpleasant* feeling tone; attainment of goal objects, a pleasant feeling tone.

Moreover, just as habits may themselves become drives to a wide range of activities, so specific or generalized emotion-feeling states may come to serve as motives to all sorts of behavior. For example, a phobia (a strong compulsive fear) may serve to direct many daily activities of an individual: claustrophobia (fear of closed places) may keep a person from attending motion pictures, lectures, or other social gatherings indoors. Or the fear of

open spaces (agoraphobia) may motivate all sorts of avoidances of certain situations. In like manner emotions growing out of anger may induce a temperamental quality of irritability or impulsiveness which may become an habitual phase of a person's social adaptation. Likewise, love, intense grief, or any other emotion may serve as a definite activating factor in setting up a variety of cycles.

Moreover, some writers have indicated a certain division in the place of emotions and feelings in behavior. That is, as Bayley (1928) points out, we may well distinguish between those emotional-feeling states marked by strong bodily changes—usually induced by great stress, actual or imagined—and those milder but more continuing states of emotion and feeling that underlie most of our daily activities. These latter are sublimated forms of the former; they serve as the driving core of our interests and habits. Thus, as J. B. Watson once put it, a man in great rage may be able to turn much of the accumulated energy into creative and useful work. Yet for most of us it would be too great a risk to operate under such stress, since the more violent emotions are likely so to disorganize the habitual patterns as to make us not more but less competent. Nevertheless, the place of strong emotions and feelings in the face of what we consider basic crises—either physical or cultural—is always evident, and without them men would not be motivated to great feats of either heroism or cruelty—be it in a political, an economic, a religious, or any other situation. (See William James, 1911, on the function of emotion in critical situations.)

When the solution is attained and we pass into a state of satisfaction, complacency, or relaxation, the feelings of pleasure or the sense of security or perhaps in some instances of indifference remains for a time. The pleasant feelings following successful issue of a cycle serve to indicate that the goal itself is attained. But unfulfilled impulses, or uncompleted cycles, are likely to leave a residue of unpleasant feelings and emotions. The Freudian psychologists and other students of mental disorder have shown that the retention of unpleasant states is an important factor in relation to repressed mental and physical states that may express themselves in mental conflicts, in pathological activities, or in other ineffective forms of adaptation. (See Chapters XXVII and XXVIII.)

In the course of subsequent chapters numerous evidences of the interplay of motives and feeling-emotional states will be presented. Now we must turn to examine certain features of learning as they function with reference to the individual's acquired motives and forms of adaptation.

Chapter V

SOME ASPECTS OF SOCIAL LEARNING

AS NOTED in Chapter II, among the higher animals the nervous system provides a means of organizing and controlling the receptivity, modifiability, and reaction of the organism in ways which make for more effective adaptation. While many animal species do effect considerable changes in their environment, they have chiefly to learn to adjust themselves to the external conditions around them. But man is able not only to adapt himself to his environment but *to change profoundly the environment to fit his own needs*. It is here that society and culture come to play such important parts in the drama of human life. (See Chapter VII.) In the present chapter we shall examine more fully the mechanisms of learning which aid in man's adaptation, discussing in particular certain forms of learning, various factors therein, its organization, especially with reference to the more complex mental functions, and finally the importance of the persistent effects which emerge as a result of such acquirements.

SOME GENERAL FORMS OF LEARNING

Learning, which refers ordinarily to habit formation of one sort or another, obviously comes into play because of some disturbance in the adaptive relations of the organism to its environment. There are all sorts of acquired reactions, which in turn will temporarily or more permanently alter still later adaptation. Some concern general bodily adjustment, such as the almost automatic responses involved in postural changes, walking, manual movements, and the avoidance of unpleasant, painful, or noxious stimuli. At more complex levels it arises from some felt difficulty, some problem, critical situation, or crisis for which the individual is not adequately prepared by reason of original constitutional make-up or by virtue of previous experience, that is, earlier adaptation. Learning may be conscious and deliberate; it may be and often is involuntary. Much of it is doubtless unconscious. (See L. E. Baker, 1938.) Many of our habits are developed early in life and represent automatic and relatively nonvoluntary learning. These serve, in fact, as the foundation upon which other acquirements are built and from which they operate. Other habits arise, both involuntarily and deliberately, more directly in connection with the cycles which carry the individual from drive to goal or consummation. In fact, the

intention to learn may be thoroughly conscious, but the mechanisms of acquiring the knowledge or skill may themselves be nonvoluntary. Then there are the habits developed from more conscious purposes, such as muscular skills enabling the person to manipulate material objects and tools more effectively. We have already observed that our emotions are largely learned, and usually at a nonvoluntary level. For example, fear of the dark, easy incitement to anger, and the affections are all acquired.

Yet habits are not confined alone to overt bodily movements but are also built up in language and the use of symbols. Words as *power-devices* to control other people and ourselves are basic, as later discussions will amply demonstrate. There are habits of attention. A traveling salesman will notice billboard or other advertising that a college professor engrossed in philosophic cogitations would completely ignore. Then, too, there are more or less generalized habitual responses which we call traits and attitudes—friendliness, irritability, tendencies to avoid or seek out social companionship, a wide variety of prejudices against persons or events, and the like.

Certain fundamentals in learning. For purposes of description and interpretation we may distinguish between learning and maturation (not that the two processes are not connected, for they are). But *learning* is usually applied to changes which go on within the organism as a result of its exposure to the external environment in certain specific ways. Its effects are, of course, embedded in the tissue, but they are perhaps best measured by changes in behavior through a time dimension. That is, given a new association of stimuli not previously presented together, it is later evident that certain determinable effects upon the organism have been produced thereby. On the other hand, *maturation*, as we pointed out in Chapter III, is used to designate modifications which arise as a result of the operation of forces within the organism which, though "not occurring in independence of external circumstances," are not obviously or directly influenced by training or external adaptation. (See Carmichael, 1936.)

In treating the topic of adjustment, psychologists usually distinguish between material and social stimuli, but we take the position that all fundamental adaptation, even that which concerns learning to manipulate and control the material environment (beyond the most rudimentary physiological sort), is socially and culturally qualified in one way or another. (These matters will be discussed more fully in Chapters IX and X.)

Taking our cue from the concepts of organic receptivity, modifiability, and reactivity (see Chapter II), we may describe the learning process as the relation of three factors (variables): (1) the stimulus and its reception, (2) the organic changes and modifications, largely neural, resulting from the reception, and (3) the response through muscles and glands. It is apparent at once that the fundamental factor in learning is the association or linkage of old and new relations among these three. The persistence

of any new connections depends upon changes wrought in neural tissue or in functional rearrangements. As already remarked, such an acquired element may be described by the concept *engram* or *neurogram*.

For the most part, the studies of learning have been concerned necessarily with an examination of the stimuli or the responses, or of both. It is extremely difficult to get at the neural and other organic factors which intervene between the reception and the reaction. At best, the investigator must take refuge in inference and theory. However, the important function of the higher brain centers, especially of the cerebral cortex, is indicated in all significant theories. Some writers emphasize the importance of the synaptic connections, others the place of differential electrical potentials in the nerve fibers, still others the possible chemical changes in the neural structures. Yet, in spite of the vast literature on learning, the precise physical nature of these internal changes remains unknown. Concerning the varied theories of learning couched in neurological terms, Lashley (1934, p. 493) goes so far as to say: "It is doubtful that we know anything more about the mechanism of learning than did Descartes when he described the opening of the pores in the nerves for the passage of animal spirits." But, theory aside, the alterations made in the brain and in other nervous tissue surely influence future acquirements. This internal neural activity may act to set off or modify overt reactions which initially may be set in motion by some incoming sensory stimuli. That is, the neurogram determines in part the internal processes and in turn more or less profoundly alters the influence of external stimuli upon conduct. In short, the control function of the cortex is a fundamental feature of all the more complex and more adequate forms of adjustment.

For purposes of review we may refer to three important sources of data on learning: (1) studies in trial-and-error learning, (2) investigations of the conditioned reflex, and (3) the contributions from the adherents of the *Gestalt* or configurational theories of psychology.¹

Trial-and-error learning. One of the oldest common-sense observations about learning is couched in the proverb, "If at first you don't succeed, try and try again." Doubtless the great bulk of nonvoluntary and automatic learning is of this character. Not only are manual skills of all sorts acquired by repeated efforts until we are successful or give up the attempt, but the management of social situations is also learned by much the same method. So, too, verbal skills such as use of words, pronunciation, and many stereotyped vocalisms are acquired in the same way. In other words, barring organic incapacity, or, in terms of the situation, barring too difficult a problem, we finally hit upon some type of action which gives us the results we

¹ The student may refresh his memory of the details on learning by reference to any good standard textbook in psychology. See *inter alia* Thorndike (1932); Stone (1934); Hull (1934); Lashley (1934); Hunter (1934); Guthrie (1935); Ruch (1937); Dashiell (1937); Woodworth (1940); Husband (1940).

want. A great deal of experimental work with animals and with human beings has taken its lead from such everyday experiences, and the literature of psychology is filled with accounts of how rats, cats, dogs, birds, monkeys, apes, and human beings, by "trial and error" and finally by success, found their way through a maze, got out of a locked cage, solved some kind of mechanical contrivance such as a puzzle box, or learned a list of nonsense syllables in order to secure some reward. The measure of success or failure is usually recorded in terms of the number of errors made and the amount of time consumed until the solution is reached. Ingenious psychologists have filled their days and nights contriving ever-new tricks, puzzles, and other problems with all sorts of amazing mechanical devices to aid them to discover the basic principles of learning by the try-and-try-again methods.

The theory behind such investigations is that learning takes place in piecemeal fashion, termed the part-whole method. We acquire first one item and then another as we proceed to the final solution or skill. It is essentially a matter of segmental and differential behavior, of selecting the key features more or less one at a time. In the course of time these separate items get co-ordinated into larger total patterns. The novice at golf "works" on his stance, on the proper grip, or his swing, his torso-leg reactions—one item at a time—hoping that in due course he will get all these elements necessary to success in striking a golf ball merged into an efficient total. Actually, of course, so far as neuromuscular mechanisms are concerned, we do not yet know just *how* this co-ordination takes place. But we do know that integration does occur in much if not in all learning.

The conditioned-reflex methods. It is apparent that habit formation must bring about some modifications in reflex-arc organization. (See Chapter III.) But we owe to two Russian physiologists, Bechterev (1933) and Pavlov (1928), a great debt for having initiated and stimulated a large number of studies in learning, animal and human, which have thrown light on the mechanics of habit formation.

Pavlov's classic experiment was that of training a dog so that he would produce saliva at the ringing of a bell. It is not "natural" for the sound of a bell to induce salivary responses, though, of course, the bell will set up wiggling of the ears or other reactions constitutionally linked to such a stimulus. A dog, into whose mouth had been attached an apparatus for draining saliva, was placed in a harness attached to a kind of stall or stand. Then a bell was sounded, and a pellet of food was given the animal. Salivation began, and the amount of saliva produced could be measured. After several presentations of the stimuli of food and bell together, the bell was sounded without the food, and it was found that the dog salivated about as copiously as he had done when the two stimuli were given together. The dog was now said to be conditioned to salivation at the ringing of the bell, and the reaction was said to be a conditioned reflex, since it was attached to or connected with the novel or conditioned stimulus. Since the food will set up salivation, it may be called the biologically adequate or unconditioned stimulus, and the bell the conditioned stimulus.

Conditioning, in short, means the association of one operating reflex arc with another; that is, a stimulus originally inadequate to elicit a particular response attains this capacity by pairing with the "natural" or adequate stimulus for the response.




FIGURE 5, showing schematically the linkage of old and new stimuli-response patterns to form a conditioned reflex.

Figure 5 illustrates the process schematically. $S_1 \rightarrow R_1$ represents the course of activity from food stimulus to eating response. $S_2 \rightarrow R_2$ indicates the course from the sound stimulus to such a reaction as movement of the ears. The new or learned connection is shown by the line $S_2 \rightarrow R_1$. It should be noted here that in this experiment the conditioning passes from S_2

to R_1 , that is, from the sound to the salivary response. One may ask why the conditioning does not also take place from S_1 to R_2 . The answer lies evidently in the fact that the salivary pattern, as it were, is prepotent for the time over any other. Theoretically, of course, this second type of conditioning is not out of the question.

While the bulk of the research on the conditioned reflex has concerned itself with simpler reflex combinations, there is no doubt that many of the facts discovered from the experiments in this field apply more generally to learning. In the first place, the time relations in the presentation of stimuli are important. In many of the earlier investigations of Pavlov and his followers the *new* or conditioned stimulus, such as the ringing of the bell, the sounding of a buzzer, or the mild electrical shock to the skin, was presented ahead of, or before, the unconditioned or biologically adequate stimulus, such as the food. This is called "forward conditioning." Or the two stimuli were presented simultaneously. More recently conditioning has been produced in some instances when the adequate or *old* stimulus was presented ahead of, or before, the new one. This is called "backward conditioning," but the results are not entirely clear, and there is considerable doubt as to the efficacy of this type of linkage. Apparently the same factors operate in much more complicated learning. A child performs some act which is followed almost immediately by some punishment by a parent or by the labeling of the act with some emotionalized word. Thereafter the linkage of the act and the parent's response, verbal or otherwise, remains to influence the child's subsequent conduct. Or the parent in trying to teach a child a new word presents an object, say a doll, simultaneously vocalizing the word "doll." And doubtless in some instances the responses to an old established stimulus may become hitched to a new stimulus which follows immediately upon it.

There have been literally hundreds of experiments on conditioning, both with animals and with human beings. (The reader may consult, for instance, Razran, 1933, 1935, and 1937. In the last reference Razran has listed 1111 titles to material on the conditioned response, classified under 115 different topics of investigation.) Moreover, a wide variety of special aspects of conditioning has been investigated. And many attempts have been made through experimentation and through logical inference to relate the principles of conditioning to those of trial and error and of *Gestalt* learn-

ing. In fact, the term *conditioning* has become almost synonymous with the term "learning." Although, strictly speaking, we are not ready for this extension of the former term to cover all learning, there is no doubt that many of the findings regarding conditioned responses throw light on aspects of trial and error and other forms of learning. (See Hilgard, 1937; and Hilgard and Marquis, 1940.)

The acquirement of new linkages involves a basic alteration in the tissues, neural and perhaps muscular. We must not, for example, imagine that the conditioned reaction is identical with the response which followed, before conditioning, the biologically adequate stimulus. Learning is not merely the summation of two fully integrated reflexes. As Hilgard and Marquis (1935, p. 53) well state, "The conditioned reflex can better be regarded as a *new* response which develops in the particular situation in which double stimulations are presented." Undoubtedly this comment would apply generally to the data of learning. The acquirement of overt or verbal reactions through training means that the tissues are profoundly altered, not that there is a mere addition of one simple pattern to another. (See the discussion of neurobiotaxis and circular reflex in Chapter III.)

The place of configuration in learning. In everyday life the acquirement of new habits is not as simple as is the induction of a conditioned reaction in a dog under controlled laboratory conditions, or as is trial-and-error learning carried on by the special devices of the technical psychologist. Common sense and clinical observation make it evident that children and adults acquire their new habits within the larger social and material setting, which is ordinarily much more complicated than are laboratory situations. Thus the child's learning the name of an object is qualified by the surroundings of the nursery or the playroom and by the emotional tone of the mother, nurse, brother, or sister, or whoever tries to teach him. The child in school is confronted not only by the arithmetic problems which he must solve but by the severe or easygoing teacher, by the pupils around him, and by the whole physical set-up of the classroom. (See Chapters XVII and XVIII.) Certainly his learning there will take on a different quality than it would if he were with his playmates outside the school. So, too, we remember acts or words acquired previously not as separate items but in certain relations. A melody is reproduced in proper sequence once the first few bars are recalled. In much learning, no doubt, items do not appear in a series to be added together but *often operate or relate to each other*. Thorndike (1931) calls this quality "belongingness." In like manner, while any given item to be learned may be considered to be in the focus of attention and activity, we must not neglect the associated social-material background which also influences the learning.

The so-called *Gestalt* school of psychology has taken its cue from this sort of fact and has developed research projects and a rather elaborate theoretical interpretation of behavior and thinking. The basic contention

is that learning must always take the configuration or *Gestalt* into account. (On *Gestalt* psychology see Ogden, 1926; Köhler, 1929; Helson, 1933; Koffka, 1935; W. D. Ellis, 1938.)²

The importance of *Gestalt* is well illustrated from the field of perceptual learning. Thus, in a simple experiment, animals were placed before two open boxes illuminated by light of some determined but different brightness—say the difference between 2 and 4. The animals were trained to go to the box of a certain brightness, say 4, and to the left. Then the brightness was changed, but the same ratio was retained, 4 and 8. The animals now responded to the higher brightness, 8, and not to 4. The inference is that they are reacting to a particular set of relationships of the stimuli rather than to the specific item, a box lighted to the brightness of 4.

Even the conditioned response is acquired within a larger patterning of stimuli. Razran (1939a) distinguishes between colligated and configurated conditioning. In the former a total pattern *and* its component parts operate together to induce a learned reaction. In the latter "the conditioned response is elicited only by the total pattern of conditioned stimuli and not by the components of the pattern." That is, the compounding of two or more stimuli—themselves related to a background—may fix learning, or the patterning itself may do so. (See Razran, 1939b.)

If a recognition of the place of configuration serves to correct the extreme atomism implied in the interpretation of conditioned-response mechanisms, another aspect of the *Gestalt* theory acts to offset the extremes of the theory of trial-and-error learning. The *Gestalt* psychologists have accumulated significant evidence that, in some situations at least, learning takes place rather suddenly without much or any evidence of preliminary trials. They call this "learning by insight"; that is, they contend that a higher mammal or human subject may perceive the correct relations necessary to solve a problem and proceed to its successful accomplishment without the customary random and often unsuccessful movements which trial and error imply.

A classic illustration of "insight" is that of Sultan, a chimpanzee studied by Köhler (1927). This ape was enclosed in a large cage, outside the bars of which was placed a food object too distant to be reached by hand. Two sticks were placed inside the cage and in front of the ape as he looked at the food. Neither of these sticks was of sufficient length to enable Sultan to use it to draw the food toward him. But the sticks had been fashioned like the joints in a fishing rod so that the end of one might be put into the open end of the other to make a stick of sufficient length to enable the ape to reach the food. The ape tried to reach the food with the aid of each of the sticks, separately. After a few unsuccessful attempts he squatted on his haunches and began playing "carelessly" with the two sticks. Having got the one

² The recognition that learning and behavior must always be considered with reference to the configuration or situation is by no means original with the members of the *Gestalt* school. Such matters have long been recognized in social psychology at least. (See Cooley, 1902; Thomas, 1923.)

stick in direct line with the other he thrust them to make a longer rod and got the food. This is called "insight." There was a relatively sudden and successful construction of a tool which enabled the animal to secure his goal and thus complete the food-getting cycle.

There is no doubt that much learning goes on in somewhat this fashion. In other words, practice or repetition is not entirely necessary in all instances. Just as some conditioned reactions are acquired with but one linkage, notably in those instances which involve strong emotional conditioning, so, too, some learning arises, apparently, without trial and error. Yet the attempt to reduce all learning to the *Gestalt* principles of configuration and insight is doubtless misleading. Hunter (1934, p. 562) remarks: "One may say that learning consists in the establishment of *Gestalten* or co-ordinations whose parts possess belongingness and that recall tends to lie within such wholes. The situation, however, is as well described in more conventional terms utilizing such concepts as stimulus-response, instruction stimulus, and habit."

VARIOUS FACTORS INFLUENCING LEARNING

There are a large number of factors, intrinsic and extrinsic, which serve to qualify the learning process, such as repetition, physiological conditions of the organism, motivation, emotions, and a large number of social or interactional situations.

Repetition of associations. The factor of frequency or practice is important in fixating a new pattern. Thorndike (1911, 1913) has stated the essential features of this factor in his concept of the *law of exercise*. Briefly put, this means that the strength and depth of the connection of a response to a situation will, other things being equal, depend upon the number of times the said response has been linked to the said situation and upon the vigor and duration of the association. The importance of repetition is well brought out in the studies of the conditioned response. Not only must a number of combinations of the new and the old reflexes be provided, but the simple conditioned reflex will ordinarily be dissipated if the adequate—that is, original—stimulus is not reintroduced from time to time until the new connections are established. Thus, though the dog will salivate to the sounding of the bell for several times after the connections have been set up, later the salivation disappears even though the ringing of the bell is continued. The exceptions to this "law," of course, are those connections made under great emotional distress or feeling, after which the single conditioning may last a lifetime, or those configured insightful associations which do not seem to arise from trial-and-error training: There are many instances of learning under conditions of shock. People acquire an emotionalized reaction to thunderstorms, to insects, to reptiles, to other

persons, and to a wide variety of stimuli. Many of these they can never shake off. Truly, intensity and vividness of the stimulus as well as its frequency must be taken into account in learning.

Other conditions influencing learning. All sorts of internal and external factors operate to affect the linkages fundamental to learning. At this point we need mention only some of the general matters which relate to the inception and carrying forward of learning as it has to do with the adaptation of the individual to his world. Some of the detailed features of these factors will be mentioned in other connections later. There is, of course, the general bodily state at the time the learning takes place. These conditions rest in part, no doubt, upon the functioning of the sustaining systems. The general neuromuscular readiness of the organism is important. There must be a "set" favorable to learning. Then, too, such matters as drowsiness, fatigue, the possible existence of diseased tissues, or the presence of toxins or infections will doubtless affect learning, but just what particular functions such factors perform we do not entirely know. Certainly, endocrine balance must be an influence, but again its specific significance is still largely unknown. So, too, matters such as age and maturation are to be recognized. Young persons learn more readily than oldsters, although the work of Thorndike *et al.* (1928) has shown that adults may continue to acquire new matter long after most of them give up trying to do so. Likewise, the work done in the measurement of intelligence has demonstrated that differences in intellectual capacity—many of which are doubtless constitutionally predetermined—play a distinctive part in limiting the possibilities of learning. In fact, intelligence is usually measured by devices of learning, direct or indirect—that is, through new learning or by testing materials already acquired, such as manual skill, memory, association, and verbal concepts. Another very important internal factor is, of course, motivation or intention, to be discussed below. External physical conditions also influence the learning, including such items as noise, ventilation, temperature, humidity, amount of oxygen in the air, and time of day. The importance of particular social circumstances will be discussed subsequently.

Many other factors serve to facilitate the acquirement of new forms of response. A simple case of facilitation is known as *summation*. If two stimuli are each independently conditioned to the same response, when both stimuli are applied together, they will as a rule evoke a stronger reaction than is produced by either stimulus operating alone. This is not a matter of mere arithmetical summation; sometimes the effects (as measured by salivation or other reflex) may be less than the arithmetical total; in some instances the summation is far in excess of mere addition of the two independent reflex effects. (See Hull, 1934, for references.) In these instances one conditioned pattern enhances or reinforces another. In somewhat like

manner we find all sorts of habits which serve to support each other—just as others tend to interfere with each other.

Motivation in learning. Perhaps the most powerful internal factor is the *intention* or motive to learn. It determines the intensity, single-mindedness, and attention which an individual will give to a task. This is evident since the need for acquirement of new ways of reaching one's goals or aims depends originally upon frustration or failure in moving at once and smoothly from drive to consummatory action with reference to the goal. In much animal and human experimentation the principal drive used was hunger, and we know, of course, that hunger is a prepotent drive of high importance.

Unfortunately there has been only a limited amount of careful experimentation with human subjects in relation to such basic drives as hunger, but the study of animal behavior has thrown much light on the importance of this basic impulsion. Thus, in summarizing his investigation of rates of learning among rats, Dodson (1917) states that "in the case of hunger, the rapidity of learning increases as the hunger increases." So, too, Tolman and Honzik (1930) note that hunger coupled with the final reward of food proved highly effective in the maze learning of rats. In other trial-and-error experimentation with animals sexual and maternal motivations have been employed. Simmons (1923, p. 79), using a variety of drives in maze learning, reported that the rate of acquirement varied with the drives. In this investigation the following represent the range from the most to the least effective motivations: "(1) female in heat [sex], (2) bread and milk followed by return to [the] home cage, (3) finding her litter at the end of the maze, (4) bread and milk, (5) sunflower seed, (6) return to [the] home cage, and (7) mere escape from the maze."

There is no doubt that the two motives—hunger and sex—play distinctive parts in the fundamental learning of human beings. Moreover, the arousal of any motive not quickly satisfied sets in motion a cycle in which ordinarily there is some thwarting or frustration. Hence the individual must find his satisfaction by seeking a means of securing the goal—the food, sexual mate, or other aim. Such obstruction, in fact, sets up greater expenditure of energy. (See Chapter IV.) There is often a great deal of emotional-feeling tone aroused, and the organism becomes highly active in trying to attain the goal. In fact, linkages set up under emotional circumstances tend, on the whole, to be more permanent and significant for the individual than do those which take place in the "cold light of reason." Over and over again we shall see how tremendously important the social-emotional training is in the person's adjustment.

Other evidence of the importance of emotional-feeling toning is shown by results from the learning of pleasant and unpleasant words. While Carter, Jones, and Shock (1934) and Carter (1935) found that the "efficiency of learning is greatest for pleasant words, intermediate for unpleasant words, and least for indifferent words," Cason (1932), Lynch

(1932), and Stagner (1933a) have reported that pleasant words are learned most easily, indifferent words less well, and unpleasant ones with least facility. But it is clear that it is the total setting in which words are learned which makes for differences in effectiveness. In everyday life many words acquire highly pleasant or unpleasant emotional connotations depending on their acceptance or rejection by others: parents, playmates, teachers, and preachers. The important point to remember is that not only drive or motive but the emotional toning and other factors will play a part in the whole learning process.

In many situations rewards and punishment operate to enhance or block successful training. Food or sex objects are usually considered as rewards. But in some habit formation punishment has its part. Thus, in trial-and-error maze learning, the introduction of electrically charged grids into the blind alleys of the maze—which represent false adjustment—will serve to speed up the rat's successful attainment of the goal sought. Prescott (1938, p. 169), in summarizing a variety of such experiments, remarks: "Punishment, administered during learning for mistakes made, has universally been found to increase the speed and efficiency of learning, providing it does not produce emotional reactions of more than a critical intensity." There is some truth in the old proverb: spare the rod and spoil the child. Thus the possible disastrous effects of punishment are qualified by the strength of the drive itself. In one learning experiment, J. Peterson (1930) penalized his subjects by an electric shock every time they gave the correct response. In spite of this unpleasant concomitant to correct reactions, the individuals learned at the usual rate found otherwise. Related to the use of rewards or punishment is the use of praise or reproof. (See below.)

The influence of motivation, whether original or acquired, of accompanying feelings and emotions, and of the successful attainment of the goal is fundamental to much of our learning and is witnessed in the home, in the school, on the playground, in vocational situations, and wherever children or adults have to acquire new patterns of activity. The successful consummation of a cycle is usually satisfying. Thorndike (1913) has summarized this general fact in his so-called *law of effect*, which states that of the varied responses to the same situation those which are linked with the adequate satisfaction will tend to recur when the same or nearly the same drive-to-goal situation is again provided. And, *per contra*, those reactions which are connected with discomfort, distress, or lack of satisfaction to the individual will tend not to be repeated.

Direct social influences on learning. It is implicit in much of our preceding discussion that the social situation serves to facilitate or inhibit the learning process. How much is learning influenced by such factors as the presence and absence of spectators or auditors, competitive stimulation,

the presence of coworkers, the use of praise or blame, the use of discussion with others, suggestion, imitation, and the sympathetic interest of others? We shall only note briefly some of the more important findings. Various specific aspects of such social influences will be noted in later chapters. (For a fuller treatment of various aspects of this whole field see May and Doob, 1937; Dashiell, 1935, pp. 1097-1158, and 1937, pp. 488-496; and Murphy, Murphy, and Newcomb, 1937.)

(1) *Spectators or auditors* have varied effects on performance. Some studies show that the presence of spectators reduced the accuracy and increased the speed of the workers on "paper and pencil" tests; others, such as in some manual skills, indicated an enhancement of accuracy; but in other studies there was a reduction of speed. In one free word-association test the range and quality of the associations were reduced by the presence of watchers.

(2) In studying the effect of the *presence of coworkers* on performance, F. H. Allport (1920) demonstrated that in free word-associations, cancellation of letters, attention tests, multiplication, and other verbal tasks there was distinct speeding up of the reactions in all tests performed in a group as compared with results attained alone. However, there was apparently a decrease in the quality of the results.

(3) *Competition* has long been considered an important device to enhance learning. Parents and teachers set up rivalrous situations in order to secure improved performance from children. Newspapers and merchants who use puzzles and other devices to stimulate sales volume usually add to their techniques the stimulation of competitive attitudes. The experimental literature on the subject is not entirely satisfactory, but mention may be made of Whittemore's studies (1924, 1925). He set up the problem of printing materials with rubber stamps from newspaper copy. He found that his subjects increased their speed under the instructions "to compete" although the quality of their performance was lessened. It was also found that, when two groups competed, there was an increase in speed, without, however, a marked change in the quality of the work turned out.

In these matters, especially in coworking groups and competition, social and cultural influences are tremendous. Our long-established habit of training our children and young people in competitive attitudes and habits in the home, in the school, on the playground, and later in their vocations provides a setting for enhancement of learning in competitive situations which might not hold true in a society in which co-operative and collective values had dominance. (See May and Doob, 1937; M. Mead, 1937.)

(4) The use of *praise or blame*, of encouragement or discouragement in facilitating learning, is evident from common-sense observation. Hurlock (1924), after testing a group of children, divided them into three sections for later retesting. In one section the children were complimented and praised for their work; in the second they were reproached; in the third no special conditions of praise or reproach were introduced. Apparently praise and encouragement acted as good incentives for better work, chiefly, it is true, in accuracy. However, it appears that the effectiveness of discouragement decreases markedly if continuously applied. (In other words, there may be a certain negative adaptation.) Also, the influence of praise or reproof is evidently greater with older and brighter children than with younger and duller ones.

Though some other investigations on the effects of praise or blame do not entirely confirm Hurlock's findings, there is enough evidence to confirm the popular opinion that on the whole children and adults do better work under positive social stimulation than under negative, although these results are doubtless qualified in terms of culture.

(5) Other social effects are indicated in studies of the influence of *group discussion* on the accuracy and quality of the individual's reactions. Bechterev and de Lange (1924), using a variety of subjects (kindergarten children, teachers, and adult students), presented material which called for remembering details of pictures, judgment of tapping intervals, and such. After each individual had been tested, all the reports were brought together for class discussion. Then the individuals were tested separately a second time. On the whole, group discussion improved the reports both as to number of details recalled and as to quality of sound thought and judgment. But again much depends on the nature of the group discussion. Evidence from Jenness' study of estimates of beans in a bottle (1932) indicates that argument among members of a group may not improve their judgment.

In fact, in this field as in other complicated social situations the attitudes of the participants, the effects of their previous cultural training, and no end of other matters play a large part in determining the results. It should be evident that some of the simple principles of conditioning or of trial-and-error learning deduced from the laboratory need considerable qualification when applied to the matter of how the person in contact with his fellows, and constantly impressed by cultural and other subtle influences, acquires new ways of proceeding from drive or motive to a satisfactory attainment of his goal or purpose.

(6) *Suggestion* also influences facilitation. For its effectiveness, suggestion depends upon the fact that the organism may be brought into a state of readiness to react. Suggestion is social in character and is usually considered to fall within the field of symbolic or verbal stimulation of one person by another. It depends on tendencies to react like others, due doubtless to our being conditioned to common stimuli and emotional sets toward or away from some object or goal. It involves selection of some stimuli and the blockage of others. (See below on inhibition.) It is itself not a mechanism but rather a general term to describe a certain form of social stimulation wherein verbal or other stimuli of a person or persons set off images, ideas, attitudes, or acts on the part of another person or persons because the images, ideas, and attitudes or acts of these latter do not inhibit the same.

Both external and internal factors are present in the operation of suggestion. External factors involve the use of visual, auditory, and other stimuli which arouse attention, activate emotions, and otherwise direct the oncoming acts or attitudes of the recipient. Internal factors include such items as fatigue, sleepiness, intoxicants, and other physiological conditions. In addition, the whole range of previous learning will play an important part. Ideas and attitudes of class superiority would predispose one to certain types of suggestion which would not affect those in the lower economic brackets. Habits and attitudes of submission to authority and power are most important. It is because we have been trained to give way to ascendant persons that the man of prestige is so effective in his suggestions.

(7) *Imitation* is a form of conditioning in which the response of one person serves as a stimulus to produce in turn a response in another of identical or highly similar

form and characteristics. It facilitates much of our learning. We come to act like parents and teachers. We follow the lead of companions or leaders in fashion, fad, moral attitudes, and conduct. We often acquire a game of skill more readily in playing with highly skilled players, not with dubs. The effect of the pace-setter in industry in increasing productivity is well known.

(8) Likewise, *sympathy* has its place in enhancing the learning of new modes of behavior. Kindly and gentle co-operation is most effective in arousing interest in the learning task; it stimulates pleasant feelings and emotions that remove fear and other inhibiting tendencies. It is highly important in all sorts of social situations, as we shall see, and its contrast to the function of strong aggressiveness will be noted later. Since both imitation and sympathy are so closely bound up with identification—an important mechanism of social interaction—we shall return to discuss their functions in another connection below. (See Chapter VI.)

THE ORGANIZATION OF LEARNING

Though at the outset the fundamental habits are erected on the basis of constitutional structures and functions, once new associations are effected, they tend in their turn to alter, more or less, the organic substrata of all activity, so that no stimulus-response pattern, unless it be the simplest reflexes of the sustaining systems, is ever quite the same again. The total organization of learned patterns as they serve to influence other acquisition is traditionally called "the apperceptive mass." Among important aspects are co-ordination or integration, expectancy or anticipatory patterning, inhibition, discrimination, generalization, and finally the canalization of many habits into such autonomous character that they even serve as driving forces themselves.

Integration of patterns. Sooner or later, most learned reactions tend to fall into some sort of co-ordinated form which we call integration. This is apparent from many experimental studies as well as from common-sense observation in the acquirement of such skills as typing, skating, swimming, and the manipulation of tools or machines. But in other situations the integration appears to arise almost from the outset of the learning. In social learning it is well to realize that, though the linkage may be chiefly determined by some factor in the focus of attention and activity, there is usually a background of social-cultural circumstance or situation which also has distinctive functions in establishing the linkage. We must always recall that learned acts do not exist and operate independently or separately but in relation to others and in a certain order and unity.

The place of expectancy or anticipatory reaction. The response at any given time or place is likely to be profoundly influenced by the fact that the organism in the presence of any stimulus—internal or external—tends to set up activity in anticipation of the overt reaction. Research work in conditioning has neatly demonstrated this fact.

For example, Anrep (1920) in an experimental study of dogs used a tuning fork as the conditioned stimulus to food. During the training period, when the biologically adequate and the new stimuli were given together, the food was not presented until seven or eight seconds after the tone was produced. However, following a few trials the salivation began one or two seconds after the first tone was sounded, but obviously before the food was given. In other words, the response precedes the situation originally giving rise to it. Hilgard and Marquis (1935) conditioned a dog to eyelid reaction to a puff of air on the eyeball, only to discover that shortly the winking became definitely anticipatory to the actual stimulation of the puff of air. Apparently the backflow of proprioceptive stimulation serves to activate the organism in such a way that, once the situation with which the stimulus is associated is perceived, the organism begins to react. Apparently the linkage of the stimuli and the entire situation (*Gestalt*) sets up in the organism effects which serve to activate the organism again once any phase of the original situation is present. Perhaps this is the inception of redintegration. (See below.) There is thus a preadaptation to oncoming stimuli which serves to prepare the organism to react in future situations. In the cases of winking and avoidance of painful stimuli generally, the physiological adaptive aspects are evident.

In this connection it is worth noting that principles of reactivity and learning operative at the physiological level perhaps apply equally well in the more complex situations of social activity. Note how at the verbal level we not only answer our own queries in conversation, but frequently anticipate what the other person is going to say. The remark "You took the words right out of my mouth" illustrates the everyday realization of the function of anticipation in social relations.

This factor of anticipation is particularly significant to higher forms of adjustment. Yet we should recognize that anticipatory patterns at the higher thought and adjustment levels are far too complex to be "explained" as the result of a conditioned reflex alone. Doubtless a variety of complicated mechanisms of learning are involved. Beginning with simple habit formation, in time the individual acquires a host of experience-formed patterns which serve as the basis for new responses. The first step in the linkage of an old habit and a new reaction is found in the fact that the former, as it were, goes out to meet the latter. In seeking a solution to a problem or trying to find the goal the anticipatory reaction is, as Lindner (1938, p. 260) puts it, a function of "the 'searching' variety; it is forward-tending, and it contrives a forecast of goal and resolution."

Hence, every organized past experience acts to set the organism in some sort of expectancy for future activity as well. Anticipation or what we shall call *patterns of expectancy* are fundamental to an understanding of much of our behavior, not only at the overt but at the verbal and covert level. In fact, it is partially through this function that the activities going on in the inside of the organism are connected with the overt peripheral movements themselves. (See Chapter X.)

The function of inhibition. Although old patterns tend to set up anticipatory reactions in advance of the full situation toward which one may respond, and although many factors in the learning situation, internal and external, may serve to facilitate acquisition of new patterns, other influences operate to block or inhibit new responses or otherwise to redirect and modify them.

A convenient illustration is afforded by Pavlov's own experience. He reported that his appearance in the laboratory room where his students were experimenting with animals served in many instances to block or prevent the dogs' secretion of saliva. He called this type of effect "external inhibition." Any number of extraneous or divergent stimuli may disturb the acquiring of new linkages. Thus the appearance of a parent in the schoolroom where his own child is reciting satisfactorily may set up in the child counter responses which blot out for the time being his successful performance.

Pavlov and his students noted still other inhibiting factors arising from organic conditions themselves. These he called "internal inhibitions." He included in this the extinction or wearing out of conditioning due to disuse. Also the so-called "memory reflex" operates in much the same way as when one memory image may block an association with another. This is neatly illustrated when, in trying to recall a person's name, we strike on some sound combination somewhat similar to that of the name wanted but just sufficiently different to prevent the proper recall.

The facts of such inhibition in learning and in recall are commonly known. But we owe a debt to the students of the conditioned response for their demonstration of important details about its operation. These may be given a somewhat generalized account as follows:

Suppose a conditioned response has been set up, say of salivation to the ringing of a bell. Once this is well established, another new stimulus is introduced, say a mild electrical shock to the skin. The salivary reaction stops. The new reflex has served to block out the conditioned reaction. This has been termed a *conditioned inhibition*. But suppose, then, that a third conditioning stimulus is provided, say a light stimulus. It is discovered that this stimulus tends to reinstate the initial conditioning; that is, the dog will salivate again with the bell. The operation of this third pattern has been called the *inhibition of the inhibition*. The matter is schematically indicated in Figure 6, where the S—R combinations may represent either simpler reflex patterns or a more or less complicated but co-ordinated organization of patterns of reactivity. The initial S_2 — R_1 linkage is blocked by the introduction of S_3 , but by the introduction of S_4 the initial conditioned pattern is restored to activity.

Interference of this sort has long been recognized in everyday life and by students of learning generally. Any shift in daily habits will demonstrate this. Thus, after wearing a hat through most of the months, suppose that during the cold weather of midwinter a man begins to wear a cap. He may

find himself making awkward and "silly mistakes" in the process of "lifting his hat" to a lady. Obviously, emotional distress tends to produce such blockage; for example, a man coming suddenly face to face with a charming but recently known girl, whom perhaps he has daydreamed of "dating," gets flustered and cannot "for the life of him" recall her name. Or an applicant for a job forgets completely his well-memorized speech in the presence of a strange and forbidding interviewer. The "interference of antagonistic habits," as Dashiell (1937) calls it, is a common experience. It




FIGURE 6, showing schematically the interference of habit patterns with each other.

represents psychologically a certain failure of the dual processes of integration and differentiation. (See below.)

Inhibitions occur, then, not only at the motor but at the symbolic levels of behavior. One of man's fundamental associations is that formed between word and act, and, once it is established, other verbal stimuli may serve to inhibit an acquired reaction. For instance, a social worker, on appearing in the home of a would-be client, may set up in the latter all sorts of inhibitions which only time and congeniality will remove. It is evident that the mechanism of inhibition, beginning largely from competing or opposing external stimuli or situations, in time gets internalized in the form of memories, attitudes, and ideas. (See below on retroactive inhibition.)

The function of these inhibitory mechanisms is highly important for training. They provide a means for relearning. They operate to make possible the development of strong avoidant reactions to stimuli of danger or of negative value to the family or other group. So, too, the inhibition of the inhibition is witnessed when under grave situations people are said to "lose their heads" or to "go to pieces." Such loss of habitual control may become all-important in a person's attempt to adapt himself to difficult

situations. It is evident in the mass reactions of enraged mobs whose members commit cruel and immoral acts which they would never dream of doing under more ordinary circumstances. (See E. D. Martin, 1920; K. Young, 1930.) Strong prepotent drives act often to inhibit the ethical acquirements of the individual. The same mechanism is at work in the manic or paranoid personality who under real or imagined wrongs at the hands of others runs amuck among his friends. (See Chapter XXVII.)

Discrimination. Certain acquired reactions tend to become highly *specialized and discriminative*, but others are capable of considerable *generalization as to effects*. As we shall note below, the problem of specificity as against generality of habits and attitudes is of considerable interest, both theoretically and practically. Some light on the relations of these apparently opposite tendencies in learning is found in the investigation of the conditioned reflex. It is apparent that many newly formed reflex patterns are rather diffuse in character.

We know that, if a dog is conditioned to a sound of a certain pitch, he will also respond with a conditioned reaction to sounds of approximately the same pitch. Hull (1934, p. 444) states: "When conditioned reflexes are in the process of being established to a stimulus such as a particular tone, or to a touch on a particular spot, there is a marked tendency for all other tones and for touches on all other places on the skin of the organism to evoke the reaction." This is called *irradiation*.

Yet this spread of conditioning may also be checkmated. Let us suppose a dog is trained to salivate when a particular spot, A, on the skin is stimulated. If a neighboring spot, B, is activated in the course of this learning, the salivary response will also take place. Still, if with further training, the stimulation of spot A be reinforced by occasional reintroduction of the unconditioned stimulus, say the food, in time the stimulation of spot B will not evoke the conditioned reaction.

But note still another aspect. If now point B be stimulated and then after that point A, the dog will not salivate. A spread of the inhibition has occurred. This is a process apparently similar to if not identical with that cited above of the inhibition of the inhibition. Thus arise discriminative reactions which involve the active blocking of a response which has itself become highly differentiated. Similar selectivity of reaction growing out of the more general early responsiveness has been observed when the stimuli are auditory or other sense modalities.

Some further interesting features of such discriminative reactions must also be mentioned. For instance, a dog is first conditioned to give a response, say X, to a specific metronome rate, and to give a different sort of reaction, Y, to another rate. Then in the successive trials the experimenter begins reducing the difference between the two metronome rates. For slight changes in the rates the discriminative reactions remain. But as the differences in the rates become still less and less, the animal begins to fluctuate between responses X and Y. If the differences are still further reduced, the animal is said to "go to pieces," to "become hysterical." In other words, he ceases to give either conditioned response but shows distinctive emotional reactions. He is, in short, reduced to a rather primary level of unco-ordinated mass activity. (Pavlov, 1928.)

The implications of this type of interference of habit and attitude are clearly evident in man. Much neurotic or hysteric behavior is of just this sort. Individuals confronted with types of stimulus-response patterns between which they cannot choose or discriminate are reduced in the end to general disintegrated and childish mass behavior, because a person's adequate orderly conduct is dependent not only on inhibition and facilitation but upon certain differentiation in patterns of activity.

The development of generalized patterns. There is still another aspect of this matter. Not only do we find an irradiation of effects in the early stages of such learning, but the differentiated reactions themselves are capable of a certain spread at a higher level of organization. In fact, discrimination of response may become linked up with stimuli that produce in time a certain generalized type of reactivity to a whole class of stimuli.

The matter is neatly illustrated in the classic case of Albert studied by J. B. and R. R. Watson (1921). This child at eleven months was conditioned to a marked but specific fear of a rat by using a sharp and loud sound as the unconditioned stimulus. The conditioning did not carry over to the room, the table, or to the blocks with which he played, but he did show startle and crying every time the rat was introduced. But, once conditioned to this fear reaction to the rat, he also showed fear reactions—without previous exposure to these stimuli—to a small dog, to a sealskin coat, and even in a mild way to cotton wool. The authors remark that “the transference was immediate.” There was in this instance a kind of irradiation of a rather specific reaction to stimuli of like characteristics in some but not in all details.

This spread of reactions is basic to the process of generalization of experience, be it in ideas, attitudes, or overt habits. As Hull (1934, pp. 446-447) well puts it, “The tendency to generalization is of primary importance in biological economy, since without it organisms would need to undergo separate conditioning in order to react to every slightest variation in the conditioned stimuli, which, strictly speaking, are never exactly alike on any two occasions.”³

In contrast to this, however, many situations require a discriminative reaction. Inhibitions or interference mechanisms may set up differentiation and selectivity. Manual skills, precise verbal reactions, and capacity for quick and exact responses in many situations illustrate this fact. As we shall see, there is in the life organization of the individual a range of habits, attitudes, and ideas extending from the highly generalized to the highly specific. In fact, generalization on the one hand and differentia-

³ A certain broad phase of such generalization of experience is evident from Pavlov's notation that dogs—not all, but many—once trained to the experimental situations, the use of the proper harness, the insertion of the tubes for collecting saliva, and so on, develop a facility for other conditioning experiments not found in the untrained animals. This appears to represent a certain transfer of training long observed both in animals and in man.

tion or selectivity on the other not only are basic features of learning but have important implications for the entire matter of adaptability. It is but a special though acquired case of the interplay of a type of total response and segmental part reactions. (See Chapters XII and XIII.)

THE PERSISTENCE OF LEARNED MATERIALS

Not only are the association and organization of old and new patterns of activity important, but the retention of these connections is fundamental, for, unless some effects carry over to future action, learning as such means little for any sort of organized and permanent adjustment. The common term for the external manifestations of these aftereffects is overt *habit*, and we have already noted that learning is often referred to as habit formation.⁴

Canalization and fixation. Certainly old habits set the stage for new ones. What Holt (1931) has termed "canalization" is highly important in this matter. Not only are habits selective; they become fixed in certain reflex patterns with reference to drives or goals. In fact, drives or motives, learned or unlearned, represent one type of canalization or fixation of impulses at a certain level of organization. Obviously, the course from drive to goal may come in time to follow a more or less regular and hence predictable order. In this combination of selectivity and fixation many factors operate; the original prepotent drives, the learned habits and attitudes, and the satisfying consummatory reactions which become linked together until they operate almost automatically. In the development of such a structuralized process will be found conditioned reactions, trial-and-error learning, and perhaps a good deal of insightful learning too. Moreover, in time these fundamental patterns become so powerful as to predetermine in large measure almost all other acquirements. These basic and somewhat autonomous patterns we call attitudes, traits, and sentiments, and such persistent neuromuscular and mental sets have significant bearing upon what we do or do not learn. The early formation of these larger patterns in terms of the social and cultural contacts becomes all-important for everything which arises later in life organization. (See Chapters VI and XIV.)

Place of memory. For those effects which are expressed largely in verbal or symbolic forms we use the term *memory*. Habit and memory are alike in regard to the basic neurological factors of modification of tissue and capacity of recurrence. Habit and memory, to be effective for action, must involve reproduction of effects; in memory this reproductive phase is usually treated in terms of recall and recognition. *Recall* refers to the reinstatement of acquired materials in symbolic terms, chiefly words.

⁴ As indicated above, the term *habit* is often used in a broad sense as well as in the narrow and, strictly speaking, more proper sense of acquired overt response.

Recognition has to do with locating past events in reference to oneself and to the time and place.

Many of the same factors which play a part in the fixation of any given linkage are effective in the reproduction of the acts or symbols. Motivation, frequency, recency, primacy, and intensity all have a part. Thus: (1) Other things being equal, the linkages most frequently in use will most likely be operative later. (2) The initial or primary experience often tends to take precedence in memory over items acquired subsequently. For example, our first impressions of a new acquaintance and our first experience with a novel situation are often remembered long after details of later contacts are lost. (3) Events which are recent in our experience tend to be retained and reinstated more easily than do those which were acquired earlier. Despite much talk to the contrary, there is evidently some advantage in cramming for examinations. (4) The intensity of the experience plays a large part in determining the nature of the retention and reproduction. For this reason learning connected with fundamental drives and with strong feeling-emotional states tends to be prepotent over other acquirements.

These four factors play a part, then, not only in the original linkage but in their reproduction as well. So, too, the context or configuration is significant. Since we acquire new items of overt or verbal response in time sequences, in spatial order, and the like, we also reproduce them in somewhat the same fashion. To illustrate: once a person gets the correct cue, he can repeat a long-forgotten story. If a single line of verse comes to mind, the rest of a long poem learned years before may be recalled. Given the reappearance of the first few movements of a complicated act of skill, the rest of the series of specific movements unfolds in proper sequence. The assumption is that, if a given number of elements in a learning combination, say WXYZ, lead to a response, R, the recall of any one of these elements separately will arouse the total pattern.

The fact that a mere section or part of a rather complicated pattern of behavior may serve to reinstate the entire schema is referred to as *redintegration*. Although the term is usually applied to the verbal or symbolic aspects of learned activities, in essence the use of a segmental or partial overt movement as the cue to a whole set of acts follows essentially the same function. But it would be a mistake to assume, as does H. L. Hollingworth (1926), that practically all, if not all, learning follows the functional independence of elements implied in redintegration. On the contrary, there are many acquired patterns that can be reinstated only when the complex totality or a large part of it is reproduced together.

Forgetting. Most acquired reactions become less effective, if not entirely lost, for lack of practice or repetition. We call this *forgetting*. We know that simple conditioned reflexes soon lose their effectiveness unless re-

inforced by practice and that even fairly well-established motor habits lose their selective and discriminative features without practice. The same is true of verbal learning.

The loss of learned matter is itself an active process, not a mere mechanical cutting off of given items of an acquired activity. One important factor is that of *retroactive inhibition*—a form of interference with recall due to the intrusion of extraneous activity between the first learning and the use to be made of it later. If one learns a speech for the next day, his performance will usually be better if in the interval he has not had to learn other matter. It is clear that this whole mechanism is closely akin to that of inhibition of a conditioned reaction, discussed previously. There we noted the importance of interference from such things as emotions and contrary actions.

The active character of remembering or of forgetting is also brought out in other ways. Common sense and carefully controlled observations on the reliability of testimony about past events illustrate the matter beautifully.

Crosland (1921) presented his subjects with one exposure of a series of pictures, bits of sculpture, written statements, and other stimuli. These persons then came back to the laboratory at stated periods and reported what they could remember of the things they saw in the first instance. Amazing changes took place. Not only were many details lost rather soon, but the details that were recalled were sometimes distorted as to size and shape or verbal relation to other features. Sometimes the items in two pictures, for example, were confused. Moreover, new items—not in the original series at all—were introduced by some subjects, who on questioning were very certain that they had seen these things in the originals. (See also Bartlett, 1932.)

Studies of the testimony of persons at actual and “staged” crimes show the same sort of loss and modification. There is not only the loss of many features but falsification and the confusion of others, transpositions as to time and place, and a distinctive tendency to dramatize the recalled events. (For a review of the whole field of *Ausage*, see Whipple, 1918.)

Social-cultural factors in remembering. What an individual will observe or otherwise perceive and what he will recall are both connected with his own particular society and culture. As Bartlett (1932, p. 244) well puts it, “In perceiving, in imaging, in remembering proper, and in constructive work, the passing fashion of the group, the social catch-word, the prevailing approved general interest, the persistent social custom and institution set the stage and direct the action.” In his important work on memory Bartlett presents ample evidence—as have other writers—to substantiate this viewpoint. A few examples from his book will serve to indicate his findings.

One observer who was shown a sketch of a hand pointing upward at some indeterminate object reported immediately that it was an antiaircraft gun. This man had

been for some time living in a community where the fearful expectation of air raids was a matter of common talk and interest.

One section of Bartlett's book is devoted to contrasting the verbal reports of individuals from two African tribes, the Zulus and the Swazis. Among the former he could quickly elicit a lively discussion of personal exploits in war, whereas among the latter he got but indifferent comment or complete silence when the topic of war was suggested. Yet with the Swazis, when he touched on the topics of cattle-raising and the use of guile in dealing with their enemies, he secured great interest. Bartlett well demonstrates that these differences can be understood only in terms of the historical factors operating among these two antagonistic societies. The Zulus have a long tradition of warlike activities; the Swazis have not. The latter have been highly successful as cattlemen, and as a means of avoiding overt conflict with their enemies have put great value on the use of deceit and clever diplomacy. Not only is the attention of a native determined by his customary values, but what he will remember is likewise so qualified.

In a long series of experiments—chiefly with British subjects—dealing with verbal and pictorial memory, Bartlett has ably shown that what is remembered, what is modified, and what is added—as the material is recalled over varying periods of time—depend very definitely upon the customs and traditions which the subject had already accepted. One interesting evidence of this he describes under the concept of *conventionalization*. Thus in a pictorial series the subjects were shown a sketch of the Egyptian "mulak" or owl, from which our own letter M has evolved. In a series of recalls of this by a typical subject the outline form of the original was gradually changed, new items were added, and in time the form was so completely altered that the subject was after six or seven reproductions sketching a cat, to which in time still further feline details were added. Similar changes took place in verbal material. It is clear that any strange or unfamiliar matter, as it is recalled, begins to be gradually fitted into some customary or conventional form familiar to the subject. He can assimilate it only by making it fit into some pattern with which he is already habituated. Involved in this process are the loss of many features, the simplification of others, the addition of still new items, and often subsequently a flowering of still other details completely unassociated with the original stimulus.

Sherif (1935, 1936), in working with certain visual illusions of movement, has shown the same sort of process at work. His laboratory subjects tended, whether alone or in groups, to invent some conventional point of reference and a range or scale of judgment as aids in giving the illusion a satisfactory meaning.

Conventionalization in perception and memory is doubtless related to the process of canalization and fixation already discussed. Not only do individuals interpret or give meaning to their experiences in terms of customary or group motivations, interests, and values, but novel experiences themselves tend to be redefined into form and substance which permit linkage with the apperceptive mass of previous learning. In the next chapter the discussion of traits, attitudes, and basic generalized patterns or frames of reference will indicate more fully some of the factors in this dynamic process of linking the old to the new, all with reference to the social and cultural world which surrounds the individual.

Chapter VI

MENTAL LIFE AND INTERACTION

IN THE present chapter we shall discuss two further aspects of the influences of learning upon the individual: first, the place of internal activities, and second, some features of the important psychological processes associated with social interaction. The first concerns the organization of the individual's inner, so-called subjective, life; the other has to do with the nature of his contacts with his fellows.

CONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS FACTORS IN ADJUSTMENT

It should be obvious that adjustment begins with acts, not thoughts. Yet in time much of our activity becomes internalized, through learning, into ideas, attitudes, values, and emotional-feeling patterns. Even at the common-sense level of observation people distinguish between thoughts and action. The field of action which involves the use of peripheral muscles making possible movement in space we call *overt*. Habits in the usual sense belong to this category. The field of thought we call *covert*: the inner world of ideas, attitudes, systemic sensations which are not expressed vocally, the whole range of wishes and impulses that we carry about with us in a kind of private domain of our own. Between habit or overt action (observable by those around us) and the internal world lies language or communication, which partakes of the nature of both. That is, language consists of verbal or other communicable symbols which relate to both action and thought. Although we shall later discuss the rise and significance of communication, symbols, and thought as they touch the development of the personality (see Chapters VIII and X), we must at this point sketch briefly some of the important features of inner life in order to complete our preliminary picture of the mechanisms of individual activity.

Dewey (1922) points out that the impulse (which we call a drive) leads to the development of various means of securing its satisfaction, which he calls habits. But the place of motivation must always be recognized. Dewey's thesis is that the human mind is essentially an instrument developed in the natural history of the animal species (and as we advance toward mankind with increasing complexity) for the purpose of better satisfaction of wants. The field of mind, in short, is the field

of preparation or anticipation carried on largely in terms of imagination or covert activity before we proceed to overt response.

Consciousness and overt behavior: Traditional psychology has described and analyzed the field of thought chiefly in terms of consciousness, that is, as an inner awareness by an individual of what is happening around him and, of course, of what is going on within himself. The foundation of consciousness is assumed to rest first of all upon sensory capacity, that is, upon what the individual gets through the various receptors. (See Chapter II.) The deposition of effects from any given experience within the organism sets the stage for the next reception of stimuli. In other words, learning enters so early that except in initial contact of the child with the world none of us experiences "pure sensation."¹ Sensation, in other words, gives way to perception. Perception is a combination of sensory awareness and the effects of previous experience or meaning. These early linkages of drive, sensation-perception, and attainment of goal—leaving as they do effects within the organism which in turn influence future conduct—begin that separation of adaptive activity into outer and inner, into overt and covert, which is so important to man's more complicated adaptation. The overt adaptive features are those of habit involving muscular movement in space. Covert activity characterizes the internal or subjective world of imagination or thought or mind, considered in the broad sense. On the basis of the interiorization of experience which produces the subjective field we acquire capacity to review past and present events and to project events into the future. The individual is able to make preparatory choices or judgments aimed at future conduct. In this way foresight is possible which should make for more effective overt adjustment. The roots of such preparatory activities are suggested by studies of learning, especially conditioning, wherein the animal or human subject begins to respond to the mere incipient and preliminary features of the total stimulating situation. (See Chapter V.)

The unconscious and cycles of activity. Only a fraction of internal adaptation and anticipatory reorganization, however, goes on in full consciousness. Not only do most internal modifications arising from experience take place below the level of awareness, but many of the effects of these changes are not directly apparent in consciousness at all. A great deal of our nonvoluntary learning is of this character, as is doubtless the insightful learning of which the *Gestalt* psychologists make so much. So, too, the history of invention and discovery gives ample proof that ideas and plans arise "without taking thought." And no end of everyday activities—overt or verbal—show that nondeliberative internal alterations occur. Such are the sudden appearance of impulses and images, slips of

¹ It must not be forgotten that some "learning" perhaps goes on during the uterine period. See Chapter III.

the tongue or pen, and numerous "unaccountable" gestures and overt acts. Likewise, nocturnal dreaming is further evidence that "the mind operates" outside the realm of consciousness. We refer to this whole aspect of internal activity by the descriptive term *unconscious*. Although this concept has been much abused by writers, and although many psychologists scoff at it, it nevertheless serves as a useful term to classify, though not to explain, certain aspects of internal activity which influence conscious thoughts, verbalization, and overt conduct. We shall use it in this descriptive sense.²

The contributions of Janet (1907), Prince (1914), Freud (1913, 1920), and others have been important in indicating the place of unconscious motivations and unconscious processes in behavior cycles. But it was Freud particularly who, in dealing largely with mild sorts of mental disturbance, made us aware of the large number of our motives and mental patterns which lie hidden under the surface of the conscious mind. The first drives or needs of the newborn for food, liquids, rest, elimination, and the like are doubtless not conscious in the adult sense of that term. Only later do these take on conscious significance, but in the meantime cultural training has repressed many of the more elementary expressions of these wants. Thus, as the child grows up, a great number of his desires and wishes are not completely fulfilled. Also, he doubtless acquires from experience wishes or desires that can express themselves only in disguised and indirect ways.

Throughout life social-cultural learning plays the dominant part in directing the expression of basic physiological wants and later of those early but acquired wishes arising in the first years of life. These latter are illustrated by desires to have *all* the toys, *all* the power, *all* the attention of the mother, *all* the opportunities for expression that one can muster. But society, in the form of parental or other taboos, builds up mechanisms of inhibition that sidetrack such desires or in various ways prevent their fulfillment. Yet the impulses or desires often remain. It thus comes about that a host of our wishes or drives become unconscious. The genuine motivation is often unknown to our consciousness. Moreover, in the expression of these motivations we develop a wide variety of substitute reactions. (See the next section.) Altruism may often be a disguised wish for power. Sadistic impulses, dating in the individual back to rudimentary impulses to do injury to a person or object that has thwarted him, may find expression later in overemotional patriotism directed against radicals within the national state, or, if one turns out to be a radical, against the conservative upholders of the *status quo*. (See Lasswell, 1930.)

² Some new word might be invented to cover this range of facts or events, but little would be gained so long as the present term is not reified into a causal principle.

Then, too, in the development of different means of satisfying wants or wishes—in the second phase of any given cycle—the unconscious mechanisms may get in their work. This is evident in the fantasy and day-dream, in the creative imagination of artist, inventor, or scientist, who finds that the solution to his problem does spring almost full-fledged into consciousness. In fact, the place of fantasy thinking has never been fully recognized or exploited as a means of solving difficulties. Our traditional philosophy and psychology have so overemphasized the conscious, logical, problem-solving functions that they have neglected, aside from a few brilliant exceptions, the possible place of unconsciously formed and free-associational mental processes as aids to the solutions of personal difficulties or to the creation of new culture traits. (See Lasswell, 1930.)

It should be apparent, however, that motives arise from both conscious and unconscious sources. Some obviously are highly conscious. But often the most powerful drives to action lie deeply embedded below our awareness. Moreover, the conscious motives expressed by the individual are, in fact, often but excuses for underlying unconscious ones.

It is important, also, to recognize that both the culturally modified and the culturally acquired drives serve to set off subsequent cycles of action. For example, hunger, having been satisfied, may lead to sleep; but it may also prepare one for love-making or work. Or the blocking of one cycle may also inhibit the development and carrying forward of another. For instance, the young man unable to secure his wished-for love object may find that he cannot eat, cannot sleep, and cannot do his work. This intermeshing of one drive with another must be reckoned with in our dealing with maladjustments of all sorts. Segmental behavior is possible for certain ends, but it cannot continue to dominate the total behavior without damage to the core of personality—the self or ego. Cases of dissociated personality, in fact, are illustrations of just this situation. (See Chapters X and XXVIII.)

ATTITUDES, TRAITS, AND FRAMES OF REFERENCE AS ASPECTS OF INTERNAL ORGANIZATION

A more detailed analysis of the process of internalization will be presented in Chapter X. At this point we must examine further certain structural aspects of the inner life of the individual. This covert pattern not only reflects a person's external adaptation, but consists of a reorganization of it into certain more or less permanent features. And, if we are to understand fully the manner in which these features influence internal reorganization and affect future action, we must examine their characteristics. We shall follow the contemporary practice of psychology and use the terms *attitude* and *trait* to describe two of the most significant of these elements. These in turn become patterned into larger frames of

reference or themata which indicate both unique and common features of the individual.

A direct approach to the conscious and unconscious features of the inner life is difficult. What goes on within the citadel of the mind can be known only by verbal or other symbolic communication or by certain aspects of overt conduct. Hence, if we wish to discover the passing or permanent features of a person's disposition and reaction tendencies, we do not ordinarily attempt a broadside approach. We piece together bits of everyday experience—culled from all sorts of situations—about the person in question. It is in this way that every person learns about another, be he the man on the street or a would-be scientist. For example, one man is easily enraged at a particular situation while another reacts calmly to the same or a similar one. At another time the behavior of these two men may be reversed. We find on the basis of many contacts with others that some person may be described as "petty," or "childish," or "aggressive," or as always wanting to "show off." In other words, such generalizations arise from our observation of this person as he talks and reacts in a wide or narrow variety of situations. These specific behavior manifestations observable in others Stagner (1937) aptly calls *indicators* of the broader, more extensive, and persistent patterns of action. And by the same token one may also learn to know himself. (See Chapter IX on the self as the introjected reactions of others to one's own behavior.) That is, these indicators throw light on the attitudes and traits of another or of oneself.

The nature of attitudes. In discussing various aspects of learning we have already mentioned attitudes or mental-motor predispositions as they influence the acquirement of new ways of acting and thinking. The word *attitude* has been variously used by psychologists. At times it is used in a narrow sense to mean the muscular set or spatial orientation of an animal or human being in the presence of a stimulus. Here we might speak of the attitude of a hunting dog as he "points" a game bird. At other times it is used in a rather broad and loose way to cover practically the whole furniture of the inner life. (See Thurstone, 1928.)

Certainly, through the repetition of certain acts and associated ideas in response to stimuli, the individual does develop specific or general reaction tendencies which in time qualify or temper the interpretation of and response to new stimuli. To describe this aspect of human reactivity Titchener (1911) employed the expression "determining tendency," and earlier psychologists used the term "mental set."

In the narrow and more specific sense attitudes are essentially internally aroused sets or predispositions of the organism toward some specific or general stimulus. They rest upon organic stimulus-response patterns as these have been modified, elaborated, and integrated together through

learning in the social world. But these elaborations and integrations become reduced to tendencies to action. The attitude partakes of the nature of an incipient reaction. It is fundamentally a form of anticipatory behavior. Since attitudes, in a sense, telescope behavior into shorthand forms, it is highly important to recognize their place in the total complex of social activity, because the knowledge of attitudes should aid us in understanding and controlling behavior.

Three further important features of attitude must be noted. First, although not to be confused with images and verbalized ideas (words), attitudes are usually associated with some image, idea, or external object of attention. Second, attitudes express directionality. That is, they not only mark the inception of overt response to situations, but give direction to this action. They are characterized by approach or withdrawal, likes or dislikes, favorable or unfavorable reactions, avoidant or adient tendencies, loves or hates as these are directed to specific or generalized situations. Third, attitudes, at least the significant ones, are linked to feelings and emotions. Pleasant or unpleasant associations with an object or situation—fear, rage, love, and all the complicated and learned emotions—play a part in attitudes.

For the prediction of his behavior, therefore, it is more important to know the attitude of a person than to know his mental images, ideas, or verbal opinions. Attitudes are really forms of internal though largely unconscious habits, and they bespeak one's actual trends to overt conduct better than do the verbalized expressions which we call opinions. Emerson's remark, "What you are sounds so loudly in my ears that I cannot hear what you say," expresses precisely the influence of attitudes rather than mere verbalisms in our judgment of those about us. Attitudes thus offer a clue to the unraveling of human motives. The building-up of attitudes, however, is so largely unconscious that often we are not aware of how they arise. Frequently the marginal impressions of an experience determine our response, because these tangential stimulations seem to touch off the deep-lying attitudes.

In summary, then, an attitude may be defined as a learned and more or less generalized and affective tendency or predisposition to respond in a rather persistent and characteristic manner, usually positively or negatively (for or against) in reference to some situation, idea, value, material object or class of such objects, or person or group of persons. More briefly, it is an acquired, more or less emotionalized, incipient reaction tendency for or against a stimulus. Thus we have attitudes approving or disapproving war in general or a particular war. We have attitudes toward Negroes, Italians, Germans, and Englishmen, but we may also have attitudes toward specific members of these racial or nationality groups.

Opinions and attitudes. Opinions, which are verbal expressions of belief, are frequently discussed in relation to attitudes, and it is often assumed that verbal statements of like or dislike, of approval or disapproval, and so on give one a genuine clue to the attitudes of persons. Although the usual statistical test of attitudes is put in verbal form of some sort or other, considerable doubt has been thrown on the assumption that verbal expression is closely linked to the reaction tendencies implied in attitudes themselves. Much depends, of course, upon the degree of correlation between what a man says and what he does. What some persons say reflects pretty much what they do. What others say does not. This again depends upon the social and cultural influences which have predetermined a man's behavior and upon particular situations at the time of the overt act.

An individual well integrated to a stable culture may present a better correlation of word and deed than one living in a society with divergent and often antagonistic groups and values, which demands a certain double-dealing if he is to escape censure. The degree of correlation of word and action also depends, of course, upon the unique organization which the particular individual has made of his life in reference to others—sometimes in contradistinction to the demands of his society. Truly the deviant person, the radical, the creative inventor, the genius, and likewise the delinquent, the criminal, the neurotic, and the psychotic represent in some ways individuals who, though diverging from the societal norms, may also be found to present in many instances a closer relation of word and deed than is found among those more conventional persons who on occasion criticize and ostracize them for their divergent behavior. We shall have occasion later to make further comment on this matter of correspondence between verbal profession, attitude, and overt conduct.

The nature of traits. The term *trait* is also used to describe certain persistent and fundamental features, both learned and native, of reaction patterns. In fact, the terms *trait* and *attitude* are frequently used almost interchangeably. (See V. E. Herrick, 1936.) However, by the term *trait* we usually mean certain persistent characteristics of a person's actions or ideas that are described by some distinguishing adjective. One is said to be neat, punctual, persevering, artistic, aggressive, submissive, conservative, radical, and so on. There are thousands of these trait names in English which represent a composite of human reactions to varied features of people's behavior. (See G. W. Allport and Odbert, 1936, for a list of 17,953 such terms, with their comments.) Despite a wide divergence in the use of the term *trait*, and despite a certain inclination among some writers to confuse it with *attitude*, the most satisfactory distinction at present seems to be that the trait is more highly generalized than the

attitude and that it does not depend upon a specific object or stimulus for its directionality. It is assumed to be relatively independent of an object. Stagner, for instance, takes the position that trait is a larger, more inclusive concept than attitude, the latter, which is more distinctly related to some fixed or stereotyped idea or object, being perhaps well defined as "a trait on a small scale" (Stagner, 1937, p. 168).

G. W. Allport takes the position that traits do not have "a well-defined object of reference" but are generalized in quality. Moreover, he contends that they lack the directionality of attitudes. That is, the latter tend to typify reactions favorable or unfavorable, or of rejection or acceptance, of like or dislike, or of withdrawal or approach. He says (1937a, p. 294), "Traits as a rule have no such clear-cut direction." They represent certain descriptive, even static, features of the personality rather than the dynamic ones. That is, for Allport, they refer more especially to the unique combination of characteristics, or total style, that sets one person off from another. (See below.)

Yet it would be a mistake to consider traits as some sort of free-floating features of conduct that have no reference to goals or objects outside oneself. People may have general traits of punctuality, of ascendancy, or others, but in actual situations these express themselves in reference to some stimulus or other, and hence take on directionality. The point is that such reactions tend to be general, persistent, and more or less consistent within the limits which the society or group expects or which the culture demands or permits. But, since these matters of attitude and trait are so distinctly bound up with matters of individuality and of type reactions—which in turn are qualified by social and cultural training—we shall return to the discussion of them when we take up the problem of typology or of the existence of generalized and more or less unified classes of personality organization, which we shall do in Chapters XII and XIII.

Frames of reference and unifying themata. As the individual grows older, his attitudes and traits tend to become organized into larger value systems or frames of reference which serve to further his adaptation to his social and cultural world. There are doubtless a variety of fundamental frames of reference centered chiefly in the major motives or desires of the individual, such as those concerned with bodily and economic security, with love and sexual life, with companionship, with the wishes for new experience, and with other motives such as were noted in Chapter IV. One might state the matter in another way. The individual develops certain *leitmotifs* which come to characterize his entire life. They are analogous to the recurrent musical patterns in a symphony which appear and reappear in varied combinations as the symphony unfolds. Or they are like the elements in the basic plot of a drama. We shall often

note that, although thought or behavior may seem unique and particular to a given situation, behind such diversity there exists some basic patterning or "unity thema," as Murray terms it, which serves as an integrating or co-ordinating focus for a wide range of specific activities. Murray and his coworkers (1938) have amply demonstrated this fact in their exhaustive description and analysis of a group of normal persons who were subjected to a large number of tests, interviews, questionnaires, and other devices to uncover their motivations, their fantasies, their ideals and ambitions—in short, the features of their inner life—as related to their basic wishes and values, on the one hand, and to their overt conduct, on the other. This investigation showed—as have the psychoanalysts time and again—that individuals possess certain recurrent deep-lying interests and modes of thought and action which, though often masked to the casual observer, may be demonstrated by the proper techniques. For example, vocational choices often emerged from a violent rivalry of a son with his father; so too, the avoidance of normal heterosexual contacts may be related to a strong and abiding, though unconscious, attachment to the mother; or long suppressed hostility to a brother may find its outlet in a rich fantasy life regarding the need of humanitarian sympathies involving world brotherhood. (In this last connection, see Lasswell, 1930.) Or, as some of our own cases will show, a person's major life interest may revolve around an insatiable craving for high social status originating in an intense feeling of inferiority or shame. Or a desire to revenge a felt wrong may act as a unity thema which will color practically every important activity throughout life.

Into the make-up of any fundamental frame of reference or of any unifying thema of life various combinations of ideas, ideals, habits, traits, and attitudes may enter. Some of these doubtless have their roots in the common or like exposure of individuals to their particular society and its culture. Others may and do represent a person's own peculiar reorganization of his experiences.

Autonomy and style of life. Although basic reaction patterns are linked together into larger frames of reference or into some dominant unity thema, it is also true that habits and traits and frames of reference take on a certain autonomy or independence of their own. The very process of canalization of responses provides a convenient interpretation of the mechanics of such autonomous behavior. These autonomous patterns often serve to set up and keep in motion rather complicated cycles of activity. (It is this fact that lies behind Murphy's classification of "activity" itself as a drive or motive. See Murphy, Murphy, and Newcomb, 1937, pp. 102-103.) As pointed out in Chapter IV, habits themselves may become drives or motives. (See Woodworth, 1918.)

This autonomous character of some of our habits is the basic fact be-

hind G. W. Allport's (1937a) theory of the fundamental uniqueness of the personality. Not only do habits often tend to act as the drive or foundation for other habits, but their very independence, of course, makes for a certain distinctiveness in the life organization of each individual. Each person develops his own peculiar set of habits and related ideas, attitudes, and traits. This interrelation of autonomy and independence of organization is, therefore, fundamental to what may be called the *style of life*—that particular life organization of each individual which sets him apart from his fellows despite more or less common cultural and social influences.

Yet the uniqueness of a person does not imply a lack of order and unity, which emerge out of experience. The fact of individual differences in style of life does not run counter to the adaptive advantage of learning or habit-formation, which implies a certain reduction of behavior to a minimal and orderly set of reactions. In short, the whole matter of learning illustrates an evident general principle of protoplasmic organization which we discussed in Chapter II. There we pointed out the dual factors of constancy and flexibility. The same principles operate in the field of habit-formation. On the one hand there is a certain fixity of effects, a certain inertia of reaction pattern—which may be either generalized or specific in character. On the other, there is a certain flexibility of reactivity. Habits do not completely encrust the individual in the "cake of custom," to use Bagehot's (1873) famous phrase. If they did, stimulus and reaction would—granting any formation of habits at all—be as rigid and unchangeable in operation as events in the inorganic world. No, the individual with all his fundamental training retains a certain flexibility. In fact, this quality makes it possible for one habit to be built upon another.

But there are important individual differences in terms of rigidity or flexibility. Some persons develop a life organization which is highly inflexible. Others tend to run off in the opposite direction. They are extremely changeable and inconstant. They never seem to have any fixity of patterns beyond the most rudimentary and physiologically determined ones. Between these extremes most persons may be found. We shall have many occasions to note the interplay of constant and rigid behavior patterns with others which are flexible and highly alterable.

Aims, ideals, and purposes as drives and ends. In the course of adaptation of the individual to his social and cultural world he learns to thrust some of his internalized and anticipatory activities, which we may designate as generalized ideas, into the future as the basis of a line of action. These are referred to as ideals, purposes, or ambitions, which are but learned and internally determined goals toward which one may strive. Ethical philosophy aims, in part, at stimulating such ideals or purposes

in the individual as ought to make him a better citizen and a better, happier, more fully adjusted person.

In short, when we talk of aims, ends, or ideals, we are but stating in another way the principle of internal drive directed to some goal or consummation, but one which is acquired in the course of living with our fellows. These are not in essence something special, nor are they distinct from the more rudimentary drives, but they do serve to set off many cycles of long-time activity which may not be finally ended until years have elapsed. The boy who aims at a professional career must set himself upon a long-time cycle of activity within which there will be hundreds of subsidiary cycles, all directed—if he keeps to his purpose or ideal—to the long-time end or purpose of his lifework.

The interplay of internal and external activity. After the newborn individual begins with certain drives which lead to overt acts seeking to satisfy these urges and normally leading to the consummatory or completed act that will complete any given cycle, he gradually acquires varied direct and indirect or substitutive means of getting what he wants. Moreover, he comes to desire many satisfactions which were not present in the early weeks or months or years of life. We noted above that the separation of activity into the field of thought, broadly considered, and that of action really arises from the learning of substitutive and novel means of securing our goals. Moreover, it is apparent that the elaboration of the inner world may be far more extensive than is its permissible expression in overt conduct. (See Chapter X.) As the individual grows up through participation with his fellows in various groups, as he is influenced on every hand by the customs, traditions, or folkways of his time and place, he not only constructs within himself new and divergent motives, but develops a whole set of images, memories, ideas, ideals, and purposes that get organized into his own particular inner world. Overt conduct does not permit the wide ramifications possible in the subjective world of imagination. Once one has committed himself to a line of conduct, it is not easy to go off in another direction. There is an inevitability about an overt act which must be recognized in preparing for it. Thus we may say that the directionality of conduct and the number of objects to which one may respond are steadily reduced as we pass from the field of inner thoughts, emotions, and impulses through verbal activity and attitude to the act itself. This is but another way of stating that there are various levels of expression: covert, verbal, and overt. Figure 7 indicates this fact schematically. At level A, items *a*, *b*, *c*, and *d-n* represent the wide-variety of possible covert (imaginable) outlets to a given stimulus, *S* (which may be external or internal). At level B, that of communication, only *b*, *c*, and *d* may appear; the others cannot be verbalized, or, if they might be, we inhibit them, perhaps because of fear, taboos, or other

"reasons." Level C shows that the attitudes (or action tendencies) are still further reduced, to two as a rule: for and against, favorable, unfavorable, and the like. Finally, at level D, which represents the act, only




FIGURE 7, illustrating various levels of activity in which S represents the stimulus (internal or external); *a, b, c, d-n*, items in thought, word, attitude, or action.

one object and one direction are possible. The dotted line indicates that one might have moved in another direction, implied, obviously, in the dual directions of the attitude level.³

To illustrate this schema concretely, imagine that a father demands that his son follow his own profession of medicine—a case of projection—though the son has no interest in or capacity for such occupation. This insistence of the father that the boy agree with him would constitute the situation or stimulus, S. On receiving the demand on a particular occasion the son might give way to a whole set of associations of varied feeling-emotional toning. He might consider running away from home, or flying in the face of the father's requirements by taking a course in law; he might find himself experiencing ambivalent reactions of wanting to please his father, and not wanting to, of determination to tell his father "where to get off" alongside acceptance of the father's authority, or even contradictory sentiments of hatred and love. At the verbal level he might mildly express his interest in something else but tell his father that he would follow medicine in spite of other ambitions. The attitudes, however, might remain strongly ambivalent: love versus hatred for the father, expressed in a conflict between following his advice and doing the opposite. But finally, at the level of overt action, he must take up one response or the other—in the direction of the particular decision.

Therefore we see that the world of thoughts, impulses, feelings, and emotions is wider and more extensive than the world of verbal com-

³ The interrelations of covert, verbal, and overt might better be represented in a three-dimensional or multidimensional way than in a plane surface, since the ambivalence of attitudes is perhaps more closely related to certain features of the strictly covert level than to what the individual says. But since attitudes are so definitely linked to acts, they are shown here as lying between verbal reactions and overt conduct.

munication, and that, in turn, the world of overt conduct is still less extensive than either of the others. The fundamental problem is the integration between these various levels, and many of the difficulties of personality adaptation with which we shall concern ourselves in later chapters are really phases of the divergences in the individual between the levels. To mention but one or two examples: We shall see that the aspirations of many individuals in our highly competitive society so far exceed their overt achievement as to produce strain and disappointment and make for neurotic or other compensatory reactions as a means of finding some relief from this stress. Or, as we shall see in matters of personal and public morality, people often carry with them a highly ethical verbal code which is quite divergent from their overt conduct. As a consequence there arise some of the nonadjustive aspects of projection and rationalization, to say nothing of the deeper problems arising from the persistence of unsocialized forms of cruelty and violence which fall into such marked contrast with the verbal professions as to split the personality rather than to integrate it. (See Chapter X.)

In actual life, of course, there are various combinations of covert activities, verbal expressions, attitudes, and overt conduct. In some instances there is a close correlation between the levels; in others there is sharp divergence. This, in part, arises from the competition of wishes or motives within the individual. Let us note briefly how this divergence may come about.

In the process of adaptation to one's fellows and the world outside it often happens that what society and culture demand differs from what one wishes or wants. One defines a given social situation, let us say in terms of his deeper and more primitive wishes for power, while society, the community, or some special group has laid down definitions of the situation—the demands of behavior—which run quite opposite to these power wishes of the individual. Hence we speak of the opposition or contrast between an *individual or personal definition of a situation* and the *social or cultural definition of a situation*. Not that personal definitions are developed in a vacuum or without reference to social interaction. They usually are, but the individual definition expresses more completely the deeper, less sublimated, more rudimentary impulses or drives. In the formulation of these wishes, personal-social training—that is, learning not culturally determined—often plays a predominant part. It is not that these earliest acquired drives are unaffected by social contacts, as is implied by certain writers. Rather they are the outgrowth of the earliest relations of the child with his mother, father, brother, sister, or other person, and in the course of his growing up in society other demands, other definitions, especially those of cultural origin, are laid over them so as to inhibit and block their overt expression.

Yet this is not to gainsay another factor, namely, the person's own reorganization of his experience in such a way as to express what he comes to consider his deeper and more basic wants. That is, each person in this sense is *unique*. As we have noted, he builds up his own *style* of life. No two persons' drives or wishes are quite identical. Moreover, the possibilities of rich elaboration of one's inner life through daydreaming, the fact that one need not communicate this to others—no matter how much the specific elements of the fantasy may derive from experience with others—makes it possible to develop a sort of private world into which others cannot enter. The extremes of this sort of activity are seen in certain pathological (insane) persons. But such extremes represent a certain failure at adequate and normal adjustment. In a way, such excessive "private" inner activity cuts one off in the end from an adequate final consummatory outlet, from the expectancies of normal social adaptation without which neither adequate group participation nor a mature personal growth will be forthcoming. (See Chapter IX on the self, and Chapters XXVII and XXVIII on pathological personalities.)

This inner world—relatively autonomous, made up of one's peculiar frames of reference and values, as well as those held in common with others—is not necessarily identical with the outer world of one's fellows. And such divergence of inner and outer world tends to produce some strain or stress in the process of adaptation. Half-measures may be necessary. Often the goal or satisfaction at the end of a cycle fails to bring the completeness of responses which might otherwise follow. And the residue of impulse or desire from such half-measures may lead to daydreams, to vicarious experiences, and may without doubt be one of the appeals of art and fantasy in our culture. In any case, the overt adaptation of the individual is always complicated by the possibility that the adjustment is not complete. To understand the person, his drives, his wishes, his manner of meeting crises and other situations, and the nature of his satisfactions, it is essential always to know of this inner life as well as to know about his overt conduct. For this reason it is difficult to accept a strictly behavioristic approach to problems of personality. No matter how much one may object to mentalistic terms, such as perception, memory, image, concept, or the unconscious, or to identification, projection, and other so-called "mental mechanisms" (see below), one must realize that they may and do serve as convenient terms to describe this inner world of experience without a knowledge of which one could not understand overt activity. (The whole role of language and symbolism as keys to this inner life will be made more apparent in Chapter X.) Moreover, it must be remembered not only that fundamental learning is largely, if not entirely, social in character, but that the internalization of overt responses is at all points linked up with social interaction. In fact,

the very mechanisms of internalization are themselves related to social contact, certain features of which we must now examine.

FORMS OF PERSON-TO-PERSON INTERACTION

Since personality must be considered in its relations with other personalities, there are certain, more or less universally acquired forms of behavior which have a special bearing on social interaction. While the precise psychological mechanisms involved in learning these patterns are not entirely clear, the concepts we are to introduce at this point cover important covert, verbal, and overt aspects involved in people's adaptation to each other. We shall first discuss the contrasted operation of identification and antagonism with their respective relations to sympathy and co-operation, on the one hand, and to aggressiveness and competition-conflict patterns on the other. Projection as a companion process to identification and antagonism will then be explained. Following this, the two important aspects of substitutive reactions, namely, compensation and sublimation, will be described. Finally, the important function of rationalization in adjustment will be made clear.

The nature of identification. The process of *identification* consists in putting oneself into another's thought or reaction systems. It involves feeling, thinking, and often acting like someone else. At the outset, at least, it is largely an unconscious, nondeliberative assumption of responses like those of another. Thus, two-months-old babies have been observed to smile when others smile. By nine or ten months a baby will cry or sit and rock back and forth in a manner similar to that of other babies near by (L. B. Murphy, 1937). This is doubtless largely an unconscious response. It represents the most rudimentary form of empathy, a term which broadly describes the assumption of acts, postures, gestures, verbalisms, feelings, and emotions of others. During these months, and later, a child adopts the acts and expressed thoughts of the mother or others closely associated with him. In play, for instance, the child may run through a wide range of identifications. As he tires of one role, in the words of Wordsworth, "The little actor cons another part." So, too, an older child or adult may identify himself with an imaginary person, with an object, or with a symbol, quite as readily as with a living person. Essentially the mechanism rests upon what the older psychology discussed as imagination and imitation. The basic mechanism is probably not unlike that of the conditioned response. (See Humphrey, 1921.)

The word *identification* came into social psychology from psychoanalysis. But to emphasize the fact that effects of such interaction are "internalized," psychoanalysts frequently prefer the term *introjection*.⁴ Eliot

⁴ There is something to be said for distinguishing between the overt features of identification as a phase of social interaction and the process of the identification as it becomes organ-

(1927, p. 76) appropriately illustrates the operation of identification as: "... what happens when spectators push their neighbors toward the opponents' goal; when Negroes swell when Jack Johnson wins; ... when the mystic is in communion with his god, or the subject *en rapport* with his hypnotist; when the humble Mr. Premby takes on the role of Sargon King of Kings; when the adolescent, before or after his father's death, wishes to behave in his role; when a savage fears to divulge his true name or have his picture taken, because it is too closely a part of his self to give it to a stranger; when the reader feels himself the hero of the romance or drama."

Identification is basic to sympathy and co-operation. Its feeling-emotional foundation is that of pleasure and love. But the ability to place oneself in another's position depends upon learned reactions. The earliest training in sympathy and identification takes place with reference to the mother or some mother-surrogate such as a nurse. The mother image, which the Freudian analysts discuss, really arises in this process of identification of oneself with the mother in the acts of feeding, bathing, being carried about, and otherwise attended to. And how a person responds to himself and to others is definitely determined, in part at least, by these early social contacts with the parent. (See Chapter IX.) Later, identification is extended to other persons—father, brothers, sisters, relatives, friends, and various members of groups—and in time even to all sorts of symbols which cluster about persons and groups. The person feels and speaks for his group: "He behaves as if the group's unity were his own." Some persons so easily identify themselves with various groups that we dub them "joiners." These persons, as Eliot remarks, easily think in terms of "we." They are versatile, play many roles, and become rather easily adjusted to other people, at least in the outward form of participation.

Participation in conjoint group life is absolutely dependent on the ability of the individual members to identify themselves with each other's wants, aims, and manner of securing their satisfactions. It is through such mutual and common identification that co-operative habits, attitudes, and traits arise. *Co-operation* may be defined as the striving together of members of a group toward some particular good—material or symbolic (e.g., prestige)—which may be shared by all if they wish. For its most successful operation it requires feelings of delight or pleasure and at least some affectionate attitudes toward fellow-members. Identification and its related responses of sympathy and co-operation tend to be adient in character. They provide a certain expansion of self-esteem, pride, or ego by giving high value to activities which are mutually undertaken and shared together. It is from practice in the specific situations

ized internally, that is, within the covert system. Some writers, however, tend to use the two terms interchangeably. We prefer the former term to cover the overt and covert aspects, and, where we use the latter, the context will indicate its specific reference to this internalization.

demanding these reactions that the more generalized traits of sympathy and co-operativeness develop. The self could not arise without some degree of sympathetic identification of the young child with others and others with the child. (See Chapter IX.) Moreover, identification, sympathy, and co-operation are fundamental to the personal sense of security, the sense of group solidarity, and the maintenance generally of cohesion of group members.

Antagonistic patterns of interaction. In contrast to identification and all that this means for sympathetic and co-operative patterns is the tendency to opposition or antagonism. J. B. Watson (1919) and many other observers have repeatedly pointed out that restraint of free bodily movement of an infant sets up attempts to throw off the inhibiting stimulus. This blockage is accompanied by excitement—that is, emotions which adult observers call rage and general feelings of distress. Later other forms of frustration, including failure to attain a goal, set up strong emotional-feeling states and attempts to overcome or escape the inhibiting stimulus or situation. Not only anger but fear may enter into these efforts; the latter is especially evident when the attempts to avoid or overcome the frustration fail or are unduly prolonged. When fear is invoked, these oppositional tendencies take on the distinctive features of avoidant reactions. In fact, the older child, like the adult, experiences a mixture of rage and fear at being blocked in efforts to get what is wanted.

Since the extension of the cycle of activity in time and effort and the attendant rise of substitutive devices of overt and covert kind are, in large part, bound up with frustrations of one sort or another, it is clear that oppositional reactions are thoroughly natural. In all sorts of trial-and-error learning, rage and fear are very evident because the individual is unable to pass easily and quickly to the goal. These states apparently serve, as do other emotions, to energize the system by enhancing the action of the autonomic nervous system in conjunction with the activities of the adrenal glands. Thus the very seeking of the adequate solution may be facilitated by such responses. And observers using the theory of *Gestalt* learning have pointed out that at times an animal, after being at first unable to solve the problem set before him, may go off into a kind of temper tantrum and then settle back into a somewhat calmer state ending in some sudden and insightful solution of the task. (See Köhler, 1927.)

Clearly, then, we must reckon with these oppositional patterns in describing social interaction. They are quite as much a phase of the individual's adaptation as are those of sympathetic identification. The earliest frustrations arise in feeding situations or in restraint of free and "random" bodily movements, but other inhibitions, which set up antagonistic and aggressive reactions, appear in the course of learning.

These rather primary emotional states and the attendant vigorous, even violent, acts are transferred to all sorts of other stimuli—material and social. In time they get entangled with habits and attitudes and finally become part and parcel of some of our fundamental traits. As we have already noted, such patterns of response take on a certain directionality with reference to particular objects of attention. Antagonism and aggression are implicit in dislike, disapproval, and hatred. And, as they pass into more fundamental traits, they often acquire a certain generality. Thus we find persons who are characterized in a marked proportion of their social acts by attitudes and traits of aggression toward others. Moreover, as aggressiveness becomes organized into more general features, it finds all sorts of outlets. (See Dollard *et al.*, 1939.) It is most evident in dominance of others in group activities. It is a fundamental feature of many forms of leadership.

Oppositional habits, attitudes, and traits are also basic to the social processes of *competition* and *conflict*. The former we may define as struggle among individuals for some good—material or symbolic—in which each strives to outdo the other in order to attain the goal, which is not shared but kept for oneself. But the interest is in the aim or goal rather than in the opponent. In fact, competition in many instances is definitely impersonal. Conflict is likewise a striving among people for some good which is not to be shared, but the struggle is directed not only to the attainment of the goal but toward the opponent as well. Competition resembles a foot race; conflict, a fist fight. The aim of the former is to win a prize or reward; that of the latter is to render the antagonist *hors de combat*, to remove him from opposition. This may take overt or symbolic form. It may mean pushing, shoving, inflicting pain, and in the most extreme cases in adult society banishment, imprisonment, or even death. In symbolic form it means debasing as to prestige and power by inflicting negative verbal controls of some sort or other.

Certainly, aggressive and antagonistic habits, attitudes, traits, and ideas have distinctive functions in competition and conflict. But, though the roots of these patterns lie in the organic structure and the first interactional relations, as do those of identification, love, and co-operation, we shall see that cultural training plays an enormously important part in stimulating, directing, and giving value to this pattern of behavior. In an individual's organization of attitudes and traits into his frames of reference, co-operativeness, sympathy, and ability for identification all come to stand over against equally strong patterns of antagonism and aggressiveness and patterns favorable to competition and conflict.

Ambivalence in patterns of activity. This discussion of co-operation and antagonism shows that many activities stand in an oppositional relationship to each other. This fact of opposite and somewhat contradictory re-

actions to situations or objects is termed *ambivalence*. (See Freud, 1920; and Healy, Bronner, and Bowers, 1930.) For Freud and his followers the term applies chiefly to alternating and contradictory emotional-feeling tones toward any stimulus.

The basic constitutional foundation for ambivalence may be found in certain drives themselves. Sometimes drives present an intraindividual struggle for prepotency. For example, hunger may compete with the sexual demands. Both drives cannot be satisfied simultaneously, and there may well be a certain struggle between them for dominance. Another factor which may operate to influence ambivalence is the periodicity or rhythm in the operation of many fundamental organic processes. Then, too, the differentiation of behavior—that is, the building up of partial or segmental patterns—furnishes a further foundation for such opposition. The interplay of inhibition and facilitation in conditioning, which we discussed above, offers a simple instance. (See Chapter V.) So, too, the contradictory directionality of rage and love, of like and dislike, provides other examples.

As the individual develops more complex patterns of acquired motives, attitudes, and traits, this same general fact is also very apparent. To use W. I. Thomas's wishes as an illustration, one might say that the desire for new experience stands over against the wish for safety and security. Still another instance is found in the oppositional character of identification, sympathy, and co-operation, on the one hand, and of antagonism, aggression, and competition or conflict, on the other. Thus L. B. Murphy (1937) has reported that among various groups of nursery-school children she found marked instances of children who were both sympathetic and co-operative and strongly aggressive and dominant. So, too, Green (1933) found in a study of friendship and quarreling among preschool children that friends showed on the average a higher incidence of quarrelsomeness between themselves than did the children who are less friendly to each other. The disputes of lovers are well known, as are oppositional reactions of members of many emotionally closely knit associations.

The term *ambivalence* does not so much describe a mechanism as denote a significant characteristic of many functions of the individual in the course of adaptation. It is a highly important concept having wide ramifications in the personality. Although it has its rise in the constitution and in the earliest social contacts, its further development and meaning are profoundly influenced by cultural training.⁵

⁵ If one followed the Freudians, one might consider ambivalence a special phase of the wider dichotomies of behavior and thought which they treat under the concept of polarity. Polarities would be illustrated in their paired concepts such as "activity-passivity," "pleasure-pain," "love-hate," "life-death instincts," and "masculine-feminine." See Healy, Bronner, and Bowers, 1930, p. 18.

Projection. Largely ambivalent to identification is another socially determined mechanism termed *projection*, which is the process of thrusting upon others one's own ideas, feelings, and emotions, or of attributing to other persons or objects one's own ideas, feelings, emotions, and actions. Like identification, projection is often unconscious as well as conscious and deliberate in character, and it is so common as to assume a particularly important place in much of our behavior.

Projection is clearly an externalization of inner anticipatory activity. That is, the inner psychological process is imagined to be located outside us. Ordinarily projection is perfectly normal. It lies at the basis, perhaps, of the very distinction between an internal and an external world and is an important phase of normal perception, especially that involving the distance-receptors. At the level of interaction the process is illustrated when some repressed or unwanted idea or attitude is thrust outward into some situation or upon another person, real or imaginary, who is thought to be the cause of the idea or attitude. B. Hart (1916, p. 118) remarks that "people who possess some fault or deficiency of which they are ashamed are notoriously intolerant of that same fault or deficiency in others." So, too, the parent may unwittingly force upon a child his own secret and thwarted wishes for a particular professional career. (See K. Young, 1927c.) Or one may attribute love or hate to another person because of one's own love or hatred. Projection also comes into operation in prejudice wherein the members of one group attribute to another group characteristics which they themselves hate or emotions which they themselves feel but are ashamed of because of social taboos. It occurs in the development of the delusions of persecution so frequently seen in prejudice and mob behavior, which are similar to the delusions found in the paranoid patients in our mental hospitals. Projection is often evident in the public behavior of the agitator or intense reformer who foists upon his followers his own "secret" or private resentment against authority or some institution which he dislikes. And since other persons (his actual or potential followers) also have feelings of resentment (though usually not so violent) against similar persons in power or against like institutions, they come easily to accept the agitator's projection as their own feelings. That is, they *identify* themselves with the agitator's projection. This interplay of identification and projection is an important phase of the relations of persons to each other.

Both identification and projection are important in building up social contacts. Both are phases of anticipatory response in which imagination aids in the adjustment of the person to other persons. In identification this consists in a type of sympathetic assumption of the qualities of the other in oneself; in projection it consists in imaginatively attributing to others qualities which we ourselves possess. The excessive pathological manifestations of the identification process are seen in the neurotic who experiences inordinate self-pity or who feels that he takes over the burdens of his fellows on himself. The pathological features of projection, as we have just noted, are seen in the paranoid who violently attributes to others the selfish or unsocialized ideas and attitudes which originate

in his own behavior. The one leads to extreme sentimentality and romanticism, the other to cruelty and persecution. The one is connected with high emotional overevaluation of the inner world, the other with an attempt to avoid such intense evaluation of the inner world by referring it from oneself into what is assumed to be a hostile social environment. (The relation of these two mechanisms to attitudes toward the in-group and out-group will be discussed in Chapter VII.)

Compensation. No individual is completely adequate to every situation which he meets, and a good deal of our social learning is concerned with acquiring a set of substitute responses in place of those which ordinarily follow from the stimulus or desire. To take a docile or inferior role with others, or to admit inadequacy in the face of great odds, undermines one's pride and self-esteem; and in such instances one often seeks to find some means to offset one's sense of incompetence. The term *compensation* is used to describe just such adoption of a substitute function or role which provides or tends to provide the satisfaction that otherwise would accrue from more direct movement from desire to goal. The mechanisms of the conditioned response are doubtless operative in these cases.

When a boy is short in stature and weak in muscle, or a cripple, he may find release for his interest in athletics by frequent attendance at football, baseball, or other contests, by sculpturing figures of athletes, or by becoming a sports writer. This type of reaction is found everywhere. When an individual, however, becomes habitually emotional over his inadequacies and feels that he is distinctly inferior to those around him, he may become a more serious problem to himself and others. He may develop what in popular parlance is called an "inferiority complex." These "complexes" are combinations of attitudes and feelings, often largely unconscious. They lead one person to make an undue effort to compensate for his inadequacy, another to take a retiring role and accept defeat, and still another to become bitter at his inability to get ahead even while he blames himself, not others.

The person who develops excessive and emotionalized substitutive habits and attitudes is described as a case of *overcompensation*. Thus the "little" man with the loud voice who speaks up on every occasion, who is strong for "rights," who struts and preens himself in the public eye, who is fearsome lest he not be accorded the "proper" social prestige—this sort of person is likely enough a case of overcompensation. As with so many of these matters, it is the very extreme expression of a trait or habit or set of attitudes that distinguishes the neurotic or inadequate person from others. So long as these traits are well socialized, they are perfectly natural and normal.

When the sense of inadequacy does not lead to compensation or over-

compensation, the person who feels inferior may take the condition for granted. He may adopt a docile, submissive, dependent attitude toward others. He retreats as completely as possible from situations which demand self-reliant action. Such habits and attitudes of withdrawal, especially from social contacts, are often associated with daydreaming and with the development of behavior which we classify as introverted. Such timid individuals make little or no effort to master the situations which confront them, and their aspirations or ideals are often lowered along with their achievements.

Sublimation. Another form of substitute response is sublimation. In this case the substitute behavior has ethical and social approval by persons or groups with high prestige. Though sublimation has much in common with compensation, strictly speaking the latter concerns only the development of substitutive activities for *felt* inferiority. In sublimation we have not only ethical and social approval but also a replacement which may follow upon circumstances which do not necessarily produce any felt inferiority. The factor of frustration, however, is present as it is in compensation. But the substitute reaction is ordinarily milder and less vigorous than might be expected were it not for the cultural factors. Thus one may sublimate his impulsive rage reactions against restraint by dominant persons by protests of his "rights" or by righteous indignation about some alleged vice or "social evil." In sexual behavior the responses in women may be modified from the direct expression of sexual activities and the attendant maternal functions to a concern with child welfare.

Much of the literature illustrating sublimation carries with it this ethical aspect of the conditioning process. There is no objection to such use of the term, but it must be borne in mind that the mechanism is at root a biological one of conditioning and that the form it takes is determined chiefly by the cultural standards of the group in question. Profanity as a substitute response for the full expression of rage is not different in its physiological and neural aspects from the production of a poem of hate during a war. Neither is the writing of a love sonnet or a romantic drama very different with reference to thwarted love life from the development of a dislike for women or the production of ribald or lascivious stories. The range of substitutions for sexual activities is very wide, and, though the quality of these substitutions is determined by the social group, the particular form of the substitution, in the main outlines, remains the same. Such recognition of the cultural norms in the interpretation of the social behavior of individuals is always important.

The psychological mechanisms involved in various substitutions do not differ greatly, but what the activities mean for other persons, and for oneself in relation to them, is determined by the content of these substitutions. The man who releases his sexual suppressions in the form of salacious talk may be avoided by others, just as the man who indulges

in what are called sexual perversions may be punished by his community. On the other hand, a woman in our society who has been deprived by circumstances of normal motherhood may win great respect for her work as a nurse, as the head of an orphanage, as a social worker, or as judge of a juvenile court. For this reason the mere analysis of the mechanism, the *how* of behavior, can never give us a complete understanding of the personality. It may be sufficient for experimental, laboratory, individual psychology, but it is hardly sufficient for social psychology, which is concerned with the interaction of individuals.

Perhaps the most noteworthy sublimations, at least in our society, lie in the field of rage and sex because these are the two fundamental reactions which are most held in check in the present cultural order. We provide channels through which these tendencies may be sublimated. To put it differently, we canalize our habits in such a direction that these physiological impulses are drained off into activities given cultural approval by others. One of the most distinctive examples of this is seen in the repressive Christian sex mores. In Western society we permit the tremendous energy thus accumulated to be redirected into highly competitive activities which are considered proper and acceptable. Some writers have gone so far as to contend that all the so-called higher and more advanced cultures are largely the result of such sublimations. (See Unwin, 1934.) In addition, substitutions exist for fear, for the more primitive egoistic acquisitiveness, for the more primitive concepts and fantasies about the supernatural, and in other dimensions of behavior.

Other forms of substitution which are neither morally nor legally accepted in the community are found in various sorts of perversions, criminal habits, and psychopathic disturbances that take the place of socially accepted adjustments. These are not sublimations but may serve for the individual somewhat the same purpose, although the most satisfactory sorts of substitutions of behavior *are those acceptable to the community*, because, after all, the individual lives most fully in the minds of others and reflects in himself their attitudes toward him.

Rationalization. Not only do we find varied types of responses built up in social interaction, such as identification, antagonism, projection, compensation, and sublimation, but people soon learn to make excuses or justify their acts to others and to themselves. We call this habitual pattern *rationalization*. It is a means of keeping peace with ourselves and our fellows when our actual but often unconscious desires and their expression, were they fully known, would make us ridiculous, disliked, or even the subject of punishment by those in power. We all seek to justify our behavior. Most of the "reasons" we give ourselves and others are not the genuine causes of our conduct but are the excuses which we im-

agine will be acceptable to others and, incidentally, to ourselves. The real or genuine reasons are often hidden from us. These "good" and socially approved reasons are rationalizations.

Rationalization is thus most in evidence when the person expresses some thought or performs some act that runs counter to what his group expects of him. A man with a salary of five thousand dollars a year may fail to marry but may explain the failure to his friends on the ground that he cannot support a wife and family. Most men marry on much less of an income than this, and failure of the man in question to marry may rest upon strong but acquired resistances to women of which he is quite unaware. Yet his group may, nevertheless, accept his "reasoning."

Most of our rationalizations are culturally determined. That is, our society approves excuses for all sorts of conduct which may be motivated by very selfish and immoral motives hidden beneath the surface. Actually, social pressure is so evident in most situations that a man is considered poorly socialized who frankly admits that he does somewhat unconventional things because these acts represent to him his inner desires. Yet an employer may rationalize his opposition to a strike by accusing the workers of communism, radicalism, and lack of patriotism when the claims of the strikers for better wages and hours may be sincere and in line with the standard of living which other employers and the wider public accept as customary. In such a case the employer often obtains support from a section of the community if his rationalized antagonism is couched in the stereotypes of bolshevism and revolution.

It has often been implied and even openly stated that rationalization is a pathological and somewhat "evil" type of behavior. Really, however, this device provides a defense reaction against the exposure of violent or unethical motives. The genuine incentives can usually be brought to light only by careful analysis of past behavior and most frequently only by other persons sufficiently outside one's social-cultural frame of reference to manifest objectivity about human conduct. Rationalizations, at least those acceptable to our group, make for smooth and uninhibited behavior. It would be hard for us to participate in the society of our fellows if we were constantly aware of the true or actual foundations of our conduct.

Universality of interactional patterns. These interactional mechanisms, like other forms of activity, always have a dual reference: (1) to the other person or object, and (2) to the pattern within, to what we may call the self or ego, or the organization of attitudes, traits, and ideas or themata within oneself. It is also important to emphasize that these mechanisms arise in social interaction. They do not unfold haphazardly but doubtless represent the substrata of social interaction everywhere. In this connection one may well raise this important question: Is it not

possible that we have in these mechanisms the fundamental social-psychological processes which underlie all social behavior everywhere without regard to culture? In other words, is it not sound to infer that, no matter how divergent overt conduct is, how divergent culturally acquired attitudes and ideas may be, there still remain not only the basic physiological drives to activity but also these mechanisms, and perhaps others, that are universal? If there is anything in Boas's (1911) notion of "psychic unity," it must refer to mental processes of sensation, perception, memory, conceptualization, judgment—to use the terms of faculty psychology—or to such interactionally derived patterns as identification, projection, substitution, and the others just noted. If this contention is sound, it follows also that one may criticize those cultural anthropologists who talk only of culture and never of society and social interaction—that is, who ignore or neglect the basic psychological processes involved in the interplay of individual with individual in any given group. Society, if it means anything as a concept, means interacting personalities. It is not a thing, but a dynamic relationship, a configuration, if you please, of persons in contact and communication with each other. Without contact and communication there can be no society, and without society, of course, there can be no culture. In short, we must reckon not only with the culture but with the interactional relations of individuals if we are to understand how personality as a combination of common and unique sets of attitudes, ideas, and habits arises. Some important details of group life and culture will be discussed in the next chapter.

Chapter VII

GROUPS AND CULTURE: THE FRAMEWORK OF PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT

IN DISCUSSING motives and learning we made some mention of society and culture. In the present chapter we shall explain these concepts more fully. Just as we drew upon biology and laboratory psychology for an understanding of the organism, so now we must draw upon sociology and cultural anthropology in order to indicate other factors.¹ When we look at man from the point of view of society, we are concerned with his interactional patterns viewed from the group as well as from the individual angle. When we consider culture, we take into account the precipitates of social living together, and we are concerned with the content of man's habits, attitudes, traits, and ideas as they are held more or less in common with others. If we were to put these variables into a convenient shorthand, the biological individual could be designated by O, for organism; society or social-interactional effects, by S; and culture, by C. It is only through the interplay of society and culture upon the organism or biological individual that the personality, which we may designate as P, arises. Thus, using our symbols, we might indicate the relations of these variables to personality as follows:

$$O \} S \} C \} = P$$

We are concerned, then, with the manner in which the biological individual with his induction into society and its culture comes to play his part in the human and social drama called life. The individual is always born into a group (or a society made up of various smaller groups) which has a culture. In this sense society and culture are always antecedent to any particular individual. All the references of psychologists to Robinson Crusoe and to feral men to the contrary, actually we know of no human personalities which have developed outside the matrix of society and culture. The fundamental drives and their course through cycles of activity toward satisfaction come to operate only in terms of group and cultural relations.

¹ I believe that sociology and cultural anthropology are or should be synonymous, at least as to method and standpoint. See K. Young (1939, rev. ed.), and Linton (1936, 1938).

GROUPS

Before we discuss various kinds of groups, we may define society itself more fully. A society is the broadest association of people who possess a certain common set of habits, attitudes, and ideas, sufficient to hold them together, who live in a definite territory, and who are often set off from other societies by attitudes and habits of difference or antagonism. Within any given society there exist various smaller collectivities more or less concerned with special social aims or purposes. A convenient division of these smaller associations with respect to organization is that into primary and secondary groups. With respect to certain relations of group to group we may make a second division into the we-group or in-group and the others-group or out-group.

The primary group. Cooley (1909, p. 23), the social psychologist, who clearly recognized the function of the primary group, defined it in these words:

"By primary groups I mean those characterized by intimate face-to-face association and co-operation. They are primary in several senses, but chiefly in that they are fundamental in forming the social nature and ideals of the individual. The result of intimate association, psychologically, is a certain fusion of individualities in a common whole, so that one's very self, for many purposes at least, is the common life and purpose of the group."

Such an association of persons is characterized by its unconscious growth and its spontaneous formation in an area inhabited by people of more or less homogeneous blood and culture. The most familiar of these groups are the family, the play group (out of which grow the gang and congeniality group), the neighborhood, and the small village group. These groups are the nursery of the personality. Under their influence the basic interactions are experienced, and the fundamental culture patterns, at least on the side of moral conduct and many fundamental attitudes, are impressed upon the growing boy or girl. Social interaction takes place at a face-to-face level. The social stimuli are direct; that is to say, voice, taste, touch, smell, facial gestures, and visual stimuli are involved. In our treatment of various adjustment problems of the child, the adolescent, and the adult—in the home, at play, in school, at work, or elsewhere—we shall have ample occasion to examine more closely the interplay of these groups and personality.

These primary groups represent the fundamental human associations. They are perhaps as old as the social life of man, and constitute together the *primary community* in its simplest form. Such a community is historically the smallest unit of society that is sufficient for the satisfaction of the major needs of the individual. It is well illustrated in tribal life and in rural villages the world over. Today the neighborhood and the

primary community are disappearing before the onslaught of changes in the production, manufacture, and distribution of economic goods and services.

These groups are primary in several senses. They are the first groups in which the individual builds up his habits and attitudes. They are fundamental to the development of the social self and the moral sense, and give one the basic training in social solidarity and co-operation. On the other hand, they are not entirely free from rivalry and competition. There is always some difference of view and action. Self-assertion comes into play, although it is disciplined by the common sense of union.

The secondary group. Secondary groups are characterized by much more deliberate, voluntary, and conscious formation than are the primary forms. They represent almost entirely partial and specialized interests or needs. In fact, they are often called "special-interest groups." They do not necessarily depend upon face-to-face contacts. Actually, such direct relations are common, but they are not absolutely essential; for example, a scientific association may exist for years without the members' ever meeting together in person. In many relations secondary groups use long-distance indirect means of communication: the postal system, the telephone, the telegraph, the radio, and the press. Secondary groups are illustrated by the modern political state, the political party, the religious body, the school system, the business or industrial corporation, various economic associations of employers or employees, medical associations, all sorts of clubs, lodges, art and scientific societies, and the followers of philosophic "schools of thought."

Although secondary groups usually represent particular interests, these very interests or needs persist through time and come to demand more formal organization than do the primary groups. There develop traditions, codes, special officers, and fixed methods of carrying on their functions, which we call social rituals and institutions. Some writers, in fact, classify secondary associations as "institutional groups."

Most of the habits and attitudes built up in the primary associations carry over to one's participation in the secondary. Although Western society is more and more characterized by the growth of secondary associations, the primary contacts are not lost. We shall not discuss in detail the variety of secondary groups, since the relations of the person to many of these associations will be discussed later. As we shall see, many personal difficulties arise from the increasing dominance of the secondary over the primary group in modern societies.

The complex interrelations of modern nations and other secondary groups has developed what may be called a set of *secondary* communities. These are made up of primary and secondary groupings in an extended territory which may go beyond political boundaries of nations.

In fact, some writers indicate that, despite international wars, we are really moving toward a world-wide community.²

Primary and secondary groups provide the individual with the area of his social operations. He cannot live, in fact, without participating in at least some of these groups. And, as important as secondary associations have become, the fundamental habits, attitudes, and ideas of the person still stem from his primary contacts, especially the family or its modern surrogates.

Personal participation in group life. The intensity, range, and nature of the individual's contacts with his fellows we may call *participation*. This differs in the various groups to which he belongs. Thus participation occupies different degrees of a person's interests and energy, giving a kind of scale of interaction. During the early years the person is bound up entirely with the family. Shortly, however, the play group and the wider neighborhood and the primary community secure some of his attention and action. Gradually he comes into contact with the church, the school, and other secondary groupings, and his earlier complete absorption in the family life, the play group, and the immediate neighborhood is dissipated. As he reaches late adolescence and adulthood, he finds himself taking part in any number of groups, none of which perhaps forms the entire center of his interest. Yet with most mature persons in our Western society the founding of a family and the taking up of a particular vocation offer the chief foci of thought and activity. We may, therefore, speak of more or less complete participation in any given group, ranging from those like the family and occupational groups which absorb much of our attention to those group associations which touch us only slightly, and in which our participation is distinctly segmental or partial.

Furthermore, since there are degrees of participation, it is possible for us to have a wide and varied range of partial or segmental activities, some of which may be quite contradictory to others and yet, because they do not converge, may be carried on rather independently. Thus a man's family life may be marked by sympathetic and kindly attitudes and habits while his business contacts are marked by the severe and selfish methods of the jungle. Familiar to all of us are those men who have reached financial power through unscrupulous business dealings and yet find much public approval for their piety and contributions to church and charity.

As we shall see throughout our discussion of personality problems, the partial and segmental nature of one person's participation in various groups raises many handicaps to effective personality integration. This

² Regarding the psychology of other forms of grouping such as crowds, audiences, and publics which are not treated in this volume, see K. Young (1930) and LaPiere (1938).

is especially so in the modern world, dominated largely by secondary-group organization.

We-group and others-group. The relations among the groups to which one belongs will profoundly influence his life. If there is no opposition—that is, conflict or competition—between what is wanted by one group and what is wanted by others, they may get along harmoniously with each other, just as may two individuals within a primary or secondary group who do not rival each other for material goods or for prestige. But, when groups come to grips with each other over some wanted object or status, such as material wealth or class distinction, then conflict and competition become definitely linked up in the person with what his group wants and struggles for. Sumner (1906), recognizing this fact, developed the important concepts of the we-group or in-group and the others-group or out-group. This functional division of social groups between the “ins” and the “outs” is one of the most common features of all societies, modern and primitive.

The we-group is that association of persons toward whom we feel a sense of commonalty and mutual identification, with whom we participate in carrying out some group function or purpose, with whom we support the group standards. For the individual it is characterized by ideas or symbols and emotional attitudes expressed in such remarks as “we belong,” “we believe,” “we feel,” or “we act.” Moreover, toward other members of our group we have a definite obligation, especially in the face of any critical situation which threatens them and us. We would protect them as they would protect us. It is in response to such symbols and activities that we express our deepest sentiments of love and sympathy. We feel at ease with those around us. We are familiar with their manner of acting and thinking, and the other members with our own. We understand their gestures. Their words are our words. Frequently the very term and its accent are unique and themselves a badge of the common membership.

The first in-group patterns are usually developed in our own family. Later other primary and secondary associations take on we-group features in terms of solidarity and familiarity, on the one hand, and oppositional reactions to outside groups, on the other. The degree to which one’s life centers in any particular in-group depends upon the extent to which such a group fosters some major interests and satisfies the principal needs of the person, especially as these satisfactions are threatened by some out-group.

The *out-group*, then, is that association of persons toward which we feel a sense of disgust, dislike, opposition, antagonism, fear, or even hatred. It is the group toward which one has no sense of loyalty, mutual aid, co-operation, or sympathy. Rather one is prejudiced against the mem-

bers of the others-group. The family across the street is inferior to our own. Our neighborhood is better than the one "on the other side of the tracks." One's race is much superior to another's. One's antagonisms, one's prejudices, one's hatreds are usually focused around some out-group. The trade union opposes the employers' associations. Toward members of the union the individuals feel the sense of solidarity, helpfulness, and co-operation and loyalty. Toward the employer and especially toward the strikebreaker, whom the union man dubs a "scab," there is intense bitterness. Or one church considers itself superior to another. Catholics cannot understand Protestants, nor Protestants Catholics.

In time of peace, within the larger political community which we call the state, the attitudes toward out-groups are somewhat milder and more restrained than in time of war, when another nation or state becomes for us the out-group. Then strong sadistic tendencies to destroy the enemy come into play, and it becomes virtuous to plunder, enslave, or kill the members of an others-group.

One of the interesting problems of social psychology is the study of the manner in which the pattern of aggression or opposition built up in the primary and smaller secondary groups gets transferred to larger collectivities like churches or nations.

This pattern of in-group versus out-group is a widespread feature of social organization wherever opposition comes into play. *Ethnocentrism* is the term often applied to the view that one's own group is the center of everything worth while. This is as common among civilized as among savage and barbaric peoples. All values are scaled to that of one's own group. Each society nourishes its own importance, believes itself superior to all others, exalts its own gods and ideologies, and derides the gods and ideologies of other societies. The ancient Hebrews divided the world into themselves, the "chosen people," and all others, "the gentiles." The Greeks referred to all outsiders as barbarians, which meant originally "babblers" or "stammerers," that is, people who could not speak Greek.

One caution must be repeated. We do not assume that for every group to which one belongs there is a corresponding out-group. Moreover, not every group in which one does not participate as a member is necessarily to him an out-group. There are outside associations toward which we are totally indifferent. The attitudes of the we-group toward an others-group depend upon the functional relationship of the two groups to each other, fostered by competition and conflict. Any primary or secondary group can on occasion develop an in-group-out-group relationship, but there are many associations of people which do not. This is especially evident in congeniality and comradeship, in many quietistic sectarian groups, and in any number of other groupings which are isolated from contact with other and possibly oppositional associations.

CULTURE

Without the common ideas, attitudes, traits, and habits which grow out of interaction, society would fall apart. Common thoughts and actions develop first of all around the basic needs for food, drink, clothes, shelter, reproduction, and child care, and the requirements of societal organization and control. So, too, thoughts and habits emerge which express aesthetic and play interests and explain and symbolize man's place in the universe and his relations to the supernatural. These common and more or less standardized patterns the members of the group pass on to other individuals, to children born into the group, or to new members who get into the particular association in one way or another. This transmission of ways of thinking and doing runs through all society from the family and other primary groupings to the most loosely knit secondary types. This continuity of ideas, attitudes, and habits from one generation to the next is one of the outstanding features of man's life in society. These folkways, these continuous methods of thinking of and handling problems and social situations, we call *culture*.

Basic factors in, and patterns of, culture. For convenience we may summarize the fundamental factors in culture as follows: (1) it arises out of the *collectivity* or group in which man lives, especially as his actions there are affected (2) by his *basic needs* for food, drink, shelter, sexual activity, protection or security, societal order, and by his secondary needs for religious, artistic, and recreational expression; furthermore, (3) these ways of thinking and doing become more or less *formalized* and (4) are *transmitted* both consciously and unconsciously from one group to another, thus (5) giving *continuity* to the culture itself.

We may outline some of the universal patterns of culture as follows:

1. Patterns of communication: gestures and language
2. Methods and objects for providing for man's physical welfare
 - a. Food-getting
 - b. Personal care
 - c. Shelter
 - d. Tools, instruments, and machines
3. Means of travel and transportation of goods and services
4. Exchange of goods and services: barter, trade, commerce, occupation
5. Forms of property: real and personal
6. Sex and family patterns
 - a. Marriage and divorce
 - b. Forms of kinship relation
 - c. Guardianship
 - d. Inheritance
7. Societal controls and institutions of government
 - a. Mores

- b. Public opinion
- c. Organized state: laws and political offices
- 8. Artistic expression: architecture, painting, sculpture, music, literature, dancing
- 9. Recreational interests
- 10. Religious and magical ideas and practices
- 11. Science (in modern cultures)
- 12. Mythology and philosophy
- 13. Patterns into which fundamental interactional processes are directed, such as forms of competition, conflict, co-operation, differentiation, accommodation, and assimilation

As to the last-named, certainly how men specialize in their work or fall into conflict, competition, or co-operation; how they make compromises with each other; and how they take on new ideas and actions—to mention only the most evident processes—are all greatly affected by culture. Although it may well be that these processes and patterns grow up from interaction itself regardless of culture, and although it is clear that the rudiments of these interactional patterns are found in our prehuman relatives, yet, as man has developed his social life, they have become interlaced with standardized, accepted folkways. Hence the expression of these underlying psychological features of social interaction will vary with the culture of the time and place. And in turn these will influence the direction of personal development.

Ethos and society. Those patterns of culture of a particular society which most distinguish it from other societies we call the *ethos* or societal character. Sumner (1906, p. 36) defined ethos as "the totality of characteristic traits by which a group [a society] is individualized and differentiated from others." Thus Sparta, Athens, Judea, India, China, and contemporary, industrialized, capitalistic western Europe and the United States have their own distinctive patterns and values. Moreover, as Sumner says, "The ethos of one group furnishes the standpoint from which it criticizes the ways of any other group." Our own American culture has for over a century been dominated by such characteristic features as belief in individual material success to be achieved by personal competition; general national progress; an amazing faith in universal literacy and education for all as a means of solving our social and personal problems; belief in the virtue of sheer size or bigness; rapid movement through space or increased mobility of our population and enhanced means of communication and transportation; novelty and constant stimulation of exciting events—sensational news, drama, speed racing, or crazes and fads; and craving for power, especially in terms of physical bigness and monetary success.

In contrast to this the Orient, at least before Western culture and its values reached there in the nineteenth century, tended toward a more

quiescent, fatalistic ideology and practice. There was no belief in progress in our sense. Mere physical size had no special merit. Certainly no virtue inhered in rapid movement. Rather, the calm deliberation and mental rumination of the scholar represented the height of man's values.

Since the ethos of a people constitutes their most fundamental patterns, it seems to them one of the most sacred, universal, and immortal aspects of their life and valuations. One of the benefits of an objective study of various cultures and of the sociopsychological processes correlated with them is the recognition of the relativity of various systems of culture and their schemes of values and the effects of these upon the person's life organization. Yet we must never forget that despite efforts at impartiality and objectivity we are likely to be unwittingly biased in our description and analysis of personality, society, and culture. (See E. Freeman, 1936.)

THE RELATION OF GROUPS, CULTURE, AND PERSONALITY

The interrelations of our three major variables—organism (O), society or groups (S), and culture (C)—are dynamic—an interplay of events within the organism in relation to events among other organisms. There is, in short, a social-cultural configuration or patterning within the framework of which individual activity takes place. These make up the manifold of events with which the student of personality must deal. If we neglect the total play of these factors, our description and analysis will be incomplete and faulty, and any conclusions which we have in the form of hypotheses, laws, or generalizations—useful for prediction and control—will be misleading if not disastrous when we come to put them to the final test of practice.

Cultural and personal-social conditioning. From the standpoint of the individual there is an important distinction to be drawn regarding the nature of the conditioning or learning to which he is exposed. With the equipment of his constitution and its drives, the young child is progressively inducted into contact with an environment of mother, father, siblings, and others. Some of the social stimuli of these persons which reach the child reflect the culture or commonly accepted habits, attitudes, and ideas of the wider society as they are expressed in the family. As the child grows up and comes into contact with other primary groups and still later with secondary associations, these cultural influences continue to play upon him. These effects we shall refer to as *cultural conditioning*. But other stimuli which have little or no cultural foundation also reach the child. There are many person-to-person relationships that are not influenced by the culturalized habits, attitudes, and ideas which, because

they are common to one's group, are considered right, proper, or fashionable. Many of these stimuli arise out of age and sex differences or temperamental qualities of participants, or rest upon other factors, all of which may be called noncultural. This sort of learning we shall call *personal-social conditioning*.⁸

It is in the primary groups, and especially in the family, that these personal-social effects are most significant and telling. The family not only provides the child the fundamental culturalized techniques of skill, manners, and moral adaptation to the society around him, but furnishes him many variations in emotional stimuli and responsiveness of others, divergences in patterns of dominance and submission and in many other features of activity which lie outside or at least marginal to the generally accepted cultural framework. Let us mention some examples.

In many societies marked by a definite class system, it is customary in the culture for the upper-class families to employ a wet nurse for a newborn baby. It is against the convention for the natural mother to nurse her infant. To do so would cause her to lose caste. On the other hand, there may be no social convention as to the time intervals between nursings, and the indulgent nurse may let the baby have the breast at any time and at irregular periods whenever the baby fusses and cries. On the basis of psychological findings we have good reason to believe that irregular nursing often produces certain habits in the individual which may influence his attachments to his mother or to the wet nurse. These attachments affect his later behavior in distinct ways; for example, the demand to have every whim satisfied often begins here. The custom of employing wet nurses is in the *folkways*, in the culture of the upper classes; but that any particular wet nurse indulged a fretful baby is not, and would be counted as a personal-social, not a cultural, influence.

We may mention another example, in which admittedly some cultural factors may also operate. The behavior of a man in a mob may be largely the result of personal-social stimuli thrust upon him, in which the rawer and less cultivated emotions and feelings would be brought to the surface. In contrast, the behavior of a man in an army corps under orders and under the impress of drill and military code would be distinctly influenced in every respect by the cultural patterns of war-making.

Again, although a patriarchal family system has been in vogue for centuries among our Western peoples, there have always been variations in the power exerted by the wife and mother in matters of discipline and control of both adults and children in the household. Even though the culture of the patriarchy demanded submission to the father, the temperament or disposition of the mother might have been so developed from her earliest years that she unconsciously and consciously influenced the child to take a position of submission to her, or to disregard the expected claims of authority of the father. So, too, a person constitutionally predisposed to nervous tensions or excitability, or, in contrast, to calm in the face of crisis, will affect the child no matter how the culture sets the stage and furnishes the form and content of behavior and thinking of children and adults in a particular group.

⁸ Though this is an awkward expression, it does emphasize the social character of these influences and also the fact that they depend upon direct person-to-person interaction.

In short, in every human grouping which has common culture patterns, it is still possible for a more or less wide range of interactional patterns and of ideas, habits, and attitudes to develop which are not and perhaps cannot be predetermined by the culture itself.

Cultural conditioning is perhaps more self-evident. The introduction of the child into the various arenas of interaction noted in the section on culture above will serve as an illustration. From his primary and secondary groups he acquires his language and the skills and techniques of economic survival, learns to manage all sorts of mechanical devices and instruments and machines of manufacture and travel, acquires knowledge and habits regarding the exchange of services and goods, builds habits and attitudes in regard to family life, takes on the morality and legal obligations of his community, gets his standards of art, adopts the religious views and practices of his social world, and so on through the whole gamut of the larger patterns of culture.

These cultural influences are carried over to the individual in either informal or formal fashion. The primary groups pass on the values, customs, moral codes, and other features of the "social heritage" in a direct but informal process of daily intercourse. As the periphery of the community expands, as specialization of social function (differentiation or division of labor) increases, and as secondary-group organization comes to replace that of primary groupings, informal means of cultural conditioning may be less evident. Yet through the indirect means of communication—the press, the radio, and the motion picture—the masses are furnished stimuli of culturalized character. Thus the newspaper not only furnishes millions of readers news of the world's events, but gives them ideas, opinions, and values which the simpler, slower transmission in primary groups could not have given them. Not only are the speed and uniformity of these impressions significant, but new values and opinions are spread over the world. Urban ideas and values reach the rural sections. Revolutionary ideas from one country are carried to other countries even without deliberate planning. The periodical and the book create modern myths and legends. Universal literacy has not made man less interested in gossip, in adventure, and in dreams of a different and wider world. Likewise, the motion picture and the radio are constantly flooding us with new phrases, new ideas, new song hits, pictures of fashion, and reflections of morally divergent behavior, all of which are bound to influence the ideas, attitudes, and actions of millions.

Society has long since devised more formal, highly organized means of passing on its culture. In primitive communities this may be in the form of instruction by the elders and priests of the novices who are about to enter the men's world of hunting, warfare, and marital responsibilities. In the matter of mechanical skills, guilds of master workmen often take over the apprentices, who learn the trade under their direction. In the more complex societies, formal educational institutions are set up to assist in giving the rising generation their initiation into the culture around them. The church has often played a part in this formal instruction, since religious organizations are always concerned that their devotees secure the correct dogma and practice. The school not only contributes formal knowledge and skill; it also gives social and

especially moral training which reflects the dominant culture. The school no less than the church is given over to indoctrination, either conscious or unconscious. So, too, the state, through its legal agencies, often serves as a transmitter of much of the valuable culture which bears on political behavior. The state also attempts through its correctional and penal institutions to transmit the moral heritage to criminals and delinquents under its care. In fact, the modern state has more and more taken over both the formal and the informal means of cultural conditioning.

Lest a misunderstanding arise, however, it is necessary to state that this distinction between personal-social or subcultural conditioning and cultural conditioning is a logical one drawn for purposes of description and analysis. In the actual development of the person's habits, attitudes, and ideas, the two factors are usually intertwined, and only a careful study of the particular person and of the social situation will enable one to




FIGURE 8, showing interplay of individual and groups.

disentangle the part each set of factors plays. In truth, there is a sort of scale of variable effects. At one end we may consider the basic culture patterns of a given society or community. These are the *universals* of culture, including here, of course, the basic ethos. Then there are also often certain choices which may be made among a number of *alternative* culture patterns. So, too, various groups develop *specialities* or particular and limited patterns that belong to some skill, ideology, or form of thought peculiar to them. (See Linton, 1936.) Then at the other end of the scale would be the range of personal-social effects which have played upon the individual, especially in his earliest years and in connection with the intimate person-to-person contacts of the family and other primary groups.

Figure 8 illustrates the general relations of the individual or organism to the primary and secondary groups in terms of the interplay of these two forms of conditioning. It shows that the personal-social effects are stronger in the primary group than in the secondary, and also that some of these effects carry over from the primary to the secondary association.

Cultural influences, of course, are prominent in both types of groups. It also shows that many of the cultural features carry over from primary to secondary groups, and also that in some instances there is a direct relationship between the individual and the secondary group without the intermediation of the primary group itself. The more rational and highly impersonal relations of modern industry and business as well as the interplay in the world of ideas, as in science and philosophy, illustrate the latter.

Definition of the situation. On the basis of his cultural and personal-social conditioning the individual learns to meet various social situations or configurations as they confront him. In the words of W. I. Thomas (1923), he learns "to define" the situation before him, in reference to which he must make an adjustment if he is to participate with his fellows. Thomas has furthermore distinguished between those definitions of the situation which are laid down for the individual by culture and those which represent more distinctly the person's own conception or definition. The first of these he would call the moral, public, and utilitarian definition, the second, the personal or hedonistic. With reference to the former, individuals in relation to their group and community life have learned to delimit the stimuli and responses in certain standardized, codified, and morally accepted ways. This is particularly evident in regard to economic, political, religious, and civic matters. Obviously, some of the public definitions of situation do not possess any moral value. These arise from what may be called the nonmoral folkways. Such details of our culture as table manners, styles of dress, and use of various sorts of machinery illustrate this dimension of culture patterns. Infraction of these nonmoral folkways by the individual may lead simply to ridicule and avoidance, but not to severe punishment, as would infraction of the mores.

To run counter to the moral codes of what is right and wrong leads one into severe ridicule, physical punishment, imprisonment, ostracism, banishment from the group, or, in the most serious instances, even death. Murder, stealing, perjury in court, dishonesty, sexual irregularity as defined by the respective codes, being traitor to the group's existence, particularly in time of warfare—these illustrate the fields of behavior in which the more severe group pressures are applied.

The situations which bring about such action on the part of others are defined in terms of moral and legal taboos. Definitions of situations and taboos are phrased largely in language terms. Thus certain terms, such as "scab," "traitor," "adulterer," "thief," "criminal," "immoral," come to be applied to persons who infringe the code. Situations are defined in the unwritten moral codes or else, as in our society, are also embodied in the formal law and a body of judicial precedents.

The hedonistic definition, in contrast, aims at permitting the individual an outlet for his more intimate and private wishes. It is not that these wishes arise directly out of constitutional factors without any learning, as is implied by some writers. These hedonistic patterns, while they rest upon fundamental drives or motives, are doubtless modified in the earlier years by personal-social and certain cultural conditioning in the circles of primary-group relationships, especially as these touch sexual interests, desires for comradeship, congeniality, and intimate pleasurable responses. Likewise, the desire for power, arising as it does in the early years, is frequently later inhibited by the public moral definitions of the situation. Yet it may remain deeply embedded in the personality and may find its outlets on occasion in the hedonistic expression of one's desires.

The choice between the public definition and the hedonistic definition is always related to the social situation in which the individual finds himself. In some instances the definition and hence the response will be loaded heavily in the direction of the utilitarian function. In others the personal definition will be more likely. The utilitarian we might designate by the symbol D_u , the hedonistic by D_h . Thus in some instances the personality, P , in relation to any social situation might be considered to be responding in either of two forms:

$$\begin{aligned} (1) \quad P &= D_u > D_h \\ &\text{or} \\ (2) \quad P &= D_u < D_h \end{aligned}$$

The former (1) would be illustrated by a conformity to certain demands of the moral code, or convention as to fashion, in which the strong personal tendencies would be relatively weak or even suppressed. The latter (2) would be instanced by gambling in a community where, though such practices were tabooed publicly, a person might indulge himself on the quiet, or by a case of masturbation, which in turn might be rationalized as a necessary release from unpleasant sexual tensions.

This struggle between more intimate personal interests and definitions and the public's more widely expected and accepted interests and their definitions lies at the heart of many of the personality problems which we shall discuss in later chapters. It is basic to the matter of in-group versus out-group attitudes and especially to the dichotomy between moral views and moral action, a problem which has long distressed the philosophers of ethics.

Participation, role, and status. Finally, every person finds some function or activity within the group or society. This rests upon the identification which others made possible for him by their definition of his situation as well as by his own. Likewise every activity or function or what we shall call *role* leads to some social *status*, or degree of prestige, for

the individual in his relations with his fellows. The role and status of a person are fundamental to his development.

The pattern or type of behavior which the person, both as child and as adult, builds up in terms of what others expect or demand of him we refer to as the *role*. The role is related to one's acceptance of the definition of the situation by others. Each group sets up its definitions of situations and lays out various roles for the members. This process begins in the family and other primary groups and continues throughout life. Primary groups still have the largest responsibility in setting the role of the individual. For example, whether a person takes a submissive or dominant attitude, or whether he fully accepts the group definition or not later in life, may well depend upon fundamental training for his participation in the family or in the play group.

The demand or requirement to follow the patterns laid down for us by our fellows is a phase of social interaction which is found everywhere. The fact of *social expectancy* is basic both to playing of roles and to social control. In all groups, apparently, and in hundreds of common situations, the expectations of others determine largely how we behave. The Chinese word for rude means "other than expected." The meaning of another's acts is linked up with this expected thought and action. Expectancy lies at the root of the sense of solidarity and participation itself. "We-feeling" is but another way of stating that the members think and react as their fellows expect them to. The citizen as citizen must be patriotic or be cast out as traitor. The class-conscious proletarian has had built up for him ideas and attitudes which he must reflect if he is to remain in the "Party." Every group, class, profession, cult, and party with any strong sense of solidarity illustrates the same thing. The images of expectancy of what others will do and of what you will do yourself are important in the whole field of anticipatory behavior. (See Chapters VI and IX.)

Closely tied up with role is the status of the individual. The terms *role* and *status* have often been used almost interchangeably in sociology, but there is a difference. *Status* is the position, the standing, accorded the individual within the group by his fellows. It does not imply high standing only, but position along the social scale. The *role*, in contrast, is what you do or do not do. It is activity, and status is one's resultant place on the prestige scale.

A person may have a low status in one group and a high status in another. In the development of the personality there is nothing more fundamental than the status attributed to one by his fellows. One's sense of importance, one's self or ego, in fact, is a crucial matter in the entire process of social adaptation. The manner in which the self arises and operates will be the subject of subsequent chapters.

Chapter VIII

THE LANGUAGE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL

As we noted in Chapter VI, an individual's adaptive activity may be considered as taking place at three levels. (1) There is overt movement in space, illustrated by habits of personal care and protection, by physical contact with others, by skilled manipulation of tools or machines, and by any other acts involving the peripheral muscular system. (2) There is the communicative or subovert response, illustrated by vocal or written speech and by a variety, of manual, facial, and other gestures. (3) There are covert or inner processes, exemplified in thoughts, conscious or unconscious wishes, feelings, and emotions. (This last is the private world of the individual and can only be investigated by means of inferences drawn from the observation of overt behavior or from what is communicated at the second level. See Chapter XI.) In actuality, of course, these different functions are closely bound together. We segregate them only for purposes of description and analysis, and the next three chapters respectively will be devoted to examining them as they bear upon linguistic development, upon the rise of the self, and upon the interrelation of language, thought, and sense of self.

THE EVOLUTION OF COMMUNICATION FROM THE GESTURE

The emergence of communication or subovert activity as an aspect of the interactional process is of immense importance in the rise of more complex and effective adaptation of animal or man to the external situation. This is true both of the species and of the individual, and, since the social act of communication has its origin in the rise of gestures among prehuman forms, we shall sketch briefly the beginnings of this subovert behavior among lower animals before describing the rise of language in the individual.

One of the great turning points in animal evolution was the assumption of an erect posture and the concomitant further elaboration of the cerebral cortex. Various effects may be noted: The freeing of the forepaws from the function of locomotion made possible the evolution of the hands, which could be used in more discriminative and skillful manipulation of food, other material objects, and mates or offspring. The

new manipulatory capacity in turn led to the development of tools and mechanical devices for further control of the environment. The postural relations of individual members to each other were altered because the animal now came upon his fellows in a more distinctly vis-a-vis manner. The visual world was enlarged. The posture of sexual intercourse was changed, as were the bodily contacts of mother and young in nursing. But of particular importance was the release of the mouth and larynx from too immediate concern with food gathering, which made possible the further development of vocalization. This latter change, moreover, enhanced the importance in interaction of auditory stimuli, both of one's own voice and of the voices of others. Along with these changes went further growth of the cerebral cortex, so basic to complex skills, vocalization, thought, and inhibition. But we are particularly concerned with the emergence of new uses for the musculature of the snout, mouth, and throat, which had hitherto been occupied with finding and tearing food and which now became significant in new relations both to the physical world and to the world of one's own or nearly related species. It was now possible for the animal to employ his vocal mechanism for social ends, that is, to extend his participation with members of his own species, which in turn might make his adaptation and theirs more effective. (See Bawden, 1919.) The significance of this new use of the vocal organs lay particularly in the field of gesture.

The nature of gesture. Though the dictionary defines *gesture* as an action or motion of the body, head, or limbs, expressive of some idea or emotion or illustrative of some utterance, in our use of the term we shall include the vocal responses as well. A grunt, a sigh, or a shout constitutes a gesture just as much as do movements of the facial muscles or the hands.

More closely defined, a gesture is a truncated or incomplete act; that is, it is an incipient overt response which is changed in the course of its expression. A gesture fails to become a full-fledged or complete act simply because another member of the same species, seeing or hearing it, begins to respond to it and thus interferes with or modifies the oncoming act before it is consummated.

Originally, vocal expressions had no communicative significance; but among the higher animals, at least, the possession of similar vocal structure and function provides a foundation upon which communication may develop. Moreover, the animal hears his own vocalization—his grunt, his growl, his cry of rage or fear, or his love call—in much the same way as do other members of his own species hear him. For instance, when an animal vocalizes an inner feeling or emotional state, he stimulates not only his fellows but also *himself*. Because gestures are indicative of overt acts to follow, they take on the rudimentary character of representative

or substitutive acts. Thus it is within the field of gesture that subovert or communicative interaction developed.

In the evolution of the social life of animals the gesture has played an enormously important part. The cry of the frightened animal or bird gives a warning of incipient danger to fellow members of his species. If his fellows perceive the same situation, his cry may easily become a conditioned stimulus for their flight or fighting. In time his hearing his own voice and his own overt reaction become linked to such responses in others. So, too, the love calls of the moose or the bird are indicative of mating acts to follow. And the cry of hunger or pain by the young may bring aid from the mother. It is in this sense that we may speak of communication of the lower animals, for certainly their activities are constantly being modified by the oncoming acts of other animals. The matter is nicely illustrated in the rudimentary stages of a dog fight, where vocal and other expressions of rage may serve to set up reactions of escape or conflict. Smelling, growling, baring of teeth, thrusting the ears forward or back, and movements toward and away from each other precede the actual attack. In the sparring of the two dogs, as of two boxers, the preliminary activities are largely gestures, indicative of more complete responses to follow.

Gestures are related to internal changes in the organism as well as to external changes in the situation. As we have seen, these internal changes, in their elementary form, consist largely of physiological tensions which make up the drives and their associated feelings and emotions. For example, at the mating season the male pigeon takes to strutting before the female and to calling her with peculiar vocal gestures. These are significant for the female in determining her responses to the male. (See Craig, 1908.) But animal gestures are not true language in the human sense of the word. Bird or animal calls do not convey definite concepts, such as the *kind* of food or the *sort* of danger sensed by the animal. The sounds, however, do serve as signs to secure attention of other members of the species and to arouse in them like attitudes or tendencies to action. (See Chapter X.)

Communication among prehuman species. Of particular interest to us as a background to the rise of the self and of human speech are the observations which have been made of the gestures of the apes. These provide us some indication of the possible roots of our own language. The vocal gestures of the apes are "subjective" and can only express emotions, or at best point out situations; they cannot designate objects symbolically. Yet the range of expression by facial and vocal gestures is very great—they can show rage, fear, despair, grief, joy, "pleading desire," playful attitudes, and pleasure.

Although the apes do not possess true speech or develop a self-feeling

in the human sense, they have considerable sense of the activity of their fellows. Köhler (1927) has described how one female ape, Tschego, demonstrated affection and sympathy for other members of the band by helping them out in distress. So, too, apes engage in a good deal of co-operative as well as oppositional behavior. They show amazing discrimination concerning other apes, and some of them develop considerable skill in manipulating situations and the activities of others in order to gain a desired goal for themselves. Thus Kempf (1916) has reported how one ape by motions of the hands distracted the visual attention of another ape from a wanted food object and in this way was able to procure the food himself when the neighbor was not watching. Such a gesture seems almost human, resembling a part of a complex, planned (that is, imagined) social act. Although these illustrations show that apes are highly aware of the actions of their fellows, it is doubtful if they possess the capacity to view themselves as objects of activity—a capacity, as we shall see, which is basic to the concept of the self.

Above all it is important to note that gestures, vocal and otherwise, are dependent on systems of accessory muscles organized so that partial or segmental activity may accompany or parallel the main overt acts of the organism. This makes possible a remote control of behavior, for every overt external act uses, as a part of the total reaction system, the responses of these accessory muscles—principally manual, facial, and vocal. Through learning these segmental reactions may come to stand for, represent, or symbolize the complete act. (See Chapter X.)

Since these gestures emerge in the field of social interaction, the control of other members of a species, and the control of oneself by others, are made increasingly possible. As Bawden (1919, p. 269) puts it, "The substitution of the gesture for the completed act, of the spoken word for the gesture, of the written word for the spoken word, and then, within the confines of the now socialized behavior of the individual, of sub-vocal articulation for interlocutory discourse, introduced a technic for handling the remotest parts of the environment." It is in this way that the gesture becomes a highly important component of the cycle of activity, and its place in the emergence of the sense of self in the human being is fundamental.

Cycles of activity and human gestures. The gesture constitutes a basic unit of the subovert or communicative interaction of two or more persons, but it functions within the framework of the larger social act. Originally an outgrowth of emotional expressions, it comes to have in time a significance or meaning for the other person. But symbolic responses are, at least in their inception, closely related to overt interaction, be it sexual congress, care of young, co-operative food-getting,

struggling among individuals for some wanted object, or other behavior necessary in the drive-to-goal cycle.

Many of the fundamental drives of the newborn child, such as hunger and need for protection from bodily discomfort, can be satisfied only in the social situation. That is, the cycle of activity itself cannot go on to completion without the intercession of another person, usually, in our society, the mother or some mother-substitute. Later the drives and cycles relating to bodily elimination, sleep, and play, and others also, become linked to the social interplay of child and adults, but for our purposes at present it is only necessary to point out the important fact that the survival of the child is absolutely dependent on the social act. Though Bühler (1930, 1933) has shown that it is not until babies are a few weeks old that they show any definite visual or auditory social recognition of mothers or other persons, we must not forget that from the day of its birth the baby, through nursing, care, and fondling, is beginning to be socially conditioned by tactile, olfactory, gustatory, and proprioceptive sensations to an interactional relationship with another human being. There is a tendency to overlook these rudimentary but basic sensorimotor roots of the social act of mother and child. In the earliest stages of social training, touch, taste, smell, and our kinesthetic sensations are more fundamental to interperson adjustment than either hearing or seeing, although the latter become dominant later. We shall discuss the broader significance of this whole matter in Chapter XIV.

At the outset the interaction of mother and child is not clearly distinguishable as to its overt and subovert or gestural character. Interaction takes place on an all-or-none level analogous to what occurs in the mass activity of the organism. Thus the facial, bodily, and vocal gestures of the child are all closely bound up with the drive which incites a particular cycle. Specifically, crying and later whining are related to hunger needs or painful stimuli from inside or outside the body; and in time cooing and smiling arise as a part of the total pleasant responsiveness of the baby in relation to the completion of a cycle.

It does not take a young infant long to learn to distinguish human from other sounds or to discriminate among the former. Bühler and Hetzer (1928) and Bühler (1930) showed that very young babies do not distinguish between human vocal sounds and those made by mechanical means, but within six weeks or two months the child begins to react to the human voice and human facial gestures differently than to all other noises or visual objects. The response to the human smile is, in fact, one of the first evidences of social interaction at a level above those involving taste, smell, and muscular senses already noted. Bühler (1933, p. 377) has summarized the development in these words:

"The baby of three or four months reacts positively to the angry as well as to the kind voice and look; the five-to-seven-months-old baby reflects the assumed expression and also begins to cry at the scolding voice and threatening gesture; the eight-to-twelve-months-old baby, however, begins to overcome the suggestion of the unfriendly grimace, the scolding voice, and the threatening gesture, and smiles again in spite of them, sometimes after several seconds of hesitation."

As Bühler says in interpreting these observations, up to five months the infant is probably not aware of fine distinctions in expression and tone, but reacts in more or less diffuse fashion without much discrimination. The baby from five to eight months old, however, begins to perceive the whole face and is influenced pleasantly or unpleasantly by the expressive differences in voice and gesture. In turn, from the age of eight months to a year, the baby comes to "understand" the seeming scolding as a form of play, that is, to get a more selective identification with the adult. "That is why," says Bühler, "after an initial hesitation, he begins to laugh and to give sounds of pleasure." In other words, as the child grows older, the first mass-activity responses become differentiated, and, moreover, they become more and more cut off from the original stimulating situation as signals or indicators of incipient interactions with others.

But on the whole the emergence of specialized or segmental acts or gestures *as important in themselves* is slow and gradual. Yet this growing distinction between overt and symbolic (subovert) activity is most significant. To the child these gestures come to serve as indicators of the oncoming acts of others, and obviously his own reactions become associated with these gestures of others. It is on the basis of this distinction between two levels of activity—overt and symbolic—that both the self and language arise. The interaction involved in these two phases is the groundwork or configuration from which human—that is, social—nature emerges. In the rest of this chapter we shall examine the rise of linguistic or communicative habits in the child, and then in the next we shall turn our attention to the development of the self.

STAGES IN THE LANGUAGE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHILD

In interpreting the vast accumulation of data on linguistic development, psychologists have frequently considered the emergence of speech as falling into a series of four stages: (1) the *prelinguistic*, characterized by random, unorganized, nonsocial sounds emitted by the child in the first weeks after birth; (2) the *babbling* or circular-response stage, wherein there is a vast amount of recurrent vocal combinations due to self-stimulation as well as to stimulation by others; (3) the "*imitation*" stage in which the recurrent babbling gets linked to the sounds made to

the child by others, leading the child to a sort of parrotlike repetition of these sounds; and (4) the stage of *true speech*, in which words as symbols of objects, acts, qualities, and relations are learned and employed in a manner more or less acceptable to the particular society or group to which the child belongs.

Certain criticisms may be offered concerning the traditional treatment of these data: (1) There is a failure to realize that social interaction begins in the field of overt conduct, is linked fundamentally to cycles of activity, and only gradually leads over into the field of symbolic interaction. Moreover, the social configuration of early vocalization, within the first few weeks, is frequently neglected because no direct evidence of its function is as yet available. This is particularly true of the so-called second or "babbling" stage, the discussion of which tends to ignore the tremendous amount of verbal stimulation which surrounds the child long before "true speech" or even "imitation" has arisen. (2) Though consideration of this development as marked by certain stages may be convenient, there is some danger that its gradual and continuous character may be ignored. Evidently there are no sudden or sharp changes but rather a continuous expansion of the use of vocal stimuli and responses. (3) Especially serious is the common failure to study language development against the background of, or in connection with, the emergence of the self and personality in the configuration of the social act. The usual description and analysis of the learning of words and sentences, of their number and length, and of the rise of the use of various parts of speech as classified by the grammarian frequently neglect the relation of these symbolic factors to the expansion of the child's social contacts and the emergence of his sense of self. The relation of speech to thought and of these in turn to the self will take on more significance if we recognize this linkage. Moreover, since the self has been defined as the inner core of the personality, its relation to thought and to language, as we shall see, is fundamental. (See Chapters IX and X.) And, while the present discussion follows somewhat the traditional form of treatment, we shall indicate the function of interaction as it influences the child's linguistic development.

The prelinguistic phase. The first vocalization, the birth cry, which the philosopher Immanuel Kant said was a cry of rage at being born, is purely an incidental reflex resulting from air being pulled rapidly over the vocal cords and causing their vibration. This vocalization is, then, merely a phase of the respiratory functions—a part of the larger repertoire of expressive responses. Therefore at the outset the vocalization of the baby has no more social significance than do the movements of his legs, arms, or bodily organs. In these responses, as in others, the infant begins as an animal, not as a human or social being. Yet within

the first few weeks the infant expresses a certain number of vowel and consonant sounds which are basic to true speech.¹

At the outset most sounds appear to be of vowel or diphthongal character. Various observers report that in the first month there appear such fundamental vowels as long *e* as in *see*, short *a* as in *pat*, broad *a* as in *father*, and short *i* as in *bit*. The earliest consonants are principally the sounds *m*, *n*, *ng*, *h*, *g*, *r*, *y*, and the glottal stop. Some of these sounds and others which continue into the babbling stage do not appear in English speech, nor, in fact, in any of the Indo-European languages. The human organism is structurally prepared for a wider variety of vocal sounds than any particular culture requires.²

Although some writers (see Major, 1906) characterize the first stage as "reflexive crying," having neither emotional nor intellectual significance, it is apparent that very shortly vocalizations are not entirely random but become linked to various cycles of activity, and hence to the feelings and emotions.

At the outset we must consider vocalization as a part of the total reactive or expressive system—responses due to stimuli arising either within the organism, as from such needs as hunger, thirst, and bodily elimination, or outside the organism, as cold, heat, and other painful conditions, and those which are pleasantly toned, such as arise from the erogenous zones. Painful or other stimuli which set up reactions of primary excitement may give rise to vocal activity since respiratory changes are closely associated with the fundamental adaptive reactions.

Although various bodily responses, including the vocal, are quickly associated with emotional accompaniments of the cycles of activity, vocalization remains in part a form of random movement which goes on without obvious connection with specific cycles of the moment. In fact, this characteristic of random vocal movement becomes ultimately most important in reference to the babbling phase. Moreover, there is here an organic foundation for that later differentiation or segmentalization of vocal behavior which has great importance in the development not only of language but of thought and of personality itself.

But let us for the present examine vocalization in relation to the fundamental cycles of activity. We have already pointed out that some of these cycles, particularly hunger and the need for bodily protection, cannot be carried through without the intervention of another person: mother,

¹ The constitutional or bodily foundations of speech, of course, will be recognized. The neuromuscular apparatus and the proper growth of mouth and vocal organs and bony structure must be assumed.

² We must be cautious, however, in accepting some of the interpretations of the first sounds of human infants. As yet we have no adequate methods or instruments for recording the vowels and consonants of babies, and even experts vary among themselves in their interpretations of the sounds of young infants.

nurse, or other experienced individual. We noted also that these cycles serve as the basic pattern for the social act. Later other cycles, such as bodily elimination, sleep, and many acquired cycles, are linked to interaction with others. Thus, though to the child the cry of pain or hunger, which is but a part of the total expressive response at the onset of a cycle, has no more social significance or meaning than any other act, in time it becomes a signal or gesture to another, usually the mother or nurse, to indicate pain or hunger and the beginning of a cycle. This association at first, however, depends upon the interpretation of others, in terms largely of their cultural training. Almost from the very outset the social influences of others begin to operate upon the child, as in the mother's or nurse's reaction to the child's sounds. Although Jespersen (1922, p. 103) is correct when he says, "A child's scream is not uttered primarily as a means of conveying anything to others," mother, nurse, father, siblings, and others begin early to interpret the screaming and crying of the newborn infant. For example, if the mother or nurse believes the cry to "mean" something to the baby, as it "means" something to her, she comes to wait on him, pick him up, turn him over, straighten out his clothes, pat him, or fondle him. Thus, though stimulus of other persons in the first instance may have nothing to do with the crying, the attention of others to his vocalizations becomes early a conditioned stimulus for the child. Already in the first months the foundations of identification and role-taking are laid down in these vocal gestures. (See above.) The conditioned-response pattern easily becomes fixed so that the child's cries or screams bring pleasant stimulations such as stroking, feeding, or carrying. It will not be long before he will use vocal means to secure whatever he wants.

In this configuration of social stimuli, of course, not only words but tone of voice, facial gestures, and overt actions all come to make up the world of others. It is interesting that, though it has been shown that in the first weeks the child cannot distinguish between human sounds and those made by mechanical means, very shortly such discrimination does arise and the child comes to attend to and respond differentially to the actions and vocalizations of persons and things around him. Thus the social world not only of actions but also of speech begins early to influence the infant. The effects of the acts and speech of others become increasingly important as the child learns to manage his own vocalizations and in time acquires true speech of his own. The first step toward this goal is taken at about two or three months, at which time the screaming stage passes over into babbling.

Just how much specialization of vowel or consonant combination takes place in these early social relations is hard to determine. Various observers differ about this matter. Major (1906, p. 284) contended that "re-

flexive crying" soon emerged into specialized cries which varied "with the kind of discomfort" the child experienced—differing in pitch, duration, and timbre as "mood or feeling of the child varies." The cry of pain was said to be high and piercing, an uncomfortable position to induce only whimpering. So, too, the sensations of hunger, cold, and wetness had each specific cries. Moreover, expressions of discomfort were more common than those of comfort. Yet J. Fenton (1925) does not believe such differentiated use of sounds appears very early; and M. G. Blanton (1917) also doubts it as regards very young children, except possibly when they have colic, which, she believes on the basis of her observations, sets up distinctive vocal reactions. Perhaps at the outset the differences in vocalization are those of intensity and volume. But, since these respiratory by-products accompany emotional and other bodily changes, the child may come fairly early to produce somewhat distinctive sounds for particular changes in bodily states.

The babbling or circular-response phase. Very early in life crying and screaming begin to give way to what the Germans aptly call *lallen* and what the Blantons (1927) term *babble singing*. The age at which this begins varies with different children. Sometimes it appears as early as the end of the second month, sometimes not until well into the fourth month or the beginning of the fifth.

At the outset the babble is shrill, loud, and somewhat unpleasant, later giving way to more pleasant sounds which approach true speech. The cooing and crowing and the attempted exercise of a wide gamut of sounds appear to be a pleasant occupation to the child. The vocalization itself is characterized chiefly by a continuous repetition of various vowel and consonant combinations. Blanton and Blanton (1927, pp. 95-96) state:

"In the girl baby studied, the first spoken sound occurred on the one hundred and fiftieth day—a soft, volumeless, uninflected *a* (as in *father*) which she said after feeding.

¹By the one hundred and sixty-fifth day, she had developed a wave-like movement of the tongue which resulted in a sort of grouping of undifferentiated vowel sounds—a sort of 'variations' of the theme *a* (as in *father*). In addition, she had the shrill pleasure-scream mentioned previously.

"By the two hundred and forty-ninth day (approximately eight months), the babble had reached its peak. It did not at this time, or ever, contain all the sounds of English speech, but it did contain sounds not occurring in English—Spanish, French, Anglo-Saxon, German and African were represented and doubtless many others not recognized by the observer. The commonest vowel sounds were *a* (as in *about*) and the vowel diphthong represented by *y* in *my*: The commonest consonant sounds were *m*, *ng* (*sing*), and the French nasal (*Montaigne*), the sounds *b*, *d*, and *g*, and the Spanish *y*, plus the sound represented by *y* in the English word *you*, which was very common. The glottal stop was common; *h* was fairly so, and a bird trill sort of an *r*. Ordinary *r* (as in *red*) and *l*, also *f*, *k*, and *t*, were very rare; and the sounds of

th in *thin* and *than*, the sounds of *s* in *sit* and *is*, and the sounds of *sh* in *shoe* and *pleasure*, and the sounds of *tsh* in *chair*, and *jam* did not occur at all. . . .

"By the two hundred and eighty-fourth day (a little over nine months), the babble had changed in character. It was softer, less distinct, and more like speech. She had developed a form of mimicry that often passes for speech. It is called echolalia. To illustrate, if 'bye-bye' was said to her, she responded with something similar. But this was true whether suitable things were being said or not, or whether remarks were addressed to her or not."

The babbling stage must be examined in some detail because one of the most important features of human learning is involved, that is, practice essential to the control of speech mechanisms, through the medium of hearing. It is in this period that circular responses, or what Holt (1931) calls reflex circles, are established between the sounds uttered and the responses made. In other words, the sound itself becomes the stimulus for a like vocal reaction. Kinesthetic sensations return from the speech organs to continue to stimulate the neuromuscular patterns already operating, but there is added to this the all-important auditory stimulus which comes from the child's hearing his own voice.

From the outset the child hears himself vocalizing; he also hears *another* person making sounds; his own sounds and those of others get linked together; but at first these are probably merely aspects of the larger linkage of internal experiences of bodily changes and needs and the total world of visual, tactile, and other sensory-perceptual experiences. Of course, in all this we must not ignore the maturation of the neuromuscular system. Early vocalization is reflexive, but its very practice tends to fix it in the stimulus-response system and doubtless may itself influence maturation.

We know from our previous discussion of conditioning that any random movement may get linked to a specific response pattern. (See Chapter V.) Applied to speech learning, the principle is particularly important. Holt (1931, pp. 39-40) remarks:

"It is well known that infants which are born deaf do not learn to speak even though their vocal organs be absolutely normal. . . . This is, because a prerequisite to the acquisition of speech is the establishment of reflex paths from the ears to the vocal organs, such that a sound received at the ears causes the vocal organs reflexly to reproduce that sound as closely as their anatomical structure permits. These indispensable reflexes are established inevitably if the infant's audition is normal. For, as is well known, its random murmuring, cooing, babbling, and other more strenuous vocalizations are, during certain of its early months, well-nigh incessant. It exercises *at random* its entire articulable gamut. Now each sound as it is produced stimulates the child's own auditory apparatus, if this is intact, and each such auditory excitation finds motor outlet in precisely that set of the vocal organs which has just made that very sound: and which will now make it again (a reflex circle). Hence the infant's persistent reiteration of any sound which it has made. . . . So, little by little, if the

child has normal hearing it becomes able to repeat also those same articulate sounds which *other persons* utter to it; and is well on the way to speaking. . . . The reflex-circle in fact gives rise to a general law of iteration: A child will repeat any of its own random acts provided that this action (simultaneously) stimulates, howsoever indirectly, any of its own sense-organs (and also, of course, that no other reflex steps in to interrupt)."

In other words, once the circular response or reflex circle is set up, it will continue until interfered with by some other internally or externally aroused stimulus-response pattern. Hence we have a form of self-conditioning arising from double stimulation—one stimulus set from the proprioceptive sensations from the lips, mouth, and larynx, and the other from the hearing apparatus. That is, the child's own voice stimulates him so that the more he babbles or cries the more he babbles or cries. This self-conditioning is a fundamental principle of learning and is particularly important for us because the repetition of vocal sounds may be set in motion by sounds made by others as well as by the child himself. (See below; also Chapter III.)

Certainly after the second or third month the vocalization of the infant comes to acquire social importance. As Shirley (1933a, p. 51) remarks, "Sometime between 2 and 6 months speech became a social reaction. The babies definitely babbled to the examiners at a median age of 25 weeks. Reports from the mothers gave a much earlier age for this reaction." And Bean (1932, p. 187) writes: "The desire for social approval is the strongest inducement for a baby to repeat a sound until it becomes a part of his permanent repertoire. Children try to attract attention even before the middle of the first year." In other words, the social act begins to be increasingly a factor in the self-stimulation which follows from the child's own babbling. Thus the mother's fondling, talking, and other stimuli are associated with the expanding range of interactions and the acquirement of new cycles of activity. Moreover, as we shall see, the role-taking process in turn arises from this social training. (See Chapter IX.)

The so-called imitation phase of speech. This phase of linguistic development is rather difficult to characterize, for there is a gradual transition from babbling to true speech, that is, to full use of vocal symbols for communication and thought. From the circular responses of the babbling stage it is but a step to the next, in which the self-starting, self-continuing neuromuscular vocal patterns of the child become associated with similar sounds uttered by another person. This period usually begins toward the end of the first year, sometimes as early as at nine months. When a mother or other person vocalizes to the child, the effect on the child will be largely the same as if he himself uttered the sound. The "ma-ma," "pa-pa," "bye-bye," and like combinations are common. The stimulations of others and of the child himself overlap. One of the results of studies

in conditioning has been to show that the child's discrimination of sounds at the outset is not so efficient as that of the lower animals. Thus, when a mother says "doll" to the child, this may be closely enough associated with his own response of "da" so that he associates the two as one sound. So, too, such expressions as "papa," "mama," and "bye-bye" fit easily into speech combinations which he has already practiced over and over again. What may easily be termed imitation is nothing but a duplication of the child's own speech stimulation by another person. Certain associations fixed at the outset by random vocalization in the babbling phase become the basis for more specific associations later. This "whittling down" from mass-activity responses to segmental, differential, and specific reactions is common here as in other learning. This period is sometimes called the parrot or echolalia (self-echoing) stage. Yet there is no mystical instinct of imitation at work, nor any conscious following of a pattern. Only sounds already acquired by chance association of ear and vocalization can be used.

In summary, two effects should be noted: (1) the child's own sounds are linked to those of others, that is, to a *social* stimulus; and (2) there is additional practice because of the social emphasis upon those sound combinations which other persons associated with the infant most often use. Hence the sounds favorable to the speech of one's own society are selected and repeated, and other combinations (in English-speaking children the gutturals, the clicks, and many nasals) are lost from lack of use. It must be noted, however, that not only words, but also tones, pitch, timbre, and intensity of words come into play. (See Chapter X.) In short, the "imitation stage," following as it does upon the babbling period, is important in fixing certain vocal patterns and in making dominant the circular-response mechanism.

In the last months of the first year or in the early months of the second the child begins to "understand" a few verbal responses of others. The Blantons (1927, p. 96) state that one of their subjects at seven months of age "gave positive evidence" of knowing what the word *milk* meant, "although she did not use it." That is, the word becomes more definitely associated with the object.

Yet in all this we must not neglect the important factor of neuromuscular maturation. Social influences alone will not account for the changes, which must wait upon the further physical development of the infant. Child training in vocalization and speech, as in other motor habits, is partially dependent upon growth, and in relation to both maturation and practice individual differences will appear.

The rise of true speech: comprehension and verbal utterance. True speech arises, with children of normal constitution, sometime during the second year, at the latest during the second half of this year. As a rule

girls begin to speak sooner than boys, the former between nine and eighteen months of age, the latter between twelve and twenty-four months. Social influences become increasingly important. Older persons who surround the child help him to fix the verbal meanings which objects have. The reflex-circle mechanism continues to function, no doubt with even more differentiation of patterns. Thus the child may first of all stimulate himself to a series of repetitions of the sound "ba." Later he may be stimulated to such a babbling by hearing his mother say "ba" or utter some sound like it. In the course of this learning the mother may bring a ball to the child and along with this say "ball," which to the child is the same sound as his "ba." The mother but introduces a




FIGURE 9, schematic manner of showing how the child learns to say "ba" for "ball." Various sensory-motor association areas are indicated: K = kinesthetic center; T = tactile center; $A_{1,2}$ = auditory center; V_o = vocal motor center; V = visual center. The linkages between areas are indicated by connecting loops. (Other probable centers are omitted.) The process proceeds in somewhat this fashion: The mother presents the ball, which produces the visual perception, V, and at the same time says "ball," which induces an auditory perception, A_1 . The child repeats the sound as nearly as he can with "ba," directed from his vocal motor area, V_o . And through the stimulation of his own voice he gets a further auditory association, A_2 , which highly resembles A_1 . Also, the mother may put the ball into the child's hands, thus permitting activity in the tactile, T, and kinesthetic, K, centers. These various sensory-motor experiences get linked together through conditioning to form an integrated pattern of perception-association-response (meaning).

visual stimulus—the material object itself—which becomes an additional conditioned stimulus to the pattern already formed of self-operating repetition of “ba, ba.” By smiles, patting, and other gestures of approval the mother fixes the child’s association of the sound with the object ball. Later, then, when the child says “ba,” the mother may say, “Oh, baby wants the ball,” and present it to the child. Or she may say, “Would baby like the ball?” Hearing this, the child repeats “ba, ba” even while the delighted mother secures the object. When the child gets the ball, a whole series of other responses—tactile, visual, and kinesthetic—are associated with the sound. It is somewhat in this manner that the verbal meaning of “ball” is developed. The vocal response is part of a social act which in time comes to stand for, represent, or symbolize the ball and its relation to the whole configuration of circumstances under which it is learned. Later, of course, it may become separated into a *class* term or concept. (See Chapter X on meaning.) Figure 9 illustrates the manner in which the child’s associations are built up.

On the basis of this association of the ball with the mother’s verbal response, it is but a step for the child to use the expression “ba” whenever he sees the ball even though the mother is not present. (See Figure 10.) Moreover, if he calls out “ba, ba,” as he may and often does, the mother may secure a ball for him. He is thus learning not only the name of the object but also how to control it for himself through the medium of someone else’s action. (See Chapters IX and X.)

As the neurological system develops, especially the association and memory areas of the brain, the effects of past perceptions remain as engrams, neurograms, or memory traces, as they are variously called. (See Chapter V.) Later such a mental image or neurogram may serve to set off the vocalization “ba,” leading to a rearousal of the previous vocalization. (See Figure 11.) Again, some person other than the mother may get the ball for the baby. Or in another case the chance repetition of “ba, ba” may set up the memory of the ball and lead to further repetition of the vocal utterance “ba” until the ball is secured. The factors of




FIGURE 10, schematic manner of showing how the child later comes to say “ba” when he sees the ball because of previous linkage of visual, V, and vocal motor, Vo, centers. The stimulation of his own auditory area, A₂, since it is also connected with the vocal motor center, would tend to keep up the vocalization of the expression, just as previously the self-stimulation had induced babbling.

social interaction in this learning situation can scarcely be overemphasized. All too frequently this aspect of linguistic learning is neglected.

Obviously, during the "imitation" phase and during early periods of true speech the child may not be able to pronounce words in adult fashion. Nevertheless, his approximations to adult standards suffice for his purpose. Jespersen (1922) has noted a large number of infantile errors of this sort: "tummy" for "stomach," "sik-kums" for "sixpence," "Bet" for "Beth," "tatoes" for "potatoes," "tash" for "mustache," "efelant" for "elephant," "wops" for "wasp."

Errors in pronunciation lead to what is called "baby talk." But "baby talk" would not persist so long as it sometimes does if older persons in the child's environment did not pick up these expressions and use them again and again in talking to the child. It might even be said that children learn baby talk from their parents, brothers, sisters, and others in the household. Again one must recognize the all-important matter of interactional effects. If parents insisted on correct enunciation and pronunciation, if they avoided many words too difficult for the infant's age, there would be less baby talk. Moreover, such talk is often tied up with various emotional and feeling situations of fondling, smiling, and otherwise paying great attention to the child. This additional stimulation helps fix these verbal habits. (See Chapter XIV.)

In this period children often invent their own words for objects. These may be onomatopoeic or imitative of sounds, as "ting-ting" for a bell, or "bow-wow" for a dog. Or they may actually be original words, as with the child who called bricks "mums," another who referred to the pebbles in his hand as "pocos," or still another who called a buggy whip-




FIGURE 11, schematic manner of showing how a memory trace or visual image, Vi, of the ball may, through its linkages, set up the vocal response "ba." This would be followed by further stimulation of the child's auditory center from hearing his own voice, and this, in turn, might serve to set up finger-hand movements from the tactile center, T, in anticipation of handling the ball, even if it were not actually available. We say that the child is calling for the ball when it is not present to sense. Of course, the chance vocal expression "ba" may itself induce the memory image of the ball, and this in its turn would set up the chain of associations.

child who called bricks "mums," another who referred to the pebbles in his hand as "pocos," or still

stock a "conger." Though the child may invent his own name for an object, it will not become significant as a symbol until others accept and use it in social intercourse. Only in this way does meaning arise. Moreover, children often develop a sort of secret language among themselves in which the participants are only a few playmates. Jespersen (1922, p. 414) reports that his son and two of his cousins had a word *kukukounen* "which they repeated constantly and thought great fun, but whose inner meanings I never succeeded in discovering." Other words may have an interjectional origin, although these apparently are linked to emotional and feeling states rather than to external objects.

VOCABULARY

It is evident that at the outset the use of words as symbols or as verbal substitutes for objects is closely tied to the totality of a situation. Only gradually does the child come to attach special, separate, segmental, and truly differentiated functions to words. At first words stand for a combination of activities and objects. Thus "bath" stands for the tub, the water, the soap, the splashing, and a whole series of acts. "Mama" likewise is the mother and all she does for one. "Papa" is another adult, of different dimensions and different actions toward one. It is only gradually that the particular denotations and connotations arise. A few words thus come to stand for a wide range of situations, objects, and actions. The poet Carl Sandburg has put this fact entertainingly into the following stanzas:³

SEVENTEEN MONTHS

This girl child speaks five words.

No for no and no for yes, "no" for either no or yes.

"Teewee" for wheat or oats or corn or barley or any food taken with a spoon.

"Go way" as an edict to keep your distance and let her determinations operate.

"Spoon" for spoon or cup or anything to be handled, all instruments, tools, paraphernalia of utility and convenience are spoons.

Mama is her only epithet and synonym for God and the Government and the one force of majesty and intelligence obeying the call of pity, hunger, pain, cold, dark—MAMA, MAMA, MAMA.

The growth of vocabulary. This little poem introduces us to a consideration of the acquirement, extent, and nature of the child's vocabulary as it reflects the development of language in the course of his adaptation. Not only is the learning of words significant, but mastery of the varied forms of parts of speech in the language is important. It is impossible in limited space to review the vast literature on this topic, but some com-

³ From *Good Morning America* (1928), p. 198. By permission of Harcourt, Brace and Company, Inc., publishers.

ments on certain aspects of these studies are in order. (See McCarthy, 1933, and Esper, 1935, for extensive reviews.)

Although reports on the vocabularies of children have been accumulating for several decades, especially since the rise of child psychology in the 1890's, the particular observations for the most part have been confined almost entirely to one, two, or at best a few children recruited largely from highly educated families. Only rather recently have some few studies appeared treating the data in statistical fashion with an adequate sample of children from all classes. Most of the investigations so far reported suggest qualifying questions of one sort or another:

(1) What are the criteria of a vocabulary? That is, when is a word a word? This is especially difficult to determine in the analysis of the first verbal utterances. Because a child makes a certain sound combination that resembles an adult word, does it follow that the child knows what it means? Moreover, is its use of a word or comprehension of its use by oneself or another that is to be used as the standard?

(2) What scientific controls are used by the observers? Most of the early investigations of children's speech development gave little or no information regarding the social setting in which the study was made, nor was there any attempt to consider the size and nature of the sample, or the sex, age, and, especially, the cultural backgrounds. Nearly all the earlier studies were made of children whose parents had professional and upper-class status, usually professors' and philosophers' children who lived in a family atmosphere highly surcharged—perhaps overcharged—with verbal interactions. These parents represent a class with wide exposure to books, travel, and much conversation. (See McCarthy, 1930; Davis, 1937.)

(3) Are the reported investigations of vocabularies statistically reliable? That is, we need studies of sufficient numbers of children at differing ages and of differing social status to enable us to draw some conclusions about the growth of language in a given community or society. Certainly one hardly dare generalize on the basis of the early studies.

It is clear that for the young child words do not stand alone. The first words are really word-sentences, called *rhemes*. As the German child psychologist Stern (1924) puts it, "the child's first utterances are not words in the real sense of the word, but *whole sentences*." As illustrated by Sandburg's poem, the same "speech unit" may be used with a wide variety of meanings.

Moreover, the child learns to respond to words and sentences spoken by others before he learns to use words himself. Thus a period of what is often called "passive" language appears before "active" speech. The former is characterized by *understanding* the verbal stimulus from others as witnessed by overt responses of following commands and directions. This passive response is perhaps at the outset not very different from the situation in which higher animals—for example, dogs, horses, and apes—respond to a vocal sign or sound combination when certainly there is no evidence that they comprehend the stimulus in any proper human

sense. One child of thirteen months observed by the writer knew only a few nouns but responded to such expressions as "go get music" by going to the phonograph, "come to papa" by running to the father, and so on. Here we have a sound combination as a total stimulation, without awareness, necessarily, of the specific meaning of the separate words. Of course, some such passive understanding continues throughout life, even at the higher levels of language, as witnessed by the fact that our reading and listening vocabulary is usually much greater than our spoken or written vocabulary.

In the first few months of true speech the expressions are largely individual words designating total situations or actions or both. Though often the first words are nouns, we must not for a moment imagine that there is no idea of movement or action involved. Words are born of social interaction in relation to objects, and at the outset apparently all words are a combination of name and action words. One might almost be willing to say that in this sense the verb precedes the substantive in the evolution of the child's grasp of language, for the meaning of objects is bound up with their activity or movement. (See Vygotsky, 1939, on the function of the predicate in both language and thought.)

Children have been known to use a few words as early as the ninth month. The child observed by Boyd (1914) uttered his first words, "dog" and "dada," in the first week of the eleventh month. Esper (1935, p. 442) has made an interesting tabulation of the first four words recorded for fourteen children by the Sterns (1922). Esper reports that of the first "definite sound-sequences" 93 per cent were related to food, toys, and other objects; 78.5 per cent were also related to reaching, orientation, and other actions; and 50 per cent were distinctly related to father, mother, and other persons.

In time, of course, true sentences do appear. Bohn reports (1914) that for the child he observed the first sentence, "Beatrice all gone," was spoken during the middle of the fifteenth month. In the child reported by Boyd (1914) the first true sentence, "Bell rings," was noted in the middle of the seventeenth month, and about the same time a three-word sentence, "T'sa do it." Bohn further remarks that inflection appeared in the seventeenth month in the sentence, "Daddie shoes wet." In the eighteenth month the same child spoke the first clearly correct sentence as to form and implication, "Daddie gave R new shoes." He says that the idea of the possessive appeared early but not in correct form until the twentieth month. In this same month the infinitive and the participle were correctly used. Abstract words came much later, but just when is not stated. This child's parents were highly educated persons who deliberately set out to give their daughter only the best of learning opportunities. Baby talk was avoided, the child's mispronunciations were cor-

rected, and altogether the child had an excellent social environment in which to develop good language habits.

G. C. and J. Brandenburg's study (1919) of their own child's use of words between forty and fifty-two months of age is interesting evidence on the growth of vocabulary, although it must be borne in mind that the child was reared in a well-educated home. We do not know whether like development would be found among children of the underprivileged population. The following is a summary of their findings:

At forty months the sentences averaged 6.6 words in length. The total vocabulary was 2,500 words, and in a sample day the child used 859 words or 34 per cent of the total vocabulary. In contrast, at fifty-two months the sentences averaged 7.5 words; the total vocabulary was 4,200 words, of which 1,000, or 24 per cent of the total vocabulary, were used on a sample day. On another sample day, at fifty-three months, 42 per cent of the words used were nouns, 31 per cent verbs, 12 per cent adjectives, 7.6 per cent adverbs. Pronouns, prepositions, interjections, and conjunctions ranged from 3.3 per cent for pronouns to 1.0 per cent for conjunctions.

Even casual observation reveals, of course, a certain acceleration in the rate of learning words. M. E. Smith's summary of various vocabulary studies (1926) showed that for fourteen cases the average vocabulary at twenty-one months was 118 words, for twenty-five babies at the end of the second year it was 272 words, at thirty months for fourteen cases it was 446 words, and at three years it had jumped to 896 words as the average for a sample of twenty cases. At four years of age, for twenty-six children, it was 1,540; at five years, for twenty cases, 2,072; and at six years, for nine cases, 2,562.⁴

There is much variability in the rate of learning words. Shirley (1933a, p. 66) remarks on the basis of her investigation: "Individual differences in the size of vocabularies used at the examinations were great. On the average each baby had spoken 36.9 different words in the examiners' presence by the age of two years; the range, however, was from 6 to 126 words. Only 274 different words were used by the entire group."

The analysis of children's vocabularies in terms of the grammarian's parts of speech may be quite misleading. After all, grammar is the adult's logical and somewhat artificial classification. However, all studies of early use of words report a preponderance of nouns. For example, Boyd (1914) reports that for the first fortnight of the seventeenth month one child used 109 nouns, 30 verbs, 1 pronoun, 8 adjectives, and 8 adverbs. Nice (1917) reports for her child 76.6 per cent nouns and 7.6 per cent verbs at eighteen months. At four years nouns constituted 55.3 per cent and verbs 21.5 per cent. But, as we have already noted, these first nouns are really rhemes and usually carry the import of a full sentence.

⁴ The cases obviously are not the same children. Smith simply tabulated the available data on studies of individual children at these various ages.

Although investigators may overdo the analysis of parts of speech in children's vocabularies, on the other hand we must not forget that the use of various parts of speech—number, gender, tense, mood, modification of meaning, clauses, and so on—is definitely linked up with growth in the child's discrimination of objects, situations, and relations. The use of these goes hand in hand with the development of thought. (See Chapter X.)

One manner of studying the growth in vocabulary and meaning is to analyze the sentences used by children. As the child advances in age and experience, his sentences take on more complex forms. Simple sentences are replaced by those having many modifiers and dependent clauses. Also, incomplete and incomprehensible utterances give way, with age and experience, to more comprehensible and complete statements. McCarthy (1930) found for her sample that there was steady increase in the mean length of responses with advancing age. Also, the length of response correlated significantly with the intelligence quotient.

The differences in the vocabularies of children and adults depend upon the range of their experience. As to the use of parts of speech, it is apparent that by the end of the third or certainly the fourth year the child usually has come to use all the parts of speech, although hardly yet with mature discrimination.

Nice (1932) compared the conversations of older children of from three to ten years of age with those of a thirty-months-old child in terms of different parts of speech used. She found in the older children a relative decrease in nouns, adjectives, and exclamations and a marked increase in verbs, pronouns, prepositions, and conjunctions. Comparing all children who speak in sentence form with adults, conversations of the latter contain relatively more nouns and prepositions and fewer pronouns and adjectives. For all conversations which she analyzed, except one, she reported that verbs lead in numbers and that adult conversation differs little from that of older children except for the increase in prepositions and conjunctions and a slight decrease in pronouns.

The relation of language growth to other factors. The development of vocabulary and capacity in language is evidently related to a number of other factors: sex, intelligence, motor ability, socioeconomic status and cultural level, the place of companions and associates, and the exposure to bilingual situation.

Girls are in advance of boys in the acquirement of language. Apparently this is true of all grades of ability. C. D. Mead (1913) reported that feeble-minded boys begin to talk later than feeble-minded girls. Terman (1925) found that girls of superior intelligence in the early months of learning to talk outstrip boys of similar intelligence in the use of short sentences. So, too, sex differences in favor of girls are revealed in various studies of comprehensibility and of functional analyses of speech in the early months of talking. From a comparison of the vocabularies of fifty-one

children at eighteen months Blachly (1923) reports that on the average the boys used only 59 words while the girls used 78.6 words. Other evidences of sex differences are at hand from the fact that boys show a higher incidence of reading disabilities and also of speech disorders than do girls. Also, there is some evidence that girls do better than boys on verbal tests of intelligence and show higher scholarship than boys in school subjects involving language ability. In interpreting these results we must bear in mind that until puberty girls for the most part mature more rapidly than do boys and that this slight superiority (for it is not marked) is but one additional feature of the general physical and intellectual development of girls.

The relation of language performance to intelligence is complicated by the fact that many intelligence tests themselves are largely verbal in character. However, it is generally accepted, on the basis of various studies, that children who talk unusually early are probably mentally superior to others and that feeble-minded children are nearly always late in learning to talk. Yet not all children who are retarded in talking are dull-witted. The whole matter of verbal opportunity in terms of occupational and social status must be taken into account. (See McCarthy, 1933, pp. 356-359, for a review of various investigations on sex differences and on social and occupational status in relation to language.)

In the early months of vocalization there seems to be a negative correlation between motor skills and talking. Shirley (1933a) has shown that, when the child is rapidly building up his motor controls, there is a certain retardation of his vocalization. And on the average, after the child has learned to walk, the median utterances show a rapid rise and far surpass those of the prewalking period.

As we noted above, most of the early reports on children's vocabularies were made of children from families of superior social and occupational standing. A number of investigations which sampled children of various socioeconomic classes have shown that the children of the upper classes surpass those of the underprivileged in linguistic development. W. Stern (1930, p. 185), reworking certain data reported by Descœudres, a Belgian psychologist who studied three hundred children of the upper and lower classes, contends that on the average the linguistic ability of a child of the upper classes is approximately eight months in advance of that of a similar child of the lower classes.

McCarthy's study (1930) of 140 Minneapolis children between the ages of eighteen and fifty-four months, equated as to intelligence and occupational status of the parents, clearly reveals the place of socioeconomic status and of cultural background in linguistic development. She used such criteria as mean length of spontaneous responses (set up by presentation of toys to play with or pictures to look at); functional analysis of "adapted information," questions and answers, and self-reference (egocentricity) in speech; sentence structure; and use of words in terms of parts of speech. She found among other things that (1) the mean length of statements by the children

fluences or directs the course of response, leading usually to a state of equilibrium and adaptation. This equilibrium, of course, is dependent both upon the play of intraindividual forces and upon the relation of the organism itself to the outside environment.

The so-called "unlearned" drives which have been listed by various writers include such items as air-getting, temperature regulation, hunger, thirst, sexual responsiveness, "eliminative tensions," "tissue injury." (Shaffer, 1936.) Others mention activity as such, rhythmic responses, sensory responses to color, tones, tastes, smells, and a generalized "mass activity" emotionality. (See Murphy, Murphy, and Newcomb, 1937.) But to attempt to list and classify all the items apparent even in infants is extremely difficult, and in doing so one is likely to fall into the same error as the earlier writers who used the blanket term *instinct* to cover the original impulsion or "causes" of behavior.

The difficulties of arriving at any entirely satisfactory short classification of the drives at birth rests upon the fact that specific studies of the activities of newborn babies are not complete, although there is an enormous amount of literature on the topic. (See, for example, K. C. Pratt, 1933, who lists 188 papers, monographs, or books in his review of the literature on the newborn; or Hurlock, 1933, who refers to sources in her review of the same topic.)

In one careful review of the responses of the newborn infant—covering only literature dealing with the first ten days of life—and from observations made in maternity wards in hospitals, Dennis (1934) has attempted a tentative classification into twelve general categories. Within these he lists 78 more or less specific reactions. The major types of response are as follows:

- | | |
|---------------------|---|
| 1. Eyelid | 7. Neck and head |
| 2. Pupillary | 8. Hand and arm, |
| 3. Ocular | 9. Trunk |
| 4. Tear secretion | 10. Sexual |
| 5. Facial and mouth | 11. Foot and leg |
| 6. Throat | 12. Co-ordination of many bodily reflexes |

In commenting on these research data Dennis criticizes those who would completely neglect the factors of prenatal maturation in determining many of the structures and functions essential to these reactions. Moreover, he doubts the assumptions of those who consider the responses of the newborn infant as "unorganized, chaotic, unspecific, and random." There is definite evidence that at least fifteen different "total bodily responses," or co-ordinated patterns, are evident. "This is in striking contrast to the young *Amblystoma* which possesses only the locomoter and the feeding reactions as general responses." (See Coghill, 1929.) Thus, while there is much behavior to be designated as "random" or of a "mass activity" character, the neonate does possess a large number of differentiated reactions related to certain integrated or organized needs essential to survival.

Obviously, we are not yet ready for more than the most tentative and broad classification of the rudimentary tendencies. But for working pur-

of linguistic growth—length of responses, functional analysis, construction, and parts of speech. This retardation was most marked between the ages of two and five. The mean length of response of the twins at five years of age was slightly below that of the average singleton of three years. She found that twins tend to retain their infantile speech habits and that they make slower progress than do singletons in the development of adult sentence constructions. She believes the differences are largely, if not entirely, due to social influences, especially those arising from too close association of the twins with each other and from the consequent lack of opportunities for contact with individuals linguistically and otherwise more mature.

An even more exhaustive investigation has been made by Davis (1937), who, using McCarthy's method and form of sampling, studied the linguistic development of 436 school children, aged 5.5 to 9.5 years. There were three groups: twins, singletons with siblings, and only children. Her results showed among other things that only children are distinctly superior in language development to children with siblings; singletons with siblings in turn are somewhat superior to twins. Yet for the children of the upper occupational classes, the twins "practically overcame their language handicap" by the time they reached their tenth year. This was not true of the twins of the lower economic strata. Twins are particularly retarded in articulation—perhaps because they manage to get along with each other and with those about them at a relatively lower level of articulatory adjustment than other children. They mumble along, as it were, because such practice suffices for the time; and Davis believes, as do others, that this handicap, if not overcome, may prove serious later in preventing an adequate command of language.

Certain studies of the effects of bilingualism on language development show that children brought up in households where two languages are used are retarded in the mastery of each. Other reports do not bear this out. Ten per cent of the children studied by McCarthy (1930) had a bilingual background, but she did not find any handicap among these children in mean length of responses when factors of age, sex, and economic status were taken into account. McCarthy (1933, p. 363) states of an unpublished study by Grabo: "In monoglot [single language] and bilingual groups matched on the basis of mental ability the English vocabularies of the bilinguals were 33 per cent below those of the monoglot group. However, if the total vocabularies, English and foreign, were considered, the two groups were equal." (See also Arsenian, 1938.) Other studies of intelligence differences among children of immigrant families indicate that bilingualism often proves a handicap to the children in dealing with the test materials. (See Klineberg, 1935.)

In summary we may say that, although language ability rests upon fundamental vocal structures and corresponding neural or brain development, speech itself is the outcome of maturation and of the exposure of the infant to cultural influences. It definitely grows out of human interaction. The Kelloggs (1933), in their instructive volume reporting the comparisons of mental and physical growth of their own

child with that of an ape which they had in their home for nine months, point out that the ape never learned to manage human sounds, nor did it show the babbling and other "practice" phases of linguistic development so common to infants. Although the ape was able to obey a large number of verbal commands or signs given by adults, and although it possessed a gamut of vocal responses for various emotional and feeling states, it never acquired the use of a single word in the human sense. This should make us aware that we have always to take into account both constitutional and environmental factors; if the former are inadequate, the environmental factors alone will not induce traits or capacities. The same is true of inherently feeble-minded children and of children who are born deaf or who early become handicapped by extreme loss of hearing. The importance of social influences is also apparent from the sketchy and poorly controlled accounts of the language development of feral man. (See Park and Burgess, 1924.) Persons reared in isolation or without social contacts do not develop human speech.

But among children of normal constitution and social-cultural opportunity linguistic development is directed and controlled in its later phases chiefly by the older and more experienced members of the family, the play group, and other associates. We can scarcely expect the child or adult of the limited social and cultural world of the manual laborer to match in language or thought the child or adult in the wider and more complex cultural world of the educated man. Finally, until we know the relation between higher thought processes and linguistic development, we shall never be quite certain how much the intelligence-test differences of children and adults from varying socioeconomic classes are reflections of circumscribed or extensive exposure to culture and how much they are the result of some more inherent difference in the constitutional make-up of the members of these respective social classes.

Chapter IX

THE RISE OF THE SELF IN INTERACTION

AT THE outset of life, the behavior of the individual is biological rather than social. One cannot become a human—that is, a social—being without contact with other human beings. In the present chapter we shall examine the manner in which the individual acquires the core of his personality, which lies in self-consciousness or, briefly, in the self or ego.¹ In order to trace the rise of the self from its organic foundations, we must first consider more fully the nature of interaction. Then we shall take up the genesis of the self within the framework of social acts, and finally discuss some aspects of its relation to status and sense of security.

THE SOCIAL ACT OR INTERACTION

The growth of personality is dependent upon contact with material objects and especially with persons. In the contact of human beings we have not only action and reaction but also interaction. That is, not only does one's act influence other persons, but their acts in turn further affect one's subsequent behavior. It is within the field of the social act that the self arises.

The nature of the social act. Reduced to its simplest form, a *social act* is an act of a person qualified or modified in its course by the act of another person. It may involve either co-operation or opposition. In the former one or more persons help an individual to complete some activity. That is, co-operation is a striving together of two or more persons for some object or goal which may or may not be shared together. But opposition, including under this term both conflict and competition, is also a social act.² Individuals in opposition strive against each other for some object or goal which each wants for himself alone. In such a struggle the striving of others qualifies or modifies one's own act. To repeat, a social act is one which is not completed without, or is definitely qualified or

¹ At times the term *ego* will be employed in obvious context as a synonym of *self*, although for Freud (1922, 1933) and G. H. Mead (1934) it represents only one section of personality structure.

² The term *social* unfortunately has often been used to refer only to co-operative activities or to moralized acts. Obviously, this is too narrow a use of the concept.

modified by, the accompanying act or counteract of another member of the same or a near species.

Important aspects of the social act are evident in the animal world. An animal may and does act upon the material or physical environment, as in the obtaining of food. In this sense, the cycle is completed for the animal when the object is handled, eaten, pushed away, or avoided. The animal adjusts himself to the physical object. It does not adjust itself to him. If the environment, however, is another animal, the adaptation of the first animal may be influenced by the response of the second. Thus is set up social interaction. The most obvious illustration of this sort of behavior is that involved in sexual congress between members of the same species. Other examples are found in the nursing of the young offspring or in the fighting of animals over a food object or over a prospective mate. Furthermore, in the preliminary stages of many interactions gestures arise which are but incipient movements checkmated by circumstances—usually the oncoming acts of others.

We have already noted that human adaptive activity may be divided into three classes: *overt*, *symbolic*, and *covert*, or, in more familiar terms, bodily act, speech and other forms of communication, and thought and other inner states. Overt behavior involves direct movements of the total organism in space in more or less direct contact with other persons or physical things. Symbolic activity is illustrated by language (an outgrowth of vocal gesture) and those "expressive" acts which we ordinarily call gestures—movements of face and limbs. This is the field of communication. These indirect and symbolic processes may be called *sub-overt*, for, though they employ peripheral neuromuscular activities which may and do stimulate others, such bodily responses are largely segmental and must be distinguished from the strictly overt activities which involve the movement of the whole organism in space. In relation to both overt and symbolic behavior, there is also that form of activity *within* the organism which we have referred to as the covert or internal, subjective, or mental world of ideas, attitudes, values, and feelings.

Identification and patterns of expectancy. The emergence of the sense of self or ego depends upon identification (or, more properly, introjection) and expectancy. According to our definition in Chapter VI, the term *introjection* refers to the capacity of the organism to take up into itself as a perception, and later as a memory image, not only its own acts, proprioceptively and vocally, but the acts of others toward its own acts. When we speak of identification of the child with his mother, we mean that her act toward him is associated with his act toward her, but in his mind. In the rise of the self the process of introjection consists in our taking the responses of others into ourselves and linking them with our own. We learn to act toward ourselves as others respond to us. As G. H.

Mead (1934) says, it is a case of a "stimulus that affects him as it affects somebody else." Or, put otherwise, "The content of the other [B] then enters into one's [A's] personality is the response in the individual [A] which his gesture calls out in the other [B]."

There are numerous illustrations of this process in everyday life. When we stretch out our hand to greet a person, we are already beginning to respond within ourselves to his handshake. If he fails to greet us, or gives us a limp hand when we were prepared for a vigorous reaction on his part, we are thrown into a temporary state of internal confusion because our own incipient responses are blocked. That is, they cannot go on to overt completion. So, too, a person when speaking to another already begins to react toward what he *anticipates* the other will say. If the reaction of the other is different from what he expected, he will modify his own subsequent speech reactions accordingly. "You can demand a certain response in others if you take a certain attitude," as G. H. Mead (1934) says, because your response sets up in the other person a reaction like that which you anticipate. So, too, the response of the other, if unexpected, may alter one's own subsequent gestures or acts. We may start to say something cruel or sadistic to a child when his look or cry of pain will change our own speech and action toward him. There is much of moral and social importance in this. It is evident that words spoken in anger do something to the one addressed. Thus our later apologies may not completely wipe out the effects of the angry remark. It may on occasion be better to inhibit talking altogether than to set up in another person an unwanted response. Also, we literally give ourselves away in emotionalized speech, because we express primary emotional-feeling attitudes which we conventionally cover over in polite tones. Or, again, the nagging mother wonders why she does not get the expected results in conduct from the child, forgetting that he has built up in himself a host of antagonistic responses to her words toward him. In these cases the social act is reduced to a rather elemental level of emotional, impulsive interaction. Calling a child a black sheep often has the result of producing misconduct. He takes up the expected role induced in him because of the *images he receives of himself from others*.

L. B. Murphy (1937, pp. 221-222) has described the results of a test of nursery-school children who were asked, on being shown a snake in a box, if they would like to cut it up and throw it away, and then subsequently, if they replied "Yes," were told that such action would hurt the snake. Especially interesting were the children who answered "Yes" to the first query and then "No" to the second after the explanation was made about hurting the snake. Four of the nine children who changed their replies were youngsters who in many other situations which Mrs. Murphy studied showed a distinct dependence on adults. It is evident that their replies were motivated in part by their wish to say what was expected.

Then, too, there is no end of demands or expectancies laid upon the person by the groups to which he belongs. The little child is supposed to be "cute" and "pretty," but also "to keep out from under foot." Later the school child is supposed to sit quietly in school. And as a boy grows up, the ideal pattern of being a man is laid before him in accordance with which he is to find a job, get married, and have a family. And the girl as she passes through adolescence to maturity is expected to continue beautiful, charming, and docile to her sweetheart, to become a good wife and mother, and to play a conventional role in society. So, also, it is assumed that the patriotic citizen will hate his country's enemies and that the good Christian will lead a moral life. One might multiply endlessly illustrations of this pattern of expectancy.

To summarize, then, human interaction is characterized by the fact that the action of one individual calls forth a reaction of another which modifies or qualifies the subsequent act of the first. In this way the person learns to control or direct his acts in terms of what others expect of him. Clearly such expectancy is fundamental to fixity and regularity of habits, attitudes, and ideas, and hence fundamental to predictability of behavior and to its control. When one knows in advance—in anticipation—that a given stimulus will set off a given attitude or act in another, one has a basis for predicting what the other will do. Such expectation and predictability are essential to moral stability in the individual and to societal or collective control. In the chapters which follow we shall illustrate again and again this central importance of expectancy or anticipation in describing, analyzing, and modifying behavior. Let us here turn to examine more closely the development of roles and the rise of the concept of the self out of this social matrix.

THE SELF AND THE SOCIAL ACT

The infant does not possess a self at birth. There is for him no distinction between self and not-self. This distinction has to be acquired. At the outset he is only a biological organism pitched into a material and social universe in which he must find his way. As we saw in Chapter III, the onset of activity depends chiefly on changes occurring within the organism, and this early behavior is characterized by a diffusive "mass activity" marked by only rudimentary integration of responses to various internal and external stimuli, chiefly of a physiological sort related to satisfying basic wants or needs. Gradually, however, the activities of the child become differentiated, through specialization or segmentalization of structures and functions, because the primary diffuse behavior proves inadequate in the increasingly complex environment to which he must adjust himself. This process of specialization, in turn, is related to the fact that original needs and those which are learned later set in motion cycles

of activity leading normally to consummatory reactions and consequent satisfactions. It is particularly important to recall that it is with reference to the second phase of a cycle that the individual acquires new devices or tools—thoughts and emotions—which aid him in meeting his needs more adequately. Furthermore, the stimuli to action depend not only upon the immediate situation to which adaptation must be made but upon internally aroused stimuli dependent upon previous experience—in short, upon memory and association. He thus develops the capacity for deciding the kind of activity in which he will engage. It is from the extension of one's drives and of the cycles of activity within the framework of social interaction that mind, self, and human nature arise.

The emergence of the self in the social act. The fact that the core of personality, the self, arises out of interaction was recognized and studied by earlier psychologists, most notably by Baldwin (1895, 1897) and Cooley (1902). The former, using the concept of imitation, described the development of self-feeling as the "dialectic of personal growth" and showed that the individual's concept of himself and his reactions as a self are dependent upon his contact with those around him. The latter, from general observation and particularly from studies of his own children, indicated the tremendous importance of imagination as a basis for sense of self. Cooley's phrase, the "looking glass self," indicates clearly that the individual's concept of selfhood depends upon the manner in which those around him treat him. But it remained for G. H. Mead (1922, 1934) to present a naturalistic and more or less objective description and analysis of the processes involved in the rise of the self. The present interpretation has been definitely influenced by Mead's treatment.

The rise of the *self* depends upon the capacity of the individual to be an *object* to himself. The essentials of this process of becoming an object arise from the introjection into our own reaction system of the response of another person to us. That is to say, one perceives oneself only after he has perceived others. The matter is illustrated by the development within the child of the habit of assuming the mother's words, tones, pronunciation, bodily gestures—in fact, by his taking over into himself the role of the mother. The configuration of activities of another person toward him is taken up and associated with his own responses. Thus is developed the ability at role-taking. The child acts, we say, first one part, and then another. He can do this because he has associated these activities with his own wishes or wants, and the role-taking is a part of the whole expressive activity related to the expectancies of others.

In the process just described the child comes to call out in himself the attitudes which others call out in him when they react to him. A girl is, in a way, the mother when she plays at being mother to her dolls. Or a boy is, in like sense, the father when he manipulates a toy in the father's

manner. As G. H. Mead (1922, p. 160) puts it, "The self arises in conduct, when the individual becomes a social object in experience to himself. This takes place when the individual assumes the attitude or uses the gesture which another individual would use and responds to it himself or tends to so respond.... The child gradually becomes a social being in his own experience, and he acts toward himself in a manner analogous to that in which he acts towards others."

Specific role-taking. This assumption of a role, this duplication of the "other" which gives rise to the "me," to use G. H. Mead's terms, this reacting to himself as an object similar to another, has its roots in the overt interaction of mother and child, or of children playing together, or in other rudimentary forms of social intercourse. The matter is well illustrated in play. Young children play more or less individually; and interactions, if they arise, are likely to be with adults or with other children who may take their toys, invade their play space, or otherwise interfere with their responses. At this level the interactions are of a rudimentary sort. Many investigations of children's play have shown, however, a positive and significant correlation between chronological age and increased interest in direct or imagined interactional play. (See K. M. B. Bridges, 1931; Van Alstyne, 1932; and Bott, 1934.) But in our society, at least, as children grow older they begin to take on the roles of others around them, as in "playing house," or they adopt the pattern of others about whom they have heard, as in "playing Indian" or "soldiers," "firemen," and the like. They may dress up in the characters, talk the way they have heard or imagine the characters talk, and otherwise act out the roles they set themselves. Thus the child, playing alone or with others, may act in turn father, mother, engineer, policeman, fireman, chauffeur, air pilot, and so on; tiring of one—as the poet Wordsworth says—he proceeds to pass on to "con" another part. This role-taking tends to be highly specific, and the child introduces and dismisses these fanciful characters just as he might approach or withdraw from actual playmates. In all this the child talks to himself as others have talked to him or as he has heard other persons talk among themselves.

It is but a step from this type of overt interaction to his internalized duplication of the role of others in playing with imaginary companions. In this instance he may, through fantasy, fill the hours with a wide variety of imagined playmates whose social functions he assumes. Sometimes his imaginary conversations may go on for considerable periods in fancied worlds far removed from his own actual life.

The influence of culture upon play and role-taking is neatly demonstrated in various studies of children's play. Thus Bott (1934) has reported that all of her sample of twenty-eight nursery-school children, between two and five years of age, most frequently indulged in imaginative constructive play involving home life or construc-

tion of houses. She also found that imaginative play interests ran high with reference to trains, automobiles, fires, robberies, and telephones. All these types of play involve types of people and situations in the child's world. L. B. Murphy (1937, p. 63) mentions seven play patterns in which the children in her nursery-school sample indulged. These were various domestic patterns built around family and household activities such as cooking, eating, and parental roles; selling and buying; various forms of transportation; "punishing, playing policeman, and gun play in general"; fires and playing fireman; "killing and dying"; and playing at mythical characters such as Santa Claus, Cinderella, and the Big Bad Wolf (very popular with her groups at the time of the study). The roles the child picks up in this way are the cornerstones from which his concept of his self is built.

In the child's playing of these roles with his companions or when he is alone, language has a central place, and as he talks to his fellows or to himself—in the varied roles—he hears himself talking and replies. The child may say something as one character and reply as another, and then his response as the other person serves as a stimulus to himself in the role of the first, and so the conversation between various imaginary persons develops within him. Suppose he sets up in imagination a store situation: he offers himself something to buy and in turn buys it. Or as conductor and passenger he requests tickets one moment and hands one over to himself (as passenger) the next; he talks to himself as teacher and responds as pupil; he may, as policeman, even arrest himself! In these dramas he develops multiple worlds of persons within his own activity. These various groups of stimuli and responses get organized into a wide range of separate roles, some actual, some imaginary, many related to his place in the family, in the schoolroom, on the playground, and elsewhere.

Originally, of course, this interaction takes place at overt and conversational levels, but, as it becomes internalized or introjected, an inner forum of activity develops imaginatively and finds expression in both overt and symbolic taking of others' roles. As we noted above, this is fundamental to the child's learning to act as others anticipate he will act. It is, in short, the process of socialization, that is, the taking over of another person's habits, attitudes, and ideas and the reorganizing of them into one's own system.

General roles. In time the introjections of the various individual roles around the child begin to get organized or integrated into larger patterns of response, perhaps because many of these imagined roles actually overlap. Thus a father at home has a certain function; as business or professional man he has another and thus furnishes a different "copy" for the child to follow. Yet in his playing of the father's roles, there is, for the child, a certain continuity and commonality between the two. G. H. Mead (1934) refers to this larger ordering of roles into a unity under the term

"the generalized other." That is, out of a wide range of specific roles of "others" which he has played, there emerges in time a generalized and more or less integrated pattern of the total role of the child. This becomes a part of the integrated self which grows up in everyday interaction with hundreds of specific persons whose attitudes and habits get woven into the child's own. The development of the generalized pattern is well indicated by G. H. Mead (1934, pp. 150-154) when he draws a contrast between the early play life of the child and the activity of the older child or youth as a member of a team in a game with rules, differentiated roles, and standard practices.

By the time the child in our society is seven or eight years of age, he begins to play simple co-ordinated games of the type where the children choose up "sides" and make up a team. In such games each child performs the same task as his teammates, as in tossing quoits or shooting or throwing at a target, but the successes of each are added together to make up the total score for one's team. Thus arises a rudimentary kind of teamwork. It is interesting to note in passing that this is about the age, too, when, according to Piaget (1926), the child begins to shift from egocentric, self-centered remarks to more socialized speech. (See Chapter X.)

But in the team game proper—which the child learns in the prepubertal and early adolescent years—each player, while he has a specialized function, discovers that his role is qualified by the special tasks of his teammates and that in order to play his own part he must be able to play the part of these others as well—overtly and especially in imagination. In other words, in an organized game where a number of individuals are involved, and where each has his own function to perform, the person in taking his own role must learn also to take the role of everyone else in the game as well. In the first games which the child plays the number of specialized roles is usually limited, but it increases as he learns to play basketball, baseball, football, hockey, and the like. But in any case, in order to carry out his own part, he must know what every other member of his team is supposed to do or is going to do. He must also anticipate the actions of the opposing team's members. He does not, of course, have to carry all the possible patterns of action in mind at once, but he may have to have a dynamic picture of two, three, or four other individuals present in consciousness at the same time. Thus the first baseman's actions will be effective for making a particular play only if he can in imagination assume the ideas and attitudes of the pitcher, the catcher, and the man at bat. The successful ball player is just that one who is able to imagine the actions of others and thus in his own inner forum of thought or imagination be able to anticipate what they will do. (See Chapter X:) Mechanistically he does actually experience in his own

neuromuscular system incipient responses like those of the other players, both those of his own team and those of the opposing side.

In complicated games many of a player's own functions as well as these anticipatory reactions to what the others will do are put into rules and standard practices. These serve to limit and to define closely the specific roles of each player in relation to all the others. It is interesting to observe that even in rudimentary games children themselves often make up rules on the spot to help define and thus objectify their varied behavior. As G. H. Mead (1934) remarks, "The rules are a set of responses which a particular attitude calls out." When a greenhorn at a game does not follow the rules—that is, the expected patterns of action—he confuses his teammates as well as the opposing team. In short, the regulations and standard practices help the child to organize his various roles into something of a unity, into a generalized pattern.

The application of this illustration to other social activities is apparent. In order to participate with other members of the family the child has to obey the rules of the family game. He cannot forever decide on the spur of the moment to take a novel role; otherwise he would acquire no regularity of habits and attitudes. (See Chapter XIV.) In other words, he must, in the first years of life, learn his more general role as *child* in the family. Later he will be pupil, comrade, industrial worker, religious participant, voter, and the like. But more than that, he must carry over from family to the school, the church, the community, the factory, or business certain common elements in his primary roles, although, as he extends the range of his interactions outward from the family, each of these other groups will furnish him in addition some specific and general roles.

The nature of role-taking with reference to the development of the self may be illustrated from the long controversy among dramatists and critics as to whether the successful actor must or should identify himself completely with the roles he plays on the stage. Some have contended that he should; others that the actor must make a cold and dispassionate portrayal of the dramatic character. Constant Coquelin, the great French actor, took a middle ground, holding that an actor must always play two roles: the character being portrayed, and his own critical self, which is useful in guiding the dramatic action. From our standpoint this is precisely what does happen in successful acting. There must be a dual consciousness. If an actor cannot vividly represent to himself in imagination the mental state or motive of the character he is to delineate, he can scarcely represent it to the audience. Imagining a given mental state and motive of another tends to set up emotional and motor responses appropriate to this state. But, once these are aroused, an alter ego—that is, the actor's own self—comes into the situation to direct and guide their expression. On the stage it is, after all, the overt responses and the words

that count. Internal states of motive and emotion are only important or necessary in helping to produce the words and overt conduct of the dramatic character more effectively for the audience.

Obviously, the actor must not allow his responses to cross the tenuous line between assumed emotions and real ones. The actor *plays* a scene, he does not *make* one! ³ As Metcalf (1931, p. 237) writes: "Real emotions are out of place on the stage. If, for instance, an actor who is representing fear suddenly becomes afflicted with stage-fright, the real fear, far from improving the performance, actually spoils it. The audience wants to have its imagination stimulated, and welcomes the actor whose playing has this effect. The mutual attitude of actor and audience is, or should be, similar to that of children when they say, 'Let's pretend.'"

This duality of the actor's consciousness is closely analogous to the situation in real life. We are often confronted with a social situation demanding one sort of role rather than another, and we learn to conform to expectations. We learn, furthermore, to control and direct this particular part in terms of another role, often the deeper and more integrated generalized pattern. And it is precisely this latter which prevents our playing at roles which may be morally disapproved even though the immediate stimuli to do so almost overwhelm us.

The generalized role as general attitude. G. H. Mead's concept of the generalized other is basic to an understanding of the integration of the self. It rests upon the ability of the individual to develop general attitudes and ideas out of a wide variety of specific and concrete experiences, which in turn raises the recurrent problems in psychology of general versus specific attitudes and of transfer of training. (See Chapter XII.) Apparently an individual may have a range from specific attitudes and habits to general attitudes and habits. So, too, the individual may play more or less specific roles in some instances and yet in others may develop the generalized or integrated self. The child is characterized by specific roles, the mature, integrated adult by a generalized self. More or less generalized roles may become linked to concepts of given primary or secondary groups, to those of a larger society or nation, or to humanity or mankind in general. Just how broad and all-inclusive the generalized other may become depends in part on one's capacity to identify himself with a participating role with reference to such human associations as may be considered units in themselves.⁴

³ A demonstration of this matter occurred some years ago during a performance of *Hamlet*. A rather well-known British actor—then touring this country—had become intoxicated shortly before the opening of the play. As the drama proceeded, he began repeating his own lines and even speaking those of the other characters as well. It was a somewhat amusing though pathetic illustration of the loss of his own critical self.

⁴ I believe that F. H. Allport's concern with what he calls the "illusion of universality" would disappear were he to recognize this whole process of social interaction in which the

Consistency and continuity in role-taking. While it is obvious from casual observation that persons play many roles in life, it is equally apparent that as a rule there arises in time a certain consistency and continuity in the behavior of the self. This continuity and consistency rests upon certain uniformities in organic structure and function, on the one hand, and upon certain recurrent and persistent features of the social situation and its cultural definition on the other. But it is obvious from our discussion that the emergence of these patterns is gradual. When we say that the child is impulsive, inconsistent, forgetful of what he "should do"—that is, of his expected roles—we are merely stating this fact of wide-ranging and more or less specific roles arising in each new situation. But maturity and responsibility depend upon generalization, consistency, and continuity of the role one plays in society. (See Chapter XVI.) While wide variation in roles is ordinarily characteristic of the child, it is also true that many adults remain fixed in personal development at rather rudimentary stages, illustrated in the ease with which they take on the roles of those about them. We often say that these persons lack a personality of their own or that they are not consistent or that they have a chameleonlike nature, changing their roles rather quickly and completely to fit every shift in the social situation. So, too, the person without character is one who has no generalized role of the kind demanded by the mores of the society in which he lives. The young child has no character in this sense because he has not yet developed a generalized other or integrated role in terms of the moral expectancies of the community. Likewise, the fanatic in politics, religion, or economics is often a person whose role-taking remains at a relatively childish level, because he fails to reckon with the possible or anticipated roles of others in society, except those that his own imagination concocts. And the disintegration of personality which marks many psychopaths is often but an example of a retreat to more infantile role-taking. (See Chapters XXVII and XXVIII.)

Mead's theory of the "I" and the "me." Up to this point we have stressed the manner in which the individual, in the development within himself of his own responses, takes over the roles—that is, the ideas, attitudes, and habits—of another. The self is born when we become an object to ourselves, that is, when we take the attitudes of others toward our own actions and respond, or tend to respond, to ourselves as others have reacted to us. We have already noted how the acts of an individual are qualified by what others expect of him. But, after all, the description so far has dealt largely with the static and structural aspects of the self. Hence the question naturally arises, is the individual in action purely the product of roles laid down by those around him? Is the self merely a collection

individual, by accepting the generalized other of the crowd, the mob, the nation, comes to react to these as units with reference to his own self. (See F. H. Allport, 1924, pp. 305-308.)

and finally an integration of various specific or general "me's"—to use Mead's word again—that have emerged as overt roles? Despite all that others can do to us or for us, there remains the sense of individuality, of our own movement in relation to outer objects or persons, and of our activity in regard to these internalized "me's." In recognition of this dynamic quality in activity, G. H. Mead (1934), following William James, introduced the concept of the "I," which is set off against the "me" or "other"—either diverse or general in character. In fact, for Mead, the self in action must be considered as made up of both the "I" and the "me."

The "me" really consists of the roles and attitudes taken up by the individual from parents, siblings, and playmates, later from teachers, preachers, and policemen, and even from imaginary characters, which are worked over into one's own action and thought. But, when the child does come to act, there is more to the matter than a mere duplication of the role which he has picked up from another. There is a dynamic item or feature in the whole interactive process. This is the "I," the self as actor. At the outset this is made up of the needs or impulses which carry the organism into a given cycle of behavior. But in the process of interaction with others the active "I" begins to be affected by the various "me's" which the individual takes over from others.

According to G. H. Mead (1934), the simplest manner in which to describe the operation of the "I" is to recognize that we know it only in memory. It is always active in the present, but we are never quick enough to catch it except in retrospect. Yet, when we look back upon the "I" in memory, it has already taken on certain aspects of a "me" which has acted in relation to some social object. In other words, the "I" always appears as a historical item in behavior. It is the response of the individual to the attitudes of others, while the "me" is the more or less integrated set of attitudes and ideas of others which one has assumed as one basis for the overt action itself.

In gestural or linguistic (subovert) interaction there is no sharp distinction between the "I" and the "me," although logically the latter serves as a phase of the object toward which the "I" responds at the moment. That is, in responding to another we react to him as an external object and also to an internal image of him, or to him as a "me." But, as Mead points out, one cannot entirely predict what this response of the "I" to the "me" will be. *There is a degree of uncertainty in every overt act except purely reflex ones.* So, too, in reflective thought, which usually takes the form of internal conversation, the same mechanism operates. (See Chapter X.) Thus in overt or covert activity the attitudes of other persons which one assumes as factors influencing his own behavior will constitute the immediate "me." But exactly what an individual is going to

do about the situation—defined in terms of this “me”—he does not know completely in advance. True, he can take this situation into his own experience because he can and does assume the ideas and attitudes of other persons involved in it. But the “I” comes into play in his response. As G. H. Mead (1934, p. 177) puts it, the “I” is “the answer which the individual makes to the attitude which others take toward him when he assumes an attitude toward them.” Yet, after he has reacted, the “I” appears in the field of experience, as we said above, chiefly as a memory image.

Thus, although the attitude or incipient action which a person may take toward others may be partially known in terms of his previous responses, the actual overt response which follows is not entirely predictable. It contains a novel feature. It is something which even the individual cannot anticipate completely. He may be aware of himself and of the situation, but precisely how he will react he never knows, as Mead puts it, “until after the action takes place.” *Thus the “I” is the unpredictable, the unique, the novel element in our thought processes and in overt action.* It represents, in short, the unanticipated, unpredictable feature of all activity more or less. This statement represents the logic of the matter. Actually, of course, there exist in most individuals levels of predictability. In highly automatic reactions the “I” factor does take on stability; in those involving any degree of choice, however, there is always this uncertain element. But in any case the “I” is constantly related to the “me” or “other.” G. H. Mead (1934, p. 178) thus summarizes the matter:

“The ‘me’ does call for a certain sort of an ‘I’ in so far as we meet the obligations that are given in conduct itself, but the ‘I’ is always something different from what the situation itself calls for. So there is always that distinction, if you like, between the ‘I’ and the ‘me.’ The ‘I’ both calls out the ‘me’ and responds to it. Taken together, they constitute a personality as it appears in social experience. The self is essentially a social process going on with these two distinguishable phases. If it did not have these two phases there could not be conscious responsibility, and there would be nothing novel in experience.”

Though Mead’s concept of the “I” provides recognition of the dynamic nature of all behavior and thought, we must not imagine from his discussion that the “I” is the same unchangeable element in every varied act. It is certainly not an unqualified factor in that sense. It is capable of modification by the various “me’s,” which in turn depend upon the social-cultural training and the configuration of the time and place. We would often act otherwise than we do were it not for the external restraints—the expectancies—which are laid upon us by others. And, when we act, there is an “I” or actor phase, quite as well as a “me” phase, in the totality

of response. We have only to observe ourselves or listen to confidential remarks of our friends to understand this. A person remarks, "I wanted to give him a piece of my mind, but I thought better of it and said something else." This merely means that one combination of "I" and "me" was inhibited in its overt expression by another combination more in line with social approval. A further illustration from the drama comes to mind. The traditional "asides" indicate the operation of dual patterns of verbal expression—one communicated, one held to the level of subvocal yet audible thought. This pattern of the "aside" became in Eugene O'Neill's *Strange Interlude* (1928) the vehicle for an entire dramatic episode. There the subvocal thinking is made audible, so that the audience is "let in on" the thoughts and attitudes which the characters in the play are normally suppressing in their accepted conversations.⁵

Thus, though the "I" and the "me" are structurally segregated, they fuse together in any given action—which action, however, is qualified by the situation. It often happens that there is a form of dissociation lying behind the communication itself. We say one thing but want to say another.

In everyday living this segmentalization—or even dissociation—of role-taking and acting is common. The act is qualified at many points by what we should like to do but can or dare not do. Men live so much in terms of half measures and compromises. Yet there are other situations in which we may get a more effective fusion of the "I" and the "me," that is, in which competing or conflicting combinations do not arise to inhibit or qualify our actions. This is illustrated neatly in the intensity of the teamwork in some joint and highly interesting co-operative activity. It is illustrated also in the exaltation of fighting or of sexual congress. It is seen in all-engrossing mystical, patriotic, aesthetic, and religious activities. Such fusion often occurs, of course, in creative work. We say, "A man loses himself in his work," meaning that there is a more or less complete combining of the "I" and the "me"—of the actor and the introjected social role to which he takes an attitude merging into a totality. As G. H. Mead (1934, p. 277) remarks, "The self under these circumstances is the action of the 'I' in harmony with the taking of the role of others in the 'me.'" This convergence of the action and the introjected social object produces that unity of response which is the aim of integration. We shall see over and over again that mental conflicts or strain results largely from the conflict between the "me's"—with their associated "I's"—which societal demands lay upon us. The lack of sense of unity and solidarity which characterizes the secondary-group organization of

⁵ The recognition of variation in role-taking is also brought out in Eugene O'Neill's *The Great God Brown* (1926), in which the stage characters don their masks when they assume other roles than those anticipated in the conventional situation.

modern society is but a sociological conception of this same phenomenon in the life of the individual.

Emergence of new patterns. The unique character of the "I" is a most important feature of the personality organization. Its roots appear to lie (1) in the organic or constitutional foundations of activity itself, the wants or impulses in connection with which feelings, emotions, fatigue, energy organization, and glandular and other bodily functions play a part; (2) in the so-called unconscious associations which have been so well exposed by psychoanalysis; and (3) in the conscious but uncontrolled mental associations depending upon exposure to a wide variety of social experiences. It represents the creative, flexible aspect of the personality. It serves as the basis of that autonomous, individualized form and activity which distinguish one person from another.

The concept of emergence applied to personality relates exactly to this novel aspect of thought and action. When this uniqueness concerns important additions to the culture, we call the individual a leader or a genius; but we all possess some of this novelty in behavior, or in thought, although in varying degrees and in different situations.

This factor of uniqueness in personality is difficult to describe and analyze objectively. Science, of course, emphasizes standardized categories, comparison of likenesses and differences among classified items or events, and hypotheses which lead to generalization and ultimately to prediction and control. Hence, when we admit uniqueness and hence unpredictability in personality, we must also raise the question whether these data may be dealt with objectively. (See Chapter XI.) But, this difficult problem aside, we must reckon with the fact that, on the basis of constitutional variations, of personal-social conditioning, and of cultural training, each individual does organize and reorganize his life in unique ways. Our responses themselves give witness to this fact. Despite rigid definitions of situations—aside from the most objective aspects of scientific procedure itself, where the responses are limited and specialized—the particular reaction of one individual will vary slightly from that of another. Even in matters of severe and closely controlled definitions of role, as in an army, though the overt conduct of the participants may be highly similar, it is never completely identical. And in other situations society and culture permit wide divergences in definition and in attitude and overt behavior.

Prediction and control. In the social setting of group life it appears evident that the "me's" or roles of an individual represent the organization of interactional patterns and culture which call for more or less stable and predictable reactions on our part. But the "I," the internal or overt action of the individual in relation to these patterns, is never entirely calculable. In the make-up of the "me" both cultural and personal-social factors are

introjected into the individual. The "me" therefore, as it enters into conduct, may be definite and controllable. The most certain features are those which arise in connection with objective, scientific data. But also relatively stable are those aspects of the "me" which come to us from the laws, mores, and regulations of society. Less certain are those from the field of nonmoral conventions and fashion. Least definite would be those which come from the more or less unique and unpredictable behavior of others—which behavior is itself, from the standpoint of those others, characterized by the very uncertainty, the very uniqueness, of their "I" as it acts toward us. It is in these latter situations, in fact, that personal-social conditioning exercises its greatest influence.

It is the "I," then, as it is rooted in physiological drives and in early experience, and as it has been influenced along the line of its development by "me's," that constitutes an important component of the growing and changing self. The purely "conventional" person is one whose adaptation within himself of the role of others has more or less tended to submerge the organic and early factors which might otherwise go into making a dominant and unique "I." Freud's concept of the "superego" helps us to understand this matter. The superego is constructed from the moral "me's" or roles which culture has foisted upon the growing individual. When the superego, the "me's" of moral behavior picked up from family and community, come to dominate us completely, we tend to fit neatly into the social order and to obey its mandates quite consistently. When the superego does not completely dominate the "id" impulses (still using Freud's term for basic impulses or needs) or modify the "ego" (perception and reason in Freud's sense), the individual makes adjustments to the societal demands more in keeping with his own wishes. The matter has bearing on certain types of leadership. The so-called strong-willed man who develops a new social theory or carries out a social reform, or the scientist who flies in the face of conventional "facts" and "findings" of his field, may be thought of as that person whose "I" is not completely dominated by the "me's" which society and culture have thrust upon him.

There are vast individual differences, of course, in the relative effectiveness or power of the "I" as against the various "me's" which one has acquired in interaction. Thus the genius stands out from the mass of people in his community by virtue of his important "I." On the other hand, the conventional person, in contrast with the deviate (whether the latter is socially accepted or not), is one in whom the *me-ness* far outweighs in importance the *I-ness*. But the very attention which even the conventionalized person gives the unique and "different" individual—whether to condemn or to praise him—affords considerable evidence of this novel trend in all of us; otherwise the necessary identification with the leader, with the unique person, would not be possible.

Thus, as important as the role of the "other" or "me" is in building the self, it is only one aspect of the process. The unique "I" is always at hand in our waking states to modify, add to, or subtract from these social influences which play upon us. This *I-ness* depends upon constitutional foundations, upon impulses, wants, and bodily perceptions, and upon the wide range of social-cultural conditioning to which we have been exposed, much of which comes to light through unconscious associations that apparently affect the actor, the "I" itself.

With this description of the rise of the self from the interacting of individuals and with some of the important structural and functional aspects of the self exposed, we shall now turn to discuss the broader problem of the relation of the self to social status and the sense of security

SELF, STATUS, AND SENSE OF SECURITY

In the development of the self from our recognition of ourselves in terms of what others do and say and expect of us, the roles we take over will have a meaning for those around us partly in terms of the prestige or standing they accord us on a scale of importance. This implied scale, obviously, has a certain significance, in part, for societal welfare. It is expressed in terms of qualifying adjectives like "good" or "bad," "high" or "low," and "efficient" or "inefficient." By introjection, the status value others accord us will be taken over by ourselves as our own normal and expected prestige. In other words, not only must we reckon with the roles as more or less integrated habits, attitudes, and ideas directed to some social object or value, but we must take into account the meaning in terms of standing or prestige which these acts and attitudes have for others and hence for ourselves.

Out of this interplay of role and status with reference to others we gradually develop what McDougall (1908) called the self-regarding sentiments. That is, from the responses of others to us, there arises (by the introjection of such other-regarding sentiments of our fellows into our own inner life) a self-status or self-esteem. The generalized other, or general role, is but the central focus for this. It is illustrated by a man's standing with his fellows in any given group, and it may vary enormously. Thus there are the congenial club man, the good or bad father, the honest or dishonest businessman, the moral or immoral citizen, and the like. The rise of such characterization lies in the praise or blame which others throw upon us. In other words, we are rewarded or punished for the particular role we play. Others exercise a variety of power devices to keep us in our place. Moreover, as we may first be praised or blamed by those around us—parents, friends, teachers, employers, or others—we later find ourselves reacting in the same vein to our own ideas, attitudes, and overt conduct. One segment of the integrated self, acting in some other

role, responds—usually in vocal or subvocal fashion—to another segment or role. For example, when a man indulges in self-praise, we say that he “pats himself on the back,” obviously a duplication of an interactional pattern learned previously.

It is evident that the role and status we acquire are determined in large part by the expectancies of others with whom we participate in society. Such roles and corresponding statuses are more or less organized, in fact, around the interests and values of the group, and vary as the group aims and values vary. Moreover, they are as integrated or disparate, in turn, as the functions of different groups overlap and intermingle. Yet in all these many contacts the personality retains a certain unique and unpredictable aspect. For although the growth of the self begins with the effects of external contacts, it must not be forgotten that the unique reorganization of social experiences constitutes an important element in the mature personality. In fact, we may now define the personality as the more or less organized or integrated ideas, traits, attitudes, frames of reference, and habits built up into roles and statuses which revolve around the central concept and sense of selfhood—or ego-esteem. This self-organization depends upon the capacity of the individual to take the role of others, to adapt them to his own inner drives, and further to view his own role in terms of the ideas and attitudes of others toward him, that is, to more or less accept the status they accord him.

Nearly all students of personality have recognized the high importance of self-esteem or some cognate concept as serving as an important center of motivation and of the life organization. McDougall (1908) considered the “self-regarding sentiment” as one of the chief keys to the understanding of man’s social and moral behavior in society. Psychoanalysts have made much of the importance of the so-called “ego drive.” Thomas listed the desire for recognition by others as one of the four principal wishes of the individual. And W. Williams (1925) has contended that the wish for status and its power was one of the “mainsprings” of human action. Certainly the desire for status or prestige is significant in all societies, primitive or advanced. (See Linton, 1936, 1938.)

Role, status, and levels of aspiration and achievement. From what we have just pointed out it is evident that the aims or aspirations of the individual will be largely determined by the role and status which those around him set up. There are obvious limits of a constitutional sort (in terms chiefly of good health and good organic foundations to intellectual and emotional control and usage), but within these broad biological limits what a child or man sets out to accomplish will reflect pretty much what those about him want him to achieve. As he grows older, the external goals set for him will become peculiarly his own as he internalizes and thus modifies the values or aims of those around him. In other words,

the roles which we build up within ourselves are directed toward certain goals or purposes determined at first largely by the expectancies of others. Our traditional Euro-American society emphasizes individual achievement through intensive competition or conflict with one's fellows. With us the levels of aspiration concern chiefly the high prestige which comes with the accumulation of evidences of material wealth. Failure to achieve such culturally fixed goals lowers the anticipated status. In our society the poor man has been the object not only of Christian pity but of blame for lack of ambition and achievement. In contrast may be set a society where the individual's ambitions are correlated with those of his fellows through a symbol or ideal of collective or group achievement. Perhaps in such a cultural situation co-operation and mutual aid as techniques of accomplishment would be considered preferable (that is, of higher prestige) to those of personal merit operating in intensive competition with others, not for a shared but for a highly individualized goal.

But there are other aspects of this matter. We have already commented on a certain strain or inclination toward consistency in behavior, and therefore in the role-taking. We saw that this has an important bearing on the matter of personal integration. But in some societies, notably in Christian countries in which the capitalistic ethos has long been dominant, there is a curious and somewhat disturbing conflict of aspirations foisted upon each rising generation. I refer to the patent fact that in this and other countries, while we place before the child patterns or ideals which emphasize the Christian virtues of love, kindness, sympathy, and co-operation, alongside these ideals we also emphasize individual struggle for role and status. We set up such levels of aspiration in terms of individual capacity and merit that the integration or co-ordination of the roles demanded by these oppositional aims is difficult if not impossible of achievement. We encourage a lip service—that is, a verbalized wish or aspiration—to the Christian ideals which stands in sharp contrast to our more basic habits and attitudes or roles centered in individual attainment, measured chiefly by the accumulation of wealth that brings high status.

The matter is schematically illustrated in Figure 12, which shows the ambivalence of the drives—one affectionate, sympathetic, and co-operative, the other oppositional (including competition and conflict)—as they operate within our dichotomous cultural framework of Christian love and the Golden Rule, on the one hand, and of intense individualistic struggle under our capitalistic system of competition and personal possessiveness, on the other. These contrasting patterns permit outlets in symbolic or overt behavior that in turn produces a dualism in the self, which, however, may find its integration in the love-hate polarity of in-group versus out-group relations. We shall have occasion in later chapters to refer to the effects of such a dichotomy on the personality.

We are now in a position to understand the tremendous importance of the sense of security in personality structure. (See W. I. Thomas, 1923; Sayles, 1928; Horney, 1937.)

Ego security and self-assurance. The basis of security lies essentially in the predictability—that is, in the recurrent stability—of interaction of the personality with others. It begins with the daily contacts with the mother and in time passes on to become important in relations with other members of one's family, with playmates, teachers, ministers, employers, civic officers, spouses, one's own children, and others. The sense of security or of insecurity, as the case may be, arises from the assurances which others




FIGURE 12, showing ambivalent cultural values and the corresponding ambivalence in personal adaptation to them.

afford us in their recurrent conduct. There is first, normally, the overt security of the child with the mother which leads to expected and predictable patterns of interaction in feeding and in other parent-child relations. In time the child internalizes the expectancies associated with these activities, and these become some of the fundamentals upon which his own personality structure is erected. Self-assurance and self-reliance, which are but aspects of ego security, depend for their origin and continuance upon ability to meet the demands of time and place as defined by others. In other words, we ourselves learn to handle the situations around us on the basis of our reorganization of the roles which have arisen as we met these requirements of others.

If, however, the behavior of others toward us is inconsistent, if parents and teachers play fast and loose with the emotional and social training of children, then the predictability and stability of behavior—in other

words, the sense of security—will not be established. Rather we shall have chaotic, impulsive, and inconsistent roles, and the wonted integration will not emerge. The ego insecurity which comes from such inconsistency of training is witnessed in the fearsome reactions of children to new situations, in their resistant behavior to adults, in their aggressive attempts to compensate for loss of status. (See Chapters XIV and XV.)

Sympathy and love versus aggression. It is evident, then, that the care and protection of the child—in short, his dependency upon adults and others around him—are basic to the first forms of security. The child is so thoroughly conditioned to the mother's acts and voice that any unanticipated change in their relations, say some mishap to her, may set up an emotional response on the part of the child. His own sense of well-being is thoroughly dependent upon her behavior. Various studies have shown that young children, long before they have developed a sense of difference between the self and the not-self, react to signs of danger or pain in another person, even though the latter does not verbalize any distress. A rudimentary empathy—a sort of cross conditioning between the mother and the child—takes place before the rise of self-consciousness, which later is fundamental to role-taking. In quality such reactions on the part of the child are like those of animals who respond to danger signals from others, but wherein there is no evident self-reflection regarding the state of mind or behavior of the others. But, as the child learns language, as he comes to play varied roles (in short, as his sense of selfness arises), this empathic reaction passes on to more deliberate identification, which takes the form of true sympathy, that is, putting oneself consciously in the place of the other. Such taking the role of the other is crucial to the rise of self-feeling and self-consciousness in the child. Put in other terms, the rise of true sympathy is but a phase of self-growth in which the roles or "me's" assumed from others have an affectionate love quality, the roots of which lie in the dependency of the child on the adult, usually the mother.

But, as we shall note in Chapter XIV, the child is not permitted complete satisfaction of his fundamental biological wants. Rather, in order to become a member of the family group, he is thwarted and inhibited in some of his biological aims. In other words, the mother or other adult not only shows sympathy and love for him, but also disciplines him by denial and redirection of his impulses into culturally approved channels. In such situations she takes the role of authority, of denier of the child's wishes, of a certain harshness, perhaps, which is ambivalent to her affectionate role. That is, training imposes frustrations and rules upon the child, and, in order to survive, he learns certain roles in relation to the mother which stand in sharp contrast to those emerging out of interactions with her of a loving, sympathetic sort.

The general emotional-feeling tone of excitement which accompanies these reactions to thwarting or blocking may in time take the form of fear and attempted withdrawal, or of anger and aggression, that is, overt struggle to remove the inhibiting stimulus. It is apparent that the insecurity set up in either case is related to the roles which the child acquires in the particular situation. Yet, in order to restore his sense of self-esteem, the child (or adult) learns to resort to various substitutive devices. These may take the form of anxiety and undue worry; they may take the form of extreme aggressiveness and efforts to conquer the frustrating situation. (Horney, 1937; Dollard, Doob, *et al.*, 1939.) In any case the child or adult seems propelled to effect some balance or equilibrium between himself and the world around him.

There are a number of ways, in fact, in which the individual tries to maintain his self-esteem or ego security. We have already noted aggressiveness or anxiety. Those who threaten our ego security are likely to be met with aggression. It is often the most insecure children, and insecure adults too, who reject would-be new members of any group because they feel that these persons are potential despoilers of their own status. It is interesting, too, to note that there is often an ambivalence in these matters: L. B. Murphy (1937) has reported, for example, that among the nursery-school children whom she studied the correlation of sympathetic reactions and co-operation was .78; but also that the correlation between sympathy and aggression was as high as .41. In other words, there were many children who scored high both in sympathy and in aggression. She cites many cases of youngsters who were most sympathetic to some playmates but unduly harsh and violent toward others, especially toward those who threatened to disturb them or their friends. Moreover, as we well know, the in-group versus out-group organization of society provides a culturally approved channel in which friendliness, co-operation, sympathy, and love may be expressed and at the same time hostility, anger, and aggression perpetrated on those who belong to the out-groups. (See Figure 12.) The ego security in these instances is doubly ensured: love and affection on the one hand, and aggression and hatred on the other. (See Chapter X.)

Not only does societal organization in terms of in-group-out-group relations furnish an outlet for ambivalent trends in the personality, but socially approved devices for saving one's face do the same thing. In other words, the mechanism of rationalization comes into play in re-establishing the ego security. We explain away our sympathy, our aggression, or our anxiety in terms of social good, or in terms of other attitudes and behavior which are approved by our fellows. The man who takes away our job or our status is a "bad" man. And, if we can link up such a man with a cause and an out-group which we do not like, so much the

better. So the threat to the employer's continued control of his labor force by the agitation among workers for unionization is met by the former by accusations that the agitators are communists or other persons who form an out-group to the employing class. Or, in polite circles people are put back in their place by being reminded of their origin on the "wrong side of the tracks."

Sense of shame and guilt. Closely linked up to self-regard as the focus of security are the guilt feelings and the sense of shame which the child acquires in the process of self-development. We have already commented on the moral roles or "me's" which the child gets from his parents, teachers, and others. In fact, the moral roles often provide the central feature of the generalized other in G. H. Mead's theory of the self (1934). In the Freudian theory of personality structure the moral "me's" in time become combined into the superego, or, in more common parlance, into the conscience. The rise of these moral "me's" is not different in form from that of any other role. They develop largely in the face of frustrations or taboos which are laid upon the individual by others. In time these are generalized into moral codes, that is, into expected and regularized roles demanded of us if we are to play our part in the drama of society. If the child is dependent upon the mother and later on others for survival, he must also learn to control his impulses and wishes or suffer punishment, verbal or overt. Punishment simply represents a form of interaction in which one person is dominant over another in terms of a moral definition of a situation, that is, one which is considered to bear upon the welfare of the individual punished and upon the welfare of his fellows in the particular group to which he belongs.

Ordinarily the role of the punisher is introjected into the child's own system of conduct. That is, the controls of society become a part of the self as the superego or the conscience. If effective, this internalization will take on such a character that the individual confronted with an alternative situation and consequent alternative conduct will select that line of action which is approved by his fellows as right and proper. In other words, one set of "me's" will tend to hold another set in check. Moreover, the punishment which follows the taking of one role tends to be associated with pain, fear, distress, and denial of varied forms of social approval. In contrast, to follow the moral way because it is socially approved means ego expansion and pleasure, because it brings approval, love, and sympathy from others. The linkage of emotions with certain socially learned codes or rules was once well expressed by the young son of Theodore Reik, the psychoanalyst. In discussing with his father the consequences of doing something defined for him by his mother and nurse as "wrong," the lad well defined conscience as "a feeling within me, but the voice of somebody else."

The individual may punish himself in an anticipatory way just as at more overt levels young children slap themselves when they have done something wrong. Such self-imposed responses are the reverse of the "patting oneself on the back." In this situation one role or segment of the personality acts upon another role or segment when the latter would digress from the culturally sanctioned line of action. In place of self-esteem we have self-abasement or shame, with which a sense of guilt is associated. The sense of guilt arises when a set of socially induced moral roles converse with other incipient roles which run in counter direction.

Again Mead's theory of the "I" and Freud's concept of the "id" (which is somewhat related to what the former called the biological "I") help us to interpret this relationship of roles. For instance, in childhood the rudimentary impulses, the primitive "I," unqualified as yet by moral "me's," may play a dominant part in action. Ordinarily in the older child and in the adult these more elemental patterns or segments of the self are repressed. But under unusual circumstances, under severe crises which threaten the ego security, the individual may revert to these more primitive forms of action. Examples of this sort are seen in mob violence, in wartime hysteria, and in religious frenzy, and are clearly evident in many forms of psychopathic and other deviant behavior. But the function of socialization, especially along moral lines, aims to fortify us and society against these more biological responses. Shame and the sense of guilt are the watchdogs of all that we consider right and proper.

Chapter X

LANGUAGE, THOUGHT, AND THE SELF

ONE of the crucial problems of psychology has to do with the relation of thought and action. If we consider the former as an inner world of events—truly as much a part of nature as overt action—we must ask what these internal factors have to do with conduct which is perceptible to others. One of the difficulties in dealing with the internal life—in the manner of the natural sciences—is its inaccessibility to direct observation. It possesses a certain privacy which can be reached only by co-operation with the individual whose inner world one wishes to investigate. The traditional method of securing information about these events has been through verbalized introspection, and we shall describe later some of the special difficulties of securing knowledge in this area of reactivity. (See Chapter XI.) At present we are concerned with certain important interrelations of language, thought, and the self. In particular our discussion will revolve chiefly around the following topics: (1) the relations of language, meaning, and communication; (2) the forms of thinking; (3) certain nonlinguistic features of communication; (4) the interplay of language and motor skill; (5) the bearing of thought and language on the integrative and dissociative aspects of the self; and (6) the functioning of the self in relation to societal organization and forms of social control.

THE RELATIONS OF LANGUAGE, MEANING, AND COMMUNICATION

We begin with acts, not with thoughts. Only gradually does the young child develop his inner life of thought, and, long before he has reached this stage, he has learned to adapt himself overtly to no end of environmental situations. The shift from overt activity to thought consists in the internalizing of certain of the segmental or partial responses which are a part of a given cycle of adaptation. Toward the end of the first year of life, or in the second, there begins to emerge a certain division in the child's reactions. Some of these develop into symbolic responses, chiefly language; others continue in the direction of more specific overt conduct. We have already noted how gestures serve to indicate the oncoming acts of another person and how they thus become associated with the major

cycles of activity whenever the latter involve a social situation. We have also described how the child's vocal gestures in particular take on a meaning for the mother, and through introjection in time come to have meaning for the child. (See Chapter IX.) In other words, certain sounds of the child and later words serve as abbreviations or symbols for a variety of activities. Yet we must never forget that the child's understanding of the behavior of others—and in due course of his own activity—does not begin with a knowledge of words but with a response of his own to the actions and gestures of others toward him.

Language, anticipatory reactions, and meaning. In short, the words which develop out of these early vocalizations are simply further extensions of the gesture—more definite and precise in defining the situation and thus in controlling it; that is, they become more exact indicators to others of one's desires and oncoming acts. They mark changes in the direction or motion of the individual in space and time. They reveal, in fact, a neat interrelation of the present needs to past reactions, on the one hand, and to future reactions, on the other. Put otherwise, language has to do with the control of the movement both of the other individual involved and of the person himself. Thus words set up (1) expectation or incipient action in the person spoken to, and also (2) expectation or incipient action in the individual speaking.

This double aspect of language is highly important for the understanding of personal traits and in the adaptation of one individual to another. The expectancy set up in others by our own verbal responses—as well as by our general bodily reactions—is the foundation of that common-sense prediction of behavior without which we could not operate as social beings. Whenever we act toward another person, we set up in him certain expectancies or "claims" on us. If we offer a child a toy, there is aroused in him an anticipation that we will carry this gesture into the complete act of giving, since we have already by our gesture set up in him the incipient reactions of acceptance or refusal. He, by that verbal sign or expression, begins organically to respond to the use of the toy. If we disappoint him, we inhibit the continuation of this incipient response and set up another which he did not expect. An illustration at the adult level is that of the flirt whose gestures of love-making toward another are labeled false because he or she sets up anticipations in another which are not carried out.

The implications of this matter of expectancy for behavior, and for moral conduct in particular, are profound, and we shall refer to the matter in other parts of this book. We have already noted that the very repetition of any given cycle of action or of a situation produces an anticipation that the subsequent activity will be like that of the previous occasion. By expectancy is meant a preparation or getting ready for an action

in advance. It is "getting set" to do something. The mechanism of establishing such a pattern is summarized by Latif (1934, p. 78) in the following way:

"... This cutting down of the infant's original adient efforts toward food, to mere-gesture, provides the infant also with a 'meaning' connected with his gesture. The mother by solicitously proffering the bottle on seeing his incipient striving for food (his 'gesture'), produces in the child the following sequence of reflexes; and these, after sufficient repetition of the meal-time experience, become connected as a chain reflex: internal hunger stimuli (appetite)—gestures of food-adience; (the mother sees and steps in) mother as visual stimulus and nursing bottle as visual, tactile and olfactory stimuli—motor exploration (perception) of mother and bottle, and motor appropriation of the bottle and its contents.

"For the first few times, the advent of the mother with the bottle is a necessary link in the sequence of reflexes. But, as in all learning of chain-reflexes, after some repetitions the proprioceptive afferent impulses returning to the central nervous system from one movement have become canalized into the motor paths of the next following movement, and are sufficient of themselves to produce the movement. From this moment on, the mother herself is not an actually necessary link in the chain. On the contrary, if the mother does not see the infant's gesture and bring the bottle, the infant's next movements will be *as before*, to recreate its mother and to grasp and carry to its lips the (not-present bottle). And precisely this it is which we have all often seen, and said: 'The baby is definitely looking for his mother; he *wants* her to bring the bottle.' Such is the physiological mechanism of 'expectation' and 'purposive' action in general. This 'expectant' re-creation of its absent mother and grasping reach for the absent bottle are the gesture's meaning in the experience of the infant. They mean, translated into words: I want mother bring bottle."

It is in this way that the reaction or gesture of a second individual, in this instance the mother, becomes associated with the gesture of the first, here the child. This linkage of the perception or imagery of the mother's response to the child's own pattern of activity influences his subsequent act or gesture toward the mother. Thus the child's hunger pangs and crying become associated with the mother's voice, fondling, kissing, and nursing him. Such association furnishes the foundation for the child's *future* acts and gestures toward the mother. In short, the most rudimentary social activity of a given individual always implies another human being *reacting* to this act.

Though expectation and meaning begin in overt interaction, their further development depends on the growing importance of gesture and language, that is, of communication, for the latter is but preparatory to overt behavior. The whole social foundation of language, communication, and meaning is well stated by Dewey (1925, pp. 178-179) in the following words:

"A requests B to bring him something, to which A points, say a flower. There is an original mechanism by which B may react to A's movement in pointing. But na-

tively such a reaction is to the movement, not to the *pointing*, not to the object pointed out. But B learns that the movement *is* a pointing; he responds to it not in itself, but as an index of something else. His response is transferred from A's direct movement to the *object* to which A points. Thus he does not merely execute the natural acts of looking or grasping which the movement might instigate on its own account. The motion of A attracts his gaze to the thing pointed to; then, instead of just transferring his response from A's movement to the native reaction he might make to the thing as stimulus, he responds in a way which is a function of A's *relationship*, actual and potential, to the thing. The characteristic thing about B's understanding of A's movement and sounds is that he responds to the thing from the standpoint of A. He perceives the thing as it may function in A's experience, instead of just ego-centrally. Similarly, A in making the request conceives the thing not only in its direct relationship to himself, but as a thing capable of being grasped and handled by B. He sees the thing as it may function in B's experience. Such is the essence and import of communication, signs and meaning. Something is literally made common in at least two different centres of behavior. To understand is to anticipate together, it is to make a cross-reference which, when acted upon, brings about a partaking in a common, inclusive, undertaking." (See also J. Peterson, 1918.)

Thus, as action gives way to gesture and true language, symbols—largely verbal—become more important in the management of behavior. And finally the internalization of gesture and verbal or other symbols provides us with the world of meaning, that is, inner anticipatory processes—both conscious and unconscious—which function in the rise of organized inner life and in the predirection of overt adaptation.

Symbols and the growth of meaning. In the early stages of acquiring language, the word and the object are linked together in the totality of the stimulus and the response. The association of words with objects which the child gets from parents and others constitutes for him a total configuration. So, too, in the uttering of his first words, the object and the name go together. It is only with further conditioning that the name and the object get separated with increasing discrimination. It is in this cutting loose of the word from the rest of the context of the particular experience that words as symbols for objects come into full play. *A symbol is a stimulus—largely verbal, pictorial, or material—which stands in place of, or suggests, or represents, some object, situation, or relation, by reason of some association of the two in experience.* The symbol is an abbreviated substitute for something else. It stands in relation to this "something else" as a part to a whole. As Dewey (1910, p. 171) puts it, in the case of symbols "we care nothing for what they are in themselves, but everything for what they signify and represent." Symbols serve as handles, as convenient devices by which to take hold of, or to control, the world of situations around us, both social and material. That is, they are *power devices*. The early crying, the whimpering, the smiling, the laughing of the child serve such ends of control over others even before

he acquires true words. But words are more effective than other gestures because they more specifically locate objects and situations in time and space, and characterize and qualify them as to number, kind, and relationship, or indicate interrelations of persons, of things, or of things and persons. And as a person builds up patterns of interaction, his expectancies tend more and more to be expressed in verbal symbols.

Symbols also take on the character of both stimulus and response. Thus utterances are substitutes for situations and become capable of setting up appropriate behavior toward these situations, but they are also themselves substitute responses—thus taking on the character of objects in themselves. The object spoken of is itself a response or behavior object. As Esper (1935, p. 449) remarks, word and object for most people seem to have a “natural, inevitable, and inherent” association, and “for the ordinary speaker, the object *is* what its name says it is.” This fact is often forgotten when we discuss language in relation to behavior and to thought. The word thus begins for the child as a part of a totality of perception and activity, a phase of a kind of mass activity, which subsequently gets cut loose from this context as symbol or substitute, only later to take on the character of an object itself.

The meaning of any stimulus or object, therefore, lies within the response which the individual makes thereto, and the interiorization and reduction in overtness of the latter are largely the basis of conscious and of the closely related unconscious mechanisms. As Langfeld (1933, p. 243) well says, “Without response there would be no consciousness. No matter how many or how strong are the stimuli and the resulting afferent impulses, without the efferent impulses and specific response, either incipient or overt, an organism would have no awareness of a world; so far as that organism is concerned there would be no experience.” The meaning of an object *is* our incipient reaction to it, *plus* our feeling-emotional tone. The motor nature of both conscious and unconscious functions is shown in Max’s studies (1935, 1937) of changes in the neural action currents of deaf mutes. For both subjects and controls the shift from waking to sleeping revealed a sharp decrease in peripheral muscular action; but in the deaf mutes dreaming was usually marked by motor responses in the arms and fingers, and like reactions accompanied their solving a variety of difficult mental tests. Clearly the whole proprioceptive system is intimately bound up with what we ordinarily call thinking.

Yet, as important as these proprioceptive and peripheral motor processes are, we must realize that the basic constitutional foundation of language and meaning lies in the cortical centers of the brain itself. The wide and complicated associations necessary to thought and communication could not be carried on if the cerebral cortex were defective. Thus idiocy and low-grade imbecility are certainly correlated with lack of development of

the frontal lobes of the brain, and, although the precise relation of brain structure to the middle grades of feeble-mindedness (upper levels of imbecility and low-grade morosity) is not known, it is a sound inference that inadequate cortical development is a basic factor in this deficiency. Without a soundly functioning cortex, speech, thought, and the higher phases of consciousness would not be possible.

Various studies of aphasia (a condition of loss of speech due to brain injuries) are interesting in this connection. Thus Head (1926) shows that the adequate use of language depends upon the ability of the brain to direct the appropriate formation of vocal sounds. A man may perceive an object and yet be unable to formulate the words necessary to describe it or otherwise designate it to another. Or, again, there may be a loss of some important inhibitory center of the brain which serves to control and direct speech. When this is out of normal function, the patient may talk endlessly in a stream of relatively meaningless words. The content of meaning and language derives from social-cultural training, but the neuromuscular—that is, appropriate organic—structures and functions must be intact or the content cannot be built up (learning), retained (engrams), or recalled for use later.

But these constitutional factors aside, at the social-psychological level meaning is an outgrowth of the dual reference of behavior which we have already noted. A response is always directed to some part of the environment. The eye and hand, for example, follow the contours and relations of objects and their movements. Following Holt, we may call this the *objective reference* of the specific reaction. But every overt response has a corresponding attitude, concept, and feeling-emotional tone within the organism. This we have called the *subjective*, inner aspect of behavior. Since in the process of human learning words become attached to external events or situations and to concepts, they come to be a part of the total complex of reactions. It is thus that words likewise take on a dual reference: toward the outside, toward the object or situation, and toward the inside, the motivations, feelings, emotions, concepts, attitudes, and awareness of bodily changes. Meaning, therefore, has two features: the objective reference characterized by *denotation*—that is, the location of the object with its properties and qualities perceived or conceived in time or space—and *connotation*, the suggested and implied ideas and feelings which cluster about the word. In connection with meaning, then, language serves to tie together the overt and covert aspects of activity. It provides the link between the internal feelings, emotions, and motor or attitudinal sets, and the peripheral bodily movements of adjustment (the external reference) toward objects, social and material. And, whatever our view of the relation of thought to language, certainly the latter is the tool of social intercourse out of which meaning is born. We adopt,

therefore, the essential thesis that language serves a symbolic and instrumental function in relation to meaning.

The relation of language to meaning is notably brought out by common-sense observations and psychological experimentation. The use of words to label items aids in the learning of complex mental operations. In one experiment a number of drawings of relatively meaningless geometrical figures were exposed to a group of subjects for two seconds each. These figures suggested different objects to different subjects; and in their reproduction of these shapes the subjects were greatly assisted by the names which they attached to the original nonsense geometrical figures. Moreover, those particular figures which were of the most unusual shape could be retained in memory *only* if a name were given to them. (See Boring, Langfeld, *et al.*, 1935, pp. 358-359; also Hull, 1920.)

Though conscious and unconscious meanings arise from the internalization of overt activity, especially of verbal responses, and though at the level of organic change this involves the operation of incipient or reduced motor response, a complete understanding of meaning requires that it be related to social interaction and to the rise of the self, especially as overt interactional patterns themselves become mirrored within the individual.

The inner forum of thought. Thinking largely consists, then, in carrying over into the inner being, into the memory and associative functions, the various stimulus-response patterns, especially the verbal ones, which have arisen in interaction. Or we may say that, although words are learned as a part of the total reactive system, in time the individual comes to use them internally in anticipating his own action and that of others. That is, he will talk to himself as he has talked to others and as others have talked to him. In short, thinking takes on the nature of an inner forum in which social acts—now symbolized—are manipulated within the organism just as originally our acts were qualified by the acts of others. As Dewey well says, thinking in this sense takes on a dramatic—that is, a social—character. *If the self arises in the dialectic and overt relations of the individual with others, thought represents but an extension of this process into the field of internal preparation or anticipation of social reaction.* Thought is a kind of covert symbolic interaction, and although, as Vygotsky (1939) points out, inner speech tends to be reduced to highly abbreviated forms of verbalization, the social nature of thought is not therefore totally lost.

Thought apparently begins in the internalization or introjection of playing first one role and then another—roles which have their inception, as we know, in the overt field of activity between persons. G. H. Mead (1934, p. 154) remarks that the essential mechanism of thought is "the internalized conversation of gestures." Thus the child is able to elaborate his rudimentary role-taking greatly when he learns to talk first as farmer,

then as merchant, and so on through a long gamut of specific roles. He uses to himself words which another may use, and then replies perhaps with another set of words. In short, the essentials of thought appear to arise when segmental and differentiated types of vocal stimulus-response have become interiorized and take on the character of an inner forum or drama.

The growth of meaning, in fact, parallels the internalization of role-taking. As the child comes to introject the attitudes, ideas, and habits of others into himself, he likewise learns to think. That is, the beginnings of thought lie largely within the field of imagery and subvocal talking, which are rather directly related to the perceptual experiences associated with playing specific roles. But we may well ask: How does this process develop into abstract thinking? G. H. Mead has provided us with a suggestive answer to this question in his discussion of the development of the "generalized other." As the child acquires more general roles or me's, he also develops the capacity to internalize the abstract symbols or concepts which characterize them. In truth, both specific and general roles depend for their development upon their linkage to the words which define them. The two processes go together. The mechanism in both is essentially the same, that is, one role (or the symbols associated with it) is set off in a conversational pattern against another role or segment of its symbolized experiences. As Markey (1928, p. 138) puts it, "Within a symbolizing behavior system there is one part of the integrated behavior which stimulates and presents absent situations, past events, possible future events—the whole range of the universe for which adequate symbols are at hand." In short, thinking is not only reflection, but also self-reflection, that is, the duplication within one of the interaction which has its origin outside. (For sound comments on the social nature of meaning, see Ogden and Richards, 1929, especially Malinowski's essay therein; Burke, 1935; Mannheim, 1936; Bloomfield, 1939; and Mills, 1939.)

At the abstract level such internalized interaction involves the use of concepts which define a certain generalization and differentiation of experience. Psychologically considered, a *concept* represents a reorganization of various aspects of perceptual experience in which some element or feature with a verbal label comes to stand for the whole experience, in which qualities of objects and actions are characterized by words indicating generalization or in which actions and states of being are represented by general terms. But, while concepts are expressed largely in the form of verbal or other symbols, their usefulness arises from their relation with various specific features of overt activities in the first instance. For example, the child who was conditioned to fear of a furry animal, a rabbit in the first instance, has been known to express fear on

his initial contact with other animals or inanimate objects of different size and activity when they possessed the features of furriness. This differentiated response represents the probable root of abstraction—that is, selection of some particular aspect out of a totality. Thus in the course of time children come to make judgments, that is, to determine courses of action not alone in terms of total stimulus situations, but with reference to specific features of them.

Furthermore, the relations of objects or actions to one another give rise by means of discriminative responses to still other and novel reactions, to qualities of objects, or to objects as a class. Thus an automobile is a perceptual object that is repeatedly presented to the child, and later there are other automobiles. Gradually he comes by the aid of words to form a conception of a class of objects called automobiles. His segmental reactions to the mechanism of motion and conveyance of these concrete objects and his neglect of such features as color or trade names, lead to the use of the word to designate a whole class of vehicles. Thus in the process of differentiation of responses, on the one hand, and of generalization or abstraction of them, on the other, the concept arises. Or, to take another instance, how does the child come to distinguish between his own father as a perceptual object and the class of other men? The following illustration, adapted from Holt, shows how specific and general terms arise. (See Latif, 1934, pp. 155-157.)

At the outset, the child, when he learns to call his father by the name "Papa," will call any other man by the same term, because he is not yet aware of any difference between his father and other men. At the outset, all men elicit the same responses in the child, and the word "papa" is simply linked to these responses and characterizes them in an abbreviated way. But, as the father repeatedly visits the nursery, talks to him in a special manner, appears with particular toys or indulges in particular activities, these combined features come to differentiate the papa from other men whom he sees and hears. In other words, the continued or repeated reactions of the father to the child and vice versa get more and more closely associated with the word "papa," and the activity and the word together come to be the meaning. Thus the denotation of the word "papa" grows narrower, and sooner or later the contacts with other men will be associated with someone not-papa, that is, a social object who reacts differently and for whom one has no adequate anticipatory reactions. For instance, if the father has a beard, the contact with a man who has none will be different. The visual and kinesthetic impulses are not the same as those associated with the motor pathways which produce the sounds "papa." In this way, then, the child comes to distinguish between the father as a specific and concrete object and all other men. This is but the reverse process of building up class concepts of men in general, which would include the father. That is to say, the inclusion of the father in the category of men is dependent, in turn, not upon the differences between the perceptual father and other men but upon similarities—themselves, however, related to differences from persons, say, who wear skirts and who do other things to and for the child.

The process of abstraction, therefore, involves finding out both differences and similarities in the larger field of concrete experiences with specific objects or persons. In time there emerge concepts of class, qualities, and attributes which in turn may be associated with, or compared to, other classes, attributes, and qualities. In principle this illustrates again a shift from a form of mass activity to one which is differentiated. It is on such bases that all manner of general terms are developed. *Quadruped* comes to stand for all four-legged animals, but not for those with six or two legs. *Redness* is a quality deriving from innumerable specific visual responses. So, too, *truth*, *honesty*, *justice*, *virtue*, and like terms come to stand for certain general attributes of everyday conduct. And without these rarefied concepts the highest forms of thinking could not be carried on. But, as we shall see, these and like terms easily get cut loose from their moorings in concrete perceptual experience and come to take on functions rather unrelated to their original ones. That is, they become not concepts but stereotypes or false and vague concepts, free-floating throughout conversation and writing, with no solid meaning but often carrying much emotional freight. (See K. Young, 1930, on stereotypes.)

In summary, then, we may say that language furnishes us a means of handling the abstractions of concrete experiences; in fact, without words we could not employ concepts in our adaptive relations. The names of specific objects or persons are, in time, supplemented by verbal symbols for classes, qualities, attributes, and relationships. And the names of the latter no less than those of the former we learn from our society. In short, verbal concepts are fundamental to the development of meanings of situations, objects, and persons and to all the intricate elaborations of these. Yet for the child, and for adults in most circumstances, meanings exist at the level of practical usage. A chair is "something to sit on," a knife is "something to cut with," and so on. But conceptualization, of course, goes far beyond this and involves us in universals of classifications, categories, and relationships which it is the purpose of formal logic to expose. Nevertheless, we must never forget that development and use of the concept are tied up with language, which, in turn, is related to social-cultural conditioning and communication. That is, no matter how far abstract words depart from the concrete everyday realities, no matter how far they become associated with the illogic of feelings and emotions or how persistently grammar and logic try to keep their use within the bounds of cause-and-effect relations, words remain in the end linked to social interaction, directly or indirectly. They are used with reference to some situation which has become internalized as a phase of anticipatory behavior, but their full meaning can be understood only by reference to the wider world of overt social conduct. (On the "danger" that concepts

will become removed from perceptual experience, see Korzybski, 1933, and Chase, 1937.)

The meaning of the physical world. If the development of meaning is essentially a social process, as we have so far contended, it may well be asked: How does one arrive at a concept or meaning of the material or physical world? Is this also a social product? Though a discussion of this question is obviously tangential to our main purpose, it does have sufficient implication for our theory to warrant at least brief attention. Again Dewey (1925) and G. H. Mead (1934) have provided us a certain systematic frame of reference in which to treat this problem.

Many writers who have approached social psychology from a background of the laboratory, with its emphasis upon the individual, have tended to classify consciousness and overt behavior into two types, non-social and social. (See Gault, 1923; F. H. Allport, 1924.) Such a standpoint ignores or neglects the interactional foundation of personality which we have stressed. Thus a traditional illustration of alleged nonsocial action is the case of a child learning to avoid being injured by some physical object or acquiring skill with tools. But, to appeal to actuality, who ever heard of a child in a genuine play or home situation who, having burned himself with a hot object, did not cry out in pain, which brought sooner or later another person—that is, a *social* feature—into the stimulus-response situation? True, a child may injure himself while playing alone, but the chances are that sooner or later in most experiences of this character a mother, nurse, or other person will enter into it to soothe the child or to aid him in acquiring the necessary skill to manage the problem confronting him. And, once *another* has entered into the situation, the reactions of the child will henceforth be qualified by this social—that is, interactional—aspect. Certainly learning manual skills is distinctly influenced by social training, even though the major attention is given to the relation of the learner to the tools or machines and materials to be handled.

But G. H. Mead has contended that, aside from such obvious qualification of learning by direct social interference, the consciousness of physical objects, or, more properly, of *things*, depends for its emergence upon a process similar to that which we find in the development of the awareness of the self as a social object from our contacts with others.

According to this theory, the important factors giving rise to the concept or meaning of the *thing* or material object have to do with its extension in space, its volume, and its mobility or momentum. By means of sensory-perceptual experiences we are able "to put ourselves inside the physical object." The most significant items in this process concern the use of the hand, the proprioceptive senses, the exteroceptors, and our like sensory-motor and cerebral organization. The hand permits the manipulation of either persons or things, and in this activity the sense of pressure associated with

tactile contact and movement over the surface gives a sense of smoothness, roughness, stickiness, or other qualities—all of which produces what Mead calls "resistance." Moreover, this sensation of resistance is similar to that which the person experiences when he presses one hand against the other. The resistance is both within the organism and within the object, and it is largely by resisting that the organism comes into fundamental or direct relationship with external objects.

In addition to the hand, of course, there are the distance or exteroceptive senses, especially of vision and hearing. Yet, as Mead points out, in building up the sense of thingness, these are really supplementary to the actual manipulation of the object with the hands. Seeing, hearing, smelling, or tasting an object merely sets up an anticipatory series of reactions of handling it. Finally, it is the cerebrum that provides the mechanism which makes possible the integration of these partial experiences and also their differentiation in turn into an anticipatory phase and their overt or consummatory fulfillment.

Yet in order to get the sense of *insideness* or thingness, one has to go beyond the first experience of resistance. Here identification and introjection come into play. As G. H. Mead (1932, pp. 132, 136) puts it, "The physical thing external to the organism can call out its own response and the answering reaction of the organism." And again: "The organism has stimulated itself, by its action on an object, to act upon itself in the fashion of the other object." That is, meaning arises when we take the attitude of pressing against an object and in turn set up an attitude of counterpressure, just as pressing one hand against the other sets up counterresistance of the second hand to the action of the first. In other words, the process of learning about and giving meaning to the physical world is similar to that of learning about other selves by taking up their attitudes into ourselves.

Though Mead's theory reminds one of Lipps's (1903) concept of empathy, the meaning of physical object is more than a simple projection of the individual's sense of effort with reference to a thing. The resistance is as much *in* the thing as it is *in* the organism. Finally, the cerebrum with its vast network of associative possibilities enables us to organize and reorganize our sensations so as to provide the basis for our anticipatory reaction of taking the role, as it were, of the physical object. In other words, interaction is just as fundamental to the development of the meaning of a physical thing as it is to the emergence of the sense of the self as an object.

Furthermore, there is much evidence that our conception of the whole spatial world around us depends upon the fact that the physical thing is abstracted *after*, not *before*, the emergence of the self as a social object, and, second, that originally the center of our spatial perceptions is our own body, which we come to experience (just as we do physical things outside the body) by beginning from the periphery and proceeding to the inside. This spatial center in ourselves is like the relationship of co-ordinates in three dimensions. These co-ordinates extend up and down, to right and left, before and behind the individual. But this is not enough.

The final check on such spatial perception lies in the manipulatory capacity of the hands and in the associated attitudes built up toward the insideness of these directly experienced material objects. As G. H. Mead (1932, p. 138) puts it, "It is the sight of the distant physical thing that stimulates the organism to take its attitude of resistance, which is the import of seeing a hard thing."

One or two further comments, however, need to be made. First, there are distinctions in our experience between the social object (another person) and the physical thing. While the physical-thingness may rest essentially on manual manipulation and upon the thing's resistance to us and our pressure on it, our "interaction" with things is highly stable and constant from experience to experience. In contrast, the interactions of human beings are always flexible from period to period—no matter how relatively automatic these become. Second, as a result of this, we learn to adjust ourselves to the essentially inflexible character of the physical thing. A chair will not remove itself from our path if we merely speak to it, but another person may and can. Third, this constancy and inflexibility of the physical object permit a prediction and hence a control of the material world that is not so far possible of the human and social world. In other words, the very external character of *thingness* makes for manipulation and control, so long as we manage by our hands, or by our tools and machines—which are themselves externalized extensions of hands—to adapt ourselves to the rules of thingness which we call the "laws of nature."

The close linkage of our consciousness and action regarding the physical world with those regarding our social world is apparent everywhere, for even as adults we carry over from childhood the habits of dealing with material things *as if* they were social objects. As G. H. Mead (1934, p. 184) remarks, "The physical object is an abstraction which we make from the social response to nature." We continue to talk to nature. We may speak about or to our furniture; for example, we say that a bed "invites" us to lie down. The infantile character of such responses is, of course, most evident under emotional stress, as witnessed by our swearing at a chair or door into which we stumble in the dark, and especially by our tendency to "blame" these material objects for hurting us.¹

While Mead's argument for the social nature of our awareness of the physical world is theoretical, his analysis, if sound, indicates that any effort to distinguish qualitatively between the consciousness and meaning

¹ I am convinced, furthermore, that children pick up their anthropomorphic conceptions of the material world around them in part from the fact that, when they are injured by objects, parents or other persons talk to the material thing as if it were a person and perhaps blame the thing for injuring the child. Such reactions of others are quickly introjected into the child's own inner life.

of the physical world and that of the social-cultural world is open to grave question. Certainly his interpretation puts a problem before both philosophers and psychologists who are interested in the rise and nature of knowledge and the social-cultural foundations of all thought and action. We cannot enter into a consideration of this topic here, but must return to our main discussion.

TWO FORMS OF LANGUAGE AND OF THOUGHT

Without our becoming involved in the ancient controversy whether thought is identical with verbal processes or is something quite independent of verbal expression, it is evident that, whenever communication of meaning takes place, we are absolutely dependent upon some form of symbol—verbal or other. Moreover, thinking and communication vary in form and quality from the emotional, wishful, or highly personal sort to that which is impersonal, logical, and intellectual. In the present section we shall discuss the two forms of thought and of language.

Objective and fantasy thinking. In the course of elaborating the anticipatory phases of behavior—the field of mind, as the older psychology put it—nothing is more important than what is called associative thinking. But we may distinguish between two forms of such a process, one logical and directive or “objective,” the other fantastic, autistic, or dereistic.²

Directive thinking is fundamentally a logical association of events and their symbols, social or material. It is open to verification by others, by statistical, experimental, or other sound methods. It rests essentially on our experience in manipulating objects or persons outside ourselves and bringing them under our control. The objects and their situational complexes may be checked against a certain consistency of motion and force in the external world; and we construct symbols to represent cause-and-effect relations of motion or action. These are anchored to actual concrete experiences in the world of men and objects outside ourselves. This is the basis of sound empirical knowledge. It gives rise to what Pearson (1911) aptly called “disciplined imagination,” which is essential not only to scientific discoveries but to new inventions and to great art as well. (See H. Ellis, 1923.)

In fantasy, on the other hand, the associations are illogical, free-ranging, or “uncontrolled,” and personal wishes, emotions, and feelings tend to dominate the intellectual functions. Such fantastic associations grow out of mere contiguity of terms, of events, or of persons which have no neces-

² Various writers use different terms for much the same process. Bleuler (1924) used “dereistic” from the roots *de reor*, away from reality. Wells (1917) employed the term “autistic” to indicate the self-propelled and somewhat compulsive nature of such forms of thought, especially in the extreme forms. We shall, for the most part, use the commoner expression “fantasy thinking.” (See Murray, 1937, for an excellent discussion of this.)

sary external cause-and-effect relationship. The associations of similars or opposites, and the linkages of contiguities of time and space, are employed, as in objective thinking, but in fantasy associations the connection is undisciplined and free-floating. This is evidenced in daydreaming or in the practices of magic wherein the name comes to stand for the object. Thus among primitive or peasant peoples a medicine man or the witch may cast a spell over a man by the use of his name, or a clay or wax effigy of a person may be used to invoke malevolent power believed to injure the person's health or fortune. For the personality this association may be as significant as if the linkage were scientifically verifiable. Although conditioning in the dereistic field takes place more in the realm of free imagery and verbal concepts than in terms of the objects and situations for which these images and words stand, the contrast of fantasy and directive thinking rests fundamentally upon the cultural acceptance of the conditioning stimuli and responses, and upon its place in the ego organization, not upon the mechanisms themselves. It is the manner in which these stimuli are integrated together toward consummatory and social, meaningful behavior which determines the differences between the two forms of thought.

The rise of two forms of thought. Both logical thinking and fantasy thinking develop as the child learns his way about in his social and material world. As has been noted already, in early childhood words and deeds or objects are linked together in the totality of the situation toward which a child responds, and only gradually does the distinction between word as object and word as symbol develop. In fact, it is just at this point that the distinction between fantasy thinking and logical thinking becomes important.

We have seen that speech reactions have two references, one to the external world of objects, the other to the inner world (the subjective states), the ideas, attitudes, values, emotions, feelings, and bodily sensations. And the sense of power which words come to afford the child arises from two somewhat different arenas of his experience. The first is the potency, the magic, of the utterance which produces the wanted object or situation. The second is the internal strength of the wish or desire which sets up the verbal utterance itself. We must recall that the most significant words are learned in the presence of a situation which is critical to the child or which is defined as critical for him by others. That is, the first basic words are related to such cycles of action as feeding, bodily comfort, elimination, preparing for sleep, or play. Usually these are accompanied by strong feelings and emotions. In these situations, mother, father, siblings, or other persons play important roles. The feeling tone of words from the outset is as fundamental as their objective reference. Hence, when the child uses the same or similar words as power devices,

his subjective states are heightened by wish and accompanying feeling. The Freudian psychology recognizes this fact in the concept of the "omnipotence of thought." Certainly the potency of verbal substitutes or symbols for the control of events outside oneself is a basic factor in social interplay.

Words are often used by children and naïve adults as if they produced or created things or events outside oneself. In discussing his investigations of children's thought and language, Piaget (1929, p. 62) reports the following conversation to show the child's linkage of word and object:

"Ar (6½) remarked during a building game: '*And when there weren't any names . . .*'"

"Be (6½) replied: '*If there weren't any words it would be very awkward (on serait très ennuyé). You couldn't make anything. How could things have been made.*' (if there hadn't been names for them)? The name thus seems to be a part of the essence of the thing and is even a necessary condition of its being made."

The roots of such belief lie in the fact that the use of words so often does profoundly alter the external situation toward which the child responds. Yet, when the word does not produce the desired changes in the outside world, the wish with its expectation or anticipatory activity remains. Moreover, the child discovers that he may secure a pleasurable state by continuing this utterance, elaborating it and talking *as if* the object were there. This *as if* pleases him. Thus he creates a daydream world, a form, not of escape, as some would say, but of inner experience with elaborations of all sorts which produce a new and rich reality inside himself, one that is useful for purposes of pleasure and self-satisfaction when the external events cannot be changed to his liking. This is the manner in which the fantasy world is created; and in this world words as well as visual or other imagery play a distinctive part. This fantasy thinking may even take the form of invention of words for objects or situations which no one else understands. So, too, the whole habit of imaginatively playing the role of real or imagined persons which we discussed in the previous chapter falls into this same category of experiences.

In contrast to fantasy, the child acquires the names of actual objects and situations, and by their internalization learns to manipulate them with reference to objective cause-and-effect relations. For instance, the overt habits of bodily care, of contact with others, of manipulating toys and other implements or tools, are increasingly qualified by effective use of logical thinking, not, of course, in the form of a syllogism, but in the sense of realizing actual causal association of events and words. The child, in the words of Freud, is increasingly made aware of the "principle of reality" outside himself. The whole matter is neatly illustrated in the graded series of items included in various tests of intelligence. Begin-

ning with such matters as eye movements, hand-eye co-ordinations, simple perceptions of differences in form or color, with numbering or counting objects, they proceed to demands for recognition of similarities, to distinctive use of words to denote objects, relations, and qualities, and the whole paraphernalia of verbal judgment.

Gradually, of course, the child comes to distinguish between these two forms of thought, in a practical way at least. He learns that many wants are not entirely ratified by fantasy. On the other hand, ridicule of a desire or an act may drive the child toward such fantastic elaboration of his own private world that he may lose the usual contact with others. In the more extreme instance of schizophrenia the patient's daydream world replaces rather completely the world built up by customary interaction with other people. (See Chapters XXVII and XXVIII.)

Forms of thought and communication. The child's self develops as his communication increasingly takes on an objective reference to others. Such growth is linked closely with the rise of logical thought and external reference in verbal expression. At the outset of his development the child's striving is directed organically toward securing some sort of working relation with the world of his fellows and with the material objects that surround him. In his early years the child has not developed very fully the capacity to imagine himself in the other person's behavior system. Only gradually does he come to take the position of "the other" (to use G. H. Mead's term) in conversation. It is not that the speech reactions are not from the outset socially conditioned by contacts with other persons; it is rather that the forms of thought and verbal expression only gradually acquire this "other" reference as a phase of the self.

From his investigations of Swiss children Piaget (1926) has shown (at least for his particular sample) that during the first seven years or so the child's language is directed by self-expressive, egocentric interests and not by a desire to place himself in the position of the person to whom he is talking. In one research project Piaget recorded the language of two boys over a considerable period of time. Forty-seven per cent of one child's spontaneous conversation was distinctly egocentric; for the other the percentage was 43 per cent. It is only after the age of seven that genuine social collaboration in thought, through "true" conversation, begins to dominate. This applies to conversation among children under this age, as well as between children and adults. Words spoken are not used from the point of view of the person addressed, but only from that of the speaker. In developing what Piaget called "socialized" communication—that is, objective conversation which takes the point of view of the other into account—children at the outset show more interest in mechanical, nonpersonal objects than in matters of human behavior itself. For example, it was found that their stories about mechanical matters were more objective or socialized than those about persons. Apparently the egocentrism of conversation disappears in relation to material, mechanical situations before it does in situations involving persons and their conduct. This fact may have some bearing on the development of

thought in relation to material and social objects. Certainly it is evident that even among adults there is a great deal of conversation which is not truly effective, not built out of an interest in understanding the addressee, but largely concerned with expression of egocentric beliefs and attitudes.

Other researches confirm the general thesis of Piaget. Thus M. E. Smith writes (1926, p. 21) of the young child's speech:

"In the strictest use of the word, very little of the younger children's talk is conversation. It rather approaches monologue, being a running commentary on the child's own actions, as in the case of Boy 30, aged two years, eleven months: 'I am making cake. . . . I'm going. No, I got. I got. My finger can get in. Just fell. I make something out of sand. Some splashed out,' or, as an expression of his desires, when the same child goes on, 'Let me pat. I want some more blocks. Can I have that track? Won't go. That's enough. I want some. I want some more. I want vinegar jar.'"

It might better be said that these remarks are self-assertive rather than egocentric. (See Rugg, Krueger, and Sondergaard, 1929; and Vygotsky and Luria, 1929.) Yet Piaget's essential point remains sound, namely, that the child does not develop his truly socialized speech until he has also learned, as G. H. Mead would say, to play the role of another person. In fact, role-taking in games and in other social situations parallels the speech reactions themselves. Thus, as the child becomes socialized in his contacts with others, he develops a more objective thought and speech. Yet self-centered fantasy thinking and talking do not disappear. Day-dreaming often continues. But more important is the fact that such forms of thought themselves become in time tied into the culture of the particular time and place.

Logic and fantasy in culture. In one form or another both logical and fantasy thinking and the language associated with them find a place in the culture of every society. The use of either or both of these kinds of thought rests fundamentally upon consensus. We must not imagine that it is only scientific thought which is accepted in our own society. Taking our own society as a point of reference, in fact, we may construct a scale ranging from highly culturized objectified thought to that which is of highly individualized and noncommunicative dereistic sort. At one end we would have logic and material science and at the other extreme the fantasies of the psychopaths locked up in our mental hospitals. Between these extremes we would find all the forms of thinking, both logical and illogical.

Thus, as we move down the scale of thought forms from the objective natural sciences toward the fantastic, we find that the social sciences possess much more of the undisciplined fantasy of everyday life than the former largely because workers in these fields have not been able to

develop adequate methods or to free themselves from the illogical ideologies furnished them by their own folkways. Likewise, in the field of empirical knowledge there is a mixture of both forms. So, too, in the world of art—notably in literature, music, sculpture, and painting—we find a highly culturized set of standards which involve both forms of thought. Moreover, at the growing end of art, such as present-day surrealism and the writings of James Joyce and Gertrude Stein, there are productions which most people in the Western world would doubtless look upon as unintelligible nonsense definitely on the "lunatic fringe." So, too, while certain religious patterns are considered sound because of wide acceptance, other religious expressions would be considered distinctly autistic. From these latter kinds of fantasy it is but a step to the extremes of highly individualized productions of the psychopaths themselves. (For a discussion of the range of forms of thought see K. Young, 1930, 1931; and Sheldon, 1932; on art, see Prinzhorn, 1923.)

The whole matter may be summarized in the following fashion:

Logical thought in natural sciences	Logic of social sciences	Everyday empirical knowledge	Thought about political and economic matters: stereotypes, myths, and legends	Artistic and religious thought	Private fantasies of normal people	Fantasies of psychopaths
HIGHLY CULTURIZED			NONCULTURIZED OR PRIVATE			

In our own society—as in others—the young child is exposed to a wide range of thought forms, from objective to dereistic, which will predetermine for him in large part his conceptions of the world he lives in. And it must not be forgotten that fantasy as well as logical thinking has a highly important place in the creative advances of both science and art. It is only for purposes of discussion that the two forms of thought are treated as rather distinctive processes. Actually one form merges easily into the other, and there is in creative thinking a constant interplay of both. (See H. Ellis, 1923; Burke, 1935.)

In logic, science, or art the very disciplining of mental associations implies a certain fixity and limitation to any production of contradictory or novel thought. Once we have delimited an object or event or a class of objects, events, attributes, or relations by a given concept, we have by that very act set bounds to further new associations of these with each other or with other objects or events. In fact, the logician and scientist well typifies what Veblen called "trained incapacity," that is, a mental set of the specialist which prevents him from making these new linkages. But in the process of free association or fantasy thinking old connections are broken and new ones may emerge. What appeared to be incongruous is now brought together. There is no better illustration of this, in fact, than in

the history of science itself, wherein the greatest advances have been made by those who dared to break with scientific tradition by means of new concepts and new experimentation.

We maintain, therefore, that fantasy thinking is as "natural" and "normal" as objective thinking. The importance of the former for the individual and for the group lies in its use and communicability. When fantasy becomes noncommunicative—that is, when it fails to carry directionality toward another—its possible function in interaction is thereby reduced. Thought and language thus lose their social and public character and exist only in the *private* world of inner conversation with oneself. In the extreme instance this way in time leads to rather complete isolation of the individual from his fellows. In contrast, when fantasies are turned outward toward the fields of mechanical or other invention, toward art, religion, or philosophy, by that very fact they become a part of the stream of interaction and culturized meanings that may be shared by others.

NONLINGUISTIC AND OTHER "EXPRESSIVE" FORMS OF COMMUNICATION

Not unrelated to fantasy thinking in character and implication are a large number of vocal reactions and overt bodily gestures which in and of themselves influence interaction and meaning. Truly not only words and sentences serve to convey meanings, but pitch, tone, rhythm, and other features of the voice do the same. Certainly domestic animals respond to caressing tones or harsh commands, not in terms of human understanding, but as a part of their conditioned reactions to vocal gestures. In much the same manner very young children, long before they learn to talk, react to tones and cadences of the voices of persons around them just as they, in turn, acquire variations in vocal reactions as a means of controlling others. Pleasant sounds associated with caressing and harsh tones linked to commands provide a basis for their interpretation, that is, anticipation, of the oncoming responses of others. However, as Major (1906, p. 286) well put it:

"If a child were accustomed to hearing soft words and being beaten at the same time, such words would come to arouse fear and trembling. If, on the other hand, gentle and caressing treatment were associated in the experience of the child with harsh sounds, the latter would soon come to be soothing and quieting."

In more mature human communication such strictly nonlanguage vocal activities are also of great significance. As a popular remark has it, "It is not so much what you say, as how you say it that counts." Meanings arise therefore not only from the words we hear but from these vocal gestures.

Possible natural symbolism in sounds. Sapir (1929) pointed out that sounds in and of themselves may induce or suggest certain symbolic meanings. The vowels *o* and *u*, for example, are said to be "heavier" or "gloomier" or "more ponderous" than *i* and *e*, and high-pitched *ee* is said to strike a hearer as "thin" or "sharp." In one experiment along this line Newman (1933) gave a series of nonsense words, arbitrarily given meanings involving size, and secured judgments as to which word denoted "larger" or "smaller." Thus *glupa* and *glopa* were given the meaning "horse," and most of the subjects, on being asked which word of the pair "signified to them the larger . . . horse," tended to select the latter, *glopa*. The longer vowel sound seemed "larger" to them than the short one. It is evident that such symbolic judgments are not produced by linguistic associations themselves. There is no correlation between culturally accepted meanings and the distribution of vocal sounds. Apparently mechanical factors such as "position of articulation, acoustic resonance-frequency, size of oral cavity, vocalic length, consonantal voicing, and phonetic structure" were basic determinants in the rise of meanings. Sounds as such do produce symbolic effects on us in spite of specific conditioning to the contrary. So, too, in the field of fantasy thinking the *Klang* association—that between sound and word—is very frequent. The proper name Strong gets associated with power in the child's mind, or Stohl with a tendency to thievery and the like. And this sort of association is common among schizophrenics. (See Wells, 1917, and K. Young, 1930.)

Some features of nonlinguistic vocalisms. In our reactions to people, in our judgment of their characteristics, and in other areas of interaction nuances of voice quality play a definite part. There is considerable pseudo science about the voice quality as a clue to personality traits just as there is a welter of hocus-pocus about judging character from facial form, handwriting, and the like. Yet one's reactions to and interpretations of another are influenced not only by facial, manual, and other bodily gestures, but by such vocal features as timbre, pitch, tone, rhythm, and pronunciation. Social-cultural training, of course, plays an important part in the use and meaning of these matters.

The quality or *timbre* of the voice doubtless rests upon constitutional make-up, but it may be modified by learning. Hence the fact that a man speaks in a gruff or coarse-grained voice does not mean that he is basically crude or rude. He may be merely reflecting his occupation or social class.

Another expressive feature of the voice is *intonation*, in which both individual and cultural variations have a part, as in English, where we raise the pitch of the voice at the end of such a sentence as "Is he coming?" But this is culturally, not naturally, determined for us. Each language, moreover, has its own "melody patterns," as Sapir (1927) calls them. Thus a Japanese talks in a monotonous voice because his speech

has been so developed; and we should not judge an Italian to be temperamental because his spoken language permits a wide gamut of tones. In fact, in many non-European languages a variety of meanings are conveyed by tone and accent rather than by inflectional changes in the words, or by tenses or moods, as in the Indo-European. For example, it is said that in Chinese one monosyllable may signify nine or ten different things, depending on the accent. (See Latif, 1934, pp. 84-85.)

Rhythm is also to be considered. In English our habit of accenting certain syllables and minimizing others is not due to the desire to be emphatic. It is just the standard conventional pattern. In other languages the rhythm may be quite different.

So, too, variations in *pronunciation* make for different effects upon the listener. A person may pronounce certain vowels or consonants with a distinctive timbre or in some peculiar manner, and we may imagine affectation. But we must know the social and cultural background on which his speech training is built before we can fairly attribute this to innate organic difference or personal idiosyncrasy. On the other hand, within certain cultural limits, people do vary in pronunciation, and the student of personality may find upon investigation that observed deviations mark certain traits or attitudes of nicety, of slipshodness, or of indifference with reference to a given social situation.

Aside from these items, matters such as *continuity* of speech and *style* of expression are important. As Sapir (1927) remarks, some individuals talk in broken "uneasy splashes of word groups," others in a more continuous fashion. So, too, *speed* of speaking and the manner in which words are put together are important. In all these, we must reckon with the cultural norms and the social situation as well as with possible individual variations. The soft-toned, slow-speaking Southerner or the rapid-fire Italian may quite mislead listeners who judge them, if probable cultural conditionings are not considered.

Students of speech are aware of these matters at the empirical level, and public speakers, preachers, actors, and lecturers, generally, develop their own standard patterns. Thus, a boy raised in a community dominated by the fiery emotionalism of a revivalistic denomination may judge the Oxford intonation of an Episcopal minister at his service not only as unpleasant but as hypocritical. So, too, most of us have come to expect bombastic words and sonorous tones from the political spellbinder, as we anticipate calm and impersonal words from a scientist presenting a formal research paper.

Some interesting aspects of the relation of speech to personality manifestations have been exposed by Newman and Mather (1938), who analyzed the variations in the spoken language of forty mental-hospital patients who had been diagnosed as falling into three categories of manic-depressive psychosis: depressed, manic, and marked by "states of dissatisfaction, self-pity, and gloom." (See Chapter XXVII on the general features of this psychosis.)

(1) The depressed patients were characterized by "laxity of articulatory movements," by a "sparing use of pitch and accent," by a "dead, listless" voice quality. Intonations tended to be stereotyped, and there was little variation or emphasis. The voice resonance was "pharyngeal and sometimes nasal." They spoke in an informal

and colloquial style with little effort at precision, and their sentences were "often loose and fragmentary in construction." Yet, as their condition improved, their speech changed, notably in matters of pitch and syntax.

(2) The manic patients, in contrast, were "'good' speakers," they enunciated well, there was no glottal rasping, and their speech was lively and marked by variability of pitch. Their sentences were "richly elaborated, and a variety of syntactic devices were used." With improvement their speech became more relaxed and normal, and their sentence structure more coherent and continuous than it was during the manic stage.

(3) For the group marked by gloom and self-pity, the articulatory movements were more vigorous, and pitch changes were notable and extended over a wide range. "In spite of the gloomy or complaining content of their speech, the use of pitch gave their voice a lively and even cheerful coloring." The patients responded quickly to questions, and their responses were varied in length, being neither long and rambling like those of the manics, nor consistently brief as with the depressed. Yet in resonance they resembled the latter, especially in the rasping quality, and their phrases were colloquial and informal. They lacked the exhibitionism of the speech response of the manics.

Although this investigation was limited in its sample and technique, it is highly suggestive. No doubt such matters as pitch, tempo, resonance, sentence structure, and word usage not only influence communicability with others, but reflect variations in personality make-up itself, which in turn is dependent upon both constitutional and social-cultural factors. And under emotional stress these patterns themselves may be sharply modified.

Judging people by voice. Vocal configuration as such is definitely a factor in the estimation of personal traits, as both common sense and experimentation have shown. (See Pear, 1931.)

In one study G. W. Allport and Cantril (1934) gave ten tests of ability to 600 students in order to discover their ability to estimate the personality traits of various speakers heard over the radio or a loudspeaker system. The voices were to be matched with certain "outer" and "inner" traits of the unseen speakers and with summary sketches of their "total" personality. The least successful judgments were made on such items as handwriting, complexion, and height. Rather better matchings were made with age and photographs; still better were judgments of occupation, political viewpoint, extroversion, ascendance-submission patterns, and the Spranger list of dominant life interests or values. But the most successful matchings were those with the over-all sketches themselves.

Everyday experience with radio speakers indicates that people do form judgments of personal traits of those they hear, although actually most of us get some additional clues by seeing photographs, newspaper stories, and the like about these speakers. But it is significant that without these aids people make fairly accurate estimates of the personal characteristics of people whom they hear but cannot see.

Dusenbury and Knower (1939) had a number of speakers express various selected moods or feeling-emotional states by merely sounding vowels or consonants (from A to K). These were recorded on phonograph records and played back to a large number of student subjects (388 in the main sample). Although there were consid-

erable variation and overlapping, on the whole the judgments agreed remarkably well with the intended expressive mood of the speakers. The order of the percentage of correct judgments, ranging from 91 per cent as the most accurate to 73 as the least, was as follows: determination, doubt, sneering, sadness, amazement, pity, fear, awe, laughter, anger, and torture. Women judges did slightly better than the men, a result which illustrates a frequent common-sense judgment that women, in contrast to men, tend to pay more attention to clues in personality of just this sort: voice, facial expression, manual gestures, and the like. (It is perhaps just such differences that give rise to the notion that women are more "intuitive" than men.)

Manual, facial, and other bodily gestures. Not only do vocalisms qualify interaction as well as indicate personality features, but manual, facial, and other bodily gestures influence communication and likewise reveal traits of the individual. Certain writers have drawn a rather sharp distinction between vocal and other gestures which they refer to as "expressive movements" and those responses which they term "adaptive." Thus Shaffer (1936) discusses the former muscular movements as non-adaptive and largely ineffectual in personality adjustment. Stagner (1937) takes much the same position. Although he considers the "expressive movements" as nonadaptive in a strict sense, G. W. Allport (1937a) recognizes them as revelatory of fundamental personal traits. From my point of view no such sharp dichotomy should be drawn. So-called "expressive movements" may not always contribute directly to overt adaptation, but they do reveal important personality characteristics and are certainly important at the communicative level of interaction. Surely, if one employs a facial grimace or a manual gesture in conversation, it can scarcely be contended that the reaction of the other person—verbal or otherwise—may not be influenced by it. Such movements not only affect social adaptation but furnish a foundation for characterization of others as possessing certain traits. In this sense, then, they certainly are adaptive.

As to the place of such gestures in communication and interpersonal adjustments, we have as yet few really adequate data, and the results of research on the significance of these muscular movements as indicators of personality traits have been highly inconclusive. This is due to a number of factors, especially (1) inadequate criteria as to what constitutes an emotion, mood, or trait; (2) lack of definite terms to characterize the same; (3) poor sampling and lack of proper experimental controls in the investigations; and (4) variation in standpoint, as illustrated by the theoretical divergences between those who would study these matters in terms of separate, discrete elements and those who emphasize general and "totality" features of personality. Then, too, in most of the early studies investigators used single photographs ("stills") to display particular traits or moods (more recently motion pictures have been employed). It would carry us beyond our present purpose to examine these studies at

any length, but some of the more suggestive investigations will be noted. (For data in this field, see Blake, 1933; G. W. Allport and Vernon, 1933; G. W. Allport, 1937a; and Murphy, Murphy, and Newcomb, 1937.)

Dusenbury and Knower (1938) used both "stills" and motion pictures to investigate the accuracy of judgments of facial expression designed to show selected moods or feeling-emotional states. Although there was considerable variability, on the whole they found a rather high degree of accuracy in the estimates. For their main sample who saw the motion pictures (388 students) the order of percentages of correct judgment, ranging from 100 per cent agreement as the most to 83 as the least accurate, was as follows: laughter, fear, awe, anger, sneering, pity, doubt, determination, sadness, and torture. In these judgments women were superior to men. The estimates made from the "stills" were less accurate than those from motion pictures.

Estes had 323 judges estimate the personality characteristics of fifteen male subjects as revealed in motion-picture records of certain activities, such as removing coat and shirt, playing games, building a house with cards, and holding a lighted match in one hand until it was entirely burned out. While he secured fairly satisfactory results, he did find that the accuracy of judgments varied with the judge, the subject, and the particular aspects of the personality to be estimated. To quote from him (1938, p. 235): "Judges who have strong interests in either the graphic arts or dramatics are more successful than those whose dominant interests are in the sciences and philosophy. Subjects who are introverted in the sense of having a liking and a capacity for contemplative observation and for the analysis and reconstruction of experience tend to be least accurately judged. Conspicuously well-judged traits are inhibition-impulsion, apathy-intensity, placidity-emotionality, and ascendance-submission."

This investigation confirms, as do some other studies, a common-sense view that individuals differ as to how much they reveal their traits by expressive movements, and that people vary considerably in their ability to form accurate judgments of others in these matters. Estes found, for example, that college professors operating on a self-consciously analytical and logical level—which reflects their own cultural training in science—were far less accurate in their estimates of personality traits of the subjects than were painters and persons with dramatic interests and stage experience. The latter apparently made little or no attempt at critical or reasoned analyses, but proceeded on a more impressionistic level. When asked about their technique of judging, some of them remarked: "I let myself go," or "I gave myself over to it." As will be indicated in Chapter XIII, it may be that in some phases of personality study such intuitive devices prove to be more accurate than highly rationalistic procedures.

Graphology, or the analysis of handwriting, has also been used to reveal certain traits. Downey (1923) in her will-temperament test used it as a means of uncovering the place of speed, adaptability, and resistance to interference, but her findings were not particularly valid or reliable. Klages (1932), a German psychologist, has attempted to support his theory that human personality represents a struggle of two life forces—*release* and *restriction*—by distinguishing between various features of handwriting. Especially important are differences in rhythm, harmony, and regularity. According to Klages the "principle" of "release" is demonstrated in such overt manifestations as speed, spaciousness, and irregularities; that of "bond" or restraint

by regularity, slowness, smallness, and like characteristics. (For a review of Klages's work, see G. W. Allport, 1937a; and Stein-Lewinson, 1938.)

G. W. Allport and Vernon (1933) carried on a series of investigations in this whole field, taking into account such items as verbal speed, drawing speed, rhythmic speed, overestimation of angles, length of stride, and areas covered by such things as total writing, blackboard figures, and foot movements. By correlating the results of their tests, they postulated three coherent, consistent, and general behavior forms: (1) *areal*, or the tendency to fill up space, whatever the movement and however made; (2) *emphasis*, or the tendency to stress certain phases of expression; and (3) *centrifugality*, or the tendency to outward rather than inward movement. Thus the nine measures of expansiveness of movement produced a "corrected" statistical correlation of internal consistency of .82. This means that, if a particular individual writes large, he will also *tend* to cover much space in drawing—whether with hand or foot—to overestimate angles, to walk with a long stride (in proportion to his height), and to use long strokes in checking a list of trait names about himself. In the same way there was found to be a certain consistency with reference to emphasis and in regard to inclinations to move "out" rather than "in," that is, to be outgoing rather than "indrawing" in movements.

These studies and others show that certain personality traits may be exposed through such movements, that there is a certain consistency and generality among them, and that, in turn, they may be indicative of deeper structural features of the entire personality. Other studies have used gait, facial gestures, and other bodily features as indicators of traits; but we can not review these here. (For material on gait, however, see Wolff, 1935; Kreezer and Glanville, 1937; and G. W. Allport, 1937a. On facial features, see F. H. Allport, 1924; E. Brunswik, 1934; and K. Dunlap, 1927.)

No one has uncovered the sources of these somewhat consistent clusters of features, but doubtless constitutional factors, such as strength of motor response, fatigue, organic injury, or special talent, have their part. So, too, personal-social conditioning, especially in the mother-child relations, may have a place. Finally, cultural training will also influence these responses. Not only vocal expression but manual, facial, and other gestures may in large part be predetermined for the individual by his society's anticipated or permissive patterns of reaction in this field of gesture. The stolid face of the Plains Indian or of the Scandinavian, like the expansive, mobile face of the Italian, is the result, in large part, of cultural conditioning.

G. W. Allport (1937a) links up his work on expressive movements with his wider theory of style, which, he says, "is the most complex and most complete form of expressive behavior," and "concerns the whole of activity." Style is but another name of individuality and uniqueness, and it reaches into verbal, artistic, and everyday overt behavior. Into its development go drives, temperamental and emotional qualities, motor skills, intellectual abilities, and all the other factors which make up the total personality.

For the most part we have only descriptive analysis of such gestures and certain statistical correlations among them and between them and other judgments of traits. So far we know little of the probable cause-and-effect relations between these bodily movements and other features of the personality. Thus we do not yet know the probable developmental

relation between expansive, centrifugal movements, long stride in walking, large handwriting, and the outgoing, extroverted personality, nor, per contra, the probable relation between narrow, confined gestures, small, cramped handwriting, other centripetal features, and the inward, introverted type of individual.

Some analysis has been made of certain of the dynamic relationships in the field of apparently meaningless muscular movements. Krout's papers (1931, 1935a, 1935b, 1937) report a rather exhaustive study of what he calls "autistic gestures," that is, dissociated, "vestigial," and "abstracted" responses "which are seemingly irrelevant" to the particular situation in which they occur. These may involve "appendicular organs"—arms, hands, fingers, legs, and feet—or such parts of the body as head, face, eyes, and torso. "Autistic gestures" are illustrated by scratching the ear, running hands through the hair, picking the nose, and the like. Krout has found that these movements arise, in large part, as a result of inner frustration or conflict and come to take on symbolic form as a substitute for verbal or other expression which might grow out of such inhibition. The gesture, in other words, serves as a release of certain tensions which characterize the blockage produced by conflicting impulses.

Thus, in summary, we may say that all these gestures, vocal, facial, manual, or otherwise, not only offer clues to traits and attitudes, but must be considered as behavioral backgrounds to a great deal of our conversational and overt interactions. But full scientific understanding of these remains a task for future research. For the present we can only note and describe them and recognize them as important aspects in the interplay of individuals.

LANGUAGE AND OVERT RESPONSE

Another interesting and practical problem concerns the possible relation of verbal reactions—subvocal or audible—to the acquirement or management of overt acts.

Language and motor skill. The practical implications of a possible correlation of language and motor habit are important. Thus, in a course in manual training, how valuable are the teacher's spoken instructions to the pupil regarding how to manipulate a particular tool? Or can one tell another how to play tennis, golf, baseball, or other games involving motor agility? Certainly it has long been assumed that verbal directions aid in the training of others, and there is some evidence to support this view from laboratory experiments.

One favorite method has been to use verbalization in various maze-learning situations. Thus Lambert and Ewert (1932) found that performance in blindfold tracing of a maze with a pencil is improved by verbalization of the memory patterns of the maze. The subject might

aid his progress through the maze by saying to himself: "Turn to the left, once to the right, twice to the left, double the distance, then goal."

The everyday application of this principle is apparent. Not only may a teacher tell a would-be golf player about his stance, grip, and so on, but the golf player in attempting to improve his stroke may talk to himself as a part of the total preparation for his swing. That is, he takes over the role of instructor and directs his own behavior from his inner forum of thought. The important matter apparently is that the skill can be broken up into units of movement that may be verbalized, and that the verbal directions may actually guide or lead the kinesthetic-tactile senses. Thus, even before a specific act is finished, the individual may say "better to the right" or "an upswing" in regard to the next act. Second, verbalization makes possible rehearsal in words between the various trials at the motor skill itself.

Esper (1935, p. 446) has pointed out that this is not a one-sided affair. He has shown that verbal learning itself is often improved by its association with some manual movement. For example, in one experiment the subjects were asked to recite verbally certain manual movements they had already learned rather thoroughly. Many of them did best when they indulged in incipient finger movements. (The manual skill had involved certain finger movements over an apparatus of keys to be pressed down.) On the other hand, some subjects apparently did not need or use this additional manual cue to the proper sequence of verbal recital. Frequently a combination of motor and verbal responses makes for efficiency in learning either motor or verbal skills. The limitations of using only verbal instruction with reference to motor performance is universally recognized. Mere listening to directions from others or talking to ourselves is no substitute for motor practice.

Another factor to note, however, is the evident absence of verbal cues in certain complex motor acts. Apparently in some types of activity verbalization is no great help. We all know painters, sculptors, or skilled manual laborers who cannot possibly verbalize their skills for themselves or others. So, too, there are some types of activity which do not easily acquire verbal labels. Certain of our feeling, emotional, and physiological or systemic reactions are of this sort. Many phases of our covert behavior in this sense are peculiarly private because they cannot be verbalized. The very nonsocial nature of much of our visceral and emotional activity is perhaps one reason why we do not communicate it. As a result, general and rather vague terms come to define much of our organic and emotional behavior. It is often of an avoidant, almost fantastic, character. One reason why verbal control is limited in this area of activity may be that the totality of such reactions cannot be easily broken down into specific units of response, as is evident in those activities which

involve the striped muscles. It is at this point, in fact, that much of the emotional toning of moral words comes into play. (See the final section.) Yet vocal instructions do play a part in the control of the sphincter muscles of elimination and other bodily processes. It may be that failure to verbalize many of our inner experiences depends on cultural inhibitions rather than upon any natural limitations.

In this connection one may note the highly probable function of verbalization in relation to emotional conflicts, especially those which develop around the physiological processes and the early unsocialized drives of the infant. Under the heavy taboos of society the individual not only tends to repress his overt reactions in these areas of behavior, but has little or no adequate language with which to deal with these experiences. One of the aims of the prolonged psychiatric interview is to aid the patient to construct a verbal framework with which to handle these conflicts and impulses. The very verbalization of his inner conflicts and of his vague yet powerful emotional tendencies enables the patient to specify and delimit them in a frame of reference which may be linked to his adult world of understanding and interaction. So, too, forgotten and painful memories are reverbalized in the full light of a social situation (between him and the physician), and a part of the "cure" may well consist in the patient's discovery that he may actually talk about these experiences not only to another but to himself as well. In other words, this raising of impulse and repressed memory to a linguistic level helps to reduce their free-floating emotionalized aspects and bring them within the orbit of socialized conduct.

Other relations of language and overt action. The very specificity of the word, especially as it relates to objective reference and directive thinking, furnishes a focus or center for discriminative action. In this sense it is superior to a vague, general motor and feeling set. The word not only labels the situation and acts as an inciter to action; it also becomes a precise surrogate for the goal and even for the consummatory response which might complete the cycle of activity the word helps to set up.

The matter is well illustrated in English usage in matters of case, tense, mode, number, and voice. Thus a sentence in the indicative mode is one in which an affirmation is made concerning some person, place, thing, or idea—in other words, an assertion of some fact or supposed fact in the pattern of external reality. The imperative mode expresses a command, exhortation, request, or imprecation designed to govern the action of other persons. The subjunctive mode is used primarily to represent some phase of external action as doubtful, some condition as contrary to fact or uncertain, as desirable, supposable, or conditional. The potential mode is used to express possibility, permissibility, compulsion, or obligation. Again, in accordance with their general purposes, sentences

may be classified as declarative, interrogative, imperative, or exclamatory. A declarative sentence is one in which a fact or opinion is stated directly as such. An interrogative sentence asks a question; it furnishes the foundation upon which future language and action may be based. And, finally, the exclamatory sentence expresses an emotional state of anger, fear, love, sorrow, surprise, or other strong feeling. A verb in the active voice asserts that the thing or person represented by the grammatical subject of its clause is or does something. The passive voice asserts that something is done to the thing or person represented by the subject. Grammatical tense indicates the time of occurrence of the activity represented in the verb.

These grammatical forms, of which most people are not fully aware when speaking or writing, belong, of course, to our own particular linguistic culture patterns. But they have in turn grown up or been borrowed from other societies to fit the particular needs of human communication; they help define situations and one's role therein, they determine the directionality of thought or conduct, and they otherwise aid the person in his verbal and overt interaction with others.

INTEGRATIVE AND DISSOCIATIVE ASPECTS OF THE SELF

While in one sense we may and do have, as William James (1890) put it, as many selves as there are persons who recognize us and carry an image of us in their minds, this does not mean that we are constantly forming and re-forming the fundamental structure and function of the personality. There do arise from the earliest period of development certain consistencies and regularities of behavior. These depend, moreover, upon the nature of the organism—its integrative processes—and upon the recurrences found in somewhat similar situations. It is thus that we shift from specific roles to generalized ones. Yet, in contrast, there are many situations which diverge rather markedly from others, and in order to adapt ourselves to them at all successfully we must acquire capacity for differentiation and selection among stimuli and responses. In short, we have certain stimulus-response systems that tend to be similar and others that differ rather sharply as we face divergent situations. In this way, then, different selves emerge, geared to varying social configurations. The whole matter may be stated in terms of integrative functions on the one hand, and of dissociative functions on the other.

Integration refers to a co-ordination or working together of a variety of roles with their attendant habits, attitudes, and ideas. The more rudimentary responses at the infantile level are largely of this character, but they are related obviously to primary motivations of hunger, thirst, bodily elimination, sleep, and the like. They represent biologically pretty much what, following Irwin, we have called *mass activity*. At the level

of self-organization—which is our present concern—integration consists in the centering or focusing of the varied roles around some dominant goal or core of activity. It represents a process of generalization of widely varied experiences. The moral man, the good citizen, the good Christian are concepts of such integrated activity.

In contrast, *dissociation* is but another name for the segmental behavior linked up with the variation in our motives and in the situations to which we must adapt ourselves. At the biological level of behavior mass activity gives way in time to differentiated responses connected with divergent motivations, on the one hand, and with differing situations, on the other. In fact, in the earliest adaptive situations we learn a large number of segmental activities which may be carried on parallel with others once they become habitual. Thus walking, maintaining our bodily balance, and many other activities may be carried on while we do something else, such as read, converse, or indulge in thought. Both integrated and dissociated activities are perfectly normal and natural. Both are necessary to efficient adaptation.

Multiple selves. The matter of divergent selves is strikingly demonstrated by an examination of cases of dual or multiple personality which may be described and analyzed in terms of the concept of the self as we have treated it. A dissociated or split personality is an excellent illustration of the segmental functions just noted, carried, of course, to extreme and nonadjustive lengths. Thus one self, say X, may be composed of roles built out of attitudes, ideas, and habits related to one sphere of interests and social situations. A contrasting or contradictory self, Y, may be built up from opposite attitudes, ideas, and habits developed either in overt interaction or in the realm of imagination, in another world of interest and situations. Unfortunately the data on multiple personalities consist almost entirely of descriptions of ideas and behavior manifest during various periods of marked dissociation. There is little material on the background or historical factors in the lives of these persons which would enable one to trace the links in the chain of events leading to the sharp division noted in these pathological individuals.

For example, Miss Beauchamp, described by Prince (1905), developed, in addition to her normal self, three other distinct "personalities" or selves, each operating more or less autonomously. These four selves kept house, as it were, within the same physical body, and yet their ideas, attitudes, and acts were often sharply at variance.

Not only were the habits, attitudes, and ideas of these various selves of Miss Beauchamp rather separate and distinct, but the variations were expressed in speech and conduct reactions as one might suspect. Thus at one time an impish, overactive, but childish "Sally" would be in control; at another a prim, shy, and moralistic puritan, and so on. Only after prolonged treatment did *one* self come into dominance again. (See Chapter XXVII for a more extended discussion of this case.)

Another instance of sharply divergent self-organization, though, strictly speaking, not of a dual personality in the usual sense, is that of Mrs. John Curran of St. Louis, Missouri, who, under the name of Patience Worth, turned out over 1500 poems and several novels, some of which became well-known. (See Cory, 1919.) Mrs. Curran, with no intimation of what was coming, would fall into a trance and begin automatic writing. Sometimes she would turn out as much as 5000 words in one evening. She had absolutely no conscious control over what she wrote. No two of her longer products were in the same literary style; some were in old English, others decidedly modern in form and content. There was no revision of what she wrote. She had no formal education beyond grammar school. Her general reading was meager and desultory. She had, however, a high general intelligence. She was never able to offer any rational explanation of her literary work, and considered it as due to a disembodied spirit that communicated through her—a neat illustration of a culturally determined rationalization.

There are numerous other instances not unlike those of Miss Beauchamp and Patience Worth. It is not our purpose to try to unravel these cases, but the extreme dissociation thus revealed must be considered as falling within the general framework of self-organization in terms of interaction. While normal individuals often show a wide range of differing roles or selves, these tend to be bound together—though perhaps somewhat loosely—by certain basic centers of activity. In contrast, pathological dissociation occurs when a segmented organization of roles—that is, separately co-ordinated ideas, habits, and attitudes—comes to dominate the organism. As G. H. Mead (1934, p. 143) puts it, dissociation “is a process of setting up two sorts of communication which separate the behavior of the individual.” The varied selves may alternate in their dominance in short-time cycles or may actually control conduct for long periods. But in any case the study of multiple personality throws a significant light on various aspects of Mead’s theory of the self. It is clear that dissociation is linked to the processes of memory and forgetting, and G. H. Mead, like William James, emphasized time and again the high importance of memory as fundamental to the continuity and consistency of role-taking. Yet the organization of these various roles or selves does not depend alone upon overt interaction with one’s fellows alone. They may be built up in conscious imagination, and even more strikingly at an unconscious, nondeliberative level of internal activity. In other words, the whole development of separate or divergent roles or selves in normal or pathological persons rests upon the mechanism of inhibition and its attendant processes of differentiation and discrimination, and upon conscious and unconscious integration and dissociation.

The matter has important implications for normal personalities. Ordinarily we have a series of selves or roles—more or less integrated, perhaps, around some symbolic center or generalized role—which operate in varying social situations; but most of us doubtless have dozens of

other potential roles or selves which never become manifest in everyday life. With normal individuals, however, these submerged selves may appear under grave crises, under alcoholic or other narcotic stimulation, in dreams, and in daydreams. But, as William James (1890) charmingly put it, most of us would like to be a whole series of selves: a *bon vivant* and a lady-killer as well as a philosopher, a philanthropist, and a money-maker, or a great warrior or a "tone poet." Though such different characters may be *possible*, they are from a practical point of view impossible of attainment, and most of us go through life tethered more or less closely to a small range of varying selves—linked as they are to the fundamental group situations and basic values.

While distinctive and separate roles develop from the division of labor and the large number of special-interest groups in which we must participate in the modern world, there remains the basic problem of how these may become co-ordinated. Certainly the integration of these into a common and somewhat consistent pattern is one of the major problems not only of ethical training, but of successful adaptation to the social world on all fronts. In the past, civic or religious ideals (or a combination of the two) have often served as the focus of such co-ordination. We shall return later to some further consideration of this problem in the light of contemporary life. (See Chapters XXIX and XXX.)

THE SELF, SOCIAL ORGANIZATION, AND SOCIAL CONTROL

In Chapter VII we reviewed the main features of the structure or organization of certain basic human relations, particularly the features of primary and of secondary groups, and the ambivalent habits and attitudes built up around in-group and out-group contacts. At this point we shall discuss the place of the self and of language in these relations.

Primary and secondary groups and the self. As we know, the self arises in the primary contacts of the child with the mother and other members of the family. In the process of assuming first one role and then another—the basis of self-development—language plays an important part. The child soon finds his behavior labeled for him by others with all sorts of words and associated nonlinguistic features and other gestures. And we have also described how the child in turn talks to himself as others have talked to him. Put otherwise, the words he learns are the symbols of his identification with various roles or me's that he acquires. Many of these roles also take on an imaginary character, and these are perhaps as important for self-development as are the more definite roles which are forced upon him in his daily round of contacts with the members of his family. Not only do the various me's or roles arise from these interactions, but the "I"—the actor—finds its first expression in primary groups. Beginning as we noted in the biological urges or needs of the

individual, the "I" becomes modified and qualified by the wide range of roles or me's which the child must acquire. That is, his dynamic motives or drives become socialized by the requirements laid down by the group configuration in which he operates. The child discovers, for instance, the importance of substitutive reactions as devices for satisfying his wishes or motives, and thus the "I" is changed or qualified from the rather violent and animalistic foundation from which it springs to one more in conformity with the social codes of his fellows.

Then, as the child moves out from the family and play group to the school and to clubs and still later to more formalized secondary groups, his roles or me's in turn become specialized and take on a segmental character not evident in the earlier years. All these particularized contacts are defined largely in linguistic terms. He acquires verbal characterizations of his roles from others, for example, as a "co-operative" member of a club, a "good" or "poor" student in school, a "skilled" machinist in a plant, an "accurate" or "trustworthy" bookkeeper in an office, or a "man about town," a religious "fanatic," or perhaps an "agitator" for political revolution. Not only is each of these specialized functions defined by certain words, but the entire range of activity associated with the role and status carries with it a specialized vocabulary necessary to communication with one's fellow members and with persons outside the group. Thus each vocational group, be it that of ditch-digger, bricklayer, or other laborer, of engineer, doctor, lawyer, teacher, or scientist, has not only its particular skills but its own jargon and its own terms to define its members' role and status.

In relation to each of these groups, the self takes on a particular organization or structure, and, as we noted above, if these varied structures stand in too sharp contrast or conflict with each other, the self may take on a split or divided character. In fact, with the wide range of groups to which one must adjust oneself in the modern industrial world there is often a decided loss of integration, a condition of *anomie*, which Emile Durkheim so well described. (See Mayo, 1933.)

The integration of the personality and the in-group versus out-group relations. The co-ordination of desires or tendencies—both native and acquired—within the person depends upon the nature of the group participation. In the early years the identification of the child with the parents and family situation is complete. As he grows up, he identifies himself with his fellows in the various groups to which he belongs. But, as his group contacts reach outward, the intensity of the participation may decrease. The identification in the family circle is intimate and deeply emotional. The identification of the member with an international scientific association may be highly impersonal, intellectual, and only slightly emotional, except perhaps as the membership enhances the ego.

There is a kind of scale of identification from a deep and abiding sort with one's mother and father, or, as an adult, with one's mate and one's children, on through the various primary and secondary groups to those ill-defined publics or crowds of which we may be but temporary members. Moreover, in secondary groups our identification is likely to be segmental and largely to group symbols rather than to persons.

As we know, such identification covers but half of the process of integration. Man is not only filled with love, sympathy, and friendly reactions of approach and co-operation; he is also filled with hatred, dislike, and antagonistic reactions of withdrawal, or of competition and conflict. The ideas, attitudes, and habits built up toward the others-group are important. Personality integration is accomplished by the interplay of these two sets of opposite patterns, such as love and hate, like and dislike, sympathy and disgust, approach and withdrawal, co-operation and competition or conflict. These dual patterns run throughout the social order at many points. They are reflected in culture because they exist in man and in his reactions with his fellows. For example, as he grows up, he learns from his mother, father, siblings, playmates, neighbors, and others in his primary contacts a whole set of attitudes and ideas about his own particular groups as set off against other persons and groups who are not acceptable, toward whom the expected attitudes are those of avoidance, distrust, and even fear and hatred. Out of specific roles or me's which he acquires at home, in play, and elsewhere, he learns, for example, to keep away from the children on the other side of the tracks, or he believes that Catholics or Jews are not to be trusted by little Protestant boys and girls, or that Negroes are inferior to whites. And along with these negative ideas and attitudes—in fact ambivalent to them—he learns the superiority of his own groups: family, play group, neighborhood, and community.

Not only does the child learn specific roles in relation to particular out-groups and in-groups, but there often arises a "generalized other" centered in a series of in-groups to which he belongs: his own family, his neighborhood, his social-economic class, and his own nation. In contrast, there is a negative or ambivalent generalization of experience toward the outsider, the members and the symbols of a series of out-groups: families of lower social class, other classes themselves, and other nations and races. That is, in one's family there are certain symbols of identification, like the family name, of expectation, such as what one is supposed to do in certain circumstances, and so on. In similar manner in every in-group to which we belong there are symbols of identification in the name, in the ideals and myths of the group, and in the expectations and demands regarding the future. So, too, in the nation we have the name, the flag, the map, the national anthem, the insignia of office, and the like.

In short, the whole mechanism of generalizing our experience into larger and integrated self patterns is linked up with the ambivalent nature of group identifications. Some persons remain integrated and generalized in experience at the level of their family, others at that of a particular religious body or social class. In an era of strong nationalism most persons do not go beyond the symbols of their own country, and the rise of a generalized other respecting international relations lies largely in the future. (See G. H. Mead, 1934.) It may well be that the high degree of integration which one develops at any one of these group levels is dependent in part on the existence of strong counteracting habits and attitudes toward out-groups.

The point is that the word is the symbol for the feeling of solidarity, of belonging to the in-group or of not belonging to an out-group. Words define one's status and role; they define the broad limits of moral conduct; they are the media of communication of the whole vast range of folkways, of securing our living, and of making an adaptation to our world.

Social control and the self. An important phase of this adaptation to the world of our fellows is couched in the concept of social control. What does this expression mean? In a broad sense control implies the fact that a stimulus fixes or delimits the response. But there are limitations to this in terms of the previous learning of the recipient of the stimulus. Unless such previous experience furnishes the foundation for a reception of the stimulus and consequent response as anticipated by the stimulator, control in the sense of our broad definition is not forthcoming.

For children as well as adults both the specific word and the purely vocal gesture play a part in regulating others. That language is basic to the control of other persons in the social situation should be evident from much of our previous discussion. The vocal gesture and the word indicate an oncoming act and hence tend to bring the recipient of the verbal utterance under control by setting up in him, an expected or incipient action.

But the term *social control* is usually employed in the social sciences in the narrower sense of moral and legal control, that is, direction and delimitation of responses that are defined within the mores and the accepted law. From this standpoint social or moral control may be defined as a form of stimulus directed toward modifying or inhibiting the behavior of others of the same group or society for the welfare and continuity of the group or society, and any act of an individual may come to be defined within the framework of social control. It is evident, moreover, that such control relates to moralization and that, in turn, moralization is but a special phase of the larger and all-inclusive process of socialization with which we have been dealing.

One of the major features of culture is the vast body of institutionalized regulations which are set up. These may take the form of overt coercive devices or of symbolic ones, chiefly in verbal form. One of the basic problems before us is how to relate the outer forms of control, such as coercion, force, and violence, with the symbolic forms, especially words, and finally how control operates in the inner features of the person, that is, in relation to his attitudes and ideas. It has long been recognized that the most effective social control stems from the inner convictions of the individuals concerned. The special attention given to these matters through education and propaganda directed to children and youth in Russia, Italy, and Germany today is but a modern instance of a long-realized principle. Mere external control—the policeman-on-the-corner form—has limitations in effectiveness. The most efficient control arises when the individual wants to act in the prescribed way, when he knows, in fact, no alternatives.

Like all other social patterns, effective control mechanisms are built up through the role-taking process. In impulsive action, for instance, the self (both “me” and “I”) is not moralized. The individual acts in terms of the immediate wish and in terms of any role which may have been built up in connection with such impulsive responses in the past. But, as we take over the roles or me’s of others in terms of expected inhibition of some acts and the performance of others (acts which usually carry the approval of those around us), our acts come to be accepted as “right” and “proper.” In other words, the moral me arises. (See G. H. Mead, 1934.) Freud (1913, 1920) described this process in his early writings in terms of the “censor” and more recently in terms of the “super-ego.” The older philosophers treated this same matter pretty much in terms of “conscience,” but unfortunately the ancient but false belief still persists that the conscience is somehow an inborn sense of right and wrong. Our naturalistic view, of course, does not admit such a postulate. Rather we look upon the moral me or conscience as itself a product of social interaction as this is defined and controlled by group members.

We may trace the development of the moral me, then, in terms of the manner in which parents, teachers, pastors, judges, probation officers, club leaders, recreational directors, and any others define the situation for the child. These definitions of the situation represent the community or societal norms as to what is right, proper, and correct procedure. The moral me is conveyed to the child in terms of the role of being a “good boy” or a “good girl” or by a statement that little children “do not do these things.” Later this same sort of definition of role is stated in terms like “good citizen,” “brave and loyal soldier,” “good provider for the family,” and “true Christian.” And, as noted above, institutional forms provide a whole host of predetermined definitions of the situations in

which we sooner or later find ourselves. These symbolize in the personality an organization of attitudes both toward others and toward oneself, all with the view to controlling behavior in advance.

Though it is true that we begin with acts and not with thoughts, the aim of moral training is to reverse this process and by use of words and other symbols to define and hence control behavior in advance of the overt expression. Moral words serve to define the situation in advance and make solution by thought (or by impulsive act) unnecessary. The moral man knows what to do in most situations without giving thought to his acts. In other words, moralization is the habituation of certain roles that determine and control our otherwise impulsive "I." As G. H. Mead (1934, p. 210) put it, "Social control is the expression of the 'me' over against the expression of the 'I.'"

The most stable and predictable verbal definitions, of course, are found in logic and science, and, when our moral behavior touches situations of logical and objective character, the individual quickly learns to adapt himself to these definitions or fails in adjustment. That is, in matters of health, or with reference to material objects, the definitions are pretty clear-cut and not easily modified. So, too, in highly institutionalized situations, such as in business dealings or in the relations of employee and employer, the codes may be specific and thoroughly established. But in these latter institutionalized patterns fantasy and stereotyped thought have played a part. For instance, we define the conservative politician or businessman whom we do not like as "fascist," or, vice versa, the believer in the political and economic status quo defines those who would change the world as "communists," "socialists," "radicals," or "reds." We have already noted how the contacts of in-groups with out-groups are defined by terms of approval, on the one hand, and of opprobrium, on the other. "Nigger," "wop," and "Chink" are stereotyped words which define role and status. It is thus that culture canalizes emotionally toned words as definers of role and status. All such patterning tends, of course, to reduce variability of response and make for class distinctions and limitation of free-flowing interaction, as well as to set up the framework for the mores and the law.

If our purpose in moral training is to reverse the process from acts to thoughts and words, an important problem arises. What relation has knowledge of moral words and concepts to moral conduct? So far as child training is concerned, one may well ask whether we should load moral concepts on the child before and independently of the concrete situation which calls for moral definition or decision. In short, what is the relation of verbal moral training to subsequent moral conduct?

Moral knowledge and moral conduct. From the first year of life on, certainly from the outset of language acquirement, the child is increas-

ingly provided with words of moral and ethical meaning which are used to define situations for him. Long before he has faced the concrete moral choice, he is equipped with words which are believed to define such situations in advance. The moral ideas with their accompanying moral words are laid upon the child in the hope that he will thus be effectively prepared to face overt conduct problems later. Schwesinger (1926) in her study of the socioethical vocabulary of children has shown that such concepts, although associated with intelligence, are closely related to non-intellectual factors as well. Apparently such emotionalized values are often defined verbally in the home with little or no reference to concrete situations which call for them. Moreover, Hartshorne and May (1928, 1929, 1930) found for a large sample of American school children that moral concepts had only slight if any relation to their overt conduct, and also that moral behavior was highly specific to particular situations. Thus the same children might cheat in their school work under certain circumstances but not in others. (See Chapter XII for a discussion of this problem of specificity as over against generality.)

Nevertheless, though there is no complete correlation of the knowledge and use of moral words with overt action, no one doubts that the two are linked together. The real problem concerns the possible value or use of moral words as guides to specific moral conduct, just as verbal instructions may be an aid in acquiring many manual skills. As Esper (1935, pp. 448-449) well says, however, the use of words in training for moral conduct—in contrast to manual acts which may be broken down into simple specific units that may be *named*—is limited because we are not yet able to break down moral behavior into sufficiently concrete specific units of activity to which we can give specific names. There is no such link between verbal terms and specific acts. We have rather a host of vague general terms with a great deal of emotional and even fantasy quality. It would be an interesting exercise to attempt to reduce these wide general concepts to smaller units and at the same time to demotionalize many of the current moral words and then try to make verbal foretraining effective in the field of moral conduct. Rather than do this, most societies ensure moral conduct by means of maxims, slogans, commandments, and other verbal instruments of broad but vague denotation. Hence the basic problem remains unanswered: how well moral words learned before the child meets a concrete moral situation will aid him in directing his conduct when it does arise.

Moral views and moral action. A person has but to open his eyes and ears to realize that adult professions of morality do not correspond any too closely with moral actions. What men say, what they profess, is often at considerable variance with what they do. Verbal reactions seldom have to correlate perfectly with overt reaction, except in exact science and its

applications. Vocal adherence to moral codes will satisfy hundreds of situations where overt conduct is not demanded. Talk bulks so large in our world of interaction that it is little wonder that verbal acceptance of morality so often satisfies us. Formal ethics, of course, generally assumes that the most highly moral person is he "who means what he says" and acts on what he professes.

Yet an emotional strain may be set up within the personality by the divergence between profession and practice. In a society like ours, where Christian morality has a difficult time of it to match with business practices, where the making of money outweighs most other considerations, the verbal code is often a matter of mouthing a ritual or phrase. The tolerance we show for the man who makes millions by dishonest stock manipulations, or by vice, gambling, and bootlegging, indicates that in American society, at least, the true moral code is rather different from that taught by official religion and morals, or from that found embodied in the law. (See Chapter VII on the ambivalence of our cultural patterns.)

In this whole matter rationalization plays its part. When our action does not fit the profession, we consciously and unconsciously find excuses for the divergence. Rationalizations usually come rather ready-made to us from our culture, and the simple mechanism of projection also lends its aid to lay the blame for our conduct on someone else, or on some phase of the situation. Thus the man in the street who has picked up the mythology of modern science may blame his conduct on his disordered glands, on his "unconscious mind," or perhaps on "heredity," itself a debasing and particularizing of the fundamental scientific doctrine of determinism.

Although moral codes differ in various societies, the strain between verbal concepts of morality and overt conduct is common everywhere. In closely knit religious communities with a simple economic order and direct primary-group controls one often found an amazingly high correlation between the moral culture norms and the daily conduct of the communicants. In a complex, highly diverse society like that in western Europe or America today, such integration of personality and social order is rare indeed.

The inner forum of thought in relation to verbal communication and to conduct. The fundamental matter, not only in regard to moral concepts and moral conduct, but as respects the whole relation of thought, verbalism, and conduct, may be stated in terms of how the forms of overt action get into the inner life and how in turn these latter influence future acts. Although, genetically, acts precede thought, the problem not only of moral training but of all education—in the broadest sense—is bound up with the manner in which this basic process is reversed, so

that thoughts and words may anticipate and hence influence oncoming overt action. As G. H. Mead said (1934, p. 141), "Thinking becomes preparatory to social action." We have already pointed out how the inner life, as it emerges from the world of primary sensations, feelings, and emotions, becomes a subjective forum which reflects—in part at least—the interactional world outside. It represents covert interaction taking place at the level of symbols, feelings, and emotions within us. But, if we are to secure adequate control, the symbolic and ideational aspects must become dominant over the more elemental feelings and emotions. And, if this internal interplay is symbolic, it is also necessarily largely verbal. That is, control takes place by our talking to ourselves as others would. We learn from talking to others and from our own previous self-talking that overt responses (in terms of the reactions of others) lead to particular results. These relations of our motives and ideas to social consequences get generalized in time into the concepts of *rights* and *duties*. Our rights are bound up at every point with certain duties to others, and represent a generalization of certain roles learned in the course of experience.

Now, from the standpoint of the function of the inner forum, we may well ask: Can we ever entirely *pre-view* overt events in advance? Or, more cautiously stated, how far are we able to predict such actions by "taking thought," as the Biblical phrase has it? The tremendous contribution of the natural sciences in the control of the material world has demonstrated that logic and experimentation—so intimately bound up with the directive, objective thought processes—provide us with the tools for a high degree of prediction in regard to the physical forces around us. When we turn to human and social conduct, however, the outlook at present is none too bright. In this region emotionalized fantasy and wishful thinking play a large part. We need both a logic and method of investigation and a full recognition of the mechanics of interaction at both verbal and overt levels. (See Chapter XI.) Yet common-sense observation indicates certain important implications for control in the following example: In one's talking to others (or even to oneself at the level of the inner forum) one's anticipated responses, in terms of others, give a clue to what the others will say or do. But, if the other does not actually do or say as one anticipated, the significance of one's own thought or speech disappears. Thus the highly impulsive man or the psychopathic patient is one whose behavior we cannot in this way anticipate, that is, *predict*. Or the failure of another to have the same sort of moral concepts and moral habit patterns as our own may lead us to misanticipate what he will actually say or do. For example, the overt conflicts between laborers on strike and their employers, or the differences between nations, arise because they do not possess any common and shared experi-

ences—verbal and overt—which will enable them properly to anticipate each other's responses. Communication therefore is reduced to an elemental level of emotionalized name-calling, accusations, and counter-accusations. Out of this sort of communication, as a rule, arises not co-operation and pacific compromise but increased tension, leading in the end to violent and rudimentary interaction involving the use of force. The stresses built up between these contending groups cannot then be relieved by thought or verbal predefinition or prearrangement. They can be reduced or eliminated only by overt struggle for power and dominance.

We may state the matter somewhat differently by saying that the concrete situation which we have anticipated in thought may turn out to be different in actual—that is, overt—action itself. We say we have failed to anticipate correctly, failed to predict adequately the actual event. That is, in the total situation, the internal state of the participants has to be taken into account. Emotion, fatigue, and momentary stresses which neither side to a controversy expected may arise at the level of the concrete situation. And these matters may profoundly affect the overt conduct. In G. H. Mead's terms one may say that the "I" of the other fellow—one's opponent or enemy—is far more difficult to predict than the various "me's" of his which one may know about and hence anticipate. There remains, therefore, even in the situations where there is a fair degree of adequate expectation, a degree of uncertainty, an "unknown," which must always be reckoned with. Speaking practically, we may say that, in conflict situations, the longer we can inhibit overt action, especially if it tends to be violent, the more we may be able to prevent this unpredictability of the "I" of either contestant from wrecking the efforts at adjustment through communication. In person-to-person relations of the kind to be discussed later in this volume, and in the wider public relations which we shall not treat here, this problem is crucial. Hence in society every standardized—that is, institutional—technique designed to foster thought and verbal communication between contestants *previous* to overt action is useful and should be preserved. When these devices are lost, men in society quickly fall back to the level of overt interaction of a violent and morally disastrous sort.³

³ The implications of this for the survival of democracy and for pacific international relations will be apparent to anyone who gives the matter a little serious consideration.

Chapter XI

METHODS OF STUDYING THE PERSONALITY

IN ORDER to investigate adequately the pertinent and significant aspects of the personality, research workers have drawn chiefly upon experimental, statistical, and life-history methods. In fact, some of the confusion in this whole area of study arises from divergent methods now in use, and because personality is a topic of interest to a number of intellectual disciplines, particularly psychology, sociology, cultural anthropology, political science, education, social work, "old-line" psychiatry, and psychoanalysis. No attempt will be made here to review the vast literature on methods of describing and analyzing personality.¹ Rather we shall treat only certain of the more pertinent features of method as a means of aiding the student to understand some of the advantages and disadvantages of the various devices of investigation which have been developed in this field. And, since any serious consideration of method must be related to theory and to application, we shall begin with a short consideration of the interrelations of theory, scientific methodology, and practical use of scientific findings.

THEORY, SCIENCE, AND APPLICATION

There can be no science without a corresponding theory of the events which are to be studied by objective techniques. Moreover, sound theory backed by scientific results should, in turn, aid the practical man who is concerned with the task of assisting individuals to solve their personal problems.

The nature and function of theory. Some people look with disdain upon anything smacking of theory, for they consider it an inhibiting consideration in sound scientific work. Yet the overattention to logical method and the use of precision instruments in science have led many otherwise intelligent persons to neglect the fundamental importance of theory properly understood. We must never forget that some form of theory is bound up at every point with science and its application, just as it is with common-sense interpretations.

¹The student may with profit consult, among others, Thomas and Thomas (1928), Symonds (1931, 1934), Guilford (1936), G. W. Allport (1937a), Murphy, Murphy, and Newcomb (1937), Murray (1938), and the various reviews and bibliographies which appear from time to time in the *Psychological Bulletin*.

Theory consists of a set of concepts which enable us to classify, describe, and interpret events or data in an objective, systematic, logical, and consistent way. Sound theory helps men to bring some sort of order out of a wide range of data which they or others have examined, to get at deeper and more widely significant interpretations of the world in which they live. Moreover, theory aids us in setting up premises, postulates, and hypotheses to be tested empirically in the laboratory, by statistical devices, or in natural life situations. And in the two chapters to follow this one we shall review some of the contemporary theories of personality. Although the most highly developed language of science is that of mathematical logic, a great deal of worthy scientific material necessarily continues to be systematically stated in nonmathematical terms. For example, as we shall see, a theory that personality is a combination of given and determinable specific units or traits lends itself readily to analysis by certain statistical techniques. In contrast, Freud's theory of personality is obviously bound up with the particular type of life-history material which is revealed through psychoanalytic techniques. And those who interpret the personality largely in terms of interaction draw more heavily upon methods which would permit a study of person-to-person interplay in a given social situation or configuration. As we shall constantly insist, a particular theoretical frame of reference will qualify both the method and the findings of science. Theory, in short, implies a certain preconception of the data and their meaning, and science cannot proceed without such assumptions.

Science. The term *science* is often used in two senses. In one it refers to a given content or body of systematic and verifiable knowledge. Thus one may speak of physics, chemistry, biology, or psychology, thinking chiefly of the facts and laws in these fields which workers have collected and put together in valid form. In the other sense, science refers to a particular method employed in observing, describing, and analyzing events or data from nature. At present we are concerned principally with this second meaning.

Yet, as to method, science is too often thought to consist merely of external tools or devices for systematically investigating and treating events in such a way as to lead to generalizations or laws which, in turn, will enable us to predict and control like events. But actually this procedure of observation, classification, and analysis depends upon logical concepts or constructs which help to formulate premises, postulates, and hypotheses. And these constructs are derived from theories which aid us in dealing more objectively with our data than is possible from the use of common-sense notions. Constructs in science are illustrated by such terms as *energy* and *electrons* in physics, or by *drive*, *intelligence*, *trait*, and *type* in psychology. As Thurstone (1935) remarks, a construct is but a

"man-made invention" which helps us in comprehending a "certain class of natural phenomena."

Moreover, such comprehension depends upon a selection of events of a certain kind. Scientific technique does not consist in a wholesale collection of "facts" to be picked up like pebbles on a beach (Cook, 1931). The "facts of science"—the basic data—are always selected out of the total ongoing events of nature, and constructs but aid the worker to simplify and unify his materials. Hence the concepts with which he begins will determine in large part his results. Still, it would be a mistake to consider science as a mere extension of, or as furnishing data to illustrate, a theory and a set of constructs. Science accepts hypotheses tentatively and tries to secure new materials inductively, which data, in turn, provide a constant check on hypotheses and theoretical formulations. In short, the aim of science is to test old or to induce new hypotheses, generalizations, and theories—in other words, to expand the boundaries of verifiable knowledge.

With a set of constructs at hand certain hypotheses are set up with which to test the regularity or recurrence of events within the scientist's selected realm of interest. This may involve discovering their frequency, intensity, and relationship or co-occurrence with other events. In another way we may say that science deals with a particular section of a series or manifold of events taken always from the standpoint of a particular observer of these events. In studying personality scientifically, we have to do with the individual in an interactional relationship with other individuals. Thus we choose only those events which throw light on our particular subject, ignoring, as science always does, other features of the totality of events. Out of the controlled description and analysis of these events we try to develop generalizations. Then, following the tradition of science, we hope, on the basis of such generalizations, to be able to predict and hence to control behavior. But, when we consider prediction and control, we come close to the third major field of our interest, practice or application.

Application. Scientific knowledge, in the course of paying its debt to a society which makes science possible, should and does contribute to practical diagnosis and plans for modifying personality adaptation. Actually, in attempting any modification in adjustment, we often draw upon several special disciplines of science. We also depend upon our theory. We may even go beyond this and synthesize scientific findings and theory into various procedures of re-education or therapy. In this process what are called hunches or impressions or insight often come into play. In other words, when we come to practice or application, we are usually obliged to put the individual back into a wider range or totality of events than science itself covered, and, in doing this, we may go beyond scientific fact and generalization. The person applying theory and science

becomes a creative artist in human activity. He does not remain a mere objective observer; he may enter into the life of the other person, that is, identify himself with him; or he may project upon the other his own wishes or intuitions; or he may offer him rationalizations to aid him in his readjustment or better adaptation, first to his inner life and second to his fellow men. In other words, there tends to arise an *art* of handling people.

With this general standpoint in mind let us turn to discuss three basic methods of studying personality: the experimental, the statistical (especially as it involves ratings, tests, and schedules), and the life- or case-history technique. Only after these have been described shall we point out the advantages and limitations of each. The chapter will close with comments on the predictive value and application of these methods.

EXPERIMENTAL METHODS IN PERSONALITY STUDY

Ideally scientific experimentation involves the reduction of the number of variables to a minimum and then their complete control in the course of setting up and manipulating a series of events. The laboratory scientist really creates a miniature world of events each of which may be completely controlled, that is, recognized and modified at will. Thus the physicist or physical chemist rigidly selects a given element or force and observes it under conditions where each item may be altered one at a time, and the resulting movements in space, effects on other elements, or other change may be observed and measured in terms of carefully defined units, and recorded for subsequent treatment by mathematical logic and a particular theory of knowledge. Strictly speaking, the experimental method consists essentially in removing or in holding constant all but two or a few factors, X_1 , X_2 , . . . , and Y , and noting whether Y varies with X_1 , X_2 , . . . , and, if so, in what manner, or according to what "law." For instance, the volume of a gas, Y , varies as its temperature, X , varies, if its pressure, Z , is kept constant. In short, the experimental method consists in testing what happens to one element or event when the experimenter alters or controls the action or operation of others.

No such ideal conditions are possible in the human field, but some approximation to the method is found in those experiments which touch closely on physiological processes or which have to do with the simpler sensory or reflex data. However, in the history of psychology all the elaborate work done on sensory processes—visual, auditory, tactile, and so on—has contributed little or nothing to an understanding of human personality in action. Yet, as experimentation began to be applied to the higher mental powers—memory, association, judgment, and logical thinking—a great deal of material was accumulated which has been of aid in understanding the processes of learning, and such data have been

of some usefulness in understanding problems of personality. More important for us, however, have been those attempts at experimentation with motivations or incentives. Yet at the human level these are so complex, so affected by social and cultural factors, that strict experimentation—that is, the rigid control of all the variables—becomes almost impossible. Nevertheless, the laboratory situation has been used to uncover variations in the capacity of individuals to maintain a drive toward a given goal in the face of certain inhibiting circumstances. In fact, the use of the obstruction device is common in both animal and human psychology. The matter in outline is essentially this: given a drive, motive, or aspiration directed toward some goal, end, or level of achievement, the animal or individual is placed in a predetermined situation (control) so that he may be carefully observed as he moves from drive to attainment. (This is obviously but an application of well-known facts about cycles of activity. See Chapter IV.) But, as the subject moves from drive to consummation, various kinds of obstructions may be placed in his way. For example, hungry rats are put into a maze of complicated alleys through which they must thread their way in order to reach a food box or reward at the end. Blind alleys or electric grids or locked doors serve as hindrances to success. The strength of the drive is measured in terms of time needed to learn the correct pathway through the maze, or by the number of errors made, as measured by frequency of getting into blind alleys or onto the electric grids. In the study of human beings some modifications of this type of experimental device have been used, and at verbal levels many types of tests are essentially paper-and-pencil modifications of this same principle, as, for example, in Moore and Gilliland's test of aggressiveness (1921).

Other experimental studies with animals have been attempted in which competing stimuli have been used, say food and mating opportunities, with a view to discovering the relative strength of these drives. In the human field, however, studies of competing incentives have usually been made at a verbal or sublimated level where the various factors involved are difficult to control in the strictly experimental fashion. (For review of literature on conflicting motives, see May and Doob, 1937.) So, too, modified experimental methods have been used in child psychology; e. g., two young children of nursery-school age may be placed in a small room with but one toy between them. The aim is to observe and record the strength or extent of dominance as against submission by noting, from behind a one-way screen, the struggle of these children for possession of this one toy. If a number of children are matched serially in pairs, data may be accumulated which will furnish measures of the character and frequency of dominance or submission among a sample of children of given age and social status. (See Goodenough and Anderson 1931.) Such

methods of placing individuals in a moderately well-controlled situation and then observing and recording their behavior are essentially derived from the experimental techniques of the more exact sciences, but with human beings the number of factors involved is so very great that often the method is combined with the statistical. (See below.) Somewhat similar are the studies of Lewin and his coworkers (Lewin, Lippitt, and White, 1939; and Lippitt, 1939) in the field of leadership and dominance, wherein they observed behavior after placing groups of children in different situations, one of which permitted democratic, the other autocratic, controls. (See Chapter XII.)

Some of the most promising experimental work regarding personality is evident in the extension of physiological research—especially on the endocrines—to the sociopsychological field. There is a growing interest in trying to discover the interplay of physiological and psychological processes. (See Chapter XXVIII and references cited therein.)

Then, too, various research workers have employed what may be termed the *quasi-experimental* method. In this type of investigation children or adults are placed in more or less "natural" situations and then presented with certain predetermined stimuli, or tasks to be performed. Their subsequent behavior is then observed and recorded as carefully as possible. Here also the strict experimental technique is combined with the statistical, and the method has proved to be very appropriate in many instances. Thus studies along this line have been made in nursery schools in order to describe and analyze the presence or absence of nervous habits, or the occurrence of dominance, sympathy, submissiveness, friendliness, antagonism, and so on. (See, for example, Olson, 1929; Arrington, 1932; Thomas, Loomis, and Arrington, 1933; and L. B. Murphy, 1937.) Of similar character is the study of Newstetter (1938) of the conduct of groups of boys under conditions of a more or less deliberately controlled camp life, and of Moreno (1934) in his investigations of friendliness and congeniality or avoidance and antagonism among selected samples of children and adults. Moreno (1937, 1939, 1940a, 1940b) has also used dramatization of symptoms under controlled conditions as a research and therapeutic device.

Finally there is a type of investigation in which groups and individuals are observed and compared as they operate in rather complex social and cultural situations and the variables are described and compared *as if* they were controlled. Such procedures are illustrated by an anthropological study by Margaret Mead and her coworkers (1937), who compared and contrasted the place of co-operative and competitive patterns of life in thirteen different tribes. Another such study is that of Linton and his associates (1940) on acculturation. Such investigations have some of the features of an experiment in the sense that behavior is compared and

generalization attempted in terms of data available from groups and individuals who show divergent patterns of life. Yet, when we attempt the comparison of groups of individuals in terms of their variable behavior in reference to complex situations of the kind noted above, we are led at once into one of the other two methods of personality study, either that which employs statistics, or that which uses life histories as a basis for analysis, comparison, and generalization.

STATISTICAL METHODS IN PERSONALITY STUDY

Statistics deals chiefly with four matters: (1) *averages* of past events, (2) *variability* of measures about these averages, (3) *covariation* or correlation of two or more sets of events, and (4) the *probability* that unobserved events will conform to observed occurrences or events. In this section we shall review some of the more important methodological concepts and tools of statistics as they apply to the study of personality. No attempt will be made to present the technical aspects of the subject.² We shall begin by noting the fundamental concepts, the nature of simple statistical procedures, and various cautions in regard to sampling. Then we shall quickly review some of the measures of central tendency, variability, and correlation. The section will close with a short discussion of the nature of validity and reliability of various instruments of measurement and a brief classification of the chief statistical devices now in vogue in our field. Certain critical comments will be reserved for a later section.

Statistics begins with the counting or measuring of some sort of unit element or event or some quality or attribute produced by certain actions or conditions. In fact, the two basic constructs of statistics are the variable and the attribute. A *variable* is any trait, feature, element, or aspect of a situation or person which may be measured along a scale of equivalent units. The problem in measurement is one of stating the amount of the variable existing for each individual in a given sample or group of individuals. An *attribute* is a quality or unmeasured feature, trait, or item usually stated with reference to its presence or absence in a given situation or individual, or group of individuals. Strictly speaking, we cannot measure attributes; we can only count and take note of their proportional relationships in terms of their presence or absence. Attributes may be illustrated by conditions such as employment or illness, by mental traits such as punctuality or tact or aggression, or by a condition such as parent-child conflict.

Distinctions are usually made between variables which are *continuous*

² The student will find the elements of statistics well described in Thurstone (1925), Lundberg (1930), Arkin and Colton (1935), Guilford (1936), Garrett (1937), and other standard texts. The writer is indebted to his former colleague T. C. McCormick for certain materials and illustrations used in the preparation of this section.

and those which are *discrete* or discontinuous. In the former it is possible to have an unlimited gradation of values on a scale ranging from the highest to lowest, or most to least, e. g., in age, weight, or memory capacity. In the latter only limited gradations are possible; each value in a discrete series is separate or distinct, such as pupils, houses, or toys. Most of the variables dealt with in psychology are treated as if they were continuous. Then, too, in comparing two variables we may treat them as either independent or dependent. The *independent variable* is the one which is considered as inducing or basically influencing the behavior or alterations of the other, the *dependent* one. For example, in studying the effect of the amount of schooling on earning capacity, we might consider the former to be the independent variable since it is believed to effect changes in the latter. Briefly, then, statistics is a method for treating variables and attributes which may be measured or counted, as the case may be.

In all instances variables and attributes should be carefully defined. In personality studies those variables which demark external features—for example, height, weight, years of age, number of children, parental income, or intensity of response to a stimulus—are relatively easy to determine. But, when we attempt to deal statistically with the aspects of the inner world of ideas, traits, attitudes, beliefs, emotions, values, and the like, the difficulties of definition are indeed great. Strictly speaking, none of these features of personality, of course, is observable by an outsider. They must be exposed by gesture, word, or action of the subject himself. Yet much attention has been given to developing various measuring instruments to get at the subjective life. The matter is illustrated by the familiar rating scale which consists of five, seven, or more equal units or steps. Thus, in order to secure a measure of the intensity of feeling or attitude of like or dislike with respect to some group, situation, individual, or other fact, we might arrange a fivefold scale as follows:

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Great like	Moderate like	Indifference	Moderate dislike	Great dislike

It is assumed that each step is equal in value to every other. That is, the shift in feeling from indifference to moderate like or moderate dislike is equal in amount to the shift from moderate to great like or great dislike. Such a scale may be used by an outside observer to rate another person or event, or it may be employed by the subject himself to express his own feeling-emotional responses to a given matter. Other illustrations of scales are the well-known intelligence tests wherein the units are measured on a scale of mental age or growth, so many correct answers or performances being requisite to securing a given month of mental age. (See Terman and Merrill, 1937.) The well-known Thurstone "atti-

tude tests" for measuring opinions or beliefs are constructed by having a series of statements classified by a large number of judges into eleven categories assumed to represent equal degrees of differences in opinion toward some such topic as war, peace, crime, industrial conflict, or race. By combining all the judgments each statement is given a score value, and this becomes the basis for constructing the measuring rod to determine the degree of liking or disliking, of approving or disapproving, the particular social-cultural phenomenon to be studied. (See Thurstone and Chave, 1929.)

In the treatment of attributes it is not possible to secure their measurement by means of a scale of equal units, but only an enumeration or notation of their presence or absence. And, because of the difficulties involved in using variables, students of personality are turning to attributes as the more convenient elements with which to work. (See below.)

Sampling. It would be ideal, of course, if we could examine all the cases—called the "universe" or "population" or "supply"—which possess or reveal a given variable or attribute. But this is ordinarily out of the question, and we become obliged to select a sample which will typify or represent the larger universe of events or elements which we wish to investigate. A *sample* is a cross section of the larger total which may be treated as a representative or miniature distribution of the larger total itself. There are a number of matters which should be taken into account in any sampling procedure:

- (1) The variable or attribute must be carefully defined and well understood by the observer so that the sample may be selected so as to represent adequately the "universe" in terms of the desired variable or attribute.

- (2) The sample must be homogeneous and truly representative of the larger universe from which it is chosen. *Homogeneity* refers to the resemblance of individuals to each other with reference to a given variable or attribute. *Representativeness* has to do with getting such individuals from the universe that we may be certain that they adequately typify or "stand for" the entire population. It should be borne in mind that the mere piling up of cases provides no assurance that a given sample is typical. In order to ensure representativeness the items may be chosen at random from the larger supply. Sometimes the supply itself is divided into strata or classes of some sort. In such an instance, we must select the sample cases so that each subuniverse or stratum is represented. Thus, if one planned to test a group of school children with an intelligence scale or test of language or the like, it would be proper to see that representative percentages were drawn from each age and sex class and from each economic-social stratum in the society in question.

- (3) It is also well to check one sample by drawing another in the same manner, and to make sure that the universe itself remains constant through time, especially if one intends to apply the findings to the same universe at a later date.

Characterizing the distribution of variables. Having at hand a scale of units for measuring a given variable, such as a test or schedule, the

statistician proceeds to apply the scale to his chosen sample—for example, a group of students, of parents, of workers in a factory or office, or of other individuals. Each participant will be given a score or numerical description of his performance—overt or verbal—on the test. All the separate scores or measures of the individuals for each unit along the scale may then be totaled to make what is termed a frequency table or display. (This may easily be graphically presented as a histogram or frequency polygon.) While a table or frequency diagram will furnish workers with a picture of the nature of the performance of the total group, we need some method of characterizing or typifying their distribution. For a simple frequency display of a variable, the two common measures are those of the *central tendency* and of the *dispersion* or spread. Measures of central tendency provide a single numerical index with which to typify an entire distribution of frequencies along a scale. We use such a concept in everyday parlance when we say that “on the average such and such is the case.” The three averages used most often in our field are the *arithmetic mean*, which is simply the sum of the scores divided by the number of subjects; the *median*, or midmeasure, which divides the distribution into two equal parts; and the *mode*, or most common score in a distribution.

Yet we may want to know more of a given frequency display than merely its central tendency. We wish to secure some index which will indicate the spread or range of the frequencies along the scale. For this purpose a variety of measures of dispersion may be employed, such as the *mean deviation*, or M.D.; the *standard deviation*, or S.D., more often called *sigma* (σ); and the *probable error*, or P.E. These indexes of spread are computed by mathematical procedures which take into account the average deviation of the separate or individual scores from the index of the central tendency, usually the arithmetic mean. The S.D. is the most widely used measure of such deviations. In the normal or probability frequency distribution, if the distance equal to one S.D. is measured off on the scale (X axis) on both sides of the arithmetic mean (plus and minus), 68.26 per cent of the cases or scores will fall within the limits indicated. (See Figure 13.) In terms of ideal probability the S.D. furnishes a means of obtaining uniform units of disperseness along a scale and thus enables us to compare directly the degrees of variability of two frequency distributions. It is a highly important device in comparing and correlating the measurement of two or more variables. The P.E. is essentially the same in principle as the S.D. It represents the range of dispersion measured plus and minus from the arithmetic mean within which 50 per cent of the cases or scores will fall. The P.E. is equal to .6745 times the S.D. While this index has no advantage over the S.D., it is frequently employed in education and psychology.

The S.D. of a distribution of arithmetic means or of any other statistical indexes or coefficients computed from samples is called the *standard error of the mean*, or the standard error of any other statistical measure. This index is particularly valuable in comparing two or more distributions in order to test the statistical significance of the differences between them.

As already noted, the distribution of attributes is essentially a matter of the frequency and proportionality of their presence or absence in a given sample. Since they are not distributed along a scale, measures of central tendency and of dispersion do not apply to them.




FIGURE 13, the normal probability curve, showing the percentages of the area included within 1 P.E. and 1 S.D. measured both plus and minus from the arithmetic mean.

Comparisons of distributions. As a rule we are not content with the mere computation of measures of central tendency or of variability, or with a statement of the occurrence or non-occurrence of attributes. We may wish to compare the averages and indexes of variability of two samples in order to discover whether these differences are due to chance or actually to some specific factor which we may isolate and analyze. This

may be done by computing the standard error of the differences between the measures of central tendency, or of the differences in the indexes of deviation. The usual purpose in using this method is to indicate the influence of some new variable which has been introduced into a sample under more or less controlled conditions, or to uncover some such factor as may be responsible for a discovered difference in two otherwise similar distributions. (On comparisons of attributes, see below.)

For example, assume a large sample of school children to be identical or highly similar with reference to variables A, B, C, D, . . . X, such as race, age, grade in school, economic status of parents, and so on. Having taken such factors into account in sampling, we then give these children a test of prejudice with reference to a given race or nationality group, and compute the usual measures of central tendency and deviation. With these facts in hand we next introduce a new variable, E, say a body of propaganda.

¹ Thereafter, half of these children—called the test or “experimental” group—are shown a motion picture which is deliberately loaded with emotionalized propaganda against this particular race or nationality. The other half of the children—called the “control” group—are not exposed to this film. But after the subsample has been shown the picture, all the children are again tested with another form of the same

scale for measuring this particular prejudice, and the averages and measures of variability are again computed, but for each subsample separately.

By taking the difference between the two means and dividing this by the standard error of that difference, we may obtain what is called a *critical ratio*. This affords a measure making it possible to determine whether the changes in the "experimental" group (assuming there be changes) were due to chance or to the operation of the new factor, E, the propaganda film. That is, by application of the statistics of probability (see below) it is possible to tell the degree to which this empirical difference found from the two test applications represents a genuine difference due to the introduction of E or whether it is due to accidental or chance factors which may have entered into the situation.

Such a ratio or index to show the difference between obtained scores and those possibly due to chance has become a useful device for testing the importance of factors believed to enter into performances on tests. A critical ratio of 3.00 or more means that we may be virtually certain that the observed difference is genuine and not due to chance or accident. (See below on chance.)

Correlation. We often wish to go beyond characterizing the central tendency or deviation, or the comparing of two distributions. The statistician may be interested in discovering how change—that is, increase or decrease—in one variable is associated with a corresponding change in another. Or he wishes to note concomitant alterations in the frequency and proportionality among two or more attributes. This introduces the problem of covariation or correlation. There are a number of statistical indexes or ratios, usually called coefficients, for expressing covariation. These involve rather complicated mathematical assumptions and computations. They lie at the heart of much of our modern statistics, and we must briefly examine some of their assumptions and implications.

Let us return to the example of the physicist dealing with rather simple and direct relations of two variables, X and Y. He discovers, let us say, certain constant relations between them which show that, as one is altered, so is the other in a very precise and exact manner or amount. Successive observations of X and Y may be plotted on co-ordinate paper, and, if the increase or decrease in one variable is accompanied by a corresponding change in the other, the plotted points for X and Y will be found to lie along a straight line. Such precise relations of X and Y may be expressed in terms of a mathematical *function*. For example, we say that the circumference of a circle is a function of its diameter. If we call the circumference Y, and the diameter X, we may state their constant relations as an equation: $Y = 3.1416 X$. And, no matter what value we give to X, we can find a corresponding value for Y by using this equation. If we were to locate every pair of values of X and Y for a series of measurements of diameters and corresponding circumferences as a

point on co-ordinate paper, the series of points would lie in a straight line. We would say that the function is a linear one. Since the physicist finds that the relations of X and Y—for example, between the volume of a gas and its temperature (with Z, pressure, held constant)—likewise fall along a straight line (with only very minute or slight deviations), he makes use of such a mathematical function to express his laboratory findings.⁸

In the biological and human sciences, the relations of X and Y are seldom, if ever, so exact. Other factors usually enter in to influence their interplay, so that, if the observed occurrences of X and Y together be plotted, the points may be found scattered along either side of a hypothetical straight line, or along a curve or some other line representing co-occurrence. (Of course, the points may be so distributed as to indicate little or no interrelation.) For instance, in agriculture one might wish to discover how the yield of wheat varies with the amount of acid-phosphate fertilizer put into the soil. But this is not so easy to determine, since other things than fertilizer affect yield, such as soil texture, humus, moisture, temperature, and the kind of seed used. In our work interfering factors may be even more complicated and difficult to take into account. Thus, in trying to discover if there be any direct or positive relationship between broken homes and the incidence of delinquency, not only should we have to observe the frequency or extent of the co-occurrence of these two events, but we should have to take cognizance of other factors, such as the economic status of the family, the character of the neighborhood culture, and the age of the children at the time of parental separation. Moreover, these elements vary greatly in their influence upon such conduct. And in addition there are often certain residual chance factors with which we must deal if we can.

In short, between the investigation of physical phenomena and the consideration of cultural and social psychological data there are at least three basic differences: (1) The materials of the latter show much greater complexity; there are many more variables and attributes to be reckoned with than in the natural sciences. (2) These phenomena reveal much greater variability among themselves, and hence it is much more difficult to predict results from one sample or situation to another. (3) There are many more chance or accidental factors which must be allowed for, if we would avoid drawing incorrect conclusions.

In our dealing quantitatively with data characterized by such complexity, variability, and residual factors, the statistics of probability and of correlation provides us with most useful tools. By wise use of such

⁸ Not all mathematical functions, of course, are linear; they may be curvilinear, parabolic, and so on. Nor do all correlations of natural phenomena fall along a line; natural scientists frequently use nonlinear formulae to express their results. So, too, in biology, psychology, and social science various mathematical formulae have been employed. But for our purposes the linear function serves well as an illustration.

methods we are often able to isolate the important factors, to determine variations in the influences playing on these factors, and above all else to reckon with the operation of chance effects that may serve to disturb the relations.

While we already have a good idea of the complex nature of our social psychological materials and have just noted some of the devices for dealing with them in terms of variables and attributes and with reference to their deviational features, we may well ask, what do we mean by chance? Broadly considered, *chance* refers to an extremely complicated set of causes the general character of which we may know but the detailed operation of which we do not comprehend. More accurately defined with regard to mathematical logic, the *Standard Dictionary* states that chance is "one of several events of which some one must and only one can follow a given antecedent, and no one of which is more likely to follow than any other." The theory of chance furnishes the basis for the calculation of the likelihood of the occurrence of certain events as against equal conflicting possibilities. Thus in the throw "of a die there is one chance in six that ace will turn up," and we say that the probability is $1/6$ that ace will appear among the total known possible occurrences.⁴ In other words, probability is the ratio of the chances favoring an event to the total number of chances both for and against it. The difference between the mathematically most probable and the observed or calculated value of a given quantity is termed *error* (obviously not to be confused with what we ordinarily mean by the term *mistake* in an arithmetical computation). For our purposes chance factors are those minute causes which may influence our findings (produce "errors") but which cannot be directly controlled in experiments or tests. Yet we must reckon with these chance elements if our numerical results are to be at all sound. Fortunately there are at hand statistical devices which enable us to do so. We have already noted one of these in mentioning the critical ratio, and others become important with reference to measures of correlation.

Since our social psychological data are of such a complex character, they do not permit us to state the relations of X and Y as a strict mathematical function. But statistical devices of correlation or covariation do provide a method of calculating the significance of the observed departures from such a theoretical X and Y relation. Correlational methods facilitate the analysis of relations between variables X and Y where the measurements reveal considerable scatter on either side of a straight line. These divergences may be due to certain known but uncontrolled elements and to chance factors as well, and both must be taken into account.

⁴ It is interesting to note that the development of the theory of probability was partially stimulated by gamblers, who asked the mathematicians to tell them what the chances were of their winning or losing at dice or cards.

In order to ensure reasonably satisfactory results in our study of correlation we need—in addition to careful definition of our variables and attributes—to take into account the following matters: (1) The sample should be not only representative and homogeneous, but large enough for us to make sure that many of the chance elements may cancel themselves out or be reduced to insignificant proportions. For example, as we increase the number of cases in a sample, other things being equal, the influence of the chance factors tends to decrease. (2) The worker with statistical techniques should be fully cognizant of the nature, advantages, and limitations of his mathematical tools. The easy application of formulae the full mathematical import of which is not understood has too often led to quite erroneous conclusions regarding some of our statistical data. (3) Even with sound mathematical methods we must be cautious in drawing inferences from our findings.

But, if these qualifications are kept in mind, the worker will often find that correlational devices furnish a useful means of dealing with complexity, variability, and chance as these influence the concomitant occurrence of two or more variables or attributes. We shall make no effort to discuss the specific techniques for computing these relations, but rather turn to mention briefly the more commonly used indexes of co-variation.

Perhaps the simplest device for determining correlation is calculated by the *rank-order* method, where paired items or factors found for a given sample are arranged into two columns by order of rank, but no consideration is given to the scalar or numerical values of the items. A convenient formula has been developed for securing a coefficient which will characterize approximately the extent of agreement in these two rankings. Thus, the rank order of a number of pupils as to their standing in an arithmetic examination might be correlated with their rank order in a test of rhetoric. The coefficient would provide a rough index of the association of ability in arithmetic with that in composition.

The most frequently used coefficient of correlation is that computed by the *product-moment* method and expressed by the symbol r . This device, invented by Karl Pearson, is useful for determining the degree of relationship between variables whose measurements show considerable scatter around a theoretical straight line—that is, one which ideally would indicate perfect relationship. The type illustration is the distribution of two variables, X and Y, along two axes of co-ordinate paper and the use of the Pearsonian formula to provide a single index of the degree to which variation in X is accompanied by a corresponding variation in Y. If for every item change on the X axis we find a corresponding item change in Y, and in the same direction—that is, if they both increase together—we get a perfect positive correlation, denoted by + 1.00. If every change in X is accompanied by a corresponding change in Y, but in the opposite direction—that is, as one increases, the other decreases—we get a perfect negative correlation, denoted by - 1.00. Various degrees of less than perfect relationship are indicated by coefficients ranging between .00 and 1.00, either plus or minus. (The usual practice is to omit the plus sign before the positive index.)

Rarely do we find perfect positive or negative covariance in social or personality studies. It is generally agreed, however, that a correlation above .80 represents a very high degree of co-occurrence. Between .60 and .80 it is considered high, and between .40 and .60 fair. Those falling between .20 and .40 are considered to be low, and an below .20 is of little significance (i. e., the "zero-order" correlations).

The Pearsonian product-moment method may also be used for expressing covariance among three or more variables. Two widely used devices are those of partial and multiple correlation.

Partial correlation enables us to estimate the influence of another factor on the relation of two variables. Thus one may be interested in the interrelations of honor (grade) points, X, intelligence, Y, and hours of study, Z. By means of partial correlation it is possible to "hold constant" the effect of any one of these three variables while determining the relationship of the other two.

Multiple correlation, R, permits us to estimate the combined influence of two or more variables on another. For instance, we could indicate—in the case just noted—the extent to which X, honor points, was determined by Y, general intelligence, and Z, study hours, when the latter two were combined.

By the use of elaborate intercorrelations among large numbers of test results, Spearman (1904, 1927), and later others, developed the theory of general and specific factors in intelligence. From this work, in turn, has emerged the device called multiple-factor analysis, a complicated statistical method for treating a large number of intercorrelated items in order to show (1) the minimum number of independent fundamental factors which may be assumed to account for all the covariation in the larger complex of intercorrelations, and (2) the amount of loading or weight of each fundamental factor in each of the items in the larger complex. The method gets at the general factors—at best a small number—which tend to control the operation of a wide variety of variables. (See Thurstone, 1935, 1938.) The use of multiple-factor analysis may be illustrated by two of many such studies.

The Bernreuter inventory is supposed to cover a number of basic features of the nonintellectual aspects of personality: inferiority, introvertiveness or its opposite, neuroticism, and some others. Flanagan (1935), using factor analysis on the responses of 305 high-school boys to the 125 items in the Bernreuter inventory, found that two "factors" would account for most of the reactions. These he labeled *self-confidence* and *sociability*. Factor one may distinguish between "the self-confident, well-adjusted, socially aggressive, 'thick-skinned' individual and the self-conscious, shy, emotionally unstable individual." Factor two differentiates "between the social and the non-social or independent" persons. (*Ibid.*, p. 47.)

Burgess and Cottrell (1939), who had collected a large number of answers to detailed questions as to what in the opinion of the respondents made for the success or failure of the marriages of a large sample of couples (see Chapter XX), wished to discover if some of these items were clustered together into a set of more general

factors or if they were purely specific and discrete. They employed Thurstone's method on twenty-eight widely scattered items about the husbands' premarital background with the hope of discovering if certain general groupings of items might not be found which would serve to summarize and generalize the major factors making for success or failure in matrimony. They found four such clusters: (1) having to do with economic role; (2) having to do with social status and social participation; (3) revealing the place of cultural training, especially of the moral-religious sort; and (4) indicating the impress of early family conditioning, that is, the more strictly psychogenetic influences.

It must not be imagined that correlational methods, either of the more simple sort or of the complicated kind like factorial analysis, are a substitute either for more complete experiment or for careful analytic life-history investigations. Yet they are highly valuable and have served to expose the significance of a variety of influences which play upon personal and social conduct.

Statistical analysis of attributes. We have already noted that attributes cannot be measured but must be dealt with in terms of counting instead. Yet there are a number of convenient methods of revealing certain approximate associations or relationships between two or more sets of attributes. It would take us far afield to discuss these in any detail as to methods of computation, but we may make note of some of them in more or less common use.

(1) The *paired-comparison* technique consists in matching each item in a series of attributes with every other item with a view to constructing a scale or hierarchy of preferences among these attributes. Coutu's study (1936) of preferences for certain professions used this method, and from his matchings he was able to compare the preferences of individuals in certain preprofessional groups for a series of twenty occupations. (On various uses of this method see Guilford, 1936.)

(2) The *Chi-square test* (χ^2) does not measure any degree of relationship but does provide an index as to whether an empirically discovered association of attributes is significant or not in terms of probability. That is, it reveals the difference between the observed and the theoretical frequency and aids in determining whether deviations in a contingency table or the variations of an observed from a theoretical frequency distribution could have been produced by chance alone. Like the critical ratio, it is a test of statistical significance of empirical and theoretical differences.

Often such a rough measure of association of attributes is more revealing than items of behavior or inner life broken up into specific variables and submitted to the Pearsonian product-moment formula. Thus Dudycha (1936) in his study of punctuality of a large sample of students got very different results from the use of the Pearsonian product-moment method and the use of the Chi-square technique. In order to use the former he measured punctuality to classes, meals, and entertainment in terms of small fractions of time that students were early or tardy. The correlation coefficients were nearly all low and meaningless. Yet, when he combined his units into very broad categories, such as tendency to be early, punctual, or tardy (ignoring the amounts of

time involved), and applied the nonlinear method of Chi-square, he discovered distinct clustering of differences among his sample in reference to these attributes.

(3) The *coefficient of contingency*, C , furnishes another means of testing the probability that the association of a number of attributes is greater than that which we might expect by chance. This method was employed by Young and Oberdorfer (1938) in dealing with the degree of association between certain political preferences of college students and those of their parents, a matter which could not well be stated—in terms of the data—by a Pearsonian r .

(4) The *biserial correlation*, r_{bis} , permits the correlation of a quantitative or measured variable, X , with dichotomous or dual categories of attributes, Y and Z . Thus one might compare the number of children in a sample of families with the number that remained in school and with the number who left school before they were eighteen years of age. Or one might correlate "mental age" with judgments as to whether a sample of school children were "socially adjusted" or "not socially adjusted."

(5) The *tetrachoric correlation coefficient* provides an index of the relation of two factors, either quantitative or qualitative, which may be broken down into dichotomous classes, considered as either continuous or discontinuous series. With this one might correlate the success or failure of a group of teachers in the classroom with the fact that they had, or had not had, previous training in pedagogical methods.

Factors in the construction of questionnaires, rating scales, and tests. Since much effort has gone into attempts to construct instruments for the measurement or other statistical analysis of traits, attitudes, interests, opinions, values, and the like, we must review some of the features of these devices and some of the conditions necessary for making them statistically reliable and valid.

(1) A *questionnaire* is a formal list of queries designed to elicit information about a person's ideas, traits, attitudes, opinions, aspirations, values, etc. If we secure straightforward "Yes" or "No" replies, the data may be treated by methods of dealing with attributes. If intensity of reactivity or feeling, or frequency of occurrence, is obtained, the results may be dealt with as variables. (2) A *rating scale*, as indicated above, is a set of equivalent units from high to low intensity, by means of which observers may record their judgment of others or of themselves. (3) A *test* is usually only a more specific and carefully prepared questionnaire calling for answers or performances which may be recorded on a scale of units of ability, attitudes, or reactivity. Those who devise tests usually employ the statistics of probability and assume that the reactions may be treated as falling along a continuous scale of variables. It should be noted that many so-called personality tests are but poorly constructed rating schemes or questionnaires. The term *test*, in fact, is often loosely used.

In the construction of scalar rating schemes and tests, it is important not only to define the variables closely and to determine the best type of items to be rated or tested, but also to take into account the reliability and validity of such instruments.

Since it is seldom possible to measure an entire universe of data, we must, obviously, depend upon sampling, and one may well ask how we know whether we would always get the same results if we repeated a measurement under the same conditions. That is, how nearly do the measures based on our sample truly represent the universe? This can be checked by what are known as measures of *reliability*. These enable us to discover the extent or degree to which a test or a rating scale is logically consistent with itself. The reliability of a scale may be discovered in three distinct ways: (1) by repeating the administration of a scale to the same group after the lapse of a certain interval of time; (2) by correlating two equivalent forms of a given test; and (3) by giving the test once to a large sample and then dividing the item scores—usually the odd-numbered against the even-numbered—so that one half may be correlated with the other. (This is often called the “split-half” method.) In any case satisfactory coefficients of reliability should be in the neighborhood of .90 or better. But many scales in use have shown reliabilities considerably below this figure.

Validity refers to the degree to which a scale actually measures what it is assumed to measure. Thus an instrument may reveal a satisfactory coefficient of reliability and yet fail to measure the variable it is supposed to. The determination of validity is not easy, and all too often the makers of tests retreat to the sophistry of operationalism by stating that a given instrument merely measures what it measures! The usual means of checking validity are:

(1) Theoretically, if we had a perfect test of a particular variable or variables, the validity of any new scale could be determined by correlating scores from the application of the two tests to the same sample. No such infallible criterion exists in the field of personality measurement, but often tests which have been found to be highly valid are used as standards for the validation of new tests of the same sort. (2) The scores of a scale on highly similar samples might be compared with the scores of a scale applied to a very different sample. Thus a sound test of intelligence or learning capacity—designed to get at mental ability uninfluenced by culture—would be one found applicable to groups of people anywhere regardless of nationality, language, or race. (3) One common means of validation is to secure the independent judgments of experts as to whether a given scale will actually measure what it is supposed to. But this method is open to grave criticism. (See below.) (4) Another possible means of validating a test is suggested by a study of Stouffer (1930).

He gave a sample of college students a Thurstone scale on liquor and prohibition. He then asked them to write brief autobiographical statements as to the origin and development of their opinions and attitudes toward liquor and prohibition. These statements were then read by a series of judges, who estimated the students' opinions or attitudes on these topics. These estimates—made on a linear scale—correlated with the scores on the test by .80 or better. Though this is only another way of checking

verbal reactions on a test with verbal narratives, the method might be tried with profit in validating other opinion scales. Whether it could be used for validating tests of emotionality, temperament, or other traits is unknown, but such a method might be attempted.

The most satisfactory device for validation is to check the verbal responses of the individual by observation of, or measure of, his overt action in the area of conduct which the instrument is assumed to test. For instance, does a given test of prejudice regarding Negroes give a predictive indication of how the individual tested will actually react to Negroes? Or does a questionnaire or inventory of emotional instability agree with a sound and independent diagnosis of a sample of neurotics or psychotics? It is not easy to find means to check a verbal scale against overt conduct, but it should be done whenever possible. (See Roskelley, 1938, for an example of a unique attempt to validate a Thurstone test.)

Variety of rating schemes, tests, and questionnaires. A great variety of psychological and sociological rating scales, tests, and more or less standardized questionnaires (the last-named often termed schedules or inventories) have been developed for uncovering and more adequately characterizing aspects of the overt, verbal, and inner life of individuals. This is not the place to undertake a description of these devices. However, to provide the student with some conception of the range of personality items which these instruments would measure or qualify, we shall attempt a rough classification. Some of them undertake to get at specific motivations, mechanisms, traits, attitudes, and opinions. Others essay a broad attack on large segments of personality structure and function, general traits, attitudes, or types. Moreover, these devices reflect the theoretical and methodological standpoint of their authors, and, as we shall indicate in the next two chapters, this fact helps to account for the rather divergent results obtained from their application.

(1) Though the matter is of primary importance, there have not yet been developed many adequate scales or rating instruments to segregate and characterize motivation, yet certain tests of drives, aspirations, and interests fall into this category.

(2) On the other hand, tests of intellectual and nonintellectual functions have been extensively developed. The oldest and most highly perfected of the former are those which measure intelligence; in recent years many attempts have been made to construct scales or ratings of such nonintellectual functions as temperament, disposition, emotional stability, and emotional maturity.

(3) Closely related to motivation and mental function are those devices designed to get at what are sometimes termed mental mechanisms. Free-association tests are of this sort, as are those which try to expose hidden wishes, unconscious patterns of thought and emotion, or other internal processes by means of verbal responses to inkblots, dramatic reconstruction in play, and the like.

(4) A large number of instruments approach the personality from what is essentially a structural point of view. Some of these would get at specific traits, others at

general ones. In this grouping may also be included tests devised to reveal so-called types of personality, such as those built around Jung's theory of introversion and extroversion, and those dealing with social types, such as those constructed around Spranger's theory of basic value systems and social role.

(5) We need a separate classification for those devices which would uncover the content rather than the form or mechanism of personality. Here may be included all those tests of opinions, or so-called "attitude tests," designed to measure prejudice or acceptance with respect to race, nationality, topics of public discussion, and so on.

(6) Finally, there are a few scales or questionnaires directed at indicating degree of social participation and social maturity. (For references to various tests see Symonds, 1934; Buros, 1938; and Hildreth, 1939).

An inspection of these rough categories will convince one of the difficulty of attempting any sharp distinctions among some of these instruments. There are not even careful definitions of the devices. Many are really rather poorly constructed questionnaires which have been renamed inventories, schedules, or even tests. Some combine the questionnaire and the rating-scale device. Despite their inadequacies, however, they represent an earnest effort to examine more objectively what seem to many to be significant aspects of personality. But, before taking up a discussion of the advantages and limitations of statistical methods of studying personal adjustment, let us discuss the nature of the life-history techniques for uncovering important aspects of the personality. We shall then be in a better position to compare and evaluate the relative merits of the various methods.

LIFE-HISTORY OR CASE-HISTORY METHODS

Academic psychologists interested in personality problems have made little use of the life-history or case-history technique. It has, however, been the stock-in-trade of social work, psychiatry, and social psychology. The standpoint, essentially historical, assumes that the present life organization of the person can be adequately understood chiefly in terms of its genesis. The fundamental aim is to get a longitudinal picture of the totality of adaptive processes as a causal sequence of events through the course of an individual's life.

Life-history material is essentially so qualitative in character that much of it does not lend itself to quantification. Yet any satisfactory scientific use of the case-history method must employ concepts and hypotheses which may be tested in the course of any investigation. As a matter of fact, many of the basic problems of method are not unlike those of statistics. There is, of course, a recognition of a set of specific or general factors to be studied. The more careful case-history studies also recognize

the problem of sampling, since the aim is to avoid the temptation to generalize from one case. So, too, references are frequently made to typical cases, which is a way of referring to some central tendency. Likewise, attention is given to the divergent instance, which is but an informal way of stating facts about variability. Finally, the worker with these data may compare his findings with those from other samples, and in order to expose dynamic relations he may indicate in qualitative terms covariation or correlation between selected factors or situations.

Moreover, every competent worker in this field recognizes the complexity of the factors with which he has to deal, and that many of the most significant lie within the inner life of the individual. He is concerned essentially with traits, attitudes, patterns of values, or frames of reference that are not easily broken down into simpler units of the kind required by the statistician. The configuration of variables and attributes into larger wholes is a basic feature of the material with which he is concerned. And an analysis of these complex patterns of the life organization provides the key to the meanings which events have for the individual. Thus one discovers how the subject views his thoughts and conduct as they relate to others and in relation to the deepest motivations and values within himself. In fact, a fuller understanding of overt conduct can be secured only when we know or sense the significance which men give to both their inner and their outer adjustments.

Yet a strictly scientific technique for dealing with the life history is now being developed, and three factors related thereto may be discussed with profit: (1) the sources of such data; (2) the use of the interview as a special device for collecting material; and (3) attempts to state necessary criteria for analyzing and interpreting such data once they are at hand.

Sources and collection of life-history data. The essential source material in this field is a human document usually compiled in a narrative and descriptive form. It may be put together from data already in existence, or it may be produced under deliberate stimulation. In either instance we may for convenience distinguish between the formal and the informal type of material.

By *formal data* we refer to those which come from legal and official sources such as courts, prisons, schools, or public records, or from a variety of social service agencies. Some of these data, of course, exist in numerical form permitting tabulation and certain statistical treatment. Other formal material may be collected by having individuals fill out detailed questionnaires which call for facts on family, school, and other experiences, and for statements regarding events of inner life—wishes, ambitions, frustrations, daydreams, and no end of other subjective matters. Though some

of this questionnaire material may be and has at times been treated statistically, as a rule the data thus secured serve merely as a more formalized source for analysis and interpretation by nonquantitative methods.⁵

Informal data derive from such intimate sources as personal correspondence, diaries, memoirs, journals, autobiographies, and the records of interviews, especially of the more extended sort. The aim here is to secure relatively free-flowing verbal accounts of the individual's reactions to situations and to get a revelation of his subjective impulses, meanings, and intentions.

The writing of an autobiographical life history may be left completely to the subject's own conception of how he should proceed. In other instances it may be obtained by furnishing him a more or less specific set of questions to be answered. In still other circumstances the subject may be provided with an outline of topics to be treated. As a rule the individual is asked to write a free narrative, to "just let his thoughts go" as he writes. Yet his attention is often directed to two sets of data, that which may be considered as rather objective and open to at least some degree of verification by others, the other of a subjective sort. The former material usually deals with the family history and his own experiences in the family circle; his play, congeniality-group, and recreational life; his school years, with attention to attitudes to schoolwork, teachers, and fellow students; and his relations with the church, business, industry, and agencies of civic control such as policemen, truant officers, public health nurses, and social workers. Second, the writer is usually asked to provide an account of his inner life: his aspirations and motives, his fantasies, his sense of frustration and the various compensatory or substitutive outlets therefor, his fundamental values and frames of reference, and so on. (See pp. 817 ff. for a brief outline for the preparation of an autobiography or a case study. See also Shaffer, 1936, pp. 447-451; and G. W. Allport, 1937a, pp. 390-394, for somewhat similar outlines or notations of pertinent items to be included in such documents.) Not only may the autobiography be obtained as the major material for an analysis of personality, but data secured by the interview may often be supplemented by asking the subject to write his history under some guidance in order to clarify and expand the data got from the interview proper.

Such informal material as comes from the autobiography, the interview, or other intimate sources should be supplemented by data from other informants, through formal records and interviews, or by other means. Finally, careful observation of the overt conduct of the subject is highly desirable.

⁵ The writer has used *The Experience Variables Record* designed by J. O. Chassell (1928) as a valuable aid to interviews. See also Chassell's revision (1938). The *Objective Personality Study* prepared by Emily L. Stogdill and H. Herndon (1939) is also a useful device.

While most case studies give the genetic factors a great deal of weight, some workers with life-history material do not consider such factors as important as a full narrative of more or less contemporary behavior and inner meaning secured during a series of interviews. This is essentially the method used by Taft (1933). She operates on the theory that through a series of clinical interviews which deal with a person's present emotional stresses and adjustment difficulties the shrewd and trained observer will secure all the material necessary to predict and hence control a satisfactory program of therapy. This is essentially a cross-sectional technique employing the prolonged interview rather than tests, schedules, and the like, in order to uncover the desired information. This particular method, again, rests upon a certain theory of personality and illustrates the interplay between theory and science already noted.

Attempts to establish criteria for life histories. Although many workers have used case-history materials in diagnosis and therapy or to support or illustrate theories of personality and behavior, few have tried to establish any basic standards of judgment for estimating their significance. Moreover, few have analyzed their data in such a way as to permit their theory to emerge out of their findings. But Dollard (1935) has attempted to set up certain criteria in an effort to show what particular factors must be taken into account if students using the life-history materials would make sure that their data are adequate for analysis. These are:

- (1) "The subject [of the life history] must be viewed as a specimen in a cultural series."
- (2) "The organic motors of action ascribed must be socially relevant."
- (3) "The peculiar role of the family group in transmitting the culture must be recognized."
- (4) "The specific method of elaboration of organic materials into social behavior must be shown."
- (5) "The continuous related character of experience from childhood through adulthood must be stressed."
- (6) "The 'social situation' must be carefully and continuously specified as a factor."
- (7) "The life-history material itself must be organized and conceptualized."

There is nothing particularly novel about these criteria, for students of the interrelation of personality and culture have long stressed them, in one way or another. In fact, Dollard derived his criteria chiefly from Freud and Thomas. The student may consult Freud (1920), Thomas and Znaniecki (1918-20), Healy (1917), Healy and Bronner (1922), Shaw (1930, 1931), and Linton (1936), who, among others, deal with the importance of cultural-historical factors in personality analysis. Yet Dollard's stress upon the need to put such material into a systematic and theoretic framework is timely.

While the present writer is, on the whole, in general agreement with Dollard's discussion, nevertheless he believes that Dollard has neglected certain factors which may well be taken into account: Not only is the concept of culture essential, but so, too, is that of *interaction*, or the *social act*, for the self or life organization arises chiefly in the interplay of per-

sons with each other. Certainly, individual variation and *personal-social* interaction must not be neglected. Differences in constitutional factors, in drives, in emotions, in sensory-perceptual sensitivity, in age, in sex, or in response patterns learned outside the framework of culture may operate to affect personality structure and function.

In the life-history treatment—as in that which draws upon experimentation or statistical devices—much depends upon the fundamental standpoint and theory lying behind the criteria and the hypotheses which are set up. For instance, Dollard's acceptance of the crucial importance of the genetic factors naturally leads him, as it leads others, to neglect the cross-sectional or purely situational approach, as exemplified by Taft. (See above.) So, too, his emphasis on cultural influences leads him to neglect the uniqueness and totality of the individual, and the value of intuitive comprehension in studying personality. (See G. W. Allport, 1937a; and Stern, 1938.) In short, scientific criteria, postulates, and hypotheses themselves cannot be divorced from the underlying theory. (See Chapters XII and XIII.)

The use of the interview in collecting data. Although many would-be objective-minded scientists oppose its use, the interview is a particularly crucial technique for securing data on personality; it permits the collection of not only qualitative but certain quantitative material as well. At this point we shall examine some of its essential features; later we shall comment on its applicability and place in gaining knowledge of people. The interview is a method of collecting material on personality by means of conversational interaction between two persons, one of whom acts as informant to the other—the observer. (Of course, interviews are sometimes conducted by an observer with two or more informants, but these are rather special instances. Most of the interview material secured for personality analysis comes from the typical instance of two persons in interaction.) The interview may be recorded at the time, or later, and from such data a case record is compiled. Interview situations may be divided into the formal and the informal type.

The *formal interview* is one in which there are a more or less standardized procedure and a predetermined type of material to be required or requested of the interviewee. In fact, the mental tests devised for individual application are actually conducted as a highly standardized form of interview. And sometimes, when life-history data are sought by means of formal questions, the procedure is almost as inflexible as the traditional Binet-Simon test. As a rule, the attempt to secure data on the subjective life by means of such rigid question-answer technique is not successful, but for more objective data it may be used in some instances, especially in securing material amenable to statistical treatment.

The *informal interview* is one in which an effort is made to secure the

desired information in the course of conversational interaction. While the interviewer usually has topics or questions about which he wishes information, he depends on his control of the conversation as a means of eliciting the facts. Thus questions may be and usually are asked by the interviewer, but they follow rather naturally out of the situation itself and should never be forced on the subject. Some topics may have to do with objective facts such as age, schooling, and the like; but the basic aim is usually to uncover the subjective life. The informal method is in common use among psychiatrists, cultural anthropologists, social and clinical psychologists, social workers, and individuals engaged in personnel work and educational guidance.

There are really two types of informal interview. In one the informant is aware of the purpose or intention of the interviewer; in the other, he is not. Under the latter situation the informant does not know that he is revealing data about himself or his fellows. This method is sometimes employed by cultural anthropologists and social psychologists in securing data from individuals in native tribes or in primary or other groups where the exposure of the actual intentions of the observer would prevent his securing the desired information. Obviously, an observer must possess some disguise as to occupation or status to be able to proceed in such a manner, and there is always danger of exposure of his genuine purpose, which would usually result in terminating the collection of information by that method and by that observer. Yet this method has been used by the so-called "participant observer," who takes up his residence in a given community and by participating in its daily life is able to secure a valid body of information by his observations of the speech and overt behavior of members and by subtly directing conversation to specific topics whenever he may do so without arousing resistance and suspicion.

The psychology of the interview. An interview between an observer and an informant is obviously a form of interaction. We know that people learn to assume varied roles in terms of the particular social situation with which they are confronted. (See Chapter IX.) Successful social adjustment, in fact, depends upon just this sort of capacity, and the interview is only a special instance of person-to-person adaptation. In the interview two selves come into relation with each other, and the success or failure of the interview will rest largely upon the character and direction of the verbal and gestural contacts between the two participants. We may state the essentials in this fashion: The interviewer comes to the situation with a view or role of himself as interviewer, and with a corresponding concept of the subject or informant as a person who will furnish him certain data. In the same way the subject of the interview will have a conception of himself, and another of the interviewer. In order that an interview may proceed successfully—that is, enable the interviewer to

secure the wanted information from the subject—there must, sooner or later, emerge a sympathetic identification between the two persons concerned. In addition to the external conversational interaction between the interviewer and the informant, there will be—on the part of the interviewer—an imaginary and internal interplay between his idea of himself and his idea of the subject. Likewise, the informant will experience an interplay between his concept of his own role and his concept of the interviewer. In fact, the course of the conversation will be directed and qualified at all points in terms of this inner dramatic process. That is, from the very beginning of the session the interviewer will in imagination begin reacting to his image of the informant, and, likewise, the informant will begin reacting to his image of the interviewer. Throughout the entire process, therefore, not only will every exchange of words and gestures influence the internal concepts of both participants, but these latter will, in turn, qualify their verbal and overt interactions.

The matter may be made more concrete by an illustration. Suppose that a personnel officer of a college plans to interview a student who is failing in his scholastic work. Not only will he possess an image of his own role as personnel officer, charged with certain duties and powers, but he will also likely form a "picture in his head" of the student—from information about the latter from the college records and perhaps from other sources. In like vein the student not only will possess a concept of his role as a student, but will have in mind certain notions about the characteristics or role of the given personnel officer—gleaned in terms of campus stereotypes about such administrative officers or from specific gossip he may have heard about that particular individual. Let us suppose, to be more definite, that the student believes in advance that the personnel officer will blame him severely for his school failure; or suppose that the personnel officer assumes in advance that the student is a lazy fellow who does not live up to his intellectual and scholastic ability. If the two meet with this kind of view of each other, the entire interview may produce quite different results than if they entered into the interview with a sympathetic view of each other. But let us imagine that the personnel officer does have a sympathetic view of the student as one needing friendly help and guidance, while the student holds the view just noted, anticipates blame, and possesses a general tendency of resistance to the college administrative policies. Under these circumstances the personnel officer may open the interview by a friendly greeting, by smiling, and by a whole series of congenial gestures which induce an alteration in the student's conception of him. If this happens, then in the ensuing discussion the student may confide to the interviewer his worries, his frustrations, his poor study habits, his interest in extracurricular activities which distract him, and no end of other items which contribute to his present role as a failing student. Psychologically this means that the student not only will change his concept of the personnel officer but will also modify his conception of himself. In like manner the interviewer will alter his image of the student. For that matter, he will modify his own role, since no sympathetic interviewer ever closed a conversation with a willing informant without himself being changed thereby.

As we know, ideas, traits, attitudes, opinions, values, and overt habits tend to center in the various roles which individuals have built into their life organization. Therefore the discovery of the details of the student's inner life—in terms of aspirations, specific or general traits and attitudes, anxieties, frustrations, and values—will of necessity throw light upon his various roles in society as well as upon his basic conceptions of himself as a person. And what applies to the student applies equally well to any other informant.

The interviewer as an instrument. It should be clear from these comments that the interviewer himself may be considered as an important instrument in the collection of life-history data. Moreover, he may be, and often is, called upon to act as the interpreter of such material. (See below.)

In identifying himself with the informant the interviewer must be able to sense or "feel" the former's aims, traits, attitudes, values, and other inner states. Yet in this understanding of the role of the other, the interviewer must not overdo his identification and thus lose his own integrity and his critical capacities. The successful interviewer must have the ability to play a dual role—his own as manipulator of the situation and seeker of information, and also in imagination that of the subject or informant. Only in this way will he be able to follow the latter's answers, comments, and confessions sympathetically. In other words, he must learn to play another's role sympathetically in imagination, but he must not completely absorb such a role in his overt or verbal reactions. This is the very point which was made in Chapter IX when we discussed the dramatic character of all role-taking.

The competent interviewer must possess keen perceptive faculties and an accurate memory. Not only should he hear correctly what is said to him, but he will be alert to the overtones of the informant's verbal and overt reactions, noting changes in voice, indications of feeling-emotional states from facial or other gestures, and any other possible clues to inner states which may subsequently be exposed. (See Chapter XII on "expressive movements.") And, while he must know how to direct the session with skillful and revealing inquiries, he must also possess the capacity for sympathetic listening. Often in interviews, especially with persons under the emotional stress of mental conflicts, once the informant has begun to pour forth his troubles, the interviewer need but listen attentively in order to gain significant information about the fundamental inner life of his subject. (On the art of listening, see Diehl and Wilson, 1933.)

Discussions of interview technique often emphasize the importance of insight and rapport. These qualities have much in common. *Insight* refers

to the capacity of one individual to identify himself sympathetically with another's inner life and verbal and overt reactions. *Rapport* means more particularly the degree of mutual sympathy and congenial interidentification between the participants. To secure rapport, then, it is necessary for each person in the session to possess insight into the other. Thus, if an interview takes place in the emotionalized atmosphere of fear, anger, or blame, obviously little or no rapport will be established.

CRITIQUE OF VARIOUS METHODS

For the most part the foregoing has been descriptive of the three basic methods which have been used for personality study. Now our attention will be focused chiefly on the advantages and the limitations of each method. Such a critique should enable us to form some judgment as to their scientific soundness and practical usefulness.

Critique of the experimental method. The ideal of the material sciences is, of course, the experimental method; but in the human and social-cultural fields almost insuperable difficulties have prevented the attainment of such precision. Applied to human materials, the strict experimental method—in which complete objectivity and exactitude or precision are obtained—either has not been possible or else has not yielded results of significance. We have already noted that the experimental psychology initiated by Weber, Fechner, and Wundt, and highly developed by Titchener, failed to contribute anything of importance to an understanding of personality. In the effort to secure objectivity, precision, accuracy, and complete control of the variables, there has often been a tendency to select items or elements of such abstract simplicity that they fail to give significant understanding of complex human behavior in its social-cultural setting. (See Woodard, 1933.) There is, in fact, a certain conflict between the theory and its accompanying scientific method, which stress the molecular features of personality, and the theory and method which are concerned with the larger, totalistic, molar character of our subject matter. (See G. W. Allport, 1937a; Murray, 1938.) The former emphasizes highly specific traits, attitudes, and other items in subjective or objective activity; the latter stresses the need to study total and complex patterns—the person's life organization as a whole. When investigators take up the former, they find that their results throw but little light on the larger adaptive processes. But attempts to get at the molar features, in turn, force research workers to modify the strict experimental procedures, especially in the direction of using the methods of testing by means of certain statistical devices.

For example, Vernon (1935, 1936), in reporting on a series of judgments of intelligence, quickness, extroversion, and emotional stability, has shown that adequacy

and validity are enhanced as the judges progress from the emphasis upon molecular, specific features to a recognition of the larger structuralized molar aspects of the total life organization. So, too, G. W. Allport and Cantril (1934), in investigating the matching of voice with personality traits, discovered that they got the most satisfactory results when the personal characteristics were grouped together into a single verbal description of each individual. The extensive investigation of Murray and his co-workers (1938) has amply shown the advantage of a combination of experimental with other devices. Some of their most telling results came from quasi-experimental methods, such as those of the thematic tests which expose the underlying patterns of thought and motivation in their subjects. These are forms of experimental-statistical method without the complete control of all the variables, but they nevertheless aid in uncovering the deeper layers of personality structure and function.

While the strict experimental approach has little to offer us at present, the quasi-experimental methods, especially those which deal with the larger and more generalized aspects of personal adaptation, show considerable promise. The worker who would undertake such research should get as great a control of variables as is commensurate with the purpose in hand; but the sensible experimenter will not be willing to substitute significant for purely trivial results, no matter how precise and accurate the latter may appear to be. In this connection the use of the school situation for purposes of research should not be overlooked. For years past, psychological and pedagogical differences in the learning process in school have been studied. We are just beginning to employ the educational situation as a laboratory for investigating social-emotional adjustments. (See May and Doob, 1937; Murphy, Murphy, and Newcomb, 1937; Prescott, 1938; and Ryan, 1938, for reviews of the literature.)

Critique of statistical methods. In our previous discussion of statistical methods many of the essential cautions respecting their use were noted, but some of these need to be emphasized and still other cautions indicated.

While in physics the units of measurement are simple and well defined, in social psychology this is seldom true, although statistical workers in the field operate as if the units were adequate. In rating scales which employ numbers, say 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, or corresponding units on a line, there is often a false impression of equality which is not borne out by the actualities. So, too, in tests, schedules, or standard questionnaires it is assumed that the questions to be answered, or the tasks to be performed, may be added up as equal units to make a total score. In all such scales or tests it is important that the questions be equated as to importance, that they have social-psychological significance, that is, that they reveal the facts desired. Too often the items are either too vague, broad, and general, or too narrow and trivial, and so specific as to shed no light on the problems at hand.

In this connection the most serious deficiency of many so-called personality scales lies in the fact that they completely ignore the cultural setting of behavior and especially the objects or situations which call out such traits or types of response. Too often such terms as *tact*, *perseverance*, *neatness*, and *emotional instability* not only are poorly defined, but are not referred to the concrete situations to which they may apply. To offset these difficulties it is important to define the terms carefully, thus avoiding ambiguity and personal interpretation, to make the questions concrete rather than abstract, and to relate terms and questions to situations or determinable objects of attention. Thus, the Allports' (see G. W. Allport, 1928) test of ascendance-submission has many advantages in that it presents the subject with a series of concrete situations which reflect verbally actual conduct. A test of dominance, on the contrary, which merely called for self-judgment as to whether one was, in general terms, aggressive or antagonistic, and so on, might not yield as sound results. Moreover, in constructing rating scales, one should define the terms accurately, furnish the raters with concrete illustrative descriptions of persons and situations to be judged, and call for ratings on distinguishable items of overt behavior. (For example, various studies have demonstrated that judges are more accurate in rating others on such features as expansiveness than on such traits as self-insight.) In rating schemes, especially, it is well to provide against the personal biases of the judges and to ask them to rate only people they know well. We know, for instance, that judges do best in rating the traits of others which resemble their own. Finally, the "halo effect" is a constant handicap; that is, raters often tend to use their general impression of fitness or unfitness of the individual when judging specific features. In short, they carry over one rating to the next, whereas in theory each estimate should represent an unbiased judgment independent of every other judgment. (See Rugg, 1922, 1923.)

In the question sort of test or in the rating scheme there frequently is a questionable assumption that the mere multiplication of questions or other items will counteract the inadequacies of careful definition of terms and concreteness of characteristics to be judged or tested. It is also well to pay attention to the matter of weighting the items in making up the final score. While the more carefully prepared tests do make an effort to analyze each item in reference to the total scores obtained, too often the inventors of tests or schedules merely guess at the proper weights to be assigned given items or clusters of items.

For instance, Woodworth's *Psychoneurotic Inventory or Personal Data Sheet* (1918) contains 116 items which have been classified by Symonds (1931) into types as follows: physical symptoms, 28 items; adjustment to social environment, 20 items; fears

and worries, 16 items; unhappiness, unsocial moods and conduct, 16 items; and a scattering of other categories with from 4 to 10 items each. The final score, supposed to measure psychoneurotic characteristics or emotional instability, is, as usual, computed from verbal responses to each question. But no one has really attempted to discover why physical symptoms should contribute 24 per cent to the total score; adjustment to environment 17 per cent; fears and worries 13.8 per cent; unhappiness, unsocial moods, and conduct 13.8 per cent; and so on. What is said here applies to almost all other tests or rating scales which use some total score or percentile ranking as a measure of the examinee's verbal reactions. Of course, the empirical test of validity and predictability of overt conduct is usually employed; if the validity is high, we simply assume that our weighting has been scientifically and logically justified. But the fact remains that such procedures still fall short of the high criteria of objectivity which science sets for itself.

Not only must the content and weighting of items be carefully worked out, but any test or schedule which does not comply with the statistical standards of determining reliability and validity should be at once suspect. There are a good many technical criticisms to be made of the "split-half" method, especially since the length of a test affects its reliability. So, too, a coefficient of reliability for a given test may be expected to hold when the test is applied to other samples only if their variability in the trait being measured is approximately the same as that of the group for which the coefficient was established.

Yet, as important as reliability is, validity is even more important, for, unless the rating scheme, the test, or the inventory shows a statistically significant correlation with some outside criteria, preferably overt behavior, the instrument has little scientific or practical usefulness. The least satisfactory method of validation is that which employs so-called experts to state whether or not a given item or test or schedule will or will not measure what it is supposed to measure. It ill becomes a statistician to pooh-pooh the student of life-history documents if he employs such subjective and inaccurate methods of validating a would-be objective scale. Such subjective judgments are seldom improved by the elaborate statistical manipulation to which they are sometimes subjected. One of the most telling criticisms ever made of such a method is found in a paper by Burnham and Crawford (1935), who demonstrated that alleged significant personality features as indicated from the Bernreuter and Thurstone schedules of neuroticism could be had by chance throws of a pair of dice. Of course, this study does not invalidate the use of personality schedules as diagnostic instruments, but it does indicate the need of caution in the interpretation of statistical results.

Even when a test or scale has been well constructed as to validity and reliability on a large and homogeneous sample, an all-too-common error in the application of such a test or scale to samples or populations

for which it was not designed. College professors not infrequently devise such instruments for high-school or college students, and are then amazed to find that the tests have little or no application in the world outside the classroom. (See Spencer, 1939, for a critical analysis of the inadequacies of many current personality schedules and for a suggestive development of a new technique of testing certain aspects of socioemotional adjustment.)

Research workers who try to apply such tests or scales to adults in rural or urban communities often discover that the content has little or no meaning for the group to be tested. If a test is to be successful, there must be co-operation and sympathetic intention to follow the instructions as honestly as possible. If such co-operation is to be secured, the subjects must have adequate motivation and interest in taking the test, in answering the questions on a schedule, or in judging themselves or others on a rating blank.

But even good intentions are not enough. If the device is too abstract, if the instructions are complicated and unclear, and if the demands on discriminative ability are meaningless, the results will be invalid—no matter how statistically perfect the instrument may be. This sort of limitation was well demonstrated by Roskelley (1938), who prepared a Thurstone scale in order to measure opinions and beliefs of a given sample from a village community regarding the drinking of hard liquor and beer. The test was constructed with the help of college students, and the usual Thurstone techniques of determining the scale values were employed. But, when Roskelley presented this test to his would-be informants in the field, many of them complained that the judgments or "answers" called for "made no sense" to them. In short, it was a case where the provision for fine discrimination called for by the test did not fit into the thought patterns or habits of these rural people. Much simpler choices, such as for or against the consumption of liquor or beer, proved more adequate in exposing the opinions of this sample. In other words, the Thurstone and like scales have grown up in an academic culture group which is sophisticated—that is, trained—in making certain kinds of verbal discriminations which are quite meaningless to adults in ordinary life situations.

Of somewhat similar nature is the situation where tests devised for school or college populations in a given culture area are applied to children or adults in a society possessing another culture. The Binet-Simon and various group tests of intelligence have too frequently been indiscriminately applied to samples of people who had no adequate comprehension of the items called for in the examination. Klineberg (1935) has shown the foolishness of applying to Negroes or American Indians many tests designed for urban white school children in this country. Thus one multiple choice item on a certain group test called for a reaction regarding people's "proper" behavior during a church service. According to the scale-makers the correct answer was that the congregation remained quiet in church; but a Negro child brought up in a sect that emphasized emotional demonstrations in church checked one of the alternate items, which indicated that one should make a noise during the services. On the white standard this was scored as a wrong answer. In terms of the Negro's training it was a thoroughly correct one. In short, it is clear that the questions or other items in a scale or inventory must be related to objects or situations or subjective charac-

teristics that arise out of the social and cultural world in which the subject lives. Otherwise such devices will prove meaningless.

Moreover, those devices which are oriented to a study of overt conduct or to traits and verbal reactions which are easily manifest to an outside observer have so far proved more adequate than those which aim at the inner life of the subject. For the most part we have oversimplified our variables and have confined them too often to external manifestations only, neglecting the subjective life entirely. Of course, some workers take the position that this internal life is inaccessible by any scientific method and that at best we must observe the given individuals in as controlled a situation as possible, leaving the worker to draw his inferences about the inner life from his statistical results. (See Thomas and Thomas, 1928.) Yet, if this extreme behavioristic theory be maintained, either we must retreat to the position that the inner life can never be subjected to observation and analysis, or we shall be forced all too frequently to resort to drawing inferences from data which are oversimplified and even trivial in character. G. W. Allport (1937a, p. 545) somewhat caustically remarks: "More effort has been wasted in the study of personality from the use of irrelevant variables and artificial conceptualizations than from any other cause."

Except with respect to proper application to given sets of data, as already indicated, technical criticisms of various statistical measures for characterizing and correlating variables or attributes are outside the scope of this chapter. Of more importance to us are certain general cautions as to just what statistics may offer as to method and interpretation of certain data in the field of our interest. Not only should workers properly define their variables or attributes, use the best means of sampling, and exercise the best techniques to check reliability and validity, but they should at all times recognize the limitations of the statistical method and not employ elaborate manipulations which reach far beyond the actual significance of their materials.

First of all it must always be remembered that statistics is a branch of mathematics which provides a language for describing and treating distributions and relationships of data. In discussing the measures of central tendency, of variability, or of correlation, we are but using certain forms of expressing logical abstract relations which are presumed to fit or portray certain empirical findings. And, though the statistical treatment of personality data may assist us to formulate generalizations about mind and behavior, we must not fall into the error of confusing the consideration of selected variables or attributes by such methods with a more complete analysis in terms of cause-and-effect relations. The various elements of personality are complex and woven together into patterns in such a

way that to tear them out of their setting is often to destroy the very interrelationships of given variables or attributes which it is most important for us to know. In constructing and applying tests, scales, and inventories or other such measures, we must reckon not only with the logical demands of sound statistics, but with the social-psychological and cultural factors at which such instruments are directed. For example, although, by using partial correlation techniques, we may establish statistically the relative weight of separate factors or elements which entered into the total (general) index of covariation, it does not necessarily follow that this represents the actual weight or importance of these elements in the situation under consideration. Assuming for the moment that a given instrument has met all the essential logical criteria of statistics, it may still fail to furnish the wanted interpretation if it does not come to grips with the significant psychological facts, or with those bearing on the social situation and the cultural milieu in which the subjects are found. The statistical frame of reference is not always identical with that of the most meaningful data of psychology or the social sciences.

The whole matter is well illustrated by reference to factorial analysis. Despite its usefulness in giving us a means of characterizing clusters of traits among a vast array of specific responses, the elaborate mechanics of factor analysis should not be allowed to provide a sense of unwarranted assurance about pertinent "factors" in thought or conduct: (a) It must be remembered that the tests which are used to collect many of the data for such techniques are frequently decidedly limited as to their validity. (b) While intellectual abilities theoretically range from zero to a maximum score, nonintellectual traits and other features of personality often fall into dichotomous categories which are not properly dealt with by the statistics of variables. Hence the application of factor analysis to such characteristics is open to grave criticism. (c) The discovery of independent abilities or factors frequently but indicates the need to throw the statistical findings back into the lap of the experimentalist or to undertake their detailed examination by life-history methods.

One is apt to be impressed in reading Thurstone's (1938) discussion of primary abilities by the great need to get at the actual psychological mechanisms which lie behind them. For example, how sound is a classification of "primary abilities" when it is shown or admitted that their classification may and can be altered in terms of age or by an increase in the difficulty of a given test on which the ability is predicated? What are the *psychological constants* in contrast to the purely statistical ones? In other words, we must never forget that, at best, statistical devices, like other methods, furnish a foundation for an interpretation from a particular frame of reference. And the statistical logic is evidently not necessarily that of social or experimental psychology. (Boring, 1920, pointed this out with respect to intelligence tests, and Anastasi, 1938, has demonstrated some serious limitations respecting alleged "primary" factors in mental organization.)

In interpreting statistical correlations, therefore, the student must bear in mind that correlation merely determines the co-occurrence—that is, the

frequency or numbers—of certain sets of relations. As Ezekiel (1930, p. 349) wisely remarks, correlation "can never itself provide the interpretation as to cause and effect. It can only establish the *facts* of the relations."

Critique of life-history methods. Certain of the advantages and limitations of the life-history technique have already been implied. The defense of this device has usually taken the form of pointing out that it provides a more or less continuous picture through time of the individual's narration and interpretation of his own experiences and often of that of others around him. It is said to be peculiarly valuable in providing a view of the inner life. It furnishes an account of past situations which gave rise to new meanings and new habits; that is, it provides information on the origins of subjective life and of overt conduct. In particular it indicates the place which crises have had in the development of new traits, attitudes, meanings, and habits. When prolonged interviews are used, such as are found in psychoanalysis, or other extensive clinical contacts, the method yields rich data respecting the operation of unconscious motivations, mental processes, and the specific effects of repressed patterns. It also helps to frame questions and hypotheses to be tested by further life-history analysis or by the application of experimental or statistical methods.

But more than this, this technique has possibilities for interpreting personality which the other methods, so far, have not given us; i. e., it furnishes a framework for compiling relevant data about one individual, keeping attention upon both his common and his unique qualities. Within the context of the single person's life story, specific events in relation to other events and to external situations take on significant meaning. And, if we compare a series of such analyses of individuals, we may formulate some generalizations about both subjective life and overt conduct.

The lack of standard procedures constitutes one major limitation of most of the work in this field to date. Failure to select acceptable variables or attributes, to determine carefully their nature, and to formulate hypotheses makes it difficult for the results from one study to be compared or correlated with like data from other investigations. The scientific criterion of duplication and verification of studies is all too often ignored. So, too, there is altogether too frequent neglect of sampling procedures; the worker with case histories is under constant temptation to generalize from too few and often atypical instances.

On the other hand, the ambition to introduce a high degree of standardization in method may itself destroy some of the virtues of the life-history technique. This danger is especially great if the variables and attributes are so torn out of their larger contexts as to become only meaningless concepts. Yet by the matching of life histories and by the use of the statistics of attributes—to note two obvious quantitative devices—doubtless some of the case materials could be put into convenient form

for comparisons and for determining significance in terms of probability. Workers with this material frequently fail to recognize the need to compare and contrast variables and attributes in a representative sample. They should welcome any statistical help in treating their material more adequately which will not at the same time destroy its significance in relation to total personality structure and function. They are properly wary of those who would apply quantitative methods in such a manner as would reduce the treatment to unimportant details. Thus, while Newcomb (in Murphy, Murphy, and Newcomb, 1937) has a point in strongly advocating the application of statistical methods to case materials, such procedures must not lead the worker to neglect the significant qualitative factors. The danger in such efforts is indicated in Chapple's (1940) attempt to quantify data on social interactions. While his method is ingenious, it may easily lead to a false sense of adequacy simply because algebraic symbols carry to readers an appealing magic of their own which may easily belie the more significant meanings in interstimulation and response. Another limitation on purely numerical results—when applied to subjective experiences—is illustrated by Gould (1939), who found in a study of levels of aspiration and achievement that the meanings which the participants gave to their aspirations and to their sense of failure or success frequently did not correspond to the quantitative indexes indicated in their scores on a series of tests.

In this connection Stouffer's (1930) combination of autobiographical sketches and testing by a Thurstone scale in his study of opinions and attitudes toward liquor traffic is suggestive. So, too, an unpublished study by Glick and the present writer on religious beliefs of college students have shown that the interview may reveal highly valuable data in uncovering the sources of beliefs and the meaning of test scores. In fact, there should be a constant interplay between the experimenters and statisticians, on the one hand, and the workers with life histories, on the other. The latter constantly expose problems which the former might well investigate, and the former, in turn, must constantly be able to undertake (or give over to others who are qualified) the more prolonged analysis of case materials which may be secured from selected members of the particular samples with which they worked in order to get at the subjective factors so essential to more complete understanding.

Of somewhat similar usefulness are the dramatic play techniques used to uncover deep-lying interests, antagonisms, and frustrations in children and in adults. (See Schwartz, 1932; Murray, 1938; Conn, 1939; Curran, 1939; and Despert, 1940.) Also the Moreno (1937) sociometric studies are of this character. By the use of dramatic rehearsals of previous experiences, he is able to effect insight and therapy in many of his neurotic patients.

The reliability of case materials cannot be checked up by the application of the usual statistical devices, but must be tested with reference to the accuracy of the account, from the determination of the logical se-

quence of events in the life course of the subject, and from other internal evidences. In the same vein validity is hard to establish in a quantitative manner. But relatively satisfactory validity may be obtained by comparing the verbal responses with overt conduct, by verifying the individual's own story against the accounts of others—say parents, teachers, pastors, social workers, or others who know the individual—and by detecting consistencies or inconsistencies between thought, word, and action.

In the interpretation of case histories the accuracy of the observer and of the informant is highly important. Certain psychological limitations in both must be recognized. Among other matters it is important to realize and detect, if possible, errors in perception, especially as to what is seen or heard. So, too, falsification of memory is a difficulty which must always be taken into account if possible. Likewise, both informant and observer are liable to unconscious omissions, to distortions of recall, to tendencies to dramatize what is remembered, and to the very common repression of unpleasant details. So, too, interviewers must always guard against the temptation to read into, or project upon, their subjects their own ideas, traits, attitudes, and frames of reference.

Any knowledge of the practice of interviewing for purposes of either research or therapy makes it evident that there are striking differences in the capacities of individuals to set up and maintain a successful interview. The worker not only must have that flexibility in role-taking which we have noted, but must possess self-insight and self-knowledge. He not only must know the mechanics of interaction, but must be aware of the influence of his own biases, of his own inclinations to overidentify himself with another, and of the likelihood that certain reactions of the subject may arouse in him certain antagonistic, moralizing, or other responses which may block the free flow of the session itself.

It is easy for both informant and observer to emphasize items which fit into their own preconceived mental patterns and to neglect others which may be equally or even more important. The social worker may stress data which the vocational counselor might overlook, or the psychiatrist may emphasize material bearing on frustrations and fantasies, and omit reference to important social-cultural counterparts. All too frequently, in the past, the life-history document has, in this sense, been too closely tied up with the immediate purpose of some agency of reform or therapy. Though we cannot avoid this fact, in the future the preparation of life-history documents for research purposes would certainly profit by the use of common concepts, general consensus regarding hypotheses, and common agreement on criteria as to the material to be secured in order to test the hypotheses. Then, too, there is the constant inclination of most persons to pay attention to the unusual and striking event to the neglect of small details which may be loaded with important meaning. As neces-

sary as it is for the worker in this field to report the influence of a severe crisis upon personal development, it is also important to see such an event against the background of the former history and the total situation in which the crisis arises.

Inference and intuition. In analyzing data from the life history, especially elements of subjective life, we are obliged to raise the question once more of the role of the observer or scientist as an instrument of interpretation. In line with the usual canons of experimental science and logic, the research worker is assumed to be impersonal and to test his hypotheses and draw his conclusions and generalizations through the logic of inference. *Inference* is a mental process in which the individual is conscious of the logical steps in deductive and inductive logic which he applies to the data at hand. In contrast to this method stands that process of drawing conclusions which employs sympathetic identification and insight, which are usually strictly avoided by the logician. Some writers like G. W. Allport (1937a) rather sharply distinguish between the method of inference and this other procedure, which he terms intuition. As a matter of fact, such a sharp dichotomy is unnecessary since it has been shown that even in alleged logical thought processes unconscious bias and insight may and often do play a part.

Rather than draw too sharp and distinct a line between logical inference and intuition we must indicate the place of the latter in the interpretation of case-history materials. We may define *intuition* as a method of formulating beliefs, postulates, and hypotheses, or of drawing conclusions or generalizations, in which not all the steps in the mental processes are known to the individual. It involves, in short, a considerable amount of unconscious inference.

Let us examine the function of intuition in the treatment of life histories. Unfortunately the term *intuition* has been used to mean all sorts of mysterious capacities and is eschewed by hard-headed logicians and scientists who would depend on the conscious processes of deduction and induction. But in the field of personality investigation many workers have come to realize that the intimate and personal nature of many of their data, especially those deriving from the inner life, cannot be comprehended or interpreted adequately by the use of these deliberate logical devices alone. The work of Stern (1938) on what is called *verstehende Psychologie*, the central use of fantasy thinking in uncovering inner meanings through psychoanalysis (see Murray, 1938; and Lasswell, 1939), and the insistence of G. W. Allport (1937a) upon the use of insight in studying the unique and autonomous nature of life organization all show a trend in the direction of recognizing the function of unconscious inference in aiding the worker to give adequate meaning to his findings in the personality field. (See Chapter XII.)

Intuition is a capacity which involves empathy or sympathetic insight into others, a type of identification and participation not unlike that already discussed in relation to the psychology of interaction.⁶ The use of intuition does not preclude the employment of rational inference, but, as Murray (1938) well remarks, in understanding his fellows a man may use not only perception and logic but his feelings and emotions as well. People do this in everyday life as does the artist in his work, but the hard-headed scientist, on the whole, has no use for the employment of the intuitive method, although he often does use it unwittingly in setting up preliminary hypotheses or problems and in drawing deductions from his data. But, since he apparently cannot accept it consciously, he denies it to anyone else.⁷ Moreover, the training of the scientist leads him to rely on rational or logical inference and to suppress his feelings, emotions, and sympathetic identification with his materials. This may be feasible and correct when he is dealing with material objects, but, when he is dealing with the life of man, it can hardly apply. In the analysis of personality there should be an empathy or sympathetic identification on the part of the observer with the situation and with the behavior, words, gestures, and other manifestations of the subject. In fact, in drawing logical inferences we all operate on the assumption that the bodily movements, gestures, and verbal reactions of another are reflective or indicative of subjective experience such as we have when we behave or gesture or speak in the same or a similar manner. (See Adams, 1928, for an excellent statement on the nature of inference.) Thus to neglect the evidences of inner life which we get from an autobiography or extensive interviewing or from other sources of life history is actually to reduce the quantity of the evidence from which we may draw inferences or make interpretations. There are many confirmatory data on this matter of in-

⁶ Here as elsewhere I have used the term *insight* to refer to the capacity of one individual to identify himself sympathetically with another—that is, to assume his role with all its attendant ideas, traits, attitudes, values, frames of reference, and the like. In contrast, G. W. Allport (1937a) uses the term *insight* to mean what I call *self-insight*—that is, the ability to describe, analyze, and interpret one's own subjective life and overt conduct. See also Waller (1934) for a discussion of what he calls "sympathetic penetration" as a device in research.

⁷ This unwillingness and even inability of the so-called tough-minded scientist or logician to grant any place to insight and intuition as aids to science or logic poses a neat psychological problem of its own. What is the personality structure and function of such individuals? It would be interesting to know, for example, if they are basically compulsive or obsessive in life organization and interest, given over, to a high degree, to organizing their world logically both as a protective and as an expressive device. Is it possible that they have deep repressions of the more sympathetic libidinous features of personality which seem to lie at the roots of a certain flexibility and appreciation of emotions and feelings, and at the roots of sympathetic insight into others? Or it may be that they have dissociated their sympathetic and intuitive capacities from their logic in such a way as to prevent any flow between the two. Certainly the rigidity of some of these individuals would suggest that they are not so much tough as brittle in mental structure. They seem to take up such a highly ordered frame of reference because they would not dare to live in a more flexible world of thought, emotion, and action.

tuitive identification. People rate others most accurately in regard to traits which they themselves have and least well in regard to those they do not have. Also ratings are much affected by the degree of familiarity with the individuals rated. (See Landis, 1934; G. W. Allport, 1937a; Murray, 1938; and discussion above.)

Yet, as we indicated in describing the interactional process in the interview, the interpreter of the life-history document not only must possess sympathetic identification, but must also retain his own role as critic, as one apart or separate from the events to be interpreted. In short, there must be a double role: one of empathy, intimate imagination, and "resonating feeling," as Murray terms it; the other of critical judgment, which depends upon general knowledge of the relation of the subject in question to his past and present social-cultural milieu, and upon the acceptable principles of psychological functioning. Murray (1938) has aptly referred to this dual aspect of interpretation by the term "critical empathy."

In turn this all calls for a degree of self-insight not found in many persons, which raises questions as to individual variation in this intuitive capacity and as to whether such capacities may be acquired by formal training. In this connection Blumer (1939, p. 77) makes this incisive comment: "The person who has a broad acquaintance with human beings, who, as we say popularly, understands human nature, and who has an intimate familiarity with the area of experience that he is studying should make a more able analysis than one who is less well equipped in these aspects." It is apparent that there are some people highly qualified in these respects while others are not.

In this connection one may ask whether it is possible to train individuals to be successful interviewers. There is no adequate answer to this query, but we do know that in training for social work, personnel work, educational guidance, clinical psychology, and work in psychiatry and psychoanalysis these and other qualities are usually recognized and that a certain percentage of people seem to lack the form of life organization which makes possible their learning the techniques of successful interviewing. But, so far, no objective tests or measures of such ability have been devised, and, since this sort of capacity involves the art of handling people, it may be that some of its more subtle features will long escape careful determination and measurement. Yet, despite the lack of specific formulae and of pedagogical materials and methods for instructing others in such skills, one must agree heartily with Murray (1938, p. 249) when he says that "critical emotional participation . . . may be cultivated to advantage and, when corrected by all other means at our disposal, is the best instrument that we possess for exploring the 'depths' of personality." (On interview techniques see Bingham and Moore, 1934; R. S. Wilson, 1937; P. V. Young, 1935, 1939; and Hulett, 1938.)

Generalization from the case history. There has been much discussion about possible sound generalization from life-history materials. Those who are aware of the deficient definitions of factors to be investigated, of sampling, reliability, and validity, contend that no verifiable general and systematic principles can ever be had from such data. They are particularly critical of the inclination to generalize from one life history. On the other hand, many people would agree with those workers who take the position that the single case is not fortuitous and scientifically unimportant, and that general laws of development may also be applicable to individuals. Murray (1938) remarks that "case histories are the proof of the pudding" in the study of personality.

In spite of this, it is all too evident that life-history documents have not served to order and determine the conclusions and interpretations so much as to amplify and illustrate theories which seem to stem out of the observer's own rich experience in life. Whereas generalization should develop from the data, we frequently find that theories derived elsewhere intrude themselves upon the data at hand. It has been pointed out that no serious effort has ever been made to check and verify the psychoanalytic method by submitting individuals to the usual scientific controls. All too often, as Blumer (1939, pp. 77, 78, 79) says, "Theories seem to order the data," and "the deficiency of human documents as a test of interpretation is due in large part to the nature of the act of interpretation" itself; in many instances the human "document has value only in terms of the theory with which it is interpreted, but... the validity of the theory usually can not be determined by the document."

In this connection it is well to note that Murray and his coworkers (1938) attempted to avoid some of this difficulty by the use of frequent staff conferences in which through interaction they hammered out their variables, a set of hypotheses to be tested, and a general theory of interpretation. We need more of this sort of investigation, just as we should have duplications of field work by cultural anthropologists, and repetition of case studies in schools, industry, business, prisons, mental hospitals, and other public institutions.⁸ Yet, despite the strictures of Blumer noted above, we cannot proceed in science, as he has himself well demonstrated (Blumer, 1931), without first having concepts, hypotheses, and theories. What we want, of course, is to keep our theories tentative, to use all the varied methods which we can in order to check one technique against another,

⁸ There is, however, an obvious difficulty in such duplication, especially if the same informants be used. No person who has been through a prolonged psychoanalysis, or served as a subject of an extensive study such as Murray's, or has acted as informant for an anthropologist or social psychologist, would ever enter into a similar situation with another interviewer or observer in the same psychological state in which he approached the first one. Thus in the very process of collecting human data, the data are altered. Man does not duplicate himself in his reactions in the way in which physical elements do.

and to submit both our theory and our findings to others for their critical analysis. Thus we might break up the life-history materials into smaller units and attempt to check some of the findings by experimental or statistical devices. In this connection the life history may provide clues to significant elements in personality which might be studied by quasi-experimental and statistical methods.

Finally, the theoretical and scientific use of the material from life histories must be related to the levels of description and interpretation which are to be employed. If we take a large, over-all (molar) view of the subject of personality, we are certain to get different results than if we take a microscopic, highly specific view. Or, if we concern ourselves chiefly with what G. W. Allport calls "common" traits—derived chiefly from our culture—and neglect the individualistic features of personality, we come out with interpretations quite different from those of workers who follow Stern (1938) and G. W. Allport (1937a, 1937b) in their emphasis upon the unique and autonomous character of life organization. (See Chapters XII and XIII.)

Or, again, we may approach our study of the person from a simple descriptive level, in which case perceptible overt responses, gestures, and verbal reactions such as opinions and beliefs would be the most obvious data. At another level we may attempt to get at the inner, subjective life of the person. And it is at this point that the life history becomes important. Will it, if at all properly safeguarded by the canons of science, enable us to get at the subjective life more adequately than other methods? Obviously a case history is couched in verbal or other symbolic form; it is no direct photograph of the workings of the inner life of man. But it may be that this sort of symbolic material will yield richer sources for meaningful analysis than will precise experimental reports or test scores treated by complicated statistical logic. Yet there are many serious difficulties involved in this approach; at some points it appears to lack any objective validity, and at others it seems to be more properly a matter of art than of science. In particular, there are serious problems regarding the determination of significant factors and the use of the research worker himself as an instrument of interpretation and generalization.

THE PREDICTIVE AND PRACTICAL USE OF SCIENCE AND THEORY

In time our scientific findings and accompanying theories should become available for application to particular groups and individuals. Here we enter the field of prediction and control. But in dealing with people practically we are confronted with the fact that at present our theory and science are not sufficiently advanced to give us the tools of re-education

and therapy which we desire. We have made advances in the statistical field, especially in the application of intelligence tests and pedagogical tests in predicting with some assurance the school success of pupils, but this remains only a section of the larger problem of personality adaptation. As tests or rating scales of emotionality, traits, attitudes, and personality types become standardized and improved as to content and treatment of results, we may look for their use not only in schools, but with reference to marital problems, to criminal and neurotic behavior, to business and industry, and to other fields. Yet prediction of personal action from statistical treatment of mass data will long remain a highly difficult task. We certainly do lack the assurance of prediction which we see around us in the material or natural sciences of chemistry and physics. In equal measure, we must be cautious of generalizing and hence of predicting from life histories until we know much more about them in terms of processes and mechanisms and adequate samples. Still, the matter is not entirely without some promise.

Despite all the negative criticisms hurled at psychoanalysis, there is no doubt that it has contributed much to a more adequate theory of personality, just as its interview techniques not only have been used by the *echt* psychoanalysts for therapy, but have greatly modified interview techniques in other fields. The researches of G. W. Allport (1937a), Murray (1938), Lewin, Lippitt, and White (1939), and a host of child psychologists who have got away from mere mental testing (see among others Arrington, 1932; L. B. Murphy, 1937; McFarlane, 1938; McGraw, 1939) are all contributing to the establishment of a set of principles about development and about behavior which will aid us in predicting and controlling behavior. In another sector the work of Burgess and Cottrell (1939) and of Terman (1938) on factors making for marital success or failure, and Burgess's (Bruce, Harno, and Burgess, 1928) and Laune's (1936) work on prediction of the behavior of parolees, give indications that by use of case materials in connection with statistical devices, predictive formulae may be devised which will aid in directing behavior. But these beginnings are very modest, although we may expect an increasingly important body of data in these fields which should help us to forecast—at least within certain limits—and thus to control human conduct.

No matter which scientific technique is used for describing and analyzing personality, it must not be forgotten that the essential aim in every instance is the same: a clearer and more objective understanding of human beings in interaction with each other, with a view to being able to predict and control their behavior and thought toward a more satisfactory adaptation to others and to themselves. However, at this juncture in our studies, it may be better to use less exact methods than to neglect facts or data which are significant. In a sense it is the meaningful rather than

the highly precise detail which is most important at this stage of our investigations into personality. For example, the contribution of psychoanalysis to knowledge and practice—despite certain philosophic fantasies of Freud—is often more important to us than many of the data collected by elaborately devised tests and schedules and treated with the most refined and complicated of statistical devices. So, too, the psychographic methods in use by G. W. Allport (1937a) and Murray (1938) may in time yield a firm basis for forecasting, at least within reasonable limits, the course of individual behavior. Or the case-method technique, as inadequate as it is in terms of conventional statistical controls of sampling, validity, and reliability, may prove in the long run to be more significant in building a theory and scientific knowledge about personality, and hence practically more useful in predicting adaptation, than concern with testable but unimportant overt behavior items.

Art of handling people. Despite this rather negative, not to say pessimistic, view, I do not take the stand that we may not or should not attempt to re-educate persons to better adaptation to themselves and to society. It seems to me that we are developing an *art* of handling people. Art, in this sense, is a practical technique or method of changing attitudes and behavior. It may and does draw upon various theories and various scientific facts, but the object is always reformation or re-education of the individual. The diagnosis and prognosis of the physician afford us something of a parallel situation. The medical man gets facts and uses theories in attempting to help his patient. But over and above that he frequently uses insight and intuitive inferences in making his judgment as to how to proceed in laying out the patient's future course of action. Applying this to personality problems, we may say that the psychiatrist, the psychologist, the social worker, the vocational or educational counselor or guidance expert, the personnel director in a plant or business house, the pastor or teacher or other specialist in education, must be more than a collector of obvious information. He must show sympathy and understanding of the person's problems. He must identify himself, in short, with the other sufficiently to get the latter's meanings into his own mind. He must, as Cooley and others point out, become a participant observer. Or, as it was put earlier in this chapter, he must enter into an interactional relation with the self or selves of the other, thus modifying his own self as well as that of the person whom he tries to assist. The interview (using the term in the broad sense to include the customary devices of the usual sort and the psychoanalytic method which gets at unconscious formulations) becomes highly important.

In this the interviewer may use the biographical method in part and employ various sorts of records and observations; yet he must go beyond this to the dynamic interplay of personality on personality. Under

his direction two persons together (forming thus for the first time a social group) attempt to develop a schema of activity or attitude which will result in a more adequate adjustment (as defined by the norms of the culture) of the patient, the student in trouble, the parishioner who has lost his faith in God or in himself, the applicant for relief or a job, the unhappy spouse or discouraged spinster, or the worker who has difficulties with his fellows or boss, and so on. In these situations hunch, guess, insight, intuition—call it what you will—comes into play. I suspect that the ablest workers with problem children in schools, with maladjusted college students, with delinquents and foster children, with criminals and neurotics, and with normal adults in personnel situations in the economic world, or with normal adults who seek help from their religious advisors, are persons who develop a number of unconscious patterns of activity and attitude that make for success in somewhat the same way that the great artists possess techniques which they cannot verbalize or describe to others. Such persons are often not the best research workers in fields of experimentation and statistical testing because these approaches force them to a conscious level of activity and thought and perhaps blocks or recasts their unconscious manifestations—something which does not necessarily happen in that sympathetic interaction of which we have spoken. In such counseling with others there is something truly creative in human thought and action.

Chapter XII

THEORIES OF PERSONALITY

THE HABIT of forming generalizations and theories about human conduct and society seems well established everywhere, among primitive tribes—as illustrated in their social myths—as well as in civilized societies wherein introspective persons indulge in attempts to formulate more orderly, general, and systematic interpretations of man's thinking and acting. As we noted in the previous chapter, a *theory* is an abstract and general statement of fundamental principles designed to explain particular events or facts which we know concretely. Applied to personalities, theories and generalizations are useful in understanding and in explaining man's inner life and outer conduct, and, as we have already indicated, both scientific research and satisfactory practical treatment of behavior problems require some sort of theoretical frame of reference, some standpoint or "approach," if we are to arrive at valid conclusions or effect some change in the individual's life organization.

In the field of personality study, there have emerged no end of theories, and some of them have already been mentioned in passing. In this and the next chapter, however, we shall review certain of the important contemporary theories as they bear upon our own discussion. (For more extensive review of some of these theories, see Murphy and Jensen, 1932; Woodworth, 1931; and G. W. Allport, 1937a.) We shall begin with the contributions of psychoanalysis.

PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORIES

Psychoanalysis has been a topic of much bitter controversy between those who consider it a vicious form of medical mythology and malpractice and those who have developed and used it, either in complete agreement with its founder, Sigmund Freud, or in some more or less modified form. But, no matter how one stands on this question, there is little doubt that Freud's work has had a profound influence on the study of personality in Europe and in this country. It is impossible to characterize the theory of Freud in a few paragraphs, and the variations of it are many. The present cursory summary is at best but an approximation to a more complete statement. (See, *inter alia*, Freud, 1913, 1920, 1933; Healy, Bronner, and Bowers, 1930; and Hendrick, 1939.)

Freudian theory. The beginnings of psychoanalysis lie in the field of

clinical medicine. As a young physician, Freud left Vienna to study in France under J. M. Charcot, the great neurologist. Here he first heard the view expressed that many abnormal mental manifestations, in particular in hysteria, were not the result of direct organic malady, but had instead a psychological origin in the previous history of the patient. Such a conception departed sharply from the contemporary materialistic interpretation that all mental and overt aberrations depended on basic neurological injury or change of some sort. This contrasting view that there were psychological determinants of abnormal behavior led to a revival and extension of the theory that the mind is made up of both conscious and unconscious elements, and that the latter have a marked influence upon many of our thoughts and actions. In connection with this interest in the relation of the unconscious to conduct disorders, hypnotism began to be used as a means of uncovering forgotten sources of the present symptoms. Freud was greatly impressed by this new world of ideas which stood in such contrast to his previous training in neurology and psychiatry. Upon his return to Vienna he began practicing psychiatry, using the methods of hypnotism as a means of getting at hidden or unconscious roots of mental and behavior disturbances. But later he and his colleague Breuer found that they could obtain better results, not by placing their patients in a hypnotic trance, but by getting them to lie quietly on a comfortable couch and verbalize everything that came into their minds. This use of free-floating, undirected mental associations which unravel themselves without conscious direction and especially without deliberate inhibition of any item became the basic technique of psychoanalysis. (For a delightful account of the rise of psychoanalysis, see Freud, 1927.) In the slang of America, the patient gradually learned to "spill everything" to the physician. As an important phase of free associations, the patient's narration of his dreams was used as a clue to the inner recesses of thought and emotion. It was also discovered that involuntary slips of the tongue, autistic gestures, and the like may be indicators of significant features of the inner life. On the basis of what was turned up from forgotten experiences—especially those of the earliest years of life—Freud and the patient together came to understand the causal chain of past events which would serve to explain a given anxiety, hysteric reaction, or other mentally distressing experience.

The procedure of analysis is long and tedious. It is difficult to get the patient to tell what is in his mind. People in our society, at least, do not like to confess their secret hatreds or fears of parents, siblings, or others; they dislike exposing the roots of their highly emotionalized, yet repressed, thoughts and emotions. It is necessary, in fact, to develop a strong identification of the patient with the physician—so-called transference—in order to induce complete freedom of association. But gradually the picture of one's inner life from infancy on is uncovered, and a basis is found for

the patient to reorient himself to a more adequate way of life. Contrary to the popular impression, the "cure" does not consist merely in the physician's explaining the mental mechanisms involved. The patient must reorganize his own mental life at an emotional and behavioral rather than a merely intellectual level. This at least is the general procedure, although we have no adequate statistical evidence of the extent of success or failure of this form of therapy. (See, however, Kessel and Hyman, 1933.)

At the outset of his work Freud apparently had no intention of formulating a theory of personality. Of course, he had a background of certain scientific concepts, but only gradually did he evolve his own thesis about the nature of the data which he collected. His first interest was in curing neurotic persons, and a great deal of misunderstanding of psychoanalysis has arisen because critics sometimes fail to distinguish between certain features of this therapy and the theoretical elaborations of Freud and his followers. To follow the wide ramifications of psychoanalytic theory would carry us far afield. For our purposes, we may note the main elements:

(1) Freud posits two fundamental life tendencies, called—metaphorically—the "life instinct" or "eros," and the "death instinct." The former, expressed largely as libido or sexual urge in the broadest sense, may take a variety of forms; it may be directed toward the external world of persons and things; it may be inhibited in its more primal form but sublimated in outward manifestation; or it may be directed inward to give rise to the strong self-preservative patterns. The latter, which is essentially destructive in purpose, may likewise be expressed differently: it may be directed outward as overt aggression or antagonism; it may be repressed, usually as the result of external environmental pressures, which in turn may result in certain regressions to more primary levels of activity; or it may be turned inward upon the self, taking the form of self-injury or self-punishment. These two instincts stand in a bipolar relation to each other and combine and recombine in a variety of ways in the development of the individual.

(2) Freud took a thoroughly deterministic standpoint regarding the psychological processes. Every minute element of thought or overt behavior—every word we use, every slip of the tongue, every thought that enters and passes through our mind, every muscular movement—can and must be linked up into a system of naturalistic cause and effect. Despite the criticism that Freudianism postulates an unnecessary mind-body relationship, that it is mystical and the result of its founder's fantastic imagination, and that it is unproved in the laboratory, in some ways Freud's thesis represents the most devastating determinism in all psychology.¹

¹ In fact, his denial of free will, indeterminism, and other comfortable doctrines of theology furnish simply one other reason, along with his emphasis on sexuality, for the considerable emotional resistance to psychoanalysis, as therapy or theory.

In this connection attention must be called to the misconception in the very expression "free association," so important to the psychoanalytic technique. There is, strictly speaking, no such thing as a "free" mental association if by that phrase one implies that any given mental linkage falls outside a complete cause-and-effect relationship. Every association is determined by its relation to others, and serves as an important source for getting at the complex of factors which enter into the personality. What is meant, then, by "free association"—as used in psychoanalysis or in psychology generally—is that the mental linkages are not directed or controlled by conscious selection or inhibition.

(3) The concept of the unconscious is another fundamental feature of this theory. Our waking thoughts, inner feelings, attitudes, and conduct are determined in large part by processes which operate outside the scope of consciousness. For descriptive purposes, Freud divided the human mind into three levels: the conscious, the foreconscious, and the unconscious. The first is that mental awareness of the inner or outer world present at a given moment in time. The second represents the potential source of memories and old associations upon which we may deliberately draw now or later. For example, though one may not have a given person's name in mind at the moment, there would be no difficulty in recalling it at once if the occasion demanded it. The third level, the unconscious, is not directly available to deliberate recall but is far more extensive and important in determining our lives than either the conscious or the foreconscious. As a matter of fact, it controls much of what goes on in the other two levels.

With these three aspects of Freud's theory before us, let us review briefly two important psychoanalytic interpretations of life organization: (1) the stages of personality growth, and (2) the basic divisions in personality structure.

(1) The two fundamental drives—eros and death—are present in the individual even before birth, and they enter into every activity, modifying or controlling development. The growth of personality is dependent upon the interplay of these instincts in relation to the external contacts of the individual with other persons and material objects. Freud has outlined a series of stages of development as the person passes from infancy to adulthood. The first is the "infancy" period, lasting approximately from birth to five years of age. In this period the libidinous urges are directed pretty largely to getting immediate satisfactions, especially those arising from the operations of the sexual, eliminative, and food-taking organs. But sensuous pleasure arises also from handling the body and from tactile or other sensory manipulations of other persons and things. During this period the fundamental fixation on the mother is established—the root of the Oedipus complex—and the disciplining of the emotions and feelings and the training in bodily habits take place. Yet the essential drive of the

infant during this period remains under what Freud called the "pleasure principle"—the desire for sensuous satisfactions, and the concomitant desire for completely selfish attainment. The organism, at this juncture, operates on an all-or-none pattern. In this infantile phase, of course, it is concerned chiefly with physical or physiological cycles of activity. Associated with this libidinous urge is another, that of absorption and control of the world for one's own satisfaction. When this demand is frustrated, the rudimentary destructive impulse (the death instinct) comes into play, and the erotic drive may be shunted aside. This sadistic, aggressive trend may be directed outward on others or on physical environment, or it may be obliged to turn inward to self-punishment, an essential factor in the rise of the superego. (See below.)

The second stage is called the "latency period," and runs from about the fifth to the twelfth year of life. During these years the attention of the child is more and more directed outward to other persons and the material world with a corresponding decline of the more obvious sexual interests which characterized the former stage. The inhibitive or repressive processes which began in the first months and years continue and result in more or less eliminating the more infantile overt manifestations of sexuality. At the same time the child continues to divert his now somewhat sublimated love interests away from the mother, father, and siblings or other close household members to other persons, such as playmates or teachers and other adults who enter into their world. Moreover, as this trend away from overt affection takes place, the aggressive responses become increasingly linked up with the expression toward the world. In this process the egoistic or power-seeking impulses—arising in part from the destructive urge—become ever more evident.

The third period arises with the coming of puberty, at which time occur sexual maturation and a heightened concern with erotic activities. There is a rearousal of overt libidinous interest, which usually takes two directions: one of self-centered character, witnessed in the recurrence of masturbatory activities—which usually had their origin in the infancy stage; and the other, of heterosexual sort, evident in the growing interest in members of the opposite sex. From this stage the individual normally passes on to adult patterns.

The crucial feature in all this development concerns the love life and ego development. In infancy the basic attachment is to the mother or mother surrogate, and in connection with this fixation and dependence the child develops an overpowering demand for all her love, affection, care, and attention. According to the Freudian theory, at the early stages this may take the form of an unconscious if not conscious wish for direct, organic satisfactions of what are essentially sexual and closely associated physiological interests. On this basis arises the Oedipus complex—a con-

figuration of emotions, feelings, attitudes, and ideas representing this attachment of infant and mother. In the normal development the direct biological demands are repressed or redirected in a variety of ways: by the rise of masturbatory interests, by substitution of other persons or things as a source of pleasure, or by more or less direct inhibition of these impulses in the face of what Freudians call "the reality principle," that is, the requirements of the material world and of society for individual conformity. During the imposition of restrictions and punishments upon the growing child there arises in him an association between his all-powerful drives for organic satisfaction and the demands of parents and others, which results in another configuration of ideas, beliefs, and feelings: the so-called "castration" complex. That is to say, he comes to feel or sense that he has lost his former potency, and the deprivation may in turn serve to motivate his drives for personal domination (ego satisfaction), or it may serve as the basis for a growing sense of inferiority. In fact, this introjection of the power pattern of others means that the fear of losing his own potency in time dissolves the earlier Oedipus complex. That is, the boy—from fear of deprivation, increasingly introjected into his own inner world—sublimates his strong attachment to the mother, partially by diffusing his affection on other persons, including a growing identification with the father and his power. It is in this period that the moral self or superego begins to emerge—that is, the inhibitory role which suppresses the earlier and more instinctual attachment to the mother as a love object.

(2) As to the structure or organization of the personality, or what is called in psychoanalytic theory the "character," Freud postulated three interacting features: id, ego, and superego. The *id* comprises, as I understand it, the biological urges or wants plus the effects of the earliest experiences which have modified or qualified them, which modifications, however, have been denied later expression, that is, have been repressed. The *ego* represents the growth of attitudes, habits, and ideas from contact with the material and social world around one. In terms of the older academic psychology, the ego is a concept for the organization or integration of modifications arising from perception of, or experience with, reality (including the important factors of authority of persons and material forces), with elaborations of imagination, judgment, and conceptualization—all directed to making an acceptable adaptation to the world. The *superego* arises out of the relations of the id to the ego. Authority from others as concerns human or social relations, especially in controlling or tabooing the basic id impulses, leads to the organization of attitudes and ideas and habits (as we would call them) which make up the moral self, the conscience, the controlling organization as regards socially approved and socially disapproved conduct. What sociologically we define as the mores correspond in the individual to combinations of attitudes, ideas,

and habits having to do with the demands for moral conformity by others. The superego may be equated to the popular term *conscience*.

Critique of Freudian theory. Since the influence of psychoanalysis upon personality study is evident in many sections of this book, and since, with reference to particular matters, critical comments are made regarding Freudian interpretations, it is only necessary at this point to comment on some of the major features of psychoanalytic theory.

One of the most significant contributions of Freud and his fellow workers was the exposure of the importance, first, of the unconscious motives and unconscious mechanisms in adult attitudes and behavior; second, of the early years in laying the foundation of adult patterns or life organization; and third, of the relations of the infant and young child to other persons, especially to members of his own family. In fact, contemporary child psychology has drawn largely upon the Freudian for much of its own standpoint, sometimes without adequate acknowledgment. Also, the emphasis upon the child's relations to his mother, father, and siblings in the course of his personal development has influenced the social psychological theory of interaction. (See below.) In this connection, unfortunately, the *echt* Freudians have been slow to recognize the differential effects of culture upon the child's development. (See, however, Kardiner, 1939.) That is to say, while they have properly emphasized the interaction with parents and other family members, they have tended to ignore the fact that these interactional relations are themselves influenced in large measure by the culture of the particular society. For instance, we need a sound body of comparable data on child development from other societies and cultures than our own before we can accept fully either the theory of the universality of the Oedipus and "castration" complexes, or the particular details of the so-called stages of personal growth. So, too, incest taboos, revolt from parental authority, and any number of items going into the make-up of the superego must be studied not only in terms of the earliest child-parent relations, but in terms of the institutionalized or cultural features of the given society. Nevertheless, the Freudians have raised the basic problem whether there are not certain universal psychological mechanisms and patterns of child-parent relations which play a large part in personality development everywhere—that is, relatively independently of specific cultural training. While the culture will provide the framework for directionality and expression of these features, may it not well be that underlying the particular culturalized manifestations there exist basic social psychological factors common to all societies and their cultures? This is a key problem which neither cultural anthropology nor social psychology has as yet completely answered.²

² My own concept of personal-social conditioning has aided me in dealing with this matter of universal underlying patterns of interaction.

In addition to the failure to reckon with the cultural influences in personality development, many other negative criticisms have been offered. (See, among others, Dunlap, 1920; Wohlgemuth, 1923; and Shaffer, 1936.) We shall note only one or two of these. The theory of the dual instincts is not compatible with present-day biology or psychology and must be considered, at best, a philosophical conception like Bergson's (1911) theory of *élan vital* and similar ideas of life force. The concept of the unconscious is repeatedly under fire from the behaviorists and others who claim that it lends nothing to an understanding of human thought and action. (See J. B. Watson, 1919.) But, as unsatisfactory as the concept is, there are phases of human activity which are certainly not to be easily explained in terms of simple stimulus-response psychology. (See Murray, 1938.) Finally, many psychologists find the whole mentalistic terminology of psychoanalysis distasteful. They, like Freud's own medical colleagues in Vienna, who ridiculed his interpretation of hysteria, are convinced of the essential soundness of their own system of materialistic concepts. But in terms of logic a case may be made for any set of terms, postulates, and hypotheses, so long as they are put into a consistent and verifiable form. The trouble is that all too often Freud and other psychoanalysts have not been any too consistent in terminology, and Freud's own habit of using analogies from physiology and culture often irritates even his friendly readers. Of course, the real test of psychoanalytic or any other theory lies not only in a consistent logical system but in the verification of this system through controlled observation—that is, by the scientific method. (See Chapter XI.) We cannot hope for any extended, critical, and complete analysis of such a complicated schema as Freud's to be done through one crucial investigation. Actually, psychologists and psychiatrists and social scientists are constantly engaged in testing, more or less adequately, various features of the theory. No doubt, in time, this theory will merge with others to form one which we hope will be more adequate than any we now have. (For a sound and appreciative critique of Freud, see Murray, 1938, pp. 723-725.)

Adler's theory of the ego. Once a colleague of Freud's, Alfred Adler, another Austrian physician, developed a school of psychology which conceived of personality development in somewhat different terms from those of Freud and his disciples. Though Adler did not develop any extensive theory of personality, he has made a considerable contribution to our thinking in this field. For him life is characterized by a fundamental, inherent, purposive impulsion toward some "expected goal of perfect achievement." (Adler, 1937.) This striving takes place largely through the basic motivation of the desire for power, unified into an ego that should not be dissected into component parts if one would comprehend its true meaning. In the early years each person develops his own special "style of life"—from innate and acquired sources—which becomes a more or less

fixed pattern that carries throughout life. Over against the individual are three aspects of the world toward which the adaptation must be made: "social contact, occupation, and love and marriage." (See also Adler, 1925 and 1931.)

The infant possessed of this potent ego drive finds himself hedged about on every hand. He is inadequate physically to his elders; he has to accommodate himself to their wills. The frustration of outgoing impulse gives rise to inferiority feelings, and these come, in turn, to further activate the tremendous demands for power. All through life other blockages of desire may arise, with corresponding incitement of inferiority and further enhancement of the demand. But the inhibiting conditions around the individual prevent his wonted expression, and he must find outlets in a variety of substitute ways. Adler referred to these as compensation, and his writings are filled with interesting illustrations of compensatory behavior. Two basic features of the substitutive goals which arise because of basic frustration are the striving for superiority and the "masculine protest." Everyone wants to be superior to someone or some thing. Moreover, since power in our social world is associated with the father's dominance, the belief arises that masculinity and potency are precisely equated. As a result, manliness is a fundamental virtue, and femininity is a mark of inferiority. Women therefore strive to be like men in order to secure the status and power which will satisfy them. Boys try to ape their fathers for the same reason, in order to gain power.

Among the many substitutive outlets we find the overcompensatory reactions, as in the little man who boasts of his prowess; or we escape into illness in order to attach ourselves to someone who is strong and healthy; or we indulge in sadistic aggression to offset our inferiority feelings; and so on. (See Chapter VI.) But in many instances intense distress in the individual arises from the overwhelming nature of the "confrontations" of external forces, such as threats of unemployment, insecurity in old age, war, and the like, for which his basic "social interest" (courage, morale), ability, and training have not prepared him. Adler believed, however, that these external pressures could be relieved if and when groups and leaders of strong social interest got into positions to control institutions and social movements.

The rather simple formulations of Adler stand in sharp contrast to the complex theories of Freud. They have something in common, but they diverge sharply at other points. Thus Adler gave up the whole conceptual system based on the unconscious. Moreover, he discounted the central place of sexuality, which Freud emphasized. Yet it is worth noting that Freud himself had to posit the death instinct and the tendencies to aggression associated therewith in order to bring some of his own findings, especially as concerned the ego or selfish trends, into a more consistent pattern. In

so doing he paid deference to Adler's concept of the ego and its drive for power.

Adler's emphasis upon the person as an indivisible totality has a certain appeal, particularly to those who stress the organismic view of behavior. (See below on topology.) So, too, Adler's concepts of the inferiority complex and of compensation have been readily taken up by students of personality. But for our purposes it is not necessary to examine Adler's thesis in detail or to compare his with Freud's. (See Murphy and Jensen, 1932; and Wittels, 1939.) However, one final comment may be made. Adler dealt almost entirely with his patients at the level of conscious processes. As a rule, he concerned himself almost entirely with the patient's present mental conflicts. He did not engage in prolonged psychoanalytic interviews, leading back to the infantile roots of such disturbances. While he got life stories from his patients, he explained their difficulties to them largely in terms of their contemporary troubles in social adjustment. He advised them on reorganizing their lives, entirely in terms of conscious and deliberate self-control. But in his last years Adler became increasingly interested in the broader societal factors which induce frustration and distress; his particular concern became pedagogical rather than analytical.

Strictly speaking, Adler should not be considered a psychoanalyst at all, if by that we refer to one who uses the techniques which Freud developed for dealing with neurotics. His work has been noted briefly in this subsection only because it grew out of psychoanalysis and because, despite his later departure from Freud, his findings, especially as to the important place of the ego motive, must have influenced the Freudian recognition of the same. (On Jung, another early follower of Freud, see Chapter XII.)

PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES

In the present section we shall sketch some of the contributions to personality study of theories which have come out of academic psychology, although obviously certain of these have themselves been influenced not only by experimental and statistical methods but by psychoanalysis and other "schools" of psychiatry as well. Some of the psychological theories stress mental elements and associationism, some the highly unique and individualized nature of the total personality. Others center their attention on the interactional and social-cultural factors in personal development. And still others revolve around the concept of personality types. Because of its broad pertinence this last will be treated in a separate chapter.

Personality as a combination of elements. Many psychologists trained in the general tradition of English associationism (see Boring, 1929), with its emphasis upon faculties of mind, have tended to study personality by breaking it down into component elements of one sort or another. British psychology divided man's fundamental mental processes into three: the

cognitive or intellectual, the affective or feeling-emotional, and the conative or volitional. (See J. Ward, 1918; McDougall, 1908.) It was easy to carry this sort of analysis over into the study of personality. Hence we have personality described as made up of various panels, such as the *intellectual*, the *emotional-feeling*, as witnessed by emotional stability, flexibility, or other criteria, and the *dispositional*, which had to do with drives, or instincts, or mood and temperament. Some included habits, especially the so-called social habits.

Another approach which must be considered under this same rubric is that of the so-called "trait" psychology. Francis Galton, who did so much to interest psychologists in statistics as a methodological device, gave great impetus to the study of mentality by dividing it up into segments or parts. (See Galton, 1883.) In this country, J. McKeen Cattell, R. S. Woodworth, and E. L. Thorndike were largely responsible for leading many American psychologists to study personality and mental phenomena generally from this standpoint. This approach breaks up the individual's inner life, as well as his habits, into specific traits and elements. Here personality is divided into such traits as sociability, tact, generosity, co-operativeness, persistence, and emotionality.

According to this school of thought, the personality was built up from elements through the operation of various "laws" of learning. As noted in Chapter V, it tended to stress trial-and-error learning, in which such factors as recency, vividness, frequency, repetition (law of exercise), and priority (law of effect) were important. Moreover, Thorndike developed his theory of "identical elements" in the learning process. According to him, "A change in one [mental] function alters any other only in so far as the two functions have as factors identical elements. The change in the second function is in amount that due to the change in the elements common to it and the first." (Thorndike, 1913, pp. 358-359, from his work of 1903.) This concept not only profoundly influenced educational psychology but entered into the analysis of the structure and function of personality, as we shall see.

Somewhat comparable to this American development was that in France, where the British theories of associationism and the doctrine of mental elements took firm hold. (See Ribot, 1870.) Moreover, these concepts greatly influenced French psychiatry, especially the development of theories of dissociation in mental disorder. The investigations of Charcot, Janet, and others, particularly of hysteria, led to the view that personality was made up of mental elements existing in different degrees or states of association. Under conditions of disease or stress some of these particular combinations might become loosened from the total associative organization which makes up the person and produce the symptoms seen in hysteria or other mental disturbances. In time these French views influenced Freud

and certain American psychologists and psychiatrists, notably William James (1890) and Prince (1905, 1914). (See Chapters X and XXVIII.)

One fundamental criticism often made of the doctrine of elements is that it has led many workers to support a theory of high specificity of traits or attitudes and to neglect the probable evidence that general traits and general attitudes arise in the course of experience. Some mention has already been made of the two views on this matter, first in relation to the nature of traits and attitudes, in Chapter VI, and again in regard to specific as contrasted to general roles in relation to the development of the self, in Chapters IX and X. In connection with this problem as it bears on personality theory certain investigations may be briefly mentioned.

Hartshorne and May (1928), Hartshorne, May, and Maller (1929), and Hartshorne, May, and Shuttleworth (1930) have reported an elaborate study of honesty, dishonesty, and related traits. They gave a series of cleverly devised tests of various sorts to thousands of American school children, under varying conditions. Using then current statistical methods (but not factorial analysis as since developed), they came to the conclusion that traits are highly specific. Thus "honesty or dishonesty is a function of the situation" in which the child is placed in so far as these "have common elements," as "he has learned to be honest or dishonest" under this or that particular circumstance, and as he has acquired a knowledge of the implications or consequences of such conduct. (1928, p. 380.) On the basis of their interpretation of the data they contend that the "common factor" is not any "inner entity" which operates independently of the conditions in which the person is placed. Rather it is a specific function "in the sense that an individual behaves similarly in different situations in proportion as these situations are alike," or as he has experienced like occasions or opportunities for either honest or dishonest conduct.

Respecting the attitudes (which seem to them to be intimately linked to the given traits) they believe that the attitude which serves to motivate a given act of honesty or dishonesty is "as specialized as the act itself" and that this specific motivation will drive a person just so far and no further in terms of the immediate situation. (1928, p. 387.)

In studying the traits of service and self-control these authors came to much the same conclusion. Thus they say (1930, p. 173): "Goodness in the sense of socially valuable forms of conduct is highly specific. The experience through which the children measured have passed has not led to any genuine integration of behavior within the fields treated. There is no evidence of any trait of goodness or character, if what is meant by goodness or character is just what may be observed or measured by conduct. We cannot infer from the conduct tests the presence of a general factor. Any community of conduct is due to factors common to the situation represented in the test and not to an inner organization of habit systems or abilities operating independently of the interrelations of situations." ³ (For another important study of specificity, see P. M. Symonds, 1928.)

³ Quotation from Hartshorne and May, *Studies in Deceit*, 1928; and from Hartshorne, May, and Shuttleworth, *Studies in the Organization of Character*, 1930. By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers.

In rather sharp contrast to the findings of Hartshorne and May are those of Cantril (1932) and of V. E. Herrick (1936).

Cantril, using a series of terms, statements, twelve personality sketches, and the Allport-Vernon test of Spranger's types, examined the responses of a sample of college students in order to see if they understood or reacted without any specific mental association. For example, the twelve personality sketches were built up on different levels of length and specificity or generality. He found that, when only a few concepts were used in describing an individual, the more general the concepts were the more revealing to the reader. The greatest efficiency in comprehension, however, was found when a more generalized description was illustrated by some specific detail which followed. He also found that in testing for recall the generalized narratives were better retained than the highly specific. Omitting reference to other details of his findings, Cantril's conclusions were these: (1) generality of some sort in mental life is independent of specific content; (2) general determining tendencies were found to be more enduring than specific factors; (3) the formation of general determining tendencies may well be due to the integration of more specific elements; (4) when a stimulus is applicable to an existing general tendency, the latter is aroused prior to any specific attitude; and (5) general attitudes appear to serve as directive or determinative influences upon more particularized attitudes and reactions. (1932, pp. 105-107.)

V. E. Herrick (1936), using a series of mental tests, rating schemes, autobiographical sketches, and the interview technique, found definite evidence for general attitudes in a college student sample regarding certain social issues and matters of conduct.

Another approach to the problem of general as against specific traits is found in the statistical analysis of test scores from a wide range of mental and educational tests given to samples of our school population. Thus from the day of Spearman's (1904; 1927; with Hart, 1912) two-factor theory of intelligence—one general, the other specific—to the work of Thurstone (1938) with his categories of "primary abilities," uncovered by elaborate statistical devices, we have witnessed an increasing recognition of the need to relate the evidence for specificity and that for generality into some more adequate theory which will encompass both. (For review of this whole field, see Guilford, 1936.) If and when this more general theoretical framework is provided, we should be in a position to see its possible bearing upon the whole matter of personality make-up and to the problem of personality types. (See Chapter XIII.)

Moreover, by linking up mental and motor performance with the larger function of the individual's taking a role in a given situation, we may be able to arrive at some concept of generality and specificity which will be related to the generalization process already described in relation to the self. (See Chapter IX.) There is sufficient evidence from common-sense experience and from individual case study that people do range from highly specific responses and roles to those which are more generalized

in character, that is, where common elements in roles $a, b, c, \dots n$ become integrated into a general pattern operative in like situations later. This whole matter of specificity versus generality is also bound up with the matter of integration and balance in personality. The moral man, the integrated personality, is one in whom there would be a core of general traits or attitudes which would tend to predetermine his behavior in many particular social situations. Such a person, however, might also have a large number of specific habits and attitudes built up around other situations. There would not necessarily be any marked conflict between the specific and the general attitudes. Hence, despite Hartshorne and May's contention that honesty—as they defined it—is highly specific for their sample of school children, it may well be that such a trait does become generalized in many people in terms of their social-cultural conditioning. We shall return to this matter later. (See Chapter XIII.)⁴

From our standpoint the two most important criticisms of personality theory based on the doctrine of specificity are (1) that it fosters a view of personality as a mere summation of discrete parts or elements, and (2) that it tends to ignore the social interactional and cultural factors as furnishing a possible framework for the emergence of generalized patterns of thought and behavior.

Gestalt and topology. In rather sharp contrast to associationism, which is fundamental to the approach just described, stand the followers of the so-called *Gestalt* psychology, who stress, not atomistic elements linked together in mental life, but rather the unified total structures and function of mind. We have already noted this contrast in discussing learning. (See Chapter V.) These psychologists take the position that the individual is a whole configuration of forces operating toward or away from or with reference to an environment which itself is always a particular configuration of stimuli. (See Köhler, 1929; Koffka, 1935; Lewin, 1936; Brown, 1936; and Wheeler, 1940.) They contend that to break down either the individual or the situation toward which he responds into elements or parts is to destroy both as valid objects of study and analysis in psychology. To dissect the personality into small units results in the loss of the very facts we need to know about it. In this emphasis on totality they have much in common with Adlerian theory.

⁴ The entire problem of finding general or specific traits is bound up with the standpoint and method employed in the investigations themselves. The viewpoint of Thorndike, coupled with a certain statistical technique, laid the foundation in part for the findings which Hartshorne and May got. Thus V. E. Herrick (1936) treated their data by means of factorial analysis and found certain "group factors" in the test results. Though the existence of general traits is not proved by this particular statistical device, certainly the discovery of group factors should make us cautious about defending extreme specificity. The most satisfactory solution, of course, will depend upon the degree of actuality or reality—psychological and sociological—which can be found to fit the statistical findings. On the importance of method in predetermining interpretation, see Chapter XI.

For years the followers of this school confined themselves almost entirely to investigations of perception and learning. But gradually some of them turned their attention more specifically to the description and analysis of child and adolescent mind and behavior. (See Koffka, 1935.) Chiefly under the leadership of Lewin (1936, 1939), a new phase of *Gestalt* psychology called topology has been developed. The followers of this theory have set up their categories and concepts in terms of elaborate mathematical, especially geometric, analogies couched in rather strange and forbidding language. To cite only a sample of terms, there is a special jargon about "valences," "life space," "space of free movement," "social field," and "power field," which terms are used to characterize directionality, individual life organization, nature and patterning of interaction, and leadership or domination.

Lewin refers to his standpoint as the "field theoretical approach," and for him a sound understanding of behavior is had when it is represented in terms of a more or less structuralized total situation (the social field) and the distribution of forces (individuals and material objects) operating therein. Thus the person may be depicted as P in Figure 14 moving through a given social field toward a given goal, G. The personality consists of a configuration of features, aspects, or forces, 1, 2, 3...7, which may be defined as physiological factors, abilities, freedom or lack of choice with reference to given actions, mental conflicts, attachments to individuals or social groupings, prejudices, or other items in the total inner "subjective" life space. The goal consists in whatever object, situation, or attainment the individual aims at, material, such as a toy or physical property, or psychological, such as a particular role, prestige, or status. The course of the person toward the goal may be through barriers *a*, *b*, and *c*, which may be physical, as distance to be traversed by a child to secure a toy, or social-psychological, as taboos to be overcome or particular tasks to be performed in series before the goal is achieved.

The same spatial analogies are used to describe the internal organization of the individual as are used to depict the total personality as he reacts overtly with reference to a given social-cultural aim or an actual point in time or space. The concept of life space is particularly important as an over-all term to include the entire "'subjective' psychological world of the individual." During infancy and early childhood this is very sketchily and vaguely organized. There is little clear distinction as to group membership, or as to the difference between reality and irreality—that is, between objective and fantasy thinking; but, as the child grows older and acquires more experience with the external world, there is a corresponding development of a complex and differentiated life space.

Although in their theoretical statements the topologists pile up a host of geometric concepts until the reader is lost in a maze of words, when

they interpret their concrete research, they usually deal in the ordinary language of child and social psychology. For example, Lewin (1939), Lewin, Lippitt, and White (1939), and Lippitt (1939), in discussing certain investigations of children's behavior in a group under democratic or autocratic patterns of dominance, alternate between unfamiliar linguistics such as "total behavior," "total field," "group and member space of free movement," "social powerfield," and "function of life space," and the employment of everyday language that anyone can understand: activity or conduct, social situation, individual and group effort to accomplish a given task, the distribution of authority or power among individuals in a given




FIGURE 14, showing a person, P, in a social field moving through a series of barriers, *a*, *b*, *c*, toward a goal, G. Features of the life space of the person are shown in the subdivisions of P: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7.

group, the place of subjective or internal factors in determining conduct, and so on.

Stripped of its fancy jargon, topology has much in common with the personalistic and interactional schools of social psychology. While it has sharpened some of the concepts to be tested by observation and experiment, it has at the same time stimulated a heavy growth of terminology that may prove in the end a great "barrier" to the movement toward a sounder psychology of personality.

The personalistic theory. Also in contrast to the study of thought and conduct by means of defining, dissecting, and examining specific elements is the standpoint represented by "personalistic psychology," with which the name of Stern (1938) has been closely associated.⁵ The essential features of this theory may be summarized from the work of G. W. Allport (1937a, 1937b), since his own standpoint has been so largely influenced by that

⁵ Stern is far better known for his extensive work dealing with individual differences and mental elements which he termed "differential psychology" than for his contribution to a theory of personality. (See Stern, 1900, 1911.)

of Stern. The fundamental tenet of this school is that "every mental function is embedded in a personal life." In any concrete sense there is no such thing as a sensation, a perception, a *Gestalt*, a mental image, a skill, or intelligence, or knowledge. Nor is there such thing as a motive, a goal, or a cycle of activity. "There are *only* people" who may have these experiences, or perform certain acts, or strive toward some objective. (Allport, 1937a.)

Following Stern more particularly, we may say that the personalistic thesis emphasizes first of all the "co-ordinating" concept of the Person, Self, or Ego within whose boundary all motivations, mental processes, and overt actions take place. The constant emphasis is on the dynamic relation of the Person⁶ to his world. Not only is mental organization itself determined by the "personal life," but the Person occupies the central position in all motivations and conscious processes and, obviously, in all overt action.

In such a system we should expect motivation to be interpreted entirely in terms of personal strivings and personal goals. And in his discussion Stern draws heavily upon the whole gamut of concepts relating to the dynamics of action, such as instinct, impulse, need, disposition, urge, interest, wish, desire, goal-striving, and will. He even employs such mystic principles as entelechy and "personal energy," whatever these may mean. Moreover, in terms of drives, the individual not only is reactive to the environment, but is actually creative and capable of spontaneous behavior. Therefore intention and planning for the future become significant principles in personalistic theory.

In the same vein any sensation or perception, which he recognized as taking the form of a *Gestalt*, is meaningless except in terms of the underlying Person. Even our concepts of, and experiences with, space and time have a self-reference, and memory is intimately "embedded in the substratum of personal existence." Thinking, moreover, develops and functions because of the demands of personal aim. That is, consciousness arises because of insecurities and attendant tensions within the individual. But adaptation is not merely passive; the person actually goes out to meet his world by means of anticipation. There is thus a fundamental dynamic basis for self-development. Stern's interpretation of logical or objective and of fantasy thinking falls into the same personalistic framework. Logical thought is decidedly limited in its significance for life; it is too rational, too impersonal, too removed from the warmth of real living to satisfy us. Such thinking does not provide us with a full understanding. This can come only when fantasy is also taken into account. This latter form of thinking, into which not only ideational processes enter but also feelings,

⁶ The capitalization of the word *person* itself serves Stern's and Allport's purpose of emphasizing its essential uniqueness. We follow their practice at this point for obvious reasons.

emotions, empathy, and other internal factors, serves to produce new conceptions of a person's place in the world, helps to satisfy many strivings, and on the broader front is a large element in inventiveness, in the production of art, and in stimulating new scientific discoveries. It is, in short, central to man's creativeness.

The feelings have a special place in Stern's theory. The term is used in a very wide sense to include practically all the conscious states which have any emotional or affective quality whatsoever. They may be broad or narrow in scope, intense or weak, lasting or temporary. They have degrees of depth, may be genuine or not, serious or playful, and may serve a variety of overt forms. In fact, the term *feeling*, as employed by Stern, is on all fours with its everyday use by the man in the street. Thus there are "feelings" of terror, grief, expectancy, anxiety, harmony with or alienation from the world, success or failure, hope or dread, familiarity or its opposite, "premonition," and a host of others.

The personalistic standpoint has much in common with a German school known as the "psychology of *Verstehen*," which emphasizes the uniqueness, totality, and ineffability of the individual. Those who follow this view stress the importance of some almost mystical kind of insight as essential to an understanding (*Verstehen*) of the personality. Many of them, like Klages (1932), interpret the basic impulses to behavior in terms of spiritual forces. But, since these theories fall into the realm of theology rather than that of science, we shall say no more about them.

In this country the most important convert to the standpoint of personalism is G. W. Allport (1937a).⁷ In particular he stresses the individuality or uniqueness of life organization. He discounts what he calls the *bio-social* concept of the person in favor of what he terms the *biophysical*. That is, although he pays some attention to the common or social-cultural influences which play upon the growing individual, he contends that these furnish but a fraction to the total source of the adult personality. Into the latter go constitutionally determined factors of impulse, temperament, and ability to formulate experience in individualistic form.

For G. W. Allport, as for Stern, "the psychology of personality proceeds from the point of view of the person himself. . . . He himself is the datum." (1937a, p. 559.) To understand an individual fully we must examine him from within, from his own unique frame of reference or standpoint. The unity of the person does not rest upon his exposure to common and unifying situations outside himself, but rests upon the operation of certain basic principles of growth and life. These are stated in such a static concept as "style of life," to which we have referred, and in such a dynamic concept as the "functional autonomy of motives." (See Chapter VI.) By this latter

⁷ Although Murray (1938) uses the term *personology* to describe this field and has shown considerable sympathy for Stern's work, in general he seems to follow the Freudian theory.

Allport means that out of concrete experiences are built habits, traits, interests, and desires which become themselves capable of serving as inner driving forces to thought and overt activity. He would have us never forget that each individual acquires his own particular pattern or organization of these autonomous motives. It is these which help to set him off from all his fellows.

Therefore, in studying personality, G. W. Allport concerns himself especially with those features which he believes denote individuality, differentiation from others, self-consciousness, distinctive unifying themata, personal interests, wishes, and highly private values. These are the items which distinguish one person from another. This stress upon uniqueness, of course, raises the question whether any known methods of objective or scientific study can be applied to the person so conceptualized, and Allport contends that we may and should work toward a formulation of a generalization or law "that tells how uniqueness comes about." As to prediction, he takes the position that we should be concerned, not with general predictions of the probability sort regarding uniformities among individuals in the mass, but with what he calls "equivalences" in the behavior of one person from one time and situation to another. As to method, G. W. Allport makes a strong case for the use of what he terms the "empirical-intuitive theory of understanding," which he drew largely from the psychology of *Verstehen*. (Compare this thesis with the "logico-meaningful" concept of Sorokin, 1937.)

The personalistic theory has much to recommend it. It certainly offers a more dynamic frame of reference than does any theory which rests upon a doctrine of more or less static traits, attitudes, faculties, or primary abilities. On the other hand, it seems to neglect the dynamism of the unconscious which Freudian theory provides. Thus, while Allport (1937a) devotes eight pages to a review of "psychoanalytic mechanisms," his system really draws only an occasional item from Freud and his followers. Evidently his emphasis upon the person as a totality is not congenial to the more detailed analysis of the "mechanisms" of individual adaptation which the psychoanalysts insist upon. Moreover, with reference to Stern we may say that, though his central concept of the Self has a good deal in common with the views expressed by Mead and in this book, he (as does his follower, G. W. Allport) ignores the place of interaction, and fails to understand the importance of culture as furnishing the content of much of the individual's motivation, thought, and action.

In this as in other theories which deal in the language of the "total personality" or the "total situation" or the "personality-as-a-whole," there is always grave danger of substituting poorly defined and general terms for more careful, detailed examination of the facts. Obviously, Stern's concept of feeling is so vague and general as to lose most of its usefulness as

a denotative term. And, with reference to method, the unchecked and unverified use of insight or intuition—inadequately defined as these usually are—must be avoided. If these concepts are employed, they must be carefully circumscribed, and the results obtained by their use must be substantiated by other scientific devices. (See Chapter XI.)

Yet, despite these strictures, personalistic theory has an important contribution to make. It forces us to realize that, despite social-cultural impress, the individual represents a distinctive life organization. Social interaction and cultural training never quite control or determine all aspects of thought, word, or deed. Such a view constantly forces upon us a recognition of individual differences, not in the older sense of variability among a list of the individual's capacities, traits, attitudes, or habits—as is the wont of traditional, educational, and differential psychology—but in regard to the individual as a distinctive self or personality among others who likewise have their distinctive and unique characteristics.

The social-interactional theory. The social-interactional theory of personality emerged from the work of Baldwin (1897, 1911), Cooley (1909), Dewey (1922, 1925), G. H. Mead (1934), Thomas (1918, 1923), Park and Burgess (1924), E. Faris (1937), and others. Since the standpoint and treatment in this volume have so much in common with the work of these men, there is no need for an extended statement of their particular contributions. Moreover, we can scarcely consider them as together forming a "school of thought." Some of them have emphasized the importance of social interaction in the genesis and operation of the self; others have given chief attention to the particular social situation to which the individual is constantly reacting. Some stress the place of cultural training in the emergence of ideas, traits, attitudes, values, and habits. Yet, despite a certain variation in treatment, they all realize the significance of the early years in laying the foundations for later growth and maturity. In short, accepting the constitutional factors as given, they consider the personality to be fundamentally a social-cultural product, but one which is always in a dynamic or moving state of equilibrium or disequilibrium with reference to the particular group and its culture at a given time and place. The most distinctive contribution of Baldwin, Cooley, and G. H. Mead concerns the rise of the self in interaction, while both Dewey and Mead have pointed out the essential social-cultural nature of thinking and hence of knowledge itself. At the outset of his career Thomas gave attention chiefly to social-cultural factors in personal development. But he is best known for his theory of the four wishes, although he later shifted his attention to what he calls "the situational approach," which stresses the constant interplay of the individual and the social situation. (See Thomas and Thomas, 1928.) Faris, taking his cue from Thomas, has gone so far as to define the personality as the "subjective aspect of culture."

The most telling criticisms of the interactional theory, if we may so designate the somewhat varied standpoints indicated among those just mentioned, are (1) that its supporters have failed to work out in careful detail the mechanisms of social interaction and the precise manner in which culture impinges on the growing individual; (2) that most interactionalists give no attention to the dynamic concepts developed by Freudian psychology, though some do pay lip service to psychoanalyses (see, however, Burgess, 1939, on the contribution of psychoanalysis to American sociology); and (3) that their general emphasis on cultural conditioning has led them to neglect the factors of uniqueness and autonomy stressed by G. W. Allport (1937a).

This implicit divergence between those who emphasize interaction within the cultural and social situation and those who contend that the personality must be considered in terms of the distinctive or unique features of thought and conduct puts the age-long matter of individual differences into somewhat new focus. Certainly the personalists must eventually arrive at some formulation on the matter of individual variability if they are ever to move beyond the descriptive analysis of each unique human specimen. Furthermore, if we follow their interpretation, we may be led to ignore the fact that social-cultural influences themselves stimulate differentiation in ideas, traits, attitudes, and habits—in short, in roles. And, since this matter has bearing on the discussion of typology in the next chapter and on the consideration of special problems later, the final section of this chapter will deal with individual differences within the social-cultural definitions of the situation.

INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES AND SOCIAL-CULTURAL DEFINITIONS

Divergences among individuals are found everywhere, be they physical, intellectual, emotional, or in the make-up of the total role or the self. From very early years deviations in physical make-up play a distinctive part in setting one person off from another. So, too, differences in intellectual capacity are evident even in the first months of life, although later social-cultural factors play an important part in determining differences in intellectual activities among people. Infants also show divergences among themselves in their emotional responses. But for us the most significant fact is that physical, intellectual, and emotional differences as such mean nothing unless we take into account the social and cultural situation in which they operate. Unfortunately, traditional psychology still gives the impression both by its research and by its interpretations that individual deviations operate to influence habits, attitudes, and ideas without respect to the social-cultural milieu. Nothing could be further from the facts. Take, for example, the matter of physical size.

In many societies, obese girls and women are at a premium in sexual selection. Males in these societies tend to pass by the spindly girl for the rotund, robust women of the tribe or community. In our own society during the 1920's and 1930's there was a definite shift in masculine interest from the buxom type of woman of the 1890's to the more slender, athletic girl. But the renewal of the popularity of a more robust form seems probable. Or, again, the fat boy who is geyed by his playmates develops a certain feeling of difference and of inadequacy because his behavior is defined as divergent from that of the majority of the boys with whom he comes into contact. Whether this is a universal reaction of boys in a play group remains to be determined. At any rate, the boy's role, his conception of himself as a "fatty," is largely socially determined.

So, too, the dullard in any society may be the object of sympathy, ridicule, or avoidance, but his conception of himself as a dullard is *socially* determined. He would never take such a role unless others defined his function and status for him. Or take, for example, the person who sees visions, dreams dreams, and has what we declare to be psychopathic manifestations. In some societies such a one may be considered a prophet, a seer, a religious leader. In another society such a person might be turned over to a psychiatrist for medical examination and care on the theory that he was so divergent from the norm of that society as to be dangerous to the welfare of the group. (See Chapters XXVII and XXVIII.)

In short, role, status, and concept of the self and all this implies as to sense of adequacy or inferiority, or social acceptance or rejection, as to traits, attitudes, and values, reflects social-cultural norms. And, while there are always an uncertainty and a uniqueness in every person—in terms of motive and peculiar life organization—which set him off from others, even his individuality is affected by the social and cultural definitions of others. Obviously, any adequate theory of personality must take both the *common* and the *unique* features into account.

We must emphasize the fact that individual differences do not rest upon hereditary bases alone. Nutrition, endocrine balance, habit, and social experience all play a part. The height and weight of populations vary with food supply. Divergences in physical and mental maturation are correlated with economic and social status. Certainly permissible cultural deviations and personal-social experiences have much to do with individual variations.

On the other hand, in many ways these conditioning factors make for likenesses as well. For instance, violin playing may be engaged in by persons with differences in morphology of hands and arms, and yet the listeners at a concert may not be aware of these facts. So, too, social groups demand conformity to certain codes of behavior, certain definitions of situations, despite divergences in physical, mental, and emotional traits.

Thus, though individual variability is highly significant, the direction which one's fundamental values and themata take is largely determined by cultural norms and personal-social experience and not alone by the more strictly biologic factors. To reassert our fundamental standpoint, in unraveling the factors in any individual's conduct we must at all times take into account his constitutional, psychological, and cultural backgrounds. No one of these alone is sufficient to account for thought or behavior. Yet, because it is frequently neglected, let us examine more closely the manner in which social-cultural training influences a person's life patterns.

Conditioning and deviations. The newborn child is thrown by circumstances into a world in which he is the weakest and most dependent member. The whole period of infancy may be one in which the child takes a position of inferiority. Physically he is more or less at the mercy of parents, of older and stronger brothers and sisters, and later of playmates. Then, too, his native talents may be bent into patterns which fit the family code, as when a boy of artistic tastes may have to forgo their development in order to help support the family by ordinary labor. Or a boy may be apprenticed to a skilled trade when under other circumstances he might well have become an inventor or a professional engineer. Then, too, rivalry in the family may give rise to the development of certain traits, such as aggressiveness or docility, out of the very relationship of a child to his parents and his siblings. For example; the first boy of a family may acquire compensatory dominant attitudes because the parents favor a younger brother or sister. His aggression is developed as a means of getting attention. Adler (1925, 1937) has shown how potent these influences are. One may therefore raise the question whether dominance or aggressiveness and the degree of its intensity are not really matters of development based upon learning rather than of inherited differences, as experimental or child psychologists sometimes assume.

If the family belongs to a certain social class, a child reared therein is usually compressed into the types of action and attitude of that class, even if he may try to avoid them. Or the boy who might be shy and retiring may assume the position of superiority demanded by the social status of his family. Too frequently writers, past and present, have taken it for granted that attitudes of dominance and the assumption of roles of social leadership rest entirely upon innate ability or upon direct personal frustration, whereas actually these may depend in large part upon the economic and social status of the class, coupled with the culture pattern of expected ascendancy. The upper classes or the élite everywhere tend to take on certain formal leadership characteristics. This is clearly evident in the rise of the poor immigrant family in our own country to a position

of opulence or political power. When a person arrives at these social positions later, he, and especially his children, soon take on the distinctions of their class, and before long the marks of peasant and "common" origin are left behind. The *nouveaux riches* always assume the letters patent of the classes which they imitate or aspire to reach.

One of the most significant things in determining individual differences in society is the occupation. The vocation which a person has to take or which he chooses will make a vast difference in his relations with his fellows. The division of labor in modern society sets up a kind of scale of occupation which makes for significant divergences in the personality. Not only does capacity to learn determine the direction of one's place in this scheme of occupational differentiation, but cultural patterns also play a part. Class lines determine that the sons of professional men shall go, on the whole, into professions. The sons of railroad engineers tend to be apprenticed to their fathers' work. But in our society what Cooley (1909) called the open class system—meaning freedom of choice in occupation—made for considerable variation between the vocations of fathers and sons. This freedom in selecting an occupation, of course, serves to promote further differentiation. Not only do differences in learning ability and in the cultural norms of the group fix the division of labor, but the personal-social experience of the individual may assist in the process. For instance, a sense of inferiority of the eldest son in a family, developed from his being less favored than the younger children, may set up in him a strong resistance to any suggestions of his parents about a certain occupation. In retaliation against this authority he may take up some other vocation. Again, a doting mother may project on her son some vocation for which he is not particularly well fitted, and yet by dint of practice he may attain mediocre success. In such an instance the mother-son relation—often largely of a personal-social sort—determines the direction of life organization and the individual's role and status in the occupational scheme of the particular society. So, too, enforced changes in occupation, due to migration, prolonged unemployment, loss of property, or other causes, mean a reshifting of individual variability in a society and might quite belie the original intellectual capacity of the persons concerned. The younger and economically more favored sons of immigrant families may go into vocations socially superior to those of their fathers or their own older brothers, and such changes are reflected in personality.

Again, from a background of religious training, differences in world view and the meaning of life may produce rather striking variations in life organization. No matter how alike in physique, in emotional-instinctive tendencies, or in native learning capacity two brothers may be, if one were raised a Catholic and one a Baptist, each would be bound

to develop attitudes reflecting his religious training, and their differences in life philosophy could be fully interpreted only in terms of their divergent social and cultural backgrounds. So, too, the Christian might develop notions of freedom of the will, whereas the child raised in the agnostic and scientifically trained family might reasonably be expected to take on a belief in complete determinism and even a kind of fatalism. Even identical twins, as H. H. Newman (1932) has shown, develop into distinctly different personalities when reared in divergent families and varied cultural milieus.

Similar comment may be made with regard to political differences in people. These may have little or no relation, for example, to deviations in native learning ability or emotions, but may depend rather upon similar social-cultural patterns from respective political camps. The value system, the attitudes and traits, of a Communist agitator serve to set him in sharp contrast to the conservative believer in the political and economic status quo.

Individual variations are everywhere evident in society, and some of these differences rest rather distinctly on constitutional divergences. Other deviations arise out of personal-social experience. Still others are laid down by the cultural patterns. Once more we must be careful not to fall into the particularistic fallacy and try to interpret such phenomena as individual variability in terms of one dimension only, but always recall the three factors: the constitutional, the personal-social, and the cultural. These influences must be examined before the full picture of individuality can be exposed and certainly before one may venture a guess as to which of these produced the difference or which, if all were influential, contributed most. Thus, though G. W. Allport's (1937a) theory of uniqueness and autonomy of personality represents a somewhat different approach to the matter of individual variability than that just discussed, there is a place for both in any consideration of personality. His emphasis on the high individuality involved in the inner organization strikingly exposes the difference between culture—as a body of more or less commonly accepted patterns of thought and behavior—and the personality itself. On the other hand, we have called attention to the fact that social and cultural influences have a place in making for differentiation among individuals. The quality of uniqueness is not due to some magic force which operates without regard to the constitutional, personal-social, and cultural factors. To ignore these in a discussion of personal autonomy will lead to mysticism, not science.

Chapter XIII

TYPES OF PERSONALITY

CONFRONTED with a welter of concrete experiences with specific individuals in a variety of situations—some similar, some dissimilar—men everywhere apparently begin to formulate general or class ideas about people and their behavior. The very recurrence of like conduct and of like circumstances provides the framework for some sort of generalization into class terms. Repeated contacts of a child with a number of adults—say neighbors or teachers—some of whom tend, on the whole, to treat him kindly and sympathetically, others harshly and unsympathetically, will easily lead him to consider these individuals as falling into two groups: those who are pleasant and congenial, and those who are the opposite. Of course, adults themselves furnish the growing child with verbal devices for classifying people in terms of experience, with a view to helping him define his own future conduct in relation to others. All through life we continue in this habit of pigeonholing persons into various types as to physique, temperament, and conduct. The most obvious classification of people is perhaps that illustrated in terms of such physical features as color, stature, or weight.

However, we may dismiss with a word many of the common beliefs which foster the concept of type in everyday life. On the basis of popular but faulty psychology the man in the street develops or acquires notions such as that redhaired persons are given to quick temper, that a hatchet face is one of a money-seeker, or that brunets are given to romantic love. The whole foundation of so-called characterology—be it phrenology, palmistry, or what not—rests upon this sort of fantastic association of certain specific items of morphology with typical behavior manifestations. (See Paterson, 1930.) Other illustrations are found in the folk belief that Communists have shaggy hair, dark visage, and murderous intentions, that all Frenchmen are great lovers, and that all Englishmen lack a sense of humor. In fact, the types used by most people frequently turn out to be what we designate in social psychology as *stereotypes*. (See K. Young, 1930.) Yet, even though popular beliefs in these matters are largely mistaken, they do show that the concept of type has a recognized use. One might well contend that some kind of typification is almost inevitable. Just as we develop general concepts in dealing with

material objects, we tend to do the same sort of thinking in dealing with people.

Not only is there a common-sense though often false foundation for placing individuals in categories of given characteristics, but philosophers, literary writers, and scientists have long been interested in the matter of typification of persons, and a number of theories of personality, as we shall see, are definitely linked up with this entire topic.

The controversy discussed in the previous chapter between the school of specificity and that of generality in traits or attitudes naturally carries over into the larger question of *personality types*. Are there general types of life organization or of roles? Are there certain unities of mentality and behavior which characterize given groups of individuals? Or, with respect to traits and attitudes, do some of these exist in correlation with others in such a way that we can conceive of them as making up a totality or configuration that may be designated by the term *type*? But there is no general agreement on this subject. Many psychologists are extremely critical of any and all attempts to develop an adequate typology, and their criticisms are not to be taken lightly.

In the present chapter we shall first review some of the more important efforts at dealing with individuals in terms of types, both psychological and morphological. Then, against the background of these materials, we shall discuss the basic problem of the concept of type with reference to scientific generalization, that is, with regard to validating hypotheses or formulating laws upon whose foundation we may predicate and predict behavior.

PSYCHOLOGICAL TYPES

As with so many other allegedly modern ideas, we owe to the Greeks, especially to Hippocrates, who lived five centuries before the Christian era, the debt for having first introduced the concept of type applied to the feeling-emotional or temperamental features of personality. Classical writers, upon the basis of the physiological theories of their time, divided people into four sorts of temperament. They believed that the body contained four fluids or "humors," yellow bile, black bile, phlegm, and blood, which tended to determine the fundamental disposition. As one or another of these predominated in an individual, a corresponding temperament developed. There were thus four of these corresponding to the four humors: (1) *choleric* (from *choler*, meaning yellow bile), characterized by irascible, hot-tempered make-up; (2) *melancholic* (from *melas* and *choler*, meaning black bile), marked by a depressed, sad, and gloomy outlook on life; (3) *phlegmatic* (from *phlegm*, meaning mucus), indicated by sluggish, apathetic disposition; and (4) *sanguine* (from *san-*

guis, meaning blood), characterized by the cheerful, hopeful, or even ardent nature. Of course the primitive physiology of the Greeks has long since been discarded, but these ancient theories as to psychological types have influenced our thinking on personality ever since. Moreover, a certain support for the classical theory of types has come from the work of Pavlov and his students in physiology.

Pavlov's theory of types. From their extensive studies of the conditioned reflex of dogs, Pavlov (1928) and his students found that these animals vary greatly among themselves in the speed and adequacy with which they form positive conditioned responses. The dogs also differ as to the place which conditioned inhibitory reactions play in their behavior. (See Chapter V.) To summarize:

Certain animals form positive conditioned reflexes quickly and effectively. Once formed, these learned responses tend to remain stable under even adverse and suddenly changed situations. Pavlov termed these the *excitatory* group. Other dogs are slow to acquire positive conditioned reactions, and, once formed, these are feeble and unstable. In contrast, these animals quickly learn inhibitory reflexes, and in any crisis or unusual circumstances their positive conditioned responses are soon lost and the inhibitory reflexes tend to prevail. These dogs he classified as the *inhibitory* type. Between these extremes are those animals which have a well-balanced capacity to form both types of conditioned reflex. These were called the *central* or *equilibrated* class. This last class reveals two subtypes: the lively, active sort, and the quiet, sedate, and "self-contained." In his discussion of these types of animals with possible application to man, Pavlov draws a close parallel to the classical types of temperament.

Therefore at one extreme there are the inhibitable class of animals, which Pavlov called the *melancholic*. At the opposite pole stand the excitable animals, which he termed the *choleric*s. Between these two extremes is the well-balanced group, which is divided into the *sanguine*—that is, the lively and agile—and the *phlegmatic*, the sedate, quiet, and somewhat lethargic. Pavlov goes even further and likens the inhibitory type in its milder forms to the hysterical personality, and in its more extreme manifestations to the schizophrenics. The highly excitable type, in contrast, he likens to the neurasthenic and cyclic or manic-depressive personalities. (See Chapter XXVII.) Hysteria and schizophrenia he considers essentially pathological forms arising from a cortical weakness which makes for an easy formation of inhibitions. These are characterized by heightened and uncontrolled suggestibility, emotionality, and general inability to manage crises, that is, any marked changes in the fixed order of their lives.

Some comments on the subclasses of the equilibrated type are interesting. One of Pavlov's followers, Rosenthal (1932, pp. 67-68) thus characterizes their basic reactions:

"A perfect equilibrium between the processes of excitation and inhibition is found with animals belonging to the central type (sanguine and phlegmatic animals). This is proved by the fact that negative and positive reflexes are easily formed in these animals and vary little in amount. The distinction between the sanguine and phlegmatic type consists in the fact that with the former the reaction of orientation is extremely pronounced; these animals are lively and agile. The phlegmatic type is much more quiet and pays less attention to changes taking place in its surroundings; they are 'sedate.' The sanguine type soon grows sleepy in uninteresting surroundings, while the phlegmatic type consistently remains awake. To express it metaphorically, we might say that the sanguine type chiefly lives with and in the external world (its environment), while the phlegmatic type is self-contemplative and lives in an inner world of its own."

Rosenthal, in fact, makes a broad dual classification out of the four groupings: melancholic, phlegmatic, sanguine, and choleric. The first he designates as the "weak type"; the other three he puts in the rubric of the "strong type." His classification may be summarized thus:

STRONG TYPE			WEAK TYPE
<i>Choleric</i>	<i>Sanguine</i>	<i>Phlegmatic</i>	<i>Melancholic</i>
EXCITABLE	LIVELY & AGILE	LETHARGIC & QUIET	INHIBITABLE
The strong type is characterized by formation of positive conditioned reflexes, by efficient cortical organization, and by adaptability.			The weak type is noted for its slow formation of positive reflexes, its poor adaptation, its weak excitation, and the diminished capacity of the cortical cells.

Pavlov cites many instances to demonstrate that dogs show these variations in behavior. The weak, feeble, inhibitable type often make excellent experimental animals, when the task before them is not too complicated or difficult, since they are docile and easy to control; but, on the other hand, undue and new stimuli easily disturb them. In fact, in some of these animals he set up experimentally a condition which resembles hysteria in the human being. His student Krasnogorski has duplicated this work with children. (See Thomas and Thomas, 1928.) Pavlov (1928, pp. 364-367) also relates the following instance to show the effects of crises upon behavior. His laboratory animals underwent a severe shock during a flood in Leningrad in 1924 during which they were rescued from their kennels only with great difficulty. In one of these dogs of the inhibitable type the effects of this crisis persisted for over a year, whereas the others soon recuperated. This animal showed fear and general distress in the presence of almost any untoward stimulus, and only with great patience and after prolonged rest was he restored to a satisfactory condition for normal experimentation.

In contrast, the excitable type—the choleric—have an aggressive nature. For instance, the owner of a dog of this sort is likely to find that under extreme provocation, such as whipping, the animal may snap at or bite him. The inhibitable type are easily subdued. They cringe and turn tail at the slightest punishment, even a harsh word. The excitable kind are easily given to violence. The well-balanced type are obviously the most desirable for most experimental work.

Pavlov implies that these constitutional differences rest upon original nature or inheritance. He believes that the inhibited type possess a weak cortical organization; that the subcortical and hence less educable areas of the brain tend to dominate their adaptation. The observations of W. T. James (1939) on the dominant or submissive behavior of a group of dogs seem to support in general Pavlov's contention for a certain innate constitutional factor in these differing types of animals. But Rosenthal takes a somewhat different view (1932, p. 68):

"Our observations show that education has an influence on temperament; in other words, that the nerve type can be changed. In the course of our experiments we saw dogs which undoubtedly belonged to a strong functional type, but which had been so influenced by a hard life that they had the appearance of feeble, easily inhibitable, cringing beasts in their first days in the laboratories. We were frequently deceived into treating such animals as examples of the feeble type, and were unable to discover the true functional type to which they belonged until we had made a careful study of their higher nervous activity. This shows the influence of education. Instances of the intimidation of children are universally known. If it is desired to discover of what type a man is a member, his history must be known."

Though the application of this theory to human individuals may seem farfetched, Pavlov's and Rosenthal's discussions are suggestive. Not only may there be inherent constitutional differences in the fundamental reaction systems, but the general principles of conditioning which apply to the mammalian animals appear to hold for mankind as well. Everyday and clinical experience with men belonging to the melancholic classification indicates that they often do show a certain physiological weakness, a certain difficulty in adapting themselves to the social and material environment. In contrast, individuals of choleric, sanguine, or phlegmatic disposition seem to manage their way in the world more adequately. But we need more investigation of human subjects to check and verify or disprove these fertile ideas derived from the animal laboratory.

Jung's theory of introversion and extroversion. Perhaps the best-known theory of psychological types is the division into extroversion and introversion developed by Jung (1922), who at the outset of his career was a follower of Freud. Broadly speaking, these groupings represent two different organizations of basic attitudes and other features of the inner life. The extrovert is one whose fundamental orientation is toward the

exterior world. His attitudes and values center in objects outside himself. In contrast, the introvert centers his attention in himself, in his inner or subjective world, and his contact with the externalities around him—people or things—is predominantly colored and changed by his efforts to retreat from the impress of this outside world into his own inner mental sanctum. He finds his chief values and satisfactions within a realm which he has re-created subjectively for himself.

Jung begins with the assumption of a fundamental life force or energy which in human beings tends to take one or the other of two directions, either outward toward the external environment, or inward toward one's subjective life patterns. The first characterizes the extrovert, the other the introvert.¹ Moreover, in either instance, this life energy may take the form of "rational" processes determined by what Jung calls "objective values," that is, activity which may be verifiable in terms of logical analysis. Or it may take the form of "irrational" processes, determined chiefly by "accidental perceptions," chance, and more or less illogical associations. The rational processes, in turn, he divides into two fundamental functions, "thinking" and "feeling." In parallel fashion he segregates the irrational into what he calls "sensation" and "intuition." The former are dominated by reasoning and judgment, the latter by intensity of perceptions but not by rational judgment. Each broad type, extroversion or introversion, therefore, may in turn be organized around one of the fourfold features: thinking, feeling, sensation, or intuition. Let us note some of the outstanding characteristics of each of these eight subtypes: four for each of the two major categories.

√(1) The *extroverted thinking type* accepts the world from the senses and uses his sensory impressions as the basis for logical analysis and construction of his reality. This sort of thinking appears to be influenced essentially by external data, and conclusions as to experience tend to agree with these objective facts. Jung contends that the more extreme individual of this sort is inclined to develop rather fixed formulae for dealing with his data. He reveals a certain shortsightedness, and his tendency to consider his views as more or less universal in application handicaps a more flexible adaptation. In short, his acceptance of the logic of events outside himself may lead to a

¹ Some have assumed this division of types to be largely determined by heredity rather than by learning. Moreover, there has arisen in our society the notion that somehow introversion—on the whole—represents an ineffective psychological divergence, while extroversion is "more normal." Yet the extreme instances of each have been frequently equated to the two fundamental functional disorders: the former to schizophrenia (*dementia praecox*), the latter to manic-depressive psychoses, so that it may be said that both have a potentiality for breakdown.

However, if it be contended that the internalization of behavior indicates a "higher" evolutionary stage or process—biologically speaking—one might defend the thesis that the essential subjectivity of the introvert represents a species advance over the extrovert, who might be considered a type with less well-developed features of mentation. While this is all largely hypothetical, we must realize that the belief that extroversion is superior and more desirable than introversion reflects the cultural concepts (values) of our own time.

certain fixity or rigidity of life organization which prevents sympathy and understanding of his own emotions and feelings, and of those of others.

(2) The behavior of the *extroverted feeling type* is consistently determined by the feeling for the external object. The individual tends to feel and act according to the demands and expectations of the situation. In what we would call the social role, the individual follows more or less the conventions and demands of the group to which he belongs. He identifies himself easily with the emotions of those around him. Jung contends that this type is found far more frequently in women than in men. But, if this be so, it probably reflects culture rather than original nature.

(3) The *extroverted sensation type* is most definitely conditioned by and oriented to the sensory, concrete features of a given object. The external object or situation has "a pronounced sensuous hold over" the individual. Jung believes that men incline toward this pattern in contrast to women, who run to the feeling type; but, again, in making such an assumption he is obviously rationalizing certain sex differences dependent not on biology but on culture. He also maintains that this sort of person tends to be a thoroughgoing realist and materialist. He takes the world as he finds it. He does not even bother to reorganize it logically, as would the introverted thinking type. Moral codes, for example, he may take for granted. But one of this sort might either be a sheer pleasure-seeker or accept the morality of his community as thoroughly sound. Thus, while the hedonist might be classified as the extroverted sensation type, the adherent to the time-honored mores would also fall into this category. In other words, the social roles of such persons might differ considerably. This would depend largely upon the sort of cultural "copies" set before him.

(4) The *extroverted intuition type* is more difficult to describe. For a person of this sort, the external object does not so much control his perception or sensation as offer him a suggestion for elaborating the possibilities of the object at the moment as something to manipulate or control. In fact, the interest and reaction of any given situation are so powerful and intriguing that what he thinks, feels, or does "may run counter to convictions hitherto unquestioned." (Jung, 1922, p. 465.) In other words, the objective world is a cue to action rather than a director, as would be true of the introverted sensation type. Jung believes that speculators, business promoters, salesmen, and news-reporters with a "nose for news" often have such characteristics. Then, too, many women fall into this category. They are great successes in social contacts with others, but their skill is rather of an intuitive, spontaneous, almost unconscious sort rather than the result of logical thought.

(5) The *introverted thinking type* is marked by ideational patterns which have been almost completely organized subjectively till they suit the individual. This sort of person tends to be indifferent toward the objective world of the extrovert. Thus, according to Jung, Charles Darwin might be classed as "the normal extroverted thinking type," and Immanuel Kant as an example of the "normal introverted thinker." Persons of this latter sort tend to isolate themselves from the world of material objects, to live largely in the realm of theories, ideas, and ideals. They are notably impractical, often thoroughly indifferent to financial matters, to clothes, and to persons around them. If they have any close and intimate friends, those are likely to be few in number.

(6) The *introverted feeling type* is also dominated by the "subjective factor," but, unlike the extroverted feeling class, which is controlled by external events and runs

perhaps to enthusiasms or depressive moods, individuals of this sort live within their own internal world of emotions and feelings. The inner life of these persons follows strong ego wishes, but, unlike the introverted thinking type, they tend to go in for daydreams and inner elaborations dependent on immediate emotional and feeling tone. They are often silent and retiring and seem to others to be thoroughly at peace with the world.

(7) The *introverted sensation type*, unlike the extroverted sensation type, determines the meaning of the sensation in terms of what Jung calls the "subjective sensation-constituent released by the objective stimulus" (1922, p. 501). That is, this sort of person, though attending to the external world, so completely dominates his perception of it by his subjective, internal states that the given perception is always recast into predetermined patterns or meanings of his own. He reacts much more egocentrically than the extroverted sensation type. Certain creative artists would fall into this class. They see, hear, and touch the world around them, but almost entirely from the viewpoint of their own inner meanings.

(8) The *introverted intuition type* directs his attention upon his own imagery. These images are the clues to his activity. He lives within himself, using the imagery as points of departure for still other images and inner experiences, for giving him a meaning to life. This type is exemplified in the mystical dreamer, seer, or religious prophet, or in the fanatical crank or artist. Often the products of a dreamer or an artist may be so remote from the ordinary experience of those around him as to be practically meaningless to them. ✓

Doubting whether people divide themselves easily into two distinctive classes of extroversion and introversion, some writers have assumed that these represent extremes of a somewhat continuous distribution of traits or attitudes. Between these two extremes lie most people, who show features of both extroversion and introversion. These have been labeled *ambiverts*. Moreover, if we accept Jung's subclasses, we must realize that the four functions—*thinking*, *feeling*, *sensation*, and *intuition*—may appear in any given individual, though in actuality one of these modes might predominate over the others. Thus a particular person's response to the world and to himself might be said to be *typically* or *characteristically* in this or that modality, but this would not imply an absence, necessarily, of the other features.

For that matter, Jung does not deny that individuals who express the predominant extroverted or introverted attitudes necessarily lack the opposite components. He maintains that the extrovert's ambivalent tendencies toward introversion lie hidden in the unconscious. There is, in fact, a compensatory mechanism at work here. Not only does the extrovert suppress his introverted tendencies, but, for example, the thinking extrovert inhibits his other psychological functions, feeling, sensation, and intuition. In the same vein the introvert of any given subclass may suppress not only his extrovertive tendencies, but also the other psychological functions which are not a phase of his particular type or pattern.

While various psychologists, chiefly in this country, have attempted to work out methods for uncovering introversion or extroversion, no adequate attempt has been made to check carefully by statistical or other methods the four respective subdivisions of Jung's dual categories.² In fact, the various definitions of the two types used by psychologists by no means agree. Thus one of the first American workers to try to use these concepts was Freyd (1924, pp. 75, 74), who defined the extrovert as one in whom there is a "diminution of thought processes in relation to directly observable social behavior, with an accompanying tendency to make social contacts"; the introvert, in contrast, is "an individual in whom exists an exaggeration of the thought processes in relation to directly observable social behavior with accompanying tendency to withdraw from social contacts." It is clear that Freyd defines all extroverts in terms of Jung's extroverted intuitive type, and all introverts essentially as Jung does the introverted thinking type. In contrast, Conklin (1923, 1927) characterized the two types in terms of divergent interests which served to control one's attention. Introversion represented "a more or less prolonged condition" wherein subjective and abstract, rather than objective, concern dominated attention and behavior. Extroversion, on the other hand, was characterized by interests which directed attention toward the objective concrete world outside.

Numerous other definitions and criteria of introversion and extroversion have been set up. Thus J. P. Guilford and R. B. Guilford (1934), in analyzing their test of introversion (made up of items from various other tests), found that this test alone involved attempts to measure not less than eighteen different traits. From their statistical manipulations of the data they tentatively named the four most significant clusters of these traits as follows: (1) tendency to fear the environment, to shrink from it; (2) emotional sensitiveness to the environment; (3) impulsiveness; and (4) interest in self. But these or like subjective categories might not satisfy other workers.

When we turn to examine the various efforts made to develop tests of introversion and extroversion, and to apply them to concrete problems of analysis and prediction, we must admit that the results are surprisingly unproductive. There is little agreement among the research workers as to how to characterize these types—assuming them to be sound in the first place. Validity and reliability are frequently low. The correlations of the tests with other tests of personality, or with school performance or social adjustments generally, are at best rather inadequate.³

² See, however, Stagner and Pessin (1934) for a critique of some of the major categories of well-known tests of introversion-extroversion.

³ The extensive literature on this topic cannot be reviewed here; but for bibliographies see Guilford and Braly (1930), Symonds (1931), Guilford and Braly (1934). References to certain findings from these tests will be made in other chapters.

There has been no end of criticism of Jung's dual classification and its various modified forms. Some of this criticism rests upon differences in standpoint and method regarding specific as against general traits, some upon the question whether traits are distributed in a continuous series as to frequency, intensity, or other scale, or whether they tend to cluster into modes or discrete categories. We shall return to some aspects of this matter in the final section of this chapter.

At this point we wish to introduce the problem of the probable constitutional as well as social-cultural determinants of introvert and extrovert traits and attitudes. Some writers, like Marston (1925), Kempf (1918), and McDougall (1926), emphasize the constitutional foundations; others, like LaPiere and Farnsworth (1936), appear to maintain not only that introverted or extroverted responses are highly specific, but that they are pretty largely determined by social-cultural training.

Marston (1925), for example, attempted to define and use the concepts behavioristically. Emphasis was placed upon the emotional components of the opposing attitudes involved in extrovert and introvert conduct, and upon the particular disposition of energy related thereto. In fact, he goes so far as to attempt to link up the types with constitutional factors. He contends, for instance, that extroversion represents the direction or expenditure of emotionally aroused energy outward upon the environment, chiefly through the skeletal musculature. Introversion, in contrast, represents the inhibition of peripheral expression and the dissipation of energy within the organism.

This attempt to link up these types with physiological and neurological factors is probably derived from Kempf (1918), who contended that introversion represents a form of affective dissociation due to an imbalance in the interplay of the autonomic and central nervous systems. The characteristic worry, self-consciousness, and ineffectual action of the introvert are said to arise because the normal outflow of energy is blocked and redirected into the inner central system—thus inducing symptoms of maladjustment. The extrovert, on the other hand, tends to more direct adaptation. In somewhat similar vein, McDougall (1926)—though describing the types in mentalistic concepts—took the position that introversion involved a greater activity of the higher cerebral centers and an inhibition of the operation of the subcortical and lower centers. In contrast, the extrovert lacks such inhibition; he acts, we might say, without thinking. But, again, the introvert of Marston, Kempf, and McDougall would fall chiefly in Jung's "introverted thinking type," and their conception of the extrovert is that of the "extroverted feeling type." Just how they would characterize in neural-physiological terms the other six subtypes is uncertain.

This emphasis upon the possible constitutional substrata of these respective types, and especially the inclination—as with McDougall and even Jung himself—to attribute the differences to inherently organic factors, open up the problem noted in Chapters II and III respecting the possible place of constitutional and hereditary factors in predetermination of the basic pattern of life organization. But we are far from hav-

ing any adequate facts on this question, though these theories are certainly suggestive and should be borne in mind by those who would take the extreme position that these reaction patterns are entirely the result of societal and cultural influences.

Yet, when one examines the replies to the questions which comprise most of these tests, one quickly realizes that they reflect the cultural training of the persons tested. In present-day society, which the Euro-American ethos has influenced, with its emphasis upon machine production, great overt activity, executive management, and mass activity, people look down upon the more quiescent philosophy or the consideration of the subjectively determined values of the sort which marked the Middle Ages and have characterized many Oriental societies. Our culture sets the stage for the extroverted attitude. (See Chapters XXVII and XXVIII.)

Heidbreder's study (1930) on the relation between self-ratings on an introversion-extroversion scale and the stated preferences for these same traits clearly reveals the power of the culture in these matters. Her subjects, forty-nine men and eighty-six women, clearly reflected the contemporary American emphasis upon extroverted characteristics. For instance, the bulk of the students expressed a preference for various "socially approved traits," although there were few if any significant correlations between measures of extroversion-introversion and the preference for these socially approved traits. So, too, both introversion and the "inferiority attitude" were considered undesirable to all students—among those who showed themselves introverts as well as among those who were extroverts. Nevertheless, these measures of the students' preferences reflect the fact that, despite cultural conditioning, which sets high prestige values on extroversion (as measured by their preferences), there may be some deeper underlying foundations in the personality for their type reactions to the tests themselves. Also, in the matter of occupational choice there is no doubt that the dominant status of the businessman, the salesman, the Babbitt, indicates the emphasis which we put upon the extrovertive tendencies. But whether such cultural stimuli can entirely counteract the deeper motives and patterns of personality remains to be seen.

In concluding this section on introversion and extroversion, let us draw together some important points in relation to the fundamental problems of personality organization. In general, the basic values of the introvert lie within himself. In terms of G. H. Mead's theory, the introvert's roles and concept of the generalized others (society) are built up largely with an inward reference. The extrovert, in contrast, builds his self around values which are assumed to be, or expected by others to be, in the external material and social world. His personality organization is developed in terms of adaptation to outside objects and persons. His roles are those anticipated for him by others, and his generalized others (society) he conceives of largely in terms of these societally and culturally determined anticipations. On the other hand, in the introvert the life organization is

built up internally to suit his egoistic wishes. He is dominated, apparently, by strong self wishes, by a preponderance of an "I," which resists interference or change. In his interaction with others he is constantly affected by the barriers which he sets up within himself: his wishes, his ego reference, his preconceptions, and his own expectancies—which often, run counter to those of persons around him. The introvert, in other words, constructs his ego by identification with his own strong wishes and with other persons as he would like them to be—that is, as they must be, to suit him. The extrovert, on the contrary, identifies himself, on the whole, rather easily with other persons or things. If he has any inner stresses or barriers, he is likely to escape them by movement with reference to the external world. In the extreme instance he escapes *into* reality, whereas the introvert *retreats* into the inner citadel of his mind, there to brood or suffer or delight in his motions, or to come into sensory and intuitive contact with the mysterious forces of the universe as he has conceived them.

Which of these extremes one should strive for is a question itself of norms and values. In our own society, despite the culturally approved stimuli to become extroverted, we find a place for some introverts—though we are likely to consider them a bit queer or at best divergent from the "best" in our values. But doubtless most people do fall into the middle range—the so-called ambiverts. This very fact may in time prevent an undue emphasis upon the externalized, material, mass-man values of our age.⁴

Other dual classification of types. On the whole, psychiatry has contributed more than has academic psychology to the whole subject of typology. It was Kraepelin, a student of Wundt's who turned to psychiatry, who developed the well-known division of the so-called functional mental disorders into *dementia praecox* or *schizophrenia*, and the *manic-depressive* or *circular* psychoses. (See Kraepelin, 1919, 1921, English edition; and Jelliffe, 1931, on the history of this classification.) On the basis of his two categories, other psychiatrists have developed theories of types of normal personality, since one of the fundamental assumptions of modern psychiatry and of psychology is that the mental manifestations of the functional psychopathics find their counterparts in the normal population. (See Chapter XXVII.) In fact, Jung himself was doubtless influenced by Kraepelinian concepts. And Bleuler's (1924) *syntonic* and *schizoid* follow pretty much in the same dualistic frame of reference. The former type of person is easily adaptable to others; the latter tends to retreat from normal social interaction and to go off into an imaginary

⁴ The reader may find amusement and enlightenment in Dorothy Canfield's article, "Lo, the Poor Introvert," *Harpers Magazine*, Dec., 1932, vol. r66, pp. 77-85, in which she discusses our modern overemphasis on extroversion.

world of his own. So, too, Wertheimer and Hesketh (1926), following up Jung's categories with certain samples of psychopathic cases, divided personalities into the *syntropic* and *idiotropic*. The former get their chief satisfactions or values in contact with others, which contacts are determined chiefly by emotional-feeling tone rather than by cold logical calculations. The latter find their basic personal satisfactions or values in detachment from personal relations with others, such as the pursuit of intellectual interests. They show little or no affective responses to other persons; rather, their emotional reactions are directed inward toward themselves.

Another dual-type theory is that of E. R. Jaensch (1923, 1930) and W. Jaensch (1926). They drew their evidence largely from studies in eidetic (perceptlike) imagery. Their dual division is into the T-type, marked by almost compulsory hallucinatory visual patterns and hyperexcitability of the motor nerves, and the B-type, characterized by eideticlike perception (or seeing) of whatever one is thinking about at the moment. But the vagaries of the attempted social-cultural applications of this theory have tended to discredit it among serious workers. (See Klüver, 1926, 1928, for a critique.)

Of all the various dual-type theories which have their foundation in Kraepelin's work, none, aside from Jung's, is so elaborate or has been so much discussed as Kretschmer's. But, since he has attempted to link up his psychological with a morphological typology, we shall discuss his work in a separate section below.

Certain three-type theories. Taking the position that temperament in a broad sense is largely innately determined, Rosanoff (1938) classifies personalities into three types: (1) the *antisocial*, which is marked by malingering, pathological lying, criminalistic tendencies, certain hysteric manifestations, and the predominance of an "overweening selfishness"; (2) the *cyclothymic*, which is constitutionally related to the manic-depressive of the Kraepelinian dichotomy, characterized by fluctuations of mood and by emotional instability; and (3) a class which he maintains is marked essentially by "chaotic sexuality." This last type is represented chiefly in schizoid individuals who show a split between the intellectual and emotional-feeling activities, retreat from social contacts, elaboration of rich fantasies, and striking maladjustments in the love life. In this last-named class the personality structure resembles that of the dementia praecox case.⁵

⁵ In an earlier publication (1920) Rosanoff indicated a fourth type, the "epileptic," characterized by "periodic alterations of mood and consciousness," with such features as strong egotism, sensitiveness to social criticism, irascibility, quarrelsomeness, suspicion, and some tendency, in certain cases at least, to curious dissociated states of a visionary and auditory sort. But evidently he has given up this type in his later work (1938). However, Humm and

Rosanoff has not elaborated his threefold classification beyond the broad general outlines of certain resemblances to neurotic and psychotic syndromes. (See Chapter XXVII.) And his use of the term "anti-social" to characterize one of his groupings is particularly unfortunate, on two counts at least. First, since he tends to stress innate predisposition or constitution as fundamental in the determination of his types, his use of such a term confuses social-cultural, especially moral, concepts with those derived from biology and psychiatry. In the second place, his usage tends to confuse the typology of psychology with that which has been developed in sociology. (See below on social types.)

Although he never systematically elaborated his theory of types, Freud (1932) classified the basic personality manifestations into *erotic*, *compulsive*, and *narcissistic*. The first is marked by a predominance of love interests and outgoing sympathetic identification with others. The second is characterized by highly organized and inflexible patterns of habit and thought. The third is essentially the strongly self-centered person who would have the world revolve around himself. In addition Freud made allowance for certain paired (mixed) types: erotic-compulsive, erotic-narcissistic, and narcissistic-compulsive, an obvious concession to the difficulties in any simple plan of typification.

Spranger's ideal types. Still another attempt to formulate a psychological theory of types is that of Spranger (1928), who divides people into what he terms six fundamental "attitudes" or "dominant value directions": the *theoretic*, the *economic*, the *aesthetic*, the *social*, the *political*, and the *religious*. The dominant mode of the personality, or what Spranger calls "character," is determined by one of these fundamental "values." There are mixed types in actuality, but his treatment is concerned only with the pure, "eternal," or *ideal* types. He believes that a theory of types is feasible for conceptual purposes. He nowhere contends that he has derived his thesis from the description and systematic analysis of individual cases or from statistical results. (Spranger himself, in a way, represents Jung's introverted thinking type.) He frankly admits that his schema is an artifact with which to study "mental phenomena on a level of relatively low complexity." Each of his types is determined theoretically in terms of "one definite meaning and value direction." These are but verbal constructs or concepts to be used to characterize the basic forms or styles of life organization. He is frank to state that he is not concerned with attempting to describe the many-sided variations of actual living or historical personalities. To do this latter would involve what he calls an "individualizing procedure." In his treatment of the ideal types he is

Wadsworth (1935) followed this older classification in constructing their "temperament scale."

concerned only with working out "the few most general forms of personality."

For our purposes of review we may summarize the features of each of Spranger's types as follows:

(1) The *theoretical* is dominated by the search for truth. In striving for this goal the person takes a "cognitive" attitude. His is a strictly objective view, one which essentially pays no attention to the beautiful or ugly, the good or bad, the usefulness or inutility of objects. The attitude is that of the pure intellectualist.

(2) In contrast, the *economic* type is controlled by an interest in the strictly useful things of life. He prefers that all his relations take on a utilitarian value. Everything is seen "as a means for self-preservation, an aid in the natural struggle for existence and a possibility to render life pleasant." (1928, p. 133.) An example is the strictly practical man so evident in the American stereotype of the business executive or salesman. This type tends to exploit or else ignore the other types.

(3) The *aesthetic* type is fundamentally concerned with the beautiful. Such a man finds his highest values in form and harmony. Every experience is judged from the standpoint of artistic form, symmetry, and fitness. For a person of this kind problems of truth and beauty merge, and to him the practicality of the economic man is often offensive. So, too, his social and religious activities are dominated by his quest for the artistic.

(4) Spranger uses the term "social" in a narrow and special sense. For him the *social* type has for its highest value the love of people. This sort of person is sympathetic, kind, unselfish. The basic value is an interest in others.

(5) The *political* type is primarily concerned with the securing of power. Spranger does not mean to confine this type to what is ordinarily considered politics, but to what the Germans call the *Machtmensch* (the power-man) in any field. The relations with others are chiefly those of domination.

(6) The *religious* type finds its principal interest in unity with the cosmos. Such a person is mystical and tends to identify himself with the totality of the universe. "A religious man is he whose whole mental structure is permanently directed to the creation of the highest and absolutely satisfying value experience." (1928, p. 213.)

Spranger probably never had any notion that this conceptual scheme of his would ever be put to the test of empirical classification of people. But two enterprising research workers, G. W. Allport and Vernon (1931), using his categorical criteria, devised a "Study of Values" scale for distinguishing the interests and values of individuals, and several investigations have shown that, except for the section of the test dealing with the *social* type, it has considerable reliability and validity.

Yet there has been no widespread and exhaustive application of this test. It is clear, however, that Spranger's categories reach over into the field of sociological types to be discussed later, and it may well be that the Allport-Vernon scale and others which may yet be derived from Spranger may have some usefulness in the field of vocational guidance.

PHYSIQUE AND PERSONALITY

That certain physical or bodily traits are causally correlated with particular mental or temperamental characteristics has long been a popular belief, and during the nineteenth century phrenology was widely accepted. But today we know that the contours of the skull bear no relation to given traits or mental functions. So, too, it was long assumed that the greater the intelligence the larger the brain and hence the bigger the skull. But this belief has also been long since exploded. For example, Pearson (1906) did not find the slightest significant correlation between various indices of head size and form of a large sample of school children and university students and either the teachers' estimates of intelligence or the scholastic grades. As he put it, "It is impossible to use head size as a basis for judgment as to intelligence." Similarly, Somerville (1924) correlated a variety of measurements of physical, motor, and sensory traits with the scores from Thorndike's intelligence test and got correlations ranging from $-.14$ to $.10$, which indicate no significant relationships whatsoever.

In like vein, attempts have been made to relate complexion, facial form, and various postural and other manifestations with intellectual and emotional characteristics. Some of the more valid studies, especially in the field of so-called expressive movement, have already been noted. (See Chapter X.) But there is much popular mythology about the relation of physiognomy to various personality characteristics. One of the most exhaustive analyses of alleged physical features as clues to personality was made by Cleeton and Knight (1924). Paterson (in Harris, Jackson, Paterson, and Scammon, 1930, p. 128) thus summarizes their findings:

"...One hundred and twenty-two physical measurements were considered in testing the hypothesis that judgment, intelligence, frankness, will power, ability to make friends, leadership, originality, and impulsiveness are revealed by various physical characteristics. Ratings of these character traits as exhibited by the thirty subjects employed in the experiment were secured from intimate associates and pooled in such a manner as to yield an unusually reliable index of those traits. These pooled ratings were then correlated with each of the physical measurements, with the net result that the average of 201 correlations between variations in physical traits and variations in character traits (presumed by character analysts to be closely related to the physical traits) is exactly zero. Here is a beautiful statistical refutation of the sweeping claims indulged in by devotees of physiognomy."

Not only have efforts been made to discover relationships between separate mental traits and various bodily features, but a number of workers have employed the concept of classes or types of physical make-up. The physical anthropologists in their attempts to delineate races are a

good example. Taking such characteristics as stature, color, head form, facial features, and the form and distribution of hair as criteria, they have tried to classify mankind in such races as Caucasoid, Mongoloid, and Negroid. But they find many mixtures, and the best standards of racial differentiation are none too satisfactory when applied to specific samples of the world's population. (See Hooton, 1931.)

Other scholars, dealing chiefly with our own white society, have sought to discover whether people may be divided into distinctive morphological groups. One of the most influential theories was that of Lombroso (1876), who believed that he had found a set of physical characteristics by which he might distinguish "born criminals" from noncriminal people. But the work of Goring (1913), in which British prisoners were compared with noncriminal samples, rather conclusively dissipated Lombroso's thesis. (See, however, Chapter XXV for a discussion of Hooton's recent revival, 1939, of a similar theory.) In addition to these investigations, there have been serious efforts to discover types of physique and to relate these constitutional factors to various aspects of the personality. Let us review the more important of these. (For a more extended review see P. S. deQ. Cabot, 1938. See also W. H. Sheldon, 1940, on physical types.)

Morphological types. Naccarati (1921), taking his cue from the work of De Giovanni and Viola in Italy, tried to work out certain indices of bodily types. He adopted Viola's threefold classification: (1) *microsplanchnics*, characterized by small trunks and development of the limbs in excess of the trunk (the thin, slender body build); (2) *macrosplanchnics* (or *megalosplanchnics*), denoted by large trunks, excessively developed (the short and fat body build); and (3) *normosplanchnics*, who show a harmonious development of physical constitution. Naccarati did not believe that any single measurement would serve as a standard with which to compare intelligence or other psychological characteristics; so after various trials he adopted a morphological index (M.I.), the ratio of height to weight, as the most satisfactory single indicator of physical type. A high height-weight ratio or index indicates *microsplanchny*, a low index *macrosplanchny*.

Just how these types distribute themselves in large samples of a given population has not been determined. One study by Viola of four hundred North Italians found that 47.7 per cent were *normosplanchnics*, 28.0 per cent of the fat stocky class, and 24.3 per cent of the thin and slender variety. But Naccarati was not so much interested in the distribution of such types in the population as in the possible relation of these morphological features to intelligence. On the basis of certain physiological facts he reasoned that *microsplanchnics* should tend to be more intelligent than *macrosplanchnics*. To test his hypothesis he correlated the indices of body build of a sample of Columbia University students with their performance on various standardized intelligence examinations. Of the thirteen coefficients of correlation which he reported, all

are low. He did show, however, that there is a somewhat higher correlation between his index of body build and intelligence—as measured by his tests—than there was between intelligence and any isolated physical trait, such as height, weight, or rate of bone growth. But his sample was none too well chosen, since he did not keep constant such factors as sex and race.

Naccarati and Garrett (1924) reported for fifty-four college men that those of low M.I. (relatively large trunk and short extremities) tended to reveal evidence of temperamental disturbances more often than did those of high M.I. (relatively small trunk and long extremities). (See also Naccarati, 1924, on morphology and psychoneuroses.)

Other workers have not been able to verify his results. For instance, Heidbreder (1926) made a most complete check on Naccarati's work. Using a sample of 1,000 white native-born college freshmen at the University of Minnesota, she compared the physical measurements with scores on carefully validated and reliable tests of intelligence. With her more adequate methods she should have secured even higher coefficients than did Naccarati, but her correlations approximated zero throughout. Later Garrett, who had collaborated with Naccarati, got thoroughly negative results. Using a large sample of college students, Garrett and Kellogg (1928) correlated the M.I. with their scores on three tests (Thorndike's intelligence examination, the Moss social intelligence scale, and the Woodworth psychoneurotic inventory) and got "small and unreliable correlations ranging from .051 to .101."

Another theory of typology—better known than Naccarati's—is that developed by Kretschmer (1925) from his rough-and-ready measurements of the patients in a mental hospital in Germany. Later other samples were used. (For a good review of the earlier studies of Kretschmer's types, see Weiss, 1927.) From his investigations Kretschmer contended that he found three more or less distinct physical types: the *asthenic* or *leptosomic*, the *athletic* or *athletosomic*, and the *pyknic* or *pykosomic*.

The *asthenic* is characterized, as a rule, by a lean, narrowly built frame, poor blood, inadequate skin secretion, narrow shoulders, long, thin arms with thin muscles, delicately shaped hands, a long, narrow chest, and a thin stomach. The lower limbs are built on lines similar to those of the upper. The face is angular. There are some variations, but these are the most noticeable features. The *athletic* type shows strong development of the skeletal framework and the muscles. The skin is firm and healthy. The shoulders are broad, the chest thick, the abdomen well covered with layers of muscle; the trunk tapers toward the middle region, the pelvis is narrow, and the legs are tapering and shapely. The arms are heavily muscled. The face is firm, the jaw is prominent, and the nose tends to be short and snubby. The *pyknic* type, which according to Kretschmer does not reach its highest development until middle age, is characterized by pronounced development of the rounded figure, fatness about the trunk, and a deep, vaulted chest which broadens out toward the lower part of the body. The limbs are soft and round and display little muscle relief, as do those of the second type. The shoulders are usually rounded and pushed slightly forward.

According to Kretschmer, these types do not always appear in pure form, but are

sometimes mixed with others. So, too, he classifies some of his cases as dysplastic, that is, as marked by distinct asymmetry of organs.

But Kretschmer went beyond the possible morphological groupings. He tried to link up these physical traits with particular varieties of personality organization. Drawing upon Bleuler for his classification of personalities, he reports that he found the asthenics and the athletics falling chiefly into the category of schizophrenics, and the pyknics into the manic-depressive or circular group. The cross distribution of the first 260 patients whom he examined is shown in Table 2.

TABLE 2

DISTRIBUTION OF 260 PATIENTS EXAMINED BY KRETSCHEMER⁶

	CIRCULAR	SCHIZOPHRENE
Asthenic	4	81
Athletic	3	31
Asthenic-athletic mixed	2	11
Pyknic	58	2
Pyknic mixture	14	3
Dysplastic	—	34
Deformed and uncataloguable forms	4	13
Total	85	175

Following the thesis noted in a previous section, these psychotics are assumed to represent but exaggerated features of the thought and behavior found in normal populations. To classify normal persons, Kretschmer uses the terms *schizothymes* and *cyclothymes*. The former tend to be characterized by unsociability, reserve, humorlessness, eccentricities, timidity, shyness, sensitiveness, nervousness, excitability, fondness for nature and for books, pliability, kindness, honesty, indifference, dullness, and silence. The latter are inclined to be sociable, good-natured, friendly, genial, cheerful, humorous, jolly, and hasty, or, in some moods, easily depressed and soft-hearted. Table 3, on page 320, gives the outstanding features of these two main classes of personality.

Kretschmer illustrates his two great divisions by citing historical characters in various arts, sciences, and fields of practical life. Table 4 presents his summary classification of the special dispositions among three major classes of persons: poets, scientists, and leaders of the masses of men.

There have been a number of attempts to verify the Kretschmer typology. For example, Mohr and Gundlach (1927) made extensive physical measurements and gave a variety of mental tests to a large group of

⁶ Quoted from E. Kretschmer, *Physique and Character*, 1925, p. 35.

TABLE 3

TRAITS AND CHARACTERISTICS OF CYCLOTHYMES AND SCHIZOTHYMES ⁷

	CYCLOTHYMES	SCHIZOTHYMES
Psychasthesia and mood	Diathetic proportion: between raised (gay) and depressed (sad)	Psychasthetic proportion: between hyper-esthetic (sensitive) and anesthetic (cold)
Psychic tempo	Wavy temperamental curve: between mobile and comfortable	Jerky temperamental curve: between unstable and tenacious alternation mode of thought and feeling
Psychomotility	Adequate to stimulus, rounded, natural, smooth	Often inadequate to stimulus: restrained, lamed, inhibited, stiff, etc.
Psychical affinities	Pyknic	Asthenic, athletic, dysplastic, and their mixtures

prisoners at Joliet, Illinois. They found, among other things: (1) that the prisoners showed about the same distribution of the morphological traits as the noncriminal population; (2) that it is not easy to detect the different types "by mere inspection" and that evidently there is a more or less continuous progression from those features which define the ex-

TABLE 4

KRETSCHMER'S CLASSIFICATION OF SPECIAL DISPOSITIONS ⁸

	CYCLOTHYMES	SCHIZOTHYMES
Poets	Realists	Pathetics
	Humorists	Romantics
		Formalists
Experimenters	Observers	Exact logicals
	Describers	Systematists
	Empiricists	Metaphysicians
Leaders	Tough whole-hoggers	Pure idealists
	Jolly organizers	Despots and fanatics
	Understanding conciliators	Cold calculators

treme asthenic to those that characterize the "best" pyknics; (3) that without any attempt "to explain the foundation" of the physical variations, important differences in mental-test performance for the three types are evident; and (4) that the asthenic subjects reveal schizothymic tend-

⁷ From E. Kretschmer, *op. cit.*, p. 258.

⁸ From E. Kretschmer, *op. cit.*, p. 261.

encies, that the pyknics reveal cyclothymic tendencies, and that the former are "more" unsocial than the latter. As a matter of fact, in some tests the alleged distinctions were quite evident, as in the reaction times in writing, cancellation tests, and others; on the other hand, distraction tests devised to demonstrate "inhibition"—such as "writing-while-counting"—revealed no differences between the pyknics and the others. In concluding their report, these authors (1927, p. 157) state:

"Our results support in a general way the Kretschmer theory of physical and temperamental kinds, in that a relationship between physique and character of performance is demonstrated. They tend to modify the theory, however, by breaking down even Kretschmer's loose conception of 'types' and insisting on the concept of a general progression both of performance and of physical characteristics. . . .

"With a correlation of performance and physical characteristics it is quite reasonable that a *more easily recognized* constellation of physical and psychological attributes should impress the clinical investigator as a 'type.' The exceptions are so numerous, however, as seriously to impair the validity of this 'type' as an entity. Although there is no incompatibility between our results relative to physique and performance and those of Kretschmer relative to physique and temperament, an interpretation of the facts at hand does not require the retention of the concept of 'type.'"

Another critical study of Kretschmer's typology was made by Klineberg, Asch, and Block (1934), who after a controlled series of tests of 153 college women and 73 college men concluded that the physical-mental types could not be substantiated. But it must be observed that their tests of perception and memory scarcely present an adequate view of the total personality. (Moreover, this study, like many others, used tests and criteria which presume continuous, not discrete, distributions of variables. See below.)

It is important to note that it is not always easy to distinguish among the three morphological types. Thus Burchard (1936), in reporting some support for Kretschmer's general thesis, found that, while the physical differences between the pyknics and the asthenics could be fairly well determined, he had difficulty securing clear-cut criteria for the athletic type. Moreover, he states that there appears to be "a tendency for all individuals to become increasingly pyknic as they grow older" (1936, p. 68). Though this statement is too unqualified, the neglect of the factor of aging in reference to increased body weight in many individuals has probably tended to make for certain inadequate distinctions between athletics and pyknics. (See Farber, 1938; also P. S. deQ. Cabot, 1938.)

Aside from Jung's classification of men into extroverts and introverts, no theory of personality types has aroused more discussion than Kretschmer's. His bold attempts to link constitutional features with psychological features indicates a view of the personality as a total responding psychobiological organism. No matter how much we may question his par-

ticular findings, the fact remains that he has laid before us a most challenging problem. Once we link up constitutional features with psychological characteristics, we throw ourselves definitely upon the endocrinologists and physiologists generally. And with the recognition of the importance of the ductless glands there has been an effort by some writers to develop another typology based upon differences arising from the effects of the endocrines upon thought and behavior.

Endocrines and types of personality. In Chapter II we reviewed the literature on the hormones—those chemical substances which come from the ductless glands and which clearly influence the constitution, and hence the behavior, of the individual. We also pointed out that the glands do not operate independently of each other, that they form a sort of interlocking chemical directorate over much of the activity within the organism. And since what goes on within the body physiologically has so much to do with our emotions, thought, and overt conduct, we can readily see that the glands must be considered important in any study of personality. It is easy to believe that the predominance of certain glands furnishes at least one foundation for variations in mentality and behavior.

On the assumption that one or two glands may have an ascendant function in a given individual, Berman (1928) has posited a series of endocrine types of personality, each one corresponding to the particular hormone assumed to dominate the individual's life organization. Yet in all this great caution is needed, and the following brief review of Berman is aimed at indicating not only some of his sound suggestions, but more especially certain of the more exaggerated contentions which follow in the wake of his rather naïve, particularistic theory of causation.

(1) Berman posits a *thymocentric* personality marked by lack of inhibitory capacity, moral irresponsibility, criminality, and general incapacity to meet the demands of a taxing environment. Yet we do not even know the exact nature of the hormone produced by the thymus gland. (2) His *thyroid* personalities are divided into those who show undersecretion and those who show oversecretion of thyroxine, the former marked by cretinoid or myxedematous characteristics, the latter by excessive activity, quick mentality, impulsiveness, restlessness, and great energy. (3) The *adrenal* personalities are said to arise from a combination of the effects of adrenin and cortin, although, as we know, these hormones have rather distinctive functions. Again there are two classes: the hyperadrenal, showing intense energy, vigor, and persistence, and the "adrenal insufficient," revealing such neurotic traits as lack of energy, irritability, dullness, fatigability, and loss of appetite. Women of the former sort are distinctly masculine. Berman (1928, p. 238) predicts that "An adrenal type will probably be the first woman president of the United States."

Although there is increasing evidence that the pituitary secretes more than two hormones, Berman boldly postulates two subtypes of (4) the *pituitary* personality, one of which tends to be masculine, the other feminine. The former—controlled, he

states, by the anterior lobe—is the ideal virile male. The latter type in men are given to fluctuations of mood and efficiency, “reminding one of the menstrual variations of the female.” To support his thesis he cites the history of Florence Nightingale, who at the outset of her career was controlled by the prepituitary or masculine component, which was revealed in her vigor and aggression for the welfare of others. Later in life she changed from an angular, energetic, and dominant leader to a fat, dull, and amiable old lady. Berman attributes this to a shift in control from the prepituitary to the postpituitary.

In much the same way he contends that Napoleon, always characterized by certain thymocentric patterns in his greatest years, was dominated by the prepituitary. His lack of sympathy and of religious insight is attributed to his deficiency in postpituitary substance. “Napoleon,” he writes (1928, p. 271), “lacked a chemical trace of the religious instinct, his sympathy was nil, and his conquests were made possible only because he was blind to the suffering and misery his greed for glory and domination generated.” The decline of the Little Corporal, on the contrary, is “explained” by the gradual replacement of the prepituitary by the postpituitary influences. In fact, Berman maintains (1928, p. 273) that “the rise and fall of Napoleon followed the rise and fall of his pituitary gland in a thymocentric personality.” Thus does the over-enthusiast for endocrinology sweep aside in a few words the long-established facts of cultural and personal history! Truly this is particularism with a vengeance.

(5) The malfunctioning of the parathyroids also results in particular personality changes. Berman goes so far as to assume that the eudetic type described by Jaensch (see above) is associated with parathyroid malfunctioning, especially with lack of calcium salts. This parathyroid deficiency is said to be the foundation of Jaensch's T-type. Those who suffer from the lack of proper parathyroid stimulation are described as “the perpetually restless, the eternally unsatisfied and fastidious ones of the earth,” who hold themselves aloof from the masses of their fellow men.

(6) The *gonadocentric personalities* discussed by Berman constitute essentially those men who, lacking proper and normal development of masculinity, either through hereditary predisposition or through castration, take on the features and manners and behavior of women. Then, too, “oversexed types of personality” may also be found, illustrated by satyriasis or nymphomania, depending on the sex involved.⁹

In fairness to Berman, it must be said that, like many other theorists, he considers that his types of personality are really but prototypes or general classifications in which actually but few persons fit. In any given population we find a mixture of various endocrine dominances, such as those of the thyroid and adrenals, in the hyperactive, aggressive persons, or the combination of thymus persistence and lack of normal gonad development in the homosexuals. So far as we know, however, there have been no adequate studies of individuals in terms of Berman's classifications. Until we learn more, through the proper tests, of physiological functions in relation to learning or conditioning, we must be exceptionally cautious about accepting such extreme views. Yet the probable close

⁹ Quotations from Berman, *The Glands Regulating Personality*, 1922. By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers.

relationship of constitution and personality characteristics must never be overlooked.

SOCIOLOGICAL TYPES

The possibility of classifying people in terms of their principal social roles has been recognized almost as long as the possibility of determining dispositional types. Theophrastus, a disciple of Aristotle, in the third century before the Christian era, attempted to classify the role and status of individuals in society. In the book *Ethical Characters* he describes types such as "the flatterer," "the boor," and "the coward." Since his time many have tried to imitate him. (For a review of some of these, see G. W. Allport, 1937a.)

In our own day various sociologists have tried to classify men in somewhat the same manner, and the concept of *social type* has come into somewhat common use. For example, Thomas and Znaniecki (1918-20), in their study of the Polish peasant in Europe and in America, employed the concept of social type in distinguishing between character and temperament. The latter they held to be largely determined by constitutional, even hereditary, factors, the former to grow out of social interaction. They remark on this point (1918-20, vol. 2, p. 1844): "We may call temperament the fundamental original group of attitudes of the individual as existing independently of any social influences; we may call character the set of organized and fixed groups of attitudes developed by social influences operating upon the temperamental basis."

In discussing the rise of character, they predicate three types of personal development: (1) the *Philistine*, or practical man, who overemphasizes the wish for security and safety; (2) the *Bohemian*, who inclines toward new experience, is flighty, and lets his hedonistic impulses and the immediate situation, rather than staid and consistent interests, determine much of his behavior; and (3) the *creative man*, who, though relatively stable, possesses the capacity for modification of attitudes and wishes in terms of some goal or aim of a creative sort in any number of different fields: art, religion, morals, mechanical invention, politics, economics, and so on.

These are not, therefore, psychological types in the sense in which that concept is employed in the previous section. Rather, they are large categories of the major role determined through social participation. And this possibility of working out a classification of social role naturally raises the question as to the interrelation, if any, between dominant social roles and possible psychological types.

Personality type and social type. For the most part, sociology and cultural anthropology have paid little attention to the matter of psychological types. Yet certain sociologists and anthropologists, especially those

with an interest in social psychology, have been increasingly concerned with an analysis of the dispositional or temperamental qualities of men who live in varied social-cultural environments. Thus Burgess (1923), in attempting a sociological interpretation of personality, distinguished between the traits, attitudes, and habits which denote the "individual" and those features which characterize the "person"—who is defined as an "individual with social status." He held that the "individual" may be analyzed in terms of his physique, intelligence, feeling-emotional tendencies, volitional traits, and temperament. In contrast, the "person"—which arises from participation with others, that is, in interaction—may be studied in terms of what he called "personal behavior patterns." And, though these are influenced by social contacts, especially in the early years of life, they have strong roots in the individual make-up as well. He offered a tentative classification of types of personality as follows: (1) the *objective* or *direct*, with such features as equability, enthusiasm, frankness, and aggressiveness; (2) the *introspective* or *indirect*, marked by imaginative, sensitive, and inhibited forms of thinking; and (3) the *psychopathic* or *perverse*, characterized by eccentricity, egocentrism, emotional instability, and strong sense of inferiority. Finally, there exist what he called the "social types" arising chiefly from the predominating roles which a person plays in his particular society. He listed three of these: (1) *practical* or *Philistine* (similar to Thomas and Znaniecki's class); (2) *liberal* or *Bohemian*, particularly given to strong individualism and desire for freedom of thought and action; and (3) *idealistic* or *religious*, characterized by intense moral idealism or religious sentiment and fervor.

Since his first discussion of this topic, Burgess has become much more clear-cut in his distinctions. Personality type, he contends, derives chiefly from the biological background and from fundamental early training or conditioning. The social type, in contrast, arises from the principal roles and the status which one secures from the community in which he participates. His standpoint is well brought out in his interpretative comments on the work of Shaw in the field of delinquency and criminality. (See Shaw, 1930, 1931, 1938.) His views may be summarized as follows:

The personality type or "pattern" is defined "as the sum and integration of those traits which characterize the typical reactions of one person toward other persons." (Shaw, 1930, p. 193.) This pattern is formed in the first years of life through conjunction of constitutional and acquired factors, and remains, with some modification and extension, fairly constant throughout the rest of life. In contrast, social type "does not refer to the mechanisms of personality reactions, but to attitudes, values, and philosophy of life derived from copies presented by society" (*ibid.*). It is the role assigned by society and assumed by the individual which creates the social type. Thus, to use Shaw's case of Stanley, he was a "runaway," a "delinquent," a "Jackroller"

during one period of his life; later he became a "salesman" and "respectable citizen."

All too frequently we mistakenly think that abrupt and revolutionary alterations in social type represent fundamental changes in the basic personality structure. It is Burgess's view that modifications in the latter are very slight after the first years. He says, "Our hypothesis is that personality patterns, since they are fixed in infancy and in early childhood, are likewise susceptible to reconditioning only in this same period. The conditioning of social types takes place in later experiences and may accordingly be reconditioned in youth and maturity." (1930, p. 194.)

This distinction between personality type and social type is important. The former may be considered the basic life organization or style of the individual in terms of the nature of his overt conduct and his inner values, meanings, themata, attitudes, traits, disposition, and the like. It is essentially a matter of *how* one responds to himself and others. Burgess believes this to be pretty thoroughly predetermined, as to major lines, by heredity and fundamental constitution. (See Shaw, 1938.) The present writer, who in general agrees with this distinction between psychological and social types, would place much more emphasis upon the earliest personal-social conditioning, but would by no means deny or neglect the probabilities that biologically inherent factors play an important part in the entire development of personality structure. (See the final section.) On the other hand, social type reflects what the individual does in his various group contacts, and the manner in which these in turn influence his status. In short, the type of social role may change with variations in participation, but the personality type is, for the adult at least, a much more fixed and inflexible feature of his total make-up. Linton (1936), in discussing somewhat this same problem, distinguishes between the genuine or real personality and what he terms the "status" personality. The former would fall into the category of the personality type, the latter somewhat into what Thomas, Burgess, and others refer to as the social type.

The recognition of this distinction should clear up many misconceptions among psychologists in their discussion of typology. As an example: some of the items in tests of introversion-extroversion really relate to social role rather than to the dispositional mechanisms—the *how*—of social interaction. That is, if we ask what people do rather than what they value, or what emotional meaning they give experiences, we are likely to tap the social role, not the underlying intellectual-emotional make-up.

P. B. deQ. Cabot's study (1938) also has some bearing on this topic of the possible relation of psychological to social type. Although his sample was small, he found evidence that his pyknoïd and athletoid cases tended, on the whole, to be more extroverted and socially adaptable than the asthenic. And in discussing this matter he tentatively posits a

theory of "*socio-biological advantage*." In terms of this thesis, the athletics and pyknics have a distinct advantage over the asthenics in social adaptation. But Cabot fails to realize that in these matters social-cultural definitions of the situation play a definite part. He may simply be describing our American cultural approval of athletoid and pyknoid individuals because they fit into our cultural expectancies. It is quite possible that in another society and culture the thin long-boned physique might have a somewhat more favorable role and status.

The relation of personality type to social role is, however, an important theoretical and practical problem. Are some personalities better suited to certain social roles than to others? How much is social adaptation itself facilitated or hindered by a failure on the part of the individual and of his fellows to recognize these differences? Such problems have obvious bearing on vocational adjustment, on the appeals of various religious or political faiths, and doubtless on the intimate relations of the family—to say nothing of their possible bearing on the appeals of different sorts of leisure-time activities, hobbies, and the like.

The matter is well illustrated in Kretschmer's discussion (1925) of various kinds of life activities which fall within his major classification of cyclothymes and schizothymes, for he is really dealing with the relations of social to personality types when he puts realistic and humorous poets, or empirical experimentalists, or "jolly" organizing leaders under the former, and the poets of pathos, romance, and formalism, or logicians, or idealistic and fanatic leaders under the latter.

There has also been some effort to correlate introversion with certain occupations, and extroversion with others. Freyd (1924) found that mechanically minded individuals tended to be introverts, and that "socially" inclined persons, such as executives, were more likely to be extroverts. Laird (1926) states that inspectors, accountants, and research engineers tend toward introversion, in contrast to executives, foremen, and nurses, who are more often extroverted. In a sample of teachers studied by Pechstein (1928) there was a preponderance of introverts. And Conklin (1927) found business-school students, premedical students, and life-insurance salesmen decidedly more introverted than students of journalism or of English literature, or bank employees.

So, too, the report of Fleming (1927), based on forty years' records at the Dorset County mental hospital in England, suggests the possibility of linking up personality types with certain occupational roles. Dividing the patients with functional disorders into introverts and extroverts, he found that, on the whole, the former tended to be represented by such vocational groups as students, engineers, bookkeepers, surgeons, dentists, chemists, soldiers, carpenters, stonemasons, bricklayers, and lawyers. Those diagnosed as extroverts tended for the most part to be farmers, blacksmiths, policemen, railwaymen, shepherds, merchants, managers, and business directors. (See also Lasswell, 1930, for an attempt to correlate political agitators, administrators, and bureaucrats to three different patterns of personality characteristics.)

The broader theoretical aspects of the relation of personality to social role bear first upon the important question of the constitutional founda-

tion of both personal differences and possible type classifications. Second, it brings into focus the importance of social interaction, especially in the early years, in fixing the basic mechanisms of interaction for the rest of life. Finally, the adaptation of individuals of particular kinds of constitutional and psychological make-up to societal demands or expectancies in role throws into relief one of the profoundest problems of social psychology and social science; namely, the relationship between the societal order and culture, on the one hand, and the *how* and *what* of the individual's life organization on the other. Thus, if there are fundamental and perhaps inherited factors making for types of personality, how far may a particular culture go in altering these types? Assuming for the moment that Jung's types have an organic, even inherent basis, will a society which places its chief interest and values upon extroverted activity, with emphasis also upon external conformity, break down because in the end it leaves little or no place for the field of introverted interests and values? This is a difficult matter to settle in our present inadequate state of knowledge, but it is a problem which is bound to arise as our studies of human personality and culture are extended.

THE CONCEPT OF TYPE

On the basis of many studies of alleged types of men, what may one say as to the soundness of the various theories which have grown up in connection with these investigations? Is the concept of type a valid one? Does it provide a logical tool for theoretical and systematic considerations, and also a logical basis for an empirical or experimental approach to the study of personality? It is clear at once that a type is a *construct*, not a material thing. Its only utility lies in helping to formulate hypotheses that will aid us in such controlled description and analysis as will lead to adequate generalizations and hence to prediction and control. Does the concept of type help us to attain this goal?

Standpoint and critique of typology. One thing is clear: the concept of type is related to the entire matter of the organization of mentality and of overt behavior. Are the elements of personality so highly specific (or perhaps even unique) from one individual to another that no generalization or commonality may be found for a random sample of individuals? Or, if any generalization is possible, is it aided by the concept of typification? In order to come to grips with these questions, let us look again at some of the various approaches to this topic of generalization and theory. (See Chapters XI and XII, where some aspects of this problem have already been discussed.)

First, there are those workers who view personality and behavior as made up of specific elements or atomistic units; they tend to look upon mental and behavior organization or integration as largely additive in

character. That is, specific mental elements or behavior units must at all times be related to particular situations, and any organization of these into larger totalities is dependent on the existence of identical or highly similar features of situation or of individual. (See the discussion of Harts-horne and May in Chapter XII.) Those who take this position in theory and method tend to find not types or varied modalities among personalities but a continuous gradation of particular variabilities from one extreme to another of a given scale of traits, intellectual processes, attitudes, habits, or other item under consideration. Thus many so-called tests of introversion and extroversion invented by workers with this point of view do not find bimodality or types, but rather a continuous distribution of units or elements across the unit scales. (See Murphy and Jensen, 1932; and P. M. Symonds, 1931.)

But it must be recalled that many of the tests of extroversion and introversion or of other alleged typifications of the total personality are constructed and standardized on the statistical theory of the unimodality of the probability distribution. This very fact tends to set the stage for finding continuous rather than discrete and bimodal or multimodal distributions. As Zubin (1938a, p. 239) well says, "The continuity in distribution may have been a result of the logical consistency of the scoring key rather than of the behavior of human beings." (See Boring, 1920, for a discussion of this point with respect to intelligence tests; much the same comment may be made with regard to measurements of the nonintellectual functions of personality.) Certainly the recurrence of situations and of particular mental functions which appear to lead to the formation of general ideas, traits, attitudes, and habits places considerable burden on those who argue for extreme specificity. Far too many would-be critics of the theory of types have employed measures of specific and rather simple perceptual, memory, and associational abilities rather than larger configurations of personality—involving both intellectual and emotional features—as the basis for their testing. (See, *inter alia*, Mohr and Gundlach, 1927; Klineberg, Asch, and Block, 1934; and, in contrast, P. B. deQ. Cabot, 1938.)

Second, we find those who hold for the generality of covert or overt features of life organization, which lays the foundation for certain over-all concepts with which to characterize individuals. It seems but a step from this to a recognition of types, for, once we generalize, in a sense we typify. Moreover, such typification of mind and behavior makes possible comparisons among individuals as unified organizations, which is not possible when we treat only particularized elements of mentality or conduct. In fact, it may well be contended that typification and comparison are among the fundamental tasks of sound science.

Then, too, there are research workers who have attempted, by com-

plicated statistical devices, to discover the existence of general factors, that is, the clustering of elements or items in such a fashion as to lead to certain generalizations about common but larger unities among a variety of highly specific mental or behavior performances. These clusters or factors must be denoted by some form of language or symbol which represents *general* concepts. (See Thurstone, 1935, 1938.) For instance, Guilford and Guilford (1936, 1939), by applying factorial analysis to the scores on certain tests of introversion, found that a series of basic traits, such as social avoidance, emotionality, submissiveness, depression, shyness, and meditative thinking, characterized individuals whose scores had indicated "thinking introversion." And, while it may be said in criticism that what we need is perhaps not so much elaborate mathematical analysis of test scores on personality or intelligence tests as further experimental work on the genesis and nature of mental and behavior organization (see Anastasi, 1938), nevertheless we must recognize that factorial analysis represents an effort to discover if there are some underlying commonalities or generalities in the highly specific mental or overt performances of individuals. As Thurstone (1938) maintains, traits, ideas, and habits probably proceed from highly undifferentiated forms (related perhaps to the general pattern of mass activity in the immature organism) to those which are distinctly differentiated. And the purpose of factorial analysis is to uncover, if possible, the uniformities and commonalities which may nevertheless underlie these apparently specific mental and behavior manifestations. In a way, the standpoint and findings of workers in this field represent a somewhat intermediate position between those who hold for high specificity and those who contend for typology.

Further, there may be a quite different approach to the entire matter, involving a combination of clinical empiricism and statistical method. For example, given the discovery of certain recurrent and general features of mentality and conduct, by means of common sense and by clinical analysis or by some other carefully controlled observation, it may be possible to classify these repeated features in some form or other. Such rough grouping is the beginning of typification; it is, in fact, the first step in such a process. As we noted at the opening of this chapter, people do this sort of thing in everyday life; clinicians have long done it, and, as inadequate as the results seem to be, it must be said that considerable light has been thrown upon personality manifestations by those who have essayed this approach in psychology and sociology. Moreover, there have been some efforts to test this crude empirical typification by more exact methods. For example, Neymann and Kohlstedt (1929) constructed their test of introversion and extroversion around the performance of a sample of mental patients who had been diagnosed as intro-

spective, schizoid, and, in general, inward-tending in personality; and of another group who had been diagnosed as expansive, manic-depressive, and outward-tending in mentality and conduct. In other words, they assumed a certain bimodality of personality on the basis of empirical clinical diagnosis and treatment.

In a more searching manner Zubin (1938a) attempted to work out statistical devices for getting at types or clusters of personality features. Rather than start with the assumption that introversion and extroversion represent the extremes of a continuous scale of traits, he reversed the usual standpoint and selected empirically "two contrasting groups of individuals" of acknowledged differences in personality organization. Thus he matched sixty-eight schizophrenes and sixty-eight normal persons in terms of age, sex, race, nativity, education, and occupation, and tested them with a carefully devised inventory of seventy items dealing with subjective and overt characteristics. Then by means of statistical devices he found certain "families" or classes of like-structured responses, which would serve to set off the schizoids from the normal individuals. That is, on certain clusters of particular items members of the former resembled each other very markedly. So, too, the normals had their distinctive groups. There were six subgroups of this kind for the abnormals and three for the normals. (See also Zubin, 1938b.)

Finally, in considering viewpoint and method as they apply to this topic (or any other), we must bear in mind the old proverb of perception, "We see things not as they are, but as we are." That is to say, standpoint, premise, hypothesis, and method have always to be taken into account when we interpret research findings, just as one would take the common-sense philosophy, stereotypes, and social myths of the man on the street into account if one would understand his interpretations of events. In a way we always find what we seek in science as in other areas of human search for meanings. This fact explains, at least in part, why some workers find only highly specific traits and situations where others discover general traits or types. Still others see only the unique individual who may be adequately comprehended only in terms of elaborate case analysis.

In truth, the matter really rests upon a pragmatic test of the premise and purpose with which we operate. There are, first of all, the fundamental assumptions with which we begin—for instance, in the problem before us, the recurrent totality and generality of mind and behavior as against the segmental and specific features of concrete mental and overt activity at a given time and place. Second, there is always the question as to what we wish to do with our results, as to theory and as to practice. In other words, the final criterion is: how do a given standpoint and method make possible prediction and control, and help to formulate a

larger systematic view of the nature of man in his social-material world? And, no matter how enamored of a given viewpoint and method we may become, we ought never to forget this essentially pragmatic and relativist position. All too frequently men become as absolutistic and dogmatic about their science as the medieval scholastics did about their theology.

Typology and generalization. Though recognition of the unique and specific features of human behavior is important, and individual differences must be taken into account, we may well ask if some more general and universal criteria of habits, attitudes, traits, or other patterns of human activity must not be developed if we are to have a science of personality. A number of considerations may be noted: (1) Despite individual variation, the constitution of the human being reveals certain features common to all members of the species. That is, the major organic systems are the same. So, too, the fundamental wants or needs appear to be much the same in all people, though they may vary as to strength or intensity. Likewise, the cycles of activity which concern their satisfaction are also basically common to all members. This commonality therefore affords a certain *constant*, a certain fixity of structure and function which must be considered in our theory and research. (2) There are variations in the nature and extent of the modifications which experience—that is, adaptation to the environment—makes in the individual with reference to wants and satisfactions. Nevertheless, despite these deviations, there remain certain constancies or recurrences of similar if not identical stimuli, both internal and external, as well as constancies of response which make for uniformity and commonality of life organization. In other words, the repetition of the material and social-cultural situations and the fundamentally stable characteristics of the organism which control the responses thereto tend to foster uniformity in the patterning of behavior and thought.

Yet, despite these factors which make for common activity and uniformity, differences and flexibilities, first, in constitution, and, second, in the nature of the environment, tend to make for divergences in patterns of activity which must also be taken into account. As Becker (1940) well puts it, "Particularity and generality are matters of *degree*." It seems to me that it is only upon the basis of these two sets of facts, that is, *uniformity* and *variation*, that we realize a logical need for some terms of classification or typification if we are to arrive at any sort of general and comparable concepts in the hoped-for science of personality. If, of course, we take the position that these divergences, these individual differences, completely overshadow generality, that each individual is really unique and lacks anything in common with another, then we must of necessity give up any hope of typification. In fact, overattention to, and dogmatic faith in, specificity of traits, attitudes, and habits may well lead to extreme

emphasis upon the *uniqueness* of personality, which would prevent any comparative treatment. But are we faced with quite such a sharp dichotomy between complete uniformity or commonality and uniqueness? Actually, individuals do seem to fall into certain clusters of behavior patterns, and, as obviously inadequate as common-sense stereotypes about this fact are, we must repeat that everyday experience gives some foundation for developing general concepts about behavior and for classifying individuals under certain general terms.

The problem is really one of selecting those criteria of traits, attitudes, values, and habits which will serve as central tendencies of a cluster or class of persons and which will set them off from another cluster or class. The heart of our present difficulty lies here. We have not yet hit upon the differentiating criteria of personality make-up. The specific details which Jung gives to distinguish introversion from extroversion fail us in many instances when we attempt to apply them to particular persons. Or, on the morphological side, Kretschmer has not given us any adequate anatomical indexes with which to classify our physical make-up. In the same manner endocrinologists like Berman assume various types, such as the thyroid, thymus, adrenal, and pituitary, but they do not give us differentiating features for each class. And what is true of psychological and anatomical or physiological characteristics applies equally well when we come to the problem of criteria of social and cultural typification. We have much descriptive material, and we have certain broad categories of social-cultural differences, but specific criteria for social typology are yet to be developed, though Max Weber (1925) made an important contribution to this field. (See also Becker, 1940, for an excellent defense of typology in the social sciences.)

Once we have arrived at some satisfactory criteria, the next step is to study their occurrence in large samples of the population. If we find that clusters or groups of features exist, we should be in a position from a statistical standpoint to indicate the limits of classes, or, if you please, of types.

It seems clear that, in analyzing our personality data statistically, we need not necessarily deal with them in terms of the normal probability curve. (In fact, the naive assumption that most if not all data in nature or society are distributed in the form of the Gaussian curve has misled a good many people who have tried to deal with these problems.) It may be that, by employing the statistics of attributes rather than that of variables, we may investigate the clustering or cohesion of ideas, traits, attitudes, and habits in such a way as to reveal contrasts that might lead to generalizations, which, in turn, might become extremely useful for the prediction and control of individual conduct. What A. Davis (1938, p. 526) writes with respect to the statistical treatment of race and blood

groups has some application to our problem: "A statistical concept of classification has its objective basis in the fact that certain associations of attributes occur much more often than their random combination inferred from their separate frequencies would lead us to predict, and the practical significance of an ascending hierarchy of classificatory units resides in the fact that what is true of a comparatively small number of individual attributes is also true of larger groups of attributes."¹⁰ As we pointed out in Chapter XI, the statistics of attributes does not deal in scalar units of equal size, but with qualities that are found grouped together in certain ways, the presence or absence of which may be recorded in such a form as to be compared in terms of likely association, sample by sample. Such devices may prove to be particularly adapted to the analysis of social types which tend to take on an all-or-none aspect.

Yet, even if the data in question should fall into a form approximating the normal probability curve, an approach to classification is not thereby entirely invalidated. We should never forget that the statistical treatment of variables permits a certain typification. Those who scorn typology should remember that the use of any average or any index of variation represents a kind of typification. Any such measure is but a device for symbolizing common or uniform aspects of a given distribution.

In line with this point, we might, for example, choose to break a distribution of traits into quartile or into sigma units, and on the basis of certain extremes label those cases, say introvert or extrovert, which fall within certain boundaries of the scale. To be concrete, we might agree that those cases falling within one and a half sigmas from the mean might be called ambivert and those outside these limits either introvert or extrovert, depending on whether they lie on one side or the other of this larger modal group. Under the normal curve this would signify that approximately 7 per cent would be extrovert, and an equal percentage introvert, the others being ambivert or of mixed characteristics. This illustration is purely hypothetical, of course, but it serves to demonstrate the manner in which a certain proportion of a given frequency of an adequate and unbiased sample might be classified by these typological terms without unduly altering a useful concept of generalization.

But, to return to the more customary concept of type, it may be that there is a foundation in fact for the assumption of certain constitutional predispositions for personality types, as Kretschmer, McDougall, Berman, Pavlov, and others have held. If there be a sound basis for such a contention, then one of the problems for the student of personality would be to discover just how, on the ground of such broad differences in organic and psychological potentialities, society and culture impinge

¹⁰ From L. Hogben (editor), *Political Arithmetic*, 1938. By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers

on the individual to induce the development of some type or other. Thus an externalized dynamic culture might stress expansive, outgoing, extrovertive characteristics, and tend to suppress the introvertive trends. A person predisposed to the latter kind of adjustment might therefore have a more difficult time in adapting himself to his social-cultural world than one of the opposite—assuming for the nonce a dual-type classification. In this connection, moreover, the major or dominant social role and the personality type may or may not link up together. In a society which provided some flexibility of choice among occupations which stressed the traits and attitudes of one personality type or another, the chances of undue strain or deviant behavior might be considerably less than in another society with a highly fixed system which greatly favored one personality type in preference to another. (See Chapters XXVII and XXVIII; also Benedict, 1932, who deals with some aspects of this topic.) We must confess that we are far from any adequate knowledge on this challenging problem, but it is certainly one with which the student of typology must reckon.

More practically considered—in terms of our present knowledge—we agree with Zubin (1938a) when he states that typology stands between the elaborate case study of a given individual and the abstract statistical “formulations about the relationship between variables emanating from research laboratories.” Certainly, from the point of view of dealing with living persons in reference to educational, vocational, marital, or other guidance, some such method of bridging the gap, of finding a middle ground between the study of the totally unique individual and the highly abstruse concepts of differential traits, attitudes, and habits seems desirable. And, if in such practical considerations we are seeking some devices for prediction and control (as we must if we are to develop beyond a rule-of-thumb and naïvely intuitive method), it is well to bear in mind that prediction in psychology and the social sciences is not that of absolute prophecy as to specific occurrence with reference to future time and place. Such prediction is only possible in the more exact sciences. At best we can only say, as Becker (1940, p. 50) well states it, “*If and when* these typical factors are given in this typical relation, these will probably be the typical consequences.” Surely, if we can get to that point of prediction, our controls over conduct will be much advanced over our present hit-or-miss methods.

Yet, in closing this chapter and this division of our work, we must again point out that at present physical and psychological types are but crude terms to describe broad classes of behavior or physical make-up, and that we are scarcely prepared to go much beyond a descriptive use of them. Certainly the concepts now in use are so badly drawn that we hardly dare attempt generalization about, or prediction of, human be-

havior in terms of them. But I do believe that psychology has made a suggestive, and, I hope, a useful beginning in the development of an adequate set of criteria and a satisfactory method of dealing with them which in time will provide the much-needed generalizations and hence usefulness for prediction and control.

Part Two

SELECTED PROBLEMS OF PERSONAL
ADJUSTMENT

Chapter XIV

THE INDUCTION OF THE CHILD INTO THE FAMILY

THE FUNDAMENTALS of child development, especially with reference to the mechanisms essential to the socialization of the individual, have already been indicated in our discussion of the constitutional foundations of adaptation, the nature of motivation, learning, and the place of social interaction in the rise of language, thought, and the self. (See Chapters II-X.) In this chapter and the next we shall discuss in more detail some features of personality growth with particular regard to the influences of the family and other primary groups. Since we assume that adolescent and adult habits, attitudes, traits, ideas, and values are largely predicated upon the early training of the child, we shall draw, in part, upon materials interpreted from the genetic and historical point of view.

Let us recall that throughout this book we are concerned with two major sets of factors. On the one hand, there is the dynamic individual characterized by original and learned needs which demand satisfaction. On the other hand, there is the dynamic environment—physical and social-cultural—with respect to which the individual must adapt himself if he is to survive.

PSYCHOLOGICAL BACKGROUNDS

There is an enormous body of data on child growth from the angle of traditional individualistic psychology, with its emphasis upon highly minute descriptions and analyses of specific sensorimotor behavior, traits, attitudes, verbal or other subovert responses, emotional manifestations, and motivation. The bulk of research done by American child psychologists in the past two or three decades has been of this kind. (For convenient summaries of this literature see Goodenough, 1933; and Munn, 1938.) There is also considerable material on child development from the standpoint of the broader, over-all processes which characterize the total individual in his efforts to adapt himself to his environment. This is essentially the approach taken by the *Gestalt* psychologists, the psychoanalysts, many clinical psychologists, and other practical workers in education, social service, and industry. Both groups have made important contributions, but, since we are interested chiefly in the social-psychologi-

cal or interactional approach, we shall deal more particularly with the latter aspects of adaptive capacity in the child rather than with the details of the growth of the various segments of the individual.

However, the specific features of maturation and learning should be borne in mind, and the student may well reread Chapters II, III, V, and VI in order to refresh his memory on these matters. Growth or development is a process of increasing differentiation and integration of the internal and external action systems (structures and functions) of the whole organism, and in these changes both maturation and learning have a place.¹ It would carry us too far afield to review the interplay of these influences, but we may note the following facts about the so-called stages in child development:

(1) Learning is qualified at all times by the state of the organism, which state is evidently dependent in part at least upon intraorganic growth or maturation. That is, practice in a given act is not effective unless the corresponding stage of maturation has been reached. This is particularly true in the first weeks since the nervous system does not reach its full powers until some time after birth. In fact, at the outset the child's sensorimotor system is basically controlled by subcortical processes, although very quickly the cortex comes into play with its fundamentally important functions of discriminative association, inhibition, facilitation, allowance for delayed response, and integration. (See Sherman, Sherman, and Flory, 1936.) Moreover, the increasing dominance of the cortical gradient permits adaptation beyond fine motor skills and selective perception to that in which language and thought play the major part—these latter two furnishing the foundation of the most elaborate and complex features of personality.

There is no end of evidence that learning is not effective until certain stages of maturation have been attained, and that many activities themselves, such as the earliest emergence of visual-manual manipulation, walking, and other acts requiring close co-ordination, are quite distinctly dependent upon maturation rather than direct tuition. (See Gesell and Thompson, 1929; Gesell, 1932; Shirley, 1931.) It is not that learning may not or does not enter into these situations, but rather that the child must be in a particular state of organic readiness or preparation before such activities are possible.

As to particular aspects of the stages of growth, we may note the following: (2) Age for age there is always a certain amount of overlapping among the children; some advance more rapidly than others. (3) Different bodily structures and functions develop at varying rates; hence a given stage with reference to one item may not indicate a like development in another. (4) Growth is often marked by irregularities; there

¹ It will be recalled that maturation refers to modifications in the structure-function organization arising in response to stimuli within the intercellular and intracellular environment "which at the given moment are independent of external influences." (See Marquis, 1930.) Learning, on the other hand, is usually defined as a modification in organic elements which comes about as a result of reaction to specific stimulation, present or relatively recent, arising in the external environment. There has been considerable controversy as to the precise relations of learning and maturation. The interested student may consult, among others, Gesell (1933), Shirley (1933b), and Carmichael (1933, 1936) for reviews of this literature.

may be acceleration at one period and retardation at another. (5) Development in one dimension or item may serve to inhibit growth in another. For example, learning to walk may block for a time linguistic advancement. (6) The retention of learned reactions varies in terms of the degree of maturation at the time of the practice and in terms of the attitudes and emotional accompaniments. This is admirably shown in McGraw's (1935, 1939) ² study of the twins "Johnny" and "Jimmy." (7) The persistence of modifications, in fact, is related to the degree of integration and to the extent and generalization of the effects of learning and maturation in the organism.

It is evident that in studying child development we have to reckon with a certain broad sequence of neuromuscular growth, affected by factors of both maturation and learning, and by the emergence of control and integration by the cortical centers in particular; but it must never be forgotten that infants do not grow up in a vacuum. Within given organic limitation to learning capacity and within the limits of maturational states, the newborn child is precipitated into a physical and social-cultural world toward which he must make certain adjustments. Let us recall what other preparation he has for this adaptation besides these fundamental sensorimotor capacities. Of particular importance, of course, is the matter of drive or motivation.

Drives and satisfactions. We noted in Chapter IV that drives, which are characterized by physiological tensions involving both the central and the autonomic nervous system, stem chiefly from internal changes in the organism and that they have a directionality toward some sort of

² This investigation is one of the most complete on record. Beginning in the early weeks of life, one twin, Johnny, was exposed to a long regime of practice in various skills: swimming, climbing up steep inclines, jumping off high pedestals, roller-skating, tricycling, and the like. The other was untrained until months later, and then given intensive instruction for about ten weeks. The findings show that in some matters early training has a distinct advantage, in others none. To illustrate: In swimming and jumping off high stools, Johnny's early training made him decidedly superior to Jimmy despite the latter's subsequent intensive training. On the other hand, in tricycling Jimmy, beginning at twenty-two months, acquired much greater proficiency than his brother ever attained, although the latter had had instruction in this activity for many weeks before Jimmy began his training.

McGraw is somewhat critical of the easy assumptions about stages of growth. As she puts it (1939, p. 1), "There is no one age period or developmental stage which clearly demarcates an earlier state of immaturity during which the child is incapable of improving through practice from the subsequent state in which improvement through practice becomes feasible." This, she believes, is due to the fact that there is no uniformity in the maturation of the nervous system and that general physical growth, such as in the development of the long bones, which alters the center of body gravity, also plays a part in these matters.

In her retest of these children (1939) four years after the original study was concluded, she has pointed out two highly important features to be taken into account in all these investigations. One is the recognition that emotions and attitudes have a place in early, as they do in later, learning. The other is that "the amount of retention of a motor performance, once the factor of repetition has been reduced or abandoned, is contingent upon the state of fixity the activity had attained at the time the practice-factor was withdrawn"; and that, on the contrary, "activities which have attained a high degree of integration may be appreciably altered if the body mechanisms are so modified through growth as to introduce new structures or elements into the situation." (1939, pp. 18-19.)

satisfying stimulus or goal. This course from drive to goal or consummation we described under the concept of *cycle of activity*. The original wants are largely reflexive in nature; that is, they have to do with survival at the physical level. As the child grows older, other wants arise from the maturation of his organism, or from what he learns in the process of adaptation to his material and social-cultural world. Moreover, the other phases of the cycle of activity are qualified by experience. In other words, through learning, new motives and goals are gained and old ones modified. And failure to attain ready satisfaction of our drives leads to an extension in the time elapsing between motivation and satisfaction—a period marked by the emergence of mental functions which act as an instrument or means in our struggle to secure a satisfactory goal or end.

But the progress from drive to consummation is often blocked by all sorts of obstacles, such as the wishes of others or impediments in learning to overcome difficulties, by counterimpulses, and by deprivations of satisfying goals. Such inhibitions lead to the development of substitutive and indirect means of getting what we wish, or to our learning to get on with something that replaces the originally wanted object. Since the cycles of activity operate largely within the definitions set down by society and culture, it is usually at the hands of other persons that the child experiences his first frustrations. In other words, social interaction furnishes the framework of our striving and provides us with the direction and meaning of our adaptation to our material and social environment.

The satisfaction of the basic physiological needs of the organism results in a pleasurable state. It was upon this fact that Freud (1920) posited his *pleasure principle*. He pointed out that at the outset the infant operates upon this level entirely. The young child seeks pleasant stimuli and responses and avoids unpleasant, painful ones. In this connection the infant is not different from his animal relatives. But, as he grows up, he learns to conform to cultural standards at considerable expense to his pleasant emotions and feelings. And it is with reference to his most rudimentary physiological cycles of action, the very ones which afford him the most pleasure, that the mother, the nurse, or other adults begin almost from birth on to lay down certain prescribed forms of behavior for him to follow if he would secure the fulfillment of these wants. For instance, the natural hunger-feeding rhythm is about two hours, but babies in our hospitals are put onto three- or four-hour schedules as soon as they begin nursing. These social-cultural definitions of the manner in which the child might attain his wishes were catalogued under the concept of the *reality principle*, backed by the *authority*, that is, the

power and wisdom of the older and more mature persons who surround the child.

The entire course of personality development is qualified by this shift from the hedonistic pattern to one which satisfies more conventional and utilitarian purposes. Nevertheless, throughout life individuals more or less constantly seek by one means or another—in actuality or fantasy—to squeeze at least a modicum of pleasure from this activity. (See Chapter VII on hedonistic versus utilitarian definitions of the situation.)

Of course, not all activities are qualified by such social inhibitions; nevertheless, social interstimulation and response are crucial to the rise of the self- or ego-organization. Beginning with the rudimentary biological "I" of impulse, drive, instinctive tendency—call these what you will—which seeks direct and immediate satisfaction, there emerges through learning the rather infantile and childish "me's" or roles which, in turn, influence and qualify the primitive "I." Later other "me's," the more socialized and moral roles, arise, and these further modify the "I." This process continues ordinarily until the mature adult comes into being, provided that somewhere along the life-career line his development is not seriously blocked, retarded, and shunted into less mature form.³

Thus, while the child possesses basic and powerful wants, he can satisfy these only through cycles of activity which are accepted as a part of the world of those around him—a world largely determined for him in terms of probable personal-social and cultural training. The child is surrounded on every hand by individuals who set the stage for his activities and, during the formative years at least, fix his role and status for him. In short, from the very outset the child's survival is chiefly dependent upon the *social act*, that is, interaction with others. Although the first habits which the child acquires have to do with the regulation of his physiological urges, this training takes place at the hands of others. And upon this foundation most of the superstructure of personality is erected. Let us turn to examine the place of the family members in this process.

CHILD-PARENT INTERACTIONS

As we pointed out in Chapter VII, the family is the basic primary group in our society. It is primary in various senses of the term. It is in the family that the biological, or racial, and the social-psychological forces converge to form the foundations of the personality. Biological heredity

³ In time we may be able to chart the course or stages in this personality development in somewhat the objective fashion of child psychologists charting the specific segmental phases of sensorimotor growth. But, aside from Freud and his followers, there has been little serious effort to develop such a schema. (See Chapter XVI for a review of Freud's thesis with respect to the development of the love life.)

and prenatal growth together produce the newborn infant, and it is upon this individual that society in the form of mother, father, and other persons begins to impress its patterns of life. The drives and mechanisms of adaptation with which the child is born can operate only within the framework laid down by the older and more experienced persons around him. (On research in parent-child relations, see P. M. Symonds, 1939.)

This family configuration has certain more or less culturally determined features. In a society like ours the mother has certain functions of caring for the child, the father others of providing a livelihood, and later of maintaining discipline. The siblings may be inhibited from approaching the infant or from handling him. But other relations, of course, are not so predetermined. These latter are those to which we have applied the concept of personal-social conditioning. Thus the rivalries of the siblings, or an older child's jealousy of the attention given the baby, imply relations which in our society are not completely fixed by culture norms and hence show wider variability than is found in situations more completely defined by culture. Other examples of noncultural effects may be found in early patterns of aggression, avoidance, and sympathy.

It is this configuration of interacting persons—mother, father, and children—that constitutes the traditional family in our society. Within this social situation the newborn infant begins his participation. He learns therein the fundamental forms of interidentification. And in the family configuration the interidentification is relatively complete. For the infant the range of stimuli and of response lies more or less totally within the familial circle; that is, in that circle the fundamental needs find their expression, and the basic habits, attitudes, and ideas develop. There is a sort of *all-or-none* quality in the relations of the child to the other family members.

Gradually, of course, this interidentification extends to persons outside the family and household. The play group, the congeniality-group, comradeship with children outside one's own household, the gang, and formal clubs illustrate these new areas of interaction. This outward spread of social contact results in the breakdown of the former complete identification and interaction within the family itself. This extension of contact to include others than members of the family results in a specialization or segmentation of interactions. In time some phases of one's role and status come to belong to one group, and other segments to other groups, and as a result new problems of personality integration arise which were not essentially present in the home. But during the first months and years the family absorbs the chief attention of the child, and it is therein that he begins to construct his own world of habits, attitudes, traits, and values.

Basic habits and interaction. The initial and fundamental dependence of the infant upon another person for survival, that is, upon a social act, has to do with nutritional needs. Unless fed at the mother's breast or by some substitute method dependent upon another individual, the child will not long survive. The satisfaction of hunger and thirst, therefore, is the infant's first social act, his primary conditioning to interaction with another human being. And, though the contact between mother and child in feeding generally follows the cultural pattern of the particular society, it is evident that from sensory experiences of taste, smell, and touch, and from many other intimate mother-child relations, the child gets a good deal of personal-social training which contributes to the experiential background of many habits and attitudes which arise later.

Next to nutritional needs the child requires bodily care and a provision for comfort and shelter, and these also take on the nature of the social act. Also, the parent very early comes to play a part in the control of eliminative processes and sleep habits, thus bringing these within the scope of interaction. In time other activities become linked to social situations, such as fear and rage, and other primary emotional-feeling reactions, and many of the so-called "expressive acts," such as vocalization and random and playful movements. (Obviously, normal sexual activity, like infant feeding, is a basic social act, but its full expression can take place only after puberty.) In short, *the linkage of fundamental drives to the social act is the most important first step in primary-group training.* On this foundation all the subsequent patterns of personality arise.

In describing and analyzing the inception and growth of the child's personality, we must emphasize two important matters. First, there is the necessity to build up consistent and stable habits of physiological control; second, there is almost universally an associated set of other but extraneous habits which accompany the first. Sound training in both is essential to that security so important for later development.

Consistency and stability of early habits. The consistent regulation of the cycles of physiological activity provides the growing child with its first training in the sense of security so important for the future. When the child has acquired a regular and consistent routine in the care of his basic physiological needs, he has provided for himself and for others a foundation for the prediction and control of his future needs in this same field of action. In other words, if an individual has a set of stable habits for handling needs or wishes, one can forecast with reasonably high probability what he will do in a like situation later. But in another way, the individual himself, as well as others, knows what to anticipate. As we noted in Chapters V, IX, and X, expectancy or anticipation of certain sorts of conduct and not of other sorts plays a highly important

function in the process of interaction and adaptation of individuals to each other. The inception of reliable patterns of expectancy rests in these initial habits of the child, for on them are constructed all others.

In contrast, if the parent permits the child to vary his schedule of feeding, bodily elimination, or sleeping with his whims or constitutional impulses of the moment, stable habits will not be formed. If the child who has been inducted into a routine of feeding is permitted by the presence of relatives, the mood of the mother, or the fact that a particular day is Christmas, Easter, or the Fourth of July to vary from this routine, the predictive and stabilizing effects of habit training are likely to be lost. Certain habits are built up in this way, but they are habits of impulsive expression or of an unstable—that is, unpredictable—kind. This sort of treatment means *playing fast and loose with the habits and emotions* of children, one of the most damaging features of much of our traditional child training. This inconsistency well reflects certain features of contemporary child-parent relations. In the first place, playing fast and loose with habit training often arises from personal-social contacts which run counter to, or supplement, the generally accepted forms of cultural learning. For instance, a mother may vary the nursing period at her own or the child's whim instead of holding to the approved pediatric practice of feeding on a fixed schedule. In the second place, this inconsistency in child instruction may reflect confused or opposing cultural patterns which the parent may unconsciously impose upon the child. A mother may for a time follow the traditional mode of infant care picked up from her observations of and conversations with her own mother, but may later alter the training in terms of advice from her physician or from material she may acquire from modern child psychology.

Accessory social habits associated with fundamental cycles. The early habit formation of the child with reference to the cycles of physiological activity also becomes combined with much extraneous learning. In fact, these additional supplementary habits and attitudes produce many of the so-called behavior problems in the early years. The matter may be illustrated by feeding habits, but the same type of thing occurs in almost all other basic training.

The mother following the cultural patterns of Western medical practice may put her infant upon a fixed feeding schedule, and she may be rather conscientious in her adherence to these regulations, just as she is solicitous about the quality of the food. But along with the regularity in nursing, the mother may caress the child, pat its cheek, rock it, carry it about the room, or respond in some other manner by behavior which is not absolutely demanded by the feeding situation. In fact, the feeding cycle occurs always in this wider configuration of interaction of the par-

ent and child. Almost from the beginning of the training the child associates these additional activities with the feeding cycle itself. And in time he may cry not because he is hungry, but because he desires the pleasant experience of being carried about by the mother and petted or caressed. Or the child may be negatively conditioned by an irritation on the part of the mother and by her gestures, tones of voice, and mannerisms as she is giving him his food; and these effects in time may lead to difficulty in the feeding habits themselves.

To summarize: (1) The fundamental habits or patterns of interaction are associated with the basic physiological needs or drives. (2) Consistency in behavior cycles is important, for only in this manner can regular and predictable anticipations be set up—phases of our conduct highly important for satisfactory interaction of individuals. (3) Many secondary and accessory but important habits and attitudes arise which influence personal development. (4) The *power devices* which the child develops in managing his world are all related to the consistency or inconsistency with which he is trained in his relations with the material and social world around him.

The following case illustrates the manner in which inconsistent habit training—in this instance because of poor co-operation between parents and grandparents—leads to a form of domination of the child over the parents and household which if not checked might prove later to be the foundation for still more inefficient and maladjusted patterns of interaction.

Case of Billy D., aged two and a half years. Billy awakens every night between 1 and 1:30 and begins to whine and to call out for his parents or grandparents, and, if one of these persons does not come to his bed and take him out and play with him, he begins crying vigorously. The child usually wants to be entertained for an hour or so and then with considerable coaxing and attention returns to his bed and to sleep. The father has borne the brunt of the care of the child during the past few months, and, moreover, he feels that it is bad training for the child.

Some months previous to this, the child had on a few occasions been awakened at about 1:15 A. M. by the rumble and noise of a passing train. He had "fussed" a little but had gone back to sleep. One night, when the grandfather was at home with the child (the other adults being out of the house), he had taken the awakened child up from his bed, had carried him to the window to show him the "choo-choo," and had played with him, in general giving the child a pleasant time for some half hour or more. When, on a later occasion, the child had been awakened, somewhat similar attention had been given by the grandfather, who, hearing the child crying a bit, had got up to help quiet him, and had used this method of entertainment again. In a short time the child began waking nightly, and the problem of getting him back to sleep was left largely to his father. The grandfather soon retired from the situation which he had largely created in the first place.

Father, mother, and Billy were living in a large house owned and occupied by the

mother's parents, who had invited the daughter and her family to reside with them. In order to save money the young husband had consented. He was just beginning in business as a branch manager for a large chain-store system. He worked hard, was ambitious to get ahead, and hoped to be able in time to set up in merchandising for himself. Naturally within the house of his wife's parents his own authority had been somewhat eclipsed, and he had put up with some inconveniences. The situation with Billy described above, however, had got out of hand. The habit was bad for the child, interfered with the father's sleep, and was altogether producing an atmosphere of strain because the young father began to resent the whole household setup and especially the fact that the grandfather of the child was more or less to blame for the original stimulation of the child's disturbing habits.

After consultation certain recommendations for a change in regimen were made: (1) The child was to be allowed to cry himself to sleep rather than to be picked up. The theory was that he might be soon fatigued, and in the absence of the pleasant stimulus he would fall asleep (an instance of reconditioning by failure to provide the conditioned stimulus, in this situation the attention by adults). (2) The co-operation of the grandparents and the wife was secured. They were made to realize how the habit started and its implications for the child's health; as far as possible it was made clear to them what this sort of habit meant for the growth of the child's other habits and attitudes. (3) A more remote plan was talked over with the father. This concerned removal of the family to a house of their own.

The child made considerable progress in overcoming the habit by the following out of items 1 and 2 above. There were occasional setbacks, due to special circumstances such as illness, when the train might awaken the child and the parents, fearing serious consequences because the child was ill, would get up and try to get him to sleep again. But the most satisfactory prognostic feature appeared when the father secured a good position in another state and the family moved away from the old homestead.

Duality of feelings and responses. It is evident that the first objects of fixation or identification for the child are the parents and others in the household. In this the mother is the central figure in our society. She is normally the most important and significant person any of us will ever know. The principal habits and attitudes of the child are acquired from her in the course of her relation to his major cycles of activity, particularly those concerned with feeding, bodily attention, elimination habits, sleep, vocalization, and the beginnings of play activities.

But the fundamental interrelations of the child and parent are obviously not entirely or always pleasant to either. As we noted above, the introduction of the child into the world of culture and authority produces in him certain stresses and strains, certain conflicts between his own wishes and the requirements of those around him. The discipline of the mother or other person may act as a form of frustration marked by strong unpleasant toning. Such control may lead the child to fear or rage or even hatred of the parental authority. This tends to split the

"mother image," or child's conception of the mother, into two phases. One of these is associated for him with pleasant responses, with the fulfillment of many cycles. The opposite of these is linked with unpleasantness, with a blocking or failure to fulfill the wish or demand. In one the social act of the child and parent proves satisfying. In the other the social interaction tends to produce strain and emotions of fear or anger or both. Such inhibition of full response, as we saw, may lead to aggressive or withdrawal behavior. Nevertheless, many acts which the child finds unpleasant and unwanted the parent labels "good," "proper," "nice," or otherwise worthy. They verbally define an approved role for him. In contrast, many of the would-be pleasant acts of the child which are inhibited by the parent are termed "bad," "improper," "naughty," "nasty," or otherwise unworthy. To continue, or take up, a role so defined might lead to avoidance, punishment, or other negativistic reactions on the part of the parent or other person. This division or split between wishes and responses continues as new situations arise in the course of growing up. Thus the child's rivalrous and envious attitudes toward his brothers or sisters in regard to toys, attention from parent, dominance, and the like may lead to disapproval from others and the consequent suppression of his overt acts. It often happens that the most pleasant feelings and emotions are connected with wishes and incomplete acts called by others "evil," while unpleasant states are linked to wishes and acts that are called by others "good" or "wise."

Yet, in order to fulfill still other wishes, in order to secure pleasantly toned attention from parents, in order to complete many required social acts, the child learns to inhibit or block some of his strongest urges. That is, he learns to fulfill other demands which, though not at first wanted, bring various rewards, frequently at the expense of other powerful desires. This illustrates again the principle of ambivalence of wishes and fulfillment so common to many of our social activities.

This division of wishes and responses indicates that in the end the child is prepared to segregate his activities and hence his world into two parts—one suppressed or inhibited, the other socially approved and rewarded. And in terms of the roles which the developing self comes to play it means that some will be expected and stimulated by parents, teachers, and others, and some prevented from full expression. As we shall see in the next chapter, the child who goes in for temper tantrums or for fantasy is in any case seeking some sort of role, overt or imaginary, which will satisfy him in the face of exterior demands. Moreover, what he learns in the family and in other primary groups will furnish the basis for his adaptation to the wide range of secondary groups in which he will participate still later.

SOME FUNDAMENTAL REQUIREMENTS IN CHILD TRAINING

In the process of acquiring his various roles and his status, and in laying the groundwork—through contact with others—for the integration of the personality, which in G. H. Mead's terminology centers in the concept of the "generalized other," the child reveals certain basic and recurrent requirements of a more or less universal and persistent sort. Obviously, the child himself is not at first conscious of these matters, but they are recognized either in common-sense concepts or in more objective terms by others. We reviewed various listings of basic motivations in Chapter IV, and here we need merely restate that any consideration of fundamental drives or impulsions to action must reckon (1) with the physiological demands; (2) with socially qualified motives such as desires for security, power, and intimate companionship; (3) with exploratory interests; and (4) with the need for recognizable goals and ideals.

One might contract or expand such a list, but for the present we shall discuss the following matters as they bear upon the child's role and status, upon self-esteem, self-reliance, and other features which represent the beginnings of a mature personality: (1) the place of security and safety, not only in relation to nutritional needs and other physiological requirements, but in terms also of emotional stability and the predictability of interactional responses; (2) the growth of responsibility and independence in relation to situations which must be met; (3) the importance of emerging and ever-advancing goals and ideals toward which the individual orients the main course of his life; and (4) the social adaptation to parents, siblings, and other persons as these bear on the development of adequate role and status, first in the family and then in other groups, both primary and secondary.

These matters are closely interrelated. They do not represent in any strict sense independent factors. They are linked together into certain patterns or configurations. Thus security is itself related to social adaptation to others, and, as one matures, he finds in his ideals and professional goal a stabilizing factor of great importance. And certainly the dependence on parents and lack of responsibility in infancy and early childhood would in an adult be quite properly considered an evidence of "never growing up." In fact, the finding of some means of balancing or integrating these requirements is among the major tasks of the maturing individual.

The need for security and safety. In its psychological essentials security rests upon the development of anticipations in the interaction between child and those about him—first the mother, and then the father, the

siblings, and others in the household. Persistent inconsistency in his social-emotional training produces in him conflicting and hence unstable and for him insecure attitudes of expectancy. The matter, moreover, does not rest merely upon provision for creature comforts—feeding, bodily care, and the like. As important as these are, the realization of social-emotional security in relation to the parents and later on to others is doubtless more significant for the ultimate development of a mentally healthy child and adult. Love, sympathy, and co-operation are all essential to this development. To let antagonism arise where affection might be is to stimulate emotionalized conflict patterns that easily reduce the quality of interaction to a more rudimentary level.

At the beginning of life the dependence of the child upon others for his safety and well-being is self-evident because the satisfaction of his potent wants depends upon the acts of others. The attainment of social-emotional maturity rests chiefly on the change and growth of earlier security patterns as new desires and new situations arise. In order to expose some of the handicaps to such growth, we shall discuss three additional important problems: (1) overattachment of the child to the parents; (2) oversolicitude of the parents for the child; (3) rejection of the child by the parent.

(1) *Overattachment of the child to the parents.* Out of the close relationship of the child and the mother some problems may arise because of the persistence of strong fixation of the child upon the parent. For example, in the early stages of development, since the mother is the principal object of identification for the child, his role and status begin to develop in relation to her. But in the normal course of growing up the child comes to have relations with the father, usually with brothers and sisters, with other relatives, and with playmates and schoolfellows. In turn his participation with these other persons depends, of course, upon his capacity to identify himself with them. Thus the *all-or-none* nature of the first interactions built up toward the parents, especially toward the mother in our society, disappears, and the child comes to take on roles and attitudes with reference to other persons and groups. Moreover, this spread outward from the parental contacts to relations with others is a mark of maturity, of developing self-confidence, and of a sense of responsibility. We often find, however, that in many areas of interaction with parents children retain their dependence or attachment long after it has ceased being essential to sound development.

In a society whose culture emphasizes love, affection, and sentiment, it is understandable that many parents little realize that they are not providing adequate training for their children when they foster such overdependence. Yet, despite real efforts to teach the child independence and responsibility, the parent may find that the child himself persists

in his babyish attachment. It is also true that some parents, feeling that as children they were too early denied expected parental affection, stimulate overattachment and continued dependence of their own children upon them. In any case overattachment is a product of interplay of parent and child; and all too often the former does little or nothing to break down the intense dependence of the child because it enhances his own ego satisfaction.

Some overdependent personalities never completely separate themselves from maternal influences. They are the so-called "tied-to-mother's-apron-strings" individuals. But the father as well as the mother may be the object of such undue fixation. Clearly a certain type of desire for security may have its roots in these infantile fixations of dependence upon parents and other members of intimate groups. And we should realize that such persons seldom want to break the bonds that bind them to their earlier objects of fixation. They come to fear any anticipation of becoming attached to any other person so closely. Later this sense of dependence may spread to various groups. Sometimes these dependent persons are petty and spoiled in all their reactions. They always want their own way, and, if they do not get it, they resort to whining, crying, temper tantrums, or other power devices to gain attention. In fact, at times ill-disguised aggression appears when the dependent attitudes do not yield the wanted emotional satisfactions. Later their technique for securing attention may change, but the sense of dependence remains unaltered.

(2) *Oversolicitude of parents for child.* Although closely related to overdependence, oversolicitude about the child has some distinctive features. The former may depend chiefly upon the child's demands or upon a mutual interdependence of child and parent, while the latter seems to arise more particularly when the parent secures an excessive emotional satisfaction from his care of the child. Some parents resent seeing their children grow up, move away from their domination and control, and learn to make up their own minds. Consciously or unconsciously a parent may attempt to hold on to a child when otherwise he might grow up. It often happens that the parent becomes emotionally so attached to the child, so enjoys waiting on him, so depends upon the attention which the child gives him, that it is difficult for him to see the child come into contact with other persons inside or outside the family itself. In these cases the child may want to get away from undue care and domination by the parent, but the latter uses many devices to counteract or prevent this. The ill effects of such overattention sometimes are more apparent in the early years than are those of overdependence. Often, when the child breaks away from the home to go to school, overattachment or oversolicitude produces a crisis. The following illustration shows the manner in which the schoolteacher may help to break down these pat-

terns, and so help the child to grow up and learn to participate in the school-group patterns.

Case of Michael M., 6 years old. On the first day of the new term at Public School No. 10 Mrs. M. appeared, along with many other parents, with her child, who was about to enter the first grade. The day was dreary, and, because it was raining, Michael was wearing a raincoat, a sou'wester, and heavy rubbers. The mother helped him off with his outer garments, placed them properly on the hooks, and turned him over to the teacher. Just before the class was dismissed for the noon recess the mother reappeared, helped Michael on with his clothes, and took him home under an umbrella. She was back with him at 1:30 P. M. when school reconvened. She was also on hand at the end of the school day to accompany Michael home. This procedure went on for several days. At noon of the fourth day the mother was delayed in getting away from the house to the school to fetch her young son. (The family lived but three short blocks from the schoolhouse.) She looked out the window just as she was about to depart and saw the lad coming down the street in the rain with his rubbers in one hand, his raincoat over his other arm, and his sou'wester askew on his head. It was raining hard, and the child was thoroughly drenched. The mother rushed him into the bathroom, disrobed him, gave him a warm bath, and dressed him in fresh and dry clothes. After luncheon she repaired to the school in high dudgeon to see why the teacher had permitted "such an outrage" as allowing Michael to start for home without being properly dressed for the storm.

The teacher met the situation coolly and sensibly. She called Mrs. M.'s attention to the fact that she had not done so intentionally, that she had thirty-five pupils under her charge, and that, although she tried to oversee their getting on their topcoats and hats and rubbers, she could not personally supervise each child. Moreover, Michael had slipped out without her seeing him. The mother was not satisfied with the teacher's explanation. The teacher then called attention to the fact that the other parents did not accompany their children to school every day and that a child of six years should be able to put on his own rubbers, hat, and raincoat without the assistance of adults. Moreover, the other children had already begun to ridicule Michael; he in turn wanted to be like the others and evidently resented somewhat the mother's solicitude. The teacher tactfully suggested, therefore, that the mother discontinue accompanying her son to and from school and promised to help Michael learn to manage his clothes until he gained confidence in handling them himself. The mother did not agree, but the teacher reported that Mrs. M. began to let the boy go home to luncheon alone and then later stopped coming in the morning and at the end of the day. In a few weeks the mother gave up the whole habit entirely. Michael responded to the new demands readily and made genuine progress in becoming self-reliant.

This instance is one of hundreds that might be cited. Mrs. M. imagined she was doing the proper thing. She was not entirely foolish, but rather misconceived her role in the situation. The teacher's tact, in turn, avoided a conflict between the mother and herself, and in the end the boy benefited from this little experience. All too often overattachment and its related oversolicitude remain even after the child has passed physically into adolescence or even adulthood. (See Chapter XVI.)

(3) *The rejection of the child by the parent.* As serious as overdependence or oversolicitude—perhaps even more serious—may be those instances in which the parent rejects the child, casting him too early or too fully upon others for emotional and social support and affection. Sometimes the mother does not want the child, either because of a strong emotional conditioning from the period of pregnancy and childbirth, or perhaps because the child symbolizes for her unwanted but moral and legal obligations to the child's father. Or a woman who has given up a business or professional career to enter marriage may find childbearing and child-rearing irksome, involving a loss of money, of independence, of a certain status which she once enjoyed. Therefore, while such rejection may result in varied effects upon the child, the motivations for such conduct on the part of the mother may also differ widely.

Sometimes, too, a father may reject a child; and this again may influence both the child's and the mother's response, not only to the father but also toward each other. It may be that the rejection of the child by one parent may lead the other parent to pay more than the usual attention to the child. This in turn may set up overattachment and other difficulties. Thus we see that one sort of maladjusted interaction frequently leads to other problems.

There are also instances in which both parents reject a child. In these cases, if it does not lead to desertion or such neglect as to warrant interference by some outside agency, such as the juvenile court or some social-work agency, there often results an attempt on the part of the child to get affection and intimate response from teachers, friends, or others outside. One finds some children who react rather well to such treatment, while others develop various forms of maladjustment. Little adequate research has been done on this problem, but doubtless the age and experience of the child will greatly affect his response to such treatment. I have seen cases in which the rejection did not come about until the son or daughter in college had done something which the parent or parents disapproved so violently that they turned him out. It sometimes happens that a parent who was oversolicitous about a child when the latter was young later turns against him when he makes an honest and natural effort to stand on his own feet, say in the years of adolescence. (See Chapter XVI; also Van Waters, 1925; and Taft, 1926.)

Growth in responsibility and independence. While a sense of security is absolutely indispensable to the welfare of the child, it is also necessary for him—if he is to attain maturity later—to begin in childhood to get a sense of independence and responsibility for his acts. What constitutes protection and security for a child of two years does not apply to one entering school. (See the case of Michael M. above.) Nor are the care and safety provided for a preadolescent necessary for a boy or girl at

the close of puberty. (See Chapter XVI.) Security, to be effective (in our culture, at least), must gradually move from reliance on others to reliance on one's own efforts. A child's or adolescent's concept of the secure self, in the early years drawing heavily upon identification with parents and other intimates, in time gives rise to a more generalized role of self-assurance and identification with socialized and ethical principles of action.

The most important step in the emotional and social maturation is the freeing of the child, as he grows older, from the great initial dependence on the parents or other adults in the family. The key to the matter lies in keeping the child oriented first of all to the need and its satisfaction in a culturally accepted manner rather than in allowing undue intrusion of adult attitudes and habits into the process. In other words, the child must learn to manage his original and acquired wants in the light of the essentials of the cycle itself; his action should be modified only when the parent's activity will promote the child's own adjustment. Whenever the parent comes into the situation—as he must in many fundamental adjustments—it must be to guide and direct the child's learning, not to predetermine every single feature of it according to his own wishes. The child who, to use the classical example, never gets even slightly burned by sticking his finger into the candle flame will, other things being equal, never learn adequately to control the candle and himself efficiently. The child who never has to face failure and try again, who is protected on every hand, is of course secure for the time, but not for long. Sooner or later he is likely to meet critical situations for which he is not prepared and where others cannot step in to help him. In this instance, he will either fail or have to seek an infantile or childish mode of controlling or escaping the situation.

Many parents always place themselves as a shield between the child and his contact with the world outside. The child's own direct experience with material objects and with other persons is inhibited by the mother's warning voice or by her literally taking him out of the situation before he can accommodate himself to it. Or the child whose every little success is met by fulsome praise from the parent is likely to come to depend upon commendation from others for his satisfactions, and not upon his own achievement. This sort of attitude built into a person in childhood may remain for life. We all know adults who require direct appreciation or praise and often outright flattery from others for everything they do, and who feel despondent if such praise is not forthcoming.

As important and as fundamental as social interaction is for satisfaction of the essential wants of the child, and as evident as is the spread of the social act to accessory and yet important contacts with the world, it is quite likely that parents in our society, especially in the middle classes,

interpose themselves too much between the child and his direct experience. One of the major tasks of the parent in training his child lies in learning just when and to what extent he should intrude himself into the latter's adaptive activities, that is, into the child's own learning process.

This point furnishes us a clue to the second of our list of basic requirements for sound development. As the child grows older, he must increasingly learn to manage his needs and situations himself. The beginnings of such independence and responsibility are illustrated in his learning to feed himself, to regulate his eliminative processes adequately, and to dress and undress himself without the aid of others. There are, in fact, a host of personal habits of bodily care—bathing, washing, brushing his teeth, combing his hair, care of clothes, and the like—that are accepted in our society as health-giving and as proper preparation for participation with others in the family, on the playground, in the school, or elsewhere. In other words, responsibility begins at home and in such simple matters long before it can be expected in more complex situations.

The class status of the family may easily influence the degree to which the child is obliged to learn to manage his more intimate and personal habits. In the bourgeois classes, where we usually find few children per family unit, the children often remain poorly trained in these matters, while in underprivileged and larger families the children early have to learn to shift for themselves. In a study of abilities in two nursery-school groups, Gesell and Lord (1927) found that children from families of low economic position showed clear evidence of more adult habits of self-care than did children of comparable age from the upper classes, although in other matters, such as intelligence scores, verbal ability, and spontaneity of behavior, the children from the bourgeois homes did better than the others.

So, too, there are obvious differences between the children of farm families and those living in cities in the opportunities and demands for responsible activities on the part of children. The old traditional "chores," such as care of the house garden and chickens, or helping with livestock, still continue in most rural areas, but doubtless to a diminishing extent. On the modern farm, with specialization and power machinery to do much of the former drudgery, chores for the children have, in many instances, disappeared entirely. But this older culture pattern had much to recommend it, despite the sentimentalities of some social reformers, who in attacking the evils of child labor in industry would also seek to prevent even ordinary household or farmstead duties for youngsters.

As the child extends his social contacts from the family to his playmates, to the school, and to other groups, he is forced, of course, to assume many responsibilities not faced in the home. So, too, this problem becomes even more acute in the adolescent years as a phase of the youth's emanci-

pation from the home, and we shall return to it in later discussions. (See Chapter XVI.) But we must not fail to recognize that the beginnings of independence of action and consequent responsibility lie in the early years, even before the child reaches the usual school age. And for the parent to wait for the habits of independence and self-determination of action to arise spontaneously in adolescence or later is to court disappointment and half measures for the child when he reaches adult years. If for no other reason, overprotection of the child is unhealthful because it stifles the rise of the habits of self-sufficiency and freedom of choice that are essential to maturity.

Another aspect of parental training in responsibility, in our own society at least, is the fact that the parents define this responsibility usually not only in terms of satisfying their own wishes but also in terms of the requirements of the community—the cultural standards of morality. That is, responsibility for success or failure is not connected directly with the situation and with the overt consummatory act set up from a drive or need, but is linked with all sorts of moral connotations of “good” or “bad,” “wise” or “foolish,” “worthy” or “sinful.” In other words, a sense of guilt for any failure to perform in the culturally accepted manner tends to be projected upon the child by parents, teachers, and others. This is especially true in those areas of behavior which touch the mores and the legal definitions of activity. In our society matters of private property, personal economic success, belief in Christianity, and the sexual proprieties are particularly important. In regard to the first two the whole gamut of attitudes toward honesty, truth-telling, thrift, and individual struggle or rivalry for power and status plays a part. In regard to religion strong emotional beliefs are required. In relation to the last, the child is instructed early and late in avoidance of overt sexual expression and in a host of taboos on talk or action related to this, one of his most powerful drives. (The topic of attitudes and values regarding sexuality will be treated in Chapter XVI.)

The importance of wider goals and ideals. As important as it is for the basic cycles to be regulated and well habituated, the mature personality is characterized in our society by a gradual and ever-expanding range and change in the nature of his needs and goals. Of course, the culture to which the child is conditioned sets down the major lines along which his growth in these matters will follow. Yet apparently there are everywhere certain recurrent needs in man which find culturalization in the form of values and institutions. As of foremost importance we may consider the economic goals, those associated with socially accepted sexuality in marriage and childbearing and child-rearing, and those related to general community protection and welfare, which we conceive in terms of the political state. These three requirements—economic, sexual, and political

—seem universal among mankind. We must add to these, however, the provision for transmission of culture, the formal aspects of which we call education, and the religious-magical, aesthetic, and recreational interests of people everywhere. These patterns of culture represent for the individual the major values or frames of reference and hence the source of his principal goals and ideals.

The essential ideals with respect to these fields of activity are laid down in the family and other primary associations. Later we shall discuss aims or goals as related to educational processes, to the objectification of work and a vocation, to the anticipated role as spouse and family head, to the ideal of the good citizen, and to the part which religious, aesthetic, and avocational values play in personal adjustment. But at present we are concerned with the general fact that our aims or goals do extend beyond those of creature survival and care to a wider set which are more or less culturally predetermined.

In this development nothing is more important than the consistency and regularity of parental behavior toward the child and the sensing by the child of an ideal in the parent toward which he may aim. The embodiment of a concrete ideal in the parent permits in the child, then, the emergence of other ideals, aims, or goals toward which he may strive. If the parent is inconsistent and impulsive in training the child, if he fails him in crises, if he rejects him at too early an age, the child, in order to preserve his own integrity, may develop all sorts of compensatory and perhaps inadequate means of substitution—overt or covert aggression, marked feelings of inferiority, withdrawal into fantasy, or others—any one of which may prevent his attainment of integrity. While there may be constitutional limitations on the capacity of a given individual to meet such difficulties, the analyses of the Freudians and others have convincingly shown that culturally defined inadequacies—neurotic, psychotic, criminal, or others—often result from a failure of the individual in the early years to develop adequate aims.

The parental ideal itself must change and grow as the child matures. In his earliest years the child views the parents' action as of an *all-or-none* character—that is, the child gives the parent all his confidence and expects complete support. So, too, the parent is all-powerful, all-knowing, all-correct in his definitions of the world. But through experience with the parents and with other individuals and through increased experience in solving his own needs in the face of varied situations, the child arrives at discrimination and choice in the matter of the parents' acts and in regard to his own ideals and goals.

Translated into terms of roles, this means that the child begins by accepting completely the attitude of the parents toward himself as an object, but that in time, with added contacts with family members in other sit-

uations and with other persons outside the family, the child acquires a host of further concepts of himself and of his expected roles. Hence, in learning to take the attitudes of others toward himself as an object and thus to develop reflective consciousness, he must choose some and reject others of these ideals and attitudes. Moreover, in terms of Mead's analogy of the place of the organized game with its rules and regulations (see Chapter IX) the child has predetermined for him, at least in part, the manner and nature of these choices and rejections out of which the conception of himself as a *totality*, as a *self*, may arise.

Any ideal aim or goal is an object toward which a person may orient the major activities of his life. It is the source of the integrated life that characterizes the mature adult. But, speaking realistically, few persons ever acquire such an integration; and as we proceed we shall see again and again how the individual is forced to accept half measures, how he must compromise with the demands of those about him, how he must often find equilibrium in balancing various ideals and aims with still others rather than find integration and full co-ordination of all the major aims toward one goal. (See Chapter XXIX.) With this general statement before us, let us look more closely into the features of the goal or aim as it relates to development.

Burnham (1924) treats the problem in terms of the *task* which the child and adult must have in order to be physically and mentally healthy. The term *task* is perhaps somewhat unfortunate because of its negative connotation, especially because it often implies the imposition on one by others—parents, teachers, employers—of a duty or onerous job. But Burnham carefully avoids this meaning: He well realizes that the task as a goal or aim must be considered in terms of sound activity moving from need to a satisfying consummation. What we desire in child training is the gradual emergence of goals or tasks which are self-determined, which represent the individual's self-imposed expectancies about his own behavior, which mean that the role of the individual in the various major group situations in life will represent for him an abiding interest—that is, will grow out of his deeper and more persistent wants or wishes. There are two features of the goal or task (in Burnham's sense) which require emphasis not only in regard to the participation of the child in the family but also in their bearing on the entire course of his life. The first of these has to do with the relationship between the aspiration or ideal aim and the degree of achievement to which we referred in another connection in Chapter IX; the second has to do with the relation of the goal and task to the situation and to the ability to discipline one's acts with reference to the aim.

The goals or aims of the child, to be adequate to his personality development, must represent a certain correlation between his ability, his potentiality or capacity to mobilize his energies, and the achievement or completion of the task or aim. The differential between what one wants or aims for and what one actually gets in the way of satisfactions is a major feature of all personality adjustment. In fact, the discrepancy between ideal aims or aspirations and one's achievement constitutes a major

problem of unhappiness or dissatisfaction. For the child, as for the adult, it is important in dealing with this problem to reckon with the nature of the ideal aim or aspiration, although we must also consider the situation and the potentialities which permit or deny the fulfillment of these aims.

An ideal goal or ideal aim may be too trivial and simple for the child or too "low" in the scale of moral values accepted in his community; it may be too complex for him or morally too "high"; or no ideal goal, beyond those rudimentary ones of creature comfort, may arise. In the first instance the petty character of the goals laid down for the child by the parent may lead to indifference and lack of interest, to an "escape" of the child into other tasks or goals, as, for instance, into daydreaming. And the child's failure to carry out these petty aims may result in conflict between parent and child. Similar kinds of response may be found in the second instance if the goals are too complex or morally beyond the child's years and experience. Sometimes parents anticipate a too adult view and habit in a child. They expect him to carry responsibilities for which he is not prepared by previous experience; they hold him to moral conduct befitting only an adult before he has been trained in the necessary steps toward such a goal. This latter situation is peculiarly evident in our own society, in which we load on the young child all sorts of moralistic words and stereotypes long before he has had any concrete contact with the situations which these words symbolize. (See Chapter X.) Then, too, some parents may fail to provide any ideals or extended aims for the child, who then grows up living only within the orbit of those cycles of action concerned with more or less immediate satisfaction of bodily requirements.

It is apparent at once that the cultural standards of a society or community or of a particular social class have much to do with the nature of these goals or aims. If the family has taken over, for example, the belief that successful living is measured only by movement of the child up the ladder of social prestige to a position higher than that of the parents (an aspect of what Cooley, 1909, well called the "open-class" system), then the parents may set before the child, may project upon him, ideal aims beyond his capacities or interests, or they may fail to provide the adequate training for the performance of these ideal tasks. Or oversolicitous parents may take over the major tasks for the child, setting before him "copies" or obligations far beneath his years and experience. Or parents of the underprivileged classes with long traditions of failure, much unemployment, illness, or perhaps with half-pauperized attitudes that the community will provide for them in severe crises, may entirely fail to set before their children sound goals regarding occupations and citizenship toward which they may orient their lives. And it is interesting to note that in our society, when such ideals are not set by the parents, the teacher or other

agent of the larger community may consciously or unconsciously assume the role of mentor and guide for the child in the matter of ideals. In this matter democratic societies tend to provide certain ideals for all citizens, even though these aims may conflict with the parents' wishes, or be induced in lieu of any parental or family ideals whatsoever. The community thus tends to furnish inspiration, or, better still, aspirations for all its prospective citizens.

The most healthy condition is one in which the ideals of the child keep sufficiently ahead of his potentialities as to capture his attention and interest; but they must not be so far in advance as to discourage or defeat him. And it is in this gradual expansion of ideals or aspirations in keeping with achievement that the sense of security, of freedom, and of responsibility also matures. In fact, these two fundamentals of personality development—security and freedom with responsibility—are intimately bound up at every point with the function of the ideal goal. As Burnham (1924) puts it, the three most important aspects of sound mental hygiene and hence of personality development are (1) the task, which we have defined as an ideal goal, (2) a plan for working this out, and (3) freedom of choice and means toward the achievement of the goal. To this last I should add the essential concomitant of personal responsibility. (See Chapter XVI.) The plan concerns the manner in which the individual expects to pass from the need, or wish, or want—the first step in the cycle—toward the attainment of the end or goal which provides the satisfaction. We have already noted how important consistency and regularity are in the fixing of fundamental bodily habits, and the same principles operate in this situation. As the child comes into contact with the school, with opportunities for vocational training, with the societal demands or expectancies in regard to sex life and ultimate marriage, with those concerned with good citizenship, and with others, the varied plans or devices for moving from need or wish to end or goal are provided for him by his society and culture. As we saw in Chapters VII and IX, society permits many alternative ways of progressing from need to goal and satisfaction, but in regard to the major societal values there still remain certain basic factors, the "core" of the cultural demands, as Linton (1936) aptly puts it, which cannot be ignored or neglected without serious consequences. In other words, society provides the definitions of the situation within which the individual is permitted to operate in moving from aim to goal.

Relation of ideal goal to discipline and responsibility. We have already shown that the most adequate growth in the child comes when he is disciplined or controlled by the inherent character of the need and the essential situation which he has to face in order to secure the satisfaction of this need. Parental control is inadequate and in the long run inefficient when it takes the nature of an intrusion or imposition upon this course

of activity of the parent's own wishes or of demands which have no direct bearing on the motive, situation, and satisfaction of the child. Not that we can avoid the occurrence of the social act, but the orientation of the child should be to the need and the situation first of all; and, if the parent or other person is a part of this situation, then the attention to the other person must take its place along with other factors in the total activity cycle.

For instance, the satisfaction of an aim should arise from the sense of completion, from the pleasure of a task fulfilled or well done, not from external rewards such as money or fondling. In our society, however, with its overemphasis upon monetary standards as a mark of success, it all too often happens that parents use such devices for rewarding the child. So, too, the threat of punishment by the parent if the task is not done, so common still, has little to recommend it as a motivating device. We have already noted that fear, the emotional core of threats of punishment, is the prime inhibitor to action. While the "ordering and forbidding technique" (Thomas and Thomas, 1928) is perhaps one of the oldest forms of control among individuals, it has distinct limitations if our larger cultural aim is the production of *self-reliant* and *responsible* children and adults, as we define these concepts.

Projection of parental aims and ideals upon the child. A common illustration of the manner in which parents interfere in the growth of their children's ideal goals is their projection upon the children of their own thwarted and incomplete professional or marital or other ambitions. This practice rests upon the fact that during the early years of parent-child relationship it is easy for the parent to thrust upon the child all sorts of prejudices, conceptions, and values which the latter, because he identifies himself so completely with the parent, takes for granted. Thus, before the child has been exposed to other persons' influences (that is, before he has formed a basis for discrimination and judgment by playing other roles and experiencing other attitudes and ideas), he accepts all sorts of beliefs and attitudes which later he may consider in a critical and even antagonistic light.

Because our cultural values for personal success are so great, many parents who have failed to secure their wonted vocational aims for themselves foist these aims upon their children. This process is often linked up with overattachment and oversolicitude. It frequently happens that the child, unfamiliar in his early years with his own potential interests and capacities (which will develop as he comes into contact with the culture of his society), follows docilely the plan of his parents to carry out their predetermined goal or ambition. Later, as the child's interest lags, or as his talents, especially in the arts, do not seem to measure up to the pa-

rental hopes, or as he comes to discrimination, he often resents the parental interference, and open revolt may ensue. (See K. Young, 1927c.)

Yet, if a family has developed through several generations a tradition and custom for the sons to follow in the vocational footsteps of their fathers, such a projection of an ideal goal may be taken as a matter of course. It becomes a familial culture pattern. And, when a son fails to live up to such an expectation, a real tragedy may occur—both for the parents and for the son. But in our open-class society this sort of familial practice is less likely to receive constant and unquestioned community support.

In fact, our culture has little class or family predetermination of roles but tends rather to emphasize individualistic aims and ideals, and the patterns in which these are worked out are largely those of competition and conflict. (See Chapter IX.) While co-operation between parents and children, and among the children, may develop in relation to particular matters, in the usual American family there is from the very outset much emphasis upon individual achievement and upon the securing of material evidences of success. The family, the school, and much later, the business world all stimulate personal competitiveness and individualistic aims. Even Burnham in his keen analysis of the place of the task and goal in relation to personality development tends to reflect the American culture of individualism. In other societies, aims and goals might well have a co-operative and group feature quite unfamiliar to us. (See M. Mead, 1937, and May and Doob, 1937.)

Social adaptation to parents and others. The family is the first group wherein the child finds his role and status. If the dominant culture demands or expects fixed relations of strict obedience and submission from the child and more or less complete dominance and ascendance on the part of the parents, the give and take of the child and parents will not be spontaneous unless personal-social relations have broken down the rigidity of the culture in regard to dominance-submission. But in modern democratic societies, at least, there has emerged a growing recognition that the child's growth toward full maturity is enhanced in those family relations in which the parents and children operate on a more or less equalitarian basis—within the limits set by the obvious physical immaturity of the children. That is, in place of a family configuration of superordination and subordination, there is a meeting of parents and children on the common ground of the child's needs and the parental duties to assist in the maturation process. This does not mean, as some theories of progressive education and child training seem to imply, that the child should grow up undisciplined and in terms of his infantile wishes. It does mean, however, that the child must mature his thought and action in terms of the need, the goal, and the situation which links these together,

and the parent at best should only play the role of advisor or friend, not of "boss" and dictator.

Frankly, this sort of child training is still more honored in the breach than in the performance; yet the contemporary freedom of children from the severe dominance of parents common a century ago must be apparent to all. There is in many families a growing sense of companionship between children and parents, a sharing of tasks and responsibilities which augurs well for the future. But, so long as parents refuse to answer the child's questions naturally and easily, so long as they remark in the face of a query, "Run along and play and don't ask so many questions," or "Mother is busy now," or "You're too young to know that; wait till you're grown up," there is little likelihood of a satisfactory parent-child companionship and of the co-operation which is essential to sound growth. We are saying, in short, what we have stated before, that, in the process of socializing, the parent tends to enter the social configuration as omnipotent and omniscient controller who orders, forbids, denies, or punishes without let or hindrance from others, without accountability to the child questioner. Sound mental health arises, however, when the parent enters into the child's dilemma as helpmate, as counselor, as fellow-solver of the problems. The most successful parent, like the successful actor, who is both the character in the play and himself, is he who can at one and the same time take the role of the child and retain his own role or self intact so as to aid the child in meeting his problems of adjustment. (See Chapters IX and XIX.)

Falling short of this high ideal, of course, we witness the oversolicitude of the parent for the child already noted, we see the projection upon the child of the parent's own mental conflicts and attitudes, we see the beginnings of favoritism and exhibitionism, or we see that the child is rejected and left to his own devices.

Exhibitionism represents the operation of one type of attention-getting and status-securing device in which both child and parent interact. The great attention showered on the baby as he develops, the comments as to how "cute" or how "wonderful" he is, and the giving of rewards and favors for his acts or failure to act—all lay a foundation for the child himself to develop habits, attitudes, and expectancies and beliefs that by showing off he can get what he wants. The repeated telling of girls that they are pretty and sweet, or of boys or girls that they are smart and clever, the parading of the child's foibles and abilities before adults—all are methods by which the exhibitionism of the child is built up. Ever in the eye of parents, brothers and sisters, relatives and friends, the child comes to believe that he is unsurpassable.

The case of James A. illustrates the exhibitionist. This child, who is in the third grade, must take the lead in everything. If he is not first in line of march, not first

in some little school performance, if he does not have a part on every room program, he has an emotional storm. He talks about it to the teacher, to his fellow pupils, and to all who will listen to him. He has been made so much of at home that, as a psychologist remarked, he imagines he should be "head man in every show." Because of lack of parental co-operation he is proving a very difficult school problem.

The writer has seen some insufferable children develop from being informed by teachers and parents that they had very superior mental ability as determined by intelligence tests. Some families induce in their children attitudes of superior performance, so that later the children meet competition emotionally and ineffectively, as happened in the case just cited. Not infrequently one sees the results of such early training in college students. A girl or a boy has been made so much of by the family, neighbors, and school authorities in a small town that in college the orientation to a new world of competition without parental and other support produces maladjustment. (See Chapter XIX.)

Exhibitionism is both a status-securing and a power-giving device. There is often a combination of identification of the parent with the child's performance and a projection of the parent on the child in pre-determining the direction which this public demonstration will take.

Favoritism of one child over others is another all too common habit of parents. If undue preference for one is shown, it amounts, often, to rejection of another child or other children. There is a sort of implied scale of status or prestige among the children in such acts by parents. Often, too, the favorite reflects the parent's wishes, or typifies for the parent his own secret ideal. Moreover, the favored boy or girl quickly seizes this excessive show of affection and care as a means to fulfill his own wishes. The "spoiled child" of popular psychology is usually an instance of favoritism. The important point in all this is the extent and intensity of this sort of training. Sometimes favoritism passes from one child to another, as when a younger child takes the center of attention formerly held by an older brother or sister. If the favoritism continues, it may permanently mark the individual, and difficulties of adjustment in school and especially in marriage may easily be traced back to the fact that the individual as a youngster had his own way unduly, was the favored and protected member of the family. Particularly unfortunate are those instances in which a favorite child of one parent is used as a foil in the conflict with the other parent. It sometimes happens that each spouse may unconsciously or consciously choose one of the children as his protégé and pit his emotional hold on him against the other spouse and his favorite. Or each parent may strive for the affection of one child, attempting by wiles and favors to make him his ally against the other. Such exploitation by the parents often results in unhealthy attitudes of the child toward marriage and toward parental relations. (See Chapter XXI.)

Intersibling relations. The striving for status goes on among the brothers and sisters of a family as it will later go on among members of almost any other group. Rivalry for the highest esteem in the eyes both of the parents and of the other children is a common occurrence. In a society like our own, which emphasizes competitive attitudes and which praises individual effort and success, even at the expense of kinsfolk, this outcropping of oppositional reactions gets a good deal of support, even in the family circle. Competition in the family group may, of course, not be unfortunate in its effects if it is counterbalanced by love and mutual aid among the family members. Apparently we all have within us the ambivalent trends of opposition and co-operation. If the latter is overstimulated in the family, it may well be that the oppositional expression may be projected upon some out-group or upon some individual outside the family circle. But if the ethos of a society emphasizes the measure of status and success in terms of competitive effort, the co-operative attitudes and habits may not develop as they might, or they may find their expression only in the publicly avowed but verbal form of acquiescence in the golden rule and love for others—often quite in contrast to the overt competitive struggle for power. (See Chapter IX.)

It sometimes happens that favoritism toward one child leads the other children to show intense rivalry toward this child and to greatly resent the parental attention to one child at the emotional expense of the others. The following account illustrates this situation:

In the N. family are two girls and three boys. The daughters are twenty months apart in age; the boys are much younger. The mother is a dominating type of woman. The father is relatively indifferent to the more intimate relations of the children to one another. Z., the older girl, made a very brilliant record in high school and college. Her mother talked a great deal about this, both in the home and out. She spoke of her professional promise, of how proud they all were of her. It was "Z. did this," and "Look at your sister, Z." She identified herself very distinctly with her older daughter. A., the younger girl, who was two years behind her sister in school, was a mediocre student. She was not interested in books. Her mother was constantly comparing her unfavorably with her abler sister.

The older girl was rather well integrated to the family life. She got along well with the neighbors, and was generally popular. The younger daughter, in contrast, developed into a quick-tempered, rebellious person. She defied her mother about hours of recreation. She sulked at home or was sharp-tongued when she did talk. She could not be aroused to do better work by being compared with her brighter sister. In fact, this unfavorable comparison only made her angry.

Both girls graduated from college. A. conformed outwardly to the family scheme so long as she was in school. Soon after she completed her course, she left home. She married after a few months in a large city, where she went to work. She says she will absolutely have nothing more to do with her family in any intimate way.

Intersibling competition may take the form of *jealousy* arising from a sense of neglect by a parent. Often the first child develops a sense that he has been rejected when another baby appears in the family. Both jealousy and envy may arise in the early years and sometimes are never lost. The manner in which rivalry and jealousy may emerge is shown in the following case:

Jane B., a bright and attractive child of three, will have nothing whatever to do with her mother or little brother if she can avoid it. When Jane was twenty-six months old, her mother went to the hospital to have her second child. Jane had seen the mother sewing baby clothes and had been told, in answer to questions, that the family was hoping for another child. But a child of such immature years naturally could not know just what it meant to hear her mother say she might have a little baby sister or brother. A day or so after the birth of the second child, a boy, Jane was taken by the father to the hospital to see the new baby. Jane showed considerable interest in the new member of the family and was affectionate toward the mother. During the ten days that the mother was in the hospital, the father and Jane became really acquainted for the first time. The father was called upon for many things that formerly had been done by the mother. Jane saw the baby frequently at the hospital and apparently was not emotionally disturbed in the least. Neither did she seem anything but affectionate toward the mother, who told her that she would soon be home again.

At the end of the ten days Jane was considerably taken aback to find not only the mother at home, but the baby as well. Within a few days Jane realized that a new life had opened for her. The mother gave so much of her time to the baby and so little to her, compared with the past! Jane asked why the baby was not left at the hospital and was told that he would always be with them at home. She was upset and became antagonistic to both mother and baby. She turned more and more toward her father. When the baby was a few weeks old, Jane one day discovered him lying on the davenport wrapped up ready to be taken out, and she unceremoniously pushed him onto the floor. The mother rushed in at the first cry of the infant, who was not injured, to find Jane standing over him in a somewhat deliberate manner, and saying, "Don't like baby."

As time went on, the dislike for the child and the avoidance of the mother grew. The father became more and more the center of Jane's affection. She waited for the father to come home at night to show him things she had made during the day. On one occasion she had a serious temper tantrum when her mother unwittingly showed the father some little crude drawing Jane had made and saved, before the child herself had had the opportunity to display her accomplishment.

Jane in time became a serious disciplinary problem in the home. She avoided relations with the baby brother and took an increasingly negativistic attitude toward the mother. Toward the father she continued to be deeply affectionate and obedient. Such a situation may easily tend to condition the child toward the mother, father, and brother in a form upon which the whole subsequent structure of family relations may be built.

Rivalry with another child, especially with one who is a favorite, may lead to a sense of inferiority and later to compensatory devices to overcome this handicap. It is not uncommon that an aggressively toned aim for ascendance and leadership may be born of such a family situation. (See Lasswell, 1930, for cases.)

In these matters as in others the problem is one of striking a balance between one set of values, attitudes, and habits and another. Rivalry, when overcharged with emotions, when associated closely with the craving for status and power, when marked by intensity of hatred in the face of defeat or failure, may become a driving force to competition for status elsewhere or may lead to the growth of permanent attitudes of bitterness and even violence toward a sibling. But, when rivalry is kept within the moral bounds of culture, when it is permitted sublimation or substitute outlets in occupational, political, or other public activities, it may and often does become the source of ascendance and accomplishment. Rivalry in the family may obviously stimulate the development of ideal goals or aims of achievement which otherwise might not arise. But the permissibilities in any given culture will set the limits of this rivalry and competition, especially as to their outlet in the wider community. In the same way, emphasis upon competition may mean an open suppression of sympathetic and co-operative habits and attitudes, leading to their remaining childish, at best, or to their finding outlets in compensatory acts such as traditional pity and charity for the poor. Often such kindly, co-operative activities—despite our Christian ideology—are quite dissociated from the main currents of intense personal struggle for economic and political power in our Christian but nevertheless competitive capitalistic society.

Finally it must be noted that not only do cultural patterns influence the rise and direction of behavior in relation to security, to the growth of responsibility, to the rise of ideal goals, and to the nature of person-to-person adjustment, but in all these—especially in the first and last—personal-social conditioning plays a larger role than may at first be realized. As we have shown, it is in the *rudimentary social relations*, aside from the broad cultural expectancy of parental care of the child, that interactions are least standardized and least culturally predetermined. And, since independence and responsibility, on the one side, and emergence of ideal goals, on the other, depend so much upon these other two patterns of security and upon person-to-person adjustment, it is obvious that a good deal of personal-social learning also lies at the roots of responsibility and ideal goals.

Chapter XV

OTHER ASPECTS OF FUNDAMENTAL TRAINING

THE PRESENT chapter will first present some of the characteristics of interaction which have their inception in other primary configurations than the family, especially as they affect the child's development. The second section will discuss aggressive and dominant behavior; various forms of withdrawal, such as resistant behavior; development of inferiority feelings and consequent compensations; retreat into fantasies; and the beginnings of certain persistent emotional reactions such as fears and anxieties. We have delayed the treatment of these particular problems because their setting is not only the family but other primary groups as well.

INTERACTIONAL PATTERNS IN PRIMARY GROUPS OUTSIDE THE FAMILY

Among the significant features of interactions with others outside the family may be noted the following: (1) In these various groups a child usually meets children more or less of his own age, permitting a form of interaction not likely in his own home. (2) Also, especially in these days of small families, he may meet children of the opposite sex for the first time, which affords him a broadening of the basis for later heterosexual attachments. (3) These primary associations of children usually operate relatively free from direct parental control, or, if relatives interfere, the other children may give a different interpretation to such interference than would the child in his own home, a process which helps the latter to redefine his role both in his family and elsewhere. (4) New patterns of interaction arise, such as those depending definitely on individual differences in physical strength, in mental alertness, and in the social capacities of co-operation or its opposite, competition and conflict. (5) Of all the personality alterations arising from membership in other primary groups perhaps the most striking come as a result of freeing the child from strong, emotionally-toned, and close identification with the mother or other family members. The social maturation of the individual, his learning to "stand on his own feet," to give and take with others, and his new-found ideals and heroes in other children and other adults, are all important in spreading the child's affections and fixations to a wider range of individuals than are found in his family and thus in preparing him to move on later to membership in secondary groups.

Many of the fundamental patterns of behavior exhibited in these other primary groups derive from habits and attitudes originating in the family circle. Thus the dominant or the resistant behavior of the child on the playground may reflect his home training, or the intensity of a comradeship with another child or some other adult may be regarded as a substitute for a strong desire to remain in intimate and close contact with a parent. So, too, the inferiority feelings arising in the competitive household may find compensatory outlets in play or gang life. Or the fantasies incited in the home situation may be the source of what E. S. Robinson (1920) well termed "compensatory make-believe play," alone or in company with other children. In short, the motives and the mechanisms of adaptation not only arise *de novo* in these other primary group situations, but for the most part have their inception in the still earlier family interactions.

Play life of children. Play may be described as the more or less spontaneous unhampered reactions of the child to the material and social objects of his environment. Along with some other social activities, it seems to grow up out of the random movements of the child and his exploration of the material and social world around him. (On various theories of play, see E. S. Robinson, 1933.)

But the manifestations of play life, and of recreation, amusement, and entertainment which grow out of it, depend upon the society and culture of a particular time and place. (See M. Mead, 1930a, for an illustration of a very different culture of early child activity.)

Unlike our traditional family relationships, which presuppose certain vertical dominance-submission patterns of relation between parent and child, or between an older sibling and a younger, the social configuration in spontaneous play of children tends to be of a horizontal, equalitarian character. True, differences in age, experience, and dominance may result in the expression of authority and leadership on the part of some children over the others, but, unless interfered with by adults, such vertical configurations arise out of the give and take of the children with each other. Although cultural forms of play life are passed on to younger children by adults and older children, for the most part the play relations of children to one another tend to be determined by the more natural personal-social interactions.

Certainly play serves as an important item in socialization and in this sense is preparatory to later behavior. Children learn the attitudes of fair play, of rivalry and emulation, of group loyalty and group antagonism. They not only identify themselves with each other, but assume adult roles in their play. They act out first one role and then another as their interest fluctuates. This identification process is highly important because it means that new patterns other than those of the family emerge and serve to

widen the range of the child's attention and thus of his activities. But play is preparatory for later life only as the activities of today prepare for those of tomorrow. There is much misunderstanding of the play life of children on the part of adults, because with adults playtime is rather distinctly separated from the business of the day. Adults engage in a kind of ritual in getting ready to play: plans for a foursome or a tennis match are made days in advance; there are special clothes, times and places, fees, memberships, and training. Such play is self-conscious in its determination. It is deliberately cut off from other aspects of living. With children, play is preparation in a sense; but, more than that, it is child life. Furthermore, the alleged playfulness of children is somewhat mistaken. A child's play is not nearly so consciously make-believe as many adults imagine.

Various writers on the psychology and pedagogy of play have described certain "stages" of play development beginning in infancy and leading on into adolescence. (See Whitely, 1924.) But these stages only reflect the larger changes in social contact which the child experiences as he grows up. It is often said that at the outset play life is highly individualistic and passes on by degrees to "social play" with other children, and then on to organized games. But from the very outset the child's random activities which we call play get quickly associated with other persons, especially with the mother or nurse. Many of the accessory habits described in the previous chapter arise from the fact that adults play with the child even though his interaction with them is rudimentary and somewhat unorganized. Yet, if the child is left to himself, he does delight in certain circular reactions of repeatedly shaking a rattle or swinging some bright-colored object or toy. He is interested apparently in noises, in his own tactile sensations, and in bright colors. If another child near by is doing much the same sort of thing, the first child does not pay any attention to him unless the second one takes away his toy or gets in his way. Later, as the child learns to walk more efficiently, he may duplicate the play of the other (so-called imitation), but he still remains somewhat individualistic. This sort of activity has been called *parallel* play in contrast to the former, which has been designated as *solitary*. Yet even these activities are not always entirely nonsocial, for one child may start a particular kind of play which the others may follow. Parten (1932) has aptly described this as *associative* play. In these instances the children engage in similar if not identical activities. There may be conversation about the play; there may be borrowing or loaning of toys; but so far there is no division of labor, no organized co-operation, no solidarity, and no rules which must be followed. Later, however, more obvious social interaction arises—for example, joint undertakings of a group of children, such as building a playhouse, or carrying out some sort of simple game. This Parten has called *co-operative* or *organized supplementary* play.

The gradual emergence of social interaction in play is brought out in an investigation by Maudry and Nekula (1939), who observed the social contacts of ninety-two children ranging in age from six to twenty-five months. (1) For the period of six to eight months the interaction between the children was unspecific and chiefly accidental; so too, their manipulation of toys was unorganized in character. (2) For the period of nine to thirteen months there was an increase in deliberate use of toys with

an accompanying increase in tendencies to resist interference from other children; in this age group, however, the beginnings of more friendly contact were also noted. (3) From fourteen to eighteen months there were more and more friendly play and a decline in fighting for toys; at this time simple games begin to take on a certain social structure. And (4) for the ages from nineteen to twenty-five months there is more and more integration of the child's interest in his play materials with his co-operative interest in his playmates; as the authors put it (1939, p. 214), "Both children modify their behavior in adjustment to the partner's activity."

Once co-operative play patterns are established, the child passes easily into simple organized games. But in all these patterns we must not neglect the influence of adults and older children, who teach the young both how and what to play. The most recent studies of the play life of children have been made in connection with nursery schools; and, while these groups depend for their inception upon the institutional arrangements made by adults, so far as the play activities themselves are concerned they resemble fairly well what one would find in any neighborhood of families whose children play together in each other's back yards. Parten's (1932) investigation will serve as a prototype of many others:

This study of play life affords a good illustration of the growth of social participation, or what we should designate as the development of the social act in the child's life. This growth is marked by extensity or number of social contacts made by the individual, and by intensity or kind of groups in which he participates and the nature of the role and status he acquires therein. She measured the first of these, for a group of forty-two nursery children, ranging in age from about two to slightly over four years, by recording the number of groups in which a child played. She measured the latter by noting the extent to which the group was organized in terms of certain duties and responsibilities of its members or whether the group was largely a mere congeries of more or less independent individuals, and also by noting the role and status of the child, that is, whether he helped shape the plans and actions of the group, whether he took a role as leader and thus came to have a certain prestige.

For her sample she found that some children did not play with others but were satisfied with being onlookers or with amusing themselves by climbing on and off chairs or examining their own bodies or following the teacher about the room or playground. Others indulged in the various sorts of play already noted: solitary or "independent," "parallel," "associative," and "co-operative." Her results indicate that the degree of social participation as measured by the kind of play activity is largely correlated with the age of the child. The youngest children play either alone or in parallel groups; the oldest play in more highly organized groups. But there are wide variations. The rank-order correlation of the measure or score of social participation with rank-order of age was .61. Intelligence does not seem to be highly correlated with degree of social participation as she measured it, nor does previous experience of the child in the nursery-school situation seem to make any difference in the degree of participation in terms of types of play.

In the nursery school—as in uncontrolled play groups—family and other background factors may well play a part in predetermining the type of play and the extent of social contacts. The child who has already learned aggressiveness from his home may carry this over into his play, and in contrast the child who has already shown introverted, shy traits may with difficulty learn the give and take with other children which is normally expected. So, too, although such young children as those in Parten's sample showed only slight relation between intelligence and play activities, studies of older children have demonstrated that the intellectually brighter children easily acquire habits of reading and recreation by themselves and often tend to avoid physical forms of play such as those enjoyed by children not intellectually so bright though of similar chronological age. There are wide individual variations in these matters, but the studies of Terman (1925) and of Lehman and Witty (1927) have demonstrated that more gifted children, when matched with children of average mentality, but of like age, sex, and environment, tend to adopt more adult and individualistic forms of play. Does this mean that children of higher intelligence quotients are less affected by the forces of socialization and culture than normal children? Not at all. In the first place, a highly intelligent child may be so advanced in mentality that the play of children of the same age offers him nothing of interest. Second, these bright children are stimulated by adults to take up reading intensely, and they often find much of their pleasure and recreation in these more intellectual activities. But it does not follow that this is unsocial. Rather it represents advancement toward internalization and verbalization of roles and interests, something of the conservatism and maturity of play and recreation among adults. It must be borne in mind that in our culture reading is one of the expected activities of mature and bright people, and the highly intelligent child in our society follows the pattern. In ancient Greece or Rome a very bright boy might well have indulged in other activities.

Also, much has been made of sex differences in play interests in the traditional literature on the psychology of play. For example, K. M. B. Bridges (1927) reports for a group of ten three-year-old children in a nursery school certain differences between the boys and girls: the former preferred more vigorous play involving the larger muscle groups, the latter those involving finer co-ordinations such as finger manipulations; the former showed a certain inventiveness in building block houses, while the latter more readily followed routine activities such as fitting Montessori cylinders and matching colored papers. But we dare not attribute these variations to inherent sex differences. Rather they demonstrate how very early in the child's life the cultural expectancies for each sex are fixed. Little girls are taught to play quietly with dolls, to sew, to go

through the household routines in play, and to be docile, polite, and tidy. Little boys are expected to be more vigorous and are often allowed to continue forms of muscular activity which would be denied their sisters. So, too, freedom to choose and to try various play activities is permitted the boy. Certainly there is no good evidence that innately the male sex is more inventive than the female, any more than there is that the former is given to better muscular co-ordinations. Any sex differences in the play life of either children or adults is fairly certain to be the result rather of culture and society than of innate abilities or interests. (On the relation of play to age, sex, and culture in American society, see Lehman and Witty, 1927.)

Play is a most valuable feature of social participation. Some children indulge much more readily than others in their opportunities for this participation. A survey made of certain public-school play groups in a city of 60,000 in 1927-1928 showed that 5-10 per cent of the children stood about and did not play or played only when constantly urged by the teachers.¹ These marginal children were inclined to be negativistic and evasive in their social activities. They were missing their opportunity to learn the manner of social participation which would enable them to get through life. Many evidently found their play life in daydreaming. It would be interesting to know what percentage of these children tended to be introverted and how many of them already displayed early trends toward misconduct. Those who engage in overt play acquire much greater facility in meeting social situations, in accommodating themselves to other children, than do those who do not or will not play. The carry-over to adult life is self-evident in our culture.

The congeniality group. Another important type of social participation is found in the congeniality group. Such groups are to be distinguished from the more or less spontaneous play groups on the one hand and from formalized clubs and organizations for recreation or serious purpose on the other. The essential characteristics of the congeniality group may be stated as follows: It has a limited membership based upon common interests and kindred tastes and is dependent upon face-to-face contact for its rise and survival. There may be some intermember rivalry, but it tends to be submerged in the friendly interactions of members. There are no formal organization, no rituals, no codes, and only occasionally a name. When a name does arise, it is often a nickname, sometimes spontaneously derived. Such groups are usually formed for purposes of recreation and pleasure, but sometimes they combine leisure-time interests with serious discussions. They are more consciously formed than the play group, and there is usually a strong in-group loyalty. An examination of a large number of congeniality groups made by the writer demonstrates that one of

¹ Data by courtesy of Miss Pauline Camp.

the most important features of such groups is the possibility of free conversational expression of ideas and activities. Inhibitions demanded by more formal associations were released in "gab fests," in uncensored talk, and occasionally in freedom of overt action.

Such groups often arise within the setting of the larger play groups, from contact in the schoolroom, or from living in dormitories or being associated together in a business office or factory. They often cut across sex, economic, and religious lines, and among older groupings even across age differences.

The congeniality group is particularly important for mental balance because it provides the individual with a release from the taboos and inhibitions produced by the folkways and conventions of the other groups out of which it arises. It cuts across the institutionalized patterns of behavior and throws one back upon his freer, more spontaneous wishes and desires. It affords an outlet, largely in verbal form, for expressions of the "I" and various aspects of the self or ego which are otherwise repressed. In a society marked by conventionalized, controlled secondary-group patterns of interaction, the congeniality group—like the comradeship—affords an important area of release of culturally imposed tensions within the individual. It is important for the child, and especially for the adolescent, in the face of our overattention to formal clubs and to institutionalized aspects of schooling. But it is perhaps even more important for the adult whose impersonal, touch-and-go contacts in special-interest groups prevent this warmer, more intimate form of interaction.

The comradeship. Another type of primary association is the comradeship, which we may define as a friendly, face-to-face relationship of two people of any age. It is verbalized by expressions like "bosom friend" and "having a pal." The pairing off may be among members of the same sex, or it may cut across sex lines, although, because of our taboos, the cross-sex comradeship among adults is none too frequent. It was a recognition of the place of this sort of interaction, perhaps, which led W. I. Thomas to list the *need for intimacy* as one in his schema of wishes. If the gang is much concerned with the desire for new experience (see below), the comrade group even more than the congeniality group arises out of the desire for intimate response. Comradeship may develop when two children begin walking home from school together, or it may be the outcome of playing together, or it may arise from the discovery of any common interest. Its greatest enhancement seems to come with adolescence and adulthood.

Unrestricted, untrammelled expression of ideas and the feeling of ease are perhaps of greatest importance in comradeship. They give one a chance to share one's innermost thoughts, one's impulses, which might otherwise be repressed into the so-called unconscious, but which in this situation may have rather full swing. Doubtless even the mere verbal

response is more valuable than unexpressed impulses thrown back into the subjective system.

The comradeship, like the congeniality group, begins in childhood but is found at all ages. When it takes the form of intimate friendship between members of the same sex, it may be considered a well-sublimated outlet for homosexual components in the personality. (See Chapter XXII for a discussion of this sort of sublimated contact as a substitute for normal love life among single women.) When it takes place between members of the opposite sex, it often becomes the foundation of courtship and later of marriage. (See Chapter XX.) Also, as Thomas (1923) has shown, it may be the foundation for sexual delinquency in young women whose need for companionship leads them in time into delinquent conduct. Likewise, as Shaw (1930) and others have shown, the companionship of two boys may take a delinquent turn if the social and cultural setting is provided. (See Chapter XXIV.)

The craving for attention from another person, for intimate friendship, begins in childhood and continues throughout life. Like the congeniality group, the comradeship seems to arise first during what Freud calls the latency period (see Chapter XVI), and it may well serve the function of providing new and extended outlets for social-emotional attachments whose origin lies in the intimate relations of the child and his family. Even more than the congeniality group it affords spontaneous expression and release of the inhibitions resulting from other social contacts. And in our culture we strongly disapprove of the person who betrays a friend's confidences.

There are, however, some persons who never have any contacts with congenial groups or with a close friend. Their primary-group experiences may be distinctly limited to their family, and, once they have broken away from these contacts, they may never re-establish any other intimate ones. (See Chapter XIV on overattachment of child and parent.)

The gang. Another group which appears on the social horizon during preadolescence and adolescence is the gang. In origin, at least, the gang has much in common with the congeniality group, but the two are easily distinguished. The gang tends to become more formalized; it is likely to construct and perpetuate legends and codes, and in most cases it bespeaks much more distinctly the conflict type of behavior seen in the in-group versus out-group relations which arise out of crises. (See Chapter VII.) Nowhere is the close correlation between culture pattern, social interaction, and individual shown more clearly than in the life of the gang. The gang really represents an important step in socialization, even though, as in the case of criminal gangs, some of its results may be disastrous to the larger community.

In our society gang groups are largely made up of boys, though some have both sexes, and a few are made up only of girls. This sex differentiation is largely the result of cultural definitions of the respective roles

of boys and girls. There is no inherent reason why girls should not form gangs or join one already organized. The "gang age," according to Puffer (1912), ranges from ten to sixteen, though one will find both younger and older boys in gangs. The exact functional delimitation of the gang from clubs and other organized boys' associations is often difficult, for many gangs operate athletic clubs composed of the boys themselves, while others, in contrast, are inclined to criminal purposes. Yet the gang must be thought of as different from the carefully organized boys' clubs sponsored by adults. As Thrasher (1927, p. 57) puts it, "The gang is... characterized by the following types of behavior: meeting face to face, milling, movement through space as a unit, conflict and planning. The result of this collective behavior is the development of tradition, unreflective internal structure, *esprit de corps*, solidarity, morale, group awareness, and attachment to a local territory."

Gang conduct is marked by distinctly childhood outgrowths of fantasy life—a life in which action is frequently dominated by daydreams. In short, it is an escape from the humdrum existence laid down by adult preoccupations, and from intolerable conditions due to lack of adequate recreational facilities of a socially accepted sort. The dime novel, the motion picture, the tales of older boys and men, pictures and magazines—all may serve as effective stimuli to such overt conduct, which is essentially an outcome of fantasy thinking.

The unity of the gang is aided by the common symbols of identification which grow up therein. Although the desire for new adventure may set the pattern of behavior for the gang boy, the development of the intimate in-group attitudes is determined by intergang conflicts, as in athletics or street fighting, or in dispute with the police over territory, with attendance officers from the schools, and with merchants and peddlers. This finally sets the seal on the development of loyalty, organization, name, hierarchy of officers, fixing of a code of conduct, determination of plans of action, and the whole range of attitudes which mark the conflict group in general.

There is usually a distinct struggle for status. Individual differences appear as they do in the play group. Leadership and dominance are important qualities. The gang is unlike the congeniality group in that leadership is one of its most important characteristics. There is also considerable division of labor—gang members often serving various minor roles before receiving the important posts in the organization. Many gangs, especially in our cities, develop delinquent and criminal activities, but it is farfetched to assume that they all do. It is only when the larger community agencies, such as the police, define the gang's behavior as misconduct that delinquency develops. (See Chapters XXIV and XXV.)

ADDITIONAL PHASES OF CHILD DEVELOPMENT

With these descriptions of certain social-psychological characteristics of primary groups other than the family at hand, let us return to examine

some additional aspects of child development in which various intimate group influences play a part, in the home and outside as well.

In the previous chapter notation was made of some of the ways in which an individual may meet and handle a given situation when it is characterized by blockage or other difficulties that prevent an easy course from motivation to attainment of the goal. In the present section we shall return to this topic and discuss more particularly (1) dominance and aggression, especially as they relate to the rise of leadership; (2) resistant behavior as exemplified in temper tantrums and stubbornness; (3) compensatory manifestations arising from the sense of inferiority; (4) withdrawal through fantasy; and (5) withdrawal by means of fears and anxieties.

Aggression as a social act. Those types of reaction which set up anger and resistant or attacking reactions at the stoppage of any course from drive to goal are usually conceptualized by the term *aggression*. Such a response is obviously a central feature of the whole pattern of conflict and in a sense represents an ambivalent mode of behavior to that which characterizes sympathy and co-operation. In recent years a large amount of time and energy has been devoted to a study of the inception, nature, and consequence to the personality of aggressive conduct in children, adolescents, and adults. (For an excellent review of much of this material, see Murphy, Murphy, and Newcomb, 1937; also Dollard *et al.*, 1939.) This contemporary interest in the problem of aggression very likely reflects something of modern man's anxiety about the larger public issues arising from intensive business competition, with its recurrent repercussions on personal economic insecurity, from conflicts between powerful special-interest groups in our own country, and from the serious problem of international war and peace.

The inception of aggression lies within the cycle of activity as it involves other persons. Yet it should not be forgotten that its expression is not always that of direct overt attack upon the inhibiting social stimulus. Though attack may be the more "natural" method of overcoming an obstacle, as indicated from observations of animal and human behavior, it is apparent that with the older child and the adult aggression may take all sorts of forms, many of which more or less fall within the terms of cultural permissibilities and expectancies. Among the outlets are the following: (1) The more direct aggressions are illustrated by rebellion against authority or the imposition of other direct controls, disobedience to parents and teachers, or assaults upon siblings or classmates. This sort of conduct is also witnessed in a good deal of delinquency and criminality, where the motivation to revenge for imagined or actual injustice is often strong. (2) Temper tantrums and negativism represent another form of aggression or resistance marked

by nonco-operation or noncompliance with respect to another. (3) Thinly disguised antagonism is seen in overt teasing, jealousy, and envy. (4) Also disguised, but socially more acceptable, are such verbal forms as cursing, nagging, verbal teasing, malicious gossip aimed at injuring another, irony, satire, and the like. (5) Highly disguised aggression is found in those fantasies wherein the person daydreams of evil befalling his enemies, of overcoming his difficulties by what is essentially a form of magic, and so on. And (6) there is the somewhat sublimated aggression found in leadership, where there is, as we shall see, a certain capacity for identification with the followers.

It is important to realize that as a social act aggression implies *submission*, which we may define as one's concession to, or agreement with, the aggressor. Moreover, in terms of internal mechanisms, when an individual is antagonistic toward another, he is, by virtue of his previous training in roles—that is, in the development of his “me’s”—imaginatively attacking himself or, better, one segment of his self. In fact, the internalization of the ambivalent pattern of attack and withdrawal by submission is essential to the expression of antagonism in any manner except the most rudimentary. The child usually takes up these ambivalent roles from identification with his parents, older siblings, schoolfellows, or others in situations where the latter indulge in such reactions. Later, having been set this “copy,” he may operate through these patterns when he is frustrated. The effect of such learning from others is illustrated in many situations. Thus a younger brother who has been the object of an older sibling’s antagonism may in turn work this same sort of aggression off on other children whom he seeks to control. It is also a common observation that the aggressive person is often confused and further enraged when the object of his attack does not respond in like vein to his attack. For the other person in such an interactional context to “turn the other cheek” may not inhibit but actually enhance the rage of the aggressor. The latter’s own expectancy is not fulfilled, and he is not able to readjust himself to the altered situation. Of course, he might change his incipient next responses into another channel if the submissive, gentle behavior of the other person should arouse the aggressor’s own more kindly and sympathetic roles. In any event the growing personality easily adopts the habit of antagonism from identification with those about him who employ it in their own interactions—on the child or on others. And normally the inclusion of this pattern into himself is set off against ambivalent patterns of a sympathetic, submissive, and kindly sort. Once the aggressive reaction is set in motion, the corresponding submissive one also arises in imagination. (See Chapter IX.)

The manifestations of aggression will vary with the situation and the particular form which it takes. Obviously the more direct expressions are

marked by rage and physical violence. The more sublimated types are evidenced in a variety of ways. For example, Eisenberg (1937a), in a study of aggression (or what he termed dominance) among college students, found that the most aggressive of his subjects were characterized by such behavior manifestations as coming late for the interview appointment, entering his office without knocking, doing the assigned tasks rapidly, maintaining a firm quality of voice in the interview, readily offering criticisms of the investigation, and being capable of looking steadily at the interviewer throughout the period. In contrast, those whose performance on the test placed them at the low end of the dominance scale, were hesitant, blushed easily, stammered, were overpolite, were uncertain of themselves, were cautious, worked slowly at the assigned tasks, refrained from criticizing the study, and avoided looking at the interviewer while in conversation with him.

There is a growing body of evidence that aggressiveness in some form or other may and often does provide the core or major frame of reference which more or less predetermines the individual's attitudes and conduct in a wide variety of social situations. But, whether aggression is a general trait or attitude that may typify a whole life organization, or is much more specific to time and place, the cultural definitions of its expression are important. Certainly in our society its transfer to hatred of an out-group is easily rationalized in terms of group welfare. So, too, satire and irony are permissible in our society while fisticuffs are not. Temper tantrums and negativism are seldom approved, though more subtle forms of resistance may be, as in the case of sit-down strikers or conscientious objectors during a war. One of the universal forms of dominance is found in leadership, and we want now to examine its beginnings in the life of the child.

Dominance and leadership. Though *aggression* and *dominance* are sometimes used synonymously, we prefer to employ the former to cover the entire range of self-assertive activity of the kind described above. In the more narrow sense of our present purpose we may define *dominance* as a form of control or predetermination by a person or group of persons of the action or thought of another person or group by reason of superior physical prowess, suggestion, persuasion, or superior capacity to solve problems. *Ascendancy* is sometimes used to indicate the fact or condition of such control. *Leadership* is a form of dominance in which the followers more or less willingly accept direction and control by another. *Headship*, in contrast, is that form of domination which arises from socially inherited power—for example, the traditional position of the father in the patriarchal family—or the control of a certain class or caste over another, or positions of authority by appointment or election from other persons in which the dominated person or group does not

necessarily willingly accept the domination. Headship sometimes develops into leadership. *Authority* is a general term used to describe the fact of domination or ascendancy whether through leadership or through headship.² Finally, as in the matter of aggression, dominance, ascendancy, leadership, headship, and authority always imply the opposite attitude of submission or subordination on the part of others.

This pattern of dominance and submission is found everywhere in human society, and the higher animals, at least, show many of the rudiments of similar social configurations. For example, in expressing demands for food, sexual mates, and shelter—to note three fundamental wants—certain stronger or more intelligent monkeys or apes come to control others for their own benefit. (On various aspects of such behavior among the anthropoids, see Köhler, 1927; Maslow, 1936, 1937a.)

Though domination by one person always implies submission by another, at the subjective level there is an ambivalence in the attitudes of the ascendant and subordinate persons concerned. What we said regarding the interplay of aggressive and submissive roles applies here. That is, the leader not only takes a dominant attitude toward others, but also in imagination takes toward this ascendant segment of himself the submissive role which he expects of the followers. In turn the followers imaginatively assume the ascendant attitude of the leader toward themselves while expressing overtly their subordination. The child or adult whose aggressiveness does not permit this sort of counterpart within himself—that is, who cannot take over the followers' submissive attitudes in his own thinking—often fails to develop effective leadership. What is called overaggressiveness in children is not always a sound substructure for later leadership, unless, of course, in the process of interaction such a youngster learns the importance of considering the other fellow, the prospective follower.³

In describing dominance we should take into account three factors: (1) the organic or constitutional factors; (2) the social situation; and (3) the cultural framework of the society in which the ascendant individual operates.

(1) *Constitutional factors.* Organic qualifications of dominant behavior, which must always express themselves in a social-cultural context, include sheer physical strength and differences in drive, in age, in intelligence, and in energy intake and output. Although endocrine influences may well enter into energy output and into physical prowess, thus furnishing

² The discussion here deals mainly with the beginnings of leadership in children. On adult leadership see K. Young (1927b, 1930), Lasswell (1930), and Bogardus (1934).

³ See Pigors (1935) for a discussion of some aspects of this matter, but without a full realization of the interactional mechanisms involved. Unfortunately, too, Pigors has put a moralistic normative qualification to leadership which reduces the scientific value of his otherwise important analysis.

a certain groundwork for dominance, any high positive correlation between hyperenergy and ascendancy does not seem to be indicated. In discussing Berman's theory of types in Chapter XIII we commented on the inadequacy of the extreme views of those who would explain leadership in terms of pituitary, thyroid, gonadal, or other glandular control. This is not to hold that constitutional factors are of no importance. (See, for example, Levy, 1936, on the relation of the Fröhlich syndrome and aggressive-submissive behavior.) But the complicating social-cultural elements are so many that it does not seem possible—with the present tools of science—to segregate such specific organic factors from the totality of "causes."

Though superior muscular strength has little or no place in many forms of leadership, it must be reckoned an important variable in certain situations of child life, just as it has a definite part in certain forms of adult ascendancy. (See Gowin, 1915.) In many play situations not only is a sound physique a prerequisite of participation, but superiority in physical capacity brings high rewards of prestige. In children's groups age and physical strength are highly correlated, which gives the older child a distinct advantage in ascendancy over the younger one, as anyone must realize who watches a group of school children at play.

Differences in intelligence—that is, in capacity to learn—doubtless have a tremendous if not the most significant part in determining leadership. In her study of leadership among preschool children, for example, Parten (1933) found that leaders somewhat exceeded nonleaders in intelligence and that individual differences in directing others or in following others or in carrying on play activities alone outweighed differences attributable to age.

Many children of better than average intellectual ability fail to assume positions of ascendancy because they have failed to learn how to manage their available energy along socially and personally efficient lines. Such failure to control energy outgo is doubtless both constitutionally and socially determined, but the evidence from studies of personality, especially by the psychiatrists and psychoanalysts, seems to indicate that personal-social and cultural conditioning has a great deal to do with this matter. For instance, the child who is constantly involved in mental-emotional conflicts within himself, bothered by worry, fear, and competing impulses or motives, appears incapable of mobilizing his energies effectively. He thus may have to take a submissive role in the presence of another who is not so handicapped.

(2) *The social situation and dominance.* Closely related to the development of dominance or submission is the social configuration of the time and place. The beginnings of one or the other of these forms of interaction

lie within the primary-group experience of the child. In the home the parents usually exercise the functions of headship and leadership, and from them the child takes over many attitudes and ideas associated with such a social role. Parents encourage children to be assertive. Not only the personal-social conditioning of children by parents and relatives, but also such cultural patterns as the traditions of leadership in a family, the picture of long generations of successful men and women in a family—these things affect the development of dominance. In our society the social status afforded by wealth or professional prestige also plays a considerable part.

On the other hand, a leader may arise from a family despite repressive influences. A person may develop impulses or drives so strong that they offset the inferiority arising from the felt repression by parent, brother, sister, or others. When, for example, a second child appears in a family, the first may sense that he is being left out of things because of the over-attention now showered by the mother, father, relatives, and friends on the new baby. So far as his own life organization is concerned, a child may deal with such a situation in one of two ways. He may retire into the background, ignoring the competitor, or develop a sense of insufficiency, and perhaps daydream of being important. Or he may assume an aggressive attitude to gain attention and maintain his place as the center of the family. This, of course, is often but the carrying out of his own fantasy of his continued importance. Especially if the child is motor-minded and impulsive, these fantasies simply serve as internal stimuli to his aggressive actions.

There has been considerable acceptance of Adler's contention that dominance is profoundly influenced by the age position of a child among the siblings. He believed that, when a parent transfers his major affection from the first child to the second, the first develops various compensatory aggressive means of securing attention and power. A number of attempts have been made to verify Adler's contentions by rating or testing children and adults. The results have not been entirely in agreement with each other or with Adler. (For the latter's views, see Adler, 1930a, 1931.) We cite but three investigations:

Goodenough and Leahy (1927) found for a sample of nearly 300 kindergarten children that those who were the oldest in their families tended to be submissive, and that in 20 per cent of the instances this lack of aggressiveness was marked. These children were rated by judges as low in self-confidence, lacking in qualities of leadership, rather highly suggestible, and inclined to be seclusive and introverted.

They also report that the "middle child" tends to lack aggression but not in so marked a degree as the oldest. The youngest child on the whole showed no tendencies to be either dominant or submissive. As to the only-child group, they state (1927, p. 70): "The only children . . . are rated as more aggressive and more self-confident

than any of the other groups." (Yet this group also were the most demanding in wishing demonstrations of fondness from others; they were the most gregarious; they tended to be most easily excited and the most given to variation in mood.)

Bender (1928), using the Allports' ascendance-submission test with nearly 200 college men, found that *only* as well as *oldest* offspring were somewhat above the mean of the sample in ascendance; but the differences were not statistically significant.

Eisenberg (1937b) observed 216 college men and 238 college women who had been given the Maslow inventory to detect feelings of dominance. For the men he found that the oldest children tended to feel more dominant than did those who fell in the middle or youngest classification. From families of two children only, the first-born feel less dominant than do the first-born from families with more than two children. Only children tended definitely to feel dominant. (The differences in dominance between first children and younger ones were found statistically insignificant for the women.)

The differences in these results may well be due to age factors, variations in research technique, differences in premise, and other complications. In any case the inception and growth of dominance patterns should be studied in terms of the whole social-cultural-constitutional composite. None of these investigations have done this. Every child, no matter what his age position in the family may be, is exposed to various and changing situations which require some sort of readaptation to himself and to his fellows. It is a tragic mistake to assume that children brought up in the same family necessarily live in identical or even similar social-cultural environments. Many studies of child behavior have been made in which all the siblings have been considered as living in the same social-psychological world in the family. The results of such research are open to grave criticism because of the failure to realize that the psychological situation is unique for every member of the household. The oldest child does not experience the same social configuration as the middle or youngest child. Parental preference for one or rejection of another child certainly represents a variation in the social milieu for each. (See Sayles, 1928, for good illustrations of deviations among siblings.)

So, too, the practice which one child gets in dominance in the family or play group will set him upon a course of control of others that may characterize him throughout life. To study leadership and followership in adults we need to know the whole range of their experience in ascendance and submission in all the groups to which they were exposed in their early years. When we have done this, some of the current nonsense about biologically inherited leadership will disappear.

(3) *The effect of culture on leadership.* The culture of a particular society produces another dimension of domination and leadership. Headship and leadership will vary with the nature of the class structure and the division of labor in a given society. In some societies, as among the ancient

Chinese, quiet scholarship had a high prestige value and became the ideal for the ambitious boy of those times. In our American life we have coined such phrases as "go-getter," "he-man," and "never say die," and a host of other popular shibboleths, as expression of our complete faith in the importance of individual aggressiveness, especially in making money. These values, being a part of our culture, are projected upon children from the earliest age. Masterful success is held up as an ideal. Our magazines herald it; preachers, public speakers, and teachers proclaim the necessity of aggressive ambitions. Families and individuals who do not conform to this norm are looked upon askance. The very nature of much of our play and schoolroom instruction is built around the value of personal competitiveness, which in turn provides the dominant direction for and quality of leadership. This in turn carries over into public life.

A most suggestive investigation of the probable differential effects of culture upon leadership and related behavior is that of Lewin and his collaborators. (See Lewin, 1939; Lippitt, 1939; and Lewin, Lippitt, and White, 1939.) The following summary is from the last-named report:

Two experimental situations were set up. In one, a group of five ten-year-old children worked on a given project under autocratic control wherein all decisions were made by the person in charge and in which no general consensus was allowed; in contrast, a like group worked under democratic methods wherein there were equal sharing of responsibility, mutual aid, and collective consensus. In the second experimental setup four comparable clubs of ten-year-old boys were observed as they operated successively under different controls: autocratic, democratic, and "laissez faire," the last characterized by extreme individualism and no participation of the leader.

The results were striking: Under the democratic plan the morale was high, there was good fellowship, and there was little person-to-person antagonism. In the first study aggression (including open hostility and "joking hostility") was eight times as frequent in the autocratic as in the democratic group. Much of this was directed upon certain scapegoats within the group. None of it was directed toward the autocratic leader. In the second investigation it was found that under the autocratic scheme the boys were either highly aggressive or given to a "nonaggressive 'apathetic' pattern of behavior."

In any interpretation, however, it should be pointed out that these children came from American homes, with a general background of individualism, and, though no general applications can be drawn from such research, it does show that variations in the form of group activity have differential effects as to patterns of aggression and leadership.

Resistant behavior as a form of withdrawal. Any overt or verbal means of refusing to comply with a request or command or suggestion of another, or of otherwise avoiding responsibilities of one sort or another, or of indicating lack of desire to co-operate with others, may be called

resistant behavior. Obviously such a definition arises from the failure of one person to follow the anticipated reactions laid down by another. This other person is usually a parent or teacher or other person in a position of authority. One form of resistant conduct is the emotional outburst commonly called the *temper tantrum*, characterized by intense anger. It is a distinctly biological reaction to frustration which reminds one of the violent rage sometimes witnessed among apes when they cannot solve some problem which has been put to them experimentally. (See Köhler, 1927.) Thus the young child who is denied some object, such as a piece of candy or a toy, or some wish, such as to go out of the house, or who has been asked to do some errand or to pick up his toys, may throw himself to the floor screaming and kicking in rage, holding his breath, and struggling against any person who attempts to force him to stand up and to cease his outburst.

But it must not be forgotten that such behavior is culturally defined for the child by the parents or others as "bad" or "silly" or with some other term. Moreover, the child learns quickly to use the tantrum as a means of securing attention and of having his own way. The interaction between the child and the other person must always be considered when we deal with such problems. Frequently, as soon as the child begins his tantrum, the mother commands him sharply to desist. This is perhaps followed by more kicking and screaming, which in turn are followed by the mother's raising her voice even louder, until we have really two persons in the heat of emotionality in which sound sense and rational behavior are out of the question. On one occasion a mother—a woman prominent in her community as a leader in parent-teacher and like organizations—asked the writer how to deal with her little girl, who had developed the habit of flying into temper tantrums. It was apparent that the woman was inclined to react to any disturbance of her own expected reactions from others with an intense response of her own. On my inquiring of her what she did when her child had a temper tantrum she replied, "Why, I can scarcely keep from having a temper tantrum myself." She went on to admit that she had had temper tantrums on occasion until she was nineteen years of age. (No questions were asked, however, as to just what devices she used on others to get her way now that she had given up this kind of power device!)

There are certain familiar and more or less accepted means of dealing with this form of behavior in children. Such practices are spanking the child, throwing cold water on him (probably because he frequently holds his breath), locking him up in a dark closet, and threatening to deny him something else he may want later. But often parents are frightened by this sort of activity on the part of their children and submit to their wishes. Still worse, they may first punish the child severely, and then

follow this up with candy, kissing, and other evidences of affection—another instance of playing fast and loose with the child's emotions.

Resistant behavior may also take the form of *negativistic* or stubborn reactions. Rather than display overt anger, the child refuses to talk, to move, or to do anything when he is asked or commanded. The child sulks, retreats into a corner, refuses to play with others, runs away from a situation, or otherwise demonstrates that he will not respond in the manner anticipated by others. Such failure to act in expected fashion may be considered a form of overt response, however, in so far as it influences the interaction.

Parents, of course, try all sorts of means to resolve an impasse developed by the refusal of the child to co-operate or otherwise react. Coaxing the child, threatening him regarding other wishes, and giving him money or candy as a reward for compliance are common but not entirely wholesome devices to overcome negativism. Finally, of course, the parent may submit to the child's wishes, thus establishing this habit of control over others more firmly in the child's make-up.

The nature, extent, and significance of resistant behavior vary with the child's age and experience. A carefully controlled study of such conduct among nursery-school children was made by Caille (1933). The situation in which this behavior was observed was that of the school or playground, but many of its features are like those shown in the home.

Thirty-six children ranging in age from nineteen to forty-nine months were observed for resistant behavior toward other persons. Resistance was defined as "failure to comply with a suggestion, or an expression of refusal to a person by means of physical or vocal reactions." An attempt was made to record the types of responses and the general situations in which such conduct took place. The observational records include data also on acquiescence and on aggression as well as on resistance. The following summary gives the chief points of interest to us:

(1) The children resisted other children more often than they did adults, and were acquiescent to adults more often than they were to children, a finding which agrees in general with that of Beaver (1932) in another study.

(2) The peak of resistance, with the exception of the material from the language records, appeared within two months of the third birthday. The older the child becomes, the more he expresses resistance in language rather than in overt reactions. In other words, overt physical resistance decreases with age. The peak of acquiescence occurred four months before the peak of resistance. Three-year-olds showed approximately twice as many cases of resistance as did two-year-olds. In acquiescence the two groups were about equal.

(3) Whether the children were indoors or outdoors, whether they were engaged in free play or in assigned routine activities made no difference in the amount of resistance recorded.

(4) The number of children present in the group also had no effect upon the number of instances either of resistance or of acquiescence.

(5) There is no significant statistical correlation between chronological age or intelligence, as measured by the intelligence quotient, and resistance, acquiescence, or aggressiveness.

(6) There are apparently no statistically significant differences between boys and girls in resistance or acquiescence. However, in aggression the boys approach a difference from the girls which may be statistically significant.

(7) There is considerable evidence from this study that resistant behavior may be rather a specific than a general form of response, at least at this age. Yet such activity can hardly be considered a specific personality trait. Caille believes, on the basis of her investigation, that the positive relationship found between resistant, acquiescent, and aggressive behavior is really determined by the general activity rather than otherwise. She remarks further: "In the majority of cases, the child who made many social contacts ranked high in the three types of behavior observed."

It is clear that resistant responses, like others, are a part of the whole repertoire of social contacts which develop in these primary social configurations, and the number of contacts increases with age. Moreover, there are wide individual differences both as to resistance to other children and as to resistance aroused in other children. Some resist many contacts but seldom arouse resistance in others. Beaver (1932, p. 64) remarks on this matter:

"The reverse may be true, or we may find a child not only arousing resistance in others, but resisting many contacts also. One small child, who had lived a pampered life previous to entering the nursery school, probably had never shared a toy. Quite naturally, therefore, the mere fact that another child was using a plaything that she desired did not deter her from trying to obtain it. The percentage of her resistance responses was high, for she refused to give up any plaything in her possession; but her percentage of resistance responses aroused [in others] was still higher, being more than double the mean percentage for the group."

In concluding the discussion of resistant behavior we should bear in mind that such activity is a part of the child's attempt to come to terms with the social world around him. And such behavior is not necessarily to be smugly labeled "evil," "bad," or "dangerous to future development." Caille (1933, p. 123) well states:

"Adults in general seem likely to consider resistance reprehensible, but it is not necessarily so. Often it is a child's method of attempting to adjust to a situation when he lacks sufficient language ability to explain his attitude or his reason for wishing to postpone a suggested activity. Furthermore, resistance of one type or another is a necessary means of maintaining a balance between one's personal needs and the needs of society. The person who never resists may easily become a completely submerged personality."

In other words, much of this behavior is but a phase of growing up, and whether such patterns will become a fixed element of the life or-

ganization or not depends in part on how parents, teachers, and others treat the child. In most instances the resistance will disappear from lack of use ("experimental extinction") or become sublimated into more acceptable forms. But, if the handling of the child has been characterized by emotional conflict and inconsistency, and if it gets entangled with other inadequate adjustments, resistance may become a more permanent aspect of the personality.

Reactions to inferiority feelings. It will be recalled that Adler made the feelings of inferiority the basic motivation of all behavior. We reviewed certain features of his theory in Chapter XII; for our purposes at this point we shall present some elements in the interplay of feelings of inadequacy and compensation in personal adjustment. According to Adler, the ego (or what he termed the *psyche*) arises from the felt inferiorities due to the child's physical and mental immaturity and to his dependence and frequent painful submission to others. Essentially his view is that feelings of inferiority induce persistent restlessness in a child, make him crave action, play a role, and pit his strength against that of others. Such feelings of inadequacy also set up anticipatory pictures of the future and serve to stimulate physical and mental preparation for attainment. From this background experience the child constructs an imaginary goal of superiority, by means of which he transforms his submission into domination, his painful mental states into pleasant ones, his ignorance into great wisdom, and his incapacities into valuable creations. And, the more intense his sense of insecurity and suffering, the higher will be his ideal aim. (See Adler, 1916, 1925, 1931.)

But this view is not entirely sufficient or satisfactory. While we must not forget that the original human drives are imperative and strong, there is absolutely no reason to believe that the nursing baby or the child in a violent rage at being thwarted has at the outset a definite sense of inferiority. Feelings of inadequacy, like other attitudes, are learned early in life by virtue of our experience in a social milieu. While the child possesses unusually strong physiological urges or demands or motives, these must always find their expression within the cultural and social framework laid down by parents, nurses, and others older and stronger.

From these contacts with others the child may come to view himself as insufficient—that is, his self-image and his roles may become those of the ineffective or the inadequate individual. But the genesis of strong feelings of difference and inadequacy and of the goals and means of compensation depends very much upon the manner in which the parents and others direct the sociocultural conditioning of the child. Though parents and others are wiser and more powerful than the little child, there is no rational reason for them to foster his feelings of inferiority. Rather, sound training should aim to protect the child against this con-

tingency. In these matters as in others, personal-social and cultural influences set the stage for the development of the individual's attitudes and habits, just as they also provide acceptable means of offsetting or overcoming the consciousness of difference and inferiority.

Three important sources of inferiority feelings. Although the awareness of inadequacy may arise in any situation—on the basis of how it is defined and the sense of capacity to meet it—we may classify three general aspects of personality in relation to which these attitudes most commonly arise: (1) constitutional defects, (2) intellectual ability and performance, and (3) social-emotional adjustments to other persons.

Constitutional defects of any sort—a crippled limb, deafness, blindness, or a facial or bodily divergence from the cultural norm of beauty—easily and quickly give rise to a sense of being different from those around one. Then, too, such deficiencies serve as an obvious social stimulus to others, and their comments and actions furnish the social interactional foundation for an individual so handicapped to develop a view of himself as inferior. Any child who has any constitutional make-up which so digresses from the acceptable or permissible norms of his society is largely predestined to develop such a role and status, a conception of himself as so different from others, as not to be thoroughly capable of normal life. (See Chapter XXVI for detailed discussion of these particular problems.)

The lack of expected intelligence or of special talent may serve as the original stimulus for the development of a sense of inadequacy. When a child does not measure up in intellectual performance to the aspirations or ideal aims laid down for him by his parents or teachers, he may easily acquire—and largely from their attitudes and comments about him—an abiding sense of inferiority. The child who is labeled “dumb” or “stupid” in contrast to a brighter and more alert brother or sister furnishes an instance in point. The discrepancy between aspiration and achievement in this field is a distinct factor in children's maladjustments in school. (See Chapter XVII.) The following illustration will make clear the manner in which a child may develop a strong sense of difference and inferiority in contrast to other members of the family, and will also indicate a level of achievement which in the end proved fairly satisfactory.

Case of Sydney W. Sydney was the only boy in a family of six children. Four of his sisters were older than he and one younger. The family lived on a farm in the Middle West. The parents were fairly well educated, both having taught school before they were married. In his early childhood Sydney was ill a great deal with what in that day was called the croup, and had to be kept in bed much of the time. His sisters, who developed rugged constitutions, had practically no illnesses that interfered with

their work and play. Sydney was teased a great deal by the two younger sisters because he had to stay in bed and "take medicine."

When able to play with his sisters, he was no match for them: he was short and plump and slow while they, especially the youngest one, were slender, muscular, and quick. They would wrestle with him and throw him down. Because of poor bone composition, perhaps, he would be the one to get hurt in any accident.

Because of his slowness and defenselessness he was made the butt of jokes and pranks by the girls. They made fun of him at the table because of his big appetite. When bedtime came for the three youngest ones, he would be told by his two tormentors that there were monkeys and bears behind the doors waiting to grab him; and he developed a fear of the dark. It did not occur to the two girls that it was unsportsmanlike for them to put the blame on him when something had been done to anger the parents. If any tools failed to be returned to the father's workshop after the youngsters had built a coaster wagon, they would both declare that Sydney was responsible. Since the boy had been known to take clocks and other things apart to see how they were made, it was not hard to convince the father of his guilt. In a rage the father would seize the boy and thresh him without giving him a chance to explain himself. The mother tried to protect her only son against the bullying of the other members of the family, but with her heavy duties as housewife, gardener, cook, and seamstress she had little energy left to interfere in disputes. She hated farm life, anyhow, with its heavy, grinding work and lack of social life. The father soon developed a habit of venting his anger on Sydney at the least provocation until Sydney acquired a great fear of him and of other persons in positions of authority. His spirit had no chance of surviving against such odds.

In school Sydney was shy and nervous and slow in his work. He spent his time daydreaming instead of attending to his studies. He had no special playmates. When he was ten years old, the family moved to a small town, as the father's eyesight began failing rapidly. Getting adjusted to schoolwork and to other children of his own age was now more difficult for Sydney than in the small rural school. His appearance, which had caused little comment before, now made him the object of much teasing by the children in his schoolroom. His head had grown to a disproportionate size, his teeth were large, and he had an overabundance of hair, which he never combed. He failed in his work the first year in town, and his youngest sister caught up with him in school. While his sisters found friends outside the family, Sydney would go roaming through the pastures alone, often talking to himself.

In high school his sisters, occupied in their own affairs, ignored his existence except to find fault with his untidiness. He was not included in their parties and dances. None of them thought of teaching him to dance, and he was afraid to ask them to do so. He still made poor grades in his schoolwork, while the girls brought home unusually good report cards. The only school activity in which he took much part was football. He managed to be a substitute on the team.

Once through high school, the sisters were eager to take some training that would fit them to earn their own living out in the world. They were given as much financial help as their parents could give, or what the girls thought they could request. Some of them worked their way through college. Sydney was too timid to ask for any help. After the girls were taken care of and had positions or were married, the

mother thought she might "make it up" to Sydney for the various handicaps he had had by sending him to a small liberal arts college, even though he was more adapted to handwork than to intellectual pursuits. When he finished at this small college, he was no better able to earn his living than before. While in school, however, and with his sisters out of the way, he began noticing girls in a sentimental way. He began having "dates" for the first time, and seemed to have more self-confidence.

Since he still did not have the initiative and confidence to venture out in the world and rustle a job for himself, his mother found one for him in a tractor factory, working as a mechanic. This factory closed down in a few months, and he was home again. He then managed to get a position delivering milk for the local dairy. After working there for some time he met and fell in love with a young immigrant girl from Holland who was doing practical nursing. He thought he should give up this job and train himself for something better if he was going to marry. His sisters were by that time all feeling that his future was a problem and that they should all do what they could for him. One of them furnished him the money to take a course in dairy chemistry. He failed to pass his chemistry examinations, so had to come home once more out of a position. His parents then set him up in a restaurant which they found on their hands through a business deal. He failed in this too. His fiancée in the meantime kept insisting on marriage, but his mother refused to let him when he asked her advice. The girl broke the engagement, which plunged him into greater despondency. With the help of another sister and a friend of his, a man much more aggressive than himself, he found work managing a boathouse in a very small out-of-the-way fishing resort in the mountains. While he barely ekes out an existence there, he is more contented than he would be having to compete and work with many people. The mountain people do not stimulate his feeling of inferiority.

A sense of inferiority may also develop in otherwise competent children in the course of their social and emotional training within the home and in other primary groups. If a child is the object of ridicule, of sarcasm, or of violent abuse in the home, he may easily acquire the belief that he is unwanted. We have already commented in the previous chapter on the effects of parental rejection on the child. Also, oversolicitous parents who pamper their children may produce such a sense of dependency in the child that he is incapable of meeting new situations in the home and later outside, and from such experiences there may later arise a sense of inadequacy.


It is particularly important that parents do not demand of the child behavior for which he is emotionally and intellectually unprepared. So, too, undue emphasis upon rivalry and competition and attainment of success may have untoward effects. Kenworthy (1922) notes that inferiority may arise: (1) through the "discrepancy" between the child's capacity and the expectation of his family; (2) through a "false sense of superiority" during childhood which really unfits the individual for "competitive struggle in adult life"; (3) through fervid efforts at "self-maximation," often by

unethical means; and (4) through "unfavorable comparisons" with other family members.

Devices for meeting inferiority. Not only do the social situation and the culture have much to do with producing the sense of inadequacy in the individual, but society and culture provide various acceptable outlets or means for overcoming these felt handicaps, several of which we have already described. (See Chapters VI and XIV.)

For convenience of graphic presentation one may imagine a scale of compensatory responses to feelings of inferiority. At one extreme would be found the complete acceptance of inferiority and at the other overcompensation. Between these would be "normal" compensation and sublimation. The former perhaps falls at a point toward overcompensation, though of less aggressive sort. The latter tends toward docility as an emotionally milder and more moralized form of substitution, thus:

HYPOTHETICAL SCALE OF REACTIONS TO INFERIORITY



The emotional components of the reactions to inferiority are worthy of comment. Anger is a marked feature of compensation, especially of overcompensation. Thwarted in his efforts to get his own way or to secure his greatly desired goals, the overcompensating person is aggressive and even sadistic toward his world. He will get his wishes even at the cost of riding roughshod over his opponents. The more usual compensation, in contrast, though it carries with it anger and resentment, apparently holds the emotions in check—perhaps by directing them into energizing the activity. But it may well be that the degree of intense emotion is itself evidence of the grip which the original motivation had upon the individual. In other words, overcompensation may reveal the depth of the original sense of inferiority. And the height of the aspiration of the overcompensatory person and his constant drive for achievement may be the only means by which the inner tension finds release. Then, too, in sublimation, there may be a still milder emotional toning of the activity—at least it seems to me that this is the manner in which we tend to interpret this form of substitution. On the other hand stands the individual who docilely accepts the implications of inferiority, in which apparently fear is the dominant emotional accompaniment. In contrast to the strong overcompensatory reaction, there is something of a masochistic acceptance of defeat. The individual retires from all situations which would require aggressive handling. He may become neurotic,

full of worry or anxiety, or he may retreat into the inner citadel of his daydreams. His adaptation to his fellows is thus reduced to the minima of contact. It may well be that the dementia praecox patient represents the extreme of such retreat from cultural reality into a world of his own making; in contrast may stand the true paranoid, who is so anxious to make himself important in the world that he attributes all his difficulties to the world of things and people outside himself, and often, in the end, resorts to sadistic attacks upon those of whom he is suspicious. (See Chapters XXVII and XXVIII on persistent nonadjustive activities, mild and severe.)

Withdrawal by fantasy. In Chapter IX we discussed some phases of fantasy thinking in relation to symbolic reactions and language. Here we shall consider it as it illustrates indirect adaptation of the individual to his social-cultural world. Although some people meet felt difficulties by overt substitutive reactions of one sort or another, these may at best be half measures, leaving a residue of unsatisfied desire. This may furnish the starting point—the energy and interest—for fantasy. Very early in life many children discover that they get considerable satisfaction and pleasure from building air castles, from believing themselves in possession of wealth, power, clothes, and talents which they may not possess but nevertheless wish they had. In the face of unresolved tensions or incomplete cycles, the child may compensate in this subjective fashion. (See Chapter XXVI on fantasy and physical handicaps.) The child who lacks companions may fill his days with imaginary playmates. Make-believe play is rather common, as when a child may rehearse the activities of an entire baseball team pitted against another, and take the various players' roles in turn. Or a child may imagine that he is some animal. One child insisted for some weeks on playing that he was a bird and went through a repertoire of acts which he believed those of a bird. Another played at being a horse, prancing about the house or garden, wanting to eat as a horse does, and generally acting out what he believed to be the life of this animal.

The social setting of fantasy varies, but it often begins at home. Moreover, the interpretations which others put upon the child's fantasies—when they are verbalized or acted out—may greatly influence their place in his life.

One child, the youngest in a family of three children, felt decidedly lacking in role and attention from his parents and siblings. One evening at the dinner table he narrated in serious tone his adventures at the city park that afternoon. He told that he had been there and had ridden on Annie the elephant and had altogether had a grand time of it. He had scarcely finished his story when his brother and sister shouted in derision, "That's a lie!" and his mother in a calmer tone warned him "not to tell stories." The father laughed at the account and joined in the fun at the expense of the

lad, who continued to insist upon the actuality of his account. The mother was somewhat disturbed at this whole affair as the child told it to others and later added similar yarns.

An analysis of the account, however, did show that the boy had visited the city zoo on the afternoon in question, that the keeper had told him and the other boys about people in India riding elephants, and that the children themselves had begged him to let them ride Annie, the town's favorite elephant. Such a concrete experience apparently had sufficed to set off a train of daydreaming, and, by the time the boy had arrived home, he had constructed his tale and half believed it himself.

Apparently the boy's sense of inferiority in the family was in part an incitement to this fantasy. Moreover, the tales of hunting adventure from his father, the prowess of his brother in his gang, and like patterns doubtless gave him a cue for his own fantasies. He evidently wished to gain prestige by such an account. It was thus an attention-getting device. It is a mistake to label such a story as lying in the sense of a deliberate falsehood. To do so tends to enhance the difficulty of handling it by thrusting it into the sphere of moral conduct, where it does not belong. Moreover, to suppress the verbalization of a child's fantasy may drive the child to keep these daydreams to himself. Only by dealing with these reactions as normal can a parent guide a child to realize the limits of their function in life.

A rather common type of childhood daydream, though not universal (as some Freudian psychologists have contended), is the foster-child fantasy. In such cases the child imagines that he is the son or daughter of persons other than his own parents. He may believe that he has been left on their doorstep by people of wealth and prestige; perhaps he was a poor waif picked up on the streets or got from an orphanage. Sometimes such a fantasy is so strong that it is not dislodged for years, although most children lose such notions fairly easily as they get older. The motivation for such fantasies—at least at the conscious level—appear to be chiefly actual or imagined mistreatment, resentment at being slighted, and desire for higher social position than that of the family he knows.

E. S. Conklin (1920) made a questionnaire study of the extent of foster-child daydreams in a sample of 904 high-school and college students. Some of the pertinent findings are these: (1) Twenty-eight per cent of the subjects could immediately recall having had such a fantasy. Of those who reported foster-child daydreams: (2) One quarter believed them to correspond to the actual facts. (3) Slightly more than half of them said it took no definite form, 15 per cent of them thought they were orphans or foundlings, and slightly less than one fifth had developed ideas of descent from superior classes. (4) Forty-five per cent attributed it vaguely to "suggestion," one quarter of them to mistreatment at home, 13 per cent to precocious thinking, 7 and 5 per cent respectively to "lack of physical or mental resemblance" and "dissatisfaction with home conditions." (5) About half of them reported that the fantasy lasted more

than a year. (6) Most of them also noted that this daydream tended to alienate them from "parental influence and authority." And (7) the development of intelligence and the coming of maturity are the most frequently noted "reasons" for the disappearance of this fantasy.

One of the most fruitful areas of research into the subjective life has been the development of methods of tapping the fantasies of children and adults by providing play and dramatic opportunities of such a character that the subjects can scarcely avoid exposing their inner desires, daydreams, and suppressed emotional reactions toward others. Moreno's (1939) dramatic technique wherein patients act out their symptoms or wishes is something of this sort designed for adults or adolescents. Murray and his collaborators (1938) employed pictures among many devices for getting at the subjective life of their adult subjects; they revealed a wide range of recurrent themata involving practically all the fundamental basic wishes and expressions, such as aggression, acquisition, exhibitionism, passivity, seclusion, and abasement. (See Chapter XI.)

Despert, working with a small sample of children, aged two to five years, provided dolls and toy household furniture for undirected play. For the most part the children quickly identified the dolls with themselves and other family members and even with the observer. Some children moved quickly from role to role—a characteristic of those who were free and easy in their emotional outlets and who by outside criteria were known to be free of emotional disturbances. Many times certain subjects expressed strong sadism by breaking and pounding the dolls—in fact, aggressive reactions were the most striking single feature. The author says (1940, p. 25): "At times, it was obvious that a child used dramatic expression and phantasy for expression and justification of a behavior which he did not otherwise think acceptable." Often these fantasy dramatizations of family life did not correspond with observations made of the children's overt conduct at home.

At another time the children were permitted to use crayons for drawing whatever they wished, and the results from this phase of the study more or less confirmed those from the dramatic play. (See Homburger, 1937, for a psychoanalytic study of play.)

All these research devices have excellent possibilities; they fit admirably into the whole interactional theory of the rise and operation of the self through roles. They indicate the essential dynamic and social character of the inner life of the individual—a life which not only rehearses but remakes and extends the contacts (actual and imagined) that have entered into his experience. And in an analysis of this internal world an examination of fantasy is perhaps even more important to us than a study of the more logical processes, though, as we pointed out in Chapter X, there is no sharp distinction between the one form of thinking and the other. There is only a gradation from severely sound logic to complete illogic, as our culture defines these terms.

In fantasy there is strong ego motivation: the child is often the hero,

or identifies himself closely with his make-believe ideal. Or he may be the aggressor who would injure or even destroy in imagination those who would harm or inhibit him. In truth, for the child, the difference between his imaginary roles played within himself and his overt playing at being fireman, air pilot, soldier, and the like is not very sharp. That is, there is little or no distinction between building up his external roles and the reconstruction and elaboration of these roles within himself. But, if social restrictions, such as ridicule or other blocking, prevents the overt expression of his imagined activity, or if the imagined form of expression does not correspond with the external social and material actualities, the child may elaborate his inner role-taking enormously. Such abstraction, or mental dissociation, cuts him off for the time being from ordinary overt social contact.

This is not serious in the child unless it comes to dominate his entire life. The extremely introverted individual—for example, the schizophrenic patient—is one who is largely controlled by his inner thoughts rather than by habits and attitudes of adaptation to others and to the material world around him. (See Chapters IX, XXVII, and XXVIII.)

Although the schizophrenic patient typifies the extreme deviation in this matter, there is no reason for assuming, as some writers have done, that daydreaming is useless and even dangerous to the personality. It is a perfectly natural phenomenon. And, when parents, teachers, and others make fun of the child for expression of his daydreams, when they use various social pressures on him to give it up, they may but drive the process inside and thus cut it off from its possible useful relation to incipient creative invention and to artistic or scientific productivity.

The divergence between healthy and useless fantasy is illustrated in a family known to the writer in which the son, who was extremely envious of his father's fame and fortune as a successful inventor, built up for himself an elaborate daydream world in which he outdid his father's creativeness at every point. In high school, instead of learning the rudiments of science and mathematics, the boy spent his time in bizarre reveries; and finally his neglect of his schoolwork led to his dropping out of school. At the age of seventeen this fantasy of great inventiveness has so gripped him that the prognosis for anything but dementia praecox is questionable.

How an intelligent parent entered into his son's daydream world and thus socialized it and brought him back into the realm of interaction and finally into a rational interpretation of it as fiction is charmingly told by Steffens (1937). He relates how his own father joined in the spirit of his boyhood fancies, and how he in turn entered into his own son's daydreams. Steffens points out that his father never ridiculed him nor broke in upon the make-believe world which he was acting out. At about the age of five his own son, Pete, began telling yarns about what he was

doing. The mother pooh-poohed these, but the father participated in the fictional world of the boy. For example, they played at running a garage, at managing large business enterprises. On other occasions they indulged in imaginary big-game hunting. The dénouement—the realization that the whole affair was make-believe—came about rather suddenly after a particularly strong remark by the mother, who had consistently refused to enter into the play: “You are both liars and I don’t think it’s funny.” After a long pause, the child said: “Daddy, Pete and Papa are not wonderful.... Mama is wonderful. Pete and Papa are absurd.”

An adequate procedure with daydreamers is to recapture or redirect their fantasy life into forms acceptable to others, that is, to help them to accommodate it to the society and culture of the time and place. Given the daydream, given the rich, free, associational, and even egocentric fantasy, the solution is to encourage its overt expression—in words, painting, sculpture, mechanical invention, or science, or in some other manner of communication—so that one’s fellows may take it up into their lives and thus give it meaning. In other words, the proper handling of the fantasy is to bring it round to some form of overt action, some form of communicable expression that will socialize it for the daydreamer himself as well as make it available to others. (See Zachry, 1933.)

The following account of daydreaming in a girl illustrates a rational use of it in social contacts.

Case of Dorothy G. Dorothy G., an only child, began early to develop a rich imagination. She did not lack for playmates through neighborhood and kindergarten contacts, but she soon showed capacity for making use of her fantasies in playing with other children. For example—and to illustrate differences in children even at these early years—at the age of four she and two other children were observed playing at housekeeping on the lawn. There was the usual assortment of toy dishes, discarded china from the kitchen, and the like, but in preparing a play dinner for the numerous dolls there were far too few plates, knives, forks, and spoons to set each place. Dorothy thereupon began tearing up strips of available brown and colored wrapping paper and laying out the table with them as plates, spoons, and so on. Betty Brown, a playmate of about the same age, objected to this, and urged Dorothy to go into the house to fetch real dishes and utensils. This Dorothy refused to do, and, when Betty continued her requests with added determination, Dorothy went on to explain that it was “as much fun” just to “play they were dishes anyway,” whereupon Betty picked up her own toys and departed for home, saying that she would not play in such a “silly” manner. The other two were not disturbed at this and continued at their imaginary make-believe activity undisturbed.

Later Dorothy began making up plays, and, when she learned to write, she enjoyed working them out in great detail and then directing their production in co-operation with her friends. The child projected her fantasies into social interaction and made a conjoint enterprise out of it.

A little later she began to go occasionally to a motion picture, but more important

for her was reading about motion-picture actresses and actors, chiefly the former, and cutting out from all available sources in periodicals, handbills, and newspapers the pictures of her favorites. At that time Clara Bow was at the height of her career, and Dorothy reports having accumulated 900 pictures of Miss Bow—obviously many of them duplicates. Just as children traded stamps in the days when stamp collecting was popular, other children in the neighborhood were also accumulating photographs of motion-picture stars, and there was much bartering of such pictures back and forth among them—a practice which kept the fantasy interest tied to certain socialized situations.

Dorothy's attention to drama extended later to short stories, and, though she did not have any of her stories published, she was often called upon to read some of them in school. As she passed into high school, her interest in dramatics led to her participation in school plays, and in college she has shown some ability on the stage.

But in all these years her interests along other lines have broadened. She not only has taken many courses in literature, writing, and dramatics, but has shown considerable ability in some of the natural sciences. She is not marked by any unusual talent, but she continues, like many late adolescent girls, to daydream somewhat of a stage career, though she is preparing herself really for something more in keeping with the actualities which she must face when her education will be completed.

The distinction between the creative fantasy of the artist or inventor and the fantasy of the dementia praecox patient depends on socialization and the consensus of, or acceptance by, society. Creative work rests specifically upon disciplining of the fantasies in the process of their elaboration toward overt construction and communication.

What we need in the home, the school, and elsewhere is the recognition of the importance of fantasy as one device for developing novelty in art or science or in the practical affairs of men. Unfortunately, our Western culture has been so impressed with the applications of science and discovery that we have tended to neglect the importance of fantasy thinking directed into socially productive channels—and by "socially productive" I mean art as well as science!

Withdrawal by fears and anxieties. Fear is one of the most potent of the emotions and usually is linked up with attempts to avoid or withdraw from a situation which is painful or unpleasant. (See Chapter III.) Originally it was a protective device of great importance, but in present-day complex society it has been reduced in importance, except under great crises like physical disasters, war, and grave civic and economic disorganization. Yet it does have a place—as has anger—in some of our everyday life in a reduced and somewhat sublimated form.

We have already noted that fear plays an important part in many conditioning processes and, furthermore, that learned responses which are accompanied by strong fear have a certain persistence not found in non-emotionalized learning. Also it is clear that, though we do not possess originally many specific stimuli to fear, it may be conditioned to an

almost infinite number of situations. Moreover, like other emotional reactions, fear of one object may be generalized to include objects of similar character. The case of Albert, cited by the Watsons (1921), is in point. Albert was conditioned at first to fear of a rabbit, but this emotion spread to a wide variety of other furry animals and even to certain inanimate furry objects. Although fear remains an important inhibitor of action which might prove dangerous, as the child's fear of being burned after the experience of placing his finger on a hot stove or in a candle flame, fears often become obsessive and prevent many necessary activities. In other words, the individual must strike a balance between rationally grounded fears, such as accompany cautiousness in regard to moving about in street traffic or avoiding exposure to infectious diseases, and irrational ones which have no positive adaptive use.

Not only do children and adults vary in the ease with which they are conditioned to fear of objects, but there are individual differences in capacity to be reconditioned to overcome these emotional reactions. There are also many variations in the means by which one may recondition a person in regard to fear. The following quotation from M. C. Jones (1924, pp. 387, 389) indicates not only individual differences in fear emotions, but variation in the attempts to recondition children in the matter:

"Arthur G. (age 4 years) was shown the frogs in an aquarium, no other children being present. He cried, and said, 'they bite,' and ran out of the play pen. Later, however, he was brought into the room with four other boys; he swaggered up to the aquarium, pressing ahead of the others who were with him. When one of his companions picked up a frog and turned to him with it, he screamed and fled; at this he was chased and made fun of, but with naturally no lessening of the fear on this particular occasion.

"Bobby G. (age 30 months) was playing in the pen with Mary and Laurel. The rabbit was introduced in a basket. Bobby cried, 'No, no,' and motioned for the experimenter to remove it. The two girls, however, ran up readily enough, looked in at the rabbit and talked excitedly. Bobby became promptly interested, said, 'What? Me see,' and ran forward, his curiosity and assertiveness in the social situation overmastering other impulses."

Ordinarily children are reconditioned in regard to fear by appeals to other strong original drives, as in the case of Albert. Watson (1921) overcame Albert's fear by appeal to his hunger drive, which proved stronger than the loud sound used originally to condition his fear of furry objects. So, too, use may be made of strong ego manifestations seen in the desire to outdo others or to acquire prestige, as in one of the instances cited by Jones; or fear may disappear from lack of practice, a process akin to what the psychologists call "experimental extinction."

Worry and anxiety are largely outgrowths of fear experiences. The former is milder in emotional tone than the latter, but both are charac-

terized by a tendency to dwell on the situation which gives rise to fear and upon feelings of helplessness rather than to tackle some sort of solution. Overanticipation of danger in the unexpected or of some untoward incident frequently characterizes worry. Furthermore, these emotional reactions often have no specific object but are broadened to a wide range of objects and situations. Often the person who feels inferior in handling a specific situation develops considerable worry or anxiety about his general incapacity. Worry and anxiety also have a persistent quality: they remain to haunt or disturb us no matter what we attempt to do to offset them, or no matter how much we talk to ourselves about their irrationality. Children who cannot face great rivalry in the home or school, whose aspirations, picked up from others, far exceed their capacities for the achievement of their ideal aims often develop these forms of emotional distress. In fact, the vague expression "nervousness," applied to either child or adult, often covers much of what we have indicated as anxiety. Since phobias and anxieties play a part in various nonadjustive reactions of adults as well as of children, we shall discuss some further aspects of these matters later. (See Chapters XXVII and XXVIII.)

Chapter XVI

SOME PROBLEMS OF ADOLESCENCE AND MATURATION

IN OUR society one of the major crises in growing up occurs with the coming of puberty and throughout the period of adolescence—popularly known as the “teen age.” Adolescence is marked by certain striking changes. Particularly obvious are those associated with sexual maturation and with the attainment of adult physique. The boy rapidly outgrows his clothes; his voice changes; he often becomes difficult to understand and difficult to manage. The most important feature, of course, is the coming of sexual maturity. The girl’s body, changing from the slender, somewhat boyish type of figure, becomes rounded and more distinctly feminine. Sexual development brings new feelings and new problems of personal hygiene. Intellectually both boys and girls soon attain their adult potentiality, which becomes evident in the degree of their success in school. Then, too, their behavior and their attitudes often impress their elders as wild and bizarre. Often their social adaptation is profoundly modified.

In all these matters we have an excellent illustration of the importance of cultural definitions in relation to individual conduct. Often the severity of the crisis is overemphasized. Many traditional discussions of the physiological factors in puberty assume that these changes operate independently of other factors in producing the difficulties of personal adjustment in the boy or girl. But actually the physiological, intellectual, and emotional changes in puberty and adolescence can be properly understood—that is, for purposes of personality analysis—only in relation to cultural influences. This is clear from the descriptions of how other peoples meet or define these problems. In our own society, at least in certain classes, parents are culturally predetermined to experience difficulties with their adolescent children. That is, there is an expectation or anticipatory pattern built up in the parents, and likewise in the children, that puberty and adolescence will prove to be difficult.

In addition to reckoning with cultural factors, we must also realize that pubertal and adolescent changes are not nearly so sudden or so unique as is commonly assumed. We must not forget the continuous nature of personality development. While there are marked variations in

the rate of personal maturation, there is clear evidence that the infantile and childhood habits and attitudes affect in varied degrees habits and attitudes which come later. Then, too, there is the important problem of the relation of adolescence to adult maturity. What are the characteristics of adulthood? Are there any tests or measures of it? The most interesting fact is that, whatever the criteria of maturity, there is much evidence of variations in this matter in a given individual. For instance, some persons are intellectually, at least as measured by school or professional success, thoroughly mature, while retaining many infantile and childish traits in their make-up, so that a man may be highly successful in business but remain undeveloped and childish in his more intimate dealings with his wife and children. This matter may be neatly stated in terms of the maturation of social roles. In some situations the individual may have a well-developed and objective conception of himself. His power devices recognize the claims of others, and his emotions are well integrated to the social definition of his role and status. In other situations he may be impulsive and emotional—that is, his role may be temporary, fluctuating rapidly with slight changes in the social configuration around him—and hence he may be given to using babyish means of controlling others.

Let us now examine in more detail certain features of puberty and adolescence. We shall first review briefly some aspects of physiological, intellectual, and socioemotional growth. Then we shall describe the most important features of growth in terms of role and status as they are related to heterosexuality, independence in vocational and other important decisions, and the development of a mature sense of responsibility in relation to freedom. In turn this discussion will indicate the progress made during these years toward an integrated personality characterized by self-control.¹

CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF PUBERTAL CHANGES

Puberty may be defined as a period in which the individual becomes sexually potent, that is, capable of fulfilling the reproductive functions. It is marked in the male by the capacity for impregnation of the female and in the female by the coming of menstrual periodicity and the capacity to bear children. The foundations for these functions are laid down in the fetal and infancy periods, but normally the individual arrives at physiological maturity from about the twelfth to the sixteenth year, al-

¹ Pertinent psychological and sociological discussions of adolescence will be found in Boorman (1929); Burgess (1934); Brooks (1929); E. S. Conklin (1935b); Cole (1939); Dell (1930); Partridge (1938); Richmond (1925, 1933); Smithies (1933); Van Waters (1925); F. E. Williams (1930); and Zachry (1940).

though there are even wider variations. (See Chapter XXVI.) Aside from sexual maturation, there are certain external and secondary indications of pubertal changes—for instance, the appearance of pubic hair, alterations in bodily proportions, and deepening of the voice in the male.

Individual differences. The variations in the age at which the incidence of pubertal changes occurs have been described by Crampton (1908). He designated three stages to mark off the full cycle: (1) pre-pubescence, marked by the absence of any obvious signs of puberty; (2) pubescence, characterized by the changes noted above; and (3) post-pubescence, marked by the stabilization of bodily form, the end of the period of noticeable modification. For boys he found that between twelve and a half and thirteen years 69 per cent were still prepubescent; a year later 41 per cent had not gone beyond that stage; a year later still, however, all but 16 per cent had passed into puberty; and between fifteen and a half and sixteen only 5 per cent had not matured into or beyond the pubertal stage. Girls in our society enter puberty earlier than do boys, and there are also marked deviations among them as to the precise onset of puberty.

This is not the place to review the extensive evidence on physical and physiological changes which occur during these important years of early adolescence. The entire body seems to be more or less affected. Hall (1906, p. 6), the American psychologist whose specialty was the study of adolescence, remarked:

"... The annual rate of growth in height, weight, and strength is increased and often doubled, and even more. Growth of parts and organs loses its former proportions, some permanently and some for a season. . . . The range of individual differences and average errors in all physical measurements and all psychic tests increases. Some linger long in the childish stage and advance late or slowly, while others push on with a sudden outburst of impulsion to early maturity. Bones and muscles lead all other tissues, as if they vied with each other; and there is frequent flabbiness or tensions as one or the other leads. Nature arms youth for conflict with all the resources at her command—speed, power of shoulder, biceps, back, leg, jaw—strengthens and enlarges skull, thorax, hips, makes man aggressive and prepares woman's frame for maternity."

The proportions of the fundamental organ systems change. Thus at birth the musculature makes up 23.4 per cent of the total weight, on the average; at eight years, 27.2 per cent; at fifteen years, 32.6 per cent; at sixteen years, 44.2 per cent; and at twenty years, 45 per cent. (See Pringle, 1922.) Landois (1904) has shown that at birth the ratio of heart size to the size of the arteries is 25 to 20. At the beginning of puberty this ratio is 140 to 50, and at maturity it is 290 to 61. The approach to adult maturity in the average thirteen-year-old boy (in our society) is neatly shown by the fact that such a lad, on the average, has attained seven

eighths of his adult height, two thirds of his adult weight, four fifths of his adult chest girth, four fifths of his adult speed of motor reaction, and half of the muscular strength of the average adult at twenty-five years.

The rapid growth of the boy in the early adolescent years often results in marked tendencies to fatigue, or in serious permanent physical handicaps if he attempts to take up strenuous athletics. The problem of "athletic heart" among adolescent boys who go in for heavy sports is well known. (The fact that the community tolerates this situation aptly illustrates our point that constitutional factors themselves take on meaning only in a social-cultural framework.)

Sex differences. It is well known that girls advance more rapidly than boys in their physical growth throughout the period of infancy, childhood, and early adolescence. A scale of anatomical differences in boys and girls of given chronological ages—based upon X-ray studies of the ossification of the carpal bones in the wrist—has been developed. As measured by this sort of physical criterion, the girl of one and a half years is anatomically as old as the boy of two years. Moreover, this difference gradually increases. At the age of four the girl is anatomically equal to the boy of five. By the age of seven and a half years, she is on a par with the lad of nine. And at the coming of puberty, say at twelve and a half years, the girl is anatomically as old as the boy of fifteen. (See B. T. Baldwin, 1921; and Gilliland and Clark, 1939.)

These physical evidences of more rapid maturity are reflected in the fact that on the average, for our society, girls arrive at puberty from one and a half to two years in advance of boys; and this may have important implications for the social adjustment of both.

For the girl, the arrival at sexual maturity—from a physiological standpoint—is evident in the beginnings of menstruation. This is nature's indication that she is now prepared, physiologically at least, for reproduction, though obviously in our society we seldom permit so young a girl to marry and bear children. External evidences of the coming of adult sexuality in the boy are not so clearly defined. Richmond (1933, p. 39) writes:

"One might think that the appearance of emissions would mean the actual physical maturity of the reproductive system, but emissions may occur for some time before spermatozoa are present; as a matter of fact there is no sure means of determining just when a boy has passed the milestone of puberty. We can only approximate it by the external signs of local growth and development."

Not only are the differences in the course of sexual maturation different for boys and girls, but it is evident that the physiological mechanisms associated with female sexuality are much more complex than are

those of the male, and that the secondary sex characteristics of the female differ sharply from those of the male. (See Hoskins, 1933.)

PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS IN PUBERTY AND ADOLESCENCE

It is during adolescence that the intellectual potentialities of most individuals reach their maximum growth. For many years it was believed, on the basis of work with intelligence tests, that at sixteen years or thereabouts the individual had reached the point of his highest possible intellectual capacity, though knowledge and skill continue to be accumulated for a long time after that. Since then we have come to realize that the potentiality of individuals varies greatly and that many people actually increase in ability after this age. But the best work in the field of measurement of intelligence indicates that it is during middle adolescence that the majority of individuals reach the point of maximum mental capacity, using the term *capacity* as different from knowledge and motor skill. (The 1937 revision of the widely used Stanford-Binet scale gives the norm as fifteen years. See Terman and Merrill, 1937.)

Just how feeble-mindedness, normality, and mental superiority are defined with reference to what is considered the norm of mature mental ability has direct bearing on problems of education, vocational guidance, and adaptation to the economic order as well as on the broader matters of sound citizenship and satisfactory community participation. In any case it is apparent that mental capacity as revealed by the intelligence tests will profoundly affect the adolescent and subsequent adult adjustment to society.

Differences in intelligence. There have been many definitions of intellectual ability, but the most adequate seems to be that it denotes or reflects *learning capacity*. The ability to learn varies tremendously among individuals, and these deviations begin to be evident in the early years of life, as we know from results of intelligence testing and from studies in all sorts of learning situations. The importance of learning in adjustment is well summarized by Arlitt (1933, pp. 119-120):

"Learning in adolescence will also proceed in proportion as the individual's nervous system is plastic and therefore modifiable. We may extend the number of needs felt, but the organism will respond more or less in terms of the variability of response which enables the individual to meet each new situation with a series of activities leading to its solution. He will retain the activities leading to the solution in proportion to the degree of modifiability which he possesses. This is in part a matter of individual difference in equipment, and in part a matter of age. That adolescent learning is superior to learning in the period which immediately follows it has been demonstrated by the work of Thorndike and others.

"According to the results of these researches sheer modifiability diminishes from

twenty-two on. The general tendency indicated was for individuals of forty-two or above to show about a fifteen per cent inferiority as compared with individuals of twenty-two.

"In ability to learn, the curve shows an increase from age ten to between ages twenty and thirty and a gradual decrease from approximately thirty on. It would appear that the adolescent has much greater ability to learn than has the preschool child and that the degree of modifiability in adolescence is higher than it will be at any later period."

These variations in learning ability are reflected in the investigation of the relation of intelligence to school success and to adaptability to the demands of society. Aside from any problem as to possible constitutional predetermination of these differing degrees of ability, they do represent certain broadly defined categories of social-cultural maturity. The most commonly accepted classification of grades of mentality is (1) idiot, (2) imbecile, (3) moron, (4) normal, and (5) supernormal or "superior."

The *idiot* is characterized by capacity for the most rudimentary learning only. He cannot develop any of the higher powers of rational thought, and remains essentially incapable of caring even for his simplest wants. He can be taught very simple motor responses, but anything beyond that seems impossible to him. The *imbecile* may learn simple motor skills, acquires a modicum of speech, and can take care of his simple bodily wants; but he is not capable of managing his other affairs, of acquiring a skilled trade, or of handling personal business affairs efficiently enough to be independent in any complex society. His ability for social and moral training for full participation in society seems definitely limited.

The *moron* is capable of a good deal of motor learning. He may become a rather skilled workman at some trade; he is capable of schoolwork in the elementary grades. But, as soon as he begins to undertake the more complex features of arithmetic, grammar, and much of the other material given in the upper grades, he begins to fall behind those of equal chronological age but of higher mental capacity. The moron, however, may acquire the fundamental habits of moral participation and take his place in an unobtrusive way even in a somewhat complex social order. But he is not likely to develop leadership or distinction even in his own fields of work. It is a great mistake to ignore the fact that there are thousands of persons of this grade of ability who are serving useful functions in society.

The *normal* person, measured by our standard tests, is one who is capable of elementary and high-school education as it is at present organized. But we have much evidence to indicate that a person of thirteen and a half years of mental age, or, by Terman's revised scale, of fifteen years of mental age, will have difficulty managing the courses given in a well-equipped college. To succeed in getting a bachelor's degree most people ought to have capacity beyond that of the mean or average of mentality. The *supernormal* persons are those of still higher intellectual capacity, say beyond the 120 or 130 intelligence quotient, as measured by Terman's standards. Since it is during adolescence that these differences become most evident, it should be obvious that social and emotional adjustment will be qualified, in part, by such differences in intelligence.

Emotional development in adolescence. There is little doubt that emotional development is closely associated with social and cultural condi-

tioning. So, too, it is not unrelated to intellectual ability. But it is clear that the pubertal changes—that is, those dependent upon rapid physical growth and especially upon sexual maturation—profoundly influence the emotionality make-up of the individual. During this period the whole endocrine system has to become reoriented. Rapid growth of the organs of the body doubtless brings about changes in the adaptive capacity of the individual, involving emotional responses not previously present. Fatigue itself, which may come on easily from too great a stress on the constitution, may set up irritability and restlessness. And new impulses, especially those relating to sex, bring new emotions and feelings to the growing boy and girl which they do not understand.

But there is clear evidence of the need to reinterpret pubertal and adolescent responses in terms of society and culture. Nowhere is there a better example of the continuity of social and emotional adjustment in the child. How the adolescent will handle himself emotionally is bound up at every point with his earliest personal-social and cultural conditioning as well as with the problems which he faces as an adolescent. These problems arise both from inner states and from his contacts with his family, neighbors, companions, schoolteachers, and others. We must not neglect the importance of the constitutional changes, especially those of sexuality, which lie behind some of the matters of social and emotional adjustment; but since, following our standpoint, we interpret constitutional and psychological factors in societal and cultural terms, we shall discuss these matters in connection with the social situation in which they take place.

INTERPLAY OF SOCIAL-CULTURAL AND BIOPSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS

The importance of our point of view in interpreting constitutional and psychological changes in adolescence in terms of social interaction and cultural norms is well indicated if we contrast the significance of puberty and adolescence in other societies with that in our own.

Variations in defining puberty. For decades writers on adolescence—drawing their inferences from observations in their own society—took it for granted that what they found was universal to adolescence everywhere. We know better now. Cultural anthropology reports to us a rather wide variation in the manner in which peoples treat puberty and adolescence. Let us note some suggestive examples:

Among the Dobuans of New Guinea, the sexual life of girls begins long before puberty, there is no fear of menstruation, and there are no special observances to mark arrival at sexual maturity. So, too, in Samoa the prepubescent girl has already learned much about sex and childbirth, and the coming of puberty means nothing

very important to her. A few years after puberty she may enter into a series of liaisons with the young men of her village, and still later settle down to be some one man's wife. M. Mead (1928, 1930a, 1930b, 1935) has consistently maintained that there is no mental conflict associated with this shifting from childhood to full womanhood. A still different system is followed among the Manus of New Guinea. Here the central theme of life—the ethos—centers around wealth, especially the exchange of property. So far as the females of the society go, the distinction is not between those who are prepubertal and those who have passed into maturity; it is between the betrothed and the unbetrothed. And, since betrothal involves considerable exchange of property, the girl of ten who has been promised to a young swain talks of "us married women" and must demean herself sedately, go about very little, and remain at home demurely veiled. Girls not yet engaged run about freely. When puberty arrives, there are, true enough, elaborate rituals, all centering in gifts and festivals of the community, not in the girl herself as one going through a physical and mental crisis. Sexual life is regarded among the Manus with what even the mid-Victorian of the last century would regard as extreme puritanism. There is no romance between young people. There is no word in the Manus language for love, or for affection, or for caress. Extramarital relations are regarded with horror and severely punished by the "spirits" or by illness. Such sex life might be regarded by the Samoans or even Europeans as distinctly dreary and uneventful. It is clear that whether the adolescent experiences an emotional disturbance or not depends upon how the particular society defines pubertal events. As M. Mead puts it (1930b, p. 179):

"... The pattern of social institutions alone is not sufficient to produce or eradicate conflict; it is rather in the far less tangible balancing of cultural forces that the seeds of conflict lie. In Samoa there is no conflict, because the adolescent girl is faced by neither revelation, restriction, nor choice, and because the society expects her to grow up slowly and quietly like a well-behaved flower. In Manus the insistence upon the shamefulness of sex, the repression of all freedom of action that the taboos of betrothal may be observed, the low standard of relations between the sexes, all serve to produce conflict irrespective of the period of adolescence or its elaborate ceremonial."

In still other societies, notably among some of the Californian and British Columbian Indians, puberty in the girl is regarded as having possible magical influences upon the community, and elaborate rituals are in vogue. In some cases these ceremonials are directed to production of good crops; sometimes they are also concerned with developing the girl's capacity to take her place in the society, not as a reproductive member, but as an economic asset as measured by her skill in making clothes and moccasins or in performing other household duties.

There is almost the same wide divergence in the treatment of adolescent boys. Among the Australian natives, for instance, there are severe ordeals in early adolescence which indicate the boy's entrance into the male adult society. Such painful inflictions as circumcision, subincision, and violent knocking out of certain teeth mark the rituals. There are often also certain periods of isolation from the tribe under severe restrictions as to food and activity. So, too, many African tribes have elaborate ceremonials connected with circumcision of the boys of the tribes. (See Holdredge and Young, 1927.) In some tribes girls also are circumcised. In still others there are infibulation and other severe treatment. (On puberty customs among primitives, see W. I. Thomas, 1936.)

Without extending our examples, it is apparent that the particular society and culture rather largely define the meaning and importance of puberty, as they do most of the other features of life. But it must not be forgotten that there always remain the physiological changes at puberty, the influence of which cannot be gainsaid. No matter how diverse the particular culture patterns, these changes provide physiological stimulation for a shift in the social role and status of young persons everywhere. In other words, certain biological limitations are put upon behavior despite all that society and culture can do. Constitution and culture must be considered together in relation to many of our problems.

Problems of adolescence in our society. In our own society we have few if any rituals to mark the pubertal changes. Moreover, in our complex world there are many standards of behavior to which the adolescent may be exposed. These alternative choices furnished by our culture tend to confuse the adolescent. There is no doubt that many of our problems arise not only from the expectancy of conflict and disturbance during adolescence but from the exposure of the youth of both sexes to a variety of norms of conduct from which they may and must choose. An examination of some of the problems associated with puberty and adolescence in our environment will make this more explicit.

The obvious physical modifications accompanying puberty make the young adolescent an object of attention from others. They become aware of the changes which are taking place in him. Society recognizes these alterations in many ways. Parents and others may ridicule the boy for his awkwardness and because in speaking his voice may "break." The girl, too, if *gauche* and lanky, may come in for unpleasant comment. Then in clothes and social response changes are anticipated and carried out. The boy dons his long trousers; the girl begins to ape the fashions of her older sisters. Also, puberty is usually followed by a heightened interest in the opposite sex, into which enter a variety of conflicting expectancies. (See below.)

So, too, in the matter of intelligence, the moron or dull normal child may be given far too much in the way of educational stimuli for him to handle. Or, in contrast, the exceptionally able child may not be furnished sufficient intellectual diet to interest him. In one case there may be revolt or inferiority or escape in some fashion from these demands. In the second there may be waste of energy, loss of interest, and even retreat into fantasy or delinquency. The matter may be conveniently stated again in terms of the discrepancy between *aspiration*, or ideal aim, and *achievement*.

The four most important aspects of personal growth in late adolescence concern: (1) emancipation from home and arrival at freedom and in-

dependence of choice, (2) arrival at heterosexuality, (3) development of a consequent sense of responsibility for one's acts, and (4) the emergence of mature self-control.² But these may be discussed more adequately when we have briefly traced some aspects of the socioemotional development of the boy and girl, especially as they relate to the love life.

Stages in sociosexual interaction. There have been a number of theories about the manner in which the love life develops through infancy and childhood to puberty and thence into adulthood. These theories largely reflect the premises and cultural definitions of their makers. For a long time it was commonly assumed that sexuality appeared first in adolescence. Whatever slight manifestations of such activity appeared between infancy and puberty were considered of no significance; often they were denied or ignored. But physicians—especially psychiatrists, who deal with mental disorders, and pediatricians, who deal with children's diseases—have long recognized that the roots of pubertal and adult sexuality lie in the earlier years. It was Freud and his followers, however, who demonstrated most fully to us the tremendous importance of these first years. The Freudian psychology states, in brief, that the boy or girl goes through a series of stages from early infancy to sexual maturity as follows:

(1) The *infancy period* is divided into two phases, the "pregenital" and the "early genital." The first is marked by emotional attention to one's feeding and eliminative processes. This lays the foundation for an absorbing interest in one's body and its functions. Then follows attention to the genitalia, which is often termed infantile autoeroticism. The child derives pleasure from examination of his sex organs and first begins to ask questions about their meaning. Thus is laid the foundation of narcissism or self-love. In the close contact with members of the family and with playmates, these persons serve largely as objects to satisfy the child's selfish wishes. It is during this latter phase, however, that the child's strong fixation upon the mother becomes apparent. This marks the inception of the "Oedipus complex"—the jealousy of the son or daughter toward the father, who constitutes a threat to their full possession of the mother.

(2) The *latency period*, usually lasting from about the time the child in our society enters school till puberty, is characterized by considerable repression of overt sexuality. But there is a decided sublimated interest in other persons. The boy may center his attention in his father, in a favorite uncle, in some popular baseball hero, pugilist, or air pilot, in his boy companions, or in a congeniality group or gang. In the girl it is witnessed by strong interest in other girls or in some older woman, who seems to replace the mother.

(3) The *pubertal and adolescent period* is marked by a revival of strong interest in sexual activities, by a return of autoeroticism, and by an increased ego-concern or narcissism. The interest in one's own sex—sometimes becoming evident in the

² The first two of these are discussed in F. E. Williams (1926, 1930), the second two by K. Young (1937).

latency period—may now become more overt; but normally the individual passes on to love objects of the opposite sex, thus laying the foundation for mature heterosexuality and marriage.⁸

As valuable as this analysis is, it lacks the recognition which we have given to cultural factors and social interaction. There is an unfortunate implication in Freud's theory that this development is a sort of unfolding of behavior from within, without regard to the cultural milieu. It fails to take into account the fact that the fundamental cycles of activity—out of which the love life of the later years emerges—tend almost from the day of birth to develop with relation to other persons. This necessary recognition of the place of interaction further implies the need to reckon with cultural definitions as these direct and control the form of social contact. Therefore I should like to restate some important aspects of this growth of the love life, not ignoring the significance of the Freudian interpretation but putting the matter more completely in the framework of the social act.

(1) In our society the child's initial social learning is in his feeding interaction with the mother. And the powerful drives having to do with bodily elimination, sleep, vocalization, and the avoidance of pain soon find their satisfaction highly qualified in relation to her or to some other person. The direction of the child's attention to his mouth, to his evacuative processes, and to his genitalia is perfectly natural in the light of their place in the fundamental cycles. The potency of the emotions and feelings, moreover, first becomes evident in relation to these physiological functions and the organs of the body associated therewith. *But these can have no meaning in and of themselves; they take on significance as impulses or acts only in the social-cultural setting.* (See G. H. Mead, 1934; also Chapter X.) The modifications which the mother insists upon in the process of managing these primary drives come about through the child's identification with her and with the cultural definitions of various situations which she carries over to him. In order to get on at all he must learn to direct his needs to the ends more or less laid down by others. Hence, as powerful as this attention to, and satisfaction with, his own body are, they are always conditioned, as to expression and meaning, upon reactions of another, especially the mother. The earliest roles, though rudimentary in character—that is, not very specific or well organized—are nevertheless built up in the mechanism of the social act by the child's taking over the attitude of the other person and directing it to his own impulses and activity.

Thus in this first stage the child is not entirely body-centered ("self-

⁸ The Freudians have elaborated these stages and have broken them down into various subdivisions which we may neglect for our purposes. (See Rickman, 1926, 1927.)

centered" in the naïve sense of this term). The potent biological drives do not long continue as completely independent factors to which some alleged social-cultural elements are later appended. Constitutional patterns become so conditioned socioculturally as to lose their original purely physiological nature. The current concept in some quarters that the drives or impulses persist as a constant quantum to be repressed or shunted here and there, but never really reduced or extended as to amount, does not seem to me valid for those who would describe and analyze behavior and thought at the social-psychological level.

Obviously, the meaning of this early training differs somewhat for each sex. For the girl child this period signifies attachment to one's own sex—that is, it is a homosexual fixation, using this term broadly to mean affection for, and dependence on, a member of one's own sex. For the boy it is a primary heterosexual pattern. But in either case, as the child in our society develops, the more elementary expressions of this interest in his own body are repressed, redirected, and qualified on all sides. So, too, his social-cultural world begins to expand as a basis for interest and activity.

(2) The so-called "latency" period, then, opens up as the child extends his role-taking and contacts to his father, siblings, playmates, schoolfellows, teachers, and ideal heroes. Primary bodily and sexual interests are ordinarily not apparent. The period is marked in our society by enhancement and spread of play interests and growing intellectual and manipulatory concern with the external world. The child has a variety of strong identifications with those who satisfy his wishes. In terms of roles, the child is really multicentered, for he has not yet learned to take a generalized attitude or role toward himself or toward those around him.

Intersex attachments are present, but—probably because of our cultural taboos—without consciousness of their possible significance. For the girl the attachment to the father, brothers, or masculine playmates indicates her initial heterosexual interest; but this can only operate in highly disguised form, in our society because of the cultural inhibitions. Toward the end of this period, we find increasing preference for companions of one's own sex. For the boy it is a time for close comradeship, for participation in gang life, for indulgence in the hero-worship of older men. For the girl the prepubertal stage is marked by identification with other girls and often with older women, teachers, club counselors, and recreational directors. On the whole it is a period of a certain idealization in which the child comes to identify himself with characteristics embodied in persons outside the home and family circle. With us, at least, these objects of idealism tend to be members of the same sex. This whole process is clearly only an instance of the emerging ideal aims which we discussed in the previous chapter.

(3) The final stage in love life in our society is reached with the attainment, not of mere physiological maturation, but of culturally acceptable attachment to the opposite sex. That is, emotional maturity in love is marked by the arrival at adult heterosexuality and its associated attitudes and habits. As we shall note below, this achievement of mature love interest in others is highly important as a background to marriage.

These alleged stages—and there are wide variations in fact—merely typify the situation for our own particular time and place. In this connection we must enter a further criticism of the traditional Freudian theory. For the most part psychoanalysts take it for granted that these stages which Freud and his followers have described are universal, that is, present in all societies and cultures. Though we must reckon with certain basic and universal aspects of the social act (the details of which in varied cultures have yet to be worked out), it is doubtful if the evidence from cultural anthropology or history will support, without great qualifications, the strict Freudian thesis respecting the uniform cultural steps in sexual development from infancy to maturity.

Two studies—among others—may be cited as presenting a more concrete picture of social-sexual development in our American setting. One of these, by E. H. Campbell (1939), is based on an analysis of judgments made by observers regarding the interests and reactions of fifty-three girls and fifty-nine boys, aged five to seventeen, who participated in certain recreational activities. According to this study the general sequence of social-sexual activities falls into three main periods: (1) Until about the age of eight there is “an undifferentiated social relationship with the opposite sex” as evidenced in playmate choice and lack of “sex discrimination in play.” (2) From approximately the eighth year to the onset of puberty there is “a rising preference for children of the same sex” and a corresponding trend toward avoidance of, or opposition to, intersex contacts in play. And (3) there is a period “of increasing attraction to and companionship with the opposite sex” beginning, on the average, with fourteen-year-old subjects.

The other investigation, conducted by Tryon (1939, pp. 77-78), “sought to determine the relative values placed on twenty personality traits by boys and girls separately at two age levels (twelve and fifteen years). The data were in terms of children’s ratings or opinions of each other. . . .” There were about 170 subjects for each of the four groups: two for boys, two for girls, at each age level. Though she dealt only with prepubertal and pubertal ages, Tryon’s results tend to confirm Campbell’s: (1) For the twelve-year-old girl, on the average, the highest values are found in the prim, sedate, quiet, attractive, good-humored, ladylike adult. Tomboyish behavior is merely tolerated. (2) At fifteen years the girl prefers glamour, being attractive to the opposite sex, lively games, good sportsmanship, and extroverted activity. (3) For the twelve-year-old boy the highest ideals are found in daring, skillful, and fearless leadership; anything construed as feminine by one’s peers is regarded as a weakness, although “certain kindly, likable qualities” tend to be associated with the more highly valued masculine qualities. (4) “At fifteen years, prestige for the boy is still in a large measure determined by physical skill, aggressiveness, and fearlessness.”

Tryon's study reveals, in fact, the age differences in the emergence of heterosexuality. Had she taken a sample of seventeen-year-old boys, she would doubtless have found a distinct development toward interest in, and concern for, the opposite sex.

Individual differences in the course of such development are clear, however, when we examine specific cases. Some persons, though they may mature intellectually and possess many admirable social traits, in their deeper love life may and do remain fixed at certain of these stages. The boy or girl who remains overattached to a parent at an infantile level may never be able to sever the ties of dependence on the latter. A girl who passes from attachment to the mother to a strong fixation on the father or uncle may not get beyond this stage; when she should normally become mature in her love interests, she still clings to the ideals carried over from her childish love for a father or uncle. More serious in our society are those boys and girls who remain at the homosexual stage, say during the years from nine to middle adolescence. Such a boy does not outgrow his intense interest in male companionship. He finds girls of no interest when he has passed through puberty and should ordinarily be ready to go out to dances and engage in other socially accepted contact with young women. Or the girl gets a strong "crush" on some camp leader or woman teacher, is unable to break this bond, and fails to pass into the final stage of normal interest in the other sex.

The importance of emancipation from the home. The significance of arriving at maturity and independence is not always recognized by those who would advise and direct adolescents, either in the home or outside. In place of previous co-operation, docility, and obedience the parent often finds that his son or daughter has become irritable, disobedient, and resistant. The mother or father may become unduly anxious over these new manifestations and, lacking any adequate definitions of the situation, may resort to very unwise and foolish devices to keep the young person in line.

The emancipation from the home, of course, should normally begin in the preadolescent years through contact with playmates, the school, and other groups. And the more independence the boy or girl between six and twelve has developed, the simpler will be the inevitable break from the home in later adolescence. The initial efforts of the child to free himself from the overprotection of and overattachment to the parents may be feeble and incomplete, but, as he advances in the adolescent years to an ever wider range of friends and acquaintances with new interests, the healthy-minded boy or girl will make an even greater effort to emancipate himself. These efforts at freedom may be met by resistance on the part of the parents, matched by similar resistance on the part of the child. This procedure causes misunderstanding, anger, and sorrow between parents and children. Frequently the parents take to blaming the

child for his behavior. They begin to invoke their traditional authority, often after years of letting the child more or less have his own way in minor matters during the preadolescent period. This in turn may lead to dishonesty on the part of the boy or girl to escape censure. The boy may lie about having taken the family car. The parents talk about having raised a "gentleman" only to discover to their sorrow that the son is turning out to be a "roughneck." The girl may falsify about her companions on a previous night's dancing party, or may deny that liquor was served at a dinner, not only in order to protect herself from blame, but to avoid accusations from parents about the "kind of company" she keeps. Parents often reveal their own emotional immaturity when they weep or rage at the behavior of adolescents. They not only make themselves unhappy but also display a form of childishness which their son or daughter either despises or learns to exploit for his own end. Moreover, if the parental repression is temporarily successful, the child either fails to develop freedom with responsibility (see below) or may break out later in more violent revolt or find an outlet in neurotic reactions. As we shall see when we discuss mental conflicts and neurotic behavior, it often happens that emotional maladjustment is rooted in the child or youth who is considered a model of deportment, kindliness, and obedience. (See Chapter XXVIII.)

Perhaps the silliest and most unfair weapon which distraught parents use in these conflict situations is to demand love and respect from their adolescent children, to comment in season and out on how they have slaved and worked for their children only to find them ingrates. As F. E. Williams put it (1926, p. 141): "With a lack of logic unworthy of a school-child—and the point is not missed by the adolescent boy or girl—they demand love in payment for sacrifices assumed voluntarily and for their own pleasure, and they demand respect as though that were a right that came with accidental parenthood."

These youths still love their parents, but they are trying desperately in the face of our confused standards and forms of activity to find themselves. In order to take their place in the adult world they must become emancipated from their previous emotional attachments to their family. In order to accomplish this task, confidence, adult leadership, and sound counsel, not blame and ridicule, are required. Too often the request that the son behave according to parental patterns in terms of his love of his mother and the fear that his interest in girls may lead him into difficulties prove an inadequate way to help him grow up.

When the mother, in particular, uses the appeal of her love as a device for keeping the son under her control, she is employing a means which is powerful but unhealthful for both persons. It is just this infantile and childish love for the mother which must be broken down.

Such an appeal is powerful, and the boy resents it at a time when he is moving toward another love object—someone outside the family circle. F. E. Williams states the matter in these words (1926, pp. 146-147):

"Love of mother is an instrument of terrible potentiality. Because by its use we can so easily cow individuals into a semblance of proper conduct, we use it recklessly. We go further and extol the man who shows great devotion to his mother and to the man who can weep at the name of 'mother' we ascribe special virtue. The love of mother is too valuable an asset in the life of any man to run the risk of turning it into a liability through reckless use.

"A man who is 'so good' to his mother is not always so good to his wife or so successful in his relationships with others; and a man's life is more concerned with his wife and with others than with his mother. A wise mother should realize this and not demand too much. She should find her happiness, even though it be a bit wistful, in helping her boy to launch his life from her own and in seeing him strong and able because of her."

In this type of behavior we see again the effect of our culture. Affection for mother and sentiment for the family have high emotional values for us, and most parents are quite unconscious of the larger significance of their attitudes. The following case brings some of the effects of persistence of undue affection for a mother.

Case of John J., aged 32 years. John is a successful high-school teacher in a large American city. He is unmarried and lives at home with his widowed mother. Only now is he beginning to be serious about breaking away from her hold on him.

The mother had been left a widow at the time her two sons Mark and John were in high school. She was well situated financially and preferred not to remarry but "to spend her life for her sons." Mark was her favorite; but on his death—just as he was finishing college—she turned all her love to John. The latter was not at first aware of the meaning of all this. He took it as proper and natural. He was fond of his mother in the approved way. But she tended to control most of his life: she regulated his education (he had never been away from home but for a few days until he attended the summer session of the state university at the age of thirty-one); she insisted on having a joint bank account with him so as to supervise his funds, although she had plenty of money and had a separate checking account of her own; she controlled his companionships in various subtle and at times somewhat dubious ways; and in innumerable details of living she managed him and he in turn depended on her.

It was recommended that he arrange to have his own bank account, that he take an apartment of his own nearer his work, that he choose his own friends, and that he continue getting away summers as often as he could manage it financially to secure further graduate work—the latter as much in order to escape from the home community as for professional reasons. It was pointed out, however, that a firm stand on his part regarding these matters would lead doubtless to a sentimental and emotional appeal by his mother, but that in case this occurred he must be prepared to ignore her injured feelings and to take the consequences of his own decision.

It was evident from the discussion of the problem with John that he wanted desperately to get away from this emotional attachment, but it was also apparent that the mother retained a good deal of a hold on him. Professionally he was emancipated; he had made good as a teacher and was now going on to take some additional professional and graduate courses. In this area of his personality he was quite mature and objective. But in relation to his mother, in matters of friendships, and especially in regard to an adequate heterosexual adjustment, he had retained many childish attitudes of care and affection for the mother which she had used as power devices to keep him tied to her apron strings. John both did and did not want to get away from his mother. He was in a mental conflict because he carried about with him two images of his mother: one of affection, love, and care (in a child's way), the other of respect but some disgust at her interference in his life. He also had a dual picture in his mind of his own role: one that of the dutiful, obedient son, the other that of a mature man who should follow his own choices in matters of friends and social activity.

A somewhat different parent-child situation is found in the following account. In this instance the son has pretty thoroughly integrated his entire life organization around a dependence-on-mother pattern.

Case of Fred A., aged 25 years. Despite his age Fred's actions still are marked by much infantile and adolescent behavior. He has an oversolicitous mother who completely dominates him at every turn. He has no initiative or interest in or curiosity about the world outside the neighborhood in which he lives. The little desire to get out to meet the world which he did possess has been completely repressed by the mother.

Mrs. A., Fred's mother, is considerably older than her husband. Their marriage was one of convenience rather than of love. Fred is their only child. Fred's father is a quiet person who does not voice his opinions or demands because of the feeling instilled by his wife that he is not competent. His only activities consist of going to work, gardening, and reading. He never goes out socially, and his neighbors scarcely know what he looks like. He was never very close to his son but left his rearing to the mother.

Fred was born when his mother was about thirty. The mother had feared that she would never have any children. The boy was a sickly child, and the mother was oversolicitous. She feared that he would not live. His frailty continued until the coming of puberty; but he has been in excellent health since.

The marital relations of the husband and wife were apparently not satisfactory. Because of this fact and because she felt that her husband was below her social level, Mrs. A. turned more and more to her son and began to center her whole affection upon him. She tried to make his pattern of life for him.

From early infancy she gave him everything he wished. She skimped on household expenditures, denied herself and the father things, in order to buy for the son. She put most of the money into annuities and insurance policies for him, so that he

would not have to be dependent on his father if she died. She was constantly dermal the father to the boy so that the boy built up no bond of companionship with a understanding of the father. The fact that the father was well into middle age during Fred's formative years doubtless contributed to the lack of closer contact between them.

For many years the mother was the boy's constant companion. He was about four or five years old when she first let him play with the other children, but even then she dominated his every action; no new playmates could be acquired without her permission, and whenever possible she supervised the play. She did everything at her command to prevent his growing up. He was not permitted to do many things the other boys did, but always acted according to his mother's wishes.

He was not very successful in school, but his mother blamed the teachers for his poor work. She laid no responsibility on the boy himself. She praised him and defended him against his instructors. She had him change schools several times because she felt that the teachers did not understand him or treat him fairly.

By the time he graduated from high school, he was completely integrated into this pattern. He let his mother shift any blame to others. He heard himself praised for not being like other children. On one or two occasions, when he tried to assert himself, to break away from her domination, she promptly shut him up in the house or punished him in some other way.

She has often said that her son is not going to marry "just any girl," but that she will find the right one for him when it is time for him to marry. He has never had any real companionship with either sex because he was never able to enter fully into their plans.

When he graduated from high school, he had no ambition to go to college or to work. He has not worked one day since graduation; in fact, he has never even bothered to look for a job. His mother does not want him to leave his home; she is afraid that he might be overworked or mistreated. He stays home because it is what she wants. If he goes out, it is to a motion picture by himself in the afternoon. He never goes out at night, except perhaps to the neighbors, but then he always leaves promptly at eight o'clock and is in bed by nine because that is the time his mother retires.

Fred has never possessed any strong masculine traits or attitudes. His actions are infantile and tend to be increasingly feminine. He identifies himself entirely with his mother, imitating her actions and attitudes in all situations. He is what she made and demanded of him. His mother is the glass through which he sees the world. The attachment to his mother is complete, and he makes no effort to break away from these close ties.

The arrival at heterosexuality. Closely linked up with emancipation from the home and the development of independence of judgment is the attainment of normal interest in the opposite sex. If parents are concerned over problems of disobedience and over the resistance to parental authority shown by the boy or girl in middle adolescence, they are, in our society, even more likely to be overconcerned with their children's growing interest in members of the other sex. True enough, if you confront a mother theoretically with the problem, she will say of her son,

"Oh, of course, I want John to marry in time," or "Jim should marry when the right girl comes along," or "I don't think that Louise is ready to consider marriage as yet." Obviously, the boy and girl in adolescence are not thinking of marriage, but the last four or five years of the "teen age" are most important in developing in them a healthy concern with each other. It is an important period of preparation for future mating. Psychiatrists agree that, if normal heterosexuality is not attained by the end of adolescence, it is not likely ever to be attained, even though marriage and a family may come later. There must be a release from infantile and childish attitudes, ideas, and identifications. Although parents may instruct their children on sex by talking or by giving them books on sex education, the child may still not have freed himself from overattachment to his mother or father or to someone else. Merely reading books on the subject of normal sex life is no substitute for day-by-day experience in meeting members of the other sex and in learning to adapt oneself to the wide variety of demands of intelligent and mature social participation. Not that reading and verbal information have no place, but such knowledge must be accompanied by the development of capacity to control one's own emotions and to take the responsibility for one's own acts.

When boys and girls begin to show an interest in each other after puberty, parents often suffer grave fears that something untoward may happen to them which will spoil their future. Instead of handling the matter emotionally, the parent must be willing to identify himself with his son or daughter and enter into his confidence as guide and helpmeet, not as an ogre of authority with "don't-do-this" and "don't-do-that" attitudes. Our culture norms, which call for a segregation of the sexes during early and late adolescence in the schools, in recreational activities, and elsewhere, are founded in part upon an older tradition of the sinfulness of sex contact, associated with the fear that young people will abuse any opportunities for learning to get on with each other. When adolescent boys and girls are surrounded with ideas and practices that keep them separated from each other, more emotional tensions are likely to be set up than when through the normal contacts of the schoolroom, of well-supervised and healthy-minded recreation, and through other community opportunities for getting acquainted, we give our young people a chance to assume new roles of mutual respect and mutual interest.

Among other false ideals which we set up in our young folks is the old notion that there are two kinds of women in this world: the good and pure woman, idealized in the mother and sister; and the "bad" and "evil" woman who is likely to lead the young man into sin. And the fear that "something" unfortunate will happen to our boys and our girls is predicated, in part, upon the very ideals of motherhood and womanhood

which tend to inhibit rather than to help them in their arrival at normal love life. F. E. Williams emphasizes the difficulty in the following paragraphs (1926, pp. 153-154):

"We try to force upon these youngsters very unhealthy ideals. Here again I let myself in for misunderstanding, but I do not see that it can be avoided. Some very unhealthy ideals have grown up in the world around this matter of sex, based largely on fears coming from a lack of understanding and philosophies of life constructed out of ignorance. One of the worst is this—the idealization of women themselves, the placing of women upon pedestals as something too fine, too sacred, too fragile to be handled in anything but the most genteel, considerate way.

"A boy is taught, in the first place, that matters of sex are degrading, wrong and sinful (at least for him and probably a little bit for everybody), but this teaching being not altogether successful, we further try to 'protect' him by creating in him an attitude towards women that we think will make him 'safe.' We teach him that in his consideration of women, he must keep in mind his mother and sister; that he must not say or think or act in any way with another woman that he would not say, think, or act with his mother or sister, or want them to know about.

"These are frightfully unhealthy ideas. . . . Nobody knows as does the psychiatrist how devastating damage has been to thousands of men and women, through this utterly false ideal. Women are not the fragile, delicate, sacred little things that they have been pictured. Women are human, vigorous individuals who can pretty well handle themselves.

"While it is perfectly right to point out to boys that under certain circumstances women must be carefully guarded and protected, it is wrong to put into their adolescent minds at the critical time when they are normally, healthfully approaching the development of their hetero-sexuality that women must not be thought of in any way except as they would think of their mothers and sisters."

It is well recognized by every student of these problems that such false idealization is often one reason for the failure to arrive at normal hetero-sexuality. Equally unhealthful ideas about the brutality and depravity of the male sex are foisted on young girls; they are constantly warned to resist any untoward "advances" from men. Such attitudes and fears make for unsatisfactory marital adjustment later. (See Chapter XX.) This is not to advocate license "or unlimited freedom among adolescents or any other group." As Williams remarks further (1926, pp. 156-157):

"There are good, social reasons for guarding carefully the developing sex life of adolescents and guard them, wisely, we should but if in the difficult process through which they are going things do happen, it is better that they do and hetero-sexuality be established than that they should not happen and ill health and abnormality be the result. I do not say that only one of the two things can happen, but if in this highly charged situation something does happen, nothing really serious has happened until we make it so. Parents should keep that in mind. By our present methods we frequently offer a child but one of the two alternatives."

All too frequently parents have little sympathy with the fumbling and awkward attempts of adolescents to understand each other within the general framework of an emerging love life. Yet in these youthful reactions direct sexual drive is not nearly so dominant as many highly suppressed parents imagine. (For a discussion of adolescent love interests see Butterfield, 1939.) Frequently the desire for emancipation from parental ties generally and for some freedom of choice is far more significant to youth than immediate love interest. But, of course, all these trends toward maturity are related; it is just because they are bound up together that the overemphasis on sexuality is so likely to distort the parent-child relations during these years.

Yet the adolescent must also learn to assume the responsibility which should go with his independence and with his growing interest in the other sex. Here again parental training plays a part. The adolescent in difficulty is frequently unwilling to face the consequences of his own acts and retreats in haste to parental protection. If he is to have his freedom, however, he must learn to assume the necessary accountability for his conduct. Let us examine some aspects of this problem.

Development of responsibility for one's acts. Responsibility means the ability and willingness to take the consequences of one's acts. It implies ethically that the person is a free moral agent, capable of being deterred or controlled by consideration of social sanctions, legal and moral. In these days of decline of traditional parental and home control over young people, in the midst of talk about "emancipation," "liberty," and "self-determination of one's life," in this period of emphasis upon freedom from restraint, and of fear on the part of parents, influenced in part by some so-called progressive educators, there is grave danger that young people may fail to realize that in human life as in material nature we cannot escape the facts of cause and effect, that in society as in nature there is a determinism which we cannot gainsay or ignore.

Freedom on the negative side means the absence of, or exemption from, restraint by the power or control of another. In the more positive sense freedom means free or unlimited choice of ends and means in action. In our society this implies self-determination of marriage, vocation, religion, and politics. It is closely bound up with our doctrine of rights. But it is not to be confused with license or absence of responsibility. Freedom from parents is therefore not merely a matter of getting away from home ties through uncontrolled indulgence of emotions and appetites. The young person who sets out upon this course sooner or later discovers that in the end his "freedom" enmeshes him in difficulties and problems of which he did not dream. Nor can the matter be considered merely one of age or locality. The process of growing up in adolescence

is predicated upon what happens in the earlier years. The problem of attitudes and habits in adolescence and puberty cannot be dissociated from what has gone on before.

In Chapter XIV we examined the roots of consistency and security in the primary attitudes of the early months and years. We saw that it is upon consistency and security that we predicate the gradual development of self-reliance, freedom of choice, and capacity to accept the consequences of one's acts.

The sense of security must in time move out from the framework of dependence on intimate family associates. As the child develops, there must be a growth toward independence, discrimination, and a sense of responsibility for his choices and acts. That is, what Sayles (1928) calls "freedom to grow" must also be provided. Too often the childish dependence continues into adolescence or early maturity, and then the individual, when confronted with problems demanding his own decisions, meets them with failures or half measures.

The important factor in providing early training in independence and responsibility is the early induction of the child into social situations in such a way that his behavior is conditioned by the *essential*, not the extraneous, factors. It is not that accessory social habits and attitudes may not or should not be built up. *It is rather the quality of these habits and attitudes which is important.* Too often the associated patterns of behavior emphasize impulsiveness, childish power devices, and other poorly organized social-emotional acts which later may prove a handicap to adequate social adaptation. In discussing the induction of the child into the family we have already shown how poor training in the basic habits and attitudes often results from parental inconsistency. The failure of parents to recognize the place of fundamental as against accessory habits is a serious matter. In like vein, if the growing child avoids any assumption of a moral role or tends to retreat to the parent in the face of any crisis, in the long run he will not develop the adequate discrimination and choice so necessary to maturation. (See Chapter XIV.) Even the revolt from parental domination, when carried out in an emotional fashion, may not mean mature responsibility or intelligent self-direction. We have all known instances of persons who, thinking to free themselves from what they believed to be intolerable circumstances by some rather drastic action, found themselves an instance of the ancient proverb of being "out of the frying pan into the fire."

Independence, freedom, and responsibility are closely related. If their roots are not laid down early, it may be difficult for the individual to acquire their integration later. Failure to direct the child's handling of his drives and the situations related to the cycles of activity which normally

follow from them may result in the retention of various devices for handling material and social situations which should belong only to the earliest years.

Variability in degree of mature responsibility. It is also worth noting that social maturation—the integration of independence with responsibility—does not always take place with equal force in the varied areas of social interaction. We often become responsible in some matters and remain childish in others. Our role and status in different groups reflect this. The writer has elsewhere stated the matter of different levels of maturation in the following words (K. Young, 1937, pp. 182-183):

"The cultural standards (that is, customs, laws, and traditions) of various groups in which one plays a part will determine largely both the role and the status of any given individual. In business and professional circles, for example, there exists one set of standards, demands, or expectancies, another in the relations of parents to children, and in sex and marital life, in one's club and fraternal or religious life, still others. For example, in business and professional circles there is an insistence on stability, consistency, and responsibility in behavior which reflects the objectivity of modern economic culture. So, too, in strictly professional education, in scientific research, in training in the fine arts, the intellectual abilities are constantly forced into a more or less logical and consistent framework. But, as one passes from economic activity to political, recreational, and leisure-time occupations, to religious activities, and to the more intimate relations of family and marital life, while there may be outward conformity to standards, there is often less and less demand for consistency, stability, and self-control. In other words, *responsibility is related to the group demands*.

"In economic life there is an insistence on taking the consequences for one's actions; in politics there is less of such insistence but still a considerable amount, and it is the ideal of all political reformers that there should be more. In recreation and leisure (except where these themselves touch the economic patterns) there is much more individual choice and much more chance to escape the consequences of our conduct. In the family there are traditional responsibilities that the husband support the family, that the wife care for the children, that the children obey their parents. Nevertheless, there is a great deal of irresponsibility developed in the family relations because we persist in maintaining verbally high standards of consistency and accountability, but fail in the crises to follow through with a strict cause-and-effect logic. This is especially likely to be true in the modern family, which has lost so much of its former stabilizing influence of economic activity, educational and religious functions, and provision for familial recreation. In other words, in the very interrelations of spouses to each other and of parents to children in the modern world we have not yet developed those *standards of expectancy* which cut down or eliminate infantilisms, futile daydreaming, and continued attempts to escape responsibility.

"There are various degrees or areas of maturity and responsibility. The person develops these qualities only in response to social demands and the influence of other people upon him. We remain impulsive, emotional, unstable, given to fear, anger, or uncontrolled affection, unless we have been trained otherwise. In short, maturation

is for most persons a matter of levels or segments of their total personality. In some relations the individual may be hard-headed, able to direct his own affairs efficiently, while in others he may have continued at infantile and childhood levels of reaction, depending upon wheedling, upon tears, upon threats of violence, upon numerous other methods which are common to children, but which by the general consensus of mature and well-balanced adults would be considered undesirable. As a matter of fact, we have actually come to accept as normal a great deal of this infantile and childish behavior. This is exemplified in the continued use by women of sexual appeal in order to win success in business, by the continued use of violence on the part of fathers in disciplining their children, by the emotional appeals of politics and religion. It is nowhere better illustrated than in the unchecked power which persons of wealth or of culturally inherited class status exercise over those around them. It is not uncommon to discover that a man who has followed all the expected patterns of our economic culture of consistency, responsibility, and objectivity in acquiring wealth uses his money and its prestige in exploiting his domestic help, his family, his children, and his friends."

The rise of self-control. The emphasis in modern psychology on determinism of behavior from biological and unconscious motivations is likely to lead to the belief that the individual can and should do nothing to try to direct and control his life. There is nothing in our standpoint to support such a view. The rise of the moral and reflective self consists not only in developing a "generalized other" in the form of high ideals and principles of conduct, but in realizing that one not only has responsibility for his acts but can in a measure direct the course of activity. It is not to be gainsaid that biological drives and culture norms do limit the individual in many ways. There are apparently definite restrictions upon the extent to which one may sublimate his deeper impulses. And cultural emphases upon values and attitudes that may be considered irrational put a great strain on the individual who would reorganize his values in harmony with a higher idealism.

Self-control implies the predirection and co-ordination of one's impulses and acts, particularly as this direction and co-ordination center in some goal, ideal, or plan. It is characterized by foresight and control, determined by mature (that is, socialized) consideration of the self in relation to others. It is thus closely linked up with both freedom and responsibility. It implies, therefore, that we can plan our lives in advance. But this plan must be co-ordinated with our deeper unconscious impulses and motives and with the requirements of morality outside. The inadequacy of the older view lies in its assumption that the unconscious impulses and motives were animal, base, unworthy, and dangerous: it was up to us as individuals to repress them completely. Much of Christian and Judaistic morality was concerned with devices to negate and deny these biological urges which are fundamental to man's living. And, when later we discovered the truer meaning of these urges, there arose in the

land a philosophy which said, in effect, "This is the way nature made us. One cannot do anything about these impulses; therefore follow them, since there is nothing else to do." Or "Nature 'intended' us to follow our impulses." This attitude is an admission that we have not yet learned how to manage and sublimate these so-called "baser" impulses.

Some of the specific factors to be taken into consideration in effecting a reunion of logic and intelligence with the deeper biological urges and emotions are described in the paragraphs which follow (slightly adapted from K. Young, 1937, pp. 184-186):

"(1) We need to recognize that, although interests and wishes determine the aims or ends of living, these may be moralized and socialized in terms of the demands of our fellows. Recognition of the fact that the self arises from building up roles and the status which others require of us should convince us that a full life can be had only when we recognize the anticipations or claims of others upon us.

"(2) The sacrifice of the biological urges and emotional outlets can be satisfactorily accomplished only by putting in their place socially accepted and tamer emotional outlets. It is important to remember that the more lasting, more permanent satisfactions arise not when we live in a world of highly emotionalized and impulsive ups and downs like a spoiled child or pampered adult, but when the emotions are less intense perhaps and more continuous and correlated with intellectual interests and activities of a creative and artistic sort.

"(3) In our love life itself, maturity is marked by mutual responsiveness, appreciation of and recognition of the sacredness of personality, that is, of the *self* of others. The mature individual will have cut himself loose from the mother's apron strings or broken his childish father fixation. He will show no traces of infantile temper tantrums in the face of denials or crises. He will show no projection of blame upon others when he cannot have his own way at every turn.

"(4) Strong hedonistic wishes or pleasure-seeking impulses will be sublimated into self-expression in creative art which may bring prestige, although perhaps only from one's intimate friends and family. Or they may find their outlet in a deep and abiding love of righteousness, in allegiance to some high cause which aims at improving the conditions of living for all.

"(5) The remodeling of the major social situations in which we operate will assist in bringing about maturity. So long as large masses of men, women, and children remain in a condition of economic insecurity, they will be the victims of their emotions and urges for security, which will be played upon by every demagogue or would-be dictator who alleges that he will be their savior if they will only follow him and do his bidding. So long as we do not provide a culturally acceptable and sound outlet for fantasy thinking in children, so long as we deal impulsively with the child's emotions and fundamental habit training, so long as we ourselves as adults control children and adolescents as if they had only emotions and no intelligence, so long shall we continue to foster the difficulties of personal maturity which confront us on every hand."

Adolescence is associated with a wide variety of problems which will be discussed in other chapters, particularly those dealing with education,

delinquency, and the development of adequate occupational adjustments. Moreover, we shall see, in discussing marriage problems and those associated with the change of role and status of the modern woman, that adolescence remains, for our society, one of the crucial periods in personality development. If we consider the first few years as basic in the formulation of habits, attitudes, and ideas as they relate to role and status in various groups and as they relate to the conception of the self which one has, we must also recognize that the years of puberty and adolescence constitute a second most significant period of one's life in predetermining what one will do thereafter. As important as the earliest habits are in laying the foundation for the adolescent and adult adjustments, we must not neglect the fact that constitutional changes in the individual—especially those connected with sexual maturation—furnish one an organic basis for a reorganization of behavior which nobody could have predicted fully from the earlier years. So, too, new social contacts arising in these years may lead to a good deal of reconditioning of the boy or girl in attitudes toward themselves or in the choice of mates or occupation or religion or politics; and, though these modifications are doubtless affected by infantile and prepubertal experiences, we cannot deny that the combination of an organic reorientation following puberty and exposure to new social contacts may lead to rather striking alterations in the life organization of an individual. Therefore, as important as the early years are, we must not neglect the fact that throughout life, but particularly until physical maturity is reached and occupational and marital adjustments are made, the individual may, under sufficient crisis from outside or sufficient alteration of internal and organic patterns, make considerable shifts in his major values and habits. It is a bit too simple to assume that the adult is completely unable to change his life or to redirect his energy and attention. Flexibility itself may become an ideal aim or goal, along with others, and the history of many great men and many unsung heroes of everyday life gives testimony to the fact that people do and may alter the course of their lives—under sufficient stimulus—even after they have reached their socially accepted status as adults. All this is but a caution against too bold an assumption that infantile and adolescent experience furnishes the last word in human conditioning. Such a view ignores the dynamic nature of the human constitution and the ability of human society to modify its culture patterns and thus to influence its members, including adults.

Chapter XVII

PUPIL ADJUSTMENT TO THE LEARNING PROCESS IN SCHOOL

IN OUR modern world the school stands second only to the home in its profound effects upon the child. As Sumner (1906) put the matter, "Popular education and certain faiths about popular education are in the *mores* of our time." The acceptance of formal education as a necessary part of modern man's equipment is a distinctive feature of our ethos. The high values attributed to education are kept alive, in fact, by no end of social myths and legends. Not only is illiteracy an abomination, not only is there a reverence for formal schooling which dates back to the Middle Ages and earlier, but there is still a strong conviction that personal achievement is immensely enhanced by going to school. The very fact that in our own country—as in many others—the citizenry spend enormous sums of money to keep their children and youth at school—long after the latter, at least, are physically capable of productive employment—is evidence enough of their overwhelming faith in education.

In this chapter and in the next two we shall discuss some of the important effects of the school experience upon personality at the elementary, secondary, and college levels. In the present chapter, after a brief review of the cultural foundations of education in our society, we shall take up certain aspects of learning in the elementary and secondary schools and then discuss some special problems of pupil adjustment.

THE SOCIAL-CULTURAL BACKGROUND OF PUPIL ADJUSTMENT

Originally the school was a part of the primary-group organization of society. Today, with the increasing dominance of secondary-group patterns and the extensive division of labor which characterizes our living, the school has become a highly complex institution. Yet its essential function continues: to transmit large sections of our cultural heritage from one generation to the next. The school furnishes a vast body of knowledge and skill, and it trains children and young people in certain standard and accepted forms of behavior, attitude, and idea. But its indirect and informal functions are also of great importance, especially in matters of social participation and moral training.

Basic aims of education. In order to give a setting for our discussion, we must note briefly four of the most important purposes of the school today: (1) intellectual instruction, (2) training in skills and techniques, (3) health, and (4) socialization and moral training.

(1) One of the characteristics of the modern world is the vast accumulation of knowledge, the rudiments of which the child and adult must acquire if he is to adapt himself at all adequately to his role in the community. The instructional curriculum is often divided into those courses providing the "tool" subjects and those providing the "content" subjects. The former are illustrated by learning to read, to spell, to write, to handle arithmetic, and otherwise to secure the intellectual tools upon which depend further acquirement of knowledge. The latter are illustrated by the subject matter of literature, art, history, and science.

One of our most significant problems in connection with widespread public education revolves around individual variations in learning ability, otherwise called intelligence. As a result of these differences many of the subjects of the modern school have been modified and changed, not only in the light of present-day demands but because the intellectual capacities of the pupils reveal a wider range than when only the intellectually most capable individuals were sent to school, at least beyond the elementary stages. As we shall see, some of the personality difficulties of the school-child arise out of attempts to foist training upon children who are, in terms of ability, ill prepared to receive it.

(2) A second item in the curriculum is the training of the child and youth in skills and techniques which have more or less bearing on their future vocation. While specific motor skills in the trades and in business practices are in large part still learned on the job, the school has more and more taken over the basic training in these matters. The boy may acquire the skilled hand-eye co-ordination necessary to the handling of tools and machines, and the girl or the boy may learn such things as typing and stenography.

(3) A third feature of modern education has to do with the emphasis put upon knowledge and habits of bodily care and the prevention of disease and accident. *Mens sana in corpore sano*, the classical ideal of Juvenal, the Roman poet, has again become an accepted principle of education. Obviously, this attention to good health is related to the increasing community recognition of the importance of public health measures. Moreover, our attention to health now takes mental as well as physical factors into account. In fact, the following discussion draws heavily upon what has become known as *mental hygiene* as it relates to school work.

(4) Finally, the school, in both direct and indirect fashion, continues and elaborates the socializing and especially the moralizing processes already begun in the family and in other primary groups. There are certain standard rituals or school practices which assist in this matter. The very physical configuration of the classroom with the customarily fixed seats, demands for docility and obedience to the teacher who carries over the authoritarian patterns of the parents, the requirements of lesson preparation and recitation, the whole system of merits or school grades and certificates of promotion or graduation—all these and others induct the child into formalized patterns of social participation with his fellows. In addition there is a good deal of direct training in morality, both personal and public. The materials of literature, art,

and history provide the heroes of our national state whom we are taught to revere. The flag-raising ceremonials, the singing of patriotic songs, the special programs on national holidays, all are designed to produce in the child the important sense of identification with our national values and aims. And, despite our legal provision against formal religious or theological instruction in the public schools, our children get indirectly much religious dogma and ideology. This is especially evident in the emphasis put upon the Christian story during the Christmas and Easter periods. Thus even children who do not attend parochial schools are nevertheless inducted into our common religious beliefs and stories, which helps to keep alive much of our Christianity.

In addition to these, of course, the school provides forms of play and recreation, and is supposed to furnish patterns of healthful leisure time, which it is hoped will carry over into later life. So, too, attention is given to aesthetic and like interests both in the formal content courses and in connection with play and such activities as festivals, musical contests, drama, and art exhibits.

In short, the school furnishes the growing child with knowledge, skills, and socialization patterns which not only give him much of his day-by-day activity but presumably prepare him for future participation in adult life.

Interactional patterns centering in the pupils. The basic person-to-person interactions in the educational situation may be considered in the form of a triangle with the child at the apex and the parent and the teacher at the two angles along the base, as in Figure 15. The major interaction, of course, is that between the pupil and the teacher. So far as formal training and most of the daily activities are concerned, it is the teacher-pupil contact which is important. Yet there is also the relation of pupil to pupil, aside from the direct pupil-teacher matrix, and




FIGURE 15.

in some situations the parent-teacher relation enters into the total school situation. Since our major purpose in this chapter concerns the formal training of the pupil, we shall focus our attention on certain aspects of learning and their social-emotional accompaniments, leaving for the next chapter consideration of other aspects of these interactional relations.

We may first ask what the child of five or six brings to the school, assuming for the moment that this age period marks his induction into formal education. The importance of the familial and primary-group culture in this matter is still little recognized. It is all too often believed that the child of ordinary health brings to the school a relatively untutored mind and a rudimentary set of skills and that upon these foundations the teachers must set to work to induct him into the world of formal learning. But the child is a dynamic personality loaded with all

sorts of attitudes, habits, and ideas touching every aspect of his life: health, social-emotional adjustments, and intellectual matters. Obviously, differences in intellectual ability among the entrants to school make problems of intellectual training; but, as we know, the learning process itself is not entirely a matter of intelligence as narrowly defined, but involves emotional and social qualities of all sorts. Thus, if the child is a pampered one suffering from overprotection at the hands of his parents, he may present a quite different problem in training than will a child who has already acquired a good deal of responsibility and independence of action, who has learned many important habits of self-reliance, who can handle his clothes, his personal needs, and the like in an intelligent fashion. Or a young child already loaded down with the projections of his parents' wishes upon him may find many features of the learning process too difficult. Or the shy, retiring, and introspective youngster may present to the teacher and to his fellow-pupils still another constellation of habits and attitudes toward which they will react. In other words, the child comes not merely as a potential learner of knowledge, skill, and moral and other socialized habits and attitudes, but as a personality already widely conditioned to a large number of aspects of life.

FACTORS IN THE LEARNING PROCESS

The central importance of learning in the school program is self-evident, but, as a background to our subsequent discussion of particular problems associated therewith, we must note briefly some aspects of individual differences in learning ability and the interplay of motivation, goals, and cycles of activity in the total learning situation.

Individual differences in learning capacity. As we have already indicated, the capacity to learn rests upon both constitutional and social-cultural factors. The former concern the potentialities for acquiring new associations of stimuli and response, for improving the kind and quality of new reactions, and for differentiating and integrating the various features of adaptation. Learning might, in this sense, be stated in terms of *power* and *speed*, and there are obviously marked individual differences in these matters. The sociocultural influences upon the learning process have to do with the problem as to how intellectual ability is qualified or influenced by the level of culture and the nature of social interaction. Since the basic mechanisms of learning were treated in Chapters V and VI, we may pass at once to the application of the facts of learning in the school. One of the crucial problems in this connection has to do with individual variations in intelligence among pupils. No one doubts that there are measurable deviations in the mental abilities of children or adults in a given community or society or within an entire race. But we must not be misled by the contention that these differences are entirely

the result of heredity or that, contrariwise, we may neglect the importance of social and cultural influences. For example, regional differences in relation to culture must be taken into account. Many earlier studies of our immigrant peoples from Europe took it for granted that their poor performance on our intelligence tests—devised for children and adults of American culture—afforded *prima facie* evidence that they were inherently inferior to our native American stock. Today these findings are being interpreted more adequately in terms of cultural, not biological, determinants. (See Brigham, 1930; Garth, 1931; and Klineberg, 1935.) In like manner differences between rural and urban schoolchildren uncovered by intelligence testing turn out, upon further analysis, to rest not on the existence of poor biological stock in the former as compared with the latter, but on the exposure to a richer and different culture. The study of M. Sherman and Key (1932) has a bearing here. By means of a series of tests of mountain and village children in Virginia they demonstrated that differences in intelligence-test performance among these schoolchildren rested upon the variations in exposure to the cultural milieu, not upon inherent or constitutional factors which were relatively unalterable.

Moreover, we must not forget that motivation and interest—though these are qualified by feelings and emotions—are also highly influenced by learning. We shall note below some instances in which emotional indifference is mistaken for lack of intellectual ability. Furthermore, we shall see that such indifference is often the outgrowth of social factors both within the school and outside. Yet it must be recalled that, despite these divergences in environmental exposures, genuine biological differences in intelligence do persist. Aside from a few fanatic environmentalists no one contends that hereditary or constitutional factors are of no consequence in acquiring knowledge and skill.

Mention of social factors leads at once to another significant feature of the learning process. There is a long-standing but faulty belief that learning is entirely an individual matter, that it essentially concerns only the direct contact of the child with the material and social world. Among traditional psychologists only occasionally has adequate recognition been given to the essentially social, that is, *interactional*, nature of all learning. As a matter of fact, the *social act* is the framework in which all learning takes place, at least that which is fundamental to reflective and higher thought processes. As we noted in Chapters IX and X, reflection itself rests upon the development of the capacity to take the attitude of others toward oneself, or the attitude or characteristic of the material object toward the self, or the attitude or relationship of one material object to another. In truth, reflection is self-reflection, and self-reflection is the outcome of social interaction. Finally, symbolic reactions—chiefly those of

language—permit an enormous range of anticipatory role-taking, of anticipatory manipulation of the material world around one—all in advance of direct and overt contact with persons or material things or both.

Applied to the school situation, this means not only that the overt interaction of pupils, of pupils and teachers, and of parents and pupils is a factor in learning, but that the internalized reflection of such contact as well as of previous interactions is fundamental. Of course, this is not to deny or gainsay constitutional differences in ability to perceive, to remember, to imagine, and to reorganize and conceptualize our experiences. But it does restate the learning process in terms of the larger social-cultural configuration in which it takes place.

Interrelation of motivation, goals, cycles, and learning. Motivation is as fundamental in school learning as in any other, and it becomes increasingly a special problem because traditionally many school authorities have assumed that it was of little or no consequence, or else they imagined that the high intellectual motivation of the trained scholar existed in the elementary and secondary pupil and certainly in the college student. We have already discussed the essential features of motivation. (See Chapter IV.) But for our purposes at this point we may discuss motivation in terms of the discrepancy between the individual's aspiration and his achievement. (See Hoppe, 1931; and May and Doob, 1937.) Obviously, motive must be linked with a goal or ideal toward which the individual strives. Furthermore, we have seen that motive and goal fall within the concept of a cycle of activity. Such a cycle runs its course from drive or motive to completion or closure of the tension-producing stimulus or motive. The cyclic principle operates in the situation of school learning as well as elsewhere.

The child comes to the school with goals or aspirations learned from his home. The teacher must begin with these. But she must go on, of course, to change, enlarge, and add to these aims or goals. These added aims, like those of the home, are related to cultural and social norms. Thus the demands of good health, sound knowledge, adequate motor and mental skills, and morality represent some of the chief aims which the school brings more strikingly to the child's attention.

Goal-seeking should be coupled with two other important matters: a plan and freedom of choice. (See Burnham, 1924.) The *plan* refers to the manner in which one decides to move from motivation or aspiration to the goal or aim, that is, to fulfill the task. *Freedom* is essential because only by individual choice of aims and of means can the most effective personal growth take place. Both intellectual and emotional factors come into play in deciding on the aim and in working out a plan for reaching it. Actually, of course, the school through the curriculum does provide the institutional framework for both the goal and the plan. These are

superimposed upon the child. And the discipline in connection with the carrying out of the plan is likely also to take on external forms of ordering and forbidding or of direct interference with the child's way of learning. But freedom of choice is important. Freedom is obviously dangerous, but it is also significant; when properly associated with responsibility, it becomes a most important aspect of maturation. (See Chapter XVI.) But two limitations of freedom of choice must be noted: (1) those of the curriculum, representing the accumulation which society believes should be transmitted to the rising generation, and (2) those rules and practices of pedagogy and school administration which have been developed in connection with this transmission. Such items as classroom arrangements, laboratory and library regulations, and methods of procedure are illustrative. These latter make up the culture of the school itself as an institution.

Yet within whatever broad limits we do permit, freedom of choice as to task and plan is fundamental. When the child is motivated from within, when his interest is aroused, then we set in motion cycles of activity which normally lead to satisfying closure or completion of the cycle. In the school, as outside, the most fundamental control and discipline arise (1) from activity in a situation in which the individual learns the limits of his own ability, (2) from the controlling effects of the material or medium with which he is working, and (3) from holding to his plan—that is, disciplining himself—until it is completed. The rewards should come out of the successful completion of a task through planned procedure. Not that external rewards may not have their place, but maturity is in large part marked by the internalization of the reward in the sense of satisfaction from completion, the realization of having fulfilled our own (and also others') expectations of our role and goal. In short, success is one of the bases upon which maturation rests.

Effects of failure. On the other hand, failure may not be entirely deleterious in its effects upon the child. Sometimes the child has abilities beyond his belief, and a failure—if properly interpreted to him—may serve to stimulate greater effort to gain his goal. In the second place, failure at a task may produce a sense of reality regarding one's limitations, and again with adequate guidance a child may direct his activities into other fields where he has potential competence. But all too frequently these qualifications of advice and personal sense of reality on the part of the pupil are not to be found. It all depends on how the sense of failure is integrated into the pupil's life organization. If it produces a strong sense of inferiority and loss of status, a retreat into noncommunicative fantasy, or overt misbehavior, it may have decidedly negative effect. As a rule, knowledge of previous failures, associated as it is with self-esteem and ego status, leads the student to enter a new learning situation in an

emotional state less favorable to effective performance than would knowledge of success. (See E. B. Sullivan, 1927; also Adler, 1930b.)

In this connection the emotional as well as other waste involved in school retardation must be tremendous. The backward child in school is an indictment of the educational institution and in part of our entire culture. We know that it means, all too often, that the retarded children are intellectually and in terms of interest incapable of handling the work laid down in the standard curriculum and that in the face of repeated failure inner emotional distress or escape into truancy and delinquency is common. In one study conducted in London, Moodie found one fifth of the pupils seriously retarded and another two fifths of them behind in their work. Among the former, 800 in number, who were sent to his clinic for examination and advice, he found emotional disturbance associated with sense of failure in schoolwork to be the most common symptom. (See Ryan, 1938, pp. 144-145.)

One way to remedy this kind of situation, of course, is to lower the level of aspiration sufficiently so that the student may be able to attain the type of success which will meet public approval and at the same time satisfy himself. Altering the course of study to fit the pupils' actual abilities, interests, and prospective vocational requirements is indicated. (See the final section.) But all too often, instead of preceeding to adjust the curriculum to the pupil, school authorities persist in pushing the child beyond the limits of his capacity and interest. Our overemphasis upon competition and high personal achievement has much to do with this matter. (See below.) More attention to individual differences in pupils' ability, coupled with careful training, may often counteract the effects of failure. Although dealing with preschool children only, Updegraff and Keister's (1938) study demonstrated how training directly related to the items in the learning process may offset the effects of failure. They devised tests to induce a sense of failure, evidenced by emotional distress, "giving up," destructive reactions, and the like. After the test they divided their sample into halves: one group to serve as a control was not given any training; the other half was. The training consisted in grading a series of tasks so that the child developed a distinct sense of success at each step, especially in the early phases. Then, as the tasks increased in difficulty, they were so arranged that perseverance was necessary to attainment, and finally throughout the child was aware of his progress, step by step, and of his previous successes. In the training group sulking and crying disappeared, and the interests and efforts of the pupils were greatly improved.

The implications of this study are evident. Failure may not be altogether disastrous if the task is interesting and if the child is motivated to try again. But it is most important to arrange the course of study so

as to provide for a graded series of attainment, and the general conditions of work should be emotionally satisfying. The latter include such matters as pupil-pupil relationships and, above all else, teacher-pupil congeniality. (See Chapter XVIII.)

This whole relation of goal to success and failure may be stated, in fact, in terms of the nature of the ideals or goals toward which we strive. These standards or criteria or goals may help us to judge the effect of the goals upon the individual concerned. First, the ideal or goal may be too trivial, too simple, or too low in the scale of intellectual or moral appeal to catch the interest or arouse a motive. Second, the goal may be too complex, too difficult, for the capacity. Third, a goal may be entirely lacking; there is nothing to catch the interest at all. In any one of these the incongruity of the task, the plan, and freedom may give rise to indifference, retreat, rebellion, or disintegration through mental-emotional conflict within the person, and these in their turn will influence self-esteem, status, role, and conduct generally.

Before going on to present and discuss particular instances of pupil adjustment in the school, we must note the wider cultural framework in which the problems of success or failure arise. Mention was made in the opening section of this chapter that educational aims and practices tend, for the most part, to reflect the larger society and culture outside the classroom. This is well illustrated in the fact that the dominant interactional pattern through which our schools operate reflects our whole ethos of individualism and person-to-person struggle for role and status. Pupil-to-pupil rivalry is the central feature of much of our school procedure. Yet, while the school, following our general competitive pattern, puts special stress upon struggle and rivalry, it must not be forgotten that the household, the play group, and the neighborhood contacts have previously conditioned most of our American children in competitive habits and attitudes.

Place of competition and co-operation. The manner in which the pupil is supposed to achieve his aims or goals is through competition with his classmates. The rewards for success are expressed in school marks, promotion, graduation, special prizes, awards, and various honors. This struggle takes on various social configurations. It may be between pupil and pupil in a given classroom. But in addition the children may be organized into somewhat artificial groups, as when the teacher, to "motivate" the pupils, as she puts it, pits one row of pupils against another, or segregates the girls of the class from the boys in some contest of learning. Or one grade may be put into competition with another in a neighboring school, or an entire school unit is deliberately obliged to compete with another.

Most often, of course, this last sort of struggle is confined to inter-

scholastic athletics, debating, declamation contests, and drama and music festivals, but such interschool rivalry may and does touch the more strictly academic matters. European observers who come from school systems where this competitive pattern is not so highly developed are often amazed at the amount of attention given to the mere mechanics and social rituals associated with this competitive pattern of our American education.

The effects of competition as against co-operation on various mental and emotional functions have been studied by a variety of methods, but it would carry us too far afield to review those investigations. (For such a review with an extensive bibliography, see May and Doob, 1937.) However, following Fuller and Baker's summary (1939), we may point out that on the whole excessive competition seems to have the following influences on various pupils: (1) there are usually discouragement and despair for the slow learners; (2) for the average pupil there tend to be either excessive emotional stress and worry or the development of a "get by" attitude; (3) often a superlative, unwarranted opinion of and optimism regarding their abilities develops among the fast learners, especially those who have a capacity to manage the types of more or less rote learning which characterizes so much of our traditional course of study; and (4) there arises pretty generally an "attitude of aggressive non-co-operation" marked by a striking indifference to the fate and welfare of other pupils and a strong fear or anxiety of losing caste if one fails to maintain his expected position in the class grading scheme.

In contrast, when the pupils are injected into a situation which calls for genuine co-operation among them in the accomplishment of some goal, aim, or project, their behavior tends to be featured by the following: (1) there is a common determination by the pupils of the problems to be investigated (under guidance this is what Rugg and Shoemaker, 1928, called the "child-centered" school); (2) on the basis of a given project the pupils co-operate in the planning of work necessary to solve the problem; (3) there are shared effort and responsibility for an adequate solution of the task; (4) there is a common credit or blame for the success or failure of a given project.

The competitive pattern, therefore, stimulates intensive person-to-person struggle for role, status, and reward. It throws into play emotional reactions of aggressiveness, fear, and anger if the activity is frustrated at any point. It tends to overstress the narrowly egoistic element at the expense of the sympathetic. The co-operative pattern, in contrast, puts its emphasis upon that form of interaction which calls out mutual aid and sympathetic understanding of others, and which stimulates identification of the ego with the symbols and reward of the group rather than of the individual. It is not that competition does not enhance effective effort—

it does, and it is not necessarily absent in co-operative activities where each may rival another in making a worth-while contribution to the total product anticipated. But the major limitation of intensive competition is that it tends to dissolve the lines of free give-and-take interaction and throw the *social act* back to the level of person-to-person antagonism, which dries up the springs of sympathy and the sharing of experience that is so important in the process of socialization.

Clearly those children who, from constitutional handicaps, intellectual inferiorities, or previous cultural and social conditioning, or for other reasons, fail to make good in this competitive activity lose status, are reduced to less acceptable roles, and otherwise suffer at the hands of their fellows, their teachers, their parents, and others in the community. The terrific pressure of the school for success in terms of the competitive pattern often produces serious maladjustments in children, in adolescents, and even in young adults. (See Horney, 1937, on the effect of intensive competition on the personality.)

SOME SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF PUPIL ADJUSTMENT

If the learning process be redefined as a *social act*, there should be a fuller recognition of a goal or aim which is motivated from well-supported interests and toward which the student may move in some planned and orderly fashion. We need to objectify both the goal and the plan as one device, among others, to remove undue emotional stress between pupils, and between pupil and teacher. When we have adequately motivated the aim or task, and co-ordinated it with a sound plan, then healthy attitudes and habits of competition and co-operation may be stimulated. But, if competition as such becomes more important than genuine learning, or if the goals are put too high or too low, thus undermining interest and attention, or if the child is denied any freedom of choice and consequent responsibility, the whole learning process is likely to become unbalanced. In the face of a poorly organized frame of reference for his education, the child or adolescent may develop varied attitudes. Among other types of response and attitudes are these: (1) one of resistance and rebelliousness, which may be either attitudinal or more directly overt; (2) one of indifference and lack of effort—the simple praecox symptom (see Chapter XXVII); (3) one of complete conformity and passive docility, marked by loss of individual initiative; and (4) removal by means of fantasy, which usually takes covert form, but may in extreme instances find overt outlet. (Item 2 is sometimes marked by fantasy, but not necessarily so.) Any one of these four, or a combination of them, means that the student is not making an adequate adaptation to the educational situation as demanded by our cultural norms. These attitudes do not demonstrate anything particularly abnormal so much

as they indicate failure to reach a goal which approaches maximum effectiveness. As in other life situations, of course, individuals vary greatly among themselves in the level of adaptation and in the degree to which they fulfill their potentialities. "Just getting by" in school perhaps is after all a prepattern for that same attitude and level of performance later in life. But, measured against the expected norms of education and personality adaptation, this is not enough.

Within the general framework of the learning process as it is related both to motive, goal, and cycle and to the broader social-cultural environment of home and community outside, we shall now take up some selected problem cases which illustrate a variety of difficulties, particularly those relating to intellectual ability, poor pedagogy, social-emotional distress, and social maladjustment. Though occasionally one discovers an instance in which some one item or factor seems to be the major "cause" of maladjustment, as a rule there are a number of factors in each case. As a matter of fact, given even a single feature, such as inadequate intelligence or some particular emotional distress, at the inception, it usually happens that in time all sorts of other difficulties or symptoms ensue to complicate the total picture.

But as a means of brief characterization we may say that the case of Grace W. illustrates a pupil of average mentality who was the victim of poor pedagogy; that of Esther N. represents a child of dull-normal ability whose excessive fantastic aspiration induced school failure and predelinquent conduct; Joan A., in contrast, was a girl of high intelligence whose autoeroticism was not unrelated to a failure of the classroom standards to interest her; Lynn S.'s case, on the other hand, illustrates, in part, scholastic retardation, but chiefly a failure in person-to-person adjustment in the school; and John B.'s case brings out the manner in which speech difficulties may result from a sense of inferiority, in turn associated with loss of role and of high status.

Case of Grace W., thirteen years old. Grace had been sent to a "Special B Class" (a so-called "opportunity room" for a variety of scholastically maladjusted children). A notation on the Binet-Simon test which accompanied her transfer stated that she was feeble-minded. "She was blank," stated the teacher from whose class Grace had been sent. Grace had failed in every school subject in this grade except spelling and penmanship. The girl was in evident good health and had passed into puberty nearly a year previously.

The family record is rather meager. The father was an engineer whose work had taken him over widely separated sections of the United States, and Grace had been enrolled in many schools in her few years of education. The family was in good economic condition. There was no evidence of any marital conflict.

Grace was an only child, and the mother spent much time in caring for her. Even at the age of thirteen years, the mother did many things for the child which other

girls of the same age would have resented. The girl was untrained in any household duties, although the mother did all the housework. Grace was allowed to do about as she pleased, but she had few friends and apparently indulged in a good deal of daydreaming, though she would never admit as much. She went about "in a daze," as her study-room teacher put it. If asked a question, she was likely to answer not that particular query, but one asked some moments previously. She never saw the point of any joke. Her attention was apparently distracted by her inner thoughts.

At the outset the teacher of the "special" class left Grace pretty much to tasks of spelling, penmanship, copying simple drawings, and the like. But her uniformly good work in spelling and penmanship made the teacher in time wonder if the child really were feeble-minded. On the other hand, the child became literally panic-stricken whenever anything suggesting arithmetic was mentioned to her. She was likewise negativistic to other academic subjects. The precipitating as well as predisposing causes of Grace's difficulties were more or less accidentally uncovered.

Several months after Grace had been in the special room, the teacher was on occasion demonstrating to a small group of children, which did not include Grace, various ways of arranging the work of handling fractions. Grace became interested from overhearing the teacher's explanation, and became greatly excited when the teacher remarked, "Here is another arrangement, an old-fashioned one, but good nevertheless." The teacher added: "I will leave these methods in sight. Take any one you want. I will be satisfied so long as you know what and why you do anything. Stick to the one you like until you can do the work without mistake, and never mind the step-ladder arrangement in the textbook, unless you like it." On hearing this, Grace got to her feet, went to the blackboard, and somewhat shyly pointed to the "old-fashioned method," saying, "Can I do that?" "Certainly," replied the teacher, though, when she handed the child a piece of crayon and told her to go over the problem step by step, Grace was so agitated that she could not hold the chalk. The teacher then put her arm round the girl's shoulder and said that they should try it together. After the two had gone over the method, and later when Grace had gone over the problem alone, the girl broke down and cried in the teacher's arms. Like a little child she remarked through her tears: "I did it that way. Daddy showed me. But Miss Jones (the 6A teacher) said it was crazy."

The basic factors in Grace's scholastic difficulties were soon exposed. She had been ill with spinal meningitis when she was just learning to add. When she was well enough to return to school, she was promoted with her grade and was never taught how to borrow and carry. Now in the sixth grade, faced with applying her previous knowledge, she had resorted to a method which had been hastily taught her by her father, only to have the teacher ridicule it, and send her back to her seat in disgrace. Being a sensitive child, and socially ill at ease, she quickly responded in a negative manner to such treatment and soon gave the teacher the impression that she was stupid. Later, faced with a mental-test situation, the girl had retreated into herself and had remained unco-operative. The result was that the psychologist who tested Grace in her report tended to confirm Miss Jones's judgment about the child's inherent stupidity.

Within a week following the dénouement, Grace was participating in the review class in arithmetic, became interested in doing additional homework so as to return to her proper grade of work, and, above all, began to participate with the other

children in their social life. Altogether she remained for two years in the special class.

However, in this time, not only did she learn to master the essentials of arithmetic and other scholastic subjects, but, having shown real aptitude in domestic science, she was prepared, when she finished the eighth grade, to enter a technical high school. Although her father and mother objected to a vocational course for their daughter, they came to realize that it fitted her interest and ability better than the regular academic course. Grace made a good record throughout her four years and upon graduation went into a supervisory position at a good salary.

The retreat of this pupil from social reality might in time have proved serious, had not an accidental discovery opened the road to a recovery of her role and status in school, both as regards her schoolwork and as regards her schoolmates and teachers.

Case of Esther N., twelve and a half years old. This girl, who was in the sixth grade, was brought to the psychological clinic by the visiting teacher, who had been asked to help the juvenile judge of the community to decide what to do about the child. Esther had been brought to the judge's attention informally on the ground that she had admitted taking small amounts of money from her employers. It was felt that perhaps the school authorities and the juvenile judge together might work out a plan to prevent the development of more serious delinquencies.

Esther was failing in her schoolwork. She was inattentive, came to school poorly prepared, and found increasing difficulty, especially with fractions. She spent three or four afternoons a week in the motion-picture houses, sometimes remaining through two full shows. This often put her home at a late hour, where after a bit of supper she went off to bed. She had little or no spending money from home, and often went out in the afternoons or evenings to tend children for other families in order to earn small amounts of money. It was her desire to get more money for admission tickets that led her to short-change some of her employers or to lift petty sums from the houses where she worked. She had never taken anything beyond small change, although she had had on occasion the opportunity to take rather substantial sums.

Esther was one of a large family. The father, although not ill-natured, was shiftless and indifferent to the traditional role of provider. He worked spasmodically and chiefly only when the seasonal peak of employment was on. He spent most of his spare time loafing about in poolhalls. As a result, the mother had been forced to seek gainful employment outside the home. One older girl had a small job in a downtown office and contributed in part to her own keep. As a result, the children were frequently left to shift for themselves. Although Esther took over some responsibility for the care of her younger brothers and sisters, such responsibility was never planned or organized, so that she had much free time for her own amusement.

The girl got along with others very well. Her success in handling smaller children, in fact, provided employment from various families who wished her to look after their youngsters while they were out in the afternoons or evenings. She enjoyed telling stories, making doll clothes, and otherwise entertaining the children. In fact, she had a real talent in sewing.

But, as indicated, Esther was failing in school; she had begun to lose her reputation with her friendly employers because of her petty stealing; and she was not develop-

ing any adequate responsibility toward her family. The psychological examination showed that she had a dull-normal rating on the Stanford-Binet test (86 I.Q.); but the girl was certainly not feeble-minded. She not only spent much of her leisure time at motion pictures, but was increasingly engaged in elaborate daydreams of her future. She pictured herself as a movie actress. She lived so completely in the fantasy world that she was beginning to lose some of her sense of actuality.

An interesting detail regarding the stimulation of the daydreaming about motion pictures came out in the interview with the psychologist. She told him that some four years previously she and some other children had put on a "song and dance act" during an evening's entertainment at one of the local picture houses, on which occasion the central attraction had been the personal appearance of Baby Peggy, a child actress of that period. Esther had talked briefly to Baby Peggy and from this minor contact had got the idea that she might become a child actress and then go on to adult success.

It was apparent that this domination of a daydream which had no chance of being fulfilled might in time lead to complete school failure and to serious delinquencies. It was also evident that the child did not possess sufficient intelligence to go on to the usual academic high-school course. But she did have skill in sewing and handwork. Although she was by age and grade not yet eligible for vocational training, it was arranged that she was to spend her afternoons in the city's vocational school, doing only a portion of her classes at the other school. (She was in a parochial school, and the priest in charge had co-operated very well in the new plan.) The visiting teacher talked to the mother, as did the priest, and the mother agreed with Esther that she should attend not more than one motion picture a week. In addition, she was given some definite responsibilities at home. And some of her previous employers were quietly reassured that they need not fear her repeating her indiscretions with money, so she was again able to earn some spending money.

Esther entered wholeheartedly into the new program. She liked her work in sewing and millinery at the vocational school. She got a genuine sense of success from making dresses and hats. Three years later the visiting teacher reported excellent progress. Already, at the age of sixteen years, Esther was being employed outside school hours as a seamstress, and, moreover, she "loved her work."

In this case we find a combination of mediocre ability, false aspirations induced by extracurricular interests, failure of the traditional curriculum to interest the pupil, and the inception of predelinquent trends and especially of excessive daydreaming, which might, uncorrected, have led to more serious mental involvement. The excellent co-operation of the school authorities with the parent and child in adopting a definite plan made possible a real beginning for vocational and other success for Esther.

Case of Joan A., nine years old. Joan was discovered masturbating on various occasions while supposedly reading her lessons. The teacher was disturbed by this, but the girl was so bright and so pleasant that the teacher felt she ought to talk to the principal and the clinical psychologist about the situation. Joan had been in school only a year and a half but was already in the 3A grade. She had an intelligence quotient

of 135 and found the schoolwork altogether too easy for her, especially in a school in which 50 per cent of the pupils were recruited from a section of the city inhabited by children of immigrant parentage.

Joan was an only child of professional parents. Her father was a successful engineer with a healthy interest in his child's development. The mother was a good housekeeper and was perhaps unduly fond of the child, but not sentimentally so.

At the outset of the episode the teacher had rather stupidly made some remarks which called the other pupils' attention to Joan's behavior, and the child had resented this. When the parents were consulted by the psychologist, a plan was developed whereby the child was to be transferred to a school on the periphery of the city where there were only a few pupils and where she might go ahead with her schoolwork as rapidly as she wished.

The new situation was fully explained to Joan. She co-operated well. The new teachers knew nothing of the details of the previous situation, but the new principal was informed. Although on one or two occasions, when Joan became a bit frightened, she made some incipient autoerotic gestures, for the most part her attention was directed to other matters. She made a number of new friends there, and at home she had no end of companions from other families in the apartment where she lived.

For two years Joan attended this new school. She completed the three additional grades in that time and was ready to enter the junior high school.

Subsequently Joan went through high school and college making a brilliant record and is now launched on a professional career.

If this problem had not been wisely handled, the results might have been altogether different. All too frequently manifestations of such conduct on the part of a pupil arouse fear and disgust on the part of the teacher, which in turn lead to censure and even public punishment. The persistence of strong taboos regarding overt sexuality in our society often leads to badly advised treatment which may result in shame, sense of inferiority, and even misconduct, rather than sound recovery.

Case of Lynn S. Lynn, whose I.Q. was only 86, had at the age of eleven years only reached the 3A grade. He was one of a number of socially poorly adjusted pupils for whom a supervised after-hours recreation club had been organized to help them improve both scholastically and socially. Lynn had previously been brought to the psychological clinic as a stutterer, but his speech handicap had been overcome by training. Yet he remained aloof from his classmates. His teacher reported that he was "not a behavior problem" but that he was nonco-operative, seclusive, and "under-active." He would perform a task definitely assigned him, but, unless he was singled out for attention, the teacher said, "you wouldn't know he was there." He not infrequently fell asleep in the schoolroom, doubtless as a result of his remaining out late nights with his parents.

The boy's father worked in various downtown buildings firing furnaces. The mother was a chambermaid in a college fraternity house. The family had moved frequently both within the present community and previously from locality to locality.

Lynn, an only child, frequently accompanied his parents on their evening visits to

play cards or "shoot dice" with their friends. The report on Lynn states: "He was proud of himself when he told of the second prize he won in dice on one occasion. 'If it hadn't been that I started later than the rest, I'd have won the first prize.' But he stated that he liked the 'second prize better, anyway, because it was a book.' " The boy had few companions of his own age, though he did play ball with some of the youngsters of the neighborhood. He preferred reading and especially feminine activities. To quote the record again: "Lynn is the family's girl. He likes his hair long and bushy in the back. It took a great deal of persuasion on the part of his teachers to get him to cut it. He likes to sew and described with enthusiasm a tea towel which he had made and a dresser scarf that he had embroidered as a Valentine for his grandmother." He had a rich fantasy life but did enjoy some conversation, especially with adults. He drew effectively upon his wide reading. But he was none too well adjusted to children of his own age.

Lynn enjoyed the club activities, and there is no doubt that they served to offset, at least for the time, his too great contact with adults. However, since he lived so far from the school which he attended, his friendships built up in the club could hardly be expected to carry over beyond the organization itself.

Here was a boy of dull-normal mentality who had been too much controlled by his mother. He had not been able to make a normal adaptation to his school situation and lacked many qualities which are best got there. Whether he would be able to cut himself loose from his mother's apron strings during and after puberty remained to be seen.

Case of John B., seventeen years old. In his third year in high school, John began having difficulty with his speech. Although his stammering was first apparent in a speech class when he was obliged to make a formal oral presentation of certain materials, in time his recitation in other classes began to be affected by a like hesitation. But this difficulty was clearly linked to a definite sense of difference and inadequacy. There was no evidence of any organic vocal defect.

John was the oldest of three sons of a popular and well-paid minister in a town of 3000 inhabitants. There were no daughters. The mother was also active in church work, and the family enjoyed high social standing in the community. As John grew up, he was given certain responsibilities, such as answering the door, receiving guests or callers, and helping to see that all visitors, formal and otherwise, were made comfortable. He was even permitted to drive the family carriage in order to take guests home. He learned to play the piano with tolerable success, and was good at giving oral readings at church festivals. He was always tidy and well-dressed, was given a fixed allowance, and altogether—within the framework of his home and community—was a well-adjusted and mature chap for his age.

But tragedy reached into the family. The father died very unexpectedly after an illness of short duration, and within a few months the mother also passed away. The three boys had practically no resources, and they were thrown upon the good will and charity of an uncle and aunt who lived on a farm some distance away.

These relatives were none too well off financially, and, though they took good care of the boys, the latter had to work hard on the farm. Moreover, the family had

no particular community status, a change which John, in particular, felt most keenly. He was no longer a minister's son, and people did not put themselves out to be nice to him. He began to feel sorry for himself, to imagine that people looked down upon him. He was lonely and unhappy, and after three years of this he grew rebellious and ran away to a near-by city. He secured a job as an elevator boy and entered high school as soon as he had sufficient funds for the books and small fees.

He made good grades in all his work but speech. He could not face the class, and his stammering began to affect his success in other classes. He had lost his former self-confidence.

His speech teacher and the clinical psychologist both interviewed him. It was indicated to him that he had superior intellectual ability (as measured by a group intelligence test), that he had moderately good looks, and that despite his reticence he made friends rather easily. His bitterness toward his uncle and aunt were shown to be largely of his own imagination. It was pointed out to him that they had done the best they could. It was stressed that one of such excellent abilities and with sufficient drive to seek further education on his own responsibility had no reason to feel ashamed of his need to work his way through school, or for his lowly social status. This interest in him and the confidential relationship built up between the clinical psychologist and the boy helped restore his self-esteem. Both the clinician and the speech teacher helped him to overcome his stammering and stage fright. And, while they were offering technical advice regarding his speech, they reiterated his assets in the way of ability and pointed out that his reorientation was largely a matter of his own determination.

Within a few weeks he had shown considerable improvement. He made more friends, joined a debating society, and in his senior year was the leading debater in the school. When he graduated from high school, his prospects were good for going on to college, even though he would have to support himself. He had regained his self-reliance and had developed an aspiration in keeping with his superior ability.

In this instance, loss of family and of the supporting high social status produced a sense of inadequacy and a loss of self-confidence. The case indicates the close relationship between external support and attitudes, traits, and roles. John, despite his excellent home training, was in no way prepared to meet the crisis which faced him at the coming of puberty. Within the orbit of his family, church, and small community he had been well adjusted. With the loss of social prestige, he had difficulty in reorientating himself. But high intellectual ability and congenial treatment from his teachers did much to bring about a change in his conception of his role and status and put him again on the road to an adequate adjustment.

From such cases as those just presented, as from many others which could be presented, it is clear that both home and school contribute to the success or failure of the child's educational performance. Schoolwork in the past centered chiefly in the intellectual acquirements of knowledge and special skills, but it is becoming increasingly evident that the

social-emotional training will have more stress in the future. Van Waters (1925, p. 97) puts the importance of the emotional life before us in these words:

"The school is not responsible for the emotional attitudes with which the pupils enter, but the school should frankly realize that success, or failure, will be determined, not by intelligence of students, nor by richness of the course of study, but in the degree of skill with which it develops the emotional life of children. In each student crises arise, seemingly without adequate basis, the every day matters of the first school success, or failure, first punishment, humiliation, reward, criticism, ridicule, undetected cheating, or unmerited approval will serve as the core around which a cluster of emotional habits will cling."

There is everywhere a growing recognition of the importance of the social-emotional factors and of the fact that the traditional "academic" curricula hardly serve the purpose of training large masses of our youngsters and adolescents for the future. Especially is there an increasingly widespread belief that the school as an institution is designed not only to transmit the past traditions and customs, but to serve as a basic center (along with the home) for the fundamental training of the whole personality. It is not our purpose to discuss the sociological or cultural features of our present or projected educational system. But in the next section we shall note, by way of illustration only, some of the broader problems involved in relating the institutional aspects of the school, especially the curricular, to the personality development of the pupils.

INDIVIDUAL TREATMENT IN THE SCHOOL SYSTEM

For present purposes we may designate the plans and practices for improving the adjustment of the pupil to the school under three headings: (1) those that depend upon attention to individual instances of poor adaptation within the more or less traditional educational framework, (2) those that look to complete remaking of the traditional curricula and pedagogical methods, and (3) those that would combine attention to the personality of the pupil with decided changes in the course of study and in classroom procedures.

Clinical guidance in the present system. The influence on the American schools of the so-called mental-hygiene movement, begun about 1910, has been considerable. Though alterations in the curricula and pedagogy have been slow to follow the implications of mental hygiene, within the older framework a great deal of work has been done in such matters as grading pupils in terms of abilities and especially in the provision of clinical help and personal guidance. In some communities clinical psychologists and visiting teachers are formally attached to the school system; in others the work is done for the school system in co-operation with

privately supported social-work agencies. (See Loutitt, 1936; and Witmer, 1940.) Most of the cases cited in this chapter came from a more or less traditional urban school system in which the public schools' own department of child guidance and certain social-work agencies co-operated.

Obviously, such programs have their merits. But common experience shows that, though individual children may be helped thereby, the very fact that some provision is made for the more divergent cases all too frequently leads school superintendents, school boards, and community leaders to imagine that there is no actual need to alter the course of study in any profound manner or to modify the older supervisory or teaching devices. Yet, in the face of this inertia, all over the country child-guidance or mental-hygiene personnel have over the years gradually helped to re-educate the classroom teachers in the direction of improving their everyday treatment of children and subject matter. Gradually through direct guidance work and through such indirect influences, coupled with present and impending social and economic changes generally, we may look for a modification in the American public-school curricula and pedagogy which will be more in harmony with human and social actualities. But the process of change is slow. And proposals for any thoroughgoing modification is usually met with the prospect of public resistance to probable increased costs. But considerable doubt may be thrown on the soundness of such defense of the *status quo*. Educational leaders and the supporting public might do well to realize the enormous amount of economic waste in the present system—to say nothing of the emotional costs—resulting from the persistence of outmoded subject matter, inefficient teaching methods, and the like.¹ In the meantime we may look for a broadening and continuation of the present practice of handling problem cases within the framework of the traditional school. Yet there are about us a number of educational programs—supported largely by private funds—which are furnishing us with valuable data on what may and can be done when education is approached from a new viewpoint and with different content and method of instruction. At the same time these newer programs are serving to indicate more sharply some of the broader problems which confront American educational policy and practice today.

Changes in curriculum and pedagogy. Proponents of the various plans to modify the curriculum rather sharply and to alter the character of the

¹ These broader matters are all linked up with changes in the composition of our population and in the economic and political basis of our American society. For instance, the decline in the birth rate is now influencing the number of pupils in our schools, just as the restriction of economic opportunities and modifications in our political order will also affect, in time, the content of the course of study and the public conception of education in our society. This topic is outside the scope of this book, but see the report (1933) of President Hoover's Committee entitled *Recent Social Trends*.

traditional modes of instruction take the view, essentially, that we may improve and enrich the life of the child and adolescent and greatly influence the course of his subsequent adult life by changing the environment to which he is exposed in the school. (See Rugg and Shoemaker, 1928; Washburne, 1928; Wrightstone, 1935; Prescott, 1938; Ryan, 1938; Thayer, Zachry, and Kotinsky, 1939.) They criticize severely the mass education of the past and present with its rather lockstep methods, its rigid ritual respecting materials and classroom practices, and all the paraphernalia of examinations, marking, promotions, certification, and the like. The more divergent of them oppose the traditional overemphasis on individualistic competition, point out the harmful strain produced by pitching the levels of aspiration too high for the abilities and interests of the pupils, and indicate the failure to correlate the aims of the curriculum and the classroom directly with life outside.

There is considerable evidence to show that the use of the project method, so called, is superior to the traditional schemes of instruction. We shall note only two studies by way of illustration:

Collings (1923) compared three rural schools, two of which followed the older course of study and method of instruction, and the third the project plan. Results for a four-year period showed that not only did the students in the latter school excel the others in the amount of sheer academic acquirement, but there were less truancy and tardiness and a better parent-school relation under the project method than under the traditional one. R. G. Anderson (1934) compared two schools and their problem cases: school A followed the usual curriculum with strict routine and decided crowding of pupils into each grade unit; school B was a so-called "progressive school" where the course of study was suited to the children's needs and interests and where the classroom procedure was informal and stimulating. The problem cases reported to the school psychologist from the former school were chiefly for disciplinary difficulties or failure in subject matter. In the latter were a few children who suffered from fear and shyness, who showed lack of social adaptability, or who came from homes with poor child-training; but on the whole there were few difficult cases.

There is no doubt that many of the "newer schools"—as they are called—have produced excellent results. (See the reports of the Progressive Education Association "evaluation" studies of high-school and college performance, among others that of Sheviakov and Friedberg, 1939; and Zachry, 1940.) Yet it should not be imagined that the mere alteration of the course of study and the method of teaching will solve all the problems, partially because not all the difficulties of the pupil arise from the subject matter and the instructional devices but from his home and community background and from the more subtle interactions of pupil and pupil, and of pupil and teacher.

Combination of new curricula and personal guidance. Apparently we may expect the best results when a school program and a pedagogy

which touch the vital interests of the child in terms of the modern world are combined with ample provision for continued diagnosis and aid to the individual who still has trouble in adapting himself to the school and to the world outside. The very difference in the type of problem case from the traditional in contrast to that from the progressive school, cited by Anderson (1934), furnishes some enlightening data on the matter of personality adjustment. In the former the difficulties lie in evidences of intellectual failure and of resistance to the routine of school life. In the latter the problems lie in quite another dimension, namely that concerned with shyness, anxiety, and avoidance of normal social contact. (See Wickman, 1928, cited in Chapter XVIII.) All too frequently in the traditional classroom the shy, introverted child is quite ignored because he makes no trouble for the teacher. In the newer schools his problems are exposed and handled, and at the same time the usual difficulties with discipline and failure in subject matter are minimized or tend to disappear altogether.

In the meantime the mass of our boys and girls must go through much the same educational regimen that their parents did. And, despite all that is said of the strain and ineffectiveness of the traditional school system, despite the accumulation of evidence as to the incidence of personality maladjustment among elementary and secondary pupils, when one looks at the whole system and its results in the large, against the background of our American culture, one must see that the picture is not too dark or discouraging. The resistance of children and youth to an overdose of routine and lockstep instruction is itself healthy. Young children and adolescents in our society are far too dynamic to be completely subdued by the more formalistic and deadening features of our traditional schools. The young personality has an amazing resilience and initiative, stimulated in part by the very extreme individualism which is often under criticism. Moreover, training in school does not consist alone in book or laboratory work. The extracurricular activities offer pupils much opportunity for growth in self-expression and for finding an outlet for their potential talents in leadership and creativeness. In this connection it is worth noting that a number of investigations of the postschool careers of high-school students show that training in leadership in high school has considerable bearing on success and the development of leadership in later life.

Shannon (1929) studied the later careers of a large sample of high-school graduates of Terre Haute, Indiana, who had been at least ten years out of secondary school. He set up a series of criteria of adult success, including such items as occupation, annual income, subsequent academic progress, special honors, outstanding achievements, publications, and services in the community. He divided his sample into those who had been school leaders in the popular, administrative sense, the scholars, or students

who secured high marks, and a control group of the average run-of-the-mill pupils.

His findings may be summarized as follows: (1) The school leaders in general were more successful in later life than the good scholars. (2) The students who had been on the scholastic honor rolls had not succeeded as well "in one-half of the respects measured as have the members of the random group." It seems that the scholars are the least successful in later life, as measured by his criteria. (3) In other words, high scholarship does not seem to be a requisite factor in later success. (4) Those activities which produce excellence in the extracurricular life in school seem to be the best preparation for adult success later.

A somewhat similar investigation by Clem and Dodge (1933) of 308 high-school graduates of Rome, New York, revealed much the same findings: the school leaders, who were not the best in scholarship, in later life excelled the honor students and the random sample not only in income but in quantity of publications, subsequent public honors, and "outstanding achievement."

Courtney (1938) using a smaller sample of 100 school leaders and 100 nonleaders, compared them as to school activities, officerships held in school, and other matters relating to extracurricular life. In high school itself the leaders had exceeded the nonleaders in these matters in a ratio of 7.9 to 0.9; in college the ratio was 5.5 to 1.5; and in later community life it was 4.7 to 1.1.

Thus, even in the face of our highly routinized classroom procedures and rather dull content of materials, in the extracurricular life of the pupil, at least, he is given a chance to get preliminary training in forms of leadership and in social experience which will carry over into adult life. But in interpreting such investigations, we must again bear in mind the potency of our traditional emphasis on personal competition and on forms of leadership which emphasize money-making and executive capacity, and the corresponding neglect of other merits. The very criteria set up by Shannon, Clem and Dodge, and Courtney reflect the high values of our particular culture.

The problems of the pupil's adjustment to the school are by no means confined to his learning the subject matter, to his adaptation to the emotional effects of intensive competition, or to the rise of social-emotional difficulties in the school that are pretty directly the outcome of home conditions. The social configuration of pupil-teacher interaction also influences the child's adaptation, and in turn the teacher's role in the school is greatly affected by her role and status in the community. In the next chapter we shall deal with some of these problems.

Chapter XVIII

TEACHER-PUPIL AND TEACHER-COMMUNITY RELATIONS

IN THE PRESENT chapter the discussion will be concerned first of all with some of the important aspects of the personality of the teacher. Second, we shall deal with the teachers' roles in the classroom and variations in the pupils' reactions to these roles. From this we shall pass on to examine the traditional teachers' views regarding classroom conduct, especially contrasting their interpretation of what constitutes pupil maladjustment with the views of mental-hygiene experts on the same topic. And, finally, we shall close with a consideration of the interaction of parents and teachers as seen against the background of community standards and expectancies.

THE PERSONALITY OF THE TEACHER

The teacher, especially at the level of the nursery school, kindergarten, and elementary grades, is in large measure a mother surrogate. In our society she takes over from the culture of the family and home the patterns of authority, discipline, advice, love, and sympathy for the child. And it must be noted in this connection that in our country the majority of elementary teachers are women. At the very time in our society when the child is in the process of emancipating himself from the maternal hold on him, we provide him with an institution which precipitates him at once into the care of another woman.¹ This practice, of course, reflects two of our somewhat contrasted cultural values; first, the dominant place of women and especially the mother in the whole field of child training, and, second, the low social status which we give to elementary teaching. (See below.) Just what this feminine role means for the child's training no one really knows, but that it does have its effects upon the growing self of the boy or girl no one can deny. The well-

¹ Since such a large fraction of the teachers in the American elementary and secondary schools are women, the common practice of referring to them in the feminine gender will be followed. Likewise, to avoid awkward phrasing the pronoun for child will be masculine, though it is apparent that the problem of the woman teacher is somewhat different for the girl than it is for the boy. But in either instance the child is kept more or less within a social-cultural configuration which carries on the maternal, feminine controls and influences.

known sentimentality of American men regarding women, for instance, must have some of its origin not only in the home but in the classroom as well. Moreover, the matter is complicated by the fact that an overwhelming percentage of our women teachers are unmarried. This means that many problems of their own social-sexual adjustment affect their reactions to their pupils. (See Chapter XXII.)

Influence of the teacher's personality on her role. Just as the problems of parent-child relationship are qualified by the hangover of the parents' own early training (see Chapter XIV), so the contact of the teacher with her pupils will be qualified at every point by her own habits, attitudes, and ideas. Without doubt one of the most important of these qualifications is due to the fact that the thwarted love life of a teacher may affect her responses to her educational charges. This may take varied forms, of course. In some instances the unmarried woman teacher finds in the pupils a sublimated outlet for her own deep desire for children of her own. The teacher's pet—a common role in some schoolrooms—is a case in point. Frequently this is a child who flatters the teacher's ego by docility; obedience, conformity, helpfulness, or other traits. On the other hand, there are instances aplenty of teachers who develop a good deal of antagonism toward the children or toward a particular child, which is often but an ambivalent outlet for their own repressed love interest. Thus a pretty girl pupil may unconsciously irritate a fading schoolmistress who has missed her chances at love; or a dominant lad may irritate her, she knows not why, because she sees in him some prototype of a man she admires but cannot capture.

When pupils are discovered in minor or major sexual escapades of a more overt sort, suppressed teachers—men or women—may expose (at least to keen observers) considerable emotional distress of their own regarding love and sex. This may take the direction of shaming, ridiculing, or severely punishing the child or adolescent for such an infraction of our mores. In the well-adjusted teacher the same sort of conduct would not arouse strong emotional reactions so much as an interest in guiding the pupil to a more healthy adjustment in regard to sex.

Another typical response is overemphasis upon obedience to authority. The teacher's own frustration at her inferior social status, for example, may cause her unconsciously to find some compensation in strict rules and constant demands for obedience from her pupils. The prevalence of the parental pattern, anticipated by the community itself, supports the teacher in many of these personal forms of substitute satisfactions.

Closely related to this authoritarian pattern is the teacher who is insistent upon conformity to a wide range of external details, or who is petty, who resorts to continual nagging, and whose discipline is constantly to the fore. Again, there is the teacher who is given over to repeated and

almost omnipresent moralizing, not only in regard to the school subjects, but respecting the behavior and attitudes of the children before her. Finally (not to make the list too long) there is the teacher suffering from anxiety who frequently projects her fears and worries upon her pupils. The author recalls a group of somewhat upset parents who discovered that the first-grade teacher in their neighborhood school was constantly frightening many of the children by weird tales of the deleterious results of infectious and contagious diseases, and who on one special occasion spent a long period relating the gory details of a horrible fire in a motion-picture theater in one of our large cities in which over one hundred children had lost their lives. This behavior led finally to formal complaints from the parents because they felt that the teacher's continual talking of these matters was producing a persistent state of emotional agitation in the children themselves. It was pretty evident that this teacher's own personal and largely unconscious anxieties were being projected upon the children under her care.

While there are many particular instances of the kinds of social-emotional divergences in teachers just cited, one may find plenty of other teachers who are well adjusted emotionally and socially and who do an excellent job, often in the face of heavy odds; such as overcrowded classes and a stultifying course of study. But no extensive survey of the mental health of a representative sample of American teachers has ever been made. There have been a few investigations which indicate that anxiety, emotional distress, inferiority feelings, and a sense of personal insecurity are all too common among them.

Thus Peck (1936) gave the Thurstone Personality Schedule and the Otis Test of Mental Ability to a hundred women teachers. (As a control group he tested fifty-two women normal-school students and twenty-six men, who were either teachers or prospective ones.) Additional data of a personal character were collected. For our discussion at this point the important findings were as follows: (1) Women teachers, on the whole, were not so well adjusted emotionally as women students, and all the women together were less well adjusted than the men. (2) One third of the women teachers were definitely maladjusted in terms of Thurstone's norms (one sixth of them being in need of psychiatric advice according to the scores), and only one fifth were really well adjusted. (3) Among the most common items which revealed their neurotic traits were undue shyness, frequent state of "low spirits," feeling that they should have a "better lot in life," and high frequency of a "state of excitement." (4) More symptoms of maladjustment were reported by those who said that they were unhappy during childhood or adolescence than by those who said they were happy. (5) In this sample, sound mental health seemed to be correlated with age, the older the woman teacher the more satisfactory her score. The mode for maladjusted teachers was in the age group between twenty-six and thirty years. Also, inexperienced women teachers did much more poorly on the test than those who had taught ten years or more. (6) For both women and men teachers, the married were better

adjusted than the unmarried. Of women only, widows were best off in this matter, single women next, and married women the least well adjusted. (7) Of women teachers, those from the primary grades fared worst on the test, the high-school instructors best. (8) A comparison of the Thurstone scores with self-estimates of maladjustment showed that the subjects were "unable to judge their own mental health." (See also Pechstein, 1928.)

Though the Thurstone Schedule is open to criticism, and though this sample is far too small for such refined breakdowns of the data (see Chapter XI), nevertheless this study is suggestive, and, in connection with some other investigations of similar character and a number of reports of psychiatrists and clinical psychologists, it serves to confirm in general the comments and interpretations offered above.² Boynton, Dugger, and Turner's study (1934) is interesting in that it shows that teachers and their pupils tend to resemble each other in particular neurotic traits.

It should be self-evident that, if the teacher is not herself socially and emotionally well balanced, she must sooner or later have some effect upon her pupils. As Taft (1923, pp. 677-678) has put the matter:

"In the teacher the child finds the parent, and if his relationship to his real parents is infantile or antagonistic or fearful, he will often tend to set up the same pattern with the teacher, perhaps taking out on her feelings that he has to restrain with his own father and mother. This means that the teacher has here not only the need for understanding the mechanism involved, but the opportunity for altering it. If the child can work out with an adult whom he respects a satisfactory and successful relationship, it is bound to affect favorably his entire adjustment. Not only does this demand tact and wisdom on the part of the teacher, it also requires a good personal adjustment. She must be free enough of her own complexes not to let them determine her reaction to the child. She must be kind, but not sentimental, friendly, but impersonal, not using the child to satisfy her own emotional needs or relieve her personal feelings, and above all she must be patient and always interested. The teacher who is interested in her children in an objective way and is able to give them a sense of freedom and self-confidence in her presence will be as potent a factor in improving mental health as any the school can contribute."

THE CLASSROOM ROLE OF THE TEACHER

The interaction of the pupils and the teacher is from the very outset influenced by a broad set of concepts and attitudes regarding their relations in the school situation. There exists in our society a set of verbal and visual stereotypes about teachers which the children pick up from their parents and from other members of the household and later from their own schoolmates. The newspaper cartoon of the long-haired be-

² For discussion of the mental health of teachers, see *inter alia*: Mason (1931); Boynton, Dugger, and Turner (1934); Plant (1934); Zachry (1934); Rivlin (1936); Challman (1937); Ryan (1938); Witty and Skinner (1939); and Griffin, Laycock, and Line (1940).

spectacled schoolmarm is common, and our Anglo-American literature contains many verbal pictures of the schoolteacher. Washington Irving's lanky, queer Ichabod Crane, striding through the colonial communities, is a foundation for some of these, and Edward Eggleston's *Hoosier Schoolmaster* is another story of a teacher deep in our tradition. So, too, Charles Dickens's account of the severe British schoolmaster of the last century is known to every reader of his *Nicholas Nickleby*. Teachers on their part have developed a host of stereotypes about the pupils they have to instruct. Rebelliousness, indifference to learning, and trouble are often anticipated. Such traditions help condition the inexperienced schoolteacher as to what to look forward to when she first enters the classroom. These stereotypes, both of pupils and of teachers, mean that a host of expected roles and behavior manifestations for pupil and for teacher are already laid down in their minds even before they come into overt contact with each other. Obviously, these predispositions will influence subsequent interaction. Yet it is the teacher that sets the stage for the interactional patterns of her class.

The life organization of teachers may be considered in terms of their classroom roles and of the pupils' responses to the same. While we all recognize variations in teacher roles and could describe different kinds of teachers whom we have known, no very extensive studies have been made of teacher success in terms of the concept of social type or role. In the present section, therefore, we shall depend upon certain qualitative data and on the few serious attempts to reveal some of the personal traits and school roles of teachers as judged by their own pupils. We shall first give several thumbnail sketches of a number of teachers which were written by a man who himself had had over twenty years of experience as a teacher, supervisor, and superintendent.³ Altogether there were forty-three such sketches. The descriptions represent in a sense the wide range of roles assumed by teachers, as these roles were judged by one in a supervisory capacity. The particular "type" characterizations are his:

(1) "The Poised Teacher": "Miss Manning, attractive because of her delicate features, a ready, quiet smile, and ever-kindly eyes, meets her classes daily with a calm poise which at once creates the impression that the class has come prepared and expecting to fulfill definite requirements. Pupils know from her manner as well as from past experience that she is prepared to present the subject matter in an interesting way and that she is able to help them with any difficulties that may arise. It is never necessary for pupils to ask for a repetition of the assignment. It is clearly given, although Miss Manning never speaks above an ordinary conversational tone. Pupils seldom, if ever, indulge in such distracting enterprises as the study of other subjects, note writing, or cartooning, because they are too busy with the work in hand. They understand

³ From Guy Hoover, "Pupil Responses to Teachers' Attitudes and Emotions," a graduate seminar paper prepared in 1935. Used by permission.

what their teacher expects of them but they are not afraid of her. They have seen her firm but never angry. No pupil has ever left her class to 'interview the principal.' . . .

"The most desirable responses are seen in the degree of poise evident in the pupils, and in the thoroughgoing calmness of their sustained effort. This serenity is not artificial, but is an outgrowth of satisfaction in work well done. . . . Perhaps the only child who fails to appreciate this poised and kindly teacher is the one whose super-physical energy makes it irksome to work calmly and quietly for an hour."

Such a teacher impresses the casual observer as highly successful. Although even Miss Manning does not reach all her pupils with equal success, on the whole, this case may serve as something of a standard against which to compare the others. Certainly she is well balanced emotionally, keeps the proper control of the school situation without offense, and sees to it that the tasks or aims of the schoolchild are carried through, as far as she can do so.

(2) "The Formal Teacher": "A German background had given Miss Kohler an appreciation for schooling as a means to an end. Her education had enabled her to do more and better work, and she had every intention of systematically grinding her pupils through educational processes, painlessly if possible, painfully if necessary, to equip them to master the mental and manual problems they should face in their afterschool life. She was generally good-natured, but all her pupils understood that she would stand for no 'monkey business.' Her assignments were regularly made at the beginning of each class hour, and woe to the pupil who arrived a minute late or appeared without paper or with an unsharpened pencil. She was herself a tremendous worker. Her pupils knew that their test papers would be returned to them the day following the test just as they knew their homework was due on the day designated.

"Results of Miss Kohler's influence were gratifying to teachers who later received her pupils because they were 'well prepared' for the next grade. They knew how to work; they respected the authority of the new teacher until they had reason to do otherwise. They had acquired an appreciation for system and order. Many of the girls improved their personal appearance because they had liked the style and well-groomed appearance of Miss Kohler.

"Was this teacher popular? Ambitious students sought her classes. Dull, plodding pupils felt safe with her and trusted her fairness. Lazy ones avoided her. Cheaters knew that they could not 'get by' her. The 'discipline problems' of the school either respected her as they did no other teachers, or hated her because she had no mercy for those who deserved punishment. Perhaps the only pupils for whom she was not 'good medicine' in the pedagogical sense were those timid souls who had a guilty feeling when others erred and so were emotionally stirred even when her criticisms did not concern them personally."

Miss Kohler in her own cultural background represents the Germanic tradition of scholarship and sound discipline. She is disturbed by any intrusion of individuals who do not fit rather easily and quickly into her preconceived patterns. But on the whole she would be rated a good teacher by most observers.

(3) "The 'Male' Hero": "The so-called 'discipline problems' were solved for Mr. Johnson by Mother Nature when she endowed him with all the external features of a modern Apollo and then enabled him to develop a rounded personality that commands both respect and love. His work is entirely with boys in the manual-training department of a large school. These boys feel a personal interest in his golf score, his social life, and his economic welfare. They work for his approbation because he is as he is. He never meets with unnecessary tardiness, lying, defiance, temper tantrums, and the like. The boys copy his gentlemanly habits of dress, hygiene, and manner. He engenders in them enthusiasm for classroom activities and co-operation with the school regime. He is hampered by no outstanding weaknesses because of his ability to cope with individual students who may need restraint. He is consistently firm. If Mr. Johnson asks some boy to do extra work, the lad is honored. When the boys are asked in English class to write a character sketch, very often Mr. Johnson is the object. He is the ideal; their great inspiration."

This teacher is one who capitalizes on the myth of the popular hero in our American society. His role both in the classroom and outside is determined largely by the fact that he fulfills the wishes of his pupils for someone to worship and imitate. Mr. Johnson is a leader of a sort and furnishes, perhaps somewhat unconsciously, certain patterns for his boys to copy. Perhaps his technique of handling his pupils is more fitted to his school subject, manual training, than to English rhetoric or mathematics; but, in any case, he has made a good adjustment to his particular professional obligation.

(4) "The Saccharine": "Whether because of her great gentleness or her love for little children or for some motivation unknown to the writer, Miss Burger presupposes perfection in all children and treats them all like darling little angels. She helps them, wheedles them, bribes them, teases them, defends them, and is distressed over any unfavorable criticism which others give them. On one occasion, when her pupils reported to her that they were having difficulty with another teacher, she accompanied them, twelve-year-olds, to the difficult class and explained before the children to the fault-finding teacher that she and the children had talked over the situation and that now the children were going to be good boys and girls because a beautiful fairy had waved her magic wand over them, etc., etc.

"Because of her attitudes and comments many of the children are drawn from reality into fantasy. 'Mamma boys' run to her for commendation for work that they should be expected to do unnoticed. And because the bulk of children are inclined to do the expected thing, Miss Burger seldom encounters overt misbehavior. But her 'sweetness and light' are a bit too much for the hard-headed realists who have to work under her."

Miss Burger is clearly one of those mildly unadjusted persons whose own adaptation takes the form of undue sentimentality. She consistently fails to see any serious problems in her pupils, and this ignoring of difficulties, of course, is itself her means of adjustment to her teaching task.

(5) "The Possessive Teacher of Starved Emotions": "Miss Bracken, a university graduate, is passing wealthy. She has been indulged by her family and friends in many ways. She seems to have everything that a woman could desire. But she lacks affection from children, with the result that she tends to indulge her pupils: she goes to endless bother and expense with them and for them, and engenders in many of them a feeling that they are indebted to her. Some of them parasitize her shamelessly, others accept her kindness with genuine appreciation, but a third group repeatedly hurt her by their blatant indifference. They build up a selfishness which youthfully refuses to be obligated, being rather resentful at her possessive attitude."

Miss Bracken reveals a poorly sublimated emotional life finding its outlet in "buying" affection and attention from the pupils. But the tragedy, of course, consists in the fact that many pupils callously exploit her services, giving little or nothing of an affectional nature in return.

In addition to these, still other social types were noted, including the "spasmodic" or the impulsive, inconsistent teacher; the "policeman" or overdisciplinary, who employs the primitive "ordering and forbidding" techniques of classroom control; and "the hardy perennial," the teacher who has certain traditional qualities but who has really long outlasted her effectiveness. While these sketches are at best impressionistic, they do reveal a phase of teacher-pupil relations which needs to be satisfactorily investigated. A comprehension of these social roles and the associated personality types or clusters of traits might serve as valuable aids to supervisory and other administrative officers in selecting and dealing with classroom teachers.

Pupils' reactions to teachers. Over against the variety of social roles which teachers play in the classroom we may place the attitudes and ideas of the pupils toward their instructors. After all, the roles of teacher and of student depend on the manner in which their contacts are qualified by the attitudes, opinions, and responses of each to the other. No adequate study has been made of this matter for pupils at the elementary-school level, but a few suggestive investigations have been made of high-school and college students. (For the latter see Chapter XIX.)

F. W. Hart (1934) sent out a questionnaire through the schools to 10,000 high-school seniors. They were asked to think of the teacher they had *liked the best* and to give as accurately as possible their reasons for liking him. This teacher was to be called teacher A. They were also requested to pick out the teacher they had *liked the least* and give their reasons. This one was called teacher Z. If neither A nor Z was the *best teacher*, they were to indicate how the best teacher did differ from A. This teacher was to be called H. In addition, other items were called for regarding disliked teachers who were, however, the best teachers, and well-liked teachers who were also the best. Then, too, information was gathered regarding the number of teachers who resembled their best-liked one, A, and their least-liked one, Z.

Results were obtained from 3725 students on the qualities which they believed

characterized the best-liked and the least-liked teachers. From the frequency with which certain items were mentioned it was possible to arrange the qualities or features in rank order. Thus, among other "reasons for liking 'Teacher A' best," the author reports the following (only the first five of a listing of twenty items is given): (1) "Is helpful with school work, explains lessons and assignments clearly and thoroughly, and uses examples in teaching"; (2) "Cheerful, happy, good natured, jolly, has a sense of humor, can take a joke"; (3) "Human, friendly, companionable, 'one of us'"; (4) "Interested in understanding of pupils"; (5) "Makes work interesting, creates a desire to work, makes class work a pleasure."

The first five of twenty items in the rank order for "liking 'Teacher Z' least" given by the same sample are these: (1) "Too cross, grouchy, crabby, never smiles, nagging, sarcastic, loses temper, 'flies off the handle'"; (2) "Not helpful with school work, does not explain lessons and assignments not clear, work not planned"; (3) "Partial, has 'pets,' or favored students, and picks on certain students"; (4) "Superior, aloof, haughty, 'snooty,' overbearing, does not know you out of class"; (5) "Mean, unreasonable, 'hard-boiled,' intolerant, ill-mannered, too strict, makes life miserable."

Of the 763 students of the total who indicated that teacher H was other than teacher A, the rest identifying H and A as the same teacher, the first five items of twelve in noting the differences between teachers H and A arranged in rank order were: (1) "More exacting in standards of work, stricter in marking, we learned more"; (2) "Better at explaining lessons and assignments, work is better planned"; (3) "Knows the subject better and can 'put it over'"; (4) "Stricter, more rigid discipline"; (5) "Makes the work more interesting."⁴

Another study of this same type of problem was undertaken by Brookover (1939), who constructed a rating scale for what he called "Person-to-Person Interaction"—designed to measure the sense of friendliness or intimacy on the part of high-school students toward their teachers. He checked his findings on this scale against the same students' responses to a modification of the Purdue Rating Scale for Instructors, devised by Remmers (1929), which provides measures of teaching effectiveness as determined by student or supervisor rating of a given teacher.

Data were collected on thirty-seven teachers from rural and urban high schools by giving these scales to 1139 students. The Pearsonian correlation coefficient of the mean ratings of these students of the same teachers on the two scales was .64. This indicates, for this sample at least, that teachers who are rated as possessing a high quality or degree of person-to-person interaction, in terms of sympathetic and friendly reactions, absence of fear and of sense of inferiority in the teacher's presence, and belief in their essential fairness, also tend to be rated high as classroom instructors. Supplementary evidence from this study suggests that there is more likelihood of finding such friendly person-to-person relations between teachers and pupils in the smaller than in the larger schools.

Both the Hart and the Brookover studies confirm the usual qualitative comments often made by psychologists, supervisors, and others, that helpfulness, clarity, consistency in demands, congeniality, friendliness, and fair dealing play a large part not only in the classroom learning process

⁴ Quotations from Hart, *Teachers and Teaching by Ten Thousand High-School Seniors*. By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers.

but in many other matters such as discipline, morale, and sense of emotional well-being on the part of the students.

THE TEACHERS' VIEWS OF PUPILS AND CURRICULUM

In contrast to the pupil's verbal reactions to the teacher, the conduct of the child in school, in turn, has definite effects upon the opinions and attitudes of the teacher toward him. There is, in fact, a long-standing culture pattern of teacher-pupil relationship which has grown out of our traditional curricula and methods of instruction. The intrusion of the view of mental hygiene—broadly conceived—with its emphasis upon the importance of social-emotional training and of individualized teaching has done something to dislodge the older practices, but we are still a long way from a more objective standpoint and method in regard to the education of our children. Many teachers still imagine that the pounding of facts into the child is their principal if not only function; they all too frequently neglect or ignore the important social and emotional responses.

Traditional teachers vs. mental hygienists. There is a sharp contrast in point of view between traditional teachers and experts in child development and mental hygiene respecting what the important matters in teacher-pupil relations are. This is ably demonstrated in the study of Wickman (1928).

He secured extensive listings and ratings by teachers in Minneapolis and in Cleveland as to what they considered the kinds and seriousness of behavior problems among their pupils. Certain rating scales of pupil personality were also employed. In addition, certain "control ratings" were obtained from thirteen "representative schools in six different communities" and from certain groups of experienced teachers in private schools and colleges. Finally, thirty mental-hygiene experts listed and qualified the behavior manifestations of children which they considered evidences of poor adjustment and which they believed were indicative of future personality maladjustments. The listings and ratings of the classroom teachers were then compared with those of the experts. In general, the ratings and opinions of the two groups diverged sharply. To quote Wickman (1928, pp. 129-130):

"The differences in attitudes toward behavior problems represented in the ratings obtained from mental hygienists and teachers should be interpreted as differences in stress laid upon the seriousness of the various problems. Teachers stress the importance of problems relating to sex, dishonesty, disobedience, disorderliness and failure to learn. For them, the problems that indicate withdrawing, recessive characteristics in children are of comparatively little significance. Mental hygienists, on the other hand, consider these unsocial forms of behavior most serious and discount the stress which teachers lay on anti-social conduct. Such differences in attitudes imply essential differences in methods of treatment and discipline."

A somewhat more specific breakdown of these ratings is afforded by considering various items in the listings in terms of degrees of seriousness of behavior problems.

The author adopted the mathematical symbol ($>$) used to designate inequalities (greater than) in order to express differences in the respective weightings of teachers and mental hygienists respecting these problems. The teachers, on the whole, considered them in the following order (to quote):

	More Serious Than		More Serious Than		More Serious Than	
Immoralities	}	Violations of:	}	Extravagant,	}	Withdrawing
Dishonesties		Orderliness in		aggressive		recessive
Transgressions		classroom		personality		personality
against		Application to		and behavior		and behavior
authority	>	school work	>	traits	>	traits

In contrast, the experts tended to list the problems in terms of their seriousness as follows (to quote):

	More Serious Than		More Serious Than		More Serious Than	
Withdrawing, recessive personality and behavior traits	} >	Dishonesties	} >	Immoralities	} >	Transgressions against authority
		Cruelty		Violations of		Violations of
		Temper tantrums		school work requirements		orderliness
		Truancy		Extravagant be- havior traits		in class

In evaluating these findings we must bear a number of factors in mind. First, the teacher stands in a distinctly different relationship to the pupils than does the child expert. The teacher is faced, in our American schools, with the demands of the administrator to put thirty or forty pupils through the subject matter of a particular grade or half grade in the educational system. The time, energy, and training necessary for dealing with their charges individually are not at hand. It would be all too easy to put upon the teachers the blame which actually should, in large part, be laid on the doorstep of our entire system of highly rigid mass education. As Wickman (1928, p. 129) well says:

"In interpreting these findings it is essential to bear in mind that the clinicians, unlike teachers, were not laboring under pressure for educating children according to prevailing curricula and thus were not especially sensitized to those problems in behavior which disturb or frustrate the teachers' interests in the educational achievement of pupils. Moreover, in making their ratings, the clinicians were influenced, both by their particular professional interests and by specific instructions, to consider (1) the effect produced on the future development and on the social, emotional adjustment of the child by the possession of any behavior problem which is allowed to run its usual course; and (2) the need for remedial work, and the nature of remedial efforts, in treating the behavior disorders in questions."

Second, in their reactions to pupil conduct the teachers are still reflecting pretty largely the traditional parental attitudes toward young children. It is questionable how far the teachers are prepared to go in diverging from the traditionally expected standpoint regarding behavior problems among their pupils. At any rate, combined with their heavy teaching load, this customary view furnishes an understandable rationalization for not making much effort to change the old-established schemes of teaching. Actually, of course, in private schools, and in a few publicly supported "experimental schools," great progress has been made in altering the patterns of teaching and hence of pupil-teacher interaction. But how widespread these new pedagogical devices may become depends upon how willing the taxpayers of the future will be to provide still more funds for public education. (See Thayer, Zachry, and Kotinsky, 1939; Washburne, 1940; also Chapter XVII.)

This difference of viewpoint toward children in our educative schema raises a host of questions. Just what are we trying to do in our school system? Is the curriculum more important than the children, characterized as they are by very evident individual differences in intellectual ability, emotionality, and social adaptability? What premium are we putting on docility, evasive behavior, or other undesirable traits which the school actually encourages by virtue of its usual practices?

These are not easy questions to answer, and, as just noted, the run-of-the-mill teacher is largely the creature of our particular educational culture patterns. As Washburne (1937, p. 6) remarks, she is, as a rule, the victim of an "autocratic" school system completely controlled "as to the books she is to use, the method she is to employ, the curriculum she is to teach, the program she is to follow." In the face of these obligations it is difficult for her to find time for creative teaching and to give attention to the more serious but often less obvious personality manifestations of each of her pupils. She has to do the best she can with the human material put into her hands and work with it in terms of institutional arrangements which are extremely slow to change. These broader aspects of teacher-pupil relations lead us to a consideration of the role and status of the teacher with reference to community folkways and demands.

TEACHER ROLE AND STATUS IN TERMS OF COMMUNITY EXPECTANCIES

The interactions of the pupils and teachers in the school situation itself not only are related to the curricular demands of the broader society which supports the school, but are also influenced by the role and status of the teachers in the particular community. This is merely a phase of the parent-teacher contacts which, we recognize, must be taken into account when we consider the effects of the educative process upon the

child's personality. These contacts of teacher and community are related to the economic rewards of the former, to the community or social status which she enjoys, and to the demands made of her for conformity to the moral and other folkways of the locality in which she works.

Isolation and inferior social status. On the whole, teachers tend to be isolated from the center of community life. They are expected naturally to give much time and energy to their school duties. They may also be expected to contribute somewhat to extracurricular community activities, but they seldom are accepted into the heart of the local ethos. They are forced to remain aloof. They do not operate, as a rule, on any equalitarian basis with the other adult citizens. This is often as true in small as it is in large localities. As one teacher put it, the sense of "apartness" from the community life induces loneliness, emotional distress, and feelings of social inadequacy.

One factor which no doubt contributes to this sense of isolation is the high rate of labor turnover among teachers. Frequently, especially in smaller communities, teachers remain only a year or so and then move on to other and often larger school systems. Then, too, many women teachers continue their school careers only till they can marry, and, since there is an almost universal legal restriction on teaching by married women in our public schools, this drift out of the profession tends to lessen the likelihood of extensive participation in community life. These two matters, turnover and residential mobility, contribute definitely to a sense of inferiority. But, in addition, the relatively low status accorded the teaching profession in this country is notorious and may itself serve to stimulate the great amount of shifting from one teaching position to another.

The lowly standing of the teacher in comparison with other persons of like training depends on a number of factors in our American society and culture. The physician, the lawyer, and the engineer all enjoy a higher status than teachers, whether in elementary, secondary, or collegiate institutions. (On this point, see Coutu, 1936.) It is something of a paradox that, in the light of the high value attributed by Americans to book-learning as such, they should give their teachers such relatively inferior standing in comparison with other vocations. Perhaps one of the reasons is the persistence of the frontier and rural attitude toward teaching as a vocation hardly befitting the ideal "he man" type. Earlier such work was taken over only by men who could not perform other kinds. Later, as public education spread to the masses, school teaching fell largely to women, who were at that time beginning in ever greater numbers to leave their homes to enter the wage-earning classes. (See Chapter XXII.) Then, as money-making in business became increasingly the ideal of young men everywhere, there was a further shift out of teaching. For

example, today, in contrast to forty years ago, there are relatively few men in the elementary field, and there appears to be a decline in the proportion of men in secondary teaching.

Concomitant with this low cultural status, teachers tend to develop distinct feelings of inferiority in the presence of persons successful in business or in one of the professions. This may not be true of men famous for research or writing or educational administration, but it is not to be denied that the usual run of instructors, from elementary school to university, possess a sense of personal inferiority in the face of cultural standards which emphasize monetary success, business acumen, and "go-getting" attitudes and habits. Some teachers, it is true, may compensate by flight into the alleged superiorities of learning, but at heart a very high percentage of them doubtless feel themselves outside the pale of the primarily successful of this world.

Teachers and the mores. Despite attempts to develop class consciousness and to improve their bargaining power through such organizations as the American Federation of Teachers and the American Association of University Professors, teachers have made only slight improvement in their status during recent years. They must still conform more or less closely to the community mores and manners. Communities under the political domination of Protestant churches pay much attention to the religious affiliations of prospective teachers. Where Catholics have considerable influence, they demand that teachers of their faith be given places in the school system. In many communities Jews are denied places on the instructional staff. (See K. Young, 1927a.)

In the absence of any effective organization of their own to secure for themselves a vote regarding the conditions of their employment, teachers are forced to accept all sorts of taboos laid down by the school authorities. Where dancing is forbidden by community standards, teachers are not permitted to dance. Where smoking by teachers and drinking alcoholic beverages are under the ban, the teachers must refrain from indulging in such practices. Even in communities where the parents, and even the high-school students themselves, smoke and drink, teachers are often still obliged to conform to older and obviously outworn standards. The following rules laid down by a school board in a small isolated community may strike the reader as foolish, but they represent only an extreme of the standpoint demanded in hundreds of American localities (quoted by Minehan, 1927, p. 606):

"I promise to take a vital interest in all phases of Sunday-school work, donating of my time, service, and money without stint for the uplift and benefit of the community.

"I promise to abstain from all dancing, immodest dressing, and any other conduct unbecoming a teacher and a lady.

"I promise not to go out with any young men except in so far as it may be necessary to stimulate Sunday-school work.

"I promise not to fall in love, to become engaged or secretly married.

"I promise not to encourage or tolerate the least familiarity on the part of any of my boy pupils.

"I promise to sleep at least eight hours a night, to eat carefully, and to take every precaution to keep in the best of health and spirits, in order that I may be better able to render efficient service to my pupils.

"I promise to remember that I owe a duty to the townspeople who are paying me my wages, that I owe respect to the school board and the superintendent that hired me, and that I shall consider myself at all times the willing servant of the school board and the townspeople."

Although not written into the contract, a considerable hangover of the theological tradition of the past is found in many places. The teacher is to be the repressive moral and religious caretaker of her pupils. This attitude is as prevalent in higher as in elementary education. The writer knows of a number of cases where, by supervised dances, parties, and other extracurricular activities, high-school teachers and principals have attempted to inject some positive devices into socially and morally disintegrated schools, only to be stopped by the entrenched schoolboards, backed up by conservative public opinion. In one such instance the high-school students often escaped into larger near-by towns for public dances, and in general there was a good deal of immoral conduct among them. The principal attempted to convince the schoolboard of the need for some supervised recreation for the high-school boys and girls to offset these practices. The leading school trustee was obdurate. His only reply was: "I danced when I was young, and I know how bad it is. So long as I am president of this schoolboard, I am against dancing in this community."

Not only do older religious and moral beliefs play a part in a community reaction to teachers, but political and economic views have become increasingly a matter of concern to schoolboards in hiring and firing teachers. Since schoolboards are still largely controlled by businessmen or landowners, teachers who take part in socialistic or communistic activities are likely to fall into disfavor. Much depends, of course, upon the general community attitudes toward trade unionism and toward liberal or radical political theories. In recent years the struggle of industrial workers to organize into unions has made the ascendant classes in many communities more conscious than formerly of the implicit threats which such movements mean for their dominance in the community and in the schools. In several states all schoolteachers must sign a pledge to support the federal and state constitutions and must otherwise indicate under oath that they will not lend aid or support to any political or

economic movements considered by the economic and political élite to be subversive. (See Gellerman, 1938.) While this sort of regulation strikes many people as useless or itself subversive of democratic liberties, in countries under dictatorial governments similar practice is taken for granted. Thus in Nazi Germany teachers must swear an oath that they are Aryan and also that their wives are not to their best knowledge Jewish. For instance according to the Prussian law promulgated on August 5, 1933, all cadet teachers must take the following oath:

"I hereby declare: After careful investigation, I am not aware of any circumstances which might justify the supposition that I am descended from non-Aryan parents or grandparents. At least none of my parents or grandparents ever belonged to the Jewish religion. I am fully aware that I lay myself open to prosecution and possible dismissal from my position if this declaration is not the absolute truth." (Quoted by Meyer, 1937. There are also regulations of somewhat like character for the wives of teachers.)

It is not only the fear of the teacher's participation in movements of political and economic radicalism outside the classroom which disturbs the entrenched classes of a community; it is the anxiety lest the teachers introduce new views on economic and political matters into their instruction. This, of course, is most feared when the pupils reach the upper grades and high school. The parents usually feel safer when the teachers stick to older and more conservative treatment of literature, art, and social science. Any frank and objective discussion of fascism, socialism, communism, or even the economics of consumer or producer co-operatives, may lead to the teacher's being dismissed or not re-employed at the end of any particular contractual period.

Whatever finds disfavor in the eyes of the dominant group in a community or society is not likely to find a place in the curriculum of education. Moreover, wherever there is a conflict of opinion, there arise difficulties for the teacher if he essays to treat these questions openly and scientifically. It is quite proper for students of economics to write theses exposing the inner workings of the financial system of the Fugger family during the sixteenth century, but to treat problems of contemporary unequal taxation, or inequalities in the distribution of wealth, or to examine, even critically, socialistic or fascist ideologies, and practices, may lead to external pressure. There is no doubt, as Sumner (1906) wrote many years ago, that, if mathematics, physics, or chemistry came into conflict with present-day ideologies or mores, society would develop an orthodoxy about them as truly as it has more recently with respect to biology or social science.⁵

⁵ The words of Sumner are almost prophetic, for today (1940) we have witnessed in various totalitarian states, but especially in Nazi Germany, the very orthodoxy, not only of

Yet, the public restrictions regarding what is "proper" and "moral" in subject matter does not concern the social sciences and literature only. In many communities in our country there still remain strong taboos on the teaching of biological evolution. Not many centuries ago the dominant Christian church of the time put intense pressure upon men of science for teaching what was considered "false doctrine" about the world and the planetary system. For example, in 1633, at the age of seventy years, Galileo, the great Italian scientist of his day, was hailed before a church court to face charges of teaching doctrines considered heretical. Even today many church groups want to and do suppress instruction regarding the natural history of man. In our own country as late as 1925 John Thomas Scopes was indicted in the courts of Rhea County, Tennessee, for denying "the story of the Divine Creation of Man as taught in the Bible" and for teaching "instead thereof that man has descended from a lower order of animals."

And no subject is more taboo in this country than that of sex. Not only is the personal conduct of teachers and students carefully guarded by the administrative authorities, but in many school systems the discussion of sex problems as a part of the curriculum is frowned upon or else definitely forbidden. This is an area of conduct that has not yet escaped the hold of outworn theology.

In our own country the trends, however, are rather favorable. Teachers everywhere are becoming more vocal and courageous about their obligations to mold the opinions and habits of their public charges, and there is a definite tendency in many communities toward changes in the curriculum and in school administration favorable to a franker and more objective treatment of both public and personal problems, particularly in respect to politics, economics, and instruction regarding the sounder view with regard to the growing boy's or girl's love life.

social science, but of the natural sciences of which Sumner wrote. To cite only one instance, there has been a definite attempt in Germany to develop Aryan, non-Jewish mathematics and natural sciences! See also G. Watson (1933) for an incisive account of the intrusion of Nazi ideology into the field of academic psychology in Germany.

Chapter XIX

MENTAL HYGIENE FOR COLLEGE STUDENTS

ENTRANCE into college introduces many new problems to the high-school graduate. In our society the period spent in college is coincident with that in which a whole gamut of late adolescent adjustments must be made. As we saw in Chapter XVI, there are at least four basic problems which must be faced in the years before one attains legal and social maturity: emancipation from the home, development of adequate heterosexual attitudes and values, the emergence of habits of self-control, and the growth of the sense of individual and mature responsibility for one's acts. A good deal of the final training of college students with reference to these matters will occur within the framework of the collegiate life or in circumstances closely linked to this life. For most of these persons college represents the last period of dependency on their parents and on childhood patterns before they assume full adult roles in relation to occupation, marriage, and civic and religious participation in their communities. And yet, because of their physical maturity and intellectual sophistication, there is bound to be a certain amount of frustration of strong desires for financial, sexual, and other privileges which mark the mature adult. Such inhibitions, in turn, may and often do result in anxiety, compensatory aggressiveness, or other means of securing balance or satisfaction for thwarted wishes.¹ Though a wide variety of new adjustments must be made during the college years, we shall discuss in particular those which revolve round scholastic attainment and social and emotional development. The closing section will comment on certain phases of the student personnel work which has recently emerged in our colleges and universities.

ADAPTATION TO ACADEMIC DEMANDS

The traditional function of higher education has been largely that of intellectual training, and our colleges have long placed their primary, if not their only, emphasis upon intellectual achievement. It is now well known that intellectual learning is qualified by social and emotional factors. The college grew up, however, around the book and the laboratory, and inability to master the printed page or failure to learn the techniques of

¹ Good discussions of mental-hygiene principles, applicable to college students in particular, will be found in Groves and Blanchard (1930); F. E. Williams (1930); Howard and Patry (1935); Shepard (1937); Sheeder (1938); and Fry (1939).

science was taken as *prima-facie* evidence of incapacity to benefit by such training. In fact, even in the face of our democratic traditions, American colleges everywhere set up certain specifications regarding entrance and graduation. These regulations are centered largely in the fact of individual variations in scholastic ability.

Individual differences in intelligence. It is now pretty well accepted that a student must possess somewhat better than average or median intellectual ability—as measured in comparison with the general population of his age—to be able to profit intellectually by attendance at college. Yet various surveys have shown that there are wide differences in the intelligence of college students, as measured by the usual tests. Such differences reflect variations in cultural backgrounds, standards of secondary preparation, and type of course which students select.

Thus Thurstone and Thurstone (1939), reporting for 1938 on the basis of the widely used American Council on Education Psychological Examination, found a range in the median gross scores from 55 in one college to 120 in another. Also, as a rule, students enrolled in the general arts and sciences outrank, on the tests, those who enter agriculture, home economics, industrial arts, and public-health nursing. (See Garrison, 1928.) A study made of 1,840 incoming freshman at the University of London reported for them a mean score of 204 on the Spearman test of general intelligence; but the mean score for those in the arts courses was 225, for science 214, and for medicine 197. From that point the mean scores ranged down to architecture with 165 and fine arts with 154. (See H. D. White, 1931, 1932.)

Although intelligence tests provide one of the most accurate indicators of those who are likely to succeed or fail in college, a high score offers no full assurance of scholastic success. Other factors, such as necessity of earning a livelihood or social and emotional maladjustments, must also be taken into account. And, while the course of study and the classroom demands of most of our colleges are pitched to the level of the modal or median student, there always exist sufficient numbers who fall below or above this standard to warrant special attention.

The low-ability group—that is, those who have poor intellectual promise—may be divided into two sections: those who fail and drop out rather soon, and those who, motivated by strong aggression and ambition, persist in their efforts to succeed. In both these groups, of course, emotional, social, and other factors enter in. If, for example, there is obvious low ability, the student not only may suffer from scholastic failure but may develop in addition such a distinct feeling of inferiority as to prevent his subsequent adaptation to a satisfactory vocation or other training program. On the other hand, the student who fails may with proper guidance and advice find a successful outlet in some job which does not require college training.

There are others who lack intellectual ability to handle collegiate work, but who do possess, for some reason or other, a strong drive to continue

in school. This may be due to some early implanted ideal about the value of a college education, especially as it may provide a good income and high social status. It may arise because of the identification of the student with some former relative or teacher who has stressed going to college. Sometimes, unfortunately, a dull student is the unwilling victim of the projection of thwarted educational ambitions of a parent or relative. Some of these latter cases are tragic indeed because usually—despite urging, employment of private tutors, and changes in courses to seek easier levels—the student finally drops out of school. Such cases, while doubtless a small percentage of the total group, provide a striking illustration of the inadequate accommodation of college instruction to personal qualifications.

In contrast to the maladjustment of the students of low capacity are those who possess superior intellectual ability but who nevertheless fail to adapt themselves to college. As a rule, these capable students either lack the interest and motivation to do good work or become so engrossed in extra-curricular and off-campus activities as to neglect their studies almost completely. Of course, the most fortunate individuals are those of high ability, who are also emotionally well adjusted, and whose success in college is a measure of healthy achievement. But there are some intellectually superior students who lack the necessary social and emotional traits and attitudes to make the usual and normal contacts with their fellows and who find in their scholastic attainments a compensatory satisfaction for failure to succeed in person-to-person relations. Again, though the number of cases is not large, most advisors or instructors know college seniors who, though they may have attained Phi Beta Kappa and are scheduled to graduate *magna cum laude*, are nevertheless bitter and disappointed at their lack of what they call "social success." Perhaps this reaction is somewhat more common with women than with men, because the former retain in large part the traditional American ideals of marriage and motherhood, and failure to secure men friends appears to them as incompetence. One such senior girl expressed herself with considerable emotion in these words: "What good is my Phi Beta pin, my honors, and all that when I've never had a 'date' and when now that I am out of college my chances of getting a husband are about nil?" There are also, of course, those even more extreme individuals whose intellectual brilliance is linked to neurotic characteristics to such a degree as to provide them with a genuine handicap in all lines except their professional specialty. Many of these individuals are destined to go through life unhappy and poorly adjusted to their fellows.

Special abilities and disabilities. Besides the fact of sharp individual differences in intelligence, there are also difficulties associated with special abilities, particularly when these are not accompanied by adequate general ability. For example, we may find a college student particularly gifted in the arts—music, painting, sculpture, or literary writing—but who lacks

sufficient generalized capacity to handle the usual run of required courses in the natural and social sciences and the languages. Most colleges make no provision for such persons, at least during the freshman and sophomore years, and as a result they may become resentful or disillusioned, or, if healthier-minded, may leave to enroll in institutions designed for specialized training only.

Then there are those persons handicapped by certain defects, especially of a sensory-motor sort, which often pass unnoticed until some critical situation arises. While medical examinations of college entrants have been much improved in late years, students in need of glasses often escape detection, and those who are hard of hearing are usually completely ignored. So, too, poor motor co-ordination is occasionally reflected in a student's inability to handle laboratory apparatus or the like, possibly leading to misunderstandings with instructors and emotional distress. In these matters, as in the case of more severe and obvious physical handicaps, the psychological awareness of these difficulties enhances any trouble arising directly from the defect itself. There are, for example, many young people who are truly ashamed to wear glasses and, even if they have them, refuse to use them if other students are about.

We have noted particularly the learning difficulties of the low and high ability groups and of students with special disabilities, but we must not forget that those of average capacity also have their problems. These include poor reading habits, inadaptability to a particular subject matter, and a host of difficulties to be described below, with reference to the classroom, the laboratory, teacher-student relations, and extracurricular matters.

Adjustment to the course of study. As noted above, the usual curriculum of the college is pitched to the level of average ability. Moreover, the customary American college curriculum has come down to us laden with emphasis upon language, literature, science, and mathematics. The first two years, in most colleges, are given over to a repetition—presumably at a higher level of proficiency—of the very courses which the student had in high school. There is often a considerable loss of interest on the part of the freshman or sophomore as he grinds away at his English, foreign language, science, or mathematics. This is not the place to expatiate on the soundness or unsoundness of these academic culture patterns, but the fact remains that both as to intellectual interest and as to emotional satisfaction many college students grow discouraged, bitter, or indifferent. Not only are many of the courses taught in a mechanical manner, but there is seldom any general meaning or correlation which will link them together. All too frequently each course proceeds as if it constituted the whole universe of learning, as if it were the only worthy topic, and as if all the students enrolled had no other aim than to become

experts in that particular branch of knowledge. The net effect is frequently deadening, and there is little wonder that the students fail to achieve a proper balance between the curricular interests and other activities.

In the preprofessional courses this situation is apparently not so common. If the student is interested in and motivated toward medicine, law, engineering, research and teaching, or some other special vocation, he may not sense the pressure of traditional courses and methods of training. If, however, a preprofessional student is misplaced in terms of capacity and interest, the effects upon his intellectual attainment and upon his emotional satisfactions may be even more disastrous than with the run-of-the-mill student in the general course, who may find compensation in courses not permitted the specialized student.

Teacher-student relations. In the classroom or laboratory the student comes to grips with the intellectual demands laid down by the course of study. While the problems of learning and of teacher-student contacts as related to subject matter are too diverse to be treated as a unit, there are certain general aspects which should be noted, such as the size of classes, various mechanical or routine devices of instruction, the study habits of the students, the personality make-up of the teacher as it bears upon his relations with his students, and the systems of reward and punishment which we have developed as measures of success or failure in college.

Doubtless the most spontaneous and uninhibited teaching and learning take place in the interaction of an instructor and one or at most a few pupils. In a small group the stimulating dialectic method may be found at its best or in the laboratory the teacher and student may work together to set up and solve their problems. But there is all too little of this sort of thing in American colleges and universities today. For the great bulk of undergraduate instruction the large lecture system is the usual program. The increase in college attendance since 1920 in particular has more or less forced these mass-production methods upon the institutions of higher learning. At the very time the freshman or sophomore needs the personal attention of a sympathetic teacher, he is likely to find himself forced to attend lecture classes ranging from seventy-five to several hundred in number. Since this procedure is relatively unknown in high school, most entering college students are quite unprepared for the more or less formal and impersonal presentation of facts and interpretations of subject matter by an instructor. Instead of informal person-to-person contact the bewildered student soon finds this mass system of teaching, which calls for note-taking on the lecture material and other devices of learning which are unfamiliar to him. There are usually, in addition, extensive and routine reading assignments in textbooks. (In some institutions weekly or biweekly quiz or re-

view section meetings of from twenty to thirty students do afford a certain off-set to the mass-lecture method.)

In some instances the standardization of instruction in college exceeds in emphasis that which is often found in secondary and elementary education. Assignments to certain fixed chapters or sections of books, formalized laboratory exercises, and routine examinations demanding little logical thought but rather recall and repetition of the facts presented by lecturer and textbook are still the usual pedagogical stock in trade. Moreover, the traditional demands regarding seating, regular attendance in the class, and other rituals are as rigid in college as elsewhere in American schools. (See K. Young, 1927a.) With respect to personality, this inflexibility provides a certain canalization or habituation of overt behavior which lessens the strain on learning, but at the same time tends to deaden the keener intellectual interests supposedly associated with higher education. Thus, while the system is often outwardly efficient, it is almost childish in pattern, and keeps up a dependence on form and ceremonial that is frequently mistaken for genuine intellectual development. The lock-step schema of college instruction may be essential to mass instruction, but the results are notoriously low in quality. (See Learned and Wood, 1938.) In recent years efforts have been made to alter this routinized system, but for the great bulk of college students little has been done. All too often the result is a stagnation of motive and interest in the student, resulting in a decline in his levels of aspiration and achievement. (See Meiklejohn, 1932; Hutchins, 1936.)

Inadequate study habits of a large proportion of our students constitute a striking deficiency in our collegiate instruction. (See Bird, 1931.) All too often the students come from high school ill prepared in study habits, and the college as a rule does little in a formal way to remedy the matter. And inefficient study habits play a part in poor scholarship, which in turn tends to affect the student's interest and motivation. Since the ego is identified in anticipation with success in schoolwork, any aspect of learning easily becomes a value in itself. Thus improvement in study habits normally not only aids in the production of better schoolwork, but indirectly influences the student's morale and his sense of satisfaction.

Reference has already been made to the problems of the teacher's personality as it bears on his daily contact with the pupils in elementary and secondary schools. College students express much the same attitudes toward teachers in college.

Duncan and Duncan (1934), using a questionnaire, secured from a group of 122 college students certain comments respecting the best-liked and least-liked college teachers. (In a second schedule they got similar information regarding their elementary and high-school instructors.) In summary they state (1934, p. 539):

"The investigation has revealed that teachers who have been friendly, sociable, and personally interested in the welfare of their students have been the best liked, and that those who have lacked these characteristics have been the most disliked. . . . The best-liked teachers also possessed traits of cheerfulness, sympathy, good sportsmanship, appreciation for students' own views, honesty, tendency to praise, neatness, and tact; while the most disliked instructors displayed characteristics of sarcasm, superiority complex, meddlesomeness, and peculiar mannerisms. . . ."

Heilman and Armentrout (1936) had a sample of college students rate their instructors on ten traits listed in the Purdue Rating Scale for Instructors. They found the qualities of personal appearance, interest in their subject matter, fairness in grading, self-reliance, and sympathetic attitude toward students to be the five most important traits of the popular and successful teachers, as judged by these students.

Some additional matters may be noted. In the first place, the common system of mass instruction tends to heighten the social-psychic distance between learner and instructor. The professor is able thereby to remain aloof from direct contact with the student—which may enhance his sense of self-importance. Second, the high degree of specialization demanded of the college teacher tends to set him apart not only from his students but from his fellow instructors as well. Emotionally this means a further opportunity for ego expansion or sense of superiority, at least within a certain field of knowledge. Then, too, this very psychological isolation of an important segment of the self of the teacher furnishes him a cover for his own insecurities, anxieties, and hidden feelings of inferiority. As a result, in his contacts with students—at the classroom or lecture level—we may find all sorts of compensatory mechanisms in operation, such as obvious exhibitionism of learning, oratory, or unchallenged ex-cathedra comments, especially in the social sciences and literary fields. Obviously not all college instructors are so egocentric and toplofty, but the very situation tends to foster such attitudes and habits; and in our large institutions the instructor who appeals to the student as "human," "natural," and "sociable" is altogether too infrequent.

In addition to these general features it sometimes happens that teacher-student relations, even in smaller classes, are not satisfactory because a particular student will set up an aggressive or antagonistic response on the part of the teacher, or vice versa. The ill-disguised prejudice of many instructors against Jews, Catholics, Negroes, or Orientals in their classes is too common to need extensive comment. On the other hand, an instructor may arouse in the student responses of negativism and antagonism because the words, tones, gestures, or other qualities of the former may set up in a student unpleasant associations.

For example, Douglas N., a freshman of high ability and otherwise excellent school record, reported that a particular history professor who had "a facile tongue and often voiced sharp bits of sarcasm in class" so irritated him that he lost interest,

began cutting classes, and was in serious danger of failing the course. In talking over this situation with an advisor, the student confessed that the manner and remarks of this teacher reminded him unpleasantly of his own father, who had long used bitter sarcasm as a power device over his son. The pent-up resentment toward his father now began to be transferred to this particular professor, who certainly had never directed his sarcastic remarks to him. In the light of the situation, the advisor arranged a transfer of the boy to another instructor, and thenceforward he experienced no difficulty in handling the course.

On the other hand, students may become too highly identified with a particular teacher, who symbolizes for them a loved parent, uncle, aunt, other relative, friend, or ideal person. In rare instances, when the opportunity for closer personal contacts are at hand, such fixations may in time distress both instructor and student. It often happens that neither is aware of the mental mechanisms involved in these situations, and find in the end that personal attachments have become burdensome. Most advisors have had some experience with such individuals: those uneasy students who run to them with every little personal problem, who cannot choose a new course without elaborate advice and counsel, who would spend hours in conference or idle talk, or who confess their troubles, not with a view to sound therapy but only to secure sympathy and emotional support. Such overattachment of student to the instructor may, if continued, serve to reveal emotional immaturity on the part of both participants.

The system of grading by percentages or letter grades, which is in vogue in our colleges, represents a culture pattern having to do with the manner of rewarding or punishing the student in terms of his performance as judged by the teachers. Although most grading is notoriously subjective, such a scheme continues as a device for determining the level of achievement, and it is obvious that, if the level of aspiration of the student has been far in excess of his grades, all sorts of social-emotional reactions may arise which not only influence his status with his fellow-students, his parents, and others, but will affect his intellectual performance in the future. A low grade may serve to stimulate the student to greater effort, or it may act to deter him from trying any further.

It is obvious that the ramifications of scholastic performance reach into person-to-person relations of all sorts. Parents who have fondly hoped for high excellence from their son or daughter and have then discovered that the student has dropped far below their expectations often feel bitterness, disappointment, and added strain in the parent-adolescent relations. Then, too, the student's relations to his fellow-students may be influenced by the grades he receives. In this the social situation and certain cultural expectancies play a part. For example, many students somehow associate getting good marks with the "grind," the person who is not successful in the extracurricular "society" life of the campus. This

point of view seems to be particularly true of students who belong to exclusive clubs, fraternities, or sororities. In many colleges a "gentleman's grade" is a C-, that is, a mark which just "passes" the requisite standards to remain in school and in line for ultimate graduation. How these anticipated values and attitudes operate is neatly demonstrated in the case of a brilliant girl, who, when asked by her sorority sisters or others about her grades, always lowered her examination marks by at least one "letter" lest she be considered too studious. Nevertheless, she always expressed elation and amazement when her semester grades were reported as being the highest in her "house." It is interesting to note, too, that she secretly suffered from a sense of shame and guilt if her marks were not among the best in her classes.

Associated with the grading system are various special honors, such as admission to Phi Beta Kappa, Sigma Xi, and the many special honor societies—all of which demonstrate again the high value which these external evidences of intellectual achievement have in college and in the community. And in connection with these facts we see again a curious ambivalence of value and attitude: the student has long been inducted into a belief in the importance of high grades and honors, and yet the culture patterns of many students, perhaps more particularly among those in fraternities and sororities, demand less emphasis upon grades and honors and more upon traits and capacities valuable in extracurricular and off-campus activities. After all, for most students going to college is more than attendance at classes and laboratories, or reading long assignments in textbooks. In fact, not only will general attitudes regarding the present or future usefulness of intellectual attainment influence success or failure, but adaptation to life at college is bound up with a host of factors which are only remotely related to scholastic performance, such as adjustment to fellow-students, participation in extracurricular activities, and especially matters that concern healthy emotional balance.

CULTURAL BACKGROUNDS AND EXTRACURRICULAR ADJUSTMENTS IN COLLEGE

Whereas the previous section gave particular attention to the adaptation of the student to the academic demands of college, in which the principal emphasis is placed upon intellectual and scholastic achievements, we have already indicated that the learning process itself is influenced on every hand by cultural and social-emotional factors.

Cultural backgrounds of college students. American collegiate education has taken on many cultural features of the secondary-group organization of society, which is marked by mass-production methods, high specialization or division of labor, impersonality of contacts, and individualistic choice of role and group affiliation. Yet a good many of our college

students, especially those from rural and small communities or from European nationality backgrounds, are poorly prepared for the type of daily life which will surround them in school. In addition to the academic demands, for which the high-school graduate is often poorly prepared, he is confronted with social situations which baffle and distress him.

Often the student finds himself for the first time cut off by distance and situation from home and parental attention. There is no opportunity to run to one's parents with every little difficulty. Mother is not about to care for one's clothes or to supervise one in many little daily details of conduct. Many freshmen for the first time find themselves with financial responsibilities to pay board and room accounts and to purchase their own clothes. In fact, one is amazed at the lack of parental training of children in matters of budgeting money, in handling checking accounts, and in habits of sound buying. Yet too frequently, when students fall into debt or are discovered to have spent their allowances foolishly, their parents turn on them with severe blame and childish reprisals. Another common problem of reorientation relates to the use of free time. The college novice often fails to realize that the many hours not formally demanded by class or laboratory periods are not opportunities for loafing, attending motion pictures, or indulging in play or sport. Though dormitories, rooming houses, and fraternities and sororities do have regulations as to hours, the freshman often finds himself for the first time in his life with no one around to urge him to study or to go to bed, or to get him up in the morning. All these matters seem trivial, but they are indicative of alterations in the behavior patterns and values of the student.

Another common symptom of maladjustment to the new life is found in homesickness—a real malady to many students. While they usually conceal their real feelings and emotions from their associates, the uncertainty and sense of loss of parental or family contact and of emotional support remains to make them unhappy and ill at ease. Occasionally a student is so overattached to the parent that he gives up college and returns home. In these instances the parents have frequently failed to allow their child, during the high-school years especially, to become sufficiently free from the former strict and close supervision to prepare him for living away from home.

But the college community affords many substitutes for the home, and most students doubtless quickly adjust themselves and even thrive on the opportunity afforded for self-control and a sense of responsibility. In this regard going to college is often the final step in the necessary emancipation from the parents. For this reason, those students who live at home while in college sometimes fail to mature as much as do their fellows who have to leave home in order to attend college. Again the

fraternity or sorority may serve the purpose of bridging the gap between the home supervision, with its close primary-group situation, and the wider secondary-group world outside. And here, as in the dormitory or rooming house, the student usually makes new friends and acquaintances who become substitutes for his family and the former associates of high school.

Not only is leaving home sometimes a distinct crisis to the freshman, but the transition from the country or small-town high school to the large college or university constitutes a considerable strain on the ego. Whereas one was well known and recognized by everyone in the high school, the freshman, especially in our large state universities, frequently finds himself alone and isolated in a vast mass of other students who pay little or no attention to him. The matter is doubly acute for those who in high school were "big shots" in athletics, debating, drama, or student-body affairs. The boy who played on the high-school football team may find himself completely ignored by the freshman football coach, or, if he tries out for the squad, may soon be dropped because he is "not promising material." And the high-school athlete who wears his sweater about the campus becomes the object of ridicule if not of actual discipline and soon stores his prized memento of high school in mothballs. Or the girl who was the leading lady in the high-school senior play may find herself in competition in dramatics with youngsters far more capable than herself. So, too, the boy or girl who topped the graduating class in scholarship may find the pace of college instruction far beyond his capacity. Such situations tend to produce frustrations with respect to anticipated successful activity, necessitating various efforts to reorganize one's aspirations, values, attitudes, and habits. There may be increased effort to master the new difficulty or to find some substitute outlet in other areas of accomplishment. There may arise a distinct deflation of the ego with an accompanying sense of inferiority; there may develop a good deal of fantasy thinking and rationalization in connection with the lowering of the level of aspiration in matters collegiate. In the extreme case there may be retreat into schizoid reactions of intensive fantasy, avoidance of social contacts, and deterioration of ambition generally.

Although in general, in America, a college education represents a high cultural value, in some families, especially those of more recent European extraction, there is often open opposition to the children's going to college. But the American emphasis upon the virtues of the higher learning which the child absorbs in elementary and secondary schools often stimulates a strong ambition to continue in school in spite of parental opposition. It is obvious, of course, that there are nationality and other group

differences among immigrants regarding the value of education. The Jewish groups, on the whole, place higher values upon education than do immigrants from European peasant backgrounds. In fact, the proportion of second and third generation persons of foreign backgrounds who attend college might serve as a rough measure not only of rising standards of living, but of acceptance of American customs and traditions.

Linked to the cultural differences resulting from divergent European backgrounds is the special problem of national, religious, and racial prejudices, which play a part in the adjustment of college students from minority groups. In the South, racial segregation keeps the white and Negro students separated, and in the North and West prejudices operate to produce a sense of inferiority and anxiety in many colored students, which doubtless has considerable effect upon their classroom performance and upon their adaptation to the college community outside. Even in teacher-student relations long-established racial prejudices often intrude themselves unconsciously.

While the situation with white students of sharply divergent cultural backgrounds is not identical with that existing between colored and white, nevertheless religious and class biases enter into the collegiate situation. The most clear-cut instance concerns the Jewish students in many of our colleges and universities. Without going into the cultural and social-psychological background of this important topic, it is obvious that we have produced what is essentially a class system in many of our institutions of higher learning, which in theory and in practice runs counter to the democratic ideal. Not only is there in many instances a thinly disguised quota system to keep down the number of Jewish students, but fraternity rules against the admission of Jews and other restrictions as to housing tend to foster antagonistic traits and attitudes in both Jewish and non-Jewish groups. Very often it is in college that the Jewish student first feels the full pressure of anti-Semitism. But again individual responses to such a situation vary. Some Jewish students retreat behind the protecting cover of their own cultural group and values, seeking only to show their scholastic competence in the larger college world; others attempt to combine identification with Hebraic patterns with aggressive striving to secure excellent grades and high social position in a somewhat hostile gentile world; others become identified with radical or revolutionary movements and find an outlet for their frustrations in aggressive agitation for equality. A small fraction attempt to hide their Hebraic backgrounds by changing their names, by identification with non-Jewish groups, and by outright denial—when possible—of their family origin.

In any case, once the student is enrolled in college, not only will cultural background factors play their part, but a number of new situations

will develop to affect his social and emotional adjustment. Among these are two of special importance: housing quarters, and the extent of responsibility for economic self-support.

Living quarters. At first mention it might seem that where a student lives while in college would have no bearing upon his personal attitudes and habits or upon his standing with the community of his fellows. But social status itself is partially if not wholly determined by such factors and the associated facts of companionship. In colleges and universities where fraternities, sororities, and special housing clubs exist, very often to live in a rooming house or in a college dormitory means that one "does not rate," to use a campus phrase. Not to be associated with a Greek-letter organization is frequently tantamount to "living on the wrong side of the tracks," as another Americanism has it.

But these broad class distinctions aside, the new student in a rooming house or dormitory may find himself ill at ease and lonesome because he does not know how to make acquaintances easily. If he has come from a home where he was the center of much attention, or from a secondary school where he had social prominence, the adjustment may be even more difficult to make.

In most rooming houses the daily contact is less close than in a dormitory, and situations of this sort not infrequently accentuate homesickness and tendencies to introversion, unless corrected by gradual accumulation of new friends. In time in both dormitories and rooming houses forms of congeniality associations develop which often have marked effects upon students, in regard to their attitudes toward their courses and their teachers, their study habits, and their eating and sleeping habits, and with respect to many other values, such as those associated with athletics, recreation, "dating," sex, religion, politics, and economics.

In the Greek-letter houses friendliness and congeniality are taken for granted, and there is little doubt that in this respect such organizations have a genuine and abiding value to the new student. Coupled with this anticipated intimacy goes the high social status attributed to fraternities and sororities. These groups often encourage snobbery, racial and class prejudices, and other attitudes and habits which provide ego satisfaction. The nature of the social pressure and status connected with membership in a fraternity is well brought out in the following autobiographical statement of Douglas N., who was mentioned above. This man, who is now successful in a profession, wrote:

"When I came to school, I received in due time enough fraternity bids to satisfy anyone's ego. I finally pledged, but broke the pledge after one semester for reasons unnecessary to enumerate. From that time on I was a 'marked man.' An invariable question when a new acquaintance was being made was, 'To what house do you belong?' If I were to say merely, 'I don't belong to a fraternity,' it was considered

equivalent to confessing social inadequacy to rise to fraternity standards. If, on the other hand, I were to suggest that I didn't care to belong to one, the obvious mental reservation on the part of the listener was that I suffered from a 'sour grapes complex.' It so happens that neither is true. But it took some time to realize that to anyone really worth knowing, fraternity affiliation is inconsequential. However, when one is alive, young, and yearning to be in the 'big swim,' this is rather a trying situation."

Despite certain benefits and the opportunities there to "bring out" the shy boy or girl, there are many negative criticisms of such fraternal organizations. They are accused of fostering class differences, of inducing and enhancing social prejudices of various kinds, and of often putting extracurricular careers, such as athletics, "student politics," and recreation, above sound academic accomplishment. Certainly it is a fair judgment to say that they are not unmixed blessings in our American college life.²

Partial or complete self-support in college. Economic independence and responsibility for self-support have long been high values in our culture, but such demands were not traditionally made on individuals until they had completed their education, elementary, secondary, or collegiate as the case might be. Until the great increase in enrollments in our institutions of higher learning the bulk of the students had full or at least partial support from home or other sources. There is a long tradition of high virtue attendant upon working one's way through college, and it is only in recent years that this problem has become acute. It is not uncommon, for instance, in midwestern state universities to find 30 or 40 per cent of the undergraduates dependent upon their own financial earnings, in whole or in part.

Aside from the economic hardships and severe physical strain often associated with earning one's way through college, there are many effects upon the student's attitudes, traits, and values. The awareness of having to work itself often sets up a sense of inferiority. Though many students who work make good grades, not infrequently their intellectual performance is lowered by the demands of their job on their time and energy. Such a lowering of the level of achievement may also make for sense of inadequacy. Then, frequently, lack of funds and the demands of time prevent any recreational outlets with members of the opposite sex. Girls who take domestic service in particular often complain that they cannot get "dates," and boys who have to work frequently remark that they "cannot afford a girl." And aside from these handicaps, many wage-earning students complain that they have no time for extracurricular

² In many instances college administrators more or less deliberately encouraged fraternities and sororities to build residential units in order to help furnish housing for students. In one sense colleges and universities where such was the case have a certain responsibility for problems which arise in connection with such organizations. (See Angell *et al.*, 1930, for a discussion of the place of Greek-letter groups in our colleges and universities.)

reading, dramatics, or other opportunities to broaden their intellectual and aesthetic horizon.

Yet there are obvious regional and institutional differences in these matters. Since 1930 the economic depression has tended to alter the financial circumstances of many families to such an extent that a larger and larger proportion of students are finding it necessary, if they wish to continue in school, to take up remunerative work in connection therewith. Thus the stigma attached to working while in school has diminished, even with families of the upper bourgeois level. Moreover, the National Youth Administration program for federal assistance to needy students has induced a further alteration in the older standards and values associated with working one's way through school. Just as there is little doubt that extensive relief programs have tended to alter the attitudes and values of many laboring people toward the need for self-support, so, too, the wide availability of N.Y.A. aids has in some quarters produced in students the belief that the government somehow would take care of them in their educational needs. Though the depth of this influence is perhaps not great, it must be noted because it already tends to initiate the high-school and the college student alike into certain new ideas and values about collective responsibility of the community and the state for the economic and other welfare of their members. (See Chapter XXIII.)

The economic depression has served to modify economic and professional opportunities for the future, and various surveys of American youth have revealed a widespread sense of frustration and attendant insecurity and mental conflict among them. (See Rainey, 1937; H. Bell, 1938.) Many young people report strong faith in and desire for an education, a job, and subsequent marriage; but they are baffled by the apparently growing restriction in job and economic opportunities. Today the hardship involved in earning one's way through college may not be rewarded by striking economic returns later—an experience rather common one or two decades ago. Our colleges are but one of many areas of activity where the effects of the wider economic and political changes of the modern world are being reflected in individual life organization.

OTHER SOCIAL AND EMOTIONAL PROBLEMS

In addition to the problems already treated there are others which tend to disturb many college students. In this section we shall discuss those that concern the love and sex life, religious and ethical reorientation, and present-day trends toward radical political and economic ideologies. We shall also note briefly some of the special problems that concern graduate and professional students. And, in closing this section, we shall point out the limited usefulness of various tests, schedules, and questionnaires which

are designed to reveal disturbances in the social and emotional adjustments of our college students.

Sexual adjustments of college students. Adequate and unequivocal data as to the nature and extent of sexual maladjustment among college students are not at hand. But it is evident to those who deal with student problems that many difficulties of scholarship and of contact with fellow-students and with parents are deeply related to anxieties arising from the love life, which often appear in symbolic and disguised form. There is no denying that matters of affectional satisfaction are of great importance to college students. We shall treat the topic under three headings: heterosexuality, homosexuality or inversion, and autoeroticism.

(1) As F. E. Williams (1926) well said, the attainment of normal heterosexual attitudes and values is one of the major needs of late adolescence. (See Chapter XVI.) And, while the student's development in regard to this matter will be determined, in large part, by his home and community background, in college new attitudes and values impinge upon him from others, and opportunities for personal experience in sexual matters (within the current limitations) will necessitate for most students considerable re-orientation. The problem may be discussed in relation to two levels of activity: the subjective and verbal reactions, and overt conduct.

The place of sex in the consciousness of persons in our society, especially when it takes the form of fantasies, tends to reflect the cultural taboos or frustrations which hedge about any free and spontaneous expression of sexual interest. The extent and significance of sexual fantasies among college students are unknown, but from extended interviews or from other sources such as intimate autobiographies it is my impression that daydreaming about the opposite sex, especially in terms of romantic love, is rather common. So, too, subjective consideration as to whether one should break the code of premarital continence is often accompanied by daydreams as to pleasures or anxieties likely to be associated with such conduct. Among men, too, there is often considerable worry regarding sexual potency, and the imaginary demonstration of adequate capacity in fantasy often provides certain compensatory satisfactions. Leisure-time conversation among students also indicates the high emotional importance of love life to them.

Student discussions—aside from the Rabelaisian story-telling which is common—of these matters often concern such topics as the soundness of the traditional double standard of sexual morality, the extent and advisability of premarital and extra-marital sexual indulgence, the meaning of homosexuality and of autoerotic practices, techniques of birth control, and the dangers of venereal disease.

At the level of overt conduct we may distinguish between petting and fondling only, and sexual intercourse. In most American colleges the culture pattern of "dating and mating" has a high value. (See Waller, 1938.) Such heterosexual companionship affords opportunity not only for verbal discussion of love, but for kissing, fondling, and other manual and bodily contacts which are biologically and socially preliminary to actual sexual congress. Again we have no reliable statistics on the extent of such

practices, nor any measure of the effects of such, physiologically or psychologically, upon the indulgents. What evidence we have comes from case studies and from general impressions gathered from conversations with college students. There are some who contend that petting and fondling afford a valuable preliminary training in heterosexuality. (See Groves, 1933.) It is believed that such experience helps both the boy and the girl to get over the common notion that a man should never react to a girl in any other way than he would to his mother or sister. (See Chapter XVI.)

It is not possible to make any definitive judgment on such a question. These areas of behavior are so surrounded by silence, fear, and taboo that it is difficult to know what these experiences mean, and there are wide individual differences in response, since cultural definitions of the situation, except within the broad and vague limits of chastity, are so often lacking. In regard to matters of the person-to-person physical contact of love, our culture provides us with only the most general frames of reference. As a result, there is considerable personal-social conditioning in this field of conduct, all of which means that wide individual variation is possible.

In any case, the evidence seems clear that young people are modifying the older codes and practices; revised standards of right and wrong are arising, and as observers and commentators we can do little else but describe what is going on and wait to see what types of new cultural patterns will emerge. Certainly the college years do afford an opportunity for mating, and, while some criticism of petting may be made, on the whole it seems that the values gained in emancipating the young people from parental and filial fixations and giving them a chance to discover their likes and dislikes for members of the opposite sex far outweigh any occasional difficulty that may arise.

As to the incidence and significance of overt sexual intercourse in our college population, we know practically nothing. Some years ago Peck and Wells (1923, 1925) reported for one sample of college men that slightly more than a third of them admitted having indulged in sexual intercourse. The age-long double standard of sexual morality is still accepted among many college men, who take this cultural pattern as a matter of course. Perhaps more indicative of recent changes in values is the alleged increase in premarital sexual experience among college women. No adequate statistics are at hand, but various questionnaire surveys state that from 10 to 30 per cent of samples of college women admit such behavior. Apparently present-day college girls have values and practices in respect to love and sex which stand in striking contrast to the mores of the nineteenth century. (See K. B. Davis, 1929; and the less valid study by Bromley and Britten, 1937.)

The meaning of premarital sexual congress for the man or woman who has indulged must vary greatly. For one thing, it is difficult in this area of behavior, concerned as it is with one of the deepest physiological drives and so closely bound up with the feelings and emotions, to tell how

much the particular choice which led to the initial intercourse was intellectually or otherwise predetermined. Certainly with serious-minded couples who are engaged it may have a different meaning from what it has for others. In any case one factor needs reiteration: the wider significance of all such conduct lies within the field of self-control and social responsibility. If premarital sexual relations are indulged in with no regard to the person-to-person moral expectancies, its impress upon the personality organization will doubtless be otherwise than if it is linked with serious plans for matrimony. To indulge in sexual congress means in terms of interactional expectancies that each party thereto places certain claims upon the other. If it falls within the scope of prostitution, impersonal money payment or its equivalent is considered in our culture to solve the problem of moral responsibility; but, if the expectancies are of more personal, intimate sort—as they are likely to be among college students—certain mutual obligations are psychologically not to be gainsaid. Put otherwise, one may say that promiscuous and easy-come-easy-go relations with no sense of future responsibility reflect childish values and absence of the *moral* role or self so fundamental in a mature person.

But we know very little about these matters. They lie so deep within the subjective life that only an intensive examination of the many factors involved will provide anything like a valid interpretation. The best we can do is to examine the particular instance with whatever degree of thoroughness our capacity and time and the situation seem to demand. Some college students, apparently, have very well integrated their overt sexuality into the rest of their personality structure. Others have not. Variations in conduct in this area well illustrate the extent to which individualization has been carried in our society.

(2) The taboos and negative values associated with homosexuality in our society are well known. And, though there are no adequate data as to the frequency of overt homosexual practices among college students, inversion is sufficiently a problem to warrant brief comment. (See, however, K. B. Davis, 1929.) Homosexuality is usually treated with reference to two levels: its overt manifestation, and its disguised and sublimated—that is, its culturally accepted—form.

For obvious technical and professional reasons the customary advisory personnel, when confronted with cases of overt inversion, should enlist the services of a psychiatrist who is competent to understand and assist the individuals involved. To resort to blame, taboo, and legal punishment will do little to aid them. Yet the college administrator, aware that in our culture such practices are under a heavy ban, is usually faced with the practical problem of removing such persons from the college community for two reasons, if not more. First, there is always the danger of open scandal and public pressure if such facts are exposed; second, there is the added likelihood that these practices may spread through example and solicitation. The role

of the invert in our society is a severe one; but few colleges are equipped to undertake prolonged diagnosis and to attempt cure of the homosexuals who are found in the student body.

It should be noted in passing that these practices occur among women as well as among men; and the girl who is disappointed in her efforts at dating men may fall into the hands of sympathetic and usually older homosexual women companions. These latter frequently afford the former emotional release and affectional intimacies otherwise lacking. The frequency of such practices among college women is unknown, and, since certain aspects of this whole problem will be discussed in Chapter XXII, we shall say no more about it at this point.

Sublimated forms of homosexuality are evident everywhere. Men and women are bisexual in nature, and the attachments to one's own sex may take the approved form, in our society, of membership in clubs, congeniality groups, fraternal organizations, and the like. In fact, the high value put upon group activities which concern only men indicates a cultural recognition of this underlying motivation. With women such acceptable cultural outlets are not so widely available, but, as women become freed from the customary dependence upon male-dominated values, we may witness an increase in sublimated forms of homosexual companionship for them too. College girls are coming more and more to form their own clubs and to go about together on hikes and sight-seeing trips, even though the stigma of failure to "date" remains. But in time a set of completely approved bisexual cultural patterns may arise, applicable to each sex. Men certainly do not consider it ridiculous or queer that they belong to men's clubs and yet retain their strong and abiding interest in the opposite sex.

(3) The frequency and significance of autoeroticism among college students is likewise unknown. Its occurrence is indicated, however, from interviews, conversations, and other sources of information; but there seems to be less negative criticism of the practice than was common a few decades ago. Certainly the fear that it is injurious to health has pretty well been dissipated, and in this matter, as in those just discussed, the meaning of such practices for the person is the important point.

For the college man or woman autosexuality may signify a failure to adapt oneself to his male and female companions. Not infrequently it indicates a carry-over from childhood habits. It is believed to be associated with introversion, but the evidence on this is scanty. Certainly the overt indulgence is often associated with a rich fantasy life involving the other sex. And, when it becomes so habitual as to lead to avoidance of opportunities for heterosexual friendships, it may serve to prevent the individual from ever attaining sexual maturity. The serious consequences of autosexuality lie in the fact that it short-circuits human interaction, eliminates the stimulating influences of contact with others, and tends to self-centeredness and an ultimate restriction of the love and affectional life that is so fundamental to the highest flowering of human personality. (See Chapter XXII.)

But, no matter what particular direction the sexual life of the college student may take, the important point, to repeat, is its subjective mean-

ing. All too frequently, in dealing with the overt manifestations in interests or motives, the college administrator has resorted to coercive techniques of control rather than try to diagnose and assist his student to handle these difficulties in terms of his total make-up and the particular situations in which he finds himself.

Religious and ethical readjustments. The frequent transition from rural and primary-group norms and patterns of conduct to those of the highly specialized secondary-group world is reflected in the alterations in many of the students' values and attitudes concerning religion and morals. A decade or two ago there was considerable comment on the effects of scientific teaching regarding biological evolution upon the religious and moral faith of young people. While we hear less of this particular problem today, many college students are emotionally distressed by the impact of the facts of modern science upon their deep-seated religious and ethical views. Courses in animal biology, psychology, philosophy, and sociology are sometimes said to "undermine the faith" of the students.

But there are wide divergences, first in the extent to which college students are exposed to the full implications of modern science, and, second, as to how much of what they learn at an intellectual level serves as a ferment among their deeper emotional values about life and destiny. Yet, when confronted with these new ideas, some students separate their intellectual knowledge from their religious faith—a kind of schizoid dissociation—and live in what is essentially a dual world: one of material science and its applications, and one of traditional religious faith. Others are inclined to take up a crass materialistic and fatalistic view of themselves and the universe, and often these persons for a time "run wild" in opinion and conduct. Still others essay to integrate their intellectual knowledge with their deeper emotionalized values, and in the course of this attempt there are often considerable emotional insecurity and distress, at least till they work out a new frame of reference regarding these matters.

The probable role of a strong cultural support for personal stability through religion is illustrated in the Murray (1938) study, which found that the Catholic subjects "were conspicuously more solid and secure," more happy and free from conflicting problems, than the average, just as the Jewish students fell below the average in these respects.³

The nature and degree of the disorganization which follows the attain-

³ This does not mean that the Jew may not or does not find solidity and security in his faith. Murray's sample was from Harvard College, and there is great likelihood that these Jewish students had broken away, in part at least, from "the faith of their fathers." The Catholic boy or girl who has given up his church often possesses the very characteristics which Murray has described for his Jewish subjects: self-consciousness, sense of insecurity, neuroticism, awareness of conflicting ideas and impulses, and possession of a certain insight into oneself and others, not evident in the firm believer.

students. There is a general consensus that they are increasingly interested in hearing about political and economic proposals of a revolutionary character, and a noisy minority of them become actively engaged in agitation for revolution.

The significance of these things for the personality structure varies tremendously. In interpreting the fact of increased interest and participation in radical movements, one must be aware of the variety of meanings which such interest and participation have for the individual, must know how deeply it touches his fundamental values.

S. A. Stouffer and the author, in an unpublished study of political and economic opinions in a midwestern university during the 1932 presidential campaign, found that some extremely radical students were so in large part because it provided them with a certain amount of public attention on the campus. With others radical opinions symbolized a revolt from parental authority. The case of L. Z. is interesting in this connection. He had a very high score on the radical side; he had participated actively in a number of socialistic student organizations. But in the interview he admitted that he did it partly as a lark, partly to irritate his father, a wealthy industrialist, and partly because it gave him a certain status on the campus. But he also granted that he was majoring in the School of Commerce and that he fully intended to return home and take up a business career with his father.

This problem, however, is no different in the wider world outside. Reformers and agitators for revolution often arise, as Lasswell (1930) has shown, from a family background of frustration, insecurity, and anxiety in which the individual has transferred his fears about his family status and his antagonisms to parental authority to the wider public world outside. This transfer, in turn, he rationalizes in terms of societal need and societal benefit. But the additional point requires attention: why do these agitators secure a following? The general aspects of the answer are obvious. Once others suffer from frustration and sense of insecurity as to their future political and economic role and status; they become increasingly suggestible and psychologically ready to listen to programs of reform and revolution which will relieve them of their present or anticipated insecurities and anxieties. In other words, the projections of the agitators provide a point of identification for the incipient followers. It is in this manner that a social movement is born. In miniature this is what happens on a college campus. While no adequate surveys are at hand, several years' observation leads me to believe that the bulk of students who actively participate in divergent political movements on American campuses are recruited from minority groups which have long endured social and other deprivations, from students who lack funds and social status, and from a heterogeneous group who unconsciously get great satisfaction from being at least verbally in revolt against the status quo.

Social and emotional problems of graduate and professional students. Before going on to the final paragraphs of this section, we must turn aside to note some of the difficulties that confront graduate and professional students in our universities. Little investigation has been made of these problems (see D. C. Stratton, 1933). Yet some preliminary investigation and several years' experience in advising graduate students induce me to make the following comments.

One of the most apparent facts concerns that of age. The students postpone the attainment of adult occupational status in the belief that additional training will ultimately repay them in high social status and a good income. Then, too, there are always a number of graduate students who have been vocational failures. These persons enter advanced training in the hope and belief that they will find success if only they secure additional education. Often such aspirations are not fulfilled.

The prolongation of the learning period involved in graduate or professional study touches in particular two vital interests and motives: economic status and marriage. In order to continue in school the student must remain dependent upon the financial support of his parents, with all that this implies as to emotional dependence, or, if he attempts to earn his own way, he is faced with the double demands of a heavy scholastic program and holding a job. Since his earnings are likely to be meager, the student often develops a sense of social inferiority associated with poverty. In addition there are difficulties connected with his love and sex life. The necessary delay in matrimony often brings in its wake increased sexual frustrations and anxieties, or the use of substitutes, such as distracting fantasies, autoeroticism, or premarital sexual intercourse with its attendant sense of shame, guilt, and fear of public exposure.

In the case of women who engage in professional and graduate work, it often happens that failure to marry is itself a dominant motive for continuing academic training. Witness a good many unhappy women who not only carry with them the sense of sexual frustration and have to face the intense competition of men in the graduate or professional studies themselves, but must anticipate even more severe competition with men once they have graduated. (See Chapter XXII.)

Those graduate and professional men students who are married often have still other problems. While matrimony may furnish a natural and culturally accepted release for sexual tensions, there are other difficulties aside from those normally linked to married life. Of first importance are worries over family finances. These not only influence the interspousal relations (see Chapter XX) but are likely to produce mental anxieties which will influence the man's academic performance and thus tend to lower his level of achievement, with all that this implies as to the attitudes of his

professors and their possible recommendations for positions later. Then, if children appear, there are added home and financial responsibilities.

If there are no children, and if the wife has some occupational competence, she may undertake a position as a clerk, stenographer, teacher, or housekeeper. This may remove the economic insecurity, but it means further reorientation for both spouses regarding household duties and problems of emotional and economic dominance in the home. A certain risk of future marital difficulties is always involved in such a situation. No one has studied the later matrimonial careers of students who were married before completing their professional or graduate training, but such an investigation might reveal valuable data regarding interactional adjustments against the background of professional training, interspousal roles during this period, and later social role and status.

Then, too, the graduate and professional student, even though older in years, often suffers from anxiety about his examinations, the outcome of his research, his grades, and his chances of attaining his higher degree. When to such anxieties are added those attendant upon economic insecurities and sexual frustrations, or, for the married student, those associated with home and family responsibilities, the lot of the graduate student is not altogether happy.

Though we have emphasized the emotional difficulties of these students, it must not be imagined that all graduate students suffer such hardships. Nor must we forget that even those who are economically hard-pressed or who carry the responsibility of a family find many highly satisfying features in life during these years. Satisfactory marital life at home, good grades, successful research, and the attainment of fellowships and honors and prizes all tend to enhance the ego and to raise the social status. The problems have been sketched, however, to indicate that not all social and emotional difficulties are confined to undergraduates.

Personality traits and characteristics of college students. While fairly adequate measures of intellectual ability are at hand for use in selecting and advising students, measures of social and emotional maturity are only now being developed. (See Chapter XI.) The tests of emotional instability, of inferiority feelings, of introversion and extroversion, have not been sufficiently developed to relate the inner subjective life—as demonstrated by verbal reactions—to the wide range of particular external situations to which they are related in overt conduct. Yet a large number of investigations have been made in the field of nonintellectual traits. In fact, during the past two decades our American college students have played the role of human guinea pigs for many experimental and testing programs of psychologists, psychiatrists, sociologists, and professors of education in pursuit of the elusive answer as to the nature of personality characteristics in the hope that their findings would have general applicability.

We have already noted some of the limitations of these findings and methods. (See Chapters XI, XII, and XIII, on methods, traits, and types.) Yet various surveys have shown that from 5 to 25 per cent of the usual college population is marked by neurotic characteristics of sufficient seriousness to warrant special attention from teachers, advisors, and personnel officers. (See Strang, 1937, for a review of the literature.) Not only have statistical studies revealed many emotional and other maladjusted features of college students, but the files of our college administrative and advisory staffs are filled with evidence from interviews that many otherwise promising students have deep-seated social-emotional disturbances. Rice (1938), from personality ratings of 385 college women (two by advisors, one by roommate, and one by student herself), reports only a third to be wholly free "of any of the undesirable traits" indicated by the scale.

While the quantitative studies of personality are not entirely satisfactory, they do expose some of the problems of adaptation among college students. We shall discuss only three classes of such investigations: those concerned (1) with emotional instability or neuroticism, (2) with feelings of inferiority, and (3) with differences in personality type, particularly introversion and extroversion. (See Katz and F. H. Allport, 1931.)

(1) One study of so-called neurotic symptoms among a group of college students reported that the most common were disturbed sleep, worry, irritability, perseveration of ideas, and self-consciousness (J. W. Bridges, 1927). Hertzberg (1933), using a sample of students from teachers' colleges, reported the most common evidences of emotional instability to be fear, timidity, and self-consciousness. Other difficulties frequently mentioned were loneliness, daydreaming, being easily moved to tears, and tendency to have one's feelings easily hurt. These and other emotional reactions in students have long been recognized in individual cases, but, when they are applied to a statistical sample, one asks if such verbal responses show any correlation with other measures of academic behavior. On the whole the results are negative. Thus Stagner (1933b) found practically zero correlation between the Thurstone Personality Schedule and school marks or scores on the American Council intelligence test. Drought (1938) reports the same sort of zero-order correlations between Stagner's W test (of nervousness) and Bell's D test (of emotionality) and the discrepancies between predicted and achieved grade points in a sample of 750 Wisconsin first-year men. Pintner (1932) found a slight indication that neuroticism was associated with prejudice and emotional stability with fair-mindedness. Hartmann (1934) reports slight positive correlation between measures of neuroticism and tendency to judge oneself to be unhappy. One study suggests that there may be considerable negative correlation between neuroticism and tendency to dominance. Thus Stagner (1932) reports a correlation of $-.51$ between scores on the Allport A-S—ascendancy-submission—test and neuroticism as measured by the Thurstone Personality Schedule.

(2) It has also commonly been observed that many college students show a decided sense of inferiority in the presence of various situations in college. Gardner and Pierce (1929) report that in a sample of 512 students nearly half admitted some feelings of inferiority, chiefly those associated with "social" inadequacy, that is, incapacity to

handle person-to-person situations. In this sample there was little evidence of sense of inferiority respecting physique, intelligence, or financial status. And Murray (1938) states that about 68 per cent of the men whom he studied, chiefly college students, suffered or had suffered from "persistent inferiority feelings," the commonest form of which concerned their social contacts with their fellows. In this sample, moreover, 41 per cent confessed some sense of physical inferiority. Yet the correlations with various measures of sense of inferiority, such as the Bernreuter B₂-S (self-sufficiency), yield zero-order correlations with school marks. (See Stagner, 1933b.) The same result was found in correlating the Wisconsin Scale of Personality (Stagner Y—self-esteem) with the discrepancy between predicted and achieved grade point ratings. (See Drought, 1938.)

(3) No better results are at hand in tests of introversion and extroversion when these are correlated with scholastic performance or with scores on intelligence tests. Stagner (1933b) reported approximately zero-order *r*'s when he compared intelligence-test scores and school marks with introversion-extroversion tests. The introvert, as indicated by the usual tests, is evidently no bookworm or grind. (See also Guthrie, 1927; Broom, 1929; Drought, 1938.)⁴

In short, the use of tests, inventories, and schedules purporting to show such social and emotional traits as neuroticism, inferiority feelings, and introversion or extroversion among students have not as yet proved particularly useful either for diagnosis or for prediction of behavior. As Strang (1937, p. 201) says, there is "no evidence that personality questionnaires measure traits that contribute in any important degree to successful school achievement." Nor have they any predictive value in regard to scholastic performance. (See Young, Drought, and Bergstresser, 1937; and Drought, 1938.) The internal variables are so many, and the external situations which induce particular attitudes or habits are so diverse, that as yet no adequate measuring devices of the paper-and-pencil sort have been developed which will predict either academic performance or extra-curricular adaptation.

Yet it would be a great mistake to assume, because so far the tests have failed us, that emotional and social traits have no bearing on scholarship or on adaptation to the community life in college. These are related to the learning process itself, to teacher-student interactions, to the carry-over into college of home and community influences, to the nature and extent of contacts with fellow-students, and to such matters as sex and love life, religious beliefs, public morality, and concern with political and economic radicalism. We are not yet prepared to measure adequately the personality characteristics associated with this range of situations, chiefly because we have not yet been able to identify such traits and

⁴ The inadequacy of the various tests and schedules purporting to reveal emotional difficulties has been frequently demonstrated. See *inter alia* Burnham and Crawford (1935); Brodemarkle (1933); Vernon (1934); Kelley, Miles, and Terman (1936); Young, Drought, and Bergstresser (1937); and the pertinent sections in Chapter XI above.

values, and partially because the testing technique does not yet provide the means of relating the verbal responses to the underlying internal states or to overt conduct itself.

Although the interview and other case-study techniques are time-consuming, although they are as yet quite unstandardized as to method, and though there is only mild consensus as to what data should be accumulated by such means, nevertheless these nonquantitative methods are useful in getting at the basic matter of the relation of traits and subjective states to overt behavior. (See Chapter XI.) One promising procedure is to try to link the findings from tests, inventories, and questionnaires to the facts uncovered by the interview and from biographical and autobiographical materials. The intensive investigation of Murray *et al.* (1938), though designed principally for research purposes, points the way to the use of a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods in dealing with college students. This elaborate study furnishes the most nearly complete body of evidence at hand that a marked proportion of our college students do carry "a heavy load of crippling anxiety," a strong sense of inadequacy, and severe feelings of guilt and dejection.

But the chief usefulness of the interview method has been in dealing with the more divergent student. We are still in need of simpler and less elaborate devices for assisting the great bulk of students who are not extreme deviants but who do suffer from mild and often temporary personal problems.

PERSONNEL WORK FOR COLLEGE STUDENTS

In the face of the increasing volume of students which followed 1920, American colleges and universities began to develop various administrative devices and special personnel to deal with the new problems of selection, guidance, and adjustment of students. At the outset there was little or no co-ordinated planning. But, as exigencies arose, provision was made for the extension of health and medical services, especially into the field of mental hygiene; the psychologists contributed intelligence tests as aids in the selection of students, more attention was given to advisory work, new methods of handling moral discipline inside and outside the classroom came into being, and increasing recognition was given to the importance of extracurricular activities. These services often overlapped each other, and not infrequently they operated at cross purposes. Contradictory conceptions and practices were particularly evident in matters of discipline and punishment with reference to the social and emotional problems of the students as these related to matters both inside and outside the classroom. For years tradition-bound presidents and deans failed to realize that the increase in enrollments had altered the nature of college life and that social psychology and psychiatry had genuine contributions

to make to the improvement of morale and to the satisfactory adaptation of students to college. Only gradually did attention begin to be given to matters of mental health, to advice on courses, to vocational guidance, and to other needs of the students as maturing persons with a wide range of interests aside from the purely academic.

After many years of undirected growth more co-ordinated programs and procedures for advising and guiding students have emerged in a good many institutions. These services may be described under the broad category of student personnel work. The basic philosophy of such service is based on the recognition that the totality of the student's adjustments must be taken into account in directing his college education and that emphasis must be put "upon the development of the student as a person rather than upon intellectual training alone," as Andrews (1938) puts it. While the focal point in college education remains the student's academic success or failure in terms of intellectual attainment, sound personnel work does not neglect the social and emotional aspects of the learning process itself, the student's adaptation to extracurricular situations, his physical welfare, and his aesthetic, religious, and civic values.

Since various specific problems with which personnel work deals have already been discussed, we shall concern ourselves at this point with the following topics only: (1) the organization of this type of service, (2) the basic features of student personnel work, and (3) certain requirements respecting the qualifications of the formal personnel staff and of the faculty advisors who carry the chief responsibility for successfully helping the student adapt himself to college.⁵

Organization of personnel work. In any formal system of dealing with student adjustment problems, the first question concerns the integration of the various special functions. In some instances there has been considerable decentralization, in others a good deal of concentration of authority and activity into a few major agencies. The soundest practice apparently calls for a centralized co-ordination of various decentralized units within the college in order to bring about some functional interdependence and co-operation so that duplication of effort and contradictory programs may be avoided.

In general, the following division of labor seems to be indicated: (1) there should be some central correlating person or committee whose function will be determination of major policy and practice and into whose hands will fall the chief co-ordinating functions. Such a person or body, of course, will operate under general administrative and faculty control. From such a central policy-making and co-ordinating body there would derive certain specialized functions, including the following: (2) A

⁵ For extended statements on the nature and techniques of student personnel work see American Council on Education (1937); Straug (1937); Williamson and Darley (1937); Paterson, Schneider, and Williamson (1938); Lloyd-Jones and Smith (1938); and O'Shea (1939).

central all-college or all-university service into whose hands would fall the responsibility for the collection of high-school records, the entire testing program before entrance, the determination of fitness of applicants for college work, registration, and the preparation and keeping of the usual academic and related records of all students. (3) The medical and health service, including mental-hygiene experts, who should be available for voluntary consultation and prepared to diagnose and advise students sent to them by administrative deans, by faculty counselors, or by parents, friends, or others. (4) The collegiate deans and their assistants, having to do essentially with the scholastic problems of the students. (5) Selected members of the teaching staff upon whose shoulders the actual advising of students must fall. This group will bear the major responsibility for the counseling of students, and ordinarily will call upon the more specialized services only in extreme cases. (6) A faculty committee or some special personnel officer having to do with moral discipline, both with respect to scholastic work and with regard to the students' extracurricular activities. But, if the regular counseling is sound, such a committee or executive officer should have little to do. Yet, so long as dishonesty in course work and theft of library and other university property occur, so long as sexual and other taboos and laws are broken, colleges and universities will have to continue to deal with those students who do not abide by the mores and regulations of the campus and the college community. (7) An official or committee to control the lodging and feeding of students in dormitories or other official provision for living quarters, and to supervise other residential facilities in the college community, such as fraternity and sorority houses, privately owned dormitories, and rooming houses. (8) A central executive officer or committee having to do with the extracurricular life of the students so far as this is a part of the college or university function, particularly regarding student participation in athletics, dramatics, debating, oratorical contests, and the like. Such an officer or committee might also serve in a liaison relation with the student-body organizations and with the staff of student unions or other agencies in the college which foster recreational and other extracurricular activities. And finally (9) some provision should be made for formal or informal relations with off-campus organizations such as various churches, the Y.M.C.A., the Y.W.C.A., the Newman Club, the Hillel Foundation, and like institutions which have frequent and important contacts with the students.

It is doubtless wise to permit direct membership and participation of representative students in some of these committees or agencies. This is particularly indicated with reference to housing and the extracurricular aspects of personnel work. The participation of the students in these matters is important in relation to the democratic process, and it makes for better service and for increased morale and satisfaction.

Attention to the students' needs. Although scholastic performance will remain the central theme of college life, sane personnel work should be concerned not only with the student's academic adjustment but with the whole scope of his life during the college years. And, on the purely scholastic side, tests and other measures for predicting success or failure should be applied with a view not to mechanical grinding out of diplomas but to aiding the student to work up to his intellectual capacity. As Wil-

liamson and Darley (1937) say, the best personnel work is concerned with judgments of the probable success or failure in college work rather than with attempts to fit the student to a specific occupation in later life. Aside from the strictly preprofessional and professional courses, where the teaching and guidance may bear more directly on a particular vocation, training for the bulk of college students should be general in character and concerned with a form of preparation which will make the student sufficiently flexible to meet the varied requirements of vocational, marital, civic, and other public duties later in life.

As for the quantitative data from scholastic records, tests, and questionnaires, sound personnel work will regard them chiefly as indicators of symptoms of personality make-up. They are reliable aids in diagnosis and prediction. But the fundamental advice and direction to the student must come through the person-to-person contact of the administrative personnel staff and the faculty advisors. It is through the interview, bolstered as it may be from the quantitative records—including school grades, scores on intelligence tests, and the like—and from biographical and autobiographical materials from the student or his previous advisors, that the most effective help will be given the student. In this way the student will come to be treated not as a subject for exposure to a certain course of study or as a nuisance when he gets into trouble, but as a person with a variety of needs, interests, and ambitions who must somehow adapt himself to the collegiate environment and at the same time prepare himself for a satisfactory life when he leaves school.

But in all these contacts the psychological principles of interaction operate, and the student, if he is to be helped, must himself contribute to the contact with his advisor. The latter is not a mechanical robot who will hand out *obiter dicta* as to what the student must or must not do or who will fix up a life schema which will protect the student against any future crises. Too frequently students approach the central personnel staff or faculty counselors in a childish belief that some sort of magical devices can be furnished them which will once and for all relieve them of their problems and of their personal responsibility in connection therewith. The soundest help which a personnel officer or faculty counselor can give is to get the student to help himself, to indicate to him the need for self-control and for a mature sense of responsibility for his conduct.

So, too, there has been considerable discussion of the value of courses in mental hygiene for college students. (See Patry, 1935.) It is believed that such informational courses will give the student insight into himself and into the mental and social mechanisms which operate in his life. While such classes may be valuable for many students, their limitations must be recognized. At best they can but furnish a body of information; they cannot replace the need for person-to-person contact of advisor and

student. Moreover, such courses sometimes serve to provide the student with a host of new concepts with which he may easily rationalize his own maladjustments. In these instances the benefits from such knowledge are slight indeed. Too frequently there has been a pious notion that sheer information about mental, social, and emotional processes will provide all that is needed to make for happy orientation to college or to life later. Such a naive view is analogous to recommending that a man with typhoid fever read a textbook in physiology or a sound treatise on *materia medica*.

No, the student must come to realize that in our society individual responsibility and self-control are two fundamental values in adult adjustment, and, with specific reference to college, he must realize that success therein is related to self-determined levels of aspiration and that achievement, in turn, depends upon his drive, ability, and interest, and upon his social-cultural background and present opportunities for learning. Moreover, he must discover that skill and attainment are dependent in large measure upon persistent effort and hard work, and finally that scholastic achievement is only complete when it is correlated with the deepest interests and motives of the individual. Only thus can it become an integrated part of the larger pattern of personality. In short, adequate personnel advising and direction must recall that the student is the focal point of all specialized services, that the aim is to integrate his educational adjustments to his total life adaptation, but that he is in the end to be held responsible for his success or failure. Personnel work can only aid the student; it cannot remake him or assume the responsibility for his motives, values, traits, attitudes, and conduct.

Qualifications for sound student counseling. Success in formal personnel work and in advising of students generally will depend upon the qualifications of the administrative staff and especially of the faculty counselors. A member of the technical staff must be adequately trained in his own specialty, be it medicine, psychological testing, or the housing and feeding of students. And those concerned with the extracurricular relations should possess, aside from executive and leadership abilities, a good deal of rather technical information bearing on their work.

But in addition to these specialized areas of knowledge and skill, the administrative personnel staff should be selected from individuals who themselves are socially and emotionally well balanced. Not only should they have a sound knowledge of the principles of mental hygiene and be able to apply these in their daily contacts with students, but they ought to be persons of sound mind and healthy traits and attitudes. Little or nothing has been done in the way of formal training in this whole field, but beginnings have been made, and, as college personnel work becomes recognized as an integral part of our total educational program, we may look for more deliberate attention to these matters.

Yet the heart of sound advising of students lies with the teachers themselves, especially with those faculty members selected to act as student counselors. These persons come into closer contact with the usual student than does the formal administrative staff. But all too frequently faculty advisors have no interest or skill in dealing with the students. Too often their contacts are infrequent and perfunctory, having to do almost entirely with the registration of the student in a course of study and occasional visits from the student, chiefly from those who are called in because of reports of failing work. We cannot go into the range of difficulties arising from the traditional student-advisor relation. We have already commented on the problem of teacher-student contact in the classroom or laboratory, and some of the difficulties cited there are also evident in this field of interaction. First of all, the usual college teacher considers himself an expert in a particular branch of knowledge and feels little or no responsibility for collegiate matters outside that narrow boundary. Second, a goodly proportion of college instructors are none too healthy-minded themselves. The ivory tower of the academic profession has long provided many highly capable introverts a protective environment in which they could carry on their intellectual labors without the distractions of the marketplace or the ordinary world of their fellows. Third, most of those who are interested in helping their students have no knowledge or understanding of human psychology or mental hygiene. As a result, they frequently flounder about in the face of a student's emotional difficulties, or fall back upon their culturally imposed patterns of blame and punishment at the very time when the student needs sympathetic aid in diagnosing his difficulties and in planning a program to overcome them.

Although many teachers, even though unfamiliar with the technical jargon of psychology, do know a great deal about problems of personal adjustment, many others do not. But it does not follow that faculty counseling should be abandoned and a specially trained staff engaged to do such work. Few colleges are financially able to bear the costs of strictly professional counseling, nor does satisfactory mental hygiene indicate such procedure to be sound. It seems wisest to keep student advising closely geared to the classroom and everyday campus life. Three suggestions may be made to improve the system of faculty counseling:

(1) There is every reason for making the advising of students a recognized part of the college instructor's duties. But such time as teachers devote to this obligation should be considered a part of their regular working schedule and professional responsibility, not put on them as extra tasks in addition to a heavy teaching load.

(2) Prospective college teachers should have a modicum of training or instruction in social psychology and mental hygiene as a phase of their general background for teaching, which all instructors should have in addition to their specialized prep-

aration for particular fields. Lacking this, specially prepared courses and materials on mental hygiene, including attention to the psychology of the interview, might be provided the faculty counselors by college departments of psychology or education. So, too, periodic conferences and discussions of student advisory problems by groups of faculty members and central personnel staff might be held. In such meetings various specialists from the formal administrative offices might be called upon to explain their work, and faculty members might provide the personnel staff with important information on many of the problems of student adjustment.

(3) For handling instances of more severe maladjustments some system of case conferences might be arranged for counselors and technical experts. Though at the outset such a program might set up an emotional resistance on the part of certain faculty members, it might, if skillfully handled, have lasting effects upon the faculty themselves and upon the students who have to come into daily contact with them.

Unfortunately, only a few colleges have yet developed a co-ordinated administrative plan for personnel work, or have realized the need of having a faculty advisory staff familiar with the psychology of human relations. It is not that every faculty man or woman should be an expert in mental hygiene, but everyone who is responsible for student counseling should know something of this field, just as every classroom teacher should. And, finally, success as an advisor rests not only upon knowledge alone, but upon the fundamental structure of the personality of the instructor himself. As we come to take these matters into account in our teacher-training programs, as these broader as well as specialized features of college teaching come to be recognized by administrators and the public outside, we may hope to see better-balanced and healthier-minded college teachers in charge of our young people during the critical years of late adolescence and early maturity.

Chapter XX

ADJUSTMENT IN MARRIAGE

IN OUR OWN country, as in most other civilized countries today, the family is legally a marriage pair—that is, a man and a woman lawfully wed. As an interactional unit a family is traditionally—at its minimum—a primary group made up of parents and their immediate offspring. Biologically and sociologically a marriage pair without children might well be considered an incomplete family. But in the present discussion we may ignore this distinction, since our basic interest lies in the relations of the spouses to each other. Despite the loss or reduction of many attendant and subsidiary functions of family life which is everywhere evident, interspouse relations and child-rearing remain the focus of the family. Sapir (1930, p. 151) well states the continuing major purposes or functions of the family in our society as “first, to give the sex relationship its greatest emotional value; second, to rear children in an atmosphere of intelligent affection; third, to prepare the individual for the give and take of society; and fourth, to prepare the child unconsciously for satisfactory mating in the future.”

In this chapter our concern will be chiefly with certain psychological features of mating and courtship, with marriage and the interactional patterns of the spouses, and with the effect of children upon these interspousal contacts. But it should be borne in mind that, for the most part, we shall be concerned with marital adjustments as they take place within the framework of American culture. In other societies the psychological problems of interspousal adaptation may be of quite another character because of different culture.

COURTSHIP AND THE PRELIMINARIES TO MATRIMONY

The mobility of population today, the emancipation of women from home and household duties, the entrance of young women into business and the professions, the rise of new agencies which afford chances for young men and women to meet, all illustrate changes from the earlier days of the isolated community wherein the families tended to intermarry among themselves. Opportunities for young persons to meet those of the opposite sex are highly important for their own future. Our society provides opportunity for a rather wide selection of mates.

With us the romantic pattern of free choice in love is considered to

be the basis of successful monogamous marriage. Romantic mating is believed to be so fundamental that we must comment on certain of its features in order to understand some of the important aspects of sexual selection in our society.

Romantic love as a culture pattern. So far as Western history goes, romantic love began in the Middle Ages when "knighthood was in flower" and when chivalry among men consisted not only in valor on the battlefield or at the tourney, but in a passionate attachment to some courtly woman. Sometimes this intense love was fixed upon a woman already married, under the custom of the time, to a man of her family's choice. Since marriage was largely determined by class and family status, the opportunity to link romantic love to marriage and family life was far less common than it was later. Thus medieval romantic love, if it became overt, often took the form of clandestine sexual relations. But the romantic passion was frequently sublimated into lyrical and spiritual poetry, songs, and certain courtly attentions which became highly conventionalized. Yet its basis in the biological urges of the individual was recognized, no matter how much they might be sublimated. Psychologically, romantic love may be characterized by (1) a strong physical attraction, (2) the dominance of the male in courting, and coyness, shyness, and a certain passivity on the part of the female, (3) a feeling that the love thus unleashed is permanent—the constancy of the lovers was a high mark of romance, (4) an idealization of the personal characteristics of the beloved individual and a rather complete glossing over of any faults or deficiencies, and (5) pain and discomfort arising from the absence of the loved one or from inhibitions which in any way prevented the romance from taking the course which the lovers wished.

As the medieval period gave way to what we call the modern age, these romantic patterns tended to be adopted by the rising bourgeois classes, where wealth rather than aristocratic family position determined high social status. But the upper bourgeoisie, unlike the medieval nobility, tended to link romantic love closely with monogamy. This shift, in fact, was one of the most important items in the history of romantic love in Western society. Later, especially in the British countries and in our own country, with their expansive colonial and pioneer life, economic and political freedom became correlated with romantic love. In time romantic choice of a mate became the more or less conventional form of sexual selection among the agricultural and industrial classes. Today we have gone so far toward individualizing the selection of mates among most classes in this country that we look askance at any attempt on the part of parents to interfere in the love life of their children—except, of course, as these matters themselves are associated with questions of racial or religious differences.

Factors influencing sexual selection. Yet there are certain limitations upon absolute freedom of choice in romantic love. After all, people have to go with those who are near them, and, despite mobility of population and freedom of choice in friends, social circumstances tend to restrict the number of individuals with whom one may associate. Age, occupation, social class, and propinquity profoundly influence mating. Women on the whole have a harder time than men in finding a mate, and, though 90 per cent of American women who live to the age of fifty-five years or over do marry, there are considerable differentials in the percentages married at varied age groups when the factors noted above are taken into account.

American studies have shown that men tend to marry women younger than themselves, and, the longer a woman after age 22 postpones matrimony, the less her chances are of marrying at all. Statistics show that 50 per cent of white women in this country are already married at age 22 (Poponoe, 1937b). The implications of this fact for the woman college graduate and for the woman who wants a career before entering matrimony are obvious. Bossard's investigation of Philadelphia marriages (1933) showed that the average man who was wed at age 25 married on the average a girl of 22.2 years—a difference of 2.8 years. In contrast, in a group of men whose mean age at marriage was 35 years, it was found that the mean age of their brides was 28.5 years—a divergence of 6.5 years. This is nearly two and one-half times as great as the difference in mean ages for the earlier marriage.

Occupational propinquity may be an important factor (Poponoe, 1937a). Marvin (1918), for certain occupation groups, showed that these people were nearly three times as likely to marry partners in the same occupational class as mere chance would indicate. It is evident that differentials in the number of men and women in a given occupation are important. Thus Poponoe (1937b) points out that women teachers outnumber men teachers in the ratio of 5.5 to 1; women librarians outnumber men in the same field nearly 8 to 1; women nurses outnumber men nurses by the ratio of 26 to 1; women engaged in religious and welfare work outnumber men in this field by the ratio of nearly 2 to 1. In such occupations, therefore, unless women have other outlets, their opportunities to marry are greatly reduced by the fact that their vocations are disproportionately overloaded with members of their own sex. (See also Tharp, 1933, on percentages of prominent professional women who are married.)

Also, higher education tends to militate against women's chances of matrimony—itsself a reflection of a certain cultural lag in the matter of masculine attitudes toward the educated woman. However, various studies of the graduates of eastern women's colleges show a gradual shift in this attitude. About 1908 only 50 to 60 per cent of these college women graduates married; more recently this percentage has risen to 75 or 80. (See Folsom, 1938; and Waller, 1938.)

This fact reveals another matter. Not only do men marry women younger than themselves, but they tend on the whole to marry women

beneath them as to social class and as to intelligence. (See Poponoe, 1937b; and Folsom, 1938.) Of course, this may not indicate any inherited constitutional deficiency in these wives as compared with their husbands (as Poponoe is inclined to contend), but may rather reflect the continuing divergences in the social status of men and women. (See Chapter XXII.) Women's evident desire to marry above their station is but another way of showing their differential status. Baber (1936), in a study of women's matrimonial wishes, showed that they were less willing than men to marry those beneath them in economic status, in family position, in morals, in health, or in intelligence. The greatest emphasis was laid on the last factor; only 18 per cent of 321 women—in contrast to 76 per cent of 321 men—were willing to marry one less intelligent.

The persistence through many decades of certain type situations in which women meet their spouses—at least for a particular economic class—is demonstrated by the study made by Folsom and Mitchell of Vassar alumnae. (See Folsom, 1934, p. 340.) In reporting the circumstances under which they met their husbands, childhood friendships and "introductions" through "mutual friends" or at "social events" have continued through a sixty-year period to be the two chief sources of initial contact with future spouses. For the classes graduating between 1925 and 1931, however, "church work" accounted for but 2 per cent of such contacts in contrast to 14 per cent for the classes finishing college between 1869 and 1881. Judging by Folsom's figures, this loss in the effectiveness of the church as a source of getting acquainted is made up in the slightly increased importance of contacts through friends and "social events." Yet for the most part, for this particular sample, there is little change in the source of first acquaintance between spouses throughout the years. Despite the increased role of women in the professions and other occupations, contacts within the local neighborhood or "social events" with friends seem to continue to be the principal situations where people of this social class meet, although other studies might show different results if applied to other social classes.

One of the problems which face the young people in many communities and particularly in secondary-group situations found in our cities is the fact that mobility of population is itself associated with impersonality and a certain "touch and go" variety of contact that often prevents a more permanent acquaintance among young people. The fundamental need is for some means by which young persons of marriageable age may be brought together with that degree of social informality which will make it possible for them to become well acquainted. In this way their personal wishes, habits, attitudes, and ideas may be exposed and become the basis either for further friendship or for discontinuance of relations. The primary group, like the neighborhood or the small community, provides this very situation; the secondary community, in spite of occupational relations of men and women in many instances, still

fails to afford sufficiently wide range of contact and choice to satisfy the normal demands of young men and women in late adolescence and early adulthood.

Opportunity to become acquainted and a certain preliminary "period of experimentation," as Groves (1933) terms it, are two important features of the courtship. Groves further remarks that these "experimental acquaintances" furnish a certain testing "of the depth of interest and resources for continuing relationship" between two prospective mates. Yet with reference to these tentative beginnings of love a certain cultural patterning has arisen. In them appear coquetry and a good deal of verbal sparring and interplay—a sort of game at becoming acquainted. In this there is frequently considerable thin disguise aimed at attempting to get a prospective view of what may be expected should such acquaintance be carried further. Waller (1938), who has devoted himself to a considerable study of courtship patterns, especially among those favorite sociological samples—college students—points out that, as courtship proceeds, the preliminary coquetry and gesturing develop into "the line" consisting of anticipatory sorts of romantic chatter which he considers essentially exploitative in character. Yet beneath this external interest in each other a couple are really measuring each other's capacity for subsequent interaction as the involvement in love becomes more serious. In time, says Waller, the couple passes on to "light love" and thence into the full swing of courtship.

There are, of course, other difficulties which beset young couples in the premarital years, particularly those arising from cultural differences which tend to interfere with the more spontaneous mutual attachment. Ciocco (1939) analyzed 450 letters (333 from women, 117 from men) that had been addressed to a "well-known popular advisor" on personal questions with respect to possible advice on premarital problems. It was found that "Differences in the social status, religion and nationality of the two partners, the promiscuous sexual conduct of the other partner, and the inadequate income of the man constitute the basic conditions which disturb the pre-marital relationship of about 70 per cent of these men and women." With the women the most serious problems had to do with parental opposition, which in turn was in large part related to matters of social position, religion, nationality, and income. For the men the most serious question concerned the fear of future loss of "affection between the partners." Though this sample is rather biased, it does reveal the kind of difficulties that confront many young persons who are eager to wed.

Courtship patterns. Writers on the family are apt to see in the preliminaries to sexual mating among the higher animals a kinship to what they observe in their own society. But often these writers are ignorant of the fact that in other human societies courtship as we know it is not

known at all. Hence such analogies have distinct limitations and should be left to the writers of fiction.

Though traditionally male dominance in courtship was taken for granted, there is considerable evidence that aggressiveness in love on the part of women is gradually becoming more common. For example, it is reflected in our contemporary motion pictures. (See Peters, 1933.) It was once assumed that male dominance was innate and universal. But we know that in part at least it is a cultural product, and there is no reason to believe that, in our own society, women, and hence men as well, may not in time change their traditional roles in courtship. Conventional Victorian society demanded a curious combination of romantic love, but of a pure variety, with careful chaperonage by adults. The disappearance of the chaperon means more freedom not only for the man but for the woman too. Yet with all these changes many essentials of the former courtship pattern remain.

Some aspects of romantic courtship. There is first of all the whole romantic love pattern itself, with emphasis upon thrill, lyrical expression of affection, high idealization of the prospective mate, and constantly reasserted loyalty and constancy. There is the cultural pattern of expected and habituated jealousy if there is any threat to this relationship by a third person. Then, too, in the middle classes in this country, there is a good deal of lavish expenditure of money during courtship. The free spending gives the girl a certain idea of luxury which the young man, once married, may neither be able, nor even intend, to carry on. Conspicuous consumption—to use Veblen's famous phrase—serves to enhance the swain's prestige. (This would perhaps be called by Waller "exploitation.")

But the most notable feature of courtship is that much of it goes on—using an old homely expression—in what may be called one's Sunday clothes. That is, young people tend to do their courting, at least in a wide range of social classes, as a leisure-time activity, often on holidays and Sundays, and through it all there runs a certain "dressed-up" attitude. Not only is this seen in matters of clothes, but the whole courtship tends to take place in a sort of Cinderella or daydream world which they and others build up.

In the idealization of each other lovers indulge in a great deal of fantasy thinking. Imagined future roles and situations form the core of a goal or aspiration that itself may serve further to motivate the courtship. Moreover, the fantasy life set up in both the young man and the young woman during courtship may provide a good deal of sublimation for their overt sexual expression, but at the same time it may prove in the end to be the basis for misunderstanding and conflict in matrimony itself. Both the overidealization of romance and marriage and the unique

role-taking of courtship foster these fantasies. And a rude awakening later may be the beginning of difficulties and strains that make marriage itself somewhat hazardous.

Young men and women who grow up more frankly with each other and who are not inducted into the Victorian expectancies regarding the romance of courtship are probably free from some aspects of this problem. There is some indication that young folks today are more honest and deliberate in stating their own wishes, in restricting the Cinderella roles which they play with each other, and in taking each other at their face value—that is, in terms of expected roles in less emotional and more customary situations. A certain rationality is also witnessed in some of our coeducational collegiate life, where there is less emphasis on expensive wardrobes and where the custom of young couples' sharing the expenses for recreation has arisen.

The person-to-person relations in courtship are likely to be surcharged with emotion and feeling. The usual physical stimulation from the presence of a member of the other sex and especially from contact of the sort called "petting" leads to the arousal of sexual emotions and incipient sexual responses. The inhibition and sublimation called for in these situations—in terms of our traditional culture of premarital continency—often heighten the interactional interests of young people. Such frustrations easily enhance the traditional role-taking of lyrical romance. It may on occasion, however, lead to outbursts of petty irritation or out-and-out quarreling. The failure of the other person to fit into the romantic role expected, the subtle thrusts at the other's self-esteem which may appear despite the following traditional patterns of being "all sweetness" and affection, the expression of some wish to do other than the masculine partner has decided, or any number of other relatively minor breakdowns in the anticipated patterns may lead to a sense of doubt, to unpleasant remarks, to a sense of inferiority, and sometimes to open conflict. Any of these, in turn, may give rise to misunderstandings or separations for a time. Yet these experiences are not all lost, for they tend to throw the romantic couple back into the stream of everyday role-taking and reality. Intelligent recognition of the situations giving rise to quarrels may bring an improvement of habits and attitudes touching on those situations, and thus foster emotionally well-balanced relations that will carry over into marriage with mutual benefit.

The function of courtship, therefore, is in part the carrying forward of that development of heterosexual interest which F. E. Williams (1926) emphasized so well and so appropriately. But, obviously, the traditional pattern of courtship, with its trappings of romanticism and sentimentality, frequently leads to overexpectation and a certain temporary, immature role-taking which may actually prevent arrival at effective maturity. If

in courtship, moreover, the high idealization of women, which Williams also noted as childish and unsound for mature adaptation, continues—as is likely in the romanticized courtship—then that preliminary experience of “testing” and “experimentation,” which Ginsberg (1933), Groves (1933), Folsom (1934), and other writers on the family defend, will not prove particularly beneficial for later adjustment. It is not an easy matter for the young person in these days of many conflicting patterns of behavior and the varied opportunities for premarital sexual congress to know just what to do. The difficult choices between overt outlets and the values of sublimation and inhibition with an eye to future marriage (after perhaps men and women have had considerable friendship with a wide range of other persons) are not easy to make. (On courtship patterns, see also N. Carpenter, 1932.)

Traditional courtship, therefore, may not be quite so satisfactory a preparation for the future of marital adjustments as we may imagine. The man and woman in courtship are expected to play certain roles, to anticipate from the marriage certain results which often do not actually materialize. The cynical joking of older married people about the future disillusionments which newlyweds will experience reflects a general recognition of a certain artificiality in courtship. But most romantically minded young persons doubt or cannot accept these realities during these emotionally thrilling months just prior to the wedding.

This expected role-taking of two young persons in love—following the older pattern—is, in a sense, false because it does not correspond closely with other roles which they then play or which they will be expected to play once they are settled in their own households. These are not matters of conscious or deliberate deception or make-believe.¹ There is merely a conventional role-taking which does not necessarily outlast courtship itself—a form of interaction calling for certain more or less expected attitudes and overt conduct.

Changes in premarital folkways. The rise of new folkways and mores respecting sex relations prior to marriage indicates a shift in the romantic pattern and in the nature of courtship. The extent and frequency of premarital sexual intercourse in contemporary America, in contrast to past practice, are impossible to estimate. (See Sait, 1938.) Casual observation, reports of school authorities, clinical psychologists, and psychiatrists, and indirect evidence from motion pictures, current fiction, and present-day advertising point to the fact that there has been a loosening of former verbal and overt inhibitions in the matter of premarital sexuality.

¹ In his discussion of courtship Waller (1938) makes three assumptions which strike me as yet quite unverified. The first two concern the place of “exploitation” and “bargaining” in these relations; the third is that romantic courtship is, when all is said and done, really neurotic in quality.

Hamilton (1929) reports that, of his selected sample of 100 men whom he interviewed, 54 per cent admitted premarital sex relations, and that, of his 100 wives, 35 per cent admitted like practice. Harvey (1932), in summarizing the results of ten investigations on this topic—six dealing with men, four with women—states that about 35 per cent of the former and 15 per cent of the latter reported premarital sex experience. Newcomb's review (1937) of certain trends in attitudes toward sex and marriage indicates a growing tolerance in these matters. H. Hart's investigation (1933) of reading habits—as measured by purchases of printed matter—showed that there was a definite shift between 1900-1905 and 1931-1932 toward increasing tolerance not only for divorce and birth control but of sex freedom before matrimony and afterward. Also, the *Fortune Quarterly Survey: VII* (Fortune, 1937a) showed for their sample (apparently pretty adequately selected as to age, sex, socioeconomic class, and geographic region) that 17.1 per cent believed that the moral standards of sex in this country were "better" than they were a "generation ago," 45 per cent that they were "worse," and 27.8 per cent that they were the "same." (Ten per cent of the sample used failed to make a judgment on any of these points.) On the whole, the women thought that the sexual standards were worse today than did the men or the younger persons of both sexes. Small-town people and farmers believed sex conditions to be more decadent today than did their city cousins. Of those classified as belonging in the upper economic brackets, 37 per cent believed sexual morals worse, while of those in the "poor" category 49.9 per cent thought them worse. Perhaps the latter bespeak real changes in sexual morality, in contrast to the wealthier classes, where sex freedom has long been more tolerated.

Again, the *Fortune Quarterly Survey: VIII* (Fortune, 1937b) collected replies to this question: "Do you think it is all right for either or both parties to a marriage to have had previous sexual experience?" Some of their enlightening data are the following: Twenty-two per cent of the total respondents—male and female—believed this practice all right for both men and women, but 28 per cent of the men respondents voted this way, and only 17 per cent of the women—indicating more conservatism of the latter. Age proved to be a factor in the answers: nearly 27 per cent of those under 40 years of age thought the practice should be permitted both sexes, while only 18 per cent of those over 40 years of age agreed to this. The persistence of the old double standard—that is, that premarital relations should be permitted men but not women—is revealed by the fact that 7.6 per cent of both men and women believed such freedom should be accorded men only. In terms of sex differences on this point, 10.2 per cent of the men voted thus, and only 5.2 per cent of the women. Again, those under 40 years of age were 33 per cent more favorable to this double standard than were those over 40 years, showing that many of the younger age groups still favor the traditional view on this matter. Fifty-six per cent of both men and women respondents believed that neither sex should be permitted this freedom, but again more women (65 per cent) voted this way than men (47.5 per cent). Those over 40 years of age were more conservative than those under 40 years—60.8 per cent of the former were against such freedom for either sex, while only 51.4 per cent of the latter voted this way. Those belonging to the factory labor class were strongest for the old double standard, while students were strongest for the single standard for all. The "most strict and least uncertain about it are, of course, the housekeepers"—66.5 per cent for complete purity." (P. 188.) Regional divergences are noteworthy:

the mountain states were most favorable toward sex experience for all under a single standard for all; in contrast, the vote in the Southwest is strongest for strict purity but also most favorable toward the traditional double-standard code for men. On the Pacific Coast this same double-standard masculine code has practically no support at all. Thus there are important sectional cultural differences as well as those of age, sex, and social class.

There is not only the direct and indirect evidence of the sort just described, but there are, I believe, everywhere in this country a much more rational and de-emotionalized discussion and recognition of all aspects of sex than there were one or two generations ago. Take for example the matter of feminine personal hygiene centering in periodicity. One has only to examine the advertising pages of the current issues of such magazines as the *Ladies' Home Journal*, the *Woman's Home Companion*, *Good Housekeeping*, and *Harpers Bazaar* and compare them with the same periodicals ten or fifteen years ago to realize the growing tolerance regarding these matters.

Yet with all these changes it must not be forgotten that new codes are arising, and Newcomb (1937) is convinced that the "wild" behavior of the postwar flapper age was definitely transitional in character. It is my own impression from observation and interviews with college students that, though premarital sex experience is rather common, it no longer so frequently symbolizes a violent revolt against the old codes as it did in the early 1920's. Today it is often linked up with courtship and engagement looking forward to matrimony.

There remains, of course, the problem of the relation of sexual life to other aspects of personality, and many persons continue frankly to ask—other things being equal—whether premarital sex relations for late adolescent youth are either physiologically or psychologically necessary for their well-being. It might be said in this connection that many medical authorities, clinical psychologists, and endocrinologists doubt very much whether continency before marriage is injurious to young people. And there are certain obligations and "claims," emotional and social, which are set up by premarital sexual relations and which cannot be ignored.

These intimate matters cannot be dissociated from a host of other aspects of interaction. Preparation for a profession or business, the attainment of economic security, the probability of pregnancies—despite the widespread knowledge of birth control—these and many other factors must not be ignored by young people contemplating matrimony, who have strong and natural urges to follow their biological impulses before marriage, but must be faced frankly. Yet, as men and women, especially in certain economic classes, find it necessary to postpone marriage into the late twenties or early thirties, many problems of the sort which face college boys and girls no longer exist, and the alleged growth of more

freedom of premarital relations among these age groups in our modern world points to an emerging pattern of male and female adjustment. Of course, there are some writers who seem to imagine that, because the Samoans or others make a practice of premarital intercourse, because there are few if any emotional conflicts over sex problems among young people in such societies, we ought ourselves to adopt such habits. Such contentions require little serious consideration, for they result chiefly from ignorance of our complex society or from the unconscious wishes of the proponents.

In short, the problem is frequently that of fostering healthy and sublimated relations of young people and of eliminating the temporary and "false" roles of prospective spouses during courtship so that there will not result the all-too-common "let-down" in human relations later. The issue is not so much that of trying to carry overromanticized courtship patterns into marriage as of qualifying courtship practices in the first place. When we have done that, many of the problems of subsequent adjustment may be more easy to solve without the dissolution of the family itself.

MARRIAGE AND EARLY ADJUSTMENTS

So far as the external relations to others go, the entrance into matrimony by two persons is largely controlled by culture. One is impressed by the attitude in present-day America that frequently anticipates marriage as a greater crisis than it need be, just as we overemphasize the importance and significance of pubertal and adolescent changes. The problems of marital adjustment seem to arise chiefly because as individuals we are exposed to a wide variety of choices of life organization and to a set of poorly defined cultural situations in these days of rapid social change.

The wedding and the honeymoon. Just as various other aspects of premarital and marital relations have undergone many modifications in recent decades in this country, so, too, the whole importance of wedding ceremonials has been altered. The freedom of choice of mates is reflected in the fact that young people often resent the public demands for elaborate weddings and their trappings. It is not uncommon to discover that it is the parents of the couple who want an elaborate wedding; and elopements are frequently nothing but an attempt to escape these formalities. So, too, the traditional tricks played upon the bride and groom (the charivari of Victorian days) are disappearing, although in some classes these practices persist.

Although the honeymoon has become less expected in many social circles, it still remains, as Groves (1933) puts it, the conventional "entrance into marriage." And, though some of its traditional aspects have changed, certain features still remain. It marks the beginning of serious

readjustment of many habits. First, in most instances there is the initial sexual intercourse, at least for the bride. There may be for both spouses, but perhaps more frequently for the bride, some trauma in the initial physical relationship. Not infrequently the wedding night remains for the couple an unpleasant rather than a happy memory. This is related to the ideational or other preparation for such an event, as we shall see. Second, the honeymoon is often undertaken in the same romantic tenor as the traditional courtship. Expensive living in hotels and leisure-time activities sometimes give the couple—but again perhaps more often the bride—a false start as to the obligations and roles which will follow in ordinary daily life. Like the overidealized courtship, this is perhaps not unrelated to some of the subsequent marital difficulties. But it is doubtless true that, if the courtship has taken a more rational course, the honeymoon likewise will be managed with some reference to the everyday life soon to follow.

Variations in spousal roles. The beginnings of new patterns of interaction in the recently founded family, of course, reach to other areas of behavior than the sexual. It is a great mistake to assume that adjustments regarding this phase of spousal relations are the only significant ones—though they are undoubtedly of high importance in our society. New roles are developed and new status determined with reference not only to these matters but to many others. Moreover, the previous history of each spouse will in large part determine the interspousal relations developed in the new home. Kirkpatrick (1936) notes three important but somewhat divergent roles which may be played by the modern married woman, each with certain privileges and expected functions: the “wife-and-mother role” as traditional; the “companion role,” which is essentially “a leisure-time phenomenon”; and the “partner role,” a gradually emerging role based doubtless on the growing equalitarian relations of the spouses.

There is doubtless a great deal of carry-over into matrimony of interactional patterns developed during childhood and adolescence. However, infantile, childhood, and adolescent roles are not unitary and single, but diverse and multiple, depending upon the various other persons and groups with whom the individual interacts. And just how these varied roles and associated attitudes and habits get reorganized for the marriage pair is the important question. No adequate study has been made of the matter for a large sample of the population, but we have some suggestive leads from case studies and from general observation. The Freudian psychologists have long contended that many of the overt manifestations of interspouse relations are symbolic of roles and attitudes developed in infancy and childhood with reference to mother, father, sibling, or other relatives, and to nonrelatives. From a sociological approach Cottrell

has also shown that the roles of the spouses in marriage not only vary with the particular social situation but are often only slight modifications of roles which were present in the respective family configurations from which the spouses came. He writes (1933, p. 108):

"... Cases seem to indicate a multiplicity of roles. For example, a wife may play a much depended upon mother-role, a hated sister-role, and a loved brother-role at different times for her husband. The husband may in turn be for his wife her distantly respected father, her hated younger brother, and her loved older sister. The startling ambivalence frequently displayed by married persons for one another may not be true ambivalence in the strict Freudian sense. It may actually be the result of corresponding attitudes for different role patterns derived from early family relations. Thus a husband may call out affectionate as well as hostile responses from his wife by playing roles of members of her family who earlier called out the different responses. Of course it is not at all necessary nor even likely that either husband or wife will be aware that he is playing such roles."

It is apparent, too, that, though the culture of our society defines the major relations of the spouses to each other, it also permits certain alternatives; and it is in this connection that the effects of personal-social conditioning may come in. Thus a spouse who was the pampered youngest of his own family may continue to employ some of his infantile devices for getting attention in marriage. Without doubt some roles are transferred from the past into the newly established family and come to play a distinctive part in determining success or failure in matrimony.

Yet we must not forget that, as predetermined in its main lines as adult behavior is by what has gone on in infancy, childhood, and adolescence, there still remains the possibility of reorienting an individual in a marriage—as in any other—group in terms of certain alternative choices or probable patterns. There are actually vast differences in the flexibility of adults in adopting new roles and new attitudes, and this itself is obviously a problem for considerable further study. But it is increasingly evident that the simple roles of dominant husband and submissive wife do not fit the concrete situation, and the variations of role with reference to familial situations must be very great and have a distinctive effect upon the degree of marital harmony. Writing of the variety in the expected role-taking among wives, Kirkpatrick remarks (1936, p. 448):

"There are women who want to be respected as mothers without bearing children, receive gratitude without earning it, have security as parasites rather than helpmates, be admired in spite of obesity and careless dress, be thought attractive in spite of ignorance and stupidity, and to receive half or more of the family income without any creation of goods or services. On the other hand, there are women who bear children, perform household drudgery, work as many hours outside the home as the husband, maintain personal charm, and demonstrate intellectual equality but who are without gratitude, security, affection or recognition."

Bearing in mind this general comment on the problem of the roles in marriage, let us examine more closely some of the situations and reactions which give rise to strain or to co-operation and which in turn will profoundly influence the development of relatively stable and personally satisfying attitudes, habits, and ideas of the spouses in relation to each other.

Sexual factors which may influence marital relations. A fundamentally important adaptation of the spouses to each other concerns the sexual relations. If a bride brings into this situation the notion and feeling that the whole matter is nasty, sinful, or crude, she may find considerable difficulty in adjusting herself to the necessary biological aspects of wedded life. The adjustment apparently depends upon informational preparation for marital relations, upon complete satisfaction, upon the relation of sexual passion to frequency of intercourse and the art of love, and upon numerous other factors. (See M. Jung, 1940, Chaps. III, IV, and XI.)

The importance of some of these matters for marital happiness (leaving the meaning of "happiness" to the subjective judgment of the respondents) is shown in K. B. Davis's study of a sample of 1,000 married women of middle-class and college background.² She writes (1929, pp. 76-77):

"We are able to show that for the group under consideration preparation for the sex side of married life is a factor making for married happiness; that there is a correlation between preparation and the attractiveness of the married relationship itself as it comes into experience; that when these first experiences are attractive there is a greater chance for subsequent happiness. There is, as might be expected, a greater chance for happiness where the original experience was pleasurable, and four times as many of the happy group as of the unhappy have found these sex relations so during their entire married life. On the other hand, at the time of filling out the questionnaire more than four times as many of the unhappy group as of the happy group found them distasteful. Where the husband's intensity and frequency of desire are greater than those of the wife, there seems to be about an even chance for happiness. Something over 50 per cent of cases in both groups belong to this class. Where frequency and intensity of desire of both husband and wife are approximately equal the chances are greater that they will be happy than unhappy. Where the wife's desires are greater we find the higher percentage in the unhappy group."

Davis's study also indicates that, according to her informants, the use of contraceptives had little to do with happiness in marriage, but that on the other hand "abortion is about three times as frequent in the unhappy group." Yet the reader must bear in mind the limited number of cases and the fact that her sample came largely from persons in the upper social strata; whether her findings have general applicability to American married women is unknown.

² The 1,000 represented about a third of the total number of questionnaires sent out.

Hamilton (1929) reports an analysis of the voluntary replies of 100 married women and 100 married men, chiefly of the middle classes, to a large number of questions regarding their sexual experiences. (Some of these questions were taken from Davis's questionnaires.) Although Hamilton's sample is small and restricted as to source in the general population, his results are very suggestive. The exhaustive character of the questions, both as to number and as to range of data secured, somewhat offsets the limited number of persons interviewed. The following paragraphs summarize some of his findings:

(1) The "reactive value" of the opposite sex for a spouse is evidently influenced by experience with the father and brothers in the case of the wives and conversely by contact with the mother and sisters by the husbands. Of the eleven women who made reference to the physically unattractive qualities of their fathers, ten were rated as dissatisfied with their husbands, and eight of the thirteen men who noted unattractive features in their mothers said that they were dissatisfied with their wives. As Hamilton points out, these attitudes seem to rest upon the spouses' responses to physical rather than to mental characteristics of their parents. Also there is some evidence that only children do not make as good risks in matrimony as do those who have had siblings, especially of the opposite sex.

(2) There is no unqualified evidence that a family background of conflict produces unsatisfactory marriage among the children. Of the 129 men and women (of the total 200) who stated whether their parents experienced disharmony, 45.4 per cent of the men whose parents got on well together and 40 per cent of those whose parents were in conflict were satisfied with their own wives. The corresponding percentages for the women were 54.5 and 33.3, which indicates a statistically significant difference. Separation or divorce of the parents did not seem to prove fatal to the child's chances of finding satisfaction in his own marriage. Of the ten men whose parents were either separated or divorced, four were satisfied with their spouses; for the fourteen women of like family background, five were satisfied.

(3) There is evidence that a man's marriage to an older woman does not indicate impending difficulties of marital adjustment. Hamilton's findings suggest that a husband is more likely to be satisfied with a wife who is from one to three years older than himself than he is with a wife who is younger. Yet for the women, although 45 per cent of the 100 were rated as satisfied with marriage, 48.1 per cent of those who were married to men more than five years their seniors were rated as satisfied.

(4) Finally, Hamilton was convinced, at least for this sample, that the husband's sense of satisfaction in matrimony depended less on his own or his wife's "specifically sexual adequacy" than Hamilton had at the outset imagined. In contrast, he believes strongly that, unless she is obviously frigid or markedly undersexed, for the woman marriage is likely to be unsuccessful if the husband is "definitely inferior as to either sex desire or sex capacity."

But, as we have remarked previously, sexual adjustment is only one phase of successful marriage relations, and many other factors, such as

clothes, personal habits of bodily care, manners, the use of money, recreational interests, and religious, political, and economic views, affect happiness and satisfaction in married life. Moreover, many of these items become linked together and thus influence the total sense of well-being and of happiness or unhappiness.

Other factors affecting interspouse adjustment. Once the "psychic honeymoon"—as Waller aptly calls it—is over, the spouses find themselves confronted with all sorts of problems of adaptation of which they had perhaps previously little dreamed. The courtship fantasies begin to dissolve in the strong light of everyday living. One spouse may have been brought up and habituated to very careful and orderly practices in regard to the wearing and care of clothes. The other may be careless, indifferent to appearance, and given to tossing discarded garments on chairs, beds, and divans, or leaving them on the floor. So, too, if a man wants to take off his coat and go about in his shirt sleeves in the house, or even to sit at the table with his coat off, the wife may be emotionally upset by such habits. Failure to tidy up a bathroom after bathing or shaving, carelessness in brushing the teeth, or many other minor and trivial items of daily routine may be enough to start a divergence of attitude and reaction which in time may lead far beyond these petty matters. The overorderly person may be irritated beyond bounds by habits that to the slovenly, careless individual mean little or nothing.

Then, too, attitudes and habits regarding finances may differ greatly. One spouse may wish to budget carefully the family income, while the other may not. One may be thrifty, saving, and even penurious, the other a spendthrift. One may have the characteristics of the gambler and seeker for new adventure, while the other may be concerned with increasing the family's social and economic security. Likewise, differences in economic and political philosophies may produce strain. Religious differences may also crop out to disturb marital happiness, especially when problems of religious training of children arise, or when, as will be noted below, such variations get linked up with other features of interactional conflict. In the realm of recreation and leisure-time activities certain divergences may soon appear. After a hard day's work at the office or factory or on the farm a husband may wish to spend his evenings in peace and quiet at home, whereas the wife, perhaps having been rather tied to routine household duties all day, may wish to go out for entertainment. Even if the couple agree upon going out, one may prefer concerts, drama, or public lectures, while the other may want such light recreation as dancing or night-club life.

There is no need to extend the list further. Many other examples will occur to the reader. Such trivial and minor matters may assume more significance as the emotional reactions to difference spread to other areas

of interaction of the spouses. In and for themselves these divergences may and usually do become accepted. The difficulty arises when these irritations get linked to other problems, when, for example, carelessness in money matters leads to indebtedness, worry, and ultimately to denial of genuine necessities for the household, or when indifference to orderliness in personal habits of dress, cleanliness, and the like are used in an argument concerning something quite remote. For instance, a wife who feels herself inferior to her husband's intellectual and professional standing and perhaps frustrated by his ego expansion may insinuate in a somewhat heated interplay that the husband "is not all perfect" as he imagines himself to be, "else he would not be so slovenly in the bathroom" or "about picking up his clothes." It is in just these ways that insignificant items in personal behavior begin to take on more and symbolic importance with reference to other matters of interspousal adaptation.

Although in the total situation financial status does not seem to be as significant as some have imagined it to be, nevertheless in many instances money does play some part in influencing interspousal relations. A husband unable otherwise to control his wife—that is, to maintain his expected dominance—may use his financial power as a symbol of strength. Also, because married women in our society so frequently have no economic independence, a wife may barter her sexual charms and favors to her husband to offset or counteract the masculine economic supremacy over her. Observation leads one to believe that the linkage of such matters as personal bodily habits or financial practices to intimate sexual life is more common than might be imagined. A couple is always faced with the likelihood of unwanted and disturbing association of sex love with other features of behavior which originally had no relation to these intimate contacts. Finally, the artificial character of the courtship prevents two young persons from discovering many of these points of divergence before marriage. It is for this reason, if for no other, that the first months or years of marriage are often considered the most critical. As the roles in courtship and honeymoon become less fantastic—in terms of everyday expectancies—some of these divergences will be recognized and dealt with before marriage.

Another area in which readaptation is often necessary and often fraught with considerable likelihood of conflict concerns the continuation of friendships made before marriage. A long-standing friendship of two men may be disturbed by the entrance of one or both of them into matrimony. There may be suppressed jealousy in these situations which is indicated only in indirect and symbolic ways. A wife may simply see to it that "socially" she and her husband find new friends or go with her "crowd." Or the wife may make a more frontal attack upon his old "buddies" and indulge in unkind or uncomplimentary remarks about them.

She may in time break out in open rebellion against her husband's interest in them. The husband may not enjoy some of the wife's former friends; especially if he suspects that his wife is deliberately keeping him from his old cronies, he may set up strong resistance.

A more serious problem, one which reflects very largely our cultural pattern of jealousy, is the common objection of a husband to his wife's interest in her former men friends, or the wife's resentment of the husband's continuing any friendship with women. All the traditional attitudes and ideas of sexual jealousy, of fear of infidelity, past, present, or future, may come into play. (This is bound up with the current problem of conflict of careers and marriage. See Chapter XXII.) Women who have been in business or the professions before marriage may resent this attitude on the part of their spouses, but they often find it difficult to continue such friendships despite their completely professional and non-sexual character. So, too, professional men who have congenial relations with professional women dating back for years are frequently amazed to discover that their wives object strenuously to any gestures of continued friendship with such persons. The subtle, often half-conscious, interplay of spouses which centers in these matters may in time distill the poison which will kill their love. Of course, sexual jealousy often arises or is recognized during courtship, and an engaged couple may be forewarned and forearmed against future difficulties in this direction, if they handle such a situation intelligently.

Because such friendships after marriage are always potential threats to one's own sense of importance in the eyes of his spouse and hence in his own eyes, they may from the outset be more difficult to deal with rationally than some of the personal idiosyncrasies already mentioned. In fact, as the years pass, a man may develop congenial relations with women who honestly have an interest in his work—or at least successfully simulate such interest—and such a situation is always fraught with danger, especially if the man has previously been unsuccessful in securing his wife's interest in the details of his vocation. Folsom wisely remarks (1938, p. 94): "Perhaps nothing has such a high potential for causing a married man to fall in love with another woman than that woman's real or pretended interest in the things he highly values but cannot induce his wife to value." And the same is equally true when the situation is reversed.

Then, too, if a wife has a career of her own or possesses wealth in her own right, a conflict may and does often arise. Because masculine economic competency is such a high and dominant value in our society, a wife financially independent of her husband constitutes a serious threat to his own self-esteem.

The processes of marital conflict. The interactional patterns which arise and continue in family life are crucial to its continuity or dissolution. Let

us trace briefly some of the important aspects of the processes involved. Marital conflicts may take any number of forms. They may be acute and rather violent, or chronic and habituated; they may be concealed and subtle in character, or they may be more or less open for all the world to see and hear. As to the stimuli to conflict—that is, the situations which set it up—they may be as varied as the items in familial interaction. So, too, the symbolic meaning which these matters have for the spouses varies enormously, depending upon the previous as well as the present roles and status developed within the family configuration itself. In our society the most common factors giving rise to marital conflicts concern finances, occupation, age differences, sexual responsiveness, mutual recognition of position or prestige, the family status in the community, divergences in cultural background, philosophy of life, temperament, health, and the more personal behavior patterns and attitudes. (See Krueger, 1928.) Many of these matters we have already discussed as they bear upon marriage adjustments.

In describing and analyzing these conflicts, we must bear in mind a number of features: (1) There is the entire constellation of objects or situations operating to set up the tension, including the linkages discussed above between petty items and more serious ones. (2) There is often a gradual intensification of the emotional reactivity, involving a certain readiness to take up the cudgels in one's defense. (3) Certain patterns of conflict emerge in time, and, since it takes two to play a game, there often arise elaborate ritual-like habits in which one spouse tries to engage the other in a quarrel. (See Waller, 1938.) (4) Frequently there develops a predictable sequence of conflicts to which memories of previous ones plus the immediate situation contribute.* One husband who could always be depended on to recall unpleasant episodes of years past very proudly and somewhat cruelly remarked, "I am like an elephant, I never forget." (5) Out of these continuing situations new tensions may arise and old ones may disappear. Here the linkage of new experiences to old patterns is significant. (6) Often these tensions become centered in a larger general configuration, and we witness a general attitude, a "generalized other"—a role of quarreling and fighting between the spouses. Into this pattern all sorts of extraneous items in interaction are likely to be drawn. There are many persons who actually enjoy quarreling and to whom apparently it has a cathartic effect. (7) Sometimes a major conflict pattern may itself spread outward to develop minor or secondary conflicts. This is something of a reverse process from that noted above in which the minor items get pulled into the larger configuration.

The precise nature of the conflict proper will vary along a scale from subtle verbal thrusts and soft words of *double-entendre*, to vociferous quarreling, to violent overt fighting. The level at which these interactions

take place is partially the function of the social class to which the person belongs. But sarcasm is often more effective than a physical blow in these matters. It all depends on how the recipient has been conditioned!

The outcome of conflict varies, of course. There may be some sort of direct adjustment in which a temporary or more permanent truce is declared without any real and genuine solution. There may be the more sublimated and congenial forms of accommodation such as conciliation and compromise. In fact, conflict itself may be constructive and indicative of oncoming more satisfactory adaptation, or it may be destructive of the personalities involved and ultimately lead to dissolution—either overt, as in divorce or separation, or more covert, as in indifference or other psychological escapes. If, however, serious disagreements are made to serve as stimuli to better adaptation, it is important to prevent the areas of controversy from spreading to ever wider features of the total interactional pattern. If a couple do quarrel, it is highly important that the wrangling be limited to the specific issues and that some mutually agreeable decision be reached rather promptly. Many adjustments of this sort occur early in marriage when the couple discover that they must give up some of the romantic fantasies and idealizations of courtship and move on to more reasonable habits and attitudes. The destructive conflicts are those which become increasingly intense, in which chronic and habitual quarreling keeps the family in a more or less persistent state of emotional tension, which tend to become generalized as a pattern to which all sorts of new items are constantly being added. Neurotic persons are bad marital risks, as a rule, and conflict with them is usually destructive of marital happiness. When tied to such a person, the other spouse, despite patience and insight, may in the end give up the attempts at satisfactory adaptation. One of the serious aspects of dealing with the neurotic is that so often such a person has no insight and does not develop any of that give-and-take which is essential to the healthy interplay of two personalities. As a result, it is always the more normal person who must adapt himself to the whims and idiosyncrasies of the emotionally unstable. In fact, if the latter could make this more acceptable adjustment, he would not be labeled a neurotic. (See Chapter XXVII.)

Factors promoting harmony. Although irritation and conflict may diffuse from trivial or single items to other features of married life, it is also true that love, affection, and sympathy may spread and grow. There is too common an assumption, as Folsom puts it, that "love forces" are a given quantity at the beginning of marriage and like a fixed reservoir will in time be drained away. Nothing is more false. The whole pattern of sympathetic and mutual interaction may be likened rather to a spring than to a stagnant reservoir. Love may grow and ripen just as irritation and hatred. Intelligent couples, freed of much of the traditional nonsense

of lyrical romanticism, will continually try to adapt themselves to each other and to reckon at all times with both pleasant and unpleasant features of their own and the other's personality. In fact, the individual of insight—that is, the one who recognizes his wishes and impulses and their relation to his “me’s” or images of himself in others’ eyes—when irritated or angry, will first look into his own ideas and attitudes rather than blame his spouse. The following paragraphs from Folsom constitute sound though homely advice (1934, p. 496):

“Play together, fret separately. Tell each other the interesting things which have happened to you during the day. Don’t hash over the disagreeable things except to get positive advice or help. Don’t use your mate for a mere outlet. Spend your times of leisure and relaxation together. Spend your moments of anxiety or strain as much as possible apart. If you cannot, then, at least, don’t get each other’s personalities mixed up with the situation which causes the unpleasant emotion. . . .

“The old-fashioned philosophy held that love is strengthened by the troubles we endure and the burdens we bear together. Love is strengthened by the knowing that your mate has endured something with courage; it is strengthened when you really can do something which helps him in trouble. But in the multitude of tensions and petty troubles, in which you cannot help, your mere useless presence on the scene does not strengthen love. Blessed are the conditioned reflexes of those who are together in joy, but apart during irritation.”

There are, of course, many additional items to be taken into account in satisfactory marital adjustment. Any sound discussion of solidarity in marriage should emphasize such matters as subordination of the family members to a common objective, conscious co-operation toward this aim, reciprocity of personal services, co-ordination of various roles in terms of obligations and privileges (rights and duties), participation of the family as a unit in outside group activities, and a co-ordinated emotional balance of each individual to the others in the family—affection, sympathy, and respect toward others and toward the family as a unity or group, attitudes of loyalty, pride, and responsibility. And Waller (1938), in discussing the criteria of sound adjustment—obviously a normative and evaluative concept—notes as important: (1) the fixation of love upon the mate; (2) the development of sound methods of accommodation, compromises, conciliation, and other devices to reduce interspousal friction and personal mental conflict; (3) emergence and continuation of common activities which give “rise to fusion of purposes, duality of participation, common memories, and other forms of solidarity”; (4) maximal satisfaction wherever possible of the ego and sexual demands of both spouses; (5) satisfactory solution of the economic problems; and (6) greatest possible freedom for self-development and self-expression compatible with marriage and family life itself—in other words, the fullest recognition of the integrity of personality in another. (See Krueger, 1928.)

We have emphasized the difficulties and problems of marriage in order to bring into focus some of the situations which the wedded couple must learn to face. In a subsequent section of this chapter we shall comment on factors making for success or failure of marriage as a total experience. But before taking up these matters let us turn attention to the influence which the coming of children may have upon the spouses.

PARENTHOOD AND INTERSPOUSAL RELATIONS

Since we have already discussed various aspects of the parent-child relation in Chapters XIV and XV, we shall confine ourselves at this point to aspects which more or less directly influence the interspousal contacts themselves. Obviously, the arrival of a child in the home changes the social configuration. No matter how much a couple may have talked of, or planned for, children during the first years of married life together, their own interactions have tended to occupy much of their attention. But with the introduction of an infant into the household their relationships will necessarily be altered.

With few exceptions children are not born as the result of deliberate planning, though it is a fair guess that this procedure is more common today, at least in the upper classes, than formerly. It is also to be recalled that pregnancy of the wife in the first months of the usual interspousal readjustment may add many problems to those already discussed. For this reason, if for no other, advice is often given that a couple should have a year or so in order to readjust their lives to each other before undertaking further obligations by having children. Yet the prolongation of home life without children may so accentuate the concern of the couple with each other and with their own wishes as to make it more difficult for them to readapt their lives when children do arrive. This type of situation frequently arises when the wife continues with a career after being married and then finds it increasingly difficult to entertain the idea of giving up her work in order to have a baby. (See Chapter XXII.)

Pregnancy constitutes a physiological and psychological crisis for the wife. Endocrine balance is changed, difficulties of diet and digestion often arise, and new bodily habits may have to be developed. Nevertheless, these constitutionally founded matters, like other organic processes, acquire meaning for the woman concerned only in terms of her social-personal and cultural background. For instance, the physical pain and discomfort connected with pregnancy and childbirth will be interpreted in anticipated forms set up from ideas and attitudes the girl has received from her mother, from her neighbors, and from myths and legends about the difficulties. So, too, the common fear that childbearing will distort the female figure and make the wife less attractive to her husband or to others is largely the result of our own cultural interpretation. Also, the

idea or attitude that childbearing will interfere with the wife's "society" life or with her chosen career may profoundly influence her response or attitude toward the entire episode. In contrast, another society might foster such strong beliefs regarding the high prestige to be gained from childbearing that the physical pain and effects on subsequent feminine attractiveness might take on different meanings than they have in our society.

In any case, the experience of carrying a child does affect the interactional pattern of the spouses. For instance, the husband may resent the wife's occasional or frequent illness, her irritability may spread to all sorts of situations, or his fear of possible economic burdens may distress him.

It is often reported that the initial childbearing experience was far and away the most difficult, not only from the standpoint of the physiological and anatomical problems involved in gestation and childbirth, but psychologically as well. The following quotation from Groves (1933, pp. 414, 416) is taken from a mother's report of her subjective reactions to her first and second experience in childbearing:

"From the very first moment I knew I was pregnant I felt like a dismembered spirit—my body did not seem my own. Something foreign and strange had been thrust upon it and it belonged to that thing. The baby seemed to be something outside of my consciousness—an objective thing—not a part of me. Whether or not that strange attitude of mind can carry over throughout life in a mother's attitude toward a child I do not know, but it is true that I have never felt *at one* with my first child. She has always remained an objective, external personality to me. . . .

"Because of our finances my husband and I decided that we could not afford a second child. But we were quite happy when nature decided differently for us.

"My feelings toward my second pregnancy were quite normal and balanced. This second child was something close to me, and it belonged to the family group and the family was going to be the happier for its coming. I felt *at one* with this baby and the feeling has continued throughout its life. During pregnancy I used to go around with a comfortable feeling of having something companionable with me. But I was not self-conscious and oftentimes forgot all about my condition. . . ."

Yet another woman has reported that, though she has borne five healthy children, she never felt any of the sense of intimacy and oneness with any child, either during pregnancy or after the child's birth. For her the whole experience was looked upon as a duty. During pregnancies she kept busy with her household and with civic interests. She had no neurotic reactions in any way. And her children were given excellent care but in a rather objective fashion. There was no sense of sentimentality; neither did she emotionally reject her children. Evidently her own familial culture, rooted in peasant Europe two generations earlier, had produced in her a strong sense of societal obligation as wife and mother,

but overt affectional responses to her children were infrequent and restrained.³

Mother and child. The arrival of the newborn infant, however, brings not only the mother but the father directly into contact with another human being—one for whom care must be provided, if normally expected obligations are to be carried out. At least in Western society, it is the mother who is most strikingly affected by the infant's presence, and it is she, as we saw in Chapter XIV, who will most profoundly influence the habit training of the infant and young child.

The mother for the first time will find it necessary to divide her time between the child and the husband, and this may disturb the accustomed expectancies of the husband toward her. If the husband frets at this, the child may become shortly a symbol of his wife's neglect of him. This in turn may accumulate by circular and cumulative interaction to the point where the wife may resent the husband's attitude in the situation, and hence she may be drawn more than she anticipated toward the child. Or the reverse of this may occur, in which instance the wife may give only a modicum of attention to the child because she wishes to keep her attention fixed upon the husband or because she may fear his neglect if she gives too much time and energy to the infant. These are subtle matters, and generalizations about them are difficult or impossible. Individual variations in practice are so great that the student must examine each case in terms of the whole configuration of role, status, and background of the spouses. In extreme instances, of course, the child may soon become to the wife the symbol of bondage to an undesirable husband. The following narrative illustrates this well.

Case of Bertha W. This girl, who had gone through several years of conflict with an overbearing father, gave up school during her freshman year in college, ran away, and married a man some five or six years her senior. This was obviously an escape from what seemed an intolerable family situation. But she soon discovered that her husband was "insanely jealous" of her, and that her difficulties, instead of being resolved, were increased. And her pregnancy and the birth of a baby made her new situation even more intolerable. She came to loathe her child as a tie that bound her to her husband, who had not proved the romantic figure she had imagined. He was an orchestra leader and had had a certain glamour for her when she first met and married him.

It is rather interesting to note that her parents more or less forgave her hasty marriage and became very fond of the baby. The reaction of the girl's father in this instance would bear further psychological analysis if more facts were available as to *why* he accepted his grandchild so readily when he and his daughter had been so at odds for years previously.

³ See "I Do Not Like My Children" (anonymous), *The American Mercury*, August, 1937, vol. 41, pp. 423-429, for a very frank statement of one mother's attitudes.

Father and child. Although for biological if not for cultural reasons the father at the outset can scarcely be in such close contact with the infant as must the mother, there are clearly wide individual differences in the response and attitudes of the father to his newly acquired offspring. While in our still somewhat patriarchal society the authority of the father comes to play upon the child, there are many affectional bonds between the growing child and the father which are only remotely related to the role of the latter as disciplinarian. It is generally accepted in our society that for his proper emotional development the child needs contact with both parents on a secure basis of interaction. But again, if the father shows too great an interest in and fondness for the child, this may in time influence the reaction of the wife both to him and to the child. Jealousy of the child may arise in the mother if the father gives the former too much attention, that is, "too much" as defined by the wife. Or the opposite of this may occur when the father, as indicated above, resents the child's intrusion into the mother's affection, time, and energy, which formerly were given to him. The deviations in these matters are great, and once more generalization is out of the question at present. Each couple, however, both before and especially after the child's coming, must develop the insight and capacity to give and take in these matters as in all others that affect their married life.

The role of the child. Many of the problems of the spouses touch the child also. We have already discussed the projection of parental ambition on the child, the exploitation of the child as a mere extension of the parental ego, the use of the child's affections as a power device over the other spouse in situations of conflict, the rejection of the child because he seems to interfere with the personal ambitions of either or both of the parents, and the imposed role of the child as a symbol of an unwanted tie that binds two persons together when they wish to go their own separate ways. But the commonly accepted and contrasted ideal is that the child does not exist for the parents' pleasure or displeasure. At best he is a growing member of an equalitarian group—the family—whose major function as regards childbearing and child-training is that of guardian, advisor, friend, and kindly teacher. But such ideal familial situations are not so common as one might hope, and in concrete everyday practice we must deal with interparental and parent-child relations as they reflect the parents' own backgrounds, reaching as they do into their own childhood and family situations.

SOME FACTORS IN SUCCESSFUL MARRIAGES

Let us now draw together some comments on what makes for successful marriages, reserving for the next chapter a more detailed description and analysis of marital discord and family dissolution. As to general

cultural factors which make for success or failure in marriage—as these are defined by students of the family in our society—it is clear that the competing and conflicting norms of family life themselves play a decided part therein. We are in sad need of a new ethics of marriage and family life, but the cultural transitions of the present are so vast and multitudinous that we are not yet in a position to formulate an adequate code of marital morality. Some matters, however, need special emphasis. It must never be forgotten that marriage relations—both intimate sexual ones and others—are *interactional* in character. The recognition of the fact that marital relations constitute a *social act* would perhaps go far in giving us a theoretical concept not only upon which to base our analyses but upon which sounder and more satisfactory marriage practices could be built up. In fact, sexual love rests upon one of the two most absorbing and powerful motives in life, and certainly the sexual interest of the spouses in each other may be and is conditioned to strong incentives to carry out common and congenial activities aside from their physical intimacy. But normal love impulses can be fully satisfied only when they involve both verbal communication and overt sexual intercourse and a whole range of impulses, attitudes, and ideas associated therewith. Every fundamental sensory process—tactile, auditory, visual, gustatory, olfactory, and kinesthetic—may come into play. There is perhaps no other social act which is, in this sense, so complete. The common contention of observers and students of marriage that sexual compatibility is fundamental to successful marriage and family life rests upon sound biological and psychological grounds. Yet the ramifications of this close contact into other areas of interaction are obvious even to the casual observer of married couples. We have already noted the significance of personal habits, economic problems, and childish sexual exploitation in disturbing healthy adjustment. Moreover, the rather biologically motivated and tradition-bound assumption of the husband that he should have ready sexual access to his wife at any time that suits his whim reveals a pattern of life (largely culturally supported) that easily inhibits full and aesthetic expression of sexual activity on the part of wife or husband. Every competent commentator on marital problems in Oriental and Occidental literature has recognized the need for an art of love in marriage. As the novelist Honoré de Balzac, in his book *The Physiology of Marriage* (Meditation V), well put it, “A husband’s own interest, at least as much as his honor, forbids him the indulgence of any pleasure which he has not had the talent to make attractive to his wife.” Ellen Key (1911), the Scandinavian feminist who contributed so much to our present views on love, marriage, children, and the role of women in the modern world, remarks, “Every developed woman wishes to be loved not *en mâle* but *en artiste*.” (On the art of love see Sanger, 1926; Stopes, 1931; Wright,

1931; and H. Stone and A. Stone, 1936.) As women become emotionally and economically emancipated from their traditional inferior roles as wife and mother, there should result a decided deflation of the traditional masculine ego and age-long assumption of final authority in these matters of sexual life.

In addition to the problem of attempting to build up a happy sexual adjustment to each other and of trying to work out various mutually satisfactory interactional patterns, other difficulties confront the married couple today. In the modern world, with the disappearance of many traditional economic, religious, educational, and other functions from the home and household, the ideal roles for the man and for the woman are being profoundly altered. The ideal aim which the man constructs, however, is all-important for his normal functioning, not only in business and civic affairs but in matrimony as well. It is a "generalized other," as G. H. Mead would have put it, which may become a driving force in his assuming and carrying on a marriage. If this imagined role is too farfetched in the light of present-day economic and other forces, or in the light of his own abilities, a man may have great difficulty in adapting himself to the marital expectancies of his spouse. Many young married men today have a sense of insecurity which is handicapping their adjustment in matrimony. We need to integrate the love life of the husband and father to other phases of his ego organization. In the present crisis women also are, as Frank (1932) puts it, "in a befogged condition." The old idea that love was "a thing apart" from occupation and other status-giving functions may give way to a closer co-ordination of the intimate affectional life of the spouses with other aspects of their activity. The husband's ideals regarding his profession, business, or job must find support from the wife, and, as Frank (1932) remarks, "If his ambitions are high but incompatible with the new conditions of life, then he is threatened with heightened anxiety from without and from his wife's too trusting faith in him." So, too, if he has overestimated his capacity before marriage—that is, if he has set his aspirations far beyond his ability—the wife should help him reorganize his life in line with achievable ends. She must not use the divergence between aspiration and achievement to deflate his pride. A husband's sense of inadequacy with reference to his wife's ideal of him does not make for marital harmony. Moreover, with the loss of former functions of household and family members, it is all the more imperative that affection and full sex realization compensate for these losses as well as sustain the couple during periods of stress and anxiety.

Women, too, are at sea about themselves, are at a loss to find the roles and functions around which to integrate their lives. Frank summarizes

his interesting discussion of the emotional problems of present-day spouses in these words (1932, p. 101):

"Woman, in these changing social conditions, is no less insecure and troubled with doubt. Her traditional goals and patterns are gone and she faces the necessity not merely of finding substitutes, as does the man, but also of discovering patterns for new activities and functions never before attempted by women. The conflict of competing loyalties is terrific and her sources of security are more depleted than are those of the man. . . .

"We have today the high tragedy not only of bewildered men and women unable to find their way through these novel situations and circumstances, but of tortured personalities yearning for reassurance and intimacy and full mating, but doomed to rend each other through lack of insight into themselves and their mates and the patterns of conduct needed for their realization.

"What men and women are doing to each other, they are doing to their children, but in different ways. The child, above all, needs security, reassurance, and the warmth of affection and peace which his parents, preoccupied with their anxieties and frustrations, can rarely give him. Nor can the father and mother who are apprehensive over their own way of life offer tolerance and sympathy for the child's bewildering experiments."

With this challenging comment on the problems of marital adjustment, let us ask: What constitutes successful or happy marriages? Obviously the terms *success* and *happiness* are thoroughly subjective categories. But so they must be, since personal satisfaction or happiness or success in any activity does depend upon how the individual defines this activity for himself, though again his apperceptive background will be colored by both cultural and personal-social experience. There have been hosts of individual comments on the matter of happiness or success in marriage, and in recent years a number of statistical studies have been made which provide more valid data on these matters, at least for certain samples of our population. A few of these investigations will be briefly summarized.

Happiness and success in marriage. Davis (1929) reports that of her sample of 1,000 college women who had married, 87 per cent of them answered "Yes" to the question: "Is your married life a happy one?" As indicated in an earlier section, Davis's sample came from a highly educated and sophisticated group, and the results may not hold for the general run of the American population.

Although Hamilton's sample was somewhat different from Davis's, still it came largely from the upper social strata. Of the 100 married women of this group only 45 per cent were rated as having experienced either "a relatively high degree" or a "fair degree" of satisfaction in marriage. The corresponding rating for the 100 married men was 51 per cent.

(See Hamilton, 1929, pp. 532, 553-554.) In this sample the women appeared to be more dissatisfied with marriage than the men.⁴ And, although the percentages of dissatisfaction were high for both men and women, a further check was made on the matter in this question of Hamilton's series: "If by some miracle you could press a button and find that you had never been married to your spouse, would you press that button?" One hundred and twenty-eight of the 200 replied "No" without qualification, and only 28 said unqualifiedly that they would press the button. To the question whether they would wish to remarry if they were free, 151 said they would so wish, and only 13 replied to this query with an unqualified "No."

Dickinson and Beam (1931), in their study of 1,000 marriages, report that, of 768 of their women patients living with their husbands, 51 per cent made no complaint about their marital life; the remainder, 375 individuals, expressed some degree of dissatisfaction. Of the latter group, 275, or 73 per cent, were definitely classified by the gynecologist's diagnosis as maladjusted; and, of these in turn, 64 per cent were cases of dyspareunia (occurrence of pain in the sexual act) and 36 per cent cases of frigidity.⁵

J. Bernard (1933a, 1933b, 1934) has developed a scale for measuring success in marriage. On this scale a score of 66 or above represents success for women; 68 or above, success for men. She compared the scores of 221 presumably normal married persons, of educated middle-class status, with those of 31 married individuals who were obviously emotionally maladjusted, as determined by clinical evidence. The mean score of the "normal" group was 81.0, indicating a very satisfactory marital life; that of the "clinical" group was only 52.6. The difference is significant, although unfortunately her clinical sample was numerically inadequate.

Terman and others (1938), from an unselected sample of people at public lectures or organizational meetings, secured self-ratings on happiness in marriage from 902 married men and 644 married women. Of the

⁴ Of the 200 married persons in Hamilton's sample, there were only 55 wedded couples. Thus there were 45 men and 45 women cases in which only one spouse was interviewed.

⁵ The figures on pp. 11 and 12 are open to misinterpretation. They first note 393 and later 363 cases as offering no complaints. The discrepancy must derive from the separate listing of 30 cases as "passionately" desiring "more sexual relations than they had." One is at a loss to know whether these should be listed as offering no complaints.

Dickinson's sample came from his clinical records (from 4,000 married women from among whom a total sample of approximately 1,000 cases were taken, and covering the years from 1885 to 1925) and is therefore perhaps statistically biased toward the maladjusted wife. Yet in other ways the sample is superior to either Davis's or Hamilton's, for it covers a wider range of economic and social status. The occupational standing of the 509 couples known from the records show 261, or 51 per cent, from the "professions," 124, or 24 per cent, from "trade," 55, or 11 per cent, from "manufacturing and mechanical industries," and scattered smaller fractions from "clerical work," "domestic service," and "public service." Only two cases of the total come from agricultural pursuits.

former, 68.0 per cent rated their marriage as "extraordinarily happy," "decidedly more happy than average," or "somewhat more happy than average." For the women, the corresponding percentage was 65.3. For the 792 husbands of this sample which he studied intensively, 82.6 per cent fell into these categories; of the 792 wives of these men, 85.2 per cent rated themselves in these categories. (In the latter sample, in particular, Terman deliberately avoided dealing with separated or divorced couples; this doubtless prejudiced his findings in favor of the higher proportion of "happy" ratings.) Burgess and Cottrell (1939) found for the 526 couples which they studied that 63.1 per cent rated themselves as either "very happy" or "happy." (The rating on happiness was "given by either husband or wife.")

Of a contrasted character is an investigation of Lang (1932), who secured ratings of success or failure in matrimony not from the couples themselves but from their friends. Altogether 8,263 marriages of from one to sixteen years' duration were rated. The ratings were made chiefly by college and university students of people whom they knew; hence this sample also may be biased toward the upper brackets of society. Of this total, 75 per cent were rated as very happy or happy and 16 per cent as unhappy or very unhappy. But, for the 4,750 of Lang's sample who had been married only from one to six years—thus making the results comparable to those of Burgess and Cottrell—it was found that only 68.5 per cent fell into the very happy and happy categories. (See Burgess and Cottrell, 1939, p. 34. Their cases were limited to couples married from one to six years.)

"Causes" of marital maladjustment or marital success. There have been various attempts to determine the "causes" or situations giving rise to marital maladjustment. Folsom (1934, p. 443) conveniently summarizes the studies of Hamilton and of Hixenbaugh in the following table:

TABLE 5

FACTORS ALLEGED TO MAKE FOR MARITAL MALADJUSTMENT
(from Hamilton, 1929, and from Hixenbaugh, 1931)

FACTORS MENTIONED	<i>Percentage of All Mentioned Items</i>	
	HAMILTON	HIXENBAUGH
Nonpersonality factors (outside circumstances)	14	28
Personality defects	22	27
Personality and cultural differentials	9	5
Specific marital frustration	55	40
Total	100	100

Drawing material from a quite different source (from letters written to a popular advisor on personal problems; see p. 506), Ciocco (1938) reported for 390 married women that the following three factors account for 70 per cent of the interspousal conflicts: (1) "the husband's unfaithfulness," (2) "maladjustment of the affective relations," and (3) problems which arise from the husband's tendency "to dominate the actions and behavior of the wife." On the other hand, he found that there was much less frequent notation of matters of "economic and sexual-reproductive aspects of marriage." It must, of course, be noted that individuals who write letters to such advisors might hesitate to go into details as to the more intimate problems of wedded life.

Regarding the factors which people believe make for successful marriage, we may note the study of Woodhouse of 250 families considered "successful." Her criterion was "that a successful family was . . . one which developed individuals well adjusted in their personal lives and doing a good piece of work in their particular job. Adjustment was the key word." The sample was entirely from professional classes. These persons listed altogether 2,208 essentials of a successful home, including attitudes, personal traits, relationships within the family, economic matters, ideals, health, and education. The problems of marriage adjustment listed by this group Woodhouse summarized as follows (1930, p. 530):

"... The factors which this group have found made their marriage happy, satisfying, successful, were first and most important of all companionship of the husband and wife with congenial tastes and ideals, common interests and common friends; give and take, co-operation, confidence, understanding and frankness, in short mutual accommodation, follow as close seconds. Love, children, a desirable character in one's partner, sexual harmony, and health, were all present. Add for the wives interesting work and freedom of personality and enough money to avoid worries and its fair handling within the family and one has the picture of the factors which in the opinions of this group have made these marriages happy, satisfying, and successful."

Two extensive studies of the conditions which make for marital success or failure are Terman's (1938) and Burgess and Cottrell's (1939) already mentioned. While they used different samples and a somewhat different standpoint and methods, the two investigations employed many of the same questions, and their results supplement each other at various points.

Terman's study was based on a sample of 792 married couples from the urban and semiurban middle classes of California. Verbal reactions to three sets of variables—(1) certain personality-test items, (2) background conditions, and (3)-sex factors in marriage—were secured. From these replies Terman used a weighted scoring to secure a total "happiness score" as an index or measure of marital satisfaction. On the personality items, his results show that unhappy persons—in his sample—were: inclined to be grouchy; easily aroused to anger; hypercritical, and careless of the feelings of others; resistant to discipline; quickly expressive of any dislikes they felt; easily influenced by praise or blame; lacking in self-confidence; dominating toward

the other sex; disinterested in old people, children, teaching, or charity; unconventional in religion, drinking, and sexual ethics; distressed at times by "useless thoughts"; and, finally, characterized by alteration between states of happiness and sadness.

As to background factors, he found among other things that income, occupation, or the presence or absence of children in the family, amount of religious training, adolescent popularity, and age differences between spouses had little or no correlation with happiness scores. The happiest wives in his sample were those who were from four to ten years the senior of their husbands, while the happiest husbands were those twelve years or more older than their spouses. Of the many background circumstances which he studied, he found the following to be the most predictive of happiness in marriage: high degree of marital happiness in one's parents, childhood happiness, absence of conflict with mother or father, firm but not harsh family discipline, strong attachment to mother and father, frankness of parents regarding sexual matters, mild and infrequent punishment during childhood, and absence of disgust or aversion about matters of sex in the premarital years.

Regarding the specific sexual factors which make for happiness in marriage, such matters as techniques of sexual relations, use of contraceptives, fear of pregnancy, duration of intercourse, wife's history of sex shock, and others frequently considered important one way or another had, on the whole, no appreciable bearing on the happiness scores of his subjects. On the other hand, the wife's happiness score (but not her husband's) is distinctly correlated with the intensity of her pleasure at her first sexual intercourse, while the husband's happiness score is negatively correlated with the wife's tendency to marked prudishness. But, of all the sexual factors investigated in his study, the two which correlate most significantly with marital happiness scores are the adequacy and satisfactory character of the wife's orgasms, and the "equality or near equality in sex drive" of the spouses. (In this sample nearly one third of the wives confess to what Terman calls "orgasm inadequacy," that is, never or "only 'sometimes'" experiencing orgasmic release during intercourse. See Terman, 1938, pp. 375-376, 379-408, on this particular problem. See also Dickinson and Beam, 1931, on the problem of frigidity among women.)

Burgess and Cottrell devised an extensive questionnaire with which to discover the elements in behavior and situation which make for marital success or failure. Their report is based on the analysis of the returns on this questionnaire from 526 husbands and wives, representing a fair cross section of urban, native white, middle-class Americans. They summarize their major findings under six headings: (1) Contrary to the popular conception, American wives, of this stratum at least, are obliged to make the major adjustments in marriage. Despite much talk about marital equality, the patriarchal pattern of male dominance seems to persist. (2) The affectional relations of the child to his parents tend distinctly to determine his love life when he grows up. Thus the parents' happiness in marriage is highly correlated with the subsequent happiness of their children. So, too, close attachment of the child to the parents, especially of son to mother, of daughter to father, and the absence of conflict with the parents, are highly correlated with the individual's own satisfactory adjustment when he, in turn, becomes married. (3) The nature and degree of socialization, as measured by participation in group and organizational activities, have an important bearing on marital success. The person with wide social contacts is—other things

being equal—more likely to make a satisfactory marriage than one with few such contacts. (4) The economic factor as such was reported to be of little or no importance as an indicator of success in matrimony. (5) For the majority of the couples in this sample, their sexual adjustments to each other seem to result not so much from the biological as from their prior psychological and cultural conditioning toward sex. (6) On the basis of this investigation the authors believe that premarital prediction of marriage adjustments is entirely feasible, and "should and can be further developed through statistical and case-study methods." (1939, p. 349.)

While we have not yet at hand a marital expectancy table analogous to the life-expectancy tables used in life insurance, there is no doubt that these two studies have greatly advanced our knowledge toward a time when it may be possible to predict marriage success not only in terms of group probabilities but in terms of an individual's score or performance on some yet to be devised valid and reliable test or questionnaire. But, as Burgess and Cottrell point out, such a prediction for the person must take into account the deeper and more fundamental pattern of habits, attitudes, and values—many of which reach back into earliest childhood.

The two investigations agree remarkably well, and of particular interest to us are their findings that—for these middle-class samples at least—the economic factors do not seem to be considered as important as might have been imagined. Second, the significance of a happy childhood in a satisfactory family wherein there is definite affectional contacts is clearly shown. And, third, the importance of initial sex adjustment and of full physiological satisfaction from intercourse are indicated in both, but especially in the Terman study.

However, when we take an over-all view of the data on marital happiness in this country, we are left in some doubt as to precisely what these findings signify, either as to general applicability or as to the meaning of satisfaction or happiness. Certainly in the studies cited—except for Lang's—the definition of happiness, success, or satisfaction is largely that of the subjects themselves. There are, thus, two aspects of these studies which must be borne in mind, if one were to generalize from them: (1) The samples are highly biased toward the middle and upper brackets of occupation and status. We have no adequate studies of the lower strata of the population, or of people of any class from village and rural areas. (2) The individuals who furnished these data come from groups that are habituated—by virtue of cultural training—to relatively easy verbalization, and, what is more important, they come from classes of people who fall easily into our contemporary patterns of rationalization. Certainly in Davis's, Terman's, J. Bernard's, and Burgess and Cottrell's samples, the persons responding are perhaps too self-conscious and sophisticated to be completely frank in answering the questions put before them. Yet, with this caution in mind, it is interesting to note that, on the whole, the

results of these studies show that for these samples between two thirds and four fifths of the respondents rate themselves as fairly happy or happy in their marriages.

On the other hand, it may well be that more intensive and extensive analysis would show that underneath these opinions there exist in many of these couples deeper attitudes of nonacceptance and dislike of the matrimonial status. It may be that the Hamilton and Dickinson and Beam studies report a lower proportion of their cases as being dissatisfied in marriage because, in part, they did probe more deeply into the underlying factors in marital life.

Yet in matrimony and family life, as in most other activities, men and women are the creatures of the habits, attitudes, and values which have been built up in them in large part from their enveloping culture. Within this framework they carry on pretty much in terms of the social-cultural expectancies in which personal pleasure and that elusive virtue called happiness are not always present. And, in view of the potent contemporary changes which are making for the breakdown of the family and other primary groups, it is enlightening to know that such a large proportion of our people—at least from the more privileged classes—do still consider marriage as a successful venture. Of course, there are many families which are broken by death or in which there is such serious conflict as to lead to desertion or divorce. In the next chapter we shall discuss some of the problems connected with family dissolution.

Chapter XXI

THE DISSOLUTION OF THE FAMILY

THE PHRASE "broken home" refers to the disintegration of the family as a group of interacting persons brought about by the death of one or both parents, by the desertion of one or both, or by legal separation or divorce. The broken home has been the topic of much discussion not only in relation to family life, but in its bearing on adolescent development, schoolwork, and juvenile delinquency. At present we are concerned only with its relation to familial disorganization.

THE EFFECTS OF BEREAVEMENT UPON THE FAMILY ¹

The death of one of the spouses profoundly alters the social attitudes and habits of the one remaining. The process of personality reorganization following such a crisis has not been adequately investigated, although the work of Eliot (1932, 1933), Becker (1932), and Waller (1938) is highly suggestive, and we shall draw in part upon their discussion of this topic.

Readaptation following the death of one spouse. For convenience of treatment we may note certain stages in the process of reorganization of attitudes and behavior which follows upon the demise of one parent. There are: (1) the crisis and the first responses of bereavement; (2) the beginnings of adaptation to a changed pattern of life; (3) a readjustment in the love life; and (4) the reorganization of the whole personality to a state of more stable equilibrium.

(1) Culture sets the general framework of response to the loss of a spouse. Yet there are rather wide variations in the reactions to the first shock. Becker notes that the loss may be marked by violent outbursts of grief or even a sort of frenzy, by a mute and tearless numbness, by a sinking into weakness and complete discouragement, or by fatigue and prostration. Of course, these may occur in certain combinations, and a person may shift from one state to another as time goes on. But the outward and inward manifestations become parts of the wider interaction

The death of both parents obviously greatly affects the subsequent role and status of the child, but, since we are chiefly concerned with interspousal and parent-child relations in the family, the problems of the completely orphaned boy or girl do not come within the scope of the present chapter. (See Spiegelman, 1932.)

which must go on. The cultural rituals such as the funeral and the necessary prior arrangements which surround this event serve to convince one that the death is real. In fact, these ceremonials actually afford the widowed person considerable social attention and a kind of gratification. There often arises a great deal of self-pity supported by the sympathetic reactions of relatives and friends. The remaining spouse is for a time the center of much attention, and the expected reactions of others canalize the grief into accepted forms.² There is no doubt that tears and manifest sorrow often serve as a catharsis fully accepted in our society.³ Yet tears do not prevent the individual from falling into prolonged melancholia or other behavior manifestations which often take on neurotic features, at least for the time being. (See Freud, 1925.)

(2) But, once the excitement of the death and the funeral is over, the individual is more or less obliged to begin the reorganization of his life. Bereavement dreams are not uncommon, and they frequently, though not always, are direct wish fulfillments that the dead have returned to life. Some reports indicate that the individual in the dream (just as one may produce such a contradiction in waking fantasy) is seen both dead and alive—a curious ambivalent recognition of the facts coupled with the strong desire not to face them. Likewise, conscious or semiconscious fantasy itself often develops. Images of the dead arise very naturally through contact with objects previously associated with the deceased person, and these become the stimuli for elaboration into all sorts of imagery. Not infrequently there begins fairly early an idealization of the qualities of the deceased person which may grow and continue through the years. But these fantasies aside, the person must make some everyday adjustments. There is often a will to be opened and property to be legally disposed of. New household arrangements have to be set up. It is interesting to note in this connection the frequency of return to the status of son or daughter if the parents of the widowed spouse are available to help out.

(3) Then, too, there sooner or later arises the problem of love life and sexual adjustment. Although for a time these impulses may be suppressed and sublimated in mourning, sooner or later the imperative nature of the sexual drive may arise to trouble one. Daydreams associated with sex are not uncommon, and it may be that, when not too persistent and too absorbing, they serve to aid the remaining spouse to adjust himself to

² As we shall note later, the likeness between reactions to the death of a spouse and reactions to the loss of one by divorce is close. One divorced widow well expressed this when she told her close friends that she would rather see her husband, about to be divorced from her, "dead" than have him leave her in such a fashion.

³ In some societies the employment of hired mourners to do the weeping and wailing for the family who have lost one of their members indicates how much the particular manifestation which we accept as normal is actually largely culturally determined.

his everyday living. Often, of course, the love life, by a process of sublimation, may be transferred to children or thrown back upon a father or favorite brother. In other cases autoerotic trends may appear, and the fantasy of intercourse may and does in some cases give rise to overt practices of masturbation. These in turn may set up a sense of shame and guilt, especially if the individual be one whose previous cultural conditioning provides that sort of interpretation of autoerotic habits.

Society, however, provides not only permissive but more or less expected alterations in the love life. As habituation to the new living arrangements advances, widowed persons ordinarily renew their social contacts with their friends and acquaintances, and often new associations are formed. Obviously, these matters are qualified by age, opportunities, the nature of the family, and the financial obligations of the widowed spouse. The variations in readaptation are great. Sometimes, after due deference is paid to the culture in the way of mourning, a person may go off into a sort of Bohemianism. One instance known to the writer illustrates this well. C. B., after a violent and almost prostrated reaction to the unexpected death of her husband, went abroad for a year and tried to find relief in a busy round of sight-seeing. After a year of this, she returned to this country, and, when the estate was settled, moved to another state, where she entered the university, ostensibly to complete her academic work, which had been interrupted by her marriage. In this college community she played somewhat the romantic role of the college widow and had a series of affairs, though confined entirely to older students in the professional schools or to businessmen in the community. Later she left for an extended visit with a brother in another part of the country, and there she remarried; she has now settled down to a more or less routine marital life again. (As we shall see, this sort of pattern is not uncommon with divorced persons.)

Yet in some instances the idealization of the deceased spouse may be so powerful that it will prevent either Bohemian experimentation or remarriage. And, if age is against the probability of re-entering into matrimony, this idealization may serve the useful function of rationalizing the continuance of widowhood. In many instances it is difficult to know how much the idealization may itself prevent remarriage and how often it serves this defensive reaction of protecting the person from a realization of failure to be sufficiently attractive to secure a new mate.

(4) As time goes on, however, there emerges some sort of more stable adaptation to oneself and to the social world around one. If widowhood is accepted and if some occupation or other objectifying activity is forthcoming, the widowed person may carry on in fairly well-adjusted fashion. But a high percentage of widowed persons wed again, especially if they fall into the acceptable age classes for matrimony.

If there is remarriage, many of the problems already noted in regard to marital adaptation may reappear, although some widowed persons seem to learn various valuable lessons from their first familial adventure which carry over into the second. A wide diversity of qualifying factors will have to be taken into account in an analysis of a particular instance. And as with the divorced person, the presence of children will complicate a new marital situation in many ways. So, too, the image of the deceased spouse may at times arise in fantasy and may benefit or injure the relations in the new family situation. The mechanism is familiar to us. Just as the idealization of a mother by a husband who unfavorably compares his wife's cooking with his mother's may set up strain, so, too, the idealization of a deceased spouse may intrude itself into the love life with the new partner, to mar or improve it as the case may be. But we really know very little about these matters, and, as in the study of the divorced person, there is much need for more research.

Role of children in bereavement. At the death of a parent many of the same psychological features appear in the attitudes and responses of the children as are manifest in the spouse. Self-pity bolstered by sympathy from others is a common reaction. Another common pattern is found in the cases where the widow does not remarry but where her idealization of the husband and father becomes the basis for holding the family together. A mother may project her idealization of the dead father upon her son to such a point that it becomes an important factor in the boy's own development, and the son will assume many of the father's masculine dominating roles. On the other hand, a widow may so turn her affections upon a son that the latter becomes so thoroughly attached to his mother that he can never cut loose from her domination. Moreover, our culturally accepted sentiments about motherhood provide ample rationalization for this failure of a son to attain mature heterosexuality. The following case is illustrative:

Case of Karl J. The father of this family died when Karl was ten years old and his only brother, Clyde, was twelve. There was a quite sufficient inheritance to provide economic security, and for one reason or another Mrs. J. never remarried. Instead she put her affection and attention upon her two boys, though Karl was the somewhat more favored of the two. Both boys were given good educations, but were sent to college in the home community so that they might live at home. The mother managed all their affairs, advised them on details of their schoolwork, regulated their leisure-time activities, and was always with them during their vacations.

When the older son died at the age of twenty-three, the entire affection was focused with increased intensity upon Karl. The latter had just completed his college training, and with his mother's aid he secured a position in one of the city's best high schools. He continued to live at home; his recreation was usually dominated by his mother; she managed his finances and altogether treated him as she had done during his

childhood. For instance, although she had ample funds of her own, she insisted on having a joint account at the bank where her son deposited his salary. (She had her own personal account in another bank.) Karl could never draw even a small check of five or ten dollars for current expenses without having to explain to his mother, when the canceled checks were returned, exactly what he had done with the money. She objected to most of his women acquaintances, and, every time he became at all seriously interested in a young woman eligible for matrimony, she devised ways and means of breaking up the relation. Of course, in discussing the matter, she always said she wanted her son to marry "when the right girl came along," but it was increasingly evident that she wanted to determine who was the "right girl."

She also objected to many of his men friends, considering them too rowdy, and, when her son, then at the age of thirty, proposed that he join with a fellow man teacher in taking a small apartment near his school (the family home was seven miles from his work), she raised a rumpus and suggested all sorts of horrible things that might happen to him, expressing the fear that his friend might get him to smoking or drinking, or might even invite women friends to the apartment. The mother always dressed up her remarks in properly conventional and acceptable language; she always subtly appealed to her son in terms of his own good—when she really was thinking of herself. When Karl was thirty-two years old, he went away to a neighboring state university for a long summer session—the first time in his life he had ever been away from his mother for more than a fortnight. (He had as a youngster occasionally been sent for two weeks to a camp for boys, but never for longer.) Here for the first time he met other young men and women without the constant intrusion of his mother into the situation. He reacted somewhat like a boy in late adolescence who leaves home for the first time to go to college. This was at least an initial step in a delayed emancipation, but even three years later he was still living at home, though he had asserted more independence, at least in minor matters. The likelihood of his marrying is slight indeed.

Then, too, if there are children from the first family, remarriage of the widowed person brings about many problems of the relation of the stepchildren to the new spouse, and later, if the latter has children, there may arise conflict between the half-siblings. In these matters age and sex differences play their part. But in any case new roles have to be developed for the spouses and for the children. A widower who remarries is likely to center his affectional life in his new wife to the neglect of his own children.

An instance in point is that of a girl who for several years managed the household for her widowed father. After the father remarried, she came to resent the role and status of her stepmother. The latter in turn was jealous of her stepdaughter and helped to wean the husband from his close attachment to her. It is, in fact, very easy for the child of a former marriage to become an unpleasant symbol of the former marital situation and thus lead to conflict and confusion. Of course, there are many successful remarriages, both for the widowed individual and for

his or her children. The matter will depend on the personality make-up of those involved in this family drama.

DESERTION

Desertion may be defined as the prolonged absence from home of either spouse without the consent of the other. Unlike formal separation or divorce, it has no legal sanctions. It is, in fact, often called "the poor man's divorce," or in more critical tone is sometimes referred to as a "moral holiday" of one spouse from familial responsibilities. Just how frequent desertion is in the United States is difficult to estimate. (See Stouffer and Spencer, 1936.) In this country it is frequently but a prelude to divorce itself. But again culture influences the whole pattern. For instance, in postwar Vienna, Austria (1918-1938), desertion became a commonly accepted way of escaping intolerable marriages; there legal divorce for the ordinary man was out of the question because of the restrictions on divorce due to ecclesiastical influences. In Vienna the desertion of a spouse not infrequently led to the establishment of another family "without benefit of clergy." And among the underprivileged classes this in turn often resulted in court action respecting the support of the legitimate children and their mother. Something of this same sort of culture pattern has been common in urban England for decades, though recent changes in the divorce law may bring about a reduction in the incidence of desertion there.

The psychological factors involved in desertion in our society have never been adequately described and analyzed. But inferences may be drawn from some case studies, derived chiefly from the records of family-welfare agencies. There lies behind desertion as a rule, as behind divorce, a long period of preparatory conflicts involving economic factors, the sexual life, the impairment of the self-esteem and pride of the spouses, and other problems found in ordinary family situations.

There is little doubt that very often, when the husband deserts his family just prior to the birth of another child, such behavior represents a definite "escape mechanism" to avoid further responsibility. Over and over again social-work records show that a husband who is fairly well adapted to his family role leaves home just before another baby is born. And, curiously enough, these spouses often turn up later and reunite themselves with their families. Whether more adequate information on how to avoid pregnancies would alleviate this type of response we do not know, but it is apparent that anxiety and feelings of inferiority do accompany such desertions, although popular explanation attributes them to the perverseness of the male head of the family.

So far as the wife is concerned—and the bulk of desertions involve the husband's leaving the wife—desertion by the spouse may set up many

reactions of bitterness and the desire for revenge. Yet at times it may actually—especially if economic security is not threatened thereby—result in a sense of relief from former family tensions. But, for the most part in our country, with divorce rather easily available, except where one's church prohibits it, desertion is, as we noted, but a preliminary step toward divorce. In these instances it represents just a stage in the process of final dissolution of the marriage by legal means.

As regards the effects of desertion on the children, these will be qualified by other matters, such as the degree of economic security, the general tolerance for such practices in the community, and the particular familial configuration itself. In fact, so far as the patterns set up in the deserted spouse or in the children are concerned, many of the same features appear as in the case of death or divorce.

THE EFFECTS OF DIVORCE UPON THE FAMILY

That the divorce rate in this country has risen greatly in recent decades is a matter of common comment.⁴ It is not our purpose to discuss the major economic and social causes of this problem, but rather to examine some of the psychological factors in divorce practice as they affect personal adjustments.

Divorce and American culture. Much has been written for and against divorce. The belief that marriage is a church sacrament is still firmly held by millions of Christians, and it is not easy to dislodge ideas, attitudes, and habits when they have the long-standing support of sacred tradition.

The more conservative leaders of religion and morals who have commented on divorce in this country tend to assume that it is a sort of social disease. They have advocated stricter laws prohibiting dissolution of marriage as one device among others to forestall this "pathological" condition, as they view it. Most careful observers and students of the situation, however, regard divorce rather as a symptom of maladjusted marital life than as itself a disease to be dealt with directly. Yet divorce involves profoundly important personal readaptations of the individuals concerned—spouses and children and even relatives, business associates, and friends. But we must regard the whole matter in the light of change-

⁴ For instance, for the years 1887-1891, according to the best available figures, there was in the United States one divorce to every 16.6 marriages. In the period 1902-1906 the ratio was 1 to 12 marriages. But in 1920 this ratio had risen to 1 to 7.4 marriages, and since 1928 the ratio has been close to 1 to 6 marriages. And, despite the lingering effects of the economic depression of 1930-1934, in 1935 this country had, according to good estimates, the highest number of total divorces ever recorded, namely 218,000. As Stouffer and Spencer remark (1936, p. 66): "It was the highest absolute number and the highest relative number per 1,000 population, per 1,000 married population, or per 1,000 marriages performed in the ten years preceding the year in which the divorce was granted."

ing mores and legal definitions which are in turn the reflection of altered interactional patterns—expectancies and obligations—within the family and community. For example, despite legal barriers, there is a growing disposition on the part of judges to grant divorces in terms of mutual consent of the married pair when there is obviously sharp incompatibility of temperament and behavior. In short, the legal definitions are stretched and modified in actual practice because the mores and public opinion have changed regarding the meaning and significance of divorce itself. (See Feinsinger and Young, 1931.)

There has been much discussion of how divorce may be prevented. Judges in divorce courts do attempt to reconcile couples who have filed suit for divorce, and in some states the divorce judges may or must appoint some individual to act as "divorce counsel." This person, often an attorney, is supposed to investigate the background causes of any divorce action started in the courts and try to reconcile the couple if possible. With few exceptions this role is purely perfunctory.

In some communities, however, family courts have been set up with a referee, usually a trained social worker and psychologist, whose business it is to mediate between the contending would-be divorcees in an effort to reconcile them. Evidently the success of such agencies varies considerably in terms of clients, capacity of workers, and locality. Moreover, if provision is made for handling these problems before formal court action has begun, reconciliation under guidance of outside agencies may be reasonably successful. (See McChristie, 1927.) Obviously, this matter is bound up with the whole problem of family and marital counseling. (See Mowrer, 1935.)

The limitation of the usefulness of divorce counsels, mediators, and even domestic-relations clinics lies first of all in the fact that they have not yet become closely integrated to family life. It is doubtful if they can become widespread in an individualized society like our own. They are at best palliative and tardy in their effects. In time we might link up the study and therapy of family problems of a social-psychological and economic sort to some type of medical and sociological service, but these agencies will arise only gradually if at all. In the meantime the problem of divorce will continue to confront us, and, since it is basically a symptom rather than a disease, we must reckon with the underlying factors, such as mobility of population, emancipation of women, decline in the birth rate, disappearance of economic and other functions from the household, and further individualization of function of men and women, which leads to assumptions of freedom from traditional obligations. When satisfactory marital adaptation does not take place, a process of alienation—with its conflict and distress—may begin which will end in the divorce court.

The process of alienation. All the background factors of previous role and status in childhood and youth play their part in alienation as they do in the making of a successful marriage. The elements in interaction which lead in the end to loss of affection and of desire to continue in matrimony are none other than those which we have already discussed with reference to marital conflict and adjustment generally. Here we shall only summarize certain aspects of the process of conflict as it leads to divorce. If courtship and mating represent the summation of stimuli of an emotionally pleasant sort, the process of alienation and divorce represent a summation of unpleasant stimuli. Two major aspects of the personality are involved in this matter: the ego or self-esteem and pride, and the love life or what the Freudians call the libido. As we know, these interests or aims operate together in many human relations, but are most apparent in the familial life. Because the personality has its deviant and unique as well as common traits and attitudes, there is nothing approaching complete uniformity in the process of losing affection. But we may note some features of the process which seem to be more or less common to a great percentage of cases.

(1) As a rule, the sexual relations of the spouses sooner or later become deranged. Differences in intensity of this drive, inability to work out a satisfactory *modus vivendi* as to time, place, and frequency, inability to develop the subtler aspects of play so important to full sexual pleasure—these and other matters of the more intimate life often bring on emotional tensions within the individual and conflict with the other spouse. Then, too, the affectional life may not reach sufficiently beyond the purely sexual aspects. For instance, the husband may be solicitous about the sex life, but unkind, sharp-tongued, or indifferent to many important little details of interaction with his wife, with the result that gradually the unpleasantness of everyday living and the sense of being neglected—aside from direct sexual interests—in time influence the intimate relations themselves. When women have few outside interests, such as a vocation or civic activities, or when they find household cares tedious and unsatisfying, their emotionally toned interplay with the husband becomes all the more important both to their love life and as a needed support to the pride and self-esteem. And, obviously enough, the reverse of this may be true. A wife may prove a fairly satisfactory sexual partner but become increasingly difficult to get along with otherwise.

Moreover, not only may the libidinous relations become gradually disorganized, but the ego manifestations may become disturbed. In fact, there is much evidence that pride and self-esteem become so intermingled with the love life that it is often hard to distinguish them. If it be said, as it often is, that satisfactory marriage requires good sexual adaptation, it is equally true that few satisfactory marriages are built

upon the foundation of sheer physical attraction alone. We have already pointed out that, when, for instance, a woman berates a husband for being a poor provider, or when a man undermines his wife's pride and self-regarding sentiments, or when the infantile patterns come to dominate the interspousal relations, the groundwork is laid for conflict.

(2) From these sources in the love life and in the ego emerge the conflicts, often slight at first, but gradually becoming more serious as the elements of opposition get associated into larger constellations. Yet following overt conflict there usually come compromises, reconciliations, and attempts to "patch up the differences." Staying together "for the children's sake" is a common ground for various forms of adjustment. But, as the months or years go on, all the devices for reconciliation and accommodation seem more or less exhausted. There is a "try and try again" until one or the other spouse may feel that the situation has reached an unsolvable impasse.

(3) A next stage emerges when the *idea* of divorce arises in consciousness and begins to grow as the only or best way to resolve the conflict. Such an idea may persist for months or years without being expressed, but, once it is uttered as a phase of the conflict, once this idea becomes verbalized and communicated to the other spouse, an important milestone in the process has been passed. It brings the possibility of divorce into the open forum of conversation. At first the expression of the idea may prove a shock to the other and may actually intensify the conflict, or it may lead to more serious attempts at further compromises. The word "divorce" may be uttered hundreds of times in interspousal conflicts before the overt act of divorce is consummated. Of course, the suggestion or the threat of divorce may become a verbal device used with the idea of frightening the other spouse and of bringing about some sort of control. But, further adjustments failing, the concrete proposal or threat of divorce becomes more evident. In this situation itself, as Waller remarks, one proposes and the other opposes. Yet, as couples become more tolerant, and as divorce by mutual consent becomes more common (despite the continued legal failure to recognize this fact), the mention and discussion of divorce may actually be welcomed as a possible release from what have become intolerable tensions.

(4) There frequently follows or accompanies the verbalization of probable divorce a further break in the familial solidarity. The hopelessness of continuing in the state of controversy becomes more evident. The decision to resort to divorce is a kind of commitment, and, though not as irrevocable as the overt act itself, it nevertheless outlines a form and direction for ending a cycle of conflict and for reducing or ending a given state of strain.

(5) Then comes the walkout. This is a more definitive act, of course,

than the verbal decision to seek a divorce. But, when one or the other spouse packs up to leave, a step is taken which is much more difficult to retrace than any previously taken. Actual separations take place in all sorts of ways: one woman leaves ostensibly for a prolonged vacation—a temporary face-saving device for the neighbors; another departs for the home of her parents; still another sets out directly for Reno or some other community where she intends to file formal papers seeking divorce. When the husband leaves, he may take a new job elsewhere; he may go to his parents' home; or he may take up living quarters with his friends, in his club, or in a rooming house. Just what is done depends upon familial and financial conditions, occupation, and other circumstances.

The emotional atmosphere which surrounds the departure also varies greatly. Sometimes a wife or a husband stalks out in high dudgeon in the dramatic manner of the motion pictures; sometimes it is done quietly and with a certain wistful attitude on the part of both husband and wife when they realize that they have come, at last, to the parting of the ways. In some instances it is done under cover of night or through deception—as when a wife uses the excuse of a vacation as a rationalization to her spouse. For some there is obviously a good deal of ego satisfaction in the more dramatic and emotional departure.

(6) Finally there is the divorce procedure itself. There is consultation with attorneys, which may induce emotional distress and a sense of guilt at having to go through this whole legal ritual. There are often problems of property settlement, decisions and agreements about the children, and no end of other items. In contested divorces, of course, the whole conflict is finally fought out in public. Even when there is a calmer situation, when there is a more or less tacit agreement to permit the divorce, it still is a public spectacle—something which itself has its effects.

Divorce a public spectacle. A divorce is more or less an emotional crisis for all concerned. Psychologically it represents the final overt stage of a long series of events that had their inception in the previous months and years. Yet, despite all the conflict which may lie behind the determination to be freed from marriage, the act itself, usually taking place under the eyes of the public, is not likely to be an easy experience. The ordeal in court may itself be an occasion for an emotional catharsis. The "injured" person—that is, the one who seeks legal redress in the form of divorce—may be so bitter and disillusioned as to want in an obviously childish way to take revenge on the other spouse. This may take the form of insistence on exorbitant alimony, open court battles for custody of the children, or public accusations of infidelity and overt cruelty. It sometimes happens that publicity-seeking attorneys themselves maneuver their clients into seeking such revenge. (Occasionally an ex-spouse is not even

satisfied with thus seeking revenge, but may later attempt to injure the other person by spreading scandal or by causing him to lose his job.) Or one or the other of the spouses or both may suffer from a marked sense of inferiority or of guilt during the entire process, sometimes produced, in part, by the attitude of relatives, friends, and the wider public. So, too, newspapers often play up divorces, especially those of persons of prominence, and this not only causes mental anguish but reflects the continued emotional interest of the public in these matters. Many people who are themselves disturbed over their own marriages get a vicarious pleasure or pain from reading the details of divorce trials. The efforts of many couples to avoid publicity reflect their fear of gossip, of reprisals by employers, and of the deep-laid sense of guilt about the whole matter which is rationalized in their conviction that a "civilized" divorce procedure would take care of these matters in the direct and simple way in which people break ordinary contracts by mutual agreement. Yet, on the whole, the routine and objective nature of most divorce proceedings today shows that the public acceptance of this practice is growing. But, despite a more rational and tolerant view of the matter, divorce remains for the spouses and the children, if for no one else, a crisis of importance.

Effect of divorce on the spouses. With few exceptions a divorce involves rather profound reorganization of the life patterns of those concerned and presents a crisis even as a *fait accompli* which the parties thereto often do not anticipate. Waller (1930, 1938) has made a significant contribution to our understanding of the problems which confront the divorcee. The discussion which follows is drawn in part from his analysis of the subject, although many of the illustrations are not his and I have not hesitated to depart at times from his interpretation. We shall begin our discussion at the point when the divorce decree has been granted and describe and analyze the processes of readaptation which follow. These processes involve such matters as the love life, the restoration of one's self-esteem, the changes in daily routine habits, the reorganization of one's social contacts, the bearing of the divorce upon one's vocational responsibilities, and especially the resolution of internal conflicts and the arrival at some satisfactory subjective and emotional integration or balance.

(1) The reorganization of the individual's love life may take a variety of forms. It usually happens that, long before the divorce is granted, sexual relations with the spouse have ceased or at least become highly unsatisfactory and infrequent. The suppression of normal sexual activity during the whole predivorce period often enhances the conflict of the spouses. And, once the legal bonds have been severed, a number of somewhat aberrant responses may be unleashed. These may be regressive in

character, taking the form of autoeroticism. A woman may find herself indulging in a combination of fantasy and overt practice in this matter for the first time in years or even in her life. In other cases the new-found freedom finds outlet in a delayed adolescent fling at Bohemianism. In some instances the bitterness and desire for revenge which arise from an injured ego may set up an exploitative pattern, and a man or a woman may, for instance, set out to make "game" of as many different persons of the opposite sex as possible.

Some times extramarital sex life begins prior to the divorce and may be marked with considerable hope of permanence. Many of the more severe features of the divorce crisis itself may be reduced in instances where one party or even both have already transferred their affectional life to another person and are looking forward to remarriage. In any case, after a period of floundering, most persons come to a more calm and stable reorganization of their love life. (A considerable percentage of divorces lead to remarriage. See Rubinow, 1936.)

(2) The reorganization of one's ego patterns—that is, the repairing of one's pride and self-esteem, the recovery from any sense of disgrace and guilt which accompanied the divorce—is imperative. In our society, despite the liberalization of divorce, there lurks in most divorced persons of Christian and Hebrew cultural backgrounds a certain sense of guilt. It may take such a form as a belief that one has "let the former spouse down" even though the conflict had become intolerable. So, too, the individual may be "cut" socially, and in this, as in other critical situations, be driven to adopt some face-saving device. In certain instances one ex-spouse may feel much abused and develop a strong sense of suffering and self-pity which can be resolved only by vigorous projection of hatred upon the former spouse. Divorced women sometimes come to hate all men, to project these ideas upon their daughters, and to indulge in other mechanisms to restore their self-esteem. Ex-wives also report that upon occasion they have to put up with casual solicitations from men who assume that, because they are divorced, they are "open game" for sexual advances. This may lead to a variety of defensive responses and further enhance any disgust toward men already set up by the initial experience. At other times there may be a retreat into a sense of inferiority and failure. It sometimes happens that one who has been divorced takes up residence with parents or other relatives who furnish solace and support for an injured ego. Or one may find escape in liquor, in gambling, in neurotic illness, or in some other symbolic release from emotional frustrations.

(3) A reorientation of everyday habits is also necessary. Curiously, no matter how irritating a marriage may become, the spouses usually continue in all sorts of habitual interplay and interdependence, which are

broken, of course, by separation and divorce. Such apparently trivial items as caring for clothes, mending socks, and preparing meals are examples. The ex-husband may find it tedious and difficult to go back to bachelorhood—with many old habits to be re-established. So, too, an ex-wife may miss the car which the family had, or may get a sense of lonesomeness when she no longer hears the husband's footsteps about the house. Some of my own cases confirm Waller's finding (1930) that the sexual habits themselves are often so deeply established that, despite quarreling, conflict, and finally divorce, the ex-spouses may experience strong impulses to see each other and that not infrequently they indulge in sexual relations after divorce. These relations plus the loneliness and other changes in daily life probably have a definite part in reuniting many divorced couples in remarriage. I suspect that often this pull is as great as that of children or as great as pressures from relatives and friends. But no adequate statistical data on these matters are at hand.

In other words, the emancipation from the former marital situation is often more imagined than real. Not infrequently a divorcee has a tendency to talk about the former marriage, about the children, and about previous occasions when the spouses were together with their friends. Although such conversation is vitally concerned with building up a defense of one's ego and may take on a critical or emotional tone, the very discussion demonstrates the continued attention or stimulus value of the ex-spouse despite legal dissolution of the family. Usually these responses decrease with time, especially as one moves into contacts with new friends or as a new love comes into one's life.

(4) The reorganization of the divorced individual's social contacts goes on apace. Just as marriage often leads to giving up old friends and acquaintances, so divorce often makes necessary the finding of new contacts. A sense of guilt may make it difficult for the person to seek out former friends, because their responses, real or anticipated, such as their implicit disapproval, make it necessary to look elsewhere for congenial companionship. Despite so-called emancipation and freedom, it is often emotionally unpleasant for the ex-mates to go about in the same social circle. Sometimes a divorced person's own sense of shame and guilt will be projected in anticipatory form upon his friends, thus making it difficult for them to continue in former easy social contacts with him.

(5) There is often a need on the part of the ex-wife to take up an occupation again. This may be demanded by the financial situation, or it may arise from a realization that a vocation affords one an excellent and objective focus for one's energy and attention. But a woman who has once given up a job or a career may find it difficult to secure re-employment. So, too, sometimes a man is required by circumstances to find another type of work following a divorce, as in situations where a minis-

ter or a teacher may not be able to retain his position because of societal pressures on him following his divorce. The function of a vocation in objectifying attention and in affording an external outlet for one's interest and energy is amply demonstrated in cases of divorced persons. The matter is sharply evident in those instances where an ex-wife retreats into neuroticism or childish dependence on her own parents or on her own children rather than tackle a job—whether financially remunerative or not.

(6) The reorganization of one's inner life, the resolution of mental conflicts—in short, the arrival at some integration or working compromise with one's egoistic and affectional drives—is fundamental to all other adaptive reactions. According to Waller (1930, p. 13) the "most important, most intangible, and most subtle of the necessities of the divorced person's new life is that of settling the rebellion within himself," of stilling the inner mental conflict. One has to learn to live with himself and with his wounds. Only after he has come to take these matters in his stride will an adequate reorganization be possible.

In short, the manner of readjustment after divorce will depend upon a number of factors both present and past. Without doubt one's previous life organization—his habits, attitudes and values—will largely determine this. How does an individual meet such a crisis? This depends, obviously, upon his background and, especially in such emotional relations as marriage, upon the patterns of life laid down in the early years. If for the moment we use the descriptive categories of the shut-in, introverted type and the expansive, extroverted type, it seems likely enough that the person of the former sort will tend to meet his divorce in a different manner than one inclined toward extroversion. The former may find substitution in his work, in his philosophy, and in reorganizing his ideal of love and building up a defense fantasy against the former spouse. The latter may find his release and outlet in a round of external activities; his former spouse no longer has any special meaning for him because he has readily adapted himself to some other person or persons.

Then, too, there may well be sex differences in the manner and extent of readjustment, reflecting perhaps both traditional—that is, cultural—and psychological differences in men and women. In our society the ex-wife doubtless has many vocational and sexual problems which the ex-husband does not have to face. It would be interesting to know, for example, how frequently women return to their own relatives after divorce or exemplify other regressive reactions as compared with men. Also, the presence or absence of children will determine many features of the re-orientation, especially for the ex-wife. Likewise, for the woman the securing of alimony may provide a form of economic security which may, in part, make up for emotional losses.

The meaning of alimony. There is no doubt that many abuses have crept into the system of paying alimony. If there are children to support, the provision of money for their support may be cheerfully assumed by the husband, though not without some conflict in instances where he has remarried and has another family to support. But, in any case, it is easy for the divorced husband to develop a good deal of resentment in time at the ever-recurring date when a considerable fraction of his wages or salary must be paid over to his ex-spouse.⁵ Such an obligation serves as a constant stimulus which easily symbolizes or keeps alive a host of unpleasant memories. The man may and often does find in such legal requirement a foundation for self-pity and a bid for sympathy from his friends. Then, too, this constant reminder of the previous marriage may become the basis for misunderstandings in the new family venture.

In other words, alimony often takes on something of the nature of damages—reflecting definitely the continuation of the property idea behind marriage. As one divorced woman frankly admitted to her ex-husband's attorney, "I gave ten years of my life to this man; why shouldn't I be paid alimony now that he has left me?" The function of alimony as a bolster to an otherwise injured ego is apparent.

There is developing an attitude, however, on the part of many women, especially those of professional training, that alimony, aside from support for children, is an outmoded and barbaric form of punishment. This reflects, of course, the changing views of women both toward marriage and toward careers and financial independence. But, so long as most women give up earning money when they marry, or never were gainfully employed prior to matrimony, we cannot expect any marked change in present practice regarding alimony. At best, women who are willing and able to assume financial responsibilities for themselves after divorce will remain only a small proportion of the total number divorced.

Instances are known where divorced women preferred to remain single and on alimony rather than to remarry, even when there was a strong affectional bond to a second man. Sometimes the alimony permits the ex-wife a higher standard of living than would be possible if she remarried. In other but perhaps rarer cases the ex-wife is more interested in revenging herself upon her ex-husband by remaining single and taking alimony than she is in a healthy remarriage.

⁵ This whole scheme reflects the relative status of men and women in our society. It is seldom indeed that an alimony or property settlement is provided for an ex-husband. The assumptions behind alimony for the wife are (1) that she is a dependent and requires financial support, and (2) that she is the innocent victim of abuse and cruelty and perhaps infidelity, which indicates the long-time view of canon law that the wife can sue for divorce only when she comes into court "with clean hands," as the old phrase has it, that is, when she is the injured party. On the persistence of this doctrine into modern times, see Feinsinger and Young (1931) and Feinsinger (1932, 1934).

The children of divorce. There is a division of opinion among students of the family and of personality about the effects of divorce upon the children. Youngsters brought up in a household marked by quarreling, violence, and conflict between the parents are often characterized by nervousness, distraction, divided affection, and mental confusion. Many critics contend that it would be better if such children were taken out of these homes, either by divorcing the parents or by placing the children in foster homes. Others hold that, despite such disharmony, it is preferable to keep the family together if possible, since the children need the emotional support and help of both parents. It is impossible to generalize on either of these points of view, but certain comments may be made.

After all, the family is a group of interacting personalities, and sharp divergence of opinion and some controversy, as well as co-operation and love, may be a common and even "normal" feature of family inter-stimulation and interresponse. Then, too, in some instances the spouses may keep their differences from the children's knowledge, at least when the latter are very young. Obviously, however, the long continuation of conflict can seldom be kept entirely from the children, since it is likely to break out in symbolic and indirect form. But couples do manage to continue together because of the children, and it is difficult to know whether this is not often better for the children—though it may be hard on the parents themselves—than to rush into divorce.

Assuming that the conflict has resulted in divorce, the question arises, what effect will such action have upon the children? During the past twenty years I have read dozens of autobiographical narratives or case histories on this problem written by my students and others. Yet out of all this material it is difficult to formulate any consistent and generalized statement. There is a wide variation in the reported experiences. For some individuals divorce of their parents constituted a grave crisis. Others take the position—whether it be a rationalization or not is often difficult to determine—that the divorce ended an intolerable family situation and that their lives were much calmer and happier afterward. Then, too, remarriage of the parents often further complicates the role of the child, and introduces still other crises requiring readjustment.

Recalling always that we have to deal with the interaction of the child with his parents, siblings, stepparents, stepsiblings, and members of the community, the response of the child of divorce is always qualified: first, by his own make-up, resting upon his previous conditioning; second, by the reactions of these others to him; and third, often by physical and other environmental circumstances which may be somewhat independent of either the child himself or the other persons in this social drama. Nevertheless, brief comments on some of these factors may be offered, based upon reading of my own collection of cases, upon my observations

of children of divorced parents, and upon certain published accounts, autobiographical and otherwise.

It is difficult to state definitely whether the age of the child at the time the parents are divorced has as much influence as some writers hold. True, the young child may continue for some time unaware of growing conflict of the parents, while for the adolescent a divorce may lead to considerable sense of inferiority, conflict of loyalties, and social disgrace which a younger child would not feel. Hence it is difficult to state whether divorce is harder on the young than on the older child. So much depends on the entire social configuration within the family and on the community standards. A very considerable number of my own case records and student comments maintain that a divorce of parents while their children are in high school—junior and senior—constitutes the most serious crisis for the latter. But there is as yet no adequate way of checking these judgments.

On the contrary, one is impressed by the apparent frequency of difficulty in child training when the child is left to dual guardianship following divorce, or when, in the absence of formal court provision the child is shifted about from parent to parent, either every few months or first for a few years here and then for a few years there. The proverbial program of visiting the other parent during vacation periods is not always entirely satisfactory if this parent uses the occasion to indulge in emotionalizing the whole situation for the child, by overindulging him with gifts, or by paying undue and somewhat artificial attention to him in order to indicate his continuing love or perhaps to show to the other parent that he still has an emotional hold on the child. There is abundant evidence that the sense of stability and security may be more adequately provided when the child is not exposed to such divergent stimuli as are likely to appear in this shuttling back and forth between two or more households. Yet the frequent allegation that divided guardianship inevitably results in damage to the child is not always borne out by the testimony at hand. So many factors enter into these situations that generalization is difficult if not dangerous.⁶

Mention has already been made of those instances where an ex-wife projects her own emotional reactions upon a child. The following synopsis of a longer case indicates the influence which an unhappy and embittered divorced mother may have upon a daughter.

Case of Sue M. Sue M. was six years of age when her father deserted her mother. Some time later the mother obtained a divorce. About the only thing Sue can recall of her father is his harsh temper and his irritation at the mother's incessant nagging of him. From the time the father left the mother continually denounced the father

⁶ For interesting cases see anonymous accounts: "A Child of Divorce," *Nation*, April 2, 1930, 130: 393-394; and "I Have Four Parents," *Reader's Digest*, May, 1937, 30: 1-5.

and was bitter in her condemnation of all men. "Every evil thing in the world," she declared, "was the result of man's selfishness." She warned her daughter against having anything to do with any man. When pressed for particulars, the mother only answered that men did cruel things to women. Sue developed an intense fear of men, though as a child she continued to play with the boys of her neighborhood despite her mother's forbidding her to do so.

The mother often invoked the name of the father as a control device over the child. There was little deep affection between mother and daughter, and, when Sue displeased her mother, the latter threatened to turn Sue over to him and said that he would be "very mean" to her.

Despite her fear of her father, Sue longed for him. She could not understand why, when other boys and girls had fathers, she had none. She developed a rich fantasy about him. She told the other children that he was planning to have her mother and her back together with him in a "nice home" in a distant city. She described her father in detail as handsome, capable, and ideal. When he did not return, she began to tell them that he was dead; and this fantasy took such a hold on her that, unless her mother reminded her of the father, as when she threatened to send her away to him, she actually believed him to be dead.

On the background of this family situation the girl grew up rather shy and timid in her social relations. Moreover, the mother gave her no adequate sex instruction, and, when she inquired about some simple matters, the mother proceeded to surround the whole topic with many taboos and fears. But Sue learned something of sex from other children in the common obscene manner, and she began to link up her mother's unhappiness and divorce and generalized reaction toward all men with all sorts of false notions about sex. She began to consider her mother a highly wronged woman and a martyr to men's bestiality.

In time her retreat into fantasies influenced her schoolwork as well as her social contacts. She avoided boys during her adolescence and found a solace in books and daydreaming. The death of her mother prevented her continuing her education after graduation from high school, and she was obliged to seek work. Her reserve was attributed to grief at the death of her mother; and she now admits that she permitted this interpretation about her shyness to continue because it fitted into her own idea that her mother was a victim of men's cruelty.

Gradually her business relations have broken down some of her reserve. Professionally her relations with men are satisfactory enough, but in the usual run of social contacts with them she is awkward and ill at ease. The few men with whom she has become well acquainted are much older than she is, but she does have many women friends. Yet on the whole she remains a rather repressed and unhappy person with a definite sense of longing and uncertainty lurking behind the mask of her daily adjustments to those about her.

It is often pointed out that divorced parents, as well as those not legally separated, sometimes use their emotional hold on a child as a power device over the other spouse as well as over the child. Each may, in turn, shower a son or daughter with gifts, money, or elaborate promises for

the future in order to counteract the efforts of the other to capture the child's affections. All too late in many cases it becomes apparent to the victim that he is being manipulated by two jealous and childish parents.

In contrast to the use of a son or daughter by the ex-spouses as a means of striking at each other are those occasional instances where a child learns to exploit the divorced parents—to play them against each other—for selfish ends.

Case of Marie W. The parents of Marie were divorced when she was nine years old. The father is a stable, sober businessman; the mother, who has remarried, is a woman of unusual beauty and one of those persons who care nothing about security and permanence. Marie was left in the care of her paternal grandmother until she was through high school. During these years she was constantly appealing first to her father and then to her mother for funds or favors, and, when her father refused a request, she would threaten to go to her mother, whom the father had come thoroughly to disrespect. This usually proved a successful plan. In turn, when her mother descended upon her, as she did periodically, Marie would get from her whatever gifts she could. The following episode is illustrative of the girl's technique:

During her freshman year in college Marie decided that she wanted to go to a near-by college town to see her boy friend and to be a guest at his fraternity dance. Unless she could secure a written permission from a parent, she could not go. Her father, who did not approve of the idea, refused to send his letter of approval to the dean of women. Thereupon Marie telegraphed her mother to wire her permission, which she did within an hour or so. Moreover, the father usually had some feeling of guilt when he refused to fulfill any of his daughter's requests, and, having learned from Marie that she had the permission, he telephoned his cordial good wishes for a pleasant time.

Space does not permit an extended presentation of other cases illustrating all the important variations in the external situations and in the subjective meanings which arise in the child of divorced parents. But the following summary of an extended autobiographical statement of a family reaction to divorce indicates an effort of the father and children to meet such a crisis in a satisfactory manner.

Case of the Cannon family. *The mother's family background.* Mrs. Cannon was of Norwegian peasant stock. Her father came to this country when he was a young man and settled on a farm in the Middle West. He was harsh, completely dominating his family, and was thoroughly miserly. None of the children had any schooling beyond a few grades. The father's entire manner of control not only represented the patriarchal severity of his background, but also well illustrated the fact that within this culture pattern a husband and father might with impunity indulge himself in any number of childish devices to control his family. He seemed to delight in showing his authority in unpleasant ways simply because these demonstrations made the members of his household miserable and unhappy. And he so completely dominated the sons that none of them ever developed any marked sense of independence or responsibility,

and the daughters, except Mrs. Cannon, never married. As the grandson who furnished this account puts it, "They [the daughters] are going to die as they lived—in isolation!"

The father's family background. Little is known of the father's father, since he deserted his family when Mr. Cannon was a small lad and was never heard from again. But the mother, Mrs. Cannon senior, was a woman of strong will, and she kept the family together in the face of pioneer hardships. Later she married again, and the stepfather was kind to the stepchildren. Mr. Cannon, the father, received only a primary-school education and then went to work to learn a trade. After he had established himself in a good occupation, he married.

The family prior to divorce. Eight children were born to Mrs. Cannon, but at present there are only six living, four girls and two boys. During the early years of marriage the Cannon family lived in a neighborhood of hard-working, beer-drinking foreigners and first-generation Americans, most of whom worked in near-by breweries. The descriptive account runs as follows: "There was a saloon on almost every corner. It was a neighborhood of street fights, and over-the-back-fence fights between the women. . . . The children were sent to the saloons to bring home beer—the old custom known as 'rushing the can.' " But the section was not degenerate or disorganized in the usual sense. It was just a rough-and-ready world in which hard work, violent conflicts, and a confusion of European culture backgrounds with those of urban industrial America were evident. Imbued with the idea of improving the social environment and educational opportunities for his children, Mr. Cannon later moved to a better section and set up in business for himself.

During these years there arose increasingly severe conflicts between the parents over all sorts of matters: finances, discipline, authority in the home, and operation of the father's business. The mother showed ever-mounting jealousy and irritability. She began to complain of her ill-health. She contended that she had injured her back from childbearing and housework, but the doctors found no physical basis for this belief. The conflict of the parents became in time so intense that the children dreaded being home and were glad to escape elsewhere on the slightest excuse; the situation was so unpleasant that the children gave up inviting their friends to their home. The social atmosphere was one of constant nagging and "raving all day" on the part of the mother. She started making false accusations about the father's fidelity. The situation became so serious that it influenced his business; the mother frequently made violent scenes in the shop and thus lost the father good customers. In fact, her temper tantrums became so recurrent and intense that her children and others began to believe that her mind was affected.

The divorce. After years of effort on the part of the father and older children to keep the family together, the father gave up trying and sought and was granted a divorce, but not without a great deal of public notice. After the divorce the mother became so violent that she had finally to be committed to the state mental hospital, where she remained for six months. She then returned to the home town and has shown considerable improvement, but the prognosis for her future is none too good. In the meantime, although the father's business declined, he has carried on, doing the best he could to help educate the younger children.

The effect of the family situation and divorce on the children. Despite the apparently maladjusted family life, the children so far have made what seems to be a suc-

cessful orientation to the situation and to life outside the family. Some notes may be offered on the adjustment of the family members:

The two youngest children (one boy and one girl) recently graduated from high school. The three oldest daughters are well and evidently happily married. Two of them have children of their own. They all seem to have considerable insight into marriage and its problems. The oldest son (the informant for the family history) graduated from the state university and for some years has been a successful high-school teacher. The father and children have co-operated to keep the family going as long as possible and to help each other to readjust themselves after the divorce. There was much intermember emotional and financial support. Despite the public attention to the divorce, the members have been able to carry forward in the community without disgrace or isolation.

The informant lists the following factors which seem to him important in stabilizing the family members in the face of conflict and legal dissolution: (1) a level-headed father with a genuine interest in the children; (2) a fairly good neighborhood environment; (3) both father and mother serious in work habits; (4) opportunity for the children to work in the father's small business, which taught them self-reliance and industry and gave them a chance to study and know people; (5) good church connections and moral and religious support therefrom; (6) sound education; (7) good health and good native ability on the part of all members of the family; (8) "bad" effects of early family dissension overcome by three members through marriage and the resulting creation of new family atmosphere for them (related, doubtless, to points 1, 4, 5, and 6), and by the older unmarried son who has made good professionally; and (9) the two youngest members given financial and social-emotional support by the father and older siblings as well as by community friends.

In this case there is evidently considerable carry-over from the unstable family life of the mother to her own marriage; but there is a strong father who holds the family together in the face of the mother's disorganization. There is excellent intersibling aid and good community support in the form of church, neighbors, and school contacts. The specific weight of various factors in such a family history is hard to determine, as are the details of the influences leading from the familial backgrounds of the spouses through their own early years as married persons to the final dissolution. But it is an illustration of how one family group did not entirely dissolve in the face of long-continuing critical situations ending in divorce.

The effects of divorce on children may be as varied as are the effects on the spouses. Moreover, it is evident that no major influences are at hand which are not found also in undivorced families in our present-day society. Obviously, some interactional tensions may be enhanced, and others may be reduced in their effects, but one may be reasonably sure that there is no single phase of child-parent relationship or resulting problem in the situation involving divorce that is not found in families which are not so broken. Here as elsewhere we find a wide range of

interactional patterns, but nothing entirely unique. For this reason the possible disorganizing influence of divorce on children must be matched against the possible deleterious effect on children of parental and other conflict in unbroken homes. The spoiled mother may easily carry infantile attitudes over to her daughter in a family externally well adjusted. A child may lack emotional support from one or both parents in families where divorce has never been imagined. On the other hand, the removal of a conflict situation by divorce and the resulting stabilization of a family pattern—though it be but a partial family—may bring a considerable improvement in the child's life as well as in that of the former spouses.

Likewise, the changing public opinion and the mores in regard to divorce may in time influence the responses of the child to such a situation. When legal dissolution of marriage becomes more or less accepted, when an understanding appreciation of the role of the stepchild arises, and when ridicule and disgrace no longer accompany divorce, many of the emotional problems for the child of divorced parents should, other things being equal, decline if not disappear entirely. Yet it must be realized that emotional growth, in our society, is normally tied up with family life, and in parent-child relations there still remains the need for emotional and economic security. Hence, though tolerance for divorce may change certain older cultural and personal-social interactions, such a break-up of the family may easily produce untoward influences on children which otherwise might not arise. It may well be that, once the present confusion of marital norms disappears as our whole modern society becomes more stable in institutions, divorce may become far less common. But future, unforeseen economic and political changes may so thoroughly redefine marriage, childbearing, and child-training that many of our present problems will completely disappear.

Chapter XXII

ADJUSTMENT PROBLEMS OF THE MODERN WOMAN

ALTHOUGH the role and status of women are linked up closely with marriage and home life and with economic endeavor, there still remain other aspects regarding changes in their role and status which may profitably be presented.

THE TRADITIONAL INFERIORITY OF WOMEN

In the past the position of women in society has been largely characterized by inferiority and degradation in comparison with men. A long-familiar rationalization contended that women are biologically inferior to men. Other writers maintained that women in their essential physiological make-up were anabolic and energy-storing while men were catabolic and energy-using. (See Thomas, 1907.) There are, of course, the childbearing and child-rearing functions of the female which set her off from the male, but aside from these there is still a common belief that women are intellectually inferior to men. This is evidenced in current conversation, in discrimination against women regarding education and occupation, in some contemporary literature, and in much wit and humor about the inadequacies of women. Even educational psychologists long held that women students as measured by mental tests were less intelligent and less variable than their male confreres. (See H. Ellis, 1894; Thorndike, 1914.) But recent studies have shown that many of these "differences" are really culturally, not biologically, determined.¹

Historical roots of woman's low status. The subjection of women to men has a long cultural history, and in our Western society their emancipation has taken place in a relatively recent period of time. Among other important features in the history of their status are the following:

(1) Hebraic and Christian ideology placed woman definitely in a position inferior to man; it was she who had caused man's expulsion from the Garden of Eden and thus brought sin into the world. Although the doctrine of love had great emphasis in Christianity, the early Church Fathers gave voice to the idea that there are two

¹ On the psychology of sex differences, see R. S. Ellis (1928); Pintner (1933); F. S. Freeman (1934); Anastasi (1937); and Gilliland and Clark (1939).

kinds of love, sacred and profane, the first ascetic, the other lustful. Though sexuality was nature's way of keeping mankind going, as a means of pleasure it was thoroughly taboo. (2) Although romantic love often bore only superficial relationship to a woman's real station, it did serve as an ideal to help free woman from the degradation laid on her by Christianity. (See Chapter XX.) (3) The Industrial Revolution gave women an opportunity to earn money outside the home and thus to become at least partially independent of their fathers and spouses. (4) The extension of political suffrage to males of practically all classes in time led to like provisions for women. (5) In this country frontier and pioneer life stimulated the emancipation of women, particularly evident in the freer choice in mating, in a recognition of their economic importance, and in their attainment of political suffrage. (Such frontier states as Wyoming, Utah, and Idaho were among the first to grant women the ballot.) (6) Finally the whole change in the view of women in this "man-made world," as Charlotte Perkins Gilman aptly described it, is reflected in the gradual recognition of the educability of women. (See Schmalhausen and Calverton, 1931.)

Yet, despite recent changes, in many areas of conduct women remain definitely in a lower station than men. In many of our own states they still lack full legal equality with men in such matters as power to make contracts and to control their own earnings, in guardianship rights, and in the determination of their domicile. (See B. J. Stern, 1934.)

Sex differences and certain roles for women. There are undeniable differences between the sexes which determine some of their respective roles. The natural linkage of childbearing and child-rearing with the hearth and home, at least during the early months of the child's life, cannot be denied. Even in societies where the child-rearing is given over to persons other than the mother the cultural patterns cannot run entirely counter to the facts of childbearing. Also, the household obligations of the care and preparation of food and the caring for the home in other ways become easily associated with woman's more sessile condition during the childbearing years. (See, however, M. Mead, 1935.)

Finally, there remain the difficult problems of possible psychological—especially temperamental and emotional—differences between the sexes, which are dependent upon distinctive physiological functions. We noted in Chapter II that men and women vary in regard to endocrine balance, in particular with reference to the operation of the sexual glands. Physiologically, the sexuality of the female is clearly more complicated than is that of the male, and it would be a mistake to ignore the carry-over of this fact to women's emotional and affective life and hence to their attitudes and habits. The physiological imbalance produced by menstruation itself must be reckoned as a factor in temperamental differences, and certainly no man can completely identify himself with a woman in matters of gestation, childbearing, and nursing. Women have certain experiences which men can never fully understand.

On the other hand, it would be a mistake to assume complete sexual divergence of the male and the female from each other. We know today that morphologically and physiologically the two sexes are not analogous to two species. Despite the major differences of men and women in their reproductive functions, modern physiology demonstrates that masculinity and femininity represent extremes on a distribution of characteristics which have much in common. In fact, men who tend to resemble the modal female physical habitus have apparently an endocrine balance resembling that of many women, and there are cases in which female endocrine-bearing tissue is found in males. (See E. Allen, 1939; and Hoskins, 1933.) Such constitutional foundations of possible emotional and temperamental divergence cannot be gainsaid. It is questionable if personal-social and cultural training can ever completely cover up the possible divergence of the sexes from each other, or, on the contrary, dispel the fact that certain males have an organic predisposition to assume, under family and other group influences, a somewhat feminine life organization, or for some females to assume masculine roles and attitudes. (See Hinkle, 1920.)

RECENT CULTURAL CHANGES AND WOMEN

Any marked reduction in birth rates, and hence in the size of the average family, influences profoundly not only the interspouse relations but also the role and status of women in regard to groups other than the family itself. Such changes in our society are related to our urban and industrial culture. Certainly in most communities the household has been relieved of many of its customary activities, and there arises among women a demand for outlets in remunerative work or in play outside the home. While more and more women generally are gainfully employed, the proportion of married women at work is increasing much faster than is the proportion of married women in the total population of this country. So, too, the attaining of political equality through the ballot, jury service, and equal rights at law for women, in this country and elsewhere, indicate a shift in the attitudes and status of all women, married and single.

Meaning of changes in the role and status of women. The independence of a woman economically and politically means that her responses to herself and to others will be different from those of her ancestors. Thus the traditional role and status of daughter, wife, and mother in the household were linked up with symbols and practices of masculine dominance of husband and father. Today, the woman at work outside the home is cut loose from the former specific role as daughter, or wife, or mother. The old symbols and habits of inferiority, dependence, and submission

are being lost. In their place is arising a new sense of power and freedom, especially in the economic and political aspects of our society.

The most important single feature of these alterations is the desexing of many customary relations of men and women. Because of the close linkage in the past of the role and status of women with the home and with the bearing and rearing of children, it is only natural that, as women have moved out of the home into business and industry, they have carried over the older identifications and expectancies of their position with regard to men. And men, too, have tended obviously to carry over somewhat similar attitudes and ideas toward women. The persistence of these attitudes and habits can be observed not only in the economic life about us, but in the responses of men to women whom they meet in political or community life. While we may never entirely escape the influence of sex differences in the nonsexual areas of interaction, the emotional-social maturation of women doubtless lags because the older attitudes regarding these differences do continue in situations where they need not apply.

The maturity of women is not necessarily measured by their mere aping of masculine ways, though this is a rather common practice in many quarters. Psychologically the low status of women is akin to the inferior position of suppressed minority groups in a larger society or community. (See W. I. Thomas, 1907; D. Young, 1932; and Stonequist, 1937.) Apparently one of the first shifts of such groups toward securing higher standing and new roles consists in imitating the external habits and attitudes of the dominant group. Thus the immigrant tends to wear American clothes, to use American slang, and to adopt American eating habits and the like long before he is internally assimilated to the deeper values of our culture. Similarly the symbols of female emancipation came not only with the securing of the ballot and the right to work, but with the imitation of men's speech, clothes, drinking and smoking habits, and general freedom of mobility. It is no accident that during the last decade of the nineteenth century many women looked upon the wearing of bloomers as a symbol of their emerging freedom.

The retention of sexuality in those relations of men and women which have essentially nothing to do with sex tends in the long run to restrict the more lasting and fundamental emancipation of women from their position as essentially a suppressed minority group. Many women fail to realize this. They continue to use their physical charm as means of power over men in business, industry, and civic affairs. This is similar to the behavior of the immature person generally, but notably the child or adolescent. In short, they wish to have their cake and eat it too. Many of them want the old-line chivalrous attention, the flattery, the care, the deference, and at the same time they crave and demand their independ-

ence and freedom. But, if their growth is to continue, in time these dual roles and dual symbols will give way to mature equalitarian relationships which will be relatively free from extraneous sexual connotations.

Effects of women's emancipation on masculine dominance. The changes in the role and status of women, married or single, must necessarily influence profoundly the role and status and hence the ego manifestations of the men of our society. The symbols of dominance and control as well as the overt practices will be much modified as women alter their relations to men and to themselves. We have already noted that male dominance is easily associated with childish and adolescent patterns rather than with those of full maturity. In the past the permissible culture patterns enabled men to exercise power over women and children in forms which we today consider to be essentially immature: violence, temper tantrums, and the withholding of privileges, without any very adequate accounting to those around them. Not that most men use these in our society, because, ideally at least, their patriarchal authority is assumed or expected to carry with it full maturity and responsibility. But it is true that often men do control women by methods which, though tolerated by the culture norms, still represent a retention of many outmoded behavior patterns.

Thus, when we speak of immaturity, we must not forget that maturity itself is largely defined by culture. In our own society we like to define maturity in terms of such features as the sense or recognition of other personalities, of their rights, duties, and desires, and of the approximate equality involved in a given social interaction. When women wish to shift the traditional interactional pattern from that of submissiveness to a dominant male to a more equalitarian relationship, they frequently find that men resent and resist such attempts at redefining the situation. However, because economic independence has such a high prestige value in our society, the monetary freedom of women becomes important in forcing this redefinition upon men. There follow, too, the new role of women as potential and actual participants in political and civic affairs and finally the reflection of these changes back into the home and into the interspouse and parent-child relations.

Some of the changes in the household role and status of the wife and mother in American urban society bear clear witness to this whole shift. The mother has come more and more to control the children in their earlier years. With the father out of the home during so much of the day, many matters of discipline and instruction must fall upon the wife and mother, and there is in our urban and suburban communities a pattern which Ralph Linton has called the "new American matriarchate," that is, a dominance of women over many matters formerly in the control of the men.

Truly not only in the wider public and economic life but within the home and family itself many of these changes are in evidence, and with them all there is gradually arising a new pattern of masculine role and status related to an equality of the sexes. There is growing up between the spouses a norm of mutual respect formerly unknown.

COMBINATION OF MARRIAGE AND GAINFUL EMPLOYMENT FOR WOMEN

Too often, as women have been relieved from household jobs and childbearing, they have been forced either to resort to relatively petty forms of new activities such as leisure-time handicrafts, playing cards, or other forms of recreation, or to center much of their attention on such matters as the selection and purchase of cloths, cosmetics, and the like. If these do not satisfy, they are likely to substitute daydreaming or its literary and dramatic counterparts in novel reading, attendance at motion pictures, and so on. In fact, aside from household obligations and childbearing, men have long tended to force women into trivial roles; and one of the problems of emancipation and maturation of all women lies right here. Quite likely the accusation that women are "personal" and "petty" in dealing with each other or with people generally has its roots in the fact that they have not been permitted to develop the objectivity toward others and hence toward themselves that has long characterized the mature male. (See W. I. Thomas, 1907.)

Yet, accompanying the emancipation of woman, as measured by her civic, economic, and other roles, there has arisen considerable discussion as to whether a woman could or should combine a career or other gainful employment with marriage. Obviously, for the single woman a career or other work outside the home may well afford her an integrating center for her life. (See below.) But what of the woman who has to, or wishes to, combine a career or gainful employment with the duties and pleasures of wife and mother? Can she effectively combine the two? Or shall she sacrifice one for the other? Is such a plan successful for more than a few women in special circumstances?

Why married women work. The census of the United States for 1930 indicated that, of the women fifteen years of age or over listed as employed for wages, 28.9 per cent were married. In 1890 the census reported but 13.9 per cent of working women as married. The percentage of all married women who were gainfully employed was 4.6 per cent in 1890, 5.6 per cent in 1900, 9.0 per cent in 1920, and 11.7 per cent in 1930. These increases not only are an indication that married women must work from economic necessity but are also related to the emancipation of women from their traditional place in the home. For instance, between 1920 and 1930 there was a marked shift into the professions by married women

which may well reflect the attempts to combine a career with marriage. The number of married women in library work, in education (including teaching and college presidencies), in literary activities, and in legal work doubled in this decade alone. In the light of such facts we may ask what this indicates regarding the possible linkage of a career and marriage for an increasingly large number of married women. Any consideration of the problem of combining marriage and an occupation outside the home, however, must reckon with the situation involving the whole group of married women gainfully employed. There have been a number of surveys of *why* married women work, from most of which it is apparent that the majority of women have gone into remunerative work not from free choice but from economic pressure. This is not the place to review the available data on this matter, but one summary of various studies covering the years 1888-1923 and including 61,679 women showed that 53.2 per cent of these women gave all their earnings to their families and that 37.5 per cent more contributed at least a portion of their earnings. Coit and Harper (1930) reported a group of 519 married women gainfully employed in sixty-six widely scattered communities as giving a variety of "reasons" for their working. (Some gave more than one reason.) For instance, 45 per cent said that the family income was insufficient, 40 per cent wanted to save money, and 40 per cent wished to earn in order to educate their children. So, too, other reasons, such as unemployment of the husband, his illness, or a broken home, were put down by something over a third of them. LaFollette (1934) found that, of her sample of 652 married women, 67 per cent put down economic necessity as the most important reason for combining homemaking and gainful employment.

Despite the direct pressure to add to the family income, it seems that more and more women are taking up outside work in a deliberate attempt to combine gainful work with homemaking. And in the light of the long tradition of masculine prerogatives in the occupations we are not surprised to find considerable resistance on the part of men to these intrusions of women into their vocational world. Such a change implies not only economic competition but certain alterations in their own life patterns. Pruette (1924) asked 354 men who were seeking employment what they thought of married women's working. Nearly two thirds of them believed that women should be allowed to earn money outside the home and that husbands should co-operate with the necessary household duties in order to make this possible. However, of the trade-union men in her sample (only 8 per cent of the total), the great majority were strongly opposed to women's working outside the home. This probably reflects a common view of many trade unionists over the country, who represent in these matters a rather striking conservatism.

Work for a woman is no different in the matter of skill than it is for a man, except as we have associated with the woman's occupation traditional attitudes about her role. Very often, when men grudgingly admit that women may or should work, they think of it as just "something for them to do," as a fill-up for their spare time, or as a device to keep them "satisfied." And, of course, until the competence of women is recognized, and until they can stand on their own feet in terms of merit, their vocational independence will be qualified unfavorably by such notions. But, aside from the matter of competence, the married woman who is gainfully employed outside the home has not one but two jobs, because most men are not willing as yet to share the responsibility for the household duties. Coit and Harper (1930) showed that, of their sample of 519 women, 322 had this dual responsibility, although, of the latter, 102 had no children and 77 had but one child. There have been few detailed studies of what is happening in those families where the mother and wife is at work, but we may profitably examine some of the available data.

Economic and other handicaps of the working woman. Before we discuss some of the more direct psychological matters, it should be noted that almost universally in our capitalistic society the wages of women for the same work are lower than those of men. This is true not only in industry and business but in the professions as well. (A. L. Peterson, 1929; LaFollette, 1934; H. Hart, 1935.) Of LaFollette's sample, 75 per cent were engaged in the professions, yet the median salary of these wives was \$1,503; that of the husbands was \$2,094. Such differentials in income often set up resentment on the part of the wives and add fuel to incipient interspousal conflicts.

Moreover, a husband has the legal right to decide where the family will reside. When a wife has a job which is definitely connected with a particular locality, a serious problem arises if her husband is obliged to move to another community. A wife's refusal to accompany her husband, of course, provides grounds for divorce. But, the legal aspect aside, such a dilemma may constitute a serious threat to satisfactory interspousal relations.

Another problem concerns the relative prestige of the vocation of the wife in comparison with that of the husband. If the occupation of the wife has a higher status than that of her husband, difficulties may appear in the interactional adaptation. The husband may develop a sense of inferiority and come to indulge in a variety of unpleasant compensatory reactions toward his wife.

LaFollette's monograph (1934) reports that 79 per cent of the working wives in her sample discussed with their spouses the matter of their keeping or taking a job outside the home. One fifth of the husbands vigorously objected, producing all sorts

of rationalizations phrased in the cultural acceptances, such as too great strain, child-bearing, jealousy of wife's vocational status, and their shame at having a wife who worked. On the other hand, three fifths of the wives believed that as a result of their working they experienced "happier companionship with their husbands," although only 10 per cent noted that their husbands directly expressed high appreciation of the benefits gained from the wives' working.

But A. H. Maslow has reported² some cases which indicate that, if two rather dominant personalities are married, and if the respective vocations are distinctly different, the adjustment on such matters may be entirely satisfactory. There is some evidence, at least from individual cases, that, when the husband and the wife are in the same profession or business, conflict may arise when the wife tends to outstrip the husband, and sometimes vice versa.

In many communities the married woman who is gainfully employed is the object of negative criticism and ridicule. A "Mrs." who works is sometimes the object of curiosity by other workers, and there is a tendency for both single women and men to criticize her because she is "robbing someone else of a job." But in the face of increased numbers of married women wage-earners, these attitudes and ideas are doubtless changing and such practices becoming accepted. If, however, a married woman undertakes some unusual or unanticipated form of work, a community may react against this, whereas, if she engages in traditional feminine vocations, nothing is thought of the matter. Thus a woman doctor in a small town might experience difficulties; more common is the feeling that women lawyers are misguided. And a woman contractor or linotype operator or railroad telegrapher (examples from LaFollette's study) is often regarded as more than a bit queer.

Effects on the children. Many critics of the career woman take the position that a mother's leaving her home to work outside will have deleterious effects upon the children. The evidence pro and con on this question is not entirely satisfactory. What happens to children as they grow up is complicated by so many factors that it is difficult to know how much weight to attribute to the influences which may arise when the mother does work away from home. If the family is one of low economic status, inadequate education, and poor standards of aspiration, the working mother may be indirectly contributing to delinquency of the children or to other untoward attitudes and habits. In families of higher economic status and richer general culture, the effects may be quite the opposite. It is easy to overemphasize either the beneficial or the deleterious effects from individual instances, and, although there is insufficient statistical evidence on this point, the results from a few studies may be cited.

² In a communication to the author.

Mathews (1931) analyzed 3,982 replies to special questions given to school children whose mothers worked outside the home. The younger children had few if any critical reactions, but many of those in adolescence expressed a desire to have the mothers remain at home. LaFollette (1934) found that most of the mothers in her sample believed that their working away from home obliged their children to learn self-reliance, the value of money, and the management of many of their own activities, although some believed strongly that working outside had deleterious effects.

Without doubt there are vast differences in these family situations; and it is difficult, if not impossible, to segregate the one variable of the mother's working away from home as necessarily a "cause" either of benefit or of its opposite. While the children of a working mother often have to do household chores, which in rural society and in earlier urban communities were normally expected of all children, and while such obligations probably aid in maturation, it does not follow that a well-managed household with a nonworking mother could not produce like benefits through instilling sound habits in the children. On the other hand, a conflict between spouses, or between the mother and the children in families where the wife does not work, may also produce serious effects which might be absent were the wife employed outside. It is difficult to generalize on these questions, and each family would have to be studied and interpreted in terms of its own history, its present personnel, and the current situation—economic and otherwise.

Influence on the wife. The effects of gainful employment on the health, disposition, and happiness of the wife and mother vary apparently with the family situation, with the nature of the work outside, and with other factors. It is true that 340, or more than half, of LaFollette's sample, reported that their work made them tired, but did not admit that this fatigue was serious enough to impair their health. Only 49, or about 1 in 13, said they "were always tired." As to disposition, this was influenced in part by the husband's attitudes. The nonco-operation of the husband was said to be the cause of their own bad tempers by 7 per cent of the women. More than half of them (372) maintained that they were better and more pleasant companions to their husbands because of having outside work and that this in turn contributed to the happiness of both spouses. LaFollette (1934, p. 140) remarks concerning the influence of work on happiness:

"Many of the women in the present study said that they were happier working. It will be remembered that 47 percent of the women worked from economic necessity, but that 46 percent worked also to continue their own personal development. Work provided an outlet for energy and self-expression. Coupled with this was the fact that 49 percent worked because they enjoyed the contacts provided thereby. There are moments of exhilaration in doing two full-time jobs successfully. . . ."

If a man's wife is gainfully employed, his attitudes are affected not only by his own ego organization, dating back to childhood and adolescence, but by public opinion, especially with reference to his own vocational status. What the majority of people in a community think about wives' working will play a part in producing in him approval or disapproval of his own wife's working. Though the women studied by LaFollette said that the "good" effects outnumber the "bad," there is no doubt that among her own sample some of the marriages were not working out well. Of the 652 in all, 183 wives stated that their husbands revealed feelings of disappointment, inferiority, and frustration arising from the growing realization that their marriage was not succeeding. The self-esteem of many of these husbands has apparently suffered from the situation. In some instances there was open opposition to the continuation of the wife's working, but often the economic situation demanded it. In other cases (34 wives noted this) the husband was apparently taking the opposite course and becoming too dependent on the wife for her own happiness. In only 17 instances did the wives say that their husbands were indifferent to whether they worked or not. As to attention-giving, "In their own estimation, 258 women do not neglect their husbands in any way; 357 felt that they did neglect them; and 37 did not give this information." Obviously the definition of *neglect* from either spouse depends on previous training and attitudes. A husband who resents his wife's failure to keep the buttons sewed on his shirts, for instance, may be carrying over too much of a dependence pattern from his earlier relations with his mother. And there is no doubt that many men in these new family circumstances have failed to adjust their own habits and attitudes in the direction of co-operation and aid in the household or the care of their own clothes and the like.

Effects on both spouses. The sexual relations of the spouses are obviously of great importance in their happiness and in the stability and continuity of the family. (See Chapter XX.) How much does the wife's working influence these matters? Some individual cases show that conflicts arise because the wife is tired, or busy with other interests, or because the husband becomes jealous and suspicious of her vocational relations with other men. But, when we examine such data as LaFollette's, for instance, it is difficult to segregate the factors producing controversy; and it is impossible to know whether conflicts might not have arisen even if the wife had not taken up gainful employment.

In the LaFollette study (1934) 87 per cent of the wives said their sex lives were satisfactory. (This compares favorably with the report on married women made by K. B. Davis, 1929.) As to the frequency of their responsiveness to their husbands' sexual wishes, 65 per cent said that their own reactions were "in accord with the husbands'

desires." Moreover, the length of time which the couples were married seems to have had no appreciable influence on the satisfactoriness of their intimate relationships. Fifty-nine of the women, or 9.0 per cent, said their sex lives were unsatisfactory, and 23.6 per cent stated that they failed to respond sexually as often as their husbands wished. An analysis of the reasons given for failing to react to their husbands' desires is classified by LaFollette into "physical," "psychological," and "environmental," but it is apparent that these interact. Among the first she notes menstruation, lack of "general physical vigor," and fatigue. (Ninety of the replies mentioned undue fatigue.) Psychological factors include "a fear of pregnancy" (noted 42 times), "too many things on one's mind" and "childhood inhibitions" (mentioned 34 times each), "husband unattractive" (25 notations), "emotionally upset" (12 times), and a wide scattering of other items including attitudes toward coitus, antipathy toward using methods of birth control, husband's drinking, and lack of kindness on the part of the husband. "Environmental" factors include the belief that the necessary methods of birth control take "too much time," lack of proper leisure time, and the disturbance of the "smooth running of household."

There are also various devices which people have tried in working out satisfactory new roles and attitudes. LaFollette (1934, p. 152) gives the thirteen major "experiences" which these women believed responsible for the difficulties associated with trying to carry out the dual roles of wife-mother and worker. These were first ranked according to relative difficulty as they recalled them from the time of marriage. Then a second rating was made according to degree of seriousness of problem at present, that is, after a considerable period of working outside the home.

Some of the shifts in relative position of these factors are worth noting: Problems of income, which ranked first at the outset, fell to a rank of 7.5, although 20 per cent of the husbands were unemployed at the time of filling out the questionnaire. On the other hand, "Trying to follow the advice of friends, relatives, and neighbors" rose from a rank of 10 at the beginning of marriage to first place at the time the replies were furnished. This doubtless reflects the fact that many dependents were found in these homes, as well as resentment at negative community and neighborhood attitudes. So, too, "recognizing sex as a normal function of marriage" had a rank of only 7.5 at the outset and shifted to the second place in importance subsequently. Some of the women also noted other difficulties which they had had to meet. Among these were unanticipated expenses, unexpected attitudes of relatives and friends, the presence of the mother-in-law in the home, arrangement of household routine, securing leisure time so that both spouses could go out together socially, and various unpleasant attitudes of the husband toward his wife's being employed, and his prosaic notion of marriage.

That a program of common responsibility for household obligations may be developed is shown by the fact that, in LaFollette's group, 73 per cent of the husbands co-operated in housekeeping. One third of them performed kitchen duties, and one fourth had something to do with general housework. (See Mavity, 1926.) Other studies have shown that

few husbands have learned this essential lesson. In many instances, of course, it was possible with the combined incomes of wife and husband to employ domestic help in the home. While only one fifth of LaFollette's group had full-time maids, 44 per cent of the women stated that a woman's employment outside the home should be sufficient to enable her to hire help in the home. As LaFollette (1934, p. 181) says, "The economic necessity which causes most married women to work accounts for the difference between desire and practice in this respect."

While the majority of married women who must work outside the home do so first of all from economic pressure, to supplement or replace the husband's income, it is apparent that an increasing number of them choose to carry on their vocations after marriage, and, as the older cultural norms give way to new ones, we may look for an increase in the percentage of women who deliberately choose to combine marriage and a career which they like or which will afford them the independence and scope for their abilities that they believe themselves capable of enjoying. Many of the women in LaFollette's study admitted that they had had no intention of keeping on at work after they married. But they also stated that they did enjoy working and were trying to meet adequately the problems of the dual role of homemaker and wage-earner. Again the alteration of the masculine attitude and roles will play an important part in all this. Only when new patterns emerge for both sexes will a more satisfactory relationship be possible.

New patterns of interaction between the sexes. In both matters, home and occupation, women are learning that their emancipation consists not in mere aping of men or completely abandoning certain traditional feminine traits. Equality and adequate differentiation of social and economic roles do not depend upon the elimination of sexual differences, but they will tend to be reduced to a minimum in those situations which do not call for them. There will, of course, remain the fundamental divergence of roles in the matter of childbearing and child-rearing, and the very physiological make-up of women may mean the development of variabilities even though women be exposed from birth to similar social experience as men.

We noted above that the desexing of the attitudes of men and women toward each other in vocations was one important change now taking place. In addition, the freeing of women from their traditional position of inferiority should stimulate a wider range of individual variation in personal qualities through altering the interactions of men and women. I believe that, as older cultural taboos give way, men and women will be able to meet on more personal-social bases, and from these in time new culture norms, both sexual and nonsexual, will arise. If so, there should result an enrichment of life for both men and women; and in time such

differences may be the source not of a sense of inferiority or pettiness but of respected and prestige-giving functions. Even the single woman and the childless wife will be accorded a role and status as women distinct in some qualities from men and accepted by all without any psychological discount. As Symes (1929, p. 686) well puts it for the "new woman": "Our biggest job perhaps is to impress upon the 'new man,' who is profiting by our independence, the knowledge that what we propose is to share, not to assume, the burdens of a common life—that our independence does not relieve him of all the responsibilities of a domestic and emotional relationship."

As to the sexual and love relations of men and women in the future—assuming that the emancipation of women proceeds in our country as it seems to be doing—it is evident that these relations will also take on new meanings. They should become more equalitarian in character, there should be more mutual toleration for differences in desire and in capacity, and the relations should be in the end more stabilizing. As Harding (1933, p. 97) says:

"Women do not really want complete independence of men in any sense which implies isolation. What woman really wants is relationship, and for that a certain separateness is necessary. There cannot be any real relationship between a dominant and a dependent member of a group, any more than there can be real relationship between masters and slaves."

Sexual love not only may be the most intimate and enjoyable interaction of two persons, but may itself become the symbol of a lasting affection and joint partnership in life.

ADJUSTMENT OF THE SINGLE WOMAN⁸

While many older unmarried women may feel that their position and role in modern society are anomalous and unpleasant, they have much better chances for an adequate social and personal adjustment than did such women a few generations ago. The traditional status of the spinster in the Western world has not been an enviable one. Unless protected by wealth and high social status, she was likely to be looked upon as a useless individual, especially if she had little or no economic value to offset her virginity. In a society which values marriage and motherhood highly

⁸ We shall hereafter use the expression *single woman* for women unmarried and thirty years of age or older. The term *bachelor woman* would serve except for its connotation in some circles of sexual freedom. Because there are historically many negative connotations in the terms *spinster* and *old maid*, I shall avoid using them except in contexts where they clearly belong in terms of cultural definitions. The phrase *unmarried woman* is too broad in meaning, but it will be used at certain points as a synonym for single woman. Here we are concerned with the woman whose probability of marriage is so slight that she has had to adjust herself consciously, if not unconsciously, to the idea of remaining unwed.

—at least as to their reproductive features—for a woman to remain unwed was often a disgrace, considered *prima-facie* evidence of incompetence, physical or otherwise.

In Occidental society, given over to frequent wars resulting in a higher proportion of females to males during the interludes of peace, the increase in unmarried women was not accompanied by any increase in masculine appreciation of their handicaps. As the factory system developed, the old-maid daughter did find an outlet in the mills; and, though this did not enhance her prestige very greatly, it at least afforded her a certain economic independence and some satisfactory objectification of interest and skill. (See Chapter XXIII.) But with the striking decline in the birth rate in many Western countries, with the increasing opportunities for unmarried women to work in industry or business, the problems of the unmarried older woman have become more insistent. We are apparently moving in the direction of certain new adjustments which are gradually becoming more generally accepted.

Social and emotional problems. The principal personality difficulties which confront the single woman are feelings of inferiority and difference and the sense of loneliness or isolation, with the concomitant conditions of restlessness, resentment, and various compensatory responses. There are doubtless both biological and social-cultural factors behind these ideas and attitudes. The unmarried woman is often the target for ridicule, or, if she is successful in taking up remunerative or other useful occupations, she must frequently experience the sense of a lower status as measured by income and prestige. But perhaps the core of the whole matter lies in the failure to meet the cultural norms of marriage and reproduction. The sense of an unfulfilled and incompleted sexual life has strong physiological roots, but the manifestations are intertwined at every point with social and cultural features, as Dickinson and Beam have so admirably shown in their important monograph *The Single Woman* (1934).⁴ Over and over again these writers demonstrate that pelvic disorders in the unmarried woman were bound up with wider problems of emotions, of adjustment to family or community obligations, and of getting on with others and with oneself in society. Writing in particular about virginity (and six out of every seven single women in their series, with the median age at thirty-four years, were “presumed” to be virgins), they state (1934, p. 101):

⁴ This book presents a description and analysis of 1,000 single women who were examined for health. (About 300 came for ‘medical care directly relating to sex, 150 of whom were rather intensively diagnosed and treated.) These cases represent over forty years of gynecological practice, and, although the bulk of them came from the economically more privileged classes of American urban society, the results reported constitute one of the few studies of this sort in English.

"The pelvic disturbance is associated with a breakdown in the emotional resources of the patient. Typically it is not associated with men but takes some form recognizable as the direction of a major interest, whether or not specifically sexual; perhaps work or family obligation, lack of joy or an impasse in the religious experience. Without direct sexual experience with others, the patient can spin exuberant fancy, display acceptance, negation, boredom, or cynicism; the real meaning of her virginity is not necessarily in her attitude about sex."

The sense of loneliness and isolation arises from a restriction of the social interaction that is so important to personal development. And, since sexual congress, normally the most absorbing social act in marriage, is denied these women (except those who have had extramarital experience), it follows that on this score alone they experience an absence of the intimate social stimulation and response normally found by married people. In this regard they tend to remain asexual, or at best dependent upon relatively inadequate forms of sexual expression. But isolation and loneliness arise perhaps equally often from the lack of normal and culturally expected family life with husband and children. If we take the view that childbearing itself completes the physiological demands of the normal healthy female, we see that the failure to have such experience puts these women in a class by themselves. So far as reproductive functioning goes, the single woman has something in common with the childless wife.

Faced with these problems, of which they often do not become thoroughly conscious until they are past thirty or thirty-five years of age, these women express their adaptation to their condition of isolation and inferiority in various ways. As we shall note shortly, these concern not only substitute sexual adjustments, but work, play, religious experience, and relations to relatives, friends, and other persons. We find emotional responses ranging from strong resentment, often shown in open anger, through irritability and restlessness, to unconscious but powerful anxiety, and on to melancholia or complete retreat. Among the gravest temptations to the woman faced ever more obviously with spinsterhood is to regress to childish and early adolescent modes of action and attitude. Of course, in this she is not different in response from others faced with personality crises, except that her problems are complicated by changing moral, economic, and familial patterns. Her greatest task or ideal aim is to grow up and remain mature in her work, in her friendships, and in other activities, and within this framework to make the most adequate sexual and affectional reorganization possible in the modern world.

Without doubt the actual reasons for not marrying are many and complex. Even the conscious justifications or rationalizations which single women provide represent a wide range of such items: "I had to care for an invalid father"; "I wanted a career rather than marriage"; "I was

jilted in a serious love affair and decided never to try again"; "the man I loved belonged to another religious faith than my own, and I could not marry him"; "I prefer sexual freedom outside marriage"; "my mother had such a terrific time in marriage that I decided never to marry"; "I never was able to attract men"; "the right man never came along"; "my parents always objected to my choice of beaux, so I lost out"; and so on endlessly.

In any case the basic background factors in the love life of the unwed do not, in essence, differ from those of the married. They must rest, for example, on the degree of emotional as well as of intellectual growth and maturity arising from the social and emotional seedbed of the family and community standards. Much of the clinical evidence of the psychiatrists and gynecologists shows clearly the importance of these family factors. The differential reactivity which we have already noted many times is apparent here. Where one sister will marry, another may not. Where one family situation may show emotional storm and stress between the parents, leading to a disgust or fear of marriage in a child or adolescent, another situation of family conflict often has no such effect.

Knopf (1932) contends on the basis of her medical experience that frequently the single girl comes from a home where the feminine role was little esteemed, where the father and brothers were brought up as the "lords of creation," and where the family life centered in them. She also often finds that the overobedient daughter is numbered among the unmarried. In fact, she says, as do others, that a spinster's own resistance against marriage may arise from an unusually obedient attitude toward the parents.

Although their sample was limited in its extent to certain classes of occupation and status, Dickinson and Beam's study of the single woman (1934) is enlightening. Though no direct attempt to discuss the family background was made, they note that family matters are mentioned 312 times in the 650 case histories which they used as the basis of their discussion. In these cases as in others the family furnishes the primary pattern of affectional life for the individual, and, unless there is subsequent maturation, the family may remain either the direct or the sublimated and often unconscious foundation of later love life. Moreover, there is clear evidence of the ambivalent desire both to grow up and to remain somewhat childishly attached to the family members, especially to one or both parents. Nearly one third of their sample specify difficulties with other members of the family, and, of these, 28 per cent had trouble with the mother, 24.8 per cent with the father, 17.3 per cent with "the family as a whole," 13.5 per cent with a brother, and 11.9 per cent with a sister. Curiously enough, many of these women report having either strong hatred or overlove, or fluctuate between intense desires to leave the parent or family and overattachment in the form of high sense of duty and obligation. This ambivalence is neatly shown in the fact that a good many of them reported either strong "mothering" habits or strong desires to be mothered. The former is seen in instances where the

family is economically dependent or where there is invalidism in the family, the latter in those situations where the mother or some surrogate sister or relative cares for the unmarried woman either in economic matters or in regard to health, or, more especially, acts as an emotional anchor. Dickinson and Beam also point out that in certain women this overattachment to the mother is bound up with hatred of some other family member, most typically a father or brother.

In their case histories dealing with the family and home, it is the mother who is noted most frequently. They say (1934, p. 299) that "mentioned as strength and dependence or as burden and problem in nearly half the 650 chief case histories in this series, absorption between mothers and daughters exceeds that noted about other relatives." The father or other male relatives who might be considered father substitutes are mentioned less frequently, but, when noted, the responses may be either negative—that is, opposed to the male members—or positive and favorable. One daughter of a reformer father is reported as saying that she never married because "Father is so wonderful I can not find any one like him."

There is often considerable conflict in identification and roles in the family drama on the part of these women. Thus such a woman may swing between the imitation of the aggressive father, helpful sympathy with the spendthrift brother, and identification with the abused brother in turn. In fact, some of the difficulty of many unwed women is apparently their failure to develop a sufficiently strong "generalized other" or central role for themselves—one on which they can operate as mature persons. (Compare with Cottrell, 1933, cited on page 514.)

There are various outlets for the emotional and social needs of these women: in direct or substitutive attempts to solve the problems of their sexual life, in their careers as workers, in their friendships, and in their recreational or religious life. These matters demand somewhat detailed treatment.

DIRECT OUTLETS IN THE LOVE LIFE OF THE SINGLE WOMAN

The affectional life of the single woman in our society becomes an acute problem because she finds it difficult if not impossible to satisfy her sexual impulses and love in a manner culturally accepted. There are three ways in which such a woman may find outlets in direct fashion: (1) autoeroticism, (2) sexual inversion or homosexuality, and (3) heterosexuality "without benefit of clergy" and ordinarily without social approval.

Autoerotic practices. Autoeroticism, or autosexuality, as Dickinson calls it, is a form of self-stimulation either imaginal or overt which sets up sexual excitement and in its completion leads to a sexual climax. Periodic sexual desire arises chiefly from changes in the glands, and satisfaction is ordinarily dependent upon external stimulation. Normally, of course,

this takes place by means of intercourse with a member of the opposite sex. While, physiologically speaking, there is no reason to believe autoeroticism to be harmful, psychologically it may or may not be, depending upon cultural conditioning.

The culturization of sexual life is all-important to the individual's adjustment. The practice of autosexuality has for centuries, at least in Christian society, been overlaid with heavy taboos; and it is only in recent decades, under the influence of medical science, on the one hand, and of the loosening of religious-moral bonds, on the other, that we are coming to a new and doubtless saner view of the matter. Related to the personality of the single woman, the practice takes on added importance as affording her a direct outlet for her perfectly natural biological impulses.

Before discussing the psychological effects on single women let us ask how extensive such practices are among them. There are very few adequate data on autoeroticism. Because of traditional taboos many people deny ever having indulged in such activity. Dickinson reports that even in the face of unmistakable anatomical evidence of such practices many of his single women patients denied masturbation, and doubtless other gynecologists could confirm his statement. Not only is it hard to get the facts about autoeroticism, but it is difficult to know whether one sex tends to practice it more frequently than the other.

Two studies (Dickinson and Beam, 1934, and K. B. Davis, 1929) throw light on our problem, and we shall draw upon their findings for the present discussion. As a section of her larger study Davis undertook to discover the extent and nature of autoerotic practices among the unmarried women of her sample. She defined autoeroticism very broadly to include sexual daydreams or reveries sufficient to induce sexual excitement as well as manipulation of the sex organs to bring about overt reaction. Dickinson, in contrast, apparently confined his discussion to data from patients who showed anatomical evidence of overt excitation only, although some of his informants told of indulging in reading erotic books, reveries, and dancing as means of securing satisfaction.

Davis's sample of 1,000 unmarried women, ranging in age from twenty-two to sixty-eight years, consisted largely of professional and well-educated women. It is worth noting that, of the 954 who were engaged in gainful employment, only 121, or 12.7 per cent, failed to find their work "absorbing and satisfactory." Of the 938 who listed masturbation, 30.8 per cent admitted such practices at the time of replying. Since her sample ranged from twenty-two years upward, and since we are concerned with the single woman who falls in the conventional age range of spinsterhood, I have retabulated her data on those who were thirty years of age or older. Of the 928 persons who reported on this item in her questionnaire and who also gave their ages, 80.1 per cent fall at thirty years or over in age. Of these, 257, or 34.5 per cent, admitted the practice of autoeroticism at the time of reporting; 229,

or 30.8 per cent, said they had once done so but had stopped; and 258, or 34.7 per cent, denied ever having indulged in the practice. (See Davis, 1929, p. 101.)

Davis's data also show that these practices seldom grow up *de novo* during adult years, but rather that these persons usually had already developed the pattern of autosexuality in childhood or adolescence. This leads at once to the reasons (largely rationalizations, of course) which the women in Davis's study gave for their indulgence. The following table is drawn from a rather detailed tabulation of the replies, in which the individuals not only quoted the particular categories, but provided a fivefold rating of their estimate of its particular importance in their own instance. An informant might, of course, check more than one category.

TABLE 6⁵

SUMMARY OF REASONS FOR PRACTICE OF AUTOEROTICISM AMONG DAVIS'S
SAMPLE OF 1,000 UNMARRIED WOMEN

REASONS	PERCENTAGES OF THE	
	308 NOW PRACTICING	295 WHO HAVE STOPPED
I. Desire for pleasure	69.1	60.0
II. Desire for physiological relief	52.3	31.5
III. Desire set up by exceptional situations only, such as spooning, dancing, seeing vaudeville, reading books	36.3	28.4
IV. Uncontrollable impulse	40.6	24.0
V. Other "reasons"	0.7	0.6

An inspection of the original table shows not only that category I was checked most frequently, but that it was rated as most important for 56.3 per cent of those who checked it at all; so, too, for category IV, 64.7 per cent of the 125 who checked it gave it as most important to them; on the other hand, only 32.9 per cent of those who checked category II considered it the most vital to them. At least so far as these records go, apparently either the desire for sheer pleasure or an uncontrollable impulse looms largest as the rationalized foundation for such indulgence.

In our society and culture the psychological effects of masturbation, such as sense of guilt and of inferiority, must be set over against the alleged biological release of unpleasant tensions. Compared with normal, socially accepted heterosexual intercourse, these autoerotic practices at best do not provide full substitution. Davis's sample also reported some differences in regard to their sense of present sexual problems as related to the presence or absence of autoeroticism. Of the group now practicing,

⁵ Adapted by permission from Davis (1929), Chap. VI, Table XVIII, pp. 126-127. Only the totals of those who checked in each category were used.

46.3 per cent said they had no problem, 57.4 per cent of the group who had stopped said they had no problem, and 68.9 per cent of those who denied ever having indulged said they had no sexual problems. These differences are statistically significant and naturally raise the question whether this form of self-indulgence gives the satisfaction, in the face of social taboos, that might be anticipated. (See Davis, 1929, pp. 148-149.)

Dickinson and Beam's data, unlike those of Davis, are drawn from over forty years of clinical experience; and obviously the persons whom Dickinson, the major author, studied came to him for medical and surgical aid. In this sense his results must necessarily differ from those reported from the exhaustive questionnaire of Davis. The two samples, however, are alike in that Dickinson's patients also came largely from the "well-educated, city-bred" group, on the average about thirty years of age.

Dickinson and Beam found that "By anatomical signs approximately every other person in this series is believed to have had sexual experience with the self and every seventh in 1,078 has said so." (1934, p. 223.) Apparently the gynecological problems of single women are complicated by emotional conflicts, such as sexual shock, memories or anticipations of sex, loneliness and sense of isolation, and the feeling that they are carrying too heavy burdens. A strong sense of guilt and sin frequently appears. It is also evident that autoeroticism does not follow any particular sequence but varies with conditions of living at home, with work, recreation, religious activity, and the like. Moreover, the authors note that auto-sexuality "can not be consistently associated with the incidence of serious constitutional unbalance," that is, it is not directly or necessarily correlated with pelvic or other physical disabilities.

The adaptive nature of autoeroticism is clearly indicated by its relation to periods of isolation and disappointment. Although only sixty-six of Dickinson and Beam's patients made mention of factors which brought on the practice, an examination of their comments makes clear that loss of affectional companionship, loneliness, or other lack of satisfactory affection had much to do with the matter. They comment (1934, p. 238):

"In these few cases autosexual interest like heterosexual interest was not continuous. It appeared in cycles or intervals; in more extreme cases, the patient loved herself most when she lacked other love interests; she was self-centered, had difficult living and working conditions, sometimes had been aroused to sexual channels of life but had lost love or could not get it."

In conclusion of this section let us note, first, that physiologically there is no evidence that autoeroticism is harmful to women, within the limits, obviously, of physical damage from the use of mechanical devices or from such overindulgence as to injure bodily tissues. Second, as useful as the practice may be for release of sexual tensions, and as free as a

person may be from the old wives' tales about its harmfulness, it certainly cannot be considered a complete substitute for the normal sexual intercourse of husband and wife, characterized as the latter may be by the most intimate and most intense form of social interaction, psychological as well as physiological.

In fact, there is much to be said in criticism of autosexuality because it is fundamentally so self-centered. It lacks the quality of give and take, of anticipation and response, found in the normal interaction of two persons in affectional relations. And we must remember that, despite any intellectually acquired emancipation from cultural taboos against the practice, unconsciously one may be still bothered by the sense of guilt. This sense of sin may enhance the deleterious emotional effects upon the self; it may tend to disintegrate the personality organization, leaving it divided against itself.

Sexual inversion. Homosexuality or sexual inversion is another means by which the single woman may find direct outlet for her sexual life. If there are strong traditional taboos on autoeroticism in our society, there are still more intense taboos on sexual attraction and love between persons of the same sex. Yet in the face of urbanization and the secondary-group organization of society generally, and in the face of the breakdown of the older mores, the public attitude toward homosexuality is gradually becoming more tolerant.

Adequate statistical surveys of the extent of homosexuality in either men or women, married or single, are lacking. In fact, we have no completely satisfactory definition of homosexuality. Many writers distinguish between intense hugging, kissing, and the like, and the more overt kind involving direct erotic interstimulation.

Davis (1929) cites a Russian study made in 1907 among university women in Moscow. This investigation reported that 52.1 per cent of a group of 324 women admitted homosexual interest, and of these 16.3 per cent admitted overt homosexual conduct. Davis's own study of unmarried women showed that, of 1,200 individuals at least five years out of college, slightly more than 50 per cent reported that they had experienced intense emotional relations with other women, and that 26 per cent of the entire group had experienced overt sexual stimulation with other women. This group is interesting for us since most of these women would fall within the category of "single women," that is, would be thirty years of age or over.

The Davis study suggests further that overt inversion in the later years may itself represent an adult adjustment predicated upon prepubertal homosexual patterns. Apparently, in a high proportion of cases, homosexual adjustment in single women in later years may be partially predetermined by very early erotic interests which are not diverted into heterosexual channels in later adolescence and early womanhood. Over

11 per cent of the overt-practice sample believed that these relations were important in preventing their marriage.⁶

It is often said that attendance at women's colleges encourages inversion. Davis states that those who attended coeducational colleges reported significantly fewer homosexual experiences, although 18 per cent of the total number who reported intense emotional relations with other girls and 21 per cent of those in the overt-practice sample had graduated from coeducational schools. There is no difference in reports of present health between those who denied ever having experienced intense affectional relations with other women and those who did experience them, but the overt-practice group had had in the past a higher proportion of "nervous breakdowns." As to occupational concomitants, those who were engaged in teaching or other educational work showed no significant differences in percentages in any one of the three groups: overt practice, intense emotional responses, or no such experiences at all. Those in social-service work, however, showed significantly high percentages in both the homosexual categories. In regard to happiness and success as stated by the informants, there are no significant differences among the groups. Curiously enough, masturbation was found to be significantly higher in the group which had experienced overt practices, but heterosexual intercourse was "significantly lowest" in the group which had indulged only in intense emotional relationships without overt practice. Finally, there is no evidence of any relation between observed periodicity of sexual desires and overt homosexuality.

It is most significant, too, that there is no evidence in this group, taken as a whole, of psychopathic symptoms, although, as we stated, there is some evidence that neuroticism is more closely associated with the overt-practice group than with the other. But, since neurotic responses may be both constitutionally and culturally conditioned, it is difficult to know how much of the nervous breakdown reported is related to the practice of inversion and how much to other factors. (See Davis, 1929, pp. 278-296, for some illustrative cases of homosexuality.) It is interesting to note that a higher proportion of the women who admitted overt practice also found heterosexual outlets in comparison with the group of less overt reactions. Furthermore, those who denied homosexual experiences of any kind admitted significantly higher percentages of being disturbed by sex problems than did those who did admit them. Finally, Davis (1929, p. 273) remarks, "Intense emotional relations with other women, whether leading to overt practices or not, seem to make little difference in the proportions of those who regret their single state."

⁶ Of course, on the matter of etiology of homosexuality, there is a sharp division between those who believe it rests upon constitutional foundations and those who attribute it largely to factors arising from the life history of the child and adolescent. Davis's study unfortunately throws no light on this controversy.

Sexual inversion, like autoeroticism, is to be studied only in the light of the total personality and the cultural milieu in which it operates. So long as society continues to place heavy taboos upon extramarital sexuality for the unmarried, yet fostering increased freedom of working women, there is likely to be considerable homosexuality. Many single women indulge in homosexuality—perhaps many of them never going beyond the mild type noted above—who in other circumstances would marry, or find extramarital heterosexual outlets were these socially sanctioned. These women can scarcely be termed homosexual, if by this term is meant a very definite personality structure. There are, however, those women who are sometimes referred to as “true Lesbians” (from the legends of Lesbos, once thought inhabited by female homosexuals); they have the masculine-feminine make-up and fall into what is sometimes called the type of intermediate sex. They have strong male attitudes and often certain male physical features. Such persons may well have a constitutional predisposition toward the masculine type due to endocrine or other factors.

But, aside from these possible organic foundations for the male counterpart among the inverts, the Freudian psychiatrists have much to support their argument that many, if not all, homosexuals represent in terms of personality an arrested love development. The theory is that these persons typify a certain continued fixation upon themselves and their own sexual makeup going back to their early childhood, which has been projected outward upon persons like themselves, that is, upon others of the same sex. As Hutton (1935, p. 127) puts it, these women’s masculinity and appearance of strength and responsibility are often only a veneer “covering often an entirely childish and dependent craving for love and attention, with nothing of the giver behind it all. They are simply mother-seekers, not the mate-seekers they appear at first to be.” Often girls who are lonely and disappointed from lack of men friends fall into the hands of such inverts only in the end to be greatly disillusioned.

In the face of both cultural taboo and the psychological instability which may arise from such relations, it is questionable whether overt homosexuality will prove very satisfactory. There is much more to be said for a sublimated and milder emotional attachment between women as companions. Again we must be cautious about generalization, because instability itself is highly conditioned by the cultural influences which play upon the individual. Doubtless there are some women who find overt homosexuality satisfying and unmarked by negative counterparts of guilt or sense of sin or obvious neurotic symptoms. But in the face of such terrific prejudices as continue in our society, many such individuals will not be found. Even those women who live together in friendly companionship without such overt relations often have to face a

good deal of ridicule and other unpleasant forms of social disapproval. Moreover, the practice appears connected with a certain kind of sophistication in the upper strata of occupation and social status. At any rate, we have few or no data on its prevalence among women, married or single, in the lower economic brackets of our society.

Extramarital sexual relations. Extramarital heterosexuality is another means by which some single women find a direct expression of their love life. But, as with autoeroticism and inversion, sexual relations outside marriage are under a powerful taboo, and many women find them a costly experience, not only in terms of peace of mind but in relation to their occupational success.

Adequate statistical information on the extent of extramarital sexual practices among single women is lacking. Davis's survey states that, of her sample of 1,200 unmarried women who were five years or more out of college, 11.3 per cent admitted sexual intercourse. This figure may be compared to the 7.1 per cent of her 1,000 married women who confessed premarital relations. (Again it must be noted that Davis's sample is made up largely of professional women.) Dickinson and Beam discuss only forty cases among their sample of single women who admitted heterosexual practices. This is obviously too small a group to be statistically significant.

The women in Dickinson and Beam's group, however, mentioned various emotional inhibitions to complete satisfaction in these affairs, such as "fear of pregnancy," "the man is married," "inability to combine marriage with the passion felt for the man," and "distrust of men, passion, and self." A considerable number of these women also confessed that they had strong hopes of matrimony in mind when they submitted to sexual relations. Apparently in no case was there adequate integration of the heterosexuality with the whole pattern of the woman's personality; even when the experience ran on for some years, it tended to have a furtive and "back-street" character, with fear of discovery. Nevertheless, some of these women reported that the sexual relations had apparently been of physical benefit and that there was no conscious sense of guilt.

Doubtless many unmarried professional women have worked out fairly satisfactory relations with men, married or single, and these relations have not interfered too greatly with their careers or with their emotional balance.⁷ But, if such experiences are to mean anything significant for the individual, they must be regarded in terms of mutual responsibility of the man and the woman. There must be an assimilation of such experiences with the rest of the personality if such love life is to provide

⁷ From time to time accounts of such adjustments appear in the quality magazines. See in particular the anonymous article, "The Single Woman's Dilemma," *Harpers Magazine*, October, 1933, Vol. 167, pp. 547-555. See also the reply by one reader in *ibid.*, December, 1933, Vol. 168, "Personal and Otherwise" section.

adequate satisfaction. The practical difficulties for most individuals who find themselves in this situation are the social taboos and the need for secrecy and dissimulation before others. For example, a professional woman may find herself increasingly involved emotionally with the man she loves—in relation to his health, his own work, his social contacts—and yet the fear of discovery prevents a normal satisfaction of the desires thus set up to share his successes or failures. There is developed an isolation of the affectional life from the rest of one's everyday activities. This often produces a curious sense of unreality about the love affair—in time producing a dissociation of attitudes and habits toward the loved one as compared with attitudes and habits toward others. Discussing this sort of situation for the unmarried woman, Harding (1933, p. 263) remarks: "It is lived so exclusively, is touched so little by other realities, that it becomes almost like a dream life lived in an enchanted castle. This, at least, is the danger of having to guard it too closely from contact with everyday concerns."

An incipient mental conflict over such a situation may in time grow to large proportions. The whole relationship tends to rest upon strong feelings and emotions whose expression must of necessity be restricted. The attitudes of the lovers toward each other are limited to their own interactions and are seldom openly shared with others. There must be a strong intention to carry on and a high sense of obligation, because such a situation normally receives no support from the general community. There are no external and generally accepted symbols of control and expectancy. In other words, from the point of view of the personality structure such a deep-laid attachment cannot link its attitudes, values, and habits to the community-determined generalized or central role which is so important for integration of the personality. Add to this the frequent danger of public exposure, the fear of pregnancy, the sense of "being out of things" in the many relations which other persons tend to share, and it is evident that these heterosexual attachments outside marriage often prove in the end unsatisfactory. Like the other forms of sexual expression discussed above, such a relation is likely to produce a great many difficulties which the participants do not anticipate.

In summary, we may say that none of these three ways of seeking direct outlets for her sexual life is, as a rule, entirely satisfactory for the single woman. Unless she has become thoroughly emancipated from the traditional mores and from the associated sense of guilt and inferiority, she is likely to find herself emotionally trapped in her very efforts at freedom. Despite our present-day cultural changes, there remain the large body of moral ideas and moral norms which reach most girls in the formative years long before they ever dream of having to face the problems of love life as lonely unmarried adults. Therefore, no matter which one of these out-

lets a single woman may choose, there usually remains the specter of unconsciously motivated sense of sin and of guilt, as well as the whole restriction of the normal sharing with others of these deep emotional expressions. Such a pattern of life tends to be dissociative rather than integrative; and, since love and sex life are so vital, so deep-seated in the constitutional motivations, and yet so overlaid with cultural expectancies of normal monogamous marriage, in our society the individual is likely to come off second-best if the love life is organized around these practices. For this reason there is much to be said for the suppression of these more overt forms of outlet, provided that sublimated—that is, ethically accepted—substitutes may be found.

INDIRECT OUTLETS IN THE LOVE LIFE OF SINGLE WOMEN

Many single women find love outlets in indirect ways and in this manner avoid some of the difficulties we have just described. In comparison with men, of course, women are still highly restricted.

Friendly and congenial sublimations. The desexing of the relations of men and women in occupational and civic contacts easily leads to situations which prevent any friendly or congenial but sublimated affectional relations with men outside the family. Thus the single woman may find her affections limited to a father, a brother, or another male relative, which may not be as satisfactory as she wishes because there are hosts of associations, as daughter, as sister, as cousin, which date back to childhood and which the other person involved may not easily forget or overlook. Or the woman may find sublimated outlets in friendships with other women, but, even in the absence of any implication by others of more overt homosexuality, these relations are not always easily maintained. We find, for example, instances of an adolescent attitude of weakness and dependence of one woman upon another who is more mature and who perhaps carries for the first certain implications of masculine strength and dominance. Out-and-out friendships on an equalitarian basis such as are found among men in our society are apparently less common among women, not because women are potentially incapable of such relations, but because the growth of women toward maturity in all aspects of their personality is still retarded. Yet, as men themselves become freed of traditional attitudes toward women, there should arise opportunities for friendly relations of men and women on intellectual, professional, and artistic levels.

Then there is the practice of setting up a partial family situation by adoption of a child by the single woman. Adoption is fraught with serious enough obligations for the childless married couple; for the single woman, however, not only is there the matter of the maternal without the bal-

ance of the paternal pattern, but there is likely to arise overattachment for the child, projection upon him of conscious or unconscious ambitions and ideals, to say nothing of the likelihood of ambivalent resentment and rejection later if he does not turn out as anticipated. As Hutton (1935, p. 138) well remarks, "A child adopted *because* the adopting mother's affections are starved is going to suffer serious psychic damage unless the latter has a very thorough knowledge of herself and her needs, and is able to satisfy these by other means besides the care of the child."

This last point is particularly well taken, since it is important for the single woman, as it is indeed for others, to divide her emotional energy among a number of outlets: work, recreation, religion, and the more intimate attachments to other persons. Only in this way will a proper balance be struck among the varied motives of the normal man or woman. To overload any particular object or person with too much affection is to limit the outlets in other directions and in turn to restrict that essential spread of interaction with other persons which is so important to normal personality growth and integration.

Objectification of work. Perhaps the greatest challenge to the single woman, as to all women who seek outlets in work or other activity outside the home, lies in the need to objectify their interests and actions. As we shall note in the next chapter, the chief asset in work lies in the fact that it forces activity to be directed from the inner self toward some object outside. It obliges one to focus one's attention and energy on the outside world of other persons and physical things. And for the single woman (as we noted for the divorced woman too) this is perhaps more important than it is for the married woman who tries to combine work and family life. Furthermore, objectification of work not only implies the acquirement of skill and intellectual capabilities for handling the demands of the job; if it is to serve the purpose we are discussing at this point, it must also carry with it a part of the emotional and feeling life. The most satisfying work for anyone is that which involves his deeper interests, which permits an outlet not only for skill and intelligence but for emotions as well. Obviously, the problem of the single woman in this connection is not different from that of any other worker, except that for the single woman her other outlets are at best likely to be only partially satisfying. If for no other reason than this, the single woman should, if she can, take up a line of work which will give her this objectification of activity and emotional satisfaction at the same time. For many women, of course, as for many male workers, this ideal is hard to attain.

There has been little systematic study of the relation of a job to personality balance and satisfaction among single women, but we do have some case histories, some autobiographical accounts, and certain other data. Of the 1,200 single women in Davis's sample (all of them five years

or more out of college), 1,079 were working at the time of answering. Of the total 1200, 78.3 per cent stated that their life was "happy," 63.7 per cent that it was "satisfactory," and 65.1 per cent that it was "successful." It would seem that a large proportion of these women find their work a definite factor in giving them an adequate life, despite many minor difficulties.

Certain occupations, of course, afford a sublimated outlet for women's love interest. This is particularly true of nursing, child-welfare work, and teaching; in these the maternal role may be and often is evoked. But the matter is not as simple as it appears. Women teachers often become too involved emotionally with their pupils, either leaning toward over-affection and sentimentality or developing a certain defensive "hard-boiled" attitude toward their charges, neither of which bespeaks well-trained attitudes. (See Chapter XVIII.) Similar ambivalence may be true in child-welfare and related social-service work. Although nursing as a profession is protected, in part, from too much of this type of response by its more technical and objective character, it is patterned on maternal care of the patient, and on the dependency role of daughter to father in the relation of nurse to physician. Not only do these occupations reflect the mother pattern, but so do others, such as, missionary work, dress-making, millinery, and domestic service. Often the daily relations of secretaries or stenographers to their employers take on many of these features. For those women who take up some form of religious activity as a vocation there may well be an outlet which may use both emotional and intellectual interests in a healthy and socially accepted form. Love, marriage, and family patterns are most evident in religious social-service work and in missionary endeavors. The traditional feminine pattern of renunciation is particularly in evidence. It is often an instance in which, quoting William James, "a higher happiness holds a lower unhappiness in check." Dickinson and Beam (1934, pp. 357, 360) aptly observe:

"The working woman who must also appear as potential Madonna finds her ideal of her own mother important for happy acceptance of occupation.

"In this series, 239 or half the cases [of those who work] are employed in ways which stress the mother pattern. Nearly a hundred are in clerical work, another in domestic or personal service, thirty more are milliners, dressmakers and seamstresses, preoccupied with feminine trade. Such workers learned their job and served their apprenticeship to women, and either work together with women or in a capacity which lets the personal relation to man be the traditional one of waiting on and helping him.

"It is then occupational preparation and sustenance to remember the mother as cheerful, lovely and good, superior in tenderness, an anodyne. She healed, encouraged, and appreciated; the maternal ideal is a figure of renunciation . . .

"[And] when work is so closely tied to the sexual impulse that it becomes the main avenue of life, it uses the familiar ingredients of the love pattern. . . ."

As elsewhere in the building of the personality, there are often ambivalent identifications. The father may also serve as an ideal for the daughter; and perhaps in many single women the overemphasis of this pattern in the personality may account, in part, for their failure to marry. (There is no man as "good and kind as father.") Or it may take the negative form, as when the father is thoroughly unpleasant and feared and hated (the "all-men-are-brutes" assumption). No adequate studies of the effects of father or of mother ideals upon the personalities of single or of married women have been developed, but there are data which suggest that in the case of many successful unmarried women the father ideal has played a definite part. As Dickinson and Beam (1934, p. 359) remark, "Just as the husband must fit into the wife's father pattern, so must accomplishment in work fit into the achievement pattern derived from the father." This is particularly likely to be true among women who go into business and professional work where masculine traditions and customs dominate. But this outlet is not always psychologically simple for the woman, for following the father's ideal into such vocations throws her into competition with and opposition to men.

On the other hand, recourse to the mother image may help the single woman over some of her problems, since male occupational associates of superior rank easily take on the father's pattern of authority and dominance, and in dealing with them the woman may drop back into the feminine role. The teacher's attitude toward the superintendent, the nurse's toward the doctor, the social worker's toward her male executive, the religious worker's toward the pastor, all show evidences of the customary response to the father as authority. It is also to be noted that, if the father image has set up antagonism, the daughter may carry this over to those who symbolize the father in vocational as in other fields. The woman may reveal a timid, silent, and even brooding reaction, or assume the compensatory attitude of being overaggressive, sarcastic, and overemphatic about her "rights."

Sublimation through recreation and art. Though Chapter XXIX deals with the function of art, avocation, and recreation as means of balancing or integrating the personality, we may anticipate that discussion by pointing out that the single woman may with profit find considerable objectification of interest in healthy play life or in avocations or artistic work. These activities provide a culturally accepted and easily available means of sublimating many thwarted wishes. There is a close linkage of play life and artistic creativeness. As a vocation or hobby, art has many of the symbolic creative features of motherhood. The development of clubs and congeniality groups among professional women, or of such groups sponsored by religious denominations, is an indication of the recognition of

this problem and an attempt to solve it. Evidently more and more women are traveling alone or with other women, are playing golf, or are taking up hobbies—all which activities a generation or two ago would have been thought improper or unworthy.

Sublimation through religion. Not only does church work, such as Sunday-school teaching or managing a young people's club, provide the single woman with an outlet for her energy and time, but personal religious experience itself may furnish a socially accepted form of sublimation for love life. This refers not only to women who take the veil or who go into church work as an occupation, but to the fact that worship, prayer, and participation in religious services afford excellent release from repressed emotions, which will get many single women over difficult periods in their loneliness and sense of inferiority.

On the other hand, it must not be denied that the moral-religious ideology which many women have acquired from their Christian or Hebraic training prevents their making any adequate adjustment to their sexual and love life. Their conditioning in early years to the doctrine of sin and guilt may act to inhibit any satisfactory direct or substitutive forms of emotional release. In such instances spinsterhood may either mean a docile retreat from the adventure of living in a modern world or end in some sort of neurotic breakdown.⁸

Limitations and advantages of sublimation. The single woman must reckon, therefore, with many limitations so far as her sex and love life is concerned. Not only is she denied that most complete of social acts and the intimate relations and the wide range of aesthetic and intellectual interests that may be associated therewith, but, despite the most adequate sublimation, there usually remains some sense of futility and incompleteness. There is always a physiological and psychological price to be paid for such sublimation. Adherence to the ethical and other demands for conformity indicates some of the definite limitations to the various substitutions which one may develop. Nevertheless, there do exist a wide gamut of approved social acts, aside from love and sex, and it is in these that the single woman must find her substitutions if she can. In the development of personality we find that the single woman may be mature and thoroughly responsible in a certain range of activities and still remain childish and immature in others. In this regard she is no different from any other individual, and, like other women who are trying "to

⁸ Certainly the woman who is confronted with a strong conscience in regard to any of the three available means of direct satisfaction of sexual impulses discussed above may prefer a certain torment and disturbance of repression rather than face a divided self after she has attempted these more direct outlets. But in the light of wide individual differences it is impossible to offer any generalization or universal advice on this matter. (See Holt, 1915, especially Chapter III.)

590 SELECTED PROBLEMS OF PERSONAL ADJUSTMENT

walk on their hind legs," as Agnes Rogers Hyde (1931) put it, she not only has to face the problems of loneliness and isolation and the sense of being thwarted in her love life, but must also carry many burdens laid on all women who are attempting to escape the traditions and customs of the man-made world.

Chapter XXIII

THE RELATION OF OCCUPATION TO PERSONALITY ADJUSTMENT

WORK AND occupation derive from the fundamental needs to satisfy hunger and thirst, and to provide for bodily care and shelter. Thus they have their roots in one or more of the basic original cycles of activity. In contrast to play, which is spontaneous and pleasurable expenditure of energy for some immediate benefit, work may be defined as regularized, recurrent, utilitarian, and organized effort directed toward a somewhat more remote goal. Like other basic activities, work reflects the particular culture of the time and place. In our Western capitalistic system the possession of a specific occupation, the virtues of hard work, thrift, steadiness of working habits, and keeping a regular job, and various bourgeois patterns of business are all high values. The ideals and habits of independence and responsibility which we have emphasized in our particular society relate not alone to citizenship and future marital adjustment, but to vocational choice and vocational performance as well. The need for ego security and ego recognition, which develops in the earliest years, becomes in time closely associated with getting and keeping a job. The high prestige value of a good position, especially one that provides a handsome income, reveals our culture standards and stimulates the aspirations of young people. In contrast, the jobless man, the lazy fellow, the idler, has little or no satisfactory status at all.

Moreover, occupations themselves in our society range up and down a scale of status value. The personnel of a given vocation tend to develop a certain occupational egocentrism, and there is associated with this a sense of social distance with respect to other vocational groups. (See Bogardus, 1928.) For instance, Coutu (1936) studied the social distance among twenty occupations as judged by three groups of professional students: medical, engineering, and law. The combined judgments of a large sample of each group were transformed into a scale of prestige measured by standard (sigma) units. As might be expected, each group judged its own profession as at the top rank in comparison with the other nineteen; moreover, the law and engineering students also placed medicine at a second position, not far below their own respective ranking. The medical students not only ranked their own profession as in first place, but put it far in advance (on the scale) of the next-ranking profession. This re-

veals not only the high prestige value of medicine, but the extreme degree of occupational egocentrism in this particular group. (See K. Young, 1930.)

Our American society has been characterized by what Cooley (1909) called the open-class system, that is, free movement up and down the ladder of societal status. With respect to occupations this is evident in the strong hold which the social myth of upward struggle from poverty to riches has in our folkways. But, as economic opportunities begin to be restricted, we may see the rise of an ever sharper discrepancy between the level of aspiration set up in terms of this cultural expectancy and the actual achievement. This becomes especially pertinent in a period of prolonged economic depression. (See below.) Davidson and Anderson (1937) have indicated for a middle-sized city of this country that in the last few decades there has been considerable movement up and down the occupational ladder and that our educational system has failed to keep closely geared to the fundamental needs and especially to the changes in occupational demands.

Finally, there are certain differentials in the culture of employers and workers under capitalism. Since work and a vocation have such important places in our individual life organization in Western society, it follows that class distinctions between employers and workers are reflected in the personality structure and function of members of each group. But, as noted above, the broad general social myth of business success and money-making ramifies widely throughout our American society, though labor unionism and various forms of economic-political radicalism tend to set up sharp differences and to develop strong in-group attitudes and values on the part of workers, aimed at their own solidarity and at opposition to the employers. But, despite the impress of labor unionism in this country, the mass of workers remain little influenced by the ideology of sharp class distinctions. The "success story" motive still remains potent in America, even in the face of prolonged unemployment and the growing obvious restriction of occupational advancement.

The present chapter will deal chiefly with the psychological aspects of work, but the social-cultural factors will become evident as the discussion proceeds. We shall begin with a consideration of the objective nature of work, the influence of the machine upon the worker, and the effects of fatigue and monotony on efficiency and personal satisfaction. A special section will be devoted to morale and incentive, and another to problems of emotional maladjustment among workers. The chapter will close with a discussion of the special difficulties arising from prolonged unemployment.

PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF WORK AND OCCUPATIONS

With this brief review of general background factors, let us examine some of the psychological features of work and occupation as they bear directly upon the individual's attitudes, habits, and ideas.

The objective character of work. From the point of view of psychology, work represents an objectification of activity. In motor skill this occurs through the overt, muscular movements of the individual directed toward some external object. The farmer planting, tending, and harvesting his crops or the skilled mechanic making a machine is a case in point. In activities involving symbolic features, such as doing research, literary writing, painting, and the fine arts generally, the expression in purely material form may be reduced to the minima of the medium itself, but the objectification remains in terms of standpoint, method, and possible verification by others, and in the sense that the results of the activity may be communicated to others. Moreover, in both material and symbolic forms of work, there are other important objective aspects: the aim or purpose of the activity sets certain limits; the nature of the medium or material dealt with sets others; there are usually various standard rules or techniques of handling the data to which the worker must conform, at least if his product is to fit into the acceptable norm of his society and culture; and the work itself both as activity and in relation to the object upon which it is directed serves to focus the attention of the individual outward, away from his subjective world, from his vague ideas, and from his fleeting or persistent wishful thinking.

Then, too, work takes on the character of a social act because it involves interaction with others, both direct and indirect. It was pointed out in Chapter X that the significance which material objects have for us depends upon culture and interaction. In this, culture furnishes most of the content of the meaning. The hand-eye and motor activities with material objects—like much of speech—constitute reactions that for social beings fall between the need or wish and the completion of a cycle of activity. Not only are these things universal, but symbolically, by gestures and words, we can communicate with each other about them. In other words, the manipulation of physical objects comes within the scope of the social act.

Then, too, there are the direct contacts of the workers with each other, their mutual identification with each other in regard to the nature of their work and to the wages that the work will bring, and the whole congeries of related factors of family, neighborhood, and general culture—all of which get introjected into the worker's self-organization.

Another important aspect of having an occupation is the regularity of work habits. The repetitive nature of much work is partially the foundation for this; routine motor habits have to be learned and kept alive by practice. Moreover, the specific locus of our working space, the regularity of hours of work, and the customary and predetermined monetary returns which we receive—all these indicate further objectification and standardization of a job within the societal order itself. The individual as he comes

to the age of going to work must accommodate himself to these various features if he is to survive.

There is no doubt that the objective character of work, psychologically considered, is one of its most significant features. It is ordinarily associated with the ideal aim or aspiration of securing a livelihood. Work symbolizes maturity; it affords a useful area of direct contact with others; and it gives a basis for status or prestige. Finally, the very character of work as an *outward* act, as an integrating pattern of behavior in which idea, emotion, and motor skill combine, is most significant for mental health. We have already commented on some aspects of this with reference to education and to careers for women. And we shall later note its importance for the readjustment of the delinquent and criminal, for the sane treatment of constitutional handicaps, and for various more general social and emotional maladjustments.

Until very recently industrial and vocational psychologists for the most part have not recognized the importance of the social act or person-to-person contact in work. They have been too preoccupied with devising and applying tests of intelligence and skill and with working out curricula for vocational training, and have altogether been too much dominated by the conception of the worker as an impersonal unit in the production process to realize the social and cultural aspects of his behavior and attitudes. Some of these matters will be more evident as we proceed to examine certain special problems of the present-day worker in industrial societies.

Dissociative character of machine work. When the handicrafts thrived, and the making of a pot, the weaving of a rug, or the tillage of the soil was a more or less unified activity, the effects of these habits on personality organization were doubtless different from those of present-day machine production. Under the old handicraft system a man's tools were almost a part of himself. Moreover, the product of a man's labors was a unified, complete object. Its inception and completion constituted an integrated series of cycles of activity involving the entire personality. Today men operate machines which make only a small part of the manufactured article. The individual worker may have little or no conception of the finished product as a totality, as a creation of his own hands. The former pride in skill, in workmanship, and in handicraft ability disappears when machines make the parts of a product, and at best men have only a slight function in putting these parts together. The artistry of the product is transferred from the man to the machine.

Some years ago various writers were lamenting that the worker's "instinct of workmanship," his inventiveness, or his "creative impulses" were throttled by the ogre of machine production. (See Marot, 1918; Veblen, 1914; Chase, 1929.) This concern was doubtless somewhat stimulated by

the so-called Taylor movement (Taylor, 1911), which aimed at improving the productivity of workers by what was called "time study," that is, by analyzing carefully every step in the man's activity and then developing more effective means of enhancing his industrial output by specializing the task and by speeding up the muscular movements. Many commentators on our industrial civilization began to fear that such extreme measures would completely destroy the unified character of man's labor habits and ideas.

This is not the place to debate about the creative impulse of the worker, on the one hand, and the damaging influences of machine production, on the other. The events of the past few decades have indicated once more the amazing adaptability of man. Some of the dire effects anticipated have not taken place, and we are rapidly becoming much more accustomed to the machine or "iron-man" age than we formerly imagined possible. In fact, the anxiety about the industrial creativeness of the ordinary worker reflects a certain sentimentality regarding the past, arising from a false notion that every worker is a potential genius and from the belief that there is some special virtue in the handicrafts and some special vice in machine production. Without doubt some of the problems of dissatisfied workers, of the breakdown of health and morale due to speeding up of work, of fatigue and monotony, represent a transitional phase in the adaptation of workers to machine production.

Yet there does remain the larger question of the dissociation of work itself from the rest of the individual's life organization, just as there is the analogous problem of the dissociation of the modern industrial order from the rest of societal organization. In fact, the two—one individual, the other societal—are not unrelated. (See the two final sections of this chapter.) While the human being is remarkably adaptable in habits and attitudes, it may well be that the segregation of the work habits and attitudes from other aspects of man's personality tends to produce in him somewhat serious mental dissociation, which in time may influence his whole adaptability to society.

But, aside from these matters, there are problems, such as fatigue, escape from monotony, daydreaming, morale, and incentives to work, which must be reckoned with.

The effects of fatigue. There is a vast literature on the subject of fatigue, drawn from hundreds of experiments by physiologists and psychologists and from the observations, controlled and otherwise, made in industrial plants. A commonly accepted characterization of fatigue covers at least three items: (1) an objectively measurable evidence of decline in output on a given task, known as the "work decrement"; (2) a physiological state, involving the reduction in the muscle tissue of the amount

of energy-producing material, particularly glycogen, and the accumulation of waste products in the muscles and blood, particularly lactic acid and carbon dioxide; and (3) a feeling or sense of fatigue.

There has been a tendency among research workers in industry to confine themselves to the first and third of the criteria cited above and to ignore the detailed physiological factors. Thus Cathcart (1928) simply defines fatigue as "a reduced capacity for doing work," and goes on to say that for the present we have no adequate objective criterion of fatigue as such, but that the following items have been used in practice as a basis for testing productive capacity among workers: (1) variations in output and quality of work performed, (2) the loss of time at work, (3) the amount of labor turnover in a plant, (4) incidence of sickness and mortality among workers, (5) incidence of industrial accidents, and (6) degree of effort expended in accomplishing a task.

Yet, despite all the investigations of fatigue, the findings on the whole are rather equivocal. Some writers have gone so far as to suggest seriously that the word *fatigue* be eliminated from our scientific vocabulary, since it is obvious that it is not some *one* thing, some *entity* which an individual has or does not have, any more than work is something which one gets out of a worker. (See Muscio, 1921; Myers, 1925; Knight, 1929; Mayo, 1933.) Nevertheless, with these cautions in mind we shall use the term to classify a wide range of mental and muscular phenomena which influence directly or indirectly the work habits and the productivity of the worker. At this point we shall note only certain objective evidences of fatigue as they reflect themselves in the personality of the worker. The mental conditions of boredom and monotony which may or may not accompany fatigue will be discussed in the next subsection.

The reduction in the hours of work per day almost invariably results in increase in the rate of output, although various investigators have found that these improvements appeared slowly, sometimes not until weeks or months had elapsed. It is clear that mental attitudes play a large part in these matters. The tradition of long hours of labor is not broken down at once. So, too, if the workers secure the shorter working day through their own solidarity, say as union members, they may take a more favorable attitude toward work after they have won their point than previously, or than they would have if the change had been initiated from the management. That is, increase in output depends not only upon lessened demands of long hours of toil but on the attitudes of the workers toward their jobs.

Innumerable studies have shown that the curve of productivity for a large sample of occupations rises in the early part of the day, slumps before the noon hour, rises again after luncheon, and then falls off sharply toward the close of the working day. Also, it is apparent that workers

everywhere develop their own rhythms of effort and rest. One British study found marked variations, the rest periods occurring with considerable regularity in some types of work and irregularly in others. In one sample of men engaged in moderately heavy work, such as road building, agriculture, and dock labor, these spontaneous rest pauses averaged eleven minutes an hour. Men working in coal mines took rests varying from seven to twenty-two minutes an hour, depending somewhat on atmospheric conditions. This report, in fact, states that "the more arduous the work the longer the rests." (See Vernon, Bedford, and Warner, 1927.)

The deliberate introduction of rest periods during the working hours has generally resulted in improvement in production and lessening of the feeling of fatigue on the part of the workers. There are also wide variations in the optimum use of rest pauses, depending upon the nature of the work and the general social configuration of the workers and the place of work. Thus, in one study made in Philadelphia among tenders of spinning mules, it was found after various attempts that staggering the periods of relaxation—in this case by having the men lie down on canvas cots—produced better results than by having all the men in the unit cease work at the same time. So, too, it was found in some studies that productivity increased during the period just preceding the rest pause as well as afterward, doubtless because of expectant attitudes as to the value of the rest period to follow. (See Mayo, 1924.)

The contention that highly mechanized repetitive tasks produce fatigue and feelings of monotony has led the sentimentalists to argue that the workers suffer greatly from such work. As we shall note below, monotony is a subjective factor which varies greatly among individuals. But studies have shown that varying the tasks and the introduction of rest pauses do cut down the feeling of fatigue. Also, it is shown that workers of less general intelligence—as measured by the usual intelligence tests—tend to do better at simple repetitive work than do those of higher intelligence. Yet in purely automatic activities the worker may carry on elaborate day-dreaming while tending to his job (see below), while work characterized by variation in the amount of attention demanded may itself be sufficiently varied to offset the fatiguing effects of more repetitive work. Also, tasks which demand very close attention, unless personally interesting to the worker, often set up marked feelings of fatigue even though the muscular effort is not arduous. In such situations rest periods have proved beneficial. In contrast, an occupation in which the person is deeply interested, in which his own creativeness may enter, may, on the other hand, be carried on for long stretches of time without any obvious signs of either mental or muscular fatigue. In such cases the occupation approaches the nature of play rather than work in the sense of an imposed task.¹

¹ Other devices which make working easier and thus tend to eliminate fatigue include improvement in conditions of lighting, ventilation, control of humidity, control of speed and

Hersey (1932) reports a detailed study of the behavior and attitudes of a sample of industrial workers both inside and outside an industrial plant. We may summarize some of his findings as follows:

In the course of a long series of interviews twelve "causes" of fatigue, both inside and outside the plant, were noted most frequently: Nearly one third of the items for the work situation itself included "physical activity," one eighth were notations of "emotional tension," slightly more of "bodily tension," and the same of "mental activity." Boredom was mentioned in but 7 per cent of the total number of items listed for the plant itself. "Outside activities" away from the plant, including recreation, family duties, and sleep habits, accounted for over 60 per cent of the "reasons" given for feeling tired while at work. In addition to "outside activities," "emotional tension" was mentioned about 8 per cent of the time as a "non-plant" factor; the rest were scattered among several items, such as "colds," "climate," and malnutrition.

Recognizing that boredom and fatigue may result from intellectual and emotional attitudes, and from physical strain itself, Hersey suggests a number of changes in production procedure which may eliminate some of these effects and by inference improve morale and productivity: (1) Fatigue which is closely related to physical exertion will be cut down by elimination of useless movements, by reduction of the intensity of exertion, and by the introduction of rest pauses and variations on the job. (2) "Mental strain" will be lessened by rest pauses and better training. (3) Emotional tension among the workers will be reduced by the employment of "alert, sympathetic, and wise foremen." (4) Health difficulties resulting from malnutrition and improper bodily elimination will be removed by providing "proper lunch hour and facilities for wholesome food," coupled with instruction in sound personal hygiene. (5) The common cold—a frequent cause of irritability and loss of working time—will be reduced in frequency by "prompt and efficient medical attention [and] elimination of plant conditions causing colds." (6) Boredom may be reduced if not removed by "education in worth of job, provision for variety in activity [and] rest pauses."

In short, the "general principles" involved concern the "expenditure of less energy," the "opportunity to recover energy before supply is too far depleted," and "provision of plant environment that is stimulating."

The effects of monotony. If the concept of fatigue is vague, so too is the concept of monotony. In general the term is used to indicate a subjective or internal state of boredom or ennui, induced by the repetition of some task. Though often associated with fatigue, it is not to be identified with the latter, for a person may be bored from monotonous activity without showing any evidence of physical or mental fatigue. Moreover, it is interesting to note that freedom from boredom seems to lead to an increase in production rate even in the face of some evidence of physical

rhythm of work activities themselves, and, of course, the construction of machines which take over more and more the processes formerly handled by the workers themselves. The reader may with profit consult convenient summaries of the studies of fatigue in Moore and Hartmann (1931), Viteles (1932, 1934), and Mayo (1933).

fatigue. Monotony is related to the nature of the task and to a host of factors arising from cultural conditioning.

Various theories have been advanced to account for monotony, but perhaps the most suggestive relate it to the broad differences between work and play. It is apparent that play is characterized by a spontaneity of action which is not found in the imposed task of regularized and restricted movements in work. But to contrast work and play is but another way of noting an important difference between interest and monotony itself. If interest be considered in this connection as relating to a pleasurable incentive in a given activity, monotony or sense of boredom may be considered as a function of, or result of, the process of struggling against inclinations or tendencies to discontinue a given job. Thus boredom may be defined as a mental state arising from the more or less enforced necessity to continue a given line of action in the face of competing and intruding desires or impulses; it implies a conflict of drives or incentives, one toward keeping at a task, the other toward escaping it. A fundamental characteristic of interesting activities is that they are done with a minimum of effort, and a prominent feature of monotonous activities is that they are marked by a sense of strain. As Viteles (1932) puts it, "The individual whose attention becomes either entirely absorbed in the task or entirely dissociated as a result of its mechanization, is free from the feeling of boredom in work." Boredom, then, is obviously an avoidant reaction toward a tension set up by what is essentially a conflict situation. It is a warning or symbol that the individual is not doing what he wishes, not fulfilling his deeper and more abiding wants. But the demands of a job and all it implies in the way of economic and other security serve to keep most individuals at their tasks even though they desire to be free from them.

The psychological factors in monotony, such as intelligence and attitudes like those in fatigue, have been examined by a wide range of investigators. (See Moore and Hartmann, 1931; Viteles, 1932, 1934; and Mayo, 1933.) Here we can only summarize some of the important features of their work:

Judged by laboratory experiments at least, boredom seems to be definitely associated with the difficulty in the reception of uniformly repeated stimuli and the accompanying uniform motor responses. Apparently it is most marked in individuals who are compelled by the nature of the job to attend to each successive sensory impression and to correlate successfully the appropriate motor response with this impression.

But, as scientific studies began to be made of the daily activities demanded in mechanized industries themselves, it became evident that some of the laboratory-trained investigators were quite unwittingly projecting upon the workers their own belief that repetitious tasks must of necessity be highly monotonous. This arises

from the fact that the research workers come from a social class quite unaccustomed to remaining long hours at simple motor tasks of repetitious character. But, when the verbal reports of the workers themselves are considered, it is clear that there are wide individual differences among them. Some of them do not mind repetitious labor; others do.

In regard to intelligence, there is considerable positive correlation in many work situations between the level of mental ability of the workers and their sense of ennui. In one factory 470 employees engaged in different departments of the plant were asked whether they were satisfied with their present work or desired to change it. These replies were correlated with the degree of educational retardation for each man at the time he left the public school. (School retardation is a fair measure in our society of the degree of mental alertness.) The results were interesting. In the tool department, where the work was of high grade but of varied character, the highest degree of dissatisfaction was expressed by those who had been the most retarded in school, and stability or satisfaction increased as the amount of retardation lessened. In sharp contrast, just the reverse attitude was found in the inspection department, where the work was highly repetitive and "foolproof." The men who had been most retarded in school expressed the least dissatisfaction, and vice versa. In still other departments there was more variability in the workers' sense of monotony, depending largely upon the nature of the work. (See Scott and Hayes, 1921, pp. 74-75.)

It is apparent, then, that monotony, as roughly measured in this study, is related both to the level of intelligence and to the nature of the job to be performed. Other studies confirm this, both those made under experimental conditions in the laboratory and those made in industry itself.

It would be a mistake, however, to believe that intelligence alone will account for the variations in the sense of boredom among workers. Attitude or mental set must also be reckoned with, and, when the attitude is surcharged with strong emotions, its influence on the worker may offset the otherwise expected influences of variability in intelligence itself. Attitudes may have a deep-seated source in the wider cultural training of the worker, or they may reflect his experience with his job more directly: Some aspects of the former will be mentioned below.

The place of both intelligence and attitudes, and of other subjective factors, will be further apparent if we examine the problem of monotony in relation to the nature and organization of the job itself. Just as mechanization of work has been held responsible for industrial fatigue, so, too, mechanization has been blamed for producing negative effects on the worker's interest. A highly routinized task which would bore an intelligent man may, in the words of Viteles (1934) be "the boon of stupidity" to another. Various investigations have been made of the relation of monotony to the nature of the job. One British study (Wyatt, Fraser, and Stock, 1929) investigated this problem as part of a larger research project. Of one group of workers studied, only about one quarter (forty-nine in the total) reported no boredom. The effects of ennui upon productivity

are most apparent in the middle of the work spell. On mechanization and general conditions of work we may summarize the findings as follows:

The amount of boredom experienced is related to the degree of mechanization of the job: (1) Boredom is less likely to arise when the task is entirely automatic, since this situation permits daydreaming, conversation, or other dissociation from the work at hand. But, if such distraction does not occur, the sense of ennui may be very intense. (2) It is less likely to occur when one's attention has to be completely concentrated on the job to be done, this being especially evident when unexpected and varied situations arise such that the worker has no time to think of the unpleasant aspects of his job. (3) It is most evident in semiautomatic tasks requiring just enough attention to keep one from fantasizing, or talking, or otherwise distracting himself, and yet not be sufficiently interesting to absorb complete mental concentration.

Individual differences in intelligence play a part in the development of sense of ennui. Workers of superior ability appear to be bored by repetitive tasks; on the other hand, those of higher intellectual capacity are often able to mechanize their operations so as to permit those very distractions which lessen monotony. Temperamental factors also play a part, but there is need for further research on these items.

Then, too, boredom is affected by the conditions under which work is performed: (1) It is less likely to arise if the form of operation is modified at suitable times during a given period of work. (2) It is lessened by paying workers for output, not for total time employed on a task. (3) It is less likely to occur if the work is thought of as "a series of self-contained tasks" rather than as an indefinite and interminable assignment. (4) It is lessened by permitting the workers to operate together in compact social groups rather than in isolation. (5) And it is less likely to arise when suitable rest periods are introduced.

Finally, it is worth noting that "continual exposure to monotonous conditions of work" brings in time an adaptation, so that tasks which initially were tedious and unpleasant no longer seem so and may be not only tolerated but "mildly enjoyed."

Apparently the reverie or daydream is not at all uncommon among workers engaged in these highly standardized or automatic forms of work. Mayo (1924) and his staff discovered in their Philadelphia study of spinning-mule tenders that the men did a good deal of fantasizing of pessimistic or accusatory sort. A competent nurse in this unit of the plant became sufficiently confidential with the workers so that they told her about their daydreams, which concerned chiefly such things as the worker's work, his home, and his philosophy of life. And these were "almost invariably morbid" in character. Moreover, when the working conditions were improved by the introduction of rest pauses and other features, these unpleasant fantasies tended to disappear. If monotony and fatigue are in turn linked to unpleasant reveries, it is clear that the ramifications of boredom and fatigue reach beyond the immediate task into the larger problem of morale and incentive. (See below.) But there is no reason to believe that all daydreaming among industrial workers is neces-

sarily morbid, and workers report that they also indulge in a good deal of more pleasant "castle building."

Before going into the larger problem of morale and incentives, we must note the fact that monotony itself, within the narrower limits of the job, must be understood against the background of the larger society and its culture in which the worker finds himself. An investigation into the problem of telegraphists' cramp by Smith, Culpin, and Farmer (1927) throws this matter into interesting focus. It has long been known that a common ailment of British telegraphists was the development of muscular cramps which incapacitated them for their work. By all the usual tests telegraphy is not unduly different from many allied occupations, although the work is exacting and is marked by a definite inflexibility of the conditions of operation and also by a certain personal isolation. But the curious fact remains that this "cramp" is an "occupational disease" known to British telegraphists and not to American. Why should this be so? In the first place, in England telegraphy is a permanent vocation, whereas in America there is much greater mobility in this as in other types of labor. Second, as Mayo (1933) suggests, many of the British workers evidently suffer from considerable mental conflict between a desire to retain a permanent and fairly well-paid job and an aversion to the exacting task and the rigid conditions it imposes. The result is a neurotic, essentially hysteric and functional avoidance reaction developed as a means of solving or reducing the tension or strain set up, in part, by the cultural connotations of the job itself. (See Chapter XXVII.)

Not only fatigue but monotony, therefore, is bound up with the whole subjective life of the individual, which reaches beyond the factory, office, or merchandizing establishment. Not only does he carry to his work, from the outside, attitudes toward his vocation and his employer, but the conditions of labor themselves foster or hinder pleasant mental associations between what he does and what he wants to do. In other words, the levels of vocational achievement are constantly circumscribed and qualified by the levels of aspiration, and the latter are determined both by conditions surrounding his work and by those which touch his social life in the family and community. For this very reason many serious problems of occupational adjustment often remain even when wages and external working conditions are pretty adequate, because the life in the plant is not integrated with the life outside. This fact leads easily to the broad topics of morale and incentive.

MORALE AND INCENTIVE IN WORK

The term *morale* is about as vague and uncertain of specific meaning as are the concepts of fatigue and monotony. It relates to the subjective, internal state—ideas, attitudes, feelings, and emotions—associated with a

job, qualified, of course, by various features of the wider social configuration. More specifically it refers to the zest for activity, co-operativeness, sense of satisfaction and well-being, loyalty, and courage to carry on a task. Conditions of work such as wages, fatigue, monotony and plant comforts, and family and community factors all influence morale, as do various subjective states themselves.

The term *incentive* is a synonym for motive, and indicates the push or inclination of the worker to activity. Obviously, incentive and morale are linked together, and both in turn are related to the level of the individual's achievement and his level of aspiration. The former might be measured by monetary considerations, by prestige, and by other satisfactions to the self of a nonmaterial but nevertheless social-cultural sort. The latter is also qualified and varied. Here culture patterns and norms play a decided part. For instance, what are the occupational levels of ambition in the bourgeois classes of our society with their emphasis on individualistic enterprise and competitive devices for getting ahead? Or, in the laboring classes, what are the levels of aspiration and what are the symbols of demand and expectation of performance among organized as contrasted with unorganized laborers? In turn, how do the discrepancies between achievement and aspiration influence not only the working process but related behavior? And then, too, how do the levels of achievement and aspiration in a capitalistic society compare with those in a socialistic?

Many theories and explanations have been offered as to why men work, what the incentives to labor are, and what produces or induces morale among workers. The philosophically minded moralists often contend that man works from a strong inner compulsion to contribute his share as a working member of society. Social psychologists of the William McDougall tradition for a decade or more attempted to explain the incentives to work in terms of inborn instincts, among which were noted the "instinct of workmanship," the "creative impulse," and "acquisitiveness." (Veblen, 1914; Tead, 1918; Marot, 1918; and C. Parker, 1920.) More hard-headed and practical psychologists contend that man works only under compulsion for food and shelter for himself and his family. Certainly the moralist's contention is largely a rationalization, and the thesis of instincts has been overthrown long since by experimental and observational studies. But is the so-called hard-headed realist correct in attributing the full cause to a rational demand for food and shelter? During recent years a number of investigations have thrown some light on this question. But again it must be borne in mind that many of the research workers were unable to get beyond the intellectual and emotional boundaries of their own capitalistic industrial societies, although others fortunately have begun to reckon with the wider cultural implications of their findings.

Let us examine some of the important factors which affect incentive and hence morale, such as financial and nonmonetary rewards, the role of supervisory and minor administrative officials, and the social configuration of the workers themselves. These considerations in turn will force attention to the wider social and cultural milieu of which working conditions are a part.

Financial rewards as incentives. In an economic order which emphasizes individual profit-making and high wages as providers of superior social status and material comforts, it is easy to assume that monetary considerations are the sole motivations to work. Yet even in our capitalistic society the matter of incentive is not so simple. Though a rise in wages often improves morale as well as productivity of the workers, investigation shows that it does not inevitably do so. Excellent evidence on this point has come from the various methods of paying workers in terms of the specific units of work performed. Since F. W. Taylor's system of differential wage payment was devised, all sorts of schemes of payment—piecework, bonuses, and the like—have been developed. All these schemes have the one central purpose of lowering the unit cost of production by using the lure of increased wages. No doubt these plans have raised the level of output. For instance, one survey of the operation of more than twenty such stimulated-incentive programs showed in general that production levels increased from 1 to 18 per cent by their use, that the average earnings of employees increased from 1 to 30 per cent, and that total costs per piece decreased from 1 to 11 per cent. (Viteles, 1932.) But the effects are not always so encouraging. Workers in the past often found, as they increased production and hence their wages, by piecework and bonuses, that their rates of pay were reduced. This induced disgust and fear of further cuts and even of unemployment. There is much evidence that the speeding-up processes often result in the rise of negativistic attitudes and more or less deliberate habits of restriction of output. Myers (1920, pp. 114-115) cites an amazing illustration of how such a program may operate:

In a certain industrial situation (in England) the earnings were based on the performance of a particular task in five hours. The workers finished the job in four hours, whereupon the time rate was reduced to four hours. The men then succeeded in completing the task in three and a half hours, and the rate was further cut to three and a half hours. When the workers finished the job in three hours, the rate was cut to three hours. As Myers says, "But by this time the workers had learned wisdom." They now used seven hours to do the job. The time rate was increased to four hours but had no effect, although, when it was raised to five hours, the task was accomplished in three and a half hours. But once again the time rate was cut, and once more the task required seven hours to complete.

"Soldiering" on the job is an old device not only to protect the worker from overfatigue, but to reduce output deliberately. So, too, various forms of sabotage are employed, as in one case cited in a report of a factory engaged in making tin cans, where an efficiency engineer had been introduced to speed up production; the workers from time to time would slyly toss tin scrap into some machine or conveyor or otherwise interfere with the production process. This would result in a temporary shutdown of that unit, which not only relieved the workers for the moment but of course irritated the foreman, the efficiency experts, and the management generally. All such situations tend in time to affect the morale in the plant. Several studies have shown that the amount of work done in a certain period "is a definite function of the amount that remains to be done." (See Viteles, 1932.) Without doubt the anticipation of a long day's work ahead and of a large amount of work to be accomplished results in an unconscious slowing down of the worker. This fact is another excellent illustration of our constant contention that in human adaptation anticipatory reactions have much to do with overt conduct itself.

Culture patterns of restricting output. There is little doubt that among workers in our society everywhere there are already long established customs and traditions favoring restriction of output in certain circumstances. In new types of jobs practices of restricting output often emerge if attitudes and conditions of work favor it. Mathewson's report (1931) of these practices among unorganized laborers in a large sample of varied kinds of industry and over a wide range of localities concludes among other things that (1) restriction of output is a widespread culture pattern among American workers; (2) scientific management has failed to develop a spirit of mutual confidence between parties to a labor contract comparable to that generally found in the good-will between parties to a sales contract; (3) underwork and restriction offer more serious problems than speeding up and overwork; (4) managerial staffs, on the whole, have been too satisfied with the general broad results of man-hour output to pay attention to the attitudes of the workers or to offer any rational means of meeting fairly the time-honored devices of self-protection which long antedate all these superincentive programs; and (5) owners and managers have not yet made the workers really believe that they can give their best efforts without running the risk of incurring penalties, such as cuts in rates of pay and loss of employment, rather than the benefits which ought normally to flow from real interest in a job.

Nonmonetary incentives. The fear of unemployment and of reduction in wages clearly influences good-will; but this rests essentially on anticipated loss of wages. But there are other, nonmonetary factors which in-

fluence incentive and morale. Workers often resent the introduction of machinery which replaces hand labor, or the introduction of new means of handling the materials. In other words, changes in overt habits, to be entirely successful, must be accompanied by changes in attitudes and emotions. One investigation made among anthracite miners in Germany showed that, even though the introduction of modern mining machinery led to an increase in daily wages, the new machines induced a good deal of antagonism on the part of the miners, especially the older men, although they could easily learn to handle successfully the new devices. (See Viteles, 1932, pp. 570-571.)

Furthermore, the factor of skill must not be overlooked in job satisfaction and in the motivation of the worker to put forth effort. One study by Fairchild (1930), made in four different plants, compared the factors which gave satisfaction for the workers, including wages, conditions of work, and skill. It showed rather well that, where skill is a large item in the total situation, it is reported as the primary source of satisfaction, but that, where skill is of less importance to the workers, such factors as wages and general working conditions are more important sources of satisfaction. These findings somewhat tend to confirm the argument of certain moralists that creativeness and pride in skill are important considerations in morale. This is doubtless true, but it hardly follows that the breakdown of skilled trades and the mechanization of production processes necessarily mean that workers may not readapt themselves adequately, provided, of course, that other elements in the total work configuration are satisfactory.

The Hawthorne Plant study. A number of the significant factors influencing incentive and morale among workers which we have just discussed are admirably brought out in an extended investigation made for the Western Electric Company at their Hawthorne Plant. We shall summarize but three of their researches: (1) an interview study of employees' attitudes and opinions regarding their work; (2) an investigation of the work habits, attitudes, and social relations of fourteen male employees whose work concerned "connecting banks of terminals with color-coded wires"; and (3) a study of the work behavior and interpersonal relations of five women assembling small electrical relays under specially controlled conditions.

(1) Over 20,000 employees were interviewed, and an approximate verbatim account was kept of their comments on a wide variety of matters: fatigue, monotony, hours of labor and rates of pay, physical conditions—such as lighting, temperature, ventilation, safety devices, tools, and machines—and the entire managerial organization of section chiefs, foremen, supervisors, and others under which they had to work. For our purposes the most striking fact brought out by these interviews was that throughout the plant there existed informal social or interactional patterns among the workers which in no way corresponded to the assumptions behind the technical or blue-print operational program of the plant as devised and put into effect by the managerial staff. This latter was developed by the engineering and managerial personnel on the assump-

tion that workers were interested only in their wages and in conditions conducive to earning as much as possible. But it was shown that this was a false premise and that there were other values among the workers, as expressed in these actual groupings of the men during working hours.

The chief features of this informal but potent social grouping of the workers was "a banding together for purposes of protection against practices they interpreted to be a menace to their welfare." (Roethlisberger and Dickson, 1934.) There grew up an actual set of culture patterns and corresponding individual roles and statuses (habits, attitudes, and values) having to do with restriction of output, protecting them from plant discipline and oversupervision.

Among a number of interactional practices may be noted the following: Considerable pressure was exerted on those workers who tended to exceed the minimum standard of output. There was fear that, once the production was increased, the rates of pay would be lowered. Many of the men admitted that they could have turned out much more work, but that it was not right to the other workers to do so. In fact, a pattern of operation had been developed marked by rather concentrated and rapid output during the morning hours and a good deal of "taking it easy" in the afternoon. Those who threatened to, or did, turn out what the others considered too much were subjected to various forms of control, ridicule, name-calling (such as being dubbed "rate-killers"), and even mild physical punishment.

Then, too, informal leadership developed among the workers. In one instance, there were two men: A, an excellent operator, habitually took the brunt of supervisory criticism and argument for the entire group, thus preventing external pressures from upsetting their morale. The other leader, B, more or less regulated the behavior of the group in relation to the work itself; for example, he taught the men various "tricks of the trade," saw to it that they appeared to be busy when the supervisory staff made rounds, and advised them not to tell other workers that their own operations were easy, or that they got through the day's work early and had time to loiter.

The group chief who had general charge of these workers always consulted either A or B about particular matters; moreover, he, in his turn, defended this group against the foreman, and said he refused to "bawl out" the men as the latter suggested, since he found that he got better results by more friendly methods. In fact, the relations of workers with those in immediate authority over them were felt by some of the investigators to be a key factor in the whole situation. Putnam (1930, p. 325) says: "The relationship between first-line supervisors and the individual workman is of more importance in determining the attitude, morale, general happiness, and efficiency of that employee than any other single factor." The existence of these informal social groupings with their leaders, however, served as a buffer between the supervisory and managerial staff and the individual operators, a feature which Putnam's statement does not indicate, but which the reports of Roethlisberger and Dickson (1934, 1939) do. The importance of this informal grouping is aptly brought out in the intensive study of a particular group of male workers, to be summarized next.

(2) Fourteen operators—nine wiremen, three soldermen, and two inspectors—were closely observed and extensively interviewed over a period of more than a half-year. We shall note but a few of the total findings which show how the informal social grouping operated with high effectiveness in countering the elaborate technical program of the management. (a) There was a complicated but technically satisfactory

system of wages, which involved a base rate called "day work" and a special premium for output above a minimum, to be paid on a "piece rate" basis; but the latter bonus could only be secured by the hearty co-operation of the entire group, and the technicians in control of the plant had followed the usual assumptions of classical economics that man was a rational individual and that he would always act in his own best monetary interests, and in the interests of others when the latter benefited him directly—the theory invoked here. It was assumed, then, that the workers would do everything they could to produce enough so that the bonus or piece rate could be secured by all. Yet exactly the opposite happened. The "day work" pay was on the whole considered preferable by the majority of the men. The workers put their pressure on the faster, not on the slower, workers; they used verbal and physical forms of social control to force conformity to their standards. In fact, they developed such an elaborate and effective cultural pattern for disguising their restrictive habits that it made the real meaning of the production records themselves quite different from that indicated by a mere inspection of the statistical charts. (See Roethlisberger and Dickson, 1934, pp. 9–10.)

Moreover, the "first-line supervisor"—the man in immediate authority over a group of workers—was caught between the system of actual operation by the men, of which he was fully conscious and with which he was in some accord, and the demands of the foreman and the managerial staff that his group increase their output. And in the interplay between the workers and the managerial group, he was intellectually and emotionally in a highly exposed situation, and had to make a variety of adjustments in the way of rationalization and projection upon others of blame for failures.

This particular study also revealed how a pattern of interaction arises among the workers themselves: how the wiremen, for instance, sometimes blamed the solderman for delays, and especially the difficult role of the inspector if the latter tried to assume unwonted authority and superiority over the wiremen. Actually the inspectors had no direct authority, and in many instances they, the wiremen, and the soldermen formed a compact social unit. But, when one inspector appeared who aroused unpleasant and antagonistic responses because he did assume superiority and authority, he became the object of sabotage of his instruments, blame for delays, ridicule, and other control devices, so that in a few weeks he had to be transferred to another place in the plant.

It is more than apparent that within a plant there may emerge a form of social grouping with certain standard practices which can completely undo the programs of management when the latter fail to reckon with these human and irrational factors in behavior and attitude. In this particular example, there was no evidence that the management had ever cut the rates of pay of these men once production had been increased; there was no general overt antagonism between the employers and the employees. (The company had a long reputation for fair dealing with its workers.) There was no evidence either that the supervisory staff was inefficient or given to oversympathy with, or to antagonism toward, the workers. It was only that the restriction of output had become a part of the whole cultural pattern of the workers, which psychologically may be "characterized as a protection from too rapid changes in their environment," a matter implicit in their overt restriction and in their rationalizations for doing so. Roethlisberger and Dickson (1934) aptly point out that the whole rational process of improving technical production implies rapid changes for

which the workers are not psychologically prepared. The inventors and engineers make the technological changes, but it is the individual workman in the plant who, though he has no place in initiating the changes, has to accommodate his life organization to them. Moreover, these changes run counter very often to customs and traditions of work which are the product not of logic but of "deeply rooted sentiments." Constant interference with the established methods of work induces frustrations and "an irrational exasperation with technical change in any form." It is on such a foundation that a system of practices and values arises which would protect the worker who is "at the mercy of technical specialists."

Therefore, as the report of Roethlisberger and Dickson points out, industrial management, if it is to secure the maximum from its workers, must recognize the place of the culturized habits and values of the workers. The latter do not behave in the manner of the "economic man" described in traditional textbooks of economics. And technological changes in industry, as in business, must take these human and social factors into account. Merely to follow the logic of a technical blue print designed on the theory that workers are mere robots in a production system is likely to lead to failure. As these writers say (1934, p. 17), "Successful management of any human enterprise depends largely on the ability to introduce more efficient methods without disrupting in the process the social foundation on which collaboration is based."

(3) A special controlled study of certain workers was made in order to discover, if possible, some of the decisive factors in rates of pay and working conditions which make for the highest efficiency. After a preliminary record of everyday performance at a certain task, five women workers were asked by the management to participate in this study. These women were given an outline of the general purpose of the program, and careful records were kept of their performance. During the first five weeks no changes were made in the work situation beyond putting them in a new location, segregated in one part of the plant. There was for this period no appreciable change in output. Following this, variations were introduced in terms of rates of pay, methods of pay (piecework), hours of labor, and rest pauses. This group remained together for approximately four and a half years, 1928-1932.

The results were rather startling. There was a gradual but regular increase in productivity, regardless, to a large extent, of the conditions of work imposed. How may these changes be accounted for? There was no evidence that there was any relief from the usual cumulative fatigue found in other workers. There was no evidence that alterations in pay incentive played any special part, for a control with the same working conditions and varying only in the basis of compensation made gains equal to those of the experimental group. The most likely and probable explanation is that their improved industrial efficiency depended upon their psychological attitudes toward the work and toward each other. It was a matter of producing a freer, happier, and more enjoyable life on the job itself.

Perhaps the most important feature of this whole experiment was the development of a new social configuration in which the workers developed a certain *esprit de corps* among themselves, in which as a group they took pride in their work and their output, and in which freedom from constant and negative supervision of minor executives fostered a more natural interrelation of workers as well as a freer rein to their skill. Although the investigation also took into account the home environment and other outside conditions, especially in relation to loss of sleep or the appearance of depressed

feelings, which were shown to have their effects, the central feature remained the favorable changes in mental attitudes induced by the new social situation in which the work took place.

The importance of these interactional factors is well brought out by T. A. Whitehead's analysis (1936) of these same data. He has pointed out the variations in morale in terms of the human relations of the women to each other and to other persons, inside and outside the plant. It is interesting to note that the whole pattern of congeniality and high productivity began to disintegrate in 1932 in the face of the economic depression then at its height. The output rate fell off violently in the last few weeks before the girls were finally discharged. Some months after this Whitehead showed the production charts to one of these girls and asked her opinion as to why the final and striking drop in output had taken place. This operator in four words summed up the whole matter: "We lost our pride."

Social relations among workers. All this evidence makes it clear, that the interactions among workers and between them and the supervisory and managerial personnel have profound effects upon motivation and morale. If a foreman or minor administrator is abusive, domineering, or petty in his demands, he tends to set up all sorts of resistances in the laborers, no matter how favorable wages and hours and other conditions may be. So, too, it often happens that events—such as transference of workers from one department to another without their knowing the real reasons—lead to misunderstandings, and in time not only the individual involved but his fellow-workers, who identify themselves with him, distrust the management and lay blame which might actually be unwarranted were all the facts known.

The social relations among workers are so important that any device tending to disrupt a social configuration or a custom of long standing is likely to destroy morale and good-will. The use of the labor spy or stool pigeon to report to the management the attitudes and ideas of the workers, especially regarding such things as "soldiering on the job," sabotage, agitation for unionization, and the like, easily leads to increased resistance toward management and ultimately to open conflict between workers and employers. (See Howard, 1921; Subcommittee on Education and Labor, La Follette report, 1936-38; and Huberman, 1937.)

Where there is any extended history of continued employment of the same employees on a particular job, new customs and traditions arise as changes in production procedures occur or older ones are carried over from other work situations. These tend, on the whole, to stabilize and structuralize the social configuration of work and hence foster morale. As a rule, co-operation among laborers is common. There is often a good deal of airing of views and grievances among themselves, which enhances negatively or positively the state of good-will. Even in the midst of highly individualized attention to machine processes by the workers,

social interaction takes place. It is impossible to prevent it if the workers come into any kind of contiguity whatsoever, and to attempt to circumvent at least a modicum of contact among the workers is out of the question, unless the employees are literally put in complete isolation from each other.

Then, too, the "caste principle," as Cooley (1909) called it, easily develops, as witnessed in a certain hierarchy of social status among workers. This may be defined as a phase of social or occupational distance. Workingmen in the highly organized skilled trades represent the upper levels; those in the unskilled trades represent the lower. Even within a given plant differentials of status are often to be found. And frequently it is rather the nature of the job than the earning power which determines this social standing. (W. Williams, 1925.) Then, too, social superiority is shown among workers by tangible evidence of their material possessions, such as ownership of cars and education of their children, and by their opportunities for conspicuous leisure. Once more one notes the close relation of ego expansion to role and status. What a man does and what his associates think of it determine pretty largely his own conception of himself, and without this support from others the individual has difficulty in maintaining his ego at the high level he might wish.

It should be apparent that the social configuration of work has direct bearing upon incentives and morale. Our whole *laissez-faire* tradition, with its emphasis upon personal competition and struggle, the high ambition to climb up the economic scale through individual effort, the fostering of a sense of personal independence, the prestige of the job, and especially the importance of monetary returns—not only as a measure of success but because material comforts obtainable by money count so much in our society—all these play a part in stimulating the worker. Yet many employers consider their workers as merely individual units whose relations with other human units are chiefly mechanical—like the relations of material things to each other. While individual differences in productiveness need to be recognized, and while the division of labor itself sets up divergent roles and status which employers may use as appeals, it must not be forgotten, as the Hawthorne and other studies show, that there are social and cultural factors—or, in terms of individuals, habits, attitudes, and values—that must be taken into account in describing and predicting human behavior in industry. Mere money success and good external working conditions are not enough; the worker's role as worker must somehow become integrated to his other roles in society.

Incentives in socialistic Russia. The experience of Soviet Russia in this connection is interesting as indicating the limitations of the dead-level theory of equality as applied to work. There the workers in the late twenties were stimulated to great efforts by the Plan, as it was called

(the Five-Year Plan). It became the symbol of worship and work for millions. Through propaganda and organized planning the government put on an immense campaign to industrialize Russia. The success of this great program is well known, but it is interesting to note that with this industrial expansion it became clear that individual differences in capacity and output had to be recognized not only by prestige but by differentials in wage rates. The Soviet chiefs, the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars, realized that their former scheme of distributing wages irrespective of success provided no direct economic incentive. So they began to reward the individual worker in proportion to the quantity and quality of his work and the time consumed. Even piecework and systems of preference and bonuses were introduced. H. F. Ward (1933) has given numerous instances of the effects of such schemes. For example, in the Crimea, when workers were paid by the day, it took 180 working days to set out a hectare of tobacco. Under piecework the time was reduced to from 40 to 76 days. A teamster hauled two barrels of water a day when paid by the day; operating under piecework, the same man with the same horse hauled fourteen barrels per day. Women cotton pickers under piecework rates picked double the amount of cotton they had previously picked.

The experience of Russia could be rationalized in terms of the hangover of capitalistic ideology and practice among Russian workers, but this is a bit too naïve. The very fact that individual differences are recognized—if not by monetary rewards, then by rewards in status—is evidence that so far the Russians have not been able to abolish completely competitive habits and attitudes. It may well be that complete elimination of competitive and oppositional responses is out of the question in social groupings, and that in some form or other they will find a place in the societal scheme of things. Furthermore, in a highly industrialized society, such as Russia aims to be, it is more than evident—as it is elsewhere—that individual differences are fundamental to the whole specialization of role and function upon which complex modern society depends. It is hard to convince any rational being that a technically trained physician, engineer, or managerial executive is not more useful—in keeping the system going—than a semiskilled machine-tender or an unskilled ditch-digger. Doubtless a successfully balanced society will make ample provision for the unskilled and semiskilled classes, but it seems to me that sooner or later, in some manner or other, it must also provide some public evidences of differentials in prestige due to differentials in societal function. Moreover, we have no reason to doubt that noneconomic culture patterns of the sort described above will also operate under socialism, or under totalitarianism for that matter.

The incentives to work, therefore, seem to rest chiefly upon monetary

compensation or its equivalent, upon prestige-giving factors arising from variations in economic roles, and upon the integration of work as a value into the larger cultural totality. Apparently these three factors tend to operate in the modern world regardless of the particular political organization of the society or nation.

THE EMOTIONALLY MALADJUSTED WORKER

In industry and business as in other social configurations there are always some individuals who fail to adjust themselves to the work situation. These persons, labeled "maladjusted" or "neurotic," often drift from job to job—a small army of misfits always on the move, undoubtedly increasing the labor turnover because of their mobility. (Fisher and Hanna, 1931.) Even where working conditions are by ordinary standards highly satisfactory, where the relations of employees and employers are co-operative and marked by sound sense on both sides, workers turn up who are well adapted neither to their work, to their families and communities, nor to themselves. Even though these persons constitute a small percentage of the total working force of the country, their existence must be noted because it may well be that their persistence indicates some deeper underlying imbalance in the societal order, as it surely does reveal underlying imbalance in their own constitutional make-up and in their adaptability to the workaday world. Fundamentally the maladjusted person in industry or business is no different as to symptom and behavior from like persons in other groups: family, neighborhood, church, or community. And, since we shall discuss the mildly neurotic and maladjusted person elsewhere, in the present section we shall only briefly note certain features as they relate specifically to industry. (See Chapters XXVII and XXVIII.)

Characteristics of neurotic workers. We must never forget that the work situation is social in character and that maladaptation is clearly related to the worker's efficiency, to his degree of ego satisfaction with the job, and to his wider role as a member of society, as regards his relations both to his fellow-workers and to other groups with which he comes into contact. We may describe the maladjusted worker as one who is intellectually and emotionally so maladapted to his work and society as to be unreasonably irritable, unhappy, and morose. He is likely to drift from job to job either from external pressure (failure to make good from the standpoint of the employers) or from internal pressure (attitudes and wishes and ideas derived from his own mental conflict or sense of inadequacy). Often these persons fail to find sufficient justification for their roles as workers or, sensing the incompatibility between their achievement as workers and what they aspire to be, fail to find balancing factors in life outside the shop or plant which will offset the disturbance due to

the work life itself. (See Chapter XXIX.) In short, the maladjusted worker is one who reveals what Shaffer (1936) would call persistent nonadjustive reactions to his work situation and to the world outside. There is a lack of integration among the varied units of his life activity, and we must not neglect the probability that in part these maladjustments reflect the cultural dissociation between work and the rest of life. But it would be a mistake to attribute the whole bulk of problems of maladjustment to the dissociative character of modern industrial life; otherwise a much higher percentage of workers should reveal instability. Without discussing the possible constitutional foundations of neurotic and other unstable adjustments, we can see that in work situations as elsewhere there are found a few individuals who fail to meet the minimum demands of effectiveness, who fall outside the range of normal performance as defined in our society and culture.

The percentage of workers who might be designated maladjusted or neurotic varies in terms of the standpoint from which such facts are collected. In the early years of interest in the problem of the maladjusted worker—soon after the World War—one writer went so far as to state that 50 per cent of American workers were more or less emotionally maladjusted and in need of mental-hygiene treatment. (Jarrett, 1920.) Another psychiatrist, V. V. Anderson (1929), who investigated the employees of R. H. Macy & Co. in New York City, has stated on the basis of his experience there that 20 per cent of the employees should be designated "problem" cases. But clinical psychologists and personnel managers in industry and business consider these estimates far too high. Obviously, much depends on our definition of normality, and the psychiatrist may be inclined to see "problem cases" where other people would not. But the fact remains that we must reckon with emotionally unstable individuals in industry and business. Let us note some of the commoner types of symptoms often found among workers. These range from minor and less serious difficulties, which nevertheless interfere with efficiency and happiness, to more serious types which border definitely on the psychotic manifestations which are legally called insanity.

Among the minor sorts of difficulty may be noted the following: (1) There are workers who frequently complain of physical illness and need of medical or nursing care in the plant. (As we shall see later, this is a common ailment of a mildly neurotic sort. See Chapter XXVII.) V. V. Anderson found that, although all Macy's prospective employees are given rigid medical examinations before being hired, there was a group of "chronic hospital users" who repeatedly sought medical aid and advice from the company's physicians and nurses. The complaints range from headaches, sick stomach, dizziness, and nervousness to more serious disorders. But many are chiefly of the attention-getting sort: demands for sympathy which found outlets in minor illnesses. (2) Then there are many workers who expect undue attention

from their fellow-workers, supervisors, or employers, who often reveal decided trends toward self-pity, or who indulge in persistent faultfinding. Others develop marked jealousy and unfounded suspiciousness of workers and supervisors, often feeling that they are discriminated against. (3) Still others find their outlets in aggressive behavior. They are defensive of their rights, or, if in positions of authority over others, often evolve into the familiar "hard-boiled" foreman or supervisor who is the bane of many plants because such a person disturbs the harmony essential to sound morale. (4) Some workers are decidedly nonco-operative; they withdraw from their fellows as much as possible, and many of these indulge in a good deal of daydreaming, though in certain occupations, as we have seen, this does not interfere with their work.

More serious symptoms, found doubtless in but a small percentage of total workers—since their elimination sooner or later is more or less a foregone conclusion—are those associated with psychotic breakdown. Among these are the following: (1) Extreme irritability, suspiciousness, and paranoia. These people are marked by feelings of being persecuted; they accuse their supervisors and fellows of spying on them; their associates are believed to foster plots against them in order to discredit them in the eyes of their employers and perhaps thus to secure their job. (2) Some workers are characterized by abnormal fears, which may develop into real anxiety neuroses or psychoses. The fear of making mistakes, or fear of machines, or fear of others, may in time completely incapacitate them for normal activity. (3) There are some who so completely withdraw into daydreams and inner life as to prove completely ineffective. And occasionally employers and supervisors have to contend with definitely psychotic individuals, who suffer from hallucinations, such as hearing voices, who show definite symptoms of dementia praecox, or who break down into marked repression or melancholy or into manic phases of a more serious sort.

In their futile efforts to adjust themselves to the job these maladjusted persons not only make themselves unhappy but affect the morale of other workers. Moreover, when economic conditions force widespread unemployment, these persons are often among the first casualties of the economic depression. But it would be a mistake to forget that in almost every instance of maladjustment there are doubtless many causes. The individual, as we have insisted, is continually in the process of adaptation to situations around him and within himself, and those who so obviously fail to make a successful adjustment—as demanded by the cultural norms held by others and hence by the persons themselves—fail from a variety of causes. The foundations of maladjustment lie both within the individual and in the situation outside him. His inability to adapt himself to the demands of the world reflects back into himself in terms of thwarted wishes, unhappiness, and feelings of failure—a discrepancy between his achievement and his aspirations. And naturally such a person carries these attitudes or "emotional complexes" into new situations. Usually the individual does not know why he is unhappy or dissatisfied or unsuccessful, and it is not uncommon for him to project the blame for his maladjustment upon his job and the working situation, as he may also cast the blame for other felt

difficulties upon his family, his friends, the community, the church, the state, or any other symbol which strikes him at the moment as a factor in his own maladjustment.

These behavior manifestations tend to become enhanced during prolonged unemployment, and many individuals show some of them for the first time in the face of a crisis of this sort. Therefore let us examine briefly some aspects of personality adaptation under conditions of prolonged unemployment.

PERSONALITY PROBLEMS RELATED TO PROLONGED UNEMPLOYMENT

We have already shown the high value which individuals in modern industrialized societies put upon having a good job or profession. In America the ideal or aspiration of the "self-made man" is widespread. Culturally it is related to economic, political, and religious individualism, and historically not only to capitalistic enterprise but to the frontier with its free land. Holding a good job not only affords economic security but is the symbol of success and high status. And the development of independence, initiative, and responsibility with reference to an occupation becomes a major feature of growth from adolescence to maturity. In the light of these factors, and other details discussed above, a grave crisis such as prolonged unemployment is likely to produce profound changes in the ego organization not only of the workers themselves but of members of their families as well. (See G. K. Pratt, 1933.)

People generally know something of the vast extent of unemployment in this country and elsewhere, but, behind the impersonal statistics of men and women out of work and of the great numbers who have long been directly or indirectly dependent on public or private assistance, lie the human stories of frustration, fear, and loss of ambition and morale which only attention to the actual instances can provide. Bloodworth and Greenwood (1939, pp. 9-10) say in characterizing their extended interview study (made in Dubuque, Iowa) of 103 families who had been or were still unemployed:

"Generally—most of these families were deeply concerned over the failure of the country to come out of the long slump. They felt there must be something basically wrong somewhere. Above all, they didn't want their children to work and save and plan as most of them had done, and then see their lives go smash in some future economic cataclysm they had no part in making.

"There are no neat morals to be drawn from these personal histories. Some of the families through a lifetime of thrift, hard work, and ingenuity under adversity managed to keep off relief. Some of them, with equal thrift and industry, bought homes, more farm land, or put their savings into industrial securities and savings banks only to have the efforts of many years canceled through foreclosure, bank

failure, or industrial collapse. Relief was more than a bitter necessity to that of any it marked the destruction of landmarks by which they had ordered their lives. Only, others spent as they made and went on relief with little more than a wry smile. While most were reluctant at first they drew some comfort from finding their friends and neighbors in the waiting room. None of these families like relief, though some of them know they are on the relief rolls to stay. Those who are back at work hope the experience of unemployment need never be repeated, but then it happened once and might again.

"These are not dull-minded or broken-spirited people. They are troubled people, a little bewildered perhaps, but still hopeful that under wise leadership the country can regain its former prosperity and thereby restore to them the means of satisfying their modest desires."

Of the broader economic and political causes of prolonged unemployment most people are ignorant. So greatly have we emphasized individual ambition and personal attainment, so much have we trained people to believe that their success rested upon their own efforts, that it is difficult, even after years of economic disorganization, for many workers to understand their personal relation to these wider cultural matters. But, when the unemployed man comes finally to sense that he cannot by any means in his own power secure a job, then the bottom may fall out of his world because his old ideas, attitudes, and habits no longer apply to the changed environment. As one unemployed husband and father put it to a relief worker (P. V. Young, 1935, p. 162):

"What do you think all these things do to me? They certainly don't add to my esteem or happiness. At times I boil inside, but mostly I just feel licked. I never imagined that the peace of my home and the control over my children depended on my job. *Why, the job just rules your life.* Oh, we are still a family, but the ties are greatly weakened." (Italics not in original.)

Changes in personality and interaction. As we have seen, the worker tends to build up a certain pride in his job; he integrates his vocation with the expansion of his ego or with his self-assertive inclinations. Although the work itself may offer him little of interest, the wages he makes and the knowledge that he is employed bolster his self-esteem. Yet even in ordinary times the fear of unemployment may haunt the worker. And in the face of a rapid recession of business and industry during a depression, such a fear is enhanced by gossip and by comments in the press or over the radio. Sometimes the anticipation of loss of work itself affects morale and efficiency before the worker actually loses his job.

The first marked effect of unemployment, after the usual restless efforts to get temporary jobs, is the loss of the sense of security. Although intelligent workers may know that impersonal economic factors have brought on the depression, so deeply ingrained is the belief in individual responsi-

bility that most workers blame themselves for being unemployed. This attitude of blame is furthermore associated with a strong sense of guilt and often with a growing sense of inadequacy or inferiority at not finding some sort of other work. With no new position in sight the individual feels ever more frustrated. Some of his strongest desires or motives cannot find any normal or habitual outlets.

The sense of inferiority, of guilt, and of blame which the unemployed wage-earner develops becomes further enhanced by his reactions to his family, to neighbors, to friends and acquaintances, as well as to other workmen, quite unknown to him personally, who still have jobs. Also, the wife and children may blame the chief wage-earner for not making any money, and loss of adequate financial support for the family produces further conflicts between spouses or between parents and children. Then, too, the social configuration of the household routine is changed by the fact that the father may remain long hours every day at home and may for the first time try taking a hand in disciplining the children. Or he may actually interfere with long-established habits of the housewife herself. Moreover, if the children, as they approach the end of their schooling, find no work, this condition in turn may add to the strain of family life. If the wife goes out for employment, the inferiority of the husband may be further increased, and the children may more openly blame him for not supporting his family.

Obviously, individuals and families vary in their manner of meeting this sort of crisis. Despite the likelihood of increased friction among family members, it may be that the single man or woman who is unemployed faces, in some ways, even more serious personal problems than the married man. In summarizing the case of a well-educated bachelor who had once had a good position but had lost his job and his savings, the commentator remarked: "Alone, belonging nowhere, frustrated at every turn, forced to live on charity against the principles on which he had been reared, sex starved, feeling utterly useless, it is no wonder that he is cowed and apathetic."²

Then, too, the inflexibility of habits and attitudes often makes occupational readjustment difficult for workers even if they are provided with jobs, either on public works or in private industries. When a man has spent twenty-five or thirty years as a highly skilled artisan, he does not easily adapt himself to the occupational role of manual laborer or janitor. In the depression following 1929 this problem was perhaps as serious among the white-collar classes and people trained in the professions as it was among the skilled and semiskilled laborers.

As drastic as such a crisis is in the life of a man, how he reacts to it will depend in large part on how he has met other crises in the past. Yet it is

² From a case furnished the writer by Henry Ladd Smith in 1936.

difficult to tell in advance just what the emotional breaking point of any person is. A critical situation which may lead one man to melancholy, crime, alcoholism, or suicide may serve as an added incentive to another to make even greater efforts at readjustment. It would be well worth while to know the individual differences in such matters as they apply to work attitudes and habits. Are there any essential age or sex differences? What variations might be found in terms of type of vocation or profession? Are the skilled artisans less flexible than the unskilled laborers? Are those individuals accustomed to sharp seasonal fluctuations in employment more easily adaptable than workers long accustomed to steady work and steady incomes? And, finally, are the paupers and semipauperized classes least affected by a severe period of economic depression? (There is some observational evidence that the latter actually find an improvement in their conditions when public and private relief-giving becomes widespread.) But the precise answers to these questions are unknown. The data rest in the intangibles of attitude and idea, and so far we have little adequate information concerning these problems.

Nevertheless, in the absence of these desirable data, we may draw upon case studies and general observation in noting briefly some of the devices which individuals use to meet the crisis of unemployment. Again we must recall that none of these means is unique to this particular situation, although some of them have more direct bearing on the workers' adjustment than do others.

Devices used for meeting loss of economic security and morale. (1) The individual may evidence extreme aggressive attitudes toward his situation. His frustrations may take an antagonistic or sadistic turn. He may show resentment to his former employers or to the political-economic system in which he lives. This may consist in grumbling, irritability, self-pity, and various forms of "blowing off steam." Or these aggressive reactions may be transferred, under the stimulus of reformers and agitators, into adherence to a "cause" or "movement" that promises to replace the old order with a better one. These social myths offer the worker new symbols of identification, expectation, and demand for a "new deal," "land for the landless," "social credit," or "redistribution of wealth." The cause absorbs his energy, and he takes it seriously.

(2) In contrast, the individual may retreat from the situation, losing in time his courage, ambition, and morale. The logical end of such personal demoralization may be complete pauperism, in which the individual falls into a new culture pattern of exploiting those better off and accepting the doles and handouts of public or private charity.

Economic recovery, however, or devices like public works or community organization of leisure, may prevent such complete breakdown. Yet there is no doubt that long-continued public and private relief to large numbers

of individuals and families has had the effect of undermining former attitudes of self-assertion, independence, and individual responsibility. Correlated as these practices are with detailed control of budgets, expenditures, and everyday life, it is easy to understand how in time many individuals come to anticipate such care even though it represents a lower standard of living than they had been accustomed to. For the individual this wider public problem tends to represent a return to the form of control exercised over him during his childhood and adolescence. One is frequently amazed at the growing inclination in this country among many classes to refer all problems of economic security back to the state and federal governments, much in the manner of a distressed child or adolescent who turns to his parent for help and advice when he cannot solve his problems.

(3) Retreat into fantasy thinking and acting is not uncommon in crises. This may take the form of a vast amount of wishful thinking, or it may find its expression in running after fortune-tellers and other modern magic-makers, or it may, in some, be linked up with hopes inspired by the reformers mentioned above. The latter always secure at least some passive support from the daydreaming minority.

(4) Unemployed persons may take to excessive alcoholic drinking or to indulgence in drugs. These provide at least temporary surcease from worry, inferiority, and sense of guilt.

(5) A common occurrence is the escape into illness, either mental or physical or both. This is a well-known and widespread device for meeting what seem to be insuperable difficulties. It is known to occur among workers in good times; it is not uncommonly used by persons who have received minor injuries as a means of continuing a sick benefit. In fact, this device is perhaps one of the most widespread types of readjustment in persons of a mildly neurotic make-up. (See Chapter XXVIII.)

(6) There is always a small minority who find outlets in criminal and quasi-criminal behavior. This may be associated with revenge or other forms of negative expression toward society, or it may take the form of desertion of families, gambling, sexual perversity, or sexual immorality.

(7) A final gesture of despair and self-pity, of course, is suicide. The suicide rate almost always rises during periods of prolonged business depression and is evidently not confined to those in the upper social strata alone.

Statistical evidence of the occurrence of some of these attitudes and habits is found in Woolston's report on a sample of unemployed. From the records of 500 jobless persons who were interviewed by a relief agency, 147 opinions were gleaned about our economic order and the relief system. Of these, 70 per cent were of no significance because they showed no definite reactions, but the balance were classified into seven groups as follows (1935, p. 339):

TABLE 7

OPINIONS OF A GROUP OF UNEMPLOYED REGARDING THE ECONOMIC
DEPRESSION: 1930-35

	PERCENTAGE
1. Confidence in the present order	6
2. Faith that the storm will abate	10
3. Fighting grimly, but see no way out	23
4. Discouraged and won't work	12
5. Carping critics of the entire system	27
6. Desolate and desperate	8
7. Want to rebel against the present order	12

This is not the place to discuss the larger problem of ways and means of preventing these occupational crises from arising. But the matter is bound up in our whole political, economic, and social fabric. Many of the problems represent mere accentuations of difficulties encountered by the modern industrial worker on the job, but, when prolonged unemployment comes along, it enhances these problems and adds others. Until we can secure some more balanced relation between our economic life and the rest of our activities, until a societal order can be built, or emerges, which will provide the basic underpinning for economic security, we are likely to see recurrences of these problems. Yet, as has been said, this is only a phase of the larger matter of the integration of work habits and attitudes with those of the human personality as a totality.

Chapter XXIV

THE PERSONALITY OF THE JUVENILE DELINQUENT

IN THIS and the next four chapters we shall discuss certain forms of deviate behavior more or less obvious to observers in terms of their particular cultural training: juvenile delinquency, adult criminality, neurotic manifestations, and the more serious psychopathic behavior. To mention variant conduct at once raises the question what is meant by normal activity. The adjective *normal* is derived from the substantive *norm*, and a norm has to do with some standard accepted as correct. From the standpoint of this book, what is normal in thought, speech, or overt behavior depends on three factors: (1) the cultural standards of acceptable thought and conduct as usually defended and maintained by the élite or dominant classes; (2) the nature of the social interaction which furnishes the genesis and constant support of the personality (here, of course, the culturally determined definitions of conduct come into play, but many variations are possible in concrete interactions, so that the norm, as applied, tends with few exceptions to be at best an approximation to the ideal norm); (3) the manner in which the individual reorganizes his own experience: how his values or frames of reference are set up, that is, how he accepts, rejects, or modifies this or that cultural definition.

In short, the meaning of any particular experience results from personal-social training, from various cultural norms or patterns which one has acquired either verbally or overtly, from such constitutional factors as differences in intellectual capacities and in emotional-feeling tone, and from divergences in the organization of habits. What is deviant or abnormal in thought, speech, or act, then, depends largely on the cultural definition of the same as this is qualified by interaction and by an individual's unique life organization.

But behavior that is variant to one group may not be so to another, and we must recognize that abnormality is not purely a matter of how a given individual reorganizes his experiences. There may be culturally accepted patterns of conduct in a subgroup existing within a wider community. For instance, some forms of behavior which the general public consider delinquent or criminal may be fully accepted by some particular group living in a community. Organized racketeers do not consider their conduct

reprehensible; in fact, if forced to justify it, they can often produce amazingly plausible rationalizations for their practices in terms of our economic and political order.

Yet this tolerated but deviant behavior within a larger framework may reach into situations which directly touch the individuals and families of the more "normal" community. Thus employers often put up with a number of minor infractions of the law on the part of their servants. But even more significant, perhaps, is the fact that "normal" individuals, the pillars of society, often indulge in conduct which does not match up to their moral professions. People in high places "get away" with acts they condemn in others not of their own social class. These acts may be criminaloid in some instances; in others they may take on highly neurotic or even psychotic features. This is but a phase of that divergence between moral ideals or aspirations and actual achievement which we have already observed in other connections—in family life, in school, and in occupations. Yet despite such discrepancy between moral profession and practice, and despite conflicting norms in various groups in our complex society, such major matters as the protection of life, the preservation of the family mores, the maintenance of customary property rights and of public safety, and the adherence to certain religious-moral ideals are considered to be matters of public control.

Since the personality is built up both from the wider society and its culture and from various smaller groups within the larger societal framework, many conflicts in the definition of right and wrong may arise. Nevertheless, most persons work out some sort of accommodation among these divergent patterns. Others, however, fail to attain an adequate working program and fall into difficulties with their fellows. These are the variants in any society which must be taken care of in some way or other. The problem is essentially this: With what degree of success, as measured by adaptation, does an individual adopt the proper roles or operate with the acceptable ideas, traits, attitudes, and habits so as to participate successfully with those around him? In this question there are always two aspects: how the person himself interprets or gives meaning to his own reactions, and how they are considered by others. The definition of normality is the product of one's acceptance (introjection) of others' real or assumed definition of the situation. But in regard to many matters an individual may fail to take over the moral-legal roles expected of him by others, and his unique organization of experience may lead him into difficulties with those around him if they do not, in turn, accept or tolerate his peculiar role or definition of the situation. Though the religious or political fanatic may and often does get others to agree with his conception of the world and of his unusual place in it, the psychopathic patient in a hospital may be there, in part, because he failed to convince others of the soundness of his fantasies. So,

too, a delinquent boy or an adult criminal may possess a definition of certain conduct that does not agree with that of persons who maintain the *status quo*—the peace officers, preachers, and civic-minded members of the élite. We must never forget that the accommodative relations of persons who are labeled divergent by others are constantly qualified by just such factors.

THE NATURE OF DELINQUENT CONDUCT¹

Since conduct defined as delinquent or criminal runs counter to strongly emotionalized moral and legal taboos, it easily arouses more or less intense resentment, blame, and inclinations on the part of others to punish the malefactors. Misconduct has high social visibility. In fact, our culturally acquired sentiments and attitudes are such that it is extremely difficult for even otherwise intelligent laymen to take anything approaching a rational view of this sort of divergent conduct. Thus the high value which our society puts on private property and on adherence to our sexual code makes an individual highly sensitive to the breaking of these codes by others, and the rather cruel and violent punitive justice which we mete out to offenders is evidence, in part, of our own strongly repressed reactivity to these same taboos. In a very real sense when we punish others we punish ourselves. (G. H. Mead, 1918.) In a way offenders are psychological scapegoats for the so-called law-abiding and normal people in the community. It is evident that we cannot understand or deal with the problems of delinquency and crime without bearing in mind the interactional aspects of the relations of these deviates to the rest of us. As with the neurotics and psychopaths, these individuals are in great measure like ourselves. In truth, the motivations and meanings of actions which are labeled illegal and disapproved are often not strikingly different from motivations and meanings which lie behind moral or socially approved conduct.

If one ask why we study the delinquent personality, the reply must be that only by discovering the meaning and impulses of these variant individuals may we hope to discover the factors—both in the society and culture and within these persons themselves—which induce this type of adaptation to the world in which such persons live. Until we understand these factors in conduct, we cannot hope to predict and hence control such behavior in the best interests of the larger community. In other words, the prevention of delinquent habits and attitudes or, at second best, the restoration of the delinquent boy or girl to the normally accepted forms of activity cannot be expected until those who deal with these young people know what principles to apply. While we are far removed from a full knowledge of these principles, psychology and the social sciences have made

¹ While the present chapter will deal with juvenile delinquency, many aspects relate equally well to problems of adult criminality.

some contribution toward a more adequate comprehension of the incitement and course of delinquent careers.

Definition of delinquency. Two obvious questions arise at once: What is delinquency? And who is a delinquent? Clearly delinquent acts are those which parents, neighbors, schoolteachers, merchants, preachers, policemen, and others define as *antisocial* in the sense of contrary to morally and legally accepted types of conduct. (But the term "antisocial" is normative and not scientific. Delinquent, like criminal, activity involves interaction and hence is *social* though it is not approved by persons who have power and prestige in the community. More strictly, delinquency is *misconduct*, that is, it is antimoral and antilegal in character.) Yet many acts of children and youth which we do not label delinquent are disapproved. It is often difficult to draw the line between the "problem child" of the home or school and the delinquent. In the present chapter our attention will be upon the deviant child and adolescent whose misconduct—as legally defined—leads to his control by some judicial and law-enforcing agency. While the state statutes vary in the matter of definition, the following from a model juvenile court law formulated by the National Probation Association provides a working basis for distinguishing delinquency from other, somewhat related acts. (See Sutherland, 1934, p. 273.)

"The words 'delinquent child' include: (a) A child who has violated any law of the state or any ordinance or regulation of a subdivision of the state. (b) A child who by reason of being wayward or habitually disobedient is uncontrolled by his parent, guardian or custodian. (c) A child who is habitually truant from school or home. (d) A child who habitually so deports himself as to injure or endanger the morals or health of himself or others."

From the legal standpoint it is the *act* of a young person with which the courts and probation-officers must be concerned. But note the broad scope of these acts, particularly in items (b) and (d) above, which have to do with such vague concepts—in the manner of the mores generally—as waywardness and disobedience. Although one aim in setting up juvenile courts was to remove the stigma of adult criminality from young persons, and to remove them from some of the responsibilities which the old common law and the statutes imposed on youth, another reason for its establishment was the public recognition of the fact that the traditional familial and neighborhood mores were no longer operating successfully in respect to many young children. Unlike the law for adult malefactors, the statutes for juvenile offenders do not place the responsibility for their acts entirely upon their own shoulders, but also upon the parents and other family members, or upon guardians and others who are held accountable for them. The juvenile-court judge, in fact, often stands *in loco parentis* to the child.

But the juvenile judge, the probation officer, the social-service worker,

and the psychologist are concerned not only with the overt act. This, to them, is merely the symptom of some underlying maladjustment within the child or adolescent. The aim of these persons is so to understand the young offender's motives and meanings as to help him to return to habits and attitudes more in conformity with the community standards of conduct.²

Multiple factors inducing delinquency. A wide variety of individuals are lumped together under the category of delinquency, and we find that the factors inducing misconduct in any one of them may be complex and numerous. We usually have to deal with social-cultural factors on the one hand, and with those which are considered phases of the personality organization itself, on the other. But the former are not independent of the latter. After all, it is the *meaning* to the individual of the poor home, of the low income, of the neighborhood companions, or of his family background which is significant. While broken homes, unemployment of parents, squalor, and family conflict may be factors inducing a boy to a delinquent career, it must always be remembered that thousands of children who grow up in such circumstances are not labeled delinquent and are not problem children. Moreover, not every act of the child, but only certain acts, get him into legal difficulties. In other words, the process of personal adaptation is not essentially different from what it is in many other situations involving home, school, vocation, play life, church, and citizenship. *There is no special psychology of delinquents and criminals.*

While the sociologist is chiefly concerned with the situations which stimulate juvenile delinquency and with the broad effects upon the community of such responses, the social psychologist and the psychiatrist are concerned fundamentally with the delinquent's own drives and meanings, that is, with the internal factors. They want, if they can, to get at the inner life, on the assumption that this is fundamental to a knowledge of the relation of the receptivity of the stimuli to overt action.

In the discussion which follows we shall first merely summarize the more important situational factors which are closely correlated, or believed to be correlated, with delinquent conduct. Then we shall pass on to consider our chief problem: the various aspects of the life organization of the delinquent, with special attention to his inner world. The chapter will close with some psychological comments on various treatment programs applied to delinquents.

² Although the statistical data on juvenile delinquency are not complete or satisfactory, in 1928 F. P. Cabot (1932) estimated that about 1 per cent of American children of juvenile-court age were handled by the courts in 1928. It is doubtful if the proportion has greatly altered in the decade or so since this estimate. In fact, there is some evidence that the rates of delinquency have declined somewhat in the years since Cabot's estimate was made. (See Children's Bureau, 1940.)

SOCIAL-CULTURAL BACKGROUNDS OF DELINQUENCY

The student of the social-cultural backgrounds of delinquency usually lists the following as being important: (1) the nature and quality of community organization, (2) variations in culture patterns, (3) the low economic circumstances of families from which delinquents come, (4) school retardation, (5) misuse of leisure time, (6) the influence of certain cultural patterns upon delinquents and criminals, and finally, but not least important, (7) the family situation.

(1) In our society, at least, juvenile delinquency is closely associated with urbanism and that secondary-group organization which characterizes our modern industrial life. As Reckless and Smith (1932, p. 47) state, "Without exception, all of the investigations show rural delinquency to be less than urban delinquency per unit of population." The complexity and impersonality of urban life, its lack of recreation and the loss of primary-group controls—all seem to foster misconduct. However, there are wide variations in the incidence of delinquency in particular urban neighborhoods. We find the highest rates of delinquency in sections of our American cities marked by low incomes, congestion of population, poor housing, and lack of adequate recreational facilities. (See Shaw, 1929; and Shaw and McKay, 1931.)

(2) Variations in the cultural backgrounds of families and neighborhoods have a bearing on the problem of delinquency. Children of immigrant parents or from our own rural sections are caught between two worlds: the older primary-group type, and the diffuse secondary sort, and misconduct often arises out of the all too obvious conflict between the norms of their families and those of the urban world. (See Wirth, 1931; J. Levy, 1933; and Crook, 1934.)

(3) It is often contended that poverty induces delinquency and crime. (See Bonger, 1916.) Yet there is slight evidence that crime is affected in rate during periods of economic depression. (D. S. Thomas, 1925.) Healy (1915), and Healy and Bronner (1926), whose work with delinquents is so well known, do not consider poverty as significant a factor as subtler matters of cultural conflict, family disharmony, and others. (See, however, Glueck and Glueck, 1934.)

(4) A number of studies have shown that retardation in school is another external factor of considerable importance in relation to delinquency, especially when poor school performance is associated with low mental ability and with inadequate provision for vocational training.

(5) The misuse of leisure time as a concomitant of misconduct has long been noted. Play affords a natural setting for socialization and especially for moral training. Unsupervised and inadequate recreation in our urban

centers is often associated with the rise of delinquent gangs which furnish the growing boy in particular with patterns of conduct that may greatly influence his subsequent life organization. The importance of companionship in delinquent behavior is well established. (See Shaw and McKay, 1931.) Thus in Chicago in 1928, among first offenders, 74.4 per cent were involved with companions. Not only has the influence of gangs and companionship been frequently noted, but in recent years the motion picture has been blamed for much of the "wild behavior" of our youth. While the motion picture may furnish patterns of misconduct along with its vicarious thrills and adventures, its influence on children is highly variable. So much depends on the general cultural level of the families and neighborhoods from which the children come, upon the social-emotional traits and attitudes which have already been built up, and upon the meaning of the pictures in the total life interests of the young people. While motion pictures may feed the fantasy life of adolescents—delinquent or not—and help foster hopes and intentions to live in luxury or to indulge in romance or adventure, there is little or no evidence of direct influences of these vicarious experiences upon delinquent acts themselves. Would-be reformers have but fastened on the motion picture as a "cause" of misconduct because they are usually indifferent to or disinterested in the deeper and more fundamental etiology of divergent conduct.⁸

Like the motion picture, the radio has been criticized as a possible source of suggestion toward delinquent conduct. But again there is no positive or direct proof of its deleterious influences. As with the possible effect of motion pictures, one must examine its stimulation against the background of a host of personality factors: motives, emotions, intellectuality, interest, and meaning in the total economy of thought and action.

(6) Culture patterns of crime and delinquency which often surround youngsters in certain sections of our cities doubtless greatly influence the direction of their interests and behavior. The continuity from adolescent to adult gangs is well known. (See Thrasher, 1927; Shaw, 1930; and Shaw and McKay, 1931.) But it is not only the direct training or the neighborhood "copies" of adult crime which stimulate youthful misconduct; the whole exploitive, speculative, money-making pattern of our business ethos doubtless has some indirect effects. In a society where illegal enterprises such as stock-market rigging, embezzlement, and the sale of worthless

⁸ The most important researches on the effects of the motion picture on children's attitudes and conduct will be found in the following: Renshaw, Miller, and Marquis (1933); Dysinger and Ruckmick (1933); Peters (1933); Charters (1933); Holaday and Stoddard (1933); Peterson and Thurstone (1933); Shuttleworth and May (1933); Blumer and Hauser (1933); and Blumer (1933). It is rather unfortunate that the cautiousness of these workers is ignored in Forman's popular account, *Our Movie-Made Children* (1933), which is clearly a piece of special pleading. He quotes the above-named research workers only when it suits his purpose to abuse the motion pictures and ignores other evidence. As a result, his book is thoroughly misleading and propagandistic in character.

securities are winked at, or thought to be a mark of success, there is evidently a certain tolerance for crime not to be found elsewhere.

(7) As we have emphasized throughout, the family is the matrix of fundamental training, and its place in the stimulation of misconduct has often been noted. Among sociological items frequently noted are the broken home, the practices of criminal or other deviant conduct on the part of parents or siblings, and, more important but less easy to quantify, such factors as family harmony or conflict.

The evidence for direct correlation of delinquency and the broken home is not unequivocal. The percentages of delinquents in correctional institutions who come from such homes vary from 60 per cent, reported by Sullenger (1936) for a Nebraska sample, to 37 per cent, for a Wisconsin sample given by Caldwell (1930). (See also Slawson, 1923; Healy and Bronner, 1926; Lumpkin, 1931; and Jameson, 1938.) Most of these studies do not present any comparable figures for proportions of broken homes among nondelinquents of the same age, sex, intelligence, and school attainment. Shaw and McKay (1931), however, showed that in their data from Chicago the percentage of delinquents coming from broken homes was but slightly higher than that of nondelinquents of comparable age and grade status. The broken home is not necessarily the deleterious influence it is often imagined to be. It is the combination of such familial background with other factors which must be kept in mind.

A considerable proportion of delinquents come from families characterized by criminal or other misconduct. Glueck and Glueck (1934) found that in one fifth of their sample one or both parents were characterized by criminality. Healy and Bronner (1926) found in 4,000 Chicago cases that 21 per cent of the parents either were alcoholic or immoral, or had a criminal record. (See also Healy and Bronner, 1936, where they report the same percentage for their Boston, New Haven, and Detroit study.) So, too, the child born out of wedlock is more likely to become delinquent than legitimate children, but this condition is, obviously, correlated with low economic status, mental deficiency, and deviant patterns of conduct on the part of the parents. (Sullenger, 1936.) Likewise, if a sibling is an offender, there is higher probability that a given youngster will also be delinquent than among children with nondelinquent siblings. (Healy and Bronner, 1926.)

But statistical data furnish only the external picture of the family situation. As Cabot (1932, p. 33) puts it, "The home may meet beautifully every statistical criterion and yet miserably fail to meet the child's most elemental needs." In short, the social-emotional and interactional contacts within the family must be examined.

These factors are clearly hard to measure, but some ratings have been made by various investigators. One of Healy and Bronner's studies (1936) reported that 44 per cent of the homes of the delinquency sample were distinctly under the domination of the father, and 31 per cent under that of the mother. For his 197 cases of delinquents, Burt (1925) says that 61 per cent had had "defective discipline," in contrast to 12 per cent for a comparable nondelinquent sample. For his sample, defective discipline was calculated to be four times as significant as poverty as a factor

conducive to delinquency. The matter of discipline itself rests upon certain broad patterns of authority exerted in the home. This may be absent, may be inconsistently administered, or may be either too weak or oversevere in terms of the accepted community norms. Burt (1925) states that overstrictness was reported in 10 per cent of his delinquent cases, and "weak and easy-going" measures in about 25 per cent of his cases. (See also Glueck and Glueck, 1934.) We have already pointed out the significance of playing fast and loose with the child's emotional and social training, and we but observe its accentuation in many of these instances.

The ideals of a family are difficult to measure, but undoubtedly they play a definite part in the child's life. Where there is alcoholism, vice, or delinquency on the part of the parents or siblings, the growing child often tends to fall into like patterns. Even when parents take the view that a child shall act better and differently than themselves or the child's siblings, the suggestions of overt conduct usually outweigh verbal admonitions or pious hopes. The belief that one may secure wealth and luxury without working or by devious ways is often present, and the child who tries to run counter to this suggestion from either his family or his neighborhood has to overcome great handicaps.

Doubtless, lack of insight on the part of the parents, as well as on the part of the delinquent boy or girl, is an important feature in these family relations. Healy and Bronner (1936) comment on the amazing lack of understanding by parents of the factors in the situation which contributed to the misconduct of their children. Moreover, as we have already noted, parents often vary sharply in their treatment of their different children. Then, too, while overstrict discipline is common, we do find occasionally a projection of a parent's own unsatisfactory childhood experience upon his offspring, which leads to the parent's dealing too sentimentally and softly with him.

In this connection it is interesting to note that one quarter of the parents in Healy and Bronner's 1936 sample considered that their own childhood had been unhappy. Yet only 5 per cent of them thought that they had been emotionally rejected by their own parents. That they had been "spoiled" or overprotected in their own childhood was admitted by 10 per cent of the mothers. Yet the delinquents experienced emotional rejection in 31 per cent of the cases from the hands of the father, and in 37 per cent of the instances from the mother. Likewise, one third of the mothers in this series overprotected or spoiled those children who later became delinquent.

The emotional tone of the family interactions is perhaps the most crucial factor among many. A child may be reared in poverty, in deteriorated neighborhoods, and with severe educational and vocational handicaps, but, if there are harmony, love, and affection between the parents, between parents and children, and among the children themselves, he may escape many of the difficulties which we have been discussing. Such a home provides a sense of security and of companionship which is indispensable. In contrast, quarreling, bickering, and overt violence between father and mother or among other members puts a premium on aggressive and sadistic attitudes and habits that can hardly fail to influence the growing boy or girl. From these patterns the child constructs his own role and status. That

is, his own self or ego organization tends to take on these features. But these features are difficult to evaluate in a statistical way, as we shall see in the next section, where we consider these matters more fully.

PERSONALITY FACTORS

Against the backgrounds of society and culture which have just been described, one may ask not only why some children become delinquent and why others do not, but what is the nature of the delinquent's life organization? What is his concept of himself? What motivates him to an act called delinquent? And what do the motive and the act mean to him? More specifically, how does he value his experiences which others designate as delinquent? In this section the discussion will deal first with the attempts to classify the overt acts labeled delinquent in terms of social-cultural and inner personality factors. Then we shall essay a somewhat dynamic interpretation of the delinquent's conduct in terms of his intellectual and emotional capacities and of the stresses which operate in the course of his efforts to adapt himself to his world and to his inner demands for self-satisfaction—for pride, sense of security, and meaningful role and status.

Classification of behavior manifestations. One might classify the behavior of delinquents in terms of the offenses with which young persons are charged before the courts. But, since delinquency is a cultural definition of particular acts representing certain overt outlets for widely varied impulses within the individual, the legal categories of offenses will not aid us in understanding these inner factors. As we have noted in regard to other aspects of behavior, a diversity of stimuli or situations may give rise to like or identical conduct, just as like or single stimuli may set off a variety of overt acts among individuals. (See Figure 1, page 6.)

A more satisfactory method of classifying delinquent behavior might be through a consideration of the social-cultural situations under which such conduct occurs. From the correlation of overt acts and the situation, an attempt might be made to infer the internal life of the individual. But it is evident that the strictly statistical methods of correlation of overt acts and environmental conditions hardly suffice to give us the requisite data for coming to grips with the fundamentals of meaning and motivation. (See Chapter XI.) Yet such a method must not be neglected, for statistical surveys reveal frequency of behavior trends, typicality of certain acts, and seriousness of offenses as defined by the legal norms as well as the probable linkage of these overt symptoms to social-cultural factors, such as family life, income, schooling, and recreational facilities. We also need the kind of data provided by the case history if we are to secure a more adequate understanding of the relationship of inner backgrounds of overt conduct. Regard for this latter research device implies that we deal with meaning and motivation in personality structure and function, that we

consider the self or ego organization of the individual in terms of his role and status among his fellows. This would include attention to possible physical features and to intellectual capacities, and a full recognition of social-emotional manifestations. And, if we wish to analyze these factors into their elements, we must examine the nature and functions of traits, attitudes, ideas, frames of reference or values, and habits.

Obviously, the self does not operate without regard to its environment, and many students have attempted to combine the overt conduct, the inner features, and the situations. Healy and Bronner (1936) note, first, those delinquent cases for whom the prognosis of return to nondelinquent behavior is highly unfavorable even with sound family and community conditions. "They are the abnormal or the markedly neurotic personalities, or those suffering from severe mental conflicts, and mental defectives—any of these who have already established delinquent tendencies" (1936, p. 161).

Of the 143 cases in their sample, 18 per cent fell into this first category. They classify a second group: those cases coming from pathological social-cultural situations, both within and without the family. In their 1936 report they found that "no less than 80 per cent" of the families in this classification came from areas in their communities marked by high delinquency rates. (Thirty-five per cent of their total cases were put into this group.) The others, 47 per cent, they place in a third category: those who were not marked by any noticeable "internal difficulties" and who lived in areas not characterized by social and cultural pathic conditions sufficient to handicap efforts to treat such cases successfully.

Such a classification is by no means scientifically satisfactory, for it combines cultural and social concepts—that is, stimuli or situations—with the subjective psychological categories, which makes for a somewhat illogical confusion of sociological and psychological concepts. Yet, as unsatisfactory as this approach is, it may well be that we cannot escape some such eclectic view at this juncture of our knowledge.

Certainly in many juvenile-court cases there is little or no evidence of emotional disturbance or of more serious pathological conditions. The boy or girl may grow up in an environment where certain acts are considered to be in the more or less tolerated or permissible folkways of a particular group. (See above.) Some of these young persons, either because of the frequency of their conduct not approved outside or because of its manifestations beyond the boundaries of their particular area, may in time run afoul of the law and the mores imposed by the dominant groups in the larger community—city, county, or state. These youngsters become labeled delinquent. Some of them may react readily to sensible treatment or correction of one sort or another. Others may react negatively to such handling and so be set upon a life career of delinquency and crime at least partially as a result of such attempted reformation. There is much evidence that a

great deal of illegal and immoral (counter to mores) behavior in these neighborhoods does not result in arrests. Yet this does not mean that all the young people brought up in these areas are potential or unapprehended delinquents. There are combinations of family circumstances, gang membership, adult patterns of crime, and other differentiating features which would play a part in particular cases. Yet even within the very families from which delinquents come in the face of similar if not identical exposure to criminal patterns outside the home, there grow up many children who evidence no serious misconduct. But again the unique organization of each person's life is no different in these than in other life situations. In order to understand and "explain" divergence in conduct under such circumstances here, there is often no need to appeal to the concepts of mental conflict, emotional distress, or severe pathological conditions among the delinquent siblings as contrasted to the normality of the non-delinquent ones.

One cannot examine the literature on delinquency or deal with actual cases in clinics without the recognition that many of these young persons, at least in their initial legally defined misconduct, are to all intents and purposes as normal as the usual run of youngsters of their own age. If a psychologist were to consider some of these cases merely in terms of integration or sound balance of personality, without reference to public morality, he would readily admit that many of them are as well balanced or integrated as any individual he gets to know in the family, in his school, business, or church, or in his civic or recreational contacts. At least at the outset of their misbehavior, there is no evidence of mental conflict or emotional disturbance of a deep-seated sort in a large fraction of the cases who come from such backgrounds.

On the other hand, many delinquents are obviously the victims of mental conflict or some other sort of emotional frustration and distress. This internal disturbance, this sense of insecurity or of inferiority, may find its overt manifestations in such escape patterns as running away from home, truancy, or compensatory reactions of a wide variety, including efforts to secure a satisfactory status. In other instances it may find its outlet in aggressive, rebellious, or revengeful and sadistic responses, such as antagonism to various forms of authority and discipline, or strong emotionalized reactions to wrongs felt by others. Or the thwarting of normal demands for affection and what W. I. Thomas calls the desire for intimate response, which is not necessarily directly sexual, may prove to be the motivating element. Moreover, there is evidence that occasionally delinquents, like some adult criminals, are driven to misconduct by an impulse toward punishment. Such individuals get a certain satisfaction from suffering at the hands of those in authority—a masochistic counterpart, perhaps, to their aggression.

Finally, there are those delinquents who must be considered, against our cultural norms, as definitely defective and pathological. These would include those of low-grade intelligence who are also emotionally disturbed and lacking in capacity to develop a moral self or role—the so-called “moral imbecile.” (See Goddard, 1915b.) These would include also those who have otherwise sufficient intelligence to make an adequate adaptation to life but who are so paranoiac or emotionally unstable as to be incapable of behavior called normal—the neurotic or prepsychotic. Furthermore, there should be included here the epileptic and postencephalitic cases and others with such severe neurological injuries as to restrict or eliminate the inhibitions to their impulses that would enable them to lead lives compatible with their fellows. (See Chapters XXVI and XXVIII.) The percentage of these constitutionally deficient cases in the total population of delinquents is very small, however.

Intelligence and delinquency. When measured by the customary intelligence tests, delinquent boys and girls are found to have, on the average, lower intelligence quotients than nondelinquents of comparable chronological ages. But the published studies vary widely as to how great this difference is. It was not uncommon, when the Binet-Simon tests were first applied to inmates of correctional institutions, to find reports that more than half of the delinquents therein were feeble-minded. In the period of the first enthusiasm for mental testing, many psychologists naïvely believed that they had at last found the key which would unlock the mystery of the causes of delinquency. Most investigators take a more sober view today.

Sutherland (1931) has critically reviewed 145 investigations of the intelligence of delinquents in correctional institutions, 1910–1928, and has found wide discrepancies in the reported intelligence quotients. As a typical instance he cites the findings at the Indiana Boys' School: For the years 1914–1917 the proportion of delinquents diagnosed as feeble-minded was 59 per cent; for 1922–1927 it was but 10 per cent. This does not mean that by some magic the percentage of intellectually low-grade children in these institutions changed so sharply.

The earlier studies reported the mean or median I.Q. of delinquents as falling, for the most part, in the range 75–85, and recent investigations report considerable differences in the average I.Q. of delinquents, ranging from 79 to 91. (See McClure, 1933; Lane and Witty, 1935; Owen, 1937; and Lichtenstein and Brown, 1938.)

These variations in interpretation depend obviously upon what the mental testers considered to be normal intelligence. Also, the sampling of delinquents has not always been adequately controlled. Then, too, lack of adequate motivation on the part of the delinquent examinees must be reckoned with, to say nothing of the incompetence in many quarters of those who administered the tests. Finally, the validity and reliability of intelligence tests themselves have been the subject of much criticism.

Lane and Witty's review (1935) of studies for the years 1912–1934 further confirm Sutherland's findings. They state the more common standpoint of investigators today

in these words: "Not only do present-day students find relatively small percentage of feeble-mindedness among delinquents, but they attach less significance than did former investigators to the fact that the average I.Q. of delinquent children is below 100." (1935, p. 2.)

The well-known high correlation of scholastic achievement with intelligence, as measured by the usual tests, indicates just what a study of individual cases reveals, namely, that retardation in school and intellectual incapacity go hand in hand together.

The report of the Crime Commission of the State of New York (1929) throws interesting light on this matter. In a study of 41 pairs of brothers—one delinquent, one not—it was found that the average I.Q. of the former was 75, and of the latter 68; and that the corresponding educational quotients were 81 and 92.5. This report goes on to state that the school retardation of delinquents is two and a half as frequent as it is among nonproblem boys. Lack of adequate motivation to attempt the traditional school curriculum is apparent in many instances. In interpreting his survey of 1,285 young male offenders in the Pontiac, Illinois, reformatory, many of whom were under twenty-one years of age, G. E. Hill (1936, p. 26) aptly remarks, "Apparently among these boys, the lad of low ability, the slow learner, has been placed in school circumstances and given a type of training that made success [in school] very improbable." This comment would doubtless apply to a wide range of the delinquents found in our correctional institutions. As Lichtenstein and Brown (1938, p. 1) well say, "The mental growth of delinquents as well as non-delinquents is never an isolated phenomenon, but is rather a function of cultural and hereditary factors."

It is apparent from the evidence that we cannot consider intelligence as the single determining factor in behavior, either normal or deviate. Beckham (1932), among others, has shown that the possession of a low I.Q. does not necessarily predispose a child to delinquency, though obviously the problem of learning and relearning is greatly qualified by mental level. It is interesting to recall that as early as 1914, just when the intelligence test was coming into great favor, Sigurd Dahlstrom, on the basis of his long experience with delinquents and criminals, had the following to say about the results of testing prisoners' intelligence in Norway: "If the 'young criminal' is below the normal in intelligence, it is, at any rate as far as most of them are concerned, in so insignificant a degree as to be imperceptible in relation to the demands that life imposes upon him." (See Dahlstrom, 1928, p. 99.)

Yet no one can deny that in many instances the level of intellectual capacity, along with other factors, should be considered in interpreting misconduct. But the precise relation of intelligence to delinquent or non-delinquent behavior is not easy to determine. There is obviously no direct, one-way cause-and-effect relationship. Poor performance on the tests may be, in part at least, qualified by the inadequate cultural conditions from

which the children came. (See E. T. Glueck, 1935, for an interpretation of intelligence and delinquency which completely neglects the probable cultural factors.) It is very interesting to note that Jenkins and Brown found that the geographical distribution of mental deficiency among Chicago children resembles in a striking manner the pattern of distribution of juvenile delinquency which Shaw (1929) and his coworkers have shown. It is not that there is necessarily a direct casual connection, but, as Jenkins and Brown (1935, p. 300) say, "It seems . . . probable that the relationship is likely to be a dependence of each on the more general phenomenon of urban organization, disorganization, and stratification."⁴

Despite these cautions we must not ignore the importance of intellectual capacity in dealing with the personality adaptation of the delinquent. Most clinical psychologists well recognize that mental dullness, especially evident in the failure to comprehend the significance of moral codes and moral behavior, is an important factor not only in their misconduct but in the failure of many of these young persons to undertake successfully a course of reformation. If the possession of normal intellectual capacity—that is, ability to learn and to use the imagination constructively—is important to the rise of the self, is fundamental along with emotions and feelings in the development of traits, attitudes, and habits, then we cannot neglect the importance of the intellectual functions in dealing with the personality problems of delinquents. The main matter to bear in mind is that such functions do not operate without reference to social-emotional values and attitudes. When a child lacks the constitutional capacity to acquire the mental instruments necessary to successful adaptation, he is always in danger of failure. Put otherwise, he is likely to attempt adjustment in some deviant or ineffective manner, as these manifestations, of course, are defined by his culture.

The following case illustrates some of the difficulties of a delinquent lad whose low mentality, along with his inadequate family background, played an important part in his misconduct.

Case of Thaddeus Castle. Tad, as the boy was called, aged 15 years, was arrested for having stolen \$100, two watches, and two fountain pens from men living in a college dormitory. The theft was readily admitted by the boy, who mentioned two other boys, Jimmy Kasten and Verne Stewart, as having told him "to get the stuff" and as having spent a part of the money.

⁴ Additional supporting data along this line are found in Freeman and Holzinger (1928), who demonstrated from studies of changes in the intelligence quotients of siblings placed in foster homes of differing socioeconomic status that intelligence as measured by the tests is modifiable. Likewise, studies by Wellman (1934) and Stoddard (1939) have shown that the long-held assumption that the I.Q. is always constant must be modified. There is no reason for believing that the intelligence-test performance of delinquents necessarily indicates a factor which is unchangeable. (See also R. L. Thorndike, 1940; McNemar, 1940; Wellman, Skeels, and Skodak, 1940; Skeels, 1940; and Wellman, 1940.)

The medical examination showed that the lad was in fair health, although he had rather inadequate care at home. His I.Q. was 70. He had long been a retarded pupil and had recently been transferred by special permission to the vocational school in the hope of his learning a trade. His chief companions were the two boys mentioned above and one or two others.

The father, aged 51 years, who was a common laborer, had been brought up on a farm. He had never gone beyond the sixth grade of a country school. Mr. Castle drank heavily and, though a fairly competent worker when sober, was often out of work. Mrs. Castle, though only 38 years old, appeared much older because of child-bearing, heavy work, and worry. There were five girls and three boys in the family. Tad was the second child and oldest son.

The family had for seven years been a frequent charge to the family-welfare association, not only for food and rent, but for medical and dental services. A medical examination made two years previously had shown both parents to be syphilitic. The parents were never given any mental tests, but it was apparent that both were dull-normal. The relations of Mr. and Mrs. Castle were characterized by suspicion and constant quarreling. The psychologist's interview with Tad further corroborated the evidence of a subnormal home life which had provided him with no adequate ideals or work habits. He thoroughly despised his father, but stated that he had always been fond of his mother.

Tad lacked any sort of supervised recreation. He did not belong to any Boy Scout troop or other club. He occasionally attended motion pictures of the Wild West variety, did little or no reading, but did express interest in fishing, skiing, and hiking. He spent most of his time "bumming around with the boys." He said he wanted a job, but had no notion of the kind of work he wished to do.

There was no evidence of emotional instability. His principal worries concerned only things which were obviously associated with his theft and subsequent arrest. He was, however, highly suggestible and evidently had been previously exploited in a series of petty thefts by Jimmy Kasten and especially by Verne Stewart.

On the clinic's recommendation the juvenile-court judge placed him on probation with the provision that he repay the \$20 necessary to make up the total amount which he had stolen. (The rest had been recovered.) But little or no provision was made for more adequate schooling or for supervision of his leisure time. A few weeks later, however, with the permission of the court, he left the city to live for some months with an aunt in a remote section of the country.

Although the prognosis of Tad's future was none too bright, the subsequent history shows that, even in the face of mental retardation and inadequate home conditions, recovery may be made. Certainly Tad's serious delinquency has to date been his last. He returned from his aunt's care and found work as a common laborer wherever he could. At the age of 20 he married, and in the four years following his wife bore him two daughters and one son. The family had to be given public assistance for medical care, especially for Mrs. Castle and her babies. Even during the economic depression Tad worked whenever he could. For two years he was employed in a factory, and in 1936 his total earnings were \$1,114.51, of which \$178.00 represented extra work unloading coal outside his regular working hours. He seems to be an earnest worker and easygoing in temperament; but his wife—like his own mother—is a poor manager.

In this case such factors as inadequate family life, unsupervised leisure time, and mental deficiency doubtless furnished together a setting for divergent behavior. The more immediate factors leading to serious delinquency, however, were evidently mental dullness and high suggestibility, which were exploited by his more intelligent companions. Though Tad doubtless had no moral or legal conception of the seriousness of his theft, he showed a sense of shame and guilt, and his ready admission of the act is further proof of the lack of mental inhibition which might well characterize a brighter boy. But there was no evidence of mental conflict, frustration, sense of personal insecurity, or other emotional distress or instability. Apparently this one serious act did not divert Tad into any other delinquency.

Yet the fact of markedly low-grade intelligence often complicates the problem of reformation. The delinquent who has the mind of an imbecile may and often does present the judge, the clinician, and the social worker with special difficulties. Though these cases are relatively few among the total number of delinquents, nevertheless it is highly important to recognize their potential inability to make adequate social-cultural adjustments. This is especially true of those instances wherein severe mental deficiency is coupled with emotional instability, epilepsy, or postencephalitic conditions. In one sense the low-grade feeble-minded individual is a potential criminal in that he lacks, apparently, the ability ever to adopt the moral roles and the attendant attitudes and traits which will enable him to make a mature adaptation to society.

Studies of attitudes and traits of delinquents. Investigations into the emotional attitudes and traits of delinquents, like those of nondelinquent children, fall roughly into two classes: statistical and quantitative studies which used various tests, schedules, and questionnaires; and the qualitative descriptions and interpretations of case histories. At this point we shall review only a sample of the former; the latter will be discussed in the section following.

Slawson (1926) found that, of one sample of 879 delinquent boys, only 15.6 per cent reached or exceeded the median score of comparable unselected school children on the Woodworth-Mathews inventory of emotional instability, and that, while the former were deficient in verbal intelligence, they did as well as the control group on the Stenquist mechanical-aptitude tests. In a comparison of 100 delinquent Negro boys with nondelinquents of the same race, Daniel (1932) found the former to be the more neurotic and emotionally unstable as measured by the Woodworth-Mathews and other inventories. Casselberry (1932) found delinquents "slightly more introverted than non-delinquents" as indicated by scores on the Neymann-Kohlstedt schedule; and, compared with his control group, they were less trustworthy and also revealed more divergent attitudes toward such matters as thrift, smoking, the importance of boys' club work, "speed cops," and the like. He also found—using the Terman attitude-interest test—that the delinquent boys in his sample were "less

masculine-minded than the boys in the adjusted group." (See also Tjaden, 1926; Collins, 1927; and Speer, 1936.)

Reusser (1933) tested 60 juvenile probationers and 423 delinquent boys in the Iowa Training School with Sweet's personal-attitudes test for younger boys and compared their performance with that of 419 public-school boys of about the same school status, but with slightly better average intelligence in the control group. There were no significant differences in capacity for self-criticism or in expression of feelings of inferiority. On the other hand, the delinquents as a group were distinctly more critical of the attitudes of the average boy, had a sharper sense of difference from others, and expressed distinct feelings of being superior to others. The delinquents likewise were more out of touch with the ideas of the average boy, and they showed definite lack of social insight when compared with the public-school controls.

On the other hand, Babcock (1932) in comparing a sample of delinquents with a control group on a variety of measures of adjustment, including such matters as sense of inferiority, honesty, co-operativeness, daydreaming, perseverance (as a measure of undue resistance to suggestion or change), personal popularity, family adjustment, and attitudes and opinions regarding schoolwork, teachers, and religious-moral instruction, found that, when the factors of age, intelligence, and socioeconomic status were held constant, "delinquent boys cannot be clearly differentiated from non-delinquent boys by any of the measures used."

While no one doubts that social-emotional traits and attitudes play a crucial part in delinquency, the attempts to uncover their precise function by means of statistical studies are not entirely satisfactory. In addition, especially where the tests or inventories deal with moral meanings and with expected reactions to parents, siblings, companions, teachers, policemen, and others, the delinquent boy or girl frequently adopts the mental set or *Aufgabe* to appear as well as possible in the eyes of the tester. The conventional and rather stereotyped character of many responses to test items, in contrast to free-flowing associations in the informal interview (once rapport is established), is known to every careful clinical psychologist. Verbal responses, like overt conduct, vary with the time and place, and, despite the generalization of experience and attitudes into somewhat unified and constant patterns, there is always a likelihood, especially at the level of verbal communication, that the child will react in the specific manner demanded by the immediate situation as he interprets it. That is, he replies as he anticipates his questioner wants him to respond.⁵

There have been, however, a few studies which attempted more objective measures of the emotional reactions which lie behind the verbal responses. Houtchens (1935) made an ingenious study of emotional reactions to a modified Kent-Rosanoff free-association word list. He carefully matched forty-two delinquent boys with thirty-

⁵ Maller (1930) neatly demonstrated the place of rationalization and of attempts to give the answers imagined to be expected by asking pupils to sign one set of tests and to leave a like set unsigned. The latter provoked verbal reactions much more representative of the child's overt conduct than the former.

nine undelinquents as to chronological and mental age, social status, and schooling. These subjects were given the word list, and by means of laboratory apparatus the involuntary muscular movements which accompanied the verbal responses were also secured. (The assumption was made, following Luria, 1932, that involuntary motor reactions exemplify any emotional blocking which may accompany the verbal associations.) He found a biserial correlation of .645 between the test results and the fact of delinquency. Second, he discovered that his sample of delinquents produced a bimodal distribution, one group having distinctive mental conflicts, the other suffering no such emotional disturbances but resembling in these matters the reactions of the normal, nondelinquent controls.

Though the results of this test are based on a small sample, Houtchens has given us some objective evidence for the contention made above that many delinquents must by all ordinary measures of personality disturbance be considered perfectly normal and well adjusted while others may well represent psychologically maladjusted children. In getting at the etiology of their misconduct and in making plans for their treatment we must take into account these divergences in emotional adjustment.

Other attempts to uncover motivations and accompanying traits and attitudes have been made by the use of case records and interview materials which could be put into simple numerical form but which do not permit statistical analysis of the usual sort.

Tjaden (1923) studied twenty-six delinquent boys with I.Q.'s ranging from 109 to 135 by means of intensive interviews. He concluded that intelligence as such had little or no direct causative influence in inducing misconduct, although it was obviously an asset in such crimes as forgery. In no case did he find any single factor responsible, but he listed as the most significant components bad companionship, interest in sex, sense of inferiority, lack of parental love, other disturbances over family affairs, and introversion. Not that all these items appeared in every case, of course, but they did occur in varied combinations.

M. S. Brill (1927), using the case records of forty delinquents, half of them with I.Q.'s below 90, the other half above 110, attempted to discover the motivations for their misconduct. While her sample was small, she found the following factors important: Misgrading in school influenced poor adjustment there; physical restlessness was also an item of importance in school. Stealing, in 25 per cent of the cases, arose directly out of the desire for the thing taken. Fighting, largely as a compensatory device, was common. Difficulty in control at home or school, which workers call ungovernability, unmanageability, or incorrigibility, was twice as common among the dull boys as in the superior-minded group. A large percentage of the children had learned at home that to use temper tantrums or impulsive willfulness or contrariness secured attention from their mothers or enabled them to get something that they wished. "The most frequent cause of difficulty found in both groups, is the desire to avoid anything unpleasant." These children simply could not learn "to take it," as contemporary slang puts it. While generalization from such a small sample is open to question, it is interesting to note that on the whole "defensive motives" were more common than "aggressive" ones. The former, such as "avoidance compensa-

tion, making up for a lack, misgrading, discouragement, predominated among the superior children. The aggressive motives—namely, self-assertion, love of excitement, pleasure derived from inflicting pain, positive enjoyment—accounted for a large percentage of behavior disorders among the dull group." (1927, p. 19.)

Two suggestive studies have been made which compare the personality characteristics of normal boys with those of their delinquent brothers, one by the Crime Commission of the State of New York (1929), the other by Healy and Bronner (1936).

In the former a rather exhaustive analysis was made of the intelligence, school records, general social conduct, and traits and attitudes of forty-one pairs of siblings. Extensive interviews and observation of fourteen pairs of brothers were made with a view to comparing their traits, attitudes, interests, and habits. In summarizing the findings the report states (1929, p. 74): "The traits . . . show as clearly as anything could that the problem group are maladjusted, not only with regard to theft, but in every other phase of their lives. They are unpopular, unstable emotionally, tending toward cowardice or toward bullying; they indulge in a great deal of variety of delinquencies in addition to stealing; they have practically no ambition; they tend to associate with other inferior individuals in gangs; they are fond of thrilling forms of play; they get along poorly with their teachers and they are in conflict with their home setting."

Healy and Bronner compared the behavior of boys from 133 families. In their sample there were 145 nondelinquents and 153 delinquents, of whom 143 were selected for careful diagnosis and treatment. For the total sample the authors found "that no less than 91 per cent of the delinquents gave clear evidence of being or having been very unhappy and discontented in their life experiences or extremely disturbed because of emotion-provoking situations or experiences" (1936, p. 122). In contrast, only 13 per cent of the control group gave evidence of inner distress of like sort.

Both these investigations demonstrate that in emotional traits and attitudes as well as in interests there are often rather sharp differences between delinquent and nondelinquent siblings. As has been indicated previously in this volume, children reared in the same family do not live in the same psychological environment. Not only are the stimuli for each child distinctive, but the constitutional make-up of children differs in terms of intellectual capacity, emotions and feelings, and reactivity patterns. Let us turn to examine some of these factors more closely.

THE DYNAMICS OF SOCIAL-EMOTIONAL FACTORS

In those cases where delinquency represents an outlet for inner emotional disturbance, the sources of such distress may be rather varied, that is, motivation may lie in some inner mental conflict, in a frustrated wish, in the deprivation of love or power, or in some sense of insecurity or inferiority. (See Aichhorn, 1935.) Moreover, no matter what the nature of the motivation, the delinquent—like other people—sooner or later produces consciously or unconsciously some rationalization for his overt conduct. As Partridge well puts it (1937, p. 10), "We should never overlook the important fact that the delinquent person has, in his own mind, justified his

actions and is following a pattern consistent with the conception he has accepted for himself."

Though some attention has already been given to the emotional factors, in this section we shall examine certain additional aspects of the same with particular reference to (1) feelings of insecurity and inferiority and forms of compensation, (2) rebellious or revengeful and other aggressive reactions, (3) the use of misconduct as an escape or avoidant response to some obsessive or intolerable inner conflict, (4) the desire for intimate response, and (5) the wish to be punished growing out of a morbid sense of shame and guilt.

Insecurity, inferiority, and compensation. As we know, frustration or deprivation leads to a sense of insecurity characterized in many instances by feelings of inferiority or inadequacy. In turn these ideas of incompetence may lead to some sort of overt compensation. The sense of inferiority may arise from lowly family status, from emotional rejection by a parent, from felt injustice in home or school, or, of course, from socially obvious physical defects. The bully, the boy who wishes to be a "big shot," the swaggering young tough, illustrate such compensations. It is in this connection that the culture patterns laid before youngsters of successful desperadoes, gangsters, and the like suggest forms of conduct which will provide demonstration to oneself and to others that the individual is strong, not weak, is hard, not soft, in his dealings with the world. The boastful young delinquent depicted in the screen success *Boys' Town* was just this sort of lad. So, too, substitutive responses developed because of felt inadequacy due to visible constitutional deficiencies may take the form of misconduct. (See the case of Teddy R., Chapter XXVI, pages 694-695.)

Rebellion and aggressiveness. Delinquent conduct not infrequently arises from strong resentment toward actual or fancied wrongs suffered at the hands of older persons: parents, teachers, police officers, attendants in correctional institutions, and others. In fact, the revenge motive is perhaps more common than we imagine. It not only is especially evident in cases which have suffered from certain mistreatment before coming into the hands of the law, but is particularly common *after* incarceration in some correctional or penal institution. (See Chapter XXV.) The desire to get even with others, however, is not confined to delinquents and criminals. It is common in all circles; but in these cases the behavior takes a form labeled immoral and illegal by the dominant élite in society. Sometimes this rebellious activity takes a strong sadistic form leading to destruction of property or even of life.

Rebellious behavior often but expresses the inner desire for status, for overcoming some sense of inadequacy. It represents a rather childish device to gain attention, to express one's ego-satisfactions in unconventional ways. In one person this resistance to authority and discipline may take a socially

approved form, as when agitators sublimate their violence by verbally advocating revolutionary changes in the social order. (See Lasswell, 1930.) Yet in another person such resistance may be expressed in some more individualized and illegal way. Another phase of rebellious reaction is found in instances where an intolerable situation is avoided by some sort of escape or flight response. The individual may feel himself unable to face the demands of his family, of the school, or of his employer. Truants, run-aways, family deserters, and transients often exemplify this type of reaction to thwarting or felt frustration.

The following case of Mary Huber well illustrates a combination of factors: thwarted affectional life, resentment of parental authority, compensation for felt inferiority, and rebellious outbursts into delinquencies. This girl, whose first serious misconduct grew out of an intolerable home situation involving a sharp conflict of cultural norms, quickly went on to a series of other delinquencies, ending in tragedy.

Case of Mary Huber. Mary, aged fourteen years, had been turned over to the juvenile-court officers after having been arrested on the charge of stealing something like \$250 from her own father. When the latter first reported the felony to the police, he had no idea that his own daughter had taken the money. Mary readily admitted having picked her father's pocket as the two of them were riding from the Huber farm into a near-by town. She said she needed money to buy some clothes and intended to return the remainder when she had got what she wanted. It was evident that she had no idea of the amount she had lifted from her father. Before being apprehended, she had purchased a pair of slippers and a pair of rubbers. When Mr. Scott, the county detective, took her into custody, she told him that she had no suitable clothes and had always had to wear the dresses handed down to her by her older sisters, and he was so impressed by her story that he actually permitted her to spend additional sums of the stolen money to get herself a winter coat and some stockings before he returned the remainder to the father.

Pending clinical examination and disposition of the case, Mary was placed in a resident clubhouse maintained by the Juvenile Protective Association. The clientele of the Girls' Club—as the home was called—ranged in age from twelve to twenty years. Some were homeless girls, some were delinquents awaiting court action, still others were problem cases from home and school detained there until foster homes or some other provision could be made for them.

On the order of the juvenile-court judge Mary was sent to a clinic. The examination there showed her to be in good health, though somewhat overweight. Her I.Q. was 89. At her first interview with the psychologist, Mary spoke frankly of her difficulties and told of her conflict with her father. While her usual reactions were rather slow, she became easily aroused to anger. "I am just like my father in that," she said. She resented her father's ridicule and criticism. "He insults me; he makes a fool of me. I often have to bite my tongue nearly off to keep from talking back to him." Her family, teachers, and playmates had all made her conscious of her violent temper. She remarked during the interview: "I can't control it. I get so mad I can see red. I want to throw things when I get mad."

She daydreamed a great deal about her appearance. She considered herself homely. (She was a stocky, heavy blonde.) She suffered somewhat from nightmares, some of which were rather violent in character. She also worried about her schoolwork, both her low grades and her having to recite in the presence of other students. In school she blushed easily, and then the students laughed at her. She was afraid of being teased and reacted violently to anyone who did tease her. She remarked, "I am clumsy and always get hurt when playing, but when I get mad I am not so very clumsy." She had a distinct sense of inferiority.

Ambivalent to her temper tantrums was her tendency to melancholy and self-pity. She had contemplated suicide from time to time. At about the age of twelve she had on one occasion deliberately walked into a small pond near her home and, standing in water just above her knees, had called out loudly that she would drown herself then and there.

To the word "disposition" on a free-association test her responses were decidedly blocked. Later it developed that she had been scolded much for her ungovernable temper and for her "bad disposition." To the word "germs" she replied she would like to get sick and die from germs. The term "childishness" also brought out strong emotional responses: "I'm afraid I will never act decent; too much of a kid."

Her schoolwork was mediocre. Her attitudes toward her teachers were almost entirely qualified by their disciplinary measures toward her. She had "no use" for the parish priest "because he hollers at me," and she heartily disliked the sisters at the parochial school—which she once attended—because they tried to restrain her. She declared that she had no intention of remaining a Catholic when she grew up. She expressed little or no vocational interest, except to say that she wanted to be a beauty-parlor operator—obviously a wish related to her anxiety about her own physical appearance.

Questioned about her playtime companions, she said she enjoyed being with daring and vigorous persons. She always liked to assume the role of the daredevil and got considerable emotional thrill out of appearing tough and "hard." She had no affection for any of her sisters, and in fact her whole reaction to her family was either open antagonism or complete indifference. She was fond of her mother at times, especially when the latter attempted to pacify the father about Mary. But Mary's greatest bitterness and resentment were directed toward her father. "I could get along without him very well," she declared feelingly.

In subsequent interviews, in addition to further evidence of her violent reactions to deprivation and frustration, it became clear that Mary was characterized by distinct suggestibility. She was restless and constantly seeking some overt outlet for her emotionally disturbed inner life. Her school acquaintances, when not poking fun at her, frequently urged her on to some adventuresome escapade or other. (As will be noted below, this high suggestibility was evidently a factor in leading her into subsequent more serious delinquencies.)

Instead of acquiring any moral role or self through home-training and in church and school, she had built up strong resistances to moral obligations chiefly because they were identified in her mind with her father's restrictive authority. At times Mary had taken odd change from her father's clothes with which to buy lunches or candy. She also confessed to having stolen fifty cents from the school on one occasion. It was evident, as in other cases of like sort, that certain habits of petty stealing were already

at hand. While she expressed some sense of shame about her temper tantrums, she had little or no remorse for having stolen money from her father.

Mary was the youngest child of a German-American farm family. The father, aged sixty-six years, and the mother, aged fifty-five, had immigrated to the United States a few years after their marriage. They purchased a dairy farm, where the family had resided for twenty-five years. The father had always made a good living, though he frequently complained about his debts and taxes. There were nine children in all, seven daughters and two sons. All but the eldest (deceased) were born in this country.

The family situation had been one of almost constant conflict. Mr. Huber ruled his wife and children with an iron hand. He was a severe and unbending peasant authoritarian who worked hard and expected all his family to do the same. In fact, he was so overbearing and even cruel, so given to violent outbursts of temper and physical punishment, that all the other children except Mary had left home as soon as they could manage to do so. The wife was a fair housekeeper but showed signs of severe treatment and looked to be twenty years beyond her actual age. On two occasions, at the entreaties of her older daughters, she had left home, but had returned when her husband had promised to be more kindly.

Upon investigation it was found that three of the daughters had previously been involved in criminal conduct. Two of them had served short terms in the state reformatory for women on sex charges; and another daughter was known to the police to have been involved in like misconduct but had escaped conviction. At the time of Mary's difficulties these sisters had all settled down apparently to fairly normal living.

Since Mary was the only child left at home, the father insisted on her helping him on the farm when she was not in school. She was obliged to rise before five o'clock every morning in order to do some of the milking and to aid in making deliveries. She then had to hurry a mile to school, and was frequently scolded by the teacher for being tardy. She was given no allowance for lunches, but her mother usually gave her unbuttered slices of bread which she might eat at noon. She often threw this would-be lunch away rather than face the ridicule of the other children, who taunted her about her fare. She had few if any clothes except the cast-off garments of her sisters. She was forbidden any recreation because both her father and her mother expressed their fears that she might become "wild like her sisters had been." But Mary later told the psychologist of attending school and neighborhood parties by pretending to be going to confession.

At the Girls' Club Mary met several older and sexually sophisticated girls who filled her with stories of adventure and of thrills at drinking and sexual parties. Much of this was pure fiction, but it greatly impressed this country girl, who had long dreamed of romance and excitement as a way of getting out of an unpleasant life of hard work and family conflict. But Mary herself proved to be a trouble-maker at the club. She became a bearer of tales; she lied with ease; she was quarrelsome and extremely quick-tempered and easily developed the habit of accusing others of abusing her.

The court put Mary on probation, and a plan was made to place her in a boarding home for a few months. During the informal hearing in the judge's chambers, when the plan for Mary was discussed and the decision announced about the boarding home and about the requirement for the father to pay in part for Mary's keep, the

father flew into a rage. He had been furious at the discovery that his own daughter had stolen the money in the first place, and he felt that to be required to aid in keeping her away from home was adding insult to injury. He tore off his coat, stormed in peasant German dialect at the judge, and declared he would go home and hang himself in his barn before he would pay one cent to keep his "evil" daughter anywhere.

Mary remained in her first boarding home less than a week, and was then returned to the probation department as being uncontrollable, given to temper outbursts, and entirely unwilling to co-operate with members of the household. She was then placed in another boarding home, with a Mrs. Johnson, who had had excellent success with a number of other girls. But in less than six weeks the Johnsons asked to be relieved of their responsibility. Mrs. Johnson reported that Mary quarreled constantly, had an ungovernable temper, used profane language, refused to go to school, and slipped out of the house on every opportunity "to gad" about with strange boys. On various occasions she had "even brought boys of questionable reputations" into the house to entertain her.

The clinic advisory group then recommended that Mary be sent to a Catholic social agency's home for wayward girls, but, while arrangements were being made for this transfer, Mary ran away from the Johnson home. She showed up a week later in the office of the clinical psychologist. It was later discovered that she, in company with girls she had met earlier at the Girls' Club and elsewhere, had been going about with a group of older boys and men who frequented the town's speak-easies. One of her married sisters then tried to keep her for a fortnight but with no success. Finally Mary was allowed to return home on her own promise to help her father and mother. She asked only that her father not make her deliver milk and that he refrain from abusing her. She gravely declared, "I won't be sworn at on Main Street."

After a week at home, Mary was taken to the state hospital for an appendectomy. Following her release from the hospital, she remained a week or so with one of her sisters. She then returned home. She later confessed that it was while living at home again that she had her initial sexual relations, with a boy she had known in school. But after a week at home she departed for the county seat. She did not report to the probation office, however, but got a room in a cheap hotel and took a job as a waitress in a near-by restaurant. There followed in the next few weeks a series of escapades with boys and men, some of whom it was discovered were involved in bootlegging, automobile thefts, and other serious crimes. She had made up her mind, she boasted, to "paint the town red." Finally she was apprehended along with some other girls, and placed in the county jail until arrangements could be made to send her to the state industrial school for girls. It was during this interim that she was seen for the last time by the clinical psychologist to whom she told a series of escapades. She confessed some fear of being pregnant, but declared that, if she was, she would kill herself. She begged the psychologist to intervene with the judge to give her "another chance." When the whole story of her six months' experience—with her constantly broken promises to do better—and the meaning of her violent temper tantrums were again discussed with her in a friendly way, and when she was faced with her own failure to co-operate, she pleaded all the more for a chance "to go straight."

But she did not know that the psychologist and the probation officer had in their possession letters which she had tried to smuggle out of the jail to her men friends

outside describing how she planned to fool the judge by getting the help of the psychologist and the social workers, or, that failing, to shoot herself in the foot or get slightly injured by an automobile, so that she could get to the hospital, from which she could then escape and make off to Chicago, where she thought she would be safe from apprehension. She felt bitter about being sent to the state school and again threatened suicide.

But, before the clinic could prepare its report on this latest interview, the girl was taken to the state school. There, two days later, she hanged herself in her room. This tragic end aroused considerable newspaper and public discussion of the case, but the clinic staff was convinced that this was intended to be but another gesture of defiance and self-pity which would bring her sympathy and an opportunity to escape, not a deliberate act of self-destruction.

This case demonstrates many of the features of delinquency which have already been discussed. There was first of all the background of conflicting cultures represented in the severe Old World patterns of paternal discipline in contrast to the American family norms. There was a constant conflict between the father and his wife and children. The fact that all the children left home as soon as they were able indicates the strength of their revolt against the father's dominance. But the family background is significant not only in terms of cultural conflict as to child training, but respecting Mary in even more detailed fashion. Her own patterns of anger and sensitiveness to authority clearly grew out of her identification with her father's egocentric patterns of the same sort. In the face of any frustration she adopted a role like his own as the means of getting her own satisfaction. Thus the father's use of the childish power device of threatening suicide when anyone attempted to cross him is interesting. He used this method himself on occasion, and Mary evidently adopted it from him and, as noted above, had employed this sort of threat herself when she could not have her own way. Her failure to make a normal adjustment was qualified by the infantile wish to do as she pleased with no sense of corresponding duty to others or responsibility for her acts. At the time she came into the hands of the juvenile court and other social-service agencies, she possessed a certain psychological readiness for an outburst into misbehavior of some sort or other. In this connection there is some evidence that the "copies" set her by her older sisters offered her something of a notion of glamour and adventure even though both her father and her mother held them up to her as bad examples of what might come to her if she misbehaved.

As to social-emotional traits and attitudes, there is in this case clear evidence of deprivation of affection and of consequent sense of insecurity. There was also a distinct feeling of inferiority regarding her appearance and her naïve rural background. Mary had an intense craving for attention. Second in importance to her violent rage reactions to deprivation and frustrations was her marked suggestibility. She was constantly on the alert for

some means to bolster her ego, to restore her sense of security, and to remove her fear of not being wanted. And, when Mary did not get this emotional-social support through love and affection, she began to strive for it through socially deviant conduct. Her responses to any frustration were immediate, intense, and impulsive. She violently reacted against every evidence of discipline at home, in the school, and later from the social workers and foster-home adults who tried to be of assistance to her.

Misconduct as an escape. In some instances delinquent behavior is evidently a more direct and compulsive outcome of intolerable inner conflicts, often coupled with a sense of shame and guilt. Such an individual frequently describes himself as being "driven" to some form of aberrant behavior and often cannot give any sound reason or even an acceptable rationalization for his acts. In a culture which lays such heavy taboos upon sexual misconduct, it is evident that many of these instances would involve emotional distress associated with some form of disapproved sexual behavior. Yet the outlet into overt action frequently has no connection with sex at all. In other words, the overt conduct may itself be merely symbolic or substitutive for the inner compulsion.

Healy (1917, pp. 103-112) describes such an instance in *Jeddy N.*, a lad of twelve years, who was initiated into certain homosexual practices by an older man while the latter took him for a buggy ride. Some time thereafter the boy developed an overpowering compulsion to steal any horse-drawn vehicle he could find once his "inner thoughts" about sex arose to disturb him. He would, for example, get into a delivery wagon in front of a house or store and drive furiously but aimlessly until the horse was exhausted or until he was apprehended by the owner or the police. Only careful and sympathetic psychiatric examination revealed the real motives for this aberrant conduct. There is considerable evidence that compulsive stealing and lying often have somewhat similar motivations. (See Stekel, 1924; and Alexander and Staub, 1931.)

Desire for intimate response. The need for affection and love, or for intimate response—to use W. I. Thomas's phrase—is often a strong motivation which may lead young people into misconduct. Thomas (1923) has shown that frequently young girls become sexually delinquent not because they are intensely erotic, but because giving sexual favors to young men secures for them a wanted sense of intimacy and affection, even though the relations implied are temporary and often clearly deceptive and exploitative in nature. Often, in these cases, there is a certain deprivation of affectional relations at home, a felt rejection by father, mother, or siblings. In such instances, rather than go into stealing or other aggressive offenses against property and persons, the individual indulges in substitutive reactions which simulate love and affection. Practically all investigations indicate that in our society it is girls rather than boys who fall into this type of misconduct, at least in significantly higher proportion. There is no doubt that cultural patterns play a distinctive part in directing the behavior

of young women into these channels of sensuality. Sexual love is the key to marriage and family life; it is the symbol of affection and security between the parents in the home; and, although a young girl may witness conflicts between her parents, the basic stability of the family remains rooted chiefly in the love life of the parents. Hence, when a girl is deprived of affection and its attendant security, sex becomes for her—at least under the suggestion of her male companions—the obvious means of repossessing the very affection which she has missed at home or elsewhere.

It may be asked: how frequently does thwarted sexual life motivate juvenile delinquency? It may motivate some adult criminality, but, aside from a small proportion of cases, it is doubtful if the direct frustration of sexual outlets plays any very significant part among juvenile delinquents. (There are, of course, those very exceptional instances of young sexual criminals of imbecilic and psychotic traits who periodically excite public attention.) Of course, once a girl or a boy has set out on a career involving sexual misconduct, attempts to thwart this form of outlet may lead to further emotional distress—a factor evident from studies of the conversations and daydreams of young women in our correctional institutions. But, except for a small percentage of older adolescents, who are physically, though not legally, mature adults, there is perhaps but little direct relation of sexual frustration to youthful misbehavior. Rather, as stated above, sex becomes the vehicle for obtaining attention, affection, and a certain status, among girls in particular, while in older boys overt sexuality is frequently their badge of wouted masculinity and maturity.

Sense of guilt and desire for punishment. There are some instances of delinquents, and of criminals too (see Chapter XXV), whose misconduct seems to be motivated by an inner desire or compulsion to be punished. With intense drives to activity arising from rebellion and resistance to authority, the individual in these cases seems ambivalently to be impelled to commit acts which he realizes more or less consciously will sooner or later get him into difficulty with the police and the courts and lead to punishment. (See Alexander and Healy, 1935; and Healy and Bronner, 1936.) This type of double motivation is not uncommon in children and adults. An individual may depart on a course of action which is tabooed by his family and friends or by the norms of the larger community; but, having been trained to accept the moral role or code in his childhood, the individual with a growing sense of guilt and shame later commits some act which exposes his misconduct. This, in turn, will lead to disapproval or punishment in which he actually finds a certain satisfaction. In this fashion he pays his debt to his fellows for having departed from the code. The compulsive demand for punishment following sense of guilt is often illustrated in homosexuality. In our society this is a form of conduct strongly tabooed, and around it have grown up all sorts of ideas of sin, guilt, crime,

and insanity. One of Healy and Bronner's (1936) cases was an effeminate type of homosexual who had been brought up in a religious and highly cultivated home. He admitted that he often wished he would be caught and punished for his deviant conduct.

Among both delinquents and criminals it is not uncommon for them to express a definite sense of relief at their arrest. Such an act from others seems itself to produce a resolution of the inner tensions which have been associated with their misdeeds. Healy and Bronner (1936, p. 129) note further that rather frequently their cases who showed strong guilt feelings and desires for punishment were also individuals who had "feelings of confused unhappiness" linked to some "internal mental conflict."

On a wider basis it should be noted that the traditional religious and moral training of most of our boys and girls who become delinquent is of such a character that, even if it be desultory and irregular, it does fix in them a superego, conscience, or moral role which sooner or later is bound to have some effect upon them. Their frequent sense of remorse, though only temporary in effect, is evidence of this. So, too, the sentimental helpfulness of many delinquents and criminals to cripples, to elderly persons, to widows and orphans, and to other down-and-outers may be considered a substitutive payment to society for their own depredations against it.⁶

Ego organization of the delinquent. In closing this section let us attempt to draw together some of the important features of the personality characteristics of the delinquent. With respect to his interactions with others we must consider him in terms of his role and status. His roles, however, must be examined in relation to the groups to which he belongs and in regard to the level of emotional and intellectual maturity which go with these functions. Especially important are two factors: the sense of moral responsibility, and the degree of integration or generality among the specific roles which relate to the varied social situations. The problem of status must be understood with reference to the delinquent's different roles, and especially in their association with his basic sense of security, self-reliance, and self-esteem. As we have emphasized time and again, the ego security of the individual is linked in part to the function and position which others accord him. And these matters play an important part not only in the years preceding the acts which become designated as delinquent, but also during the attempts at reformation of the delinquent. (See the next section.) When for purposes of description and analysis we break down the roles and the ego organization into their components, we come to such matters as the intellectual capacity, the emotional-social

⁶ An obvious parallel of this sort of sentimentality in paying debts to society because of felt sense of guilt is seen among the rich and powerful who contribute to education, research, and charity.

traits and attitudes, and the basic value systems of the individual as they are related to motivation and to overt conduct.

While delinquent boys and girls in our society appear to fall, on the average, into the dull-normal group or into the class of borderline ability, low intelligence cannot be considered the all-determining factor in inducing delinquency, as it was once imagined to be. That it contributes heavily to deviant conduct, however, no one would deny. But its influence is often indirect. For example, the slow learner, faced with types of schoolwork emphasizing verbal acquirement but providing little to interest mechanical or other abilities, may develop a sense of frustration and consequent restlessness which will find an outlet in types of interest and conduct leading in time into specific acts termed delinquent. If our cultural norms pitch the levels of aspiration far above the level of intellectual ability of many of our children, we should not be surprised to discover a sense of inferiority arising from failure, emotional distress, and other nonintellectual responses. Then, too, there appears to be a decided correlation between intellectual level and capacity to understand and take over the moral and legal code of the community. One is impressed by what may be called the moral stupidity of many youngsters brought before the juvenile courts. Many of them seem quite incapable of identifying themselves with the moral roles demanded by society. Though these matters do rest upon training in the home, the school, and the church, the constitutionally determined obtuseness of the children may well be a factor in their failure to acquire the moral roles normally expected of them. Their failure to develop a superego, or moral self, or "conscience," depends in part on their lack of mental capacity.

Two other features falling within the area of intellectual and emotional functions are important. One is the tendency to perseveration in thought and conduct. This is but another way of recognizing a certain fixity of habit and attitude. Many studies have shown that some delinquents are incapable of being motivated to change their patterns of thought and action. Such inflexibility is found among all classes and ages, but Babcock's (1932) findings suggest that it may be an important factor in the behavior of many in her samples of delinquents. And the emotional counterpart cannot be ignored. Perseveration itself may well be tied up with a certain emotional resistance toward change. Having once built habits, traits, and attitudes around certain roles, the delinquent is unwilling to face the possible loss of emotional security by undertaking something novel which would dislocate his life organization.

In contrast to this inflexibility we find a high degree of suggestibility among many delinquents. The ease with which many of them pick up patterns of behavior from their companions is well known. This means

that their moral self is not sufficiently developed to serve as a brake on their impulses. The failure to comprehend the implications of one's acts, the failure to identify oneself with a moral role, is undoubtedly qualified by learning ability and rationality.

Perseveration and suggestibility are not completely at odds with each other. The habit patterns of impulsiveness in a case like Mary Huber's represent a certain perseveration, a certain level of reactivity which could not be altered. A person may be suggestible if being so serves his wishes; at the same time he may be relatively inflexible in the face of any stimulation to modify either his deeper wishes or his means of satisfying them.

Social-emotional traits and attitudes are evidently more significant in most delinquent careers than are the intellectual qualities. We have noted the importance of frustration, deprivation, and rejection, and the attendant sense of inferiority with all its compensatory manifestations. The rebelliousness, the aggressiveness, and the resentment of many delinquents are traceable to thwarted love life and to loss of the sense of security, in the home and school in particular. Failing to develop the expected attitudes and traits, the individual faced with emotional distress comes to be dominated by more rudimentary impulses, by what Freudian psychologists would call the "id," or what in George H. Mead's terms we might call a rudimentary and unsocialized "I." It is easy to understand how, like water, the impulses seek their own level and these boys and girls soon gravitate to companions and localities where there are thrill, adventure, excitement, and other outlets for these deep-seated emotional interests.

As to social-emotional types of personality—assuming typicality to be a sound category—neither tests and personality schedules nor case studies provide any evidence that delinquents are, for example, either particularly introverted or extroverted. As elsewhere, it must be recalled that not overt conduct, but the meaning of experience, is the basic criterion of introversion or extroversion.

Finally it may be said that we do not have any clear idea just what psychological factors predispose certain children to delinquent behavior while their siblings do not become so divergent. But the studies of Healy and Bronner (1936) and others (see Crime Commission of the State of New York, 1929) would indicate that in many instances there early arises considerable contrast in thought and action between siblings—one of whom became delinquent, the other not. On the whole the former tends either to be more easily emotionally distressed, or to be overdocile and overattached to adults, with no effort at emancipation until it takes an aberrant form partly because it is delayed. The situation is not unlike that in the prepsychotic cases described and analyzed by Bowman (1934), who found a congeries of mild emotional deviations: overdocility or over-resistance and aggressiveness, or considerable daydreaming, or other be-

havior manifestations apparently providing the roots from which later psychotic behavior emerged. (See Chapter XXVIII, pages 759-760.)

SOME PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF TREATMENT

The central aim of treatment for delinquents is the restoration of the boy or girl to a more normal place in society. According to Healy and Bronner (1936, p. 141), however, the usual handling of misconduct by the courts has, on the whole, been "extremely disappointing in results." Furthermore, the studies of the aftercareers of juvenile delinquents differ widely in their findings. Obviously, the varied standards of what constitutes success in later life and the lack of adequate information on many cases make comparisons difficult.

Knox (1928), reporting the follow-up of 103 boys from the Whittier School (California) ten years after their admission, states that 58.2 per cent of them made a good adjustment later, 38 per cent of them failed and had continued their delinquent or criminal careers, and 3.8 per cent had made sufficient improvement to indicate that they might make good later. Of 877 girls committed to the Indiana State School for Girls (Clermont) who had been released from one to ten years before from the jurisdiction of the institution, Beane (1931) found that 51.3 per cent were "doing well," 8.7 per cent were failures, 7.0 per cent had died, 1.5 per cent had been committed to the state school for the feeble-minded, and the whereabouts of 31.5 per cent were unknown. But other investigations show no such degree of success. Thus Glueck and Glueck (1934) in their follow-up investigation of 1,000 delinquent boys in Massachusetts report that five years later only 12 per cent of them were found to be free from any delinquency. (See, however, Healy and Bronner, 1939.)

All too frequently, however, the specific recommendations of clinicians and social workers regarding delinquents have not been followed, and it may well be that the high percentage of failure is not unrelated to this fact. Calhoon (1937) followed up the careers of 476 delinquents for a period of three years. All these children had been carefully studied, and specific recommendations had been made to the juvenile judges and officials in charge of probation and retraining. The sample was divided into those cases where the recommendations were followed, those where they were only partially followed, and those where they were completely ignored. Calhoon (1937, p. 309) thus summarizes his study:

"Stated in simple terms [the findings] mean: if the court, the school, social agency or parent had succeeded in putting into effect the various suggestions offered by the bureau the child was found to have seven chances out of ten of effecting marked improvement in social adjustment. If, on the other hand, the agency responsible for the child had not succeeded in carrying out the bureau's recommendations, the child had only two chances out of ten of showing any improvement in social adjustment."

Of course, there is no end of factors which play a part in the subsequent success or failure of the boy or girl who has been delinquent. One factor commonly mentioned is the grade of intelligence, and Knox (1928) did find a slightly higher probability of success among those of

higher I.Q.'s and also among those of better schooling. But Calhoon (1928) in another study found recurrence of delinquency much more common among the normals than among the subnormals, in the ratio of 1.65 to 1.00 when based on reappearances in the courts. It is evident that in the recovery from, as in the inception to, misconduct, intelligence plays a part only in combination with other factors, such as degree of emotional stability, opportunities for vocational outlets, and the attitudes of others toward the individual who has been released.

In any case, if we are to deal more effectively with juvenile delinquents in hope of returning them to normal society, the following factors, among others, must be taken into account: (1) Aid must be given the boy or girl to find an expression of his ego in socially acceptable ways. (2) The delinquent's confidence in himself and in others must be restored. (3) He must acquire insight into his motivations and behavior so that self-control and a sense of moral responsibility may be built up. (4) There must be provision of adequate and satisfying vocational outlets, which will enable him later to assume his own role as a sensible head of his own family and as a sound citizen in the community. In dealing with delinquents, it must never be forgotten that their interactions with police officers, juvenile-court judges, probation-staff members, social-service workers, psychologists or psychiatrists, teachers, the personnel of correctional institutions, foster parents, and all others will profoundly influence the success or failure of any program of treatment.

Interaction of the delinquent and others in the course of treatment. Although the purpose in setting up juvenile courts⁷ was to escape or avoid the implication of juvenile crime and the meting out to children of punitive revenge for infractions of the law and mores, the actual development of the juvenile court has meant that in many communities it is now all too often just another criminal court. The very term *delinquent*, which was employed to avoid the branding of the child or adolescent offender as a criminal, has acquired a vast amount of unpleasant, negative feeling tone. Despite its propitious beginning, many people have come to believe that the juvenile court is ineffective. (See Thomas and Thomas, 1928.) In fact, there has been some agitation in recent years to abolish the juvenile courts and to reorganize the whole program of legal and public treatment of preadult misconduct along other lines.⁸ But the juvenile-court procedure in one form or another is used in nearly all communities in this country, and we must examine the effects of its practices on the delinquent.

⁷ We are not here dealing with other aspects of juvenile-court work, such as attention to dependent, neglected children, mothers' pensions, and the like, where no misconduct is involved.

⁸ The student may consult Healy and Bronner (1936), Plant (1937), Eliot (1937), and Siegler (1937).

As a rule, the young person who is found in misconduct has his first contact with legal measures in the person of the policeman. Where there is a well co-ordinated program for dealing with delinquency, the child is promptly turned over to the probation staff attached to the juvenile court or to some other designated agency. If the police official handles the child or adolescent in a cruel or severe manner, this may itself be a first item in overt interaction which will color subsequent handling by the probation officers, the juvenile-court judge, the clinicians, and others.

In communities with anything approaching adequate juvenile-court and social-service facilities, there are usually three minimal phases in this total procedure: (1) the examination into the factors inducing the delinquent conduct, including a diagnosis of the child's personality; (2) the recommendations of the psychological clinic or of the social-service agencies or of the probation personnel as to the program of treatment for each particular case; (3) the disposition of the case by the judge himself. At times certain conflicts regarding treatment arise between judge and other workers. The persistence of the ideas and practices of punitive justice among many juvenile-court judges (who often serve in this capacity but a few hours a week at most) has resulted in a good deal of criticism of their decisions, which are often at marked variance with the recommendations of the social-service workers and clinicians who spend hundreds of hours digging into the background factors making for delinquency in a particular case. (See Calhoun, 1937.)

It must not be forgotten, however, that the state as the protector of life and property is concerned with overt conduct, and the legal definition of misbehavior may not be that of the psychologist or social worker. This situation is analogous to that discussed by Wickman (1928) in describing the contrast between the view of the schoolteacher and the view of the mental hygienist regarding children's conduct in the classroom. (See Chapter XVIII.) The judiciary and the police deal essentially with overt acts, not with inner motives. But the solution of any conflict between the legalist and the expert in diagnosis and the planning of treatment does not lie in neglecting one and stressing the other. What we need and what we are gradually getting is a recognition in law of the relation of these personality and cultural factors in motivating delinquent and criminal acts. Such a view should modify the treatment in terms not of overt conduct alone but of motivation and meaning as well.

The very term "correctional institution" implies something of the traditional views of public officials who hope to reform the young offender. For the most part the degree of success in reforming our wayward youth who are sent to correctional institutions has been decidedly limited. Too frequently the superintendents and the attendants are poorly trained for the task of sane treatment. Nor is there sufficient financial support

to allow much careful work with individual cases. On the whole, the boys and girls are handled in the manner of prisoners rather than students. The schoolwork in these institutions is quite unsatisfactory, though there are increasing efforts to provide sensible vocational training for their charges. The recreational facilities are usually inadequate. As a rule, the treatment takes on the character of "ordering and forbidding" techniques and not those calling into use well-known devices of sound re-education. Such narratives as that of Stanley, the Jack Roller, regarding ill-advised procedures in such institutions could be duplicated hundreds of times. (See Shaw, 1930.) The frequency of escape and the occasional riots among the inmates are further evidence of maladjustment in treatment. (See Van Waters, 1925; and Shaw and Myers, 1929.) Elliott and Merrill (1934, p. 115) pertinently remark: "The most effective functions such institutions perform are to satisfy the offended public and to get the offender out of the way temporarily."

It must be repeated, too, that but a very small fraction of the delinquent's conduct falls within the definition of illegal and contramores acts. If through treatment of the individual charged with misconduct we stimulate him in such a way as to cause a spread of his deviant behavior and attitudes to ever wider segments of his personality, we may in the end produce an integrated but a socially maladjusted person where at the outset we had only a mild case. Thus if attendants mete out physical punishment, it will, in most instances, be met with further resistance on the part of the delinquent. Sadism is matched with sadism, and in time it is discovered that the would-be reformation has produced in the delinquent or criminal only a hard-boiled attitude of revenge supported by a deep sense of injustice and self-pity.

What we need are not locks and bars and the big stick, but infinite patience, kindness, and, above all, calmness. In the words of Van Waters (1925, p. 156):

"As in the management of the insane, attendants who show tranquillity of mind, and a little skill in personality, have successfully handled the most obstreperous; so with young delinquents, the apparently violent and dangerous yield almost without a struggle to simple approach of a human being, without fear, prejudice, or hatred."

There is a growing practice of placing a large number of delinquents on probation in foster homes, which are usually supervised by private or public social-service agencies. But individual variations must be recognized. A family may have all the external qualifications ordinarily required to make a good foster home and yet fail to deal successfully with the delinquent placed in its care. (See the case of Mary Huber above.)

In some communities special schools have been set up under the usual public-school administration to handle difficult problem cases and de-

linquents. (See Stullken, 1940, on the Montefiore School in Chicago.) Likewise, many privately endowed clubs, schools, and summer camps have been rather successful in dealing with predelinquents and delinquents, but at best these institutions reach only a limited number of cases.

One of the most important educational services which public or private institutions and schools can offer the delinquent is sound vocational guidance and training. The ability and opportunity to hold a job are fundamental to successful recovery. Many surveys have shown us the importance of such education. Close (1931) estimates that fully 60 per cent of the boys at the Preston School of Industry (California) are 'capable of vocational training and good adjustment later. (See G. E. Hill, 1935.) The significance of a job and of vocational skill in maintaining sound personality balance has already been indicated. (See Chapter XXIII.)

Not only are the cost and time involved in these educative programs great, but the problem of qualified personnel is at once obvious. While private social agencies, such as child-guidance clinics and special schools and camps, may employ experts for diagnosis and executive functions, and while their attendants and teachers may be specially trained in sound educational devices, the majority of delinquents remain in the hands of incompetent people, who are, for the most part, untrained, and who also have such a heavy load of responsibility that they could not do an adequate job even if they had the time and capacity. (See Wagner, 1937.) The whole problem of personnel from the juvenile judge to the probation workers and attendants at the institutions must be solved before we may look for much improvement. Some years ago the federal Children's Bureau, in conjunction with the National Probation Association, formulated the following standards respecting juvenile-court judges:

"The judge should be chosen because of his special qualifications for juvenile court work. He should have legal training, acquaintance with social problems, and understanding of child psychology. The tenure of office should be sufficiently long to warrant special preparatory studies and the development of special interest in juvenile work, preferably not less than six years." (Quoted in Bassett, 1934, p. 142.)

But this high ideal is found in such few instances that poorly qualified juvenile-court judges are the subject of comment by social workers and educators everywhere. In most instances the probation and social-work personnel must try to educate the judges, since so few of them have any real preparation for this work. In fact, some of the criticism of the juvenile courts has arisen because of the poor qualifications of so many of the judges themselves.

For the most part probation officers are but little better prepared for their work than the judges. It takes unusual insight and imagination to realize the human forces with which the probation officer deals. Van Waters

(1923, pp. 156, 164) thus states her view of the necessary qualifications for such officers:

"The probation officer has the twofold task of discovering human forces and of directing them into the conquest of delinquency. . . . There is no excuse for their not knowing the elements of biology, psychology, sociology, and the facts of mental hygiene. They should be social physicians, and their attitude should be that of the social worker, he who builds up social relationships. They should have respect for the worth, dignity, and integrity of human personality. They should use knowledge, not force, in the solution of their problems. They should believe in miracles, those daily miracles of the reconstruction of broken lives."

So, too, the personnel of correctional institutions and special schools for delinquents should, like the probation officer and the judge, be sufficiently trained in the elements of psychology and the social sciences to understand the nature of the task before them. But, in addition, each of these individuals must, like the good physician, be able to heal himself. That is, these workers need to be emotionally well balanced; they must possess a sound sense of security, be free from disturbing compensatory patterns, and especially free from hidden aggressive or sadistic complexes which are likely to interfere with sympathetic treatment of their charges.

Wider implications of delinquency in the community. Not only is the total cost of delinquency high, but it is clear that individualized treatment of the kind described in various research projects is out of the question at present. (See Shaw, 1930; and Healy and Bronner, 1936.) In fact, such individual studies as made by Shaw and others, while invaluable for a more complete understanding of the cultural and psychological foundations of misconduct, do not touch the larger community problem of prevention. Thousands of dollars were spent for the Healy and Bronner investigation (1936) and large amounts for the work of Shaw on Stanley, the Jack Roller (1930). But the impress of these studies upon any intelligent community organization for prevention of delinquency is indirect and long delayed. It is hoped that in time, such research projects will have their beneficial effects. (See Burgess, Lohman, and Shaw, 1937; and Alinsky, 1939.) In closing let us note a few outstanding points to bear in mind in an attack upon this larger problem.

The high importance of the home in forming the personality of the child is well recognized, and in the matter of delinquency, as in other areas of deviant conduct, it is more than evident that the disorganizing features of contemporary family life will be reflected in misconduct. Marital conflict and inharmonious atmosphere, overindulgence or overdiscipline, and, especially, marked inconsistency of child-training, are doubtless much more deleterious than the inadequate incomes which happen to characterize a large proportion of the families from which our de-

linquents are recruited. The importance of affection, harmony, and tranquillity are indicated; to secure these qualities requires sound child-training of potential parents and, second-best, effective adult education for parents whose children are likely to prove delinquent, neurotic, or otherwise divergent. So, too, parents must recognize the need for sane and healthy recreation outside the home—a failure very common among the parents of delinquents. (See Truxal, 1929; Healy and Bronner, 1936; Sullenger, 1936.)

Second, the school has a significant part to play in the prevention of delinquency. As the traditional functions of the home and church are being dissipated, the school is assuming more and more responsibility, not only for mental and vocational training, but for the whole development of the person from early childhood to late adolescence or beyond. The detection of incipient behavior difficulties among school children is fundamental, and teachers are beginning to be trained to give attention to these matters as well as to formal drill in school subjects. As Van Waters aptly puts it (1925, p. 99), "The teacher should have ability to detect early signs of emotional maladjustment in children, should feel respect for complexities of personality, above all should understand *why* force in dealing with emotional disorders is blind, stupid, useless and often cruel and dangerous." The development of mental-hygiene and guidance clinics within many school systems is further evidence of the growing realization of this problem. And the high importance of extra-curricular activities in preventing delinquency is everywhere being recognized. At this point the wider community agencies must enter into the situation with various programs of recreation, organized sports, summer camps, festivals, and other devices for intriguing youthful interests.

Finally, there must be a growing recognition in this area of human conduct, as in many others, that the motivations and meanings of life are colored at nearly every point by the larger cultural expectancies and norms. Not only is the economic and political order of our country responsible in a broad way for the production of conditions which stimulate delinquency, but more specifically our whole scheme of dominant values—individualized competition for wealth, prestige, and status; our emphasis upon aggression; our doctrines of independence, freedom, and liberty for the person; our lack of theories and practices of co-operation; and the curious ambivalence of all this to the Christian moral principles of the Golden Rule, of co-operation, sympathy, and love—these together produce a configuration of stimuli which induce much of our delinquency just as it does much of our neurotic and psychotic behavior. (See Horney, 1937.) Not that misconduct might not occur under other forms of societal organization. It does. But there is no doubt that the extreme emphasis upon individual prowess, upon the prestige and wealth accu-

ing to individual effort, sets a certain pattern that influences misconduct as well as behavior which we call "normal." In our society individual sense of security is obtained in this highly competitive struggle, while affection, mutual aid, and calmness of behavior and outlook are in a sense taboo.

As we noted at the outset of this chapter, behavior termed delinquent is only a form of divergence from the expected norms of conduct. But it is interesting to observe how the fundamental patterns of success (as judged by themselves) are the same among those who are delinquents and criminals as among those who are not. It is not that companionship and a sort of co-operation are not found among our people. We have seen that this group aspect is important, but the particular meanings and values we give life are largely individual. The businessman or industrialist may be a member of a corporation, or he may be a great "joiner" of clubs, but his basic satisfactions arise from his sense of self-esteem and pride at his individual accomplishments. So it is with the delinquents, even though they commit crimes in company with their fellows.

It might well be that, were we to develop a very strong idealistic program and practice, taking such forms at the outset as a revolutionary movement which would interest our adolescents, we might find that the incidence of delinquency would be reduced enormously. (See F. E. Williams, 1934.) In such movements the spontaneity and restlessness and emotional conflicts of youth might find socially approved outlets, whereas now they tend to flow into behavior which is labeled delinquent or neurotic.

THE PERSONALITY OF THE ADULT CRIMINAL

IF WE wish to understand the personal characteristics of those whom society labels as criminals, we need to take into account both the cultural and the psychological factors. As indicated in the previous chapter, crime is a form of deviant behavior which runs counter to the accepted conduct norms of a given society. In the words of Sellin (1938, pp. 32-33), a conduct norm is fundamentally "a rule which prohibits, and conversely enjoins, a specific type of person, as defined by his status in (or with reference to) the normative group, from acting in a certain specified way in certain circumstances." As he says further (1938, p. 34), "A conduct norm then, becomes a rule which governs a specific type of life situation and is authoritative to the extent of the group's resistance to violation" of this norm. The resistance of the norm-setters toward the violation of the code Sellin calls "resistance potential," and this varies, obviously, with the definition of the seriousness of the infraction. Narrowly delimited, it has to do with acts which are forbidden by statute or other legal instrument. In these matters the political state operates to enforce the criminal law by means of punishment. But obviously the law touches only some, but not all, of the conduct norms. Infractions of the mores and of the demands of public sentiment also represent deviant behavior for which disapproval is expressed in some form or other. What is criminal therefore depends upon how a society defines acts as antilegal and antimoral, and how it punishes those who commit such acts. Some offenses lead to very slight punishment, others to severe. Thus in our society such offenses as murder and predatory attacks on property are considered most serious. Infractions of the sex code also involve high group resistance. On the other hand, gambling on the stock market, corruption in political office, and violations of the laws regarding child labor, pure food, and many public health measures are not considered highly serious. The violation of many municipal ordinances respecting speeding, parking, and other traffic matters is not thought serious at all. So, too, there are many "dead letters" in our criminal code, such as the "Sunday Blue Laws," which people ignore completely.

CULTURE AND CRIME

Even slight acquaintance with anthropology or history will convince one that conduct norms vary tremendously in different human societies, and in the same society with changes in time. Root (1925, p. 16) writes:

"The six most important crimes, that is, the ones that society has punished longest, most severely, and most consistently, are: *witchcraft, sacrilege, treason, incest, poisoning, and breach of hunting rules*. None are of importance today from the standpoint of frequency. Witchcraft and sacrilege are no more. Treason is severely punished, but is rare, except in military cases in time of war. Hunting laws are of minor importance; and poisoning, while severely punished, is relatively infrequent. Incest is negligible in the modern criminal problem. Thus time scoffs at our vengeance and laws, for not one of these shadowy offenses has disappeared as a result of punishment, but rather through education, the elimination of superstition and fear, and the removal of the cause inducing the offense." (*Italics in original.*)

The laws and the mores of a given time and place are obviously more or less expressive of the values of the dominant groups or the élite of a given society, and are modified as these are changed, or "as the vicissitudes of social growth cause a reconstitution of these groups themselves in the focus of power." (Sellin, 1938, p. 22.)

When we turn to examine the personality of those who run afoul the conduct norms, especially those who fall into the hands of the police and the courts, we are impressed by the difficulties of trying to describe and analyze the elements which distinguish the criminal from the non-criminal. In the first place, the situation in our present-day complex society is vastly different from the situation under primary-group organization. In the latter type of society, with a homogeneous culture, the criminal or moral code is as a rule relatively simple and direct, and the norms of behavior are usually pretty well integrated into the personal lives of most of the members of the society. In these situations, violations of the norms are usually easy to detect, and the punishment may be relatively direct. But today we have a wide variety of competing interest groups with conflicting standards, and the matter of describing and interpreting the infractions of the codes of the community and the state is not so simple.

Effects of changing and conflicting norms. As a matter of fact, the seriousness of the problem of crime in our country depends in large part upon the conflict of norms. This in turn is but a phase of the larger process of cultural growth involving a shift from primary- to secondary-group dominance. In this process such matters as mass migration of rural immigrants (either from Europe or Asia, or from our own countryside), the great mobility of people, the decline of the family as the basic social group, the disappearance of the neighborhood, the high division of labor, the increase of impersonality in human contacts, and the loss of moral-

religious faith all play a part in producing social and personal disorientation and disorganization. Delinquency and crime are really, in part, but phases of the reorganization of cultural norms and the reshaping of personality organization which accompanies this larger process.

Various studies have shown that on the whole the foreign-born do not produce as many criminals per population unit as do the groups of mixed parentage (foreign-born and native white) or as to those of native white parentage. Yet the frequency of legal charges for behavior which we labeled criminal gives some indication of the differentials in adaptation of the various national groups to our own culture. Thus Sellin (1938, p. 76) has made a rank-order listing of the frequency of felony charges against various nationality groups in comparison with the native whites for various samples, chiefly urban in character, for the years 1929 and 1930. For New York state he shows that the rank order of rates per 100,000 of the same population class eighteen years of age or over put those born in Greece at the top (rate of 779), with native white next (347), followed by natives of Italy (344), Austria (196), Russia (189), and so on, down to natives of Czechoslovakia with a low rate of 38. Like data for other localities show that the Polish and Lithuanian groups have comparatively high rates. These facts and others show that, while most foreign-born groups do not come into contact with the law as often as the native-born, some nationality groups have much higher rates than others. Such data thus provide indirect evidence of a differential in the adaptability of these immigrant minorities to our American culture.

A study by Stofflet (1935) dealing with the nationality and cultural differences in the backgrounds of New Jersey prisoners for the period 1928-1934 is interesting in this connection. He showed that the "character of criminality," as measured by the type of offense, tended to change with each succeeding generation beginning with the immigrant. The most noteworthy shift is from crimes of violence to those of a predatory sort. There is no evidence that a particular type of crime remains attached to a particular nationality or subracial group through succeeding generations, despite Hooton's (1939a) contention to the contrary.¹ Thus we Americanize our immigrants not only in habits of success, occupation, politics, and the like, but in our criminal patterns as well. (For a discussion of other aspects of this problem see Sutherland, 1939, and Sellin's excellent review, 1938.)

A classification of the criminal personality in terms of the particular offenses considered criminal by the dominant political or other élite of a community or nation will scarcely yield us the framework for a satisfactory understanding of the criminal's ideas, attitudes, and habits as they contrast with those of the noncriminal. As Sellin (1938) suggests, it might be more objective to consider the criminal and his offense in terms of the *resistance potential* set up against him by the culture norm. But this is an ideal easier to state than to develop in practice, since our norms themselves are not fixed in time or in one community as contrasted with another. In our society today the protection of life and property ranks

¹ The Hooton investigation aroused considerable popular interest and a great deal of severe professional criticism. (See below.)

highest in our codes. In contrast, in countries like Soviet Russia, Nazi Germany, or Fascist Italy, political crimes, such as counterrevolutionary activity, rank perhaps at the top or near the top of the list of significance.

We must take into account the motivation and meaning of the act for the individual in relation to the conduct norms which he accepts and considers correct as well as with reference to the norms of the larger society within which he operates. We must never forget that *meaning* is socially and culturally determined, largely by how one's fellows define a particular item or series of items of behavior. As noted in the previous chapter, a racketeer may consider his alleged criminal activity as perfectly right and proper. So, too, a member of an isolated minority group like the gypsy may see no wrong in his depredations against the property of persons outside his own group. Revolutionary agitators seldom consider their acts against the dominant state as anything but praiseworthy. If there is a genuine conflict of cultural standards as to what is right and lawful, the handling of the criminal in terms of a group norm which he does not accept may be useless so far as prevention or reformation is concerned. Only when the individual internalizes—that is, accepts emotionally and intellectually—the norm of the punishing group will he make, ordinarily, any serious effort to change his ideas, attitudes, and habits as they concern his alleged criminal activity.

There are, in fact, a variety of individuals who deviate from the legal and moral norms of a particular community or society. First, there are those who do not accept the codes of the group which acts to enforce a certain norm. Second, there are those who do more or less accept this norm in principle but who nevertheless run counter to it in actual conduct. Third, from the viewpoint of the political state there are those who are known to the police as criminals but who cannot be charged with or arrested for crimes because of various technical or other reasons. Fourth, there are those who get arrested for alleged infractions. Fifth, there are the individuals who are convicted and punished by the legal authorities. The criminal persons who have been studied by lawyers, criminologists, psychiatrists, psychologists, sociologists, social workers, and others are chiefly a sample of this last classification.

In other words, we are necessarily concerned principally with those individuals who, having come into conflict with the legal authorities, are punished for their illegal acts. The broader problem of misconduct—that is, infractions of the cultural norms generally—as important as it is falls outside the scope of the present chapter. In this connection, however it is well to recall again that in a complex society like ours there is scarcely an individual who does not sooner or later commit an offense against the legal code, to say nothing of the infractions against the wider and less

well-defined moral codes of the community. Moreover, the publicity given to the more spectacular crimes tends to mask the deeper underlying factors in personality make-up in all of us that enable us to wink at our own offenses or those of our friends and yet to become emotionally disturbed over the alleged violations of people we do not know or like. The meaning of criminality not only for the criminal but for the non-criminal (using these terms now in the sense of legally determined offenses) must be understood if we are ever to deal with this kind of deviant behavior in any but the traditional and superstitious manner of primitive man, from whom we have culturally acquired most of our ideas and practices about crime and the criminal. And, in this connection, we frequently find in the criminal, consciously or unconsciously, a convenient scapegoat for our own repressions. In punishing others we vicariously punish ourselves for our own actual or wished-for offenses against the moral and criminal codes.

CRIMINALITY AS A PERSONALITY MANIFESTATION

When we undertake to deal with the dynamics of criminal behavior, we come face to face with a wide variety of difficult problems and with divergent ways of "explaining" such aberrant conduct. Around the topics of delinquency and crime there has been accumulated a vast body of pseudo-scientific interpretation. Some of this pretends to be sound anatomy and physiology; some consists chiefly of pat psychological stereotypes, especially regarding the I.Q. or the "psychopathic inferiors"; and some provides rather simple explanations in terms of environment. While we may not ignore the possible constitutional factors, nor those of psychological make-up, nor the wider external influences which play upon the individual, we must at all times be careful not to regard the causes of crime in any single-track or particularistic manner.

Particularistic theories of criminal behavior. The commonest of the biological theories is that the criminal somehow represents a special, biologically divergent individual, with structural and functional predispositions to delinquency and crime. The Italian criminologist, Lombroso (1876), worked out a rather elaborate set of criteria to mark what he called the "born" criminal. Such items as cleft palate, scanty body hair, receding forehead, abnormalities of the external ear, and other physical features were assumed to be causally correlated with predispositions to criminal acts. Other writers have taken the view—largely due to poorly controlled observations or inadequate statistical findings—that serious criminality, in whole or in large part, is due to an inherent lack of intelligence, or to an absence of emotional stability, or to a lack of something vaguely called innate moral sense. The earlier enthusiasm for intelligence testing led many to believe that they had at last dis-

covered some means of detecting significant causal factors in behavior—factors resting, it was assumed, chiefly on hereditary mental qualifications. Some workers reported as many as 60 per cent of prisoners to be what they called feeble-minded, and these results were interpreted by the extremists to indicate that feeble-mindedness was inherited, and, moreover, that it represented a predisposition to crime. (Goddard, 1915a, 1920.) Others defended a theory of innate criminality which would take into account emotional, intellectual, and moral instability. Thus Rosanoff (1938), in discussing what he considers innately determined personality types, has one classification of "antisocial," in which he groups delinquents, criminals, and other deviates from the moral-legal codes of society. (See Chapter XIII.) So, too, the familiar, but meaningless, classification of certain undiagnosed divergent individuals as "constitutional psychopathic inferiors" is another evidence of retreat to some notion of organically inherited proclivity to divergent behavior which may on occasion take criminal form. Other writers have tried to make out a case for a high correlation of endocrine imbalance and predispositions to misconduct. (Berman, 1921.)

None of these theories has been verified, and some of them have been pretty thoroughly discredited. The crucial study by Goring (1913) in England, in which he compared the criminal with a sample of the non-criminal population, demonstrated that the distribution of so-called "criminal traits" in the general population gave the quietus to the theory of Lombroso that there were some special physical anomalies highly correlated with criminal activity. Hooton (1939a, 1939b), however, has published the results of an exhaustive series of measurements of known criminals found in American prisons in an effort to discover if there is any combination of physical features which are statistically correlated with various legal offenses.

Hooton's basic data consist of a variety of measurements of 17,680 individuals from ten "far-flung" states. The author contends, on the basis of his findings, that he is able to mark off known criminals from the mass of the general population and also to differentiate classes of criminals from one another. Hooton states that Lombroso had a sound idea in the main but that he failed in his work in seeking a specific criminal type. Hooton finds rather a multiplicity of criminal types, that is, a constellation of features which occur more frequently in criminals than in noncriminals. An illustration of his findings is that on robbers, for whom he found nine characteristic features, such as attached ear lobes, heavy beards, and diffused pigment in the iris. In a group of 414 robbers, six had none of these nine features, no robber, on the other hand, had all nine, and only one had as many as seven. Yet more than half of this group had two or more of the nine characteristics, a significantly higher incidence of such items than were found in other criminals or in noncriminals.

He also divided his sample into subracial types, such as "Nordic," "Mediterranean," and "Dinaric." He found, moreover, that in his sample the Nordic criminals went

in heavily for forgery and fraud but ranked lowest in sex offenses and in robbery. In contrast, the Mediterraneans were highest in sex offenses, and the Dinarics in robbery.

The Hooton data need careful re-examination and evaluation, but at first glance the author does not seem to have entirely freed himself from some of the difficulties which also beset the Lombroso studies. In the first place, his sampling method has been severely criticized, especially for his method of determining his physical type of "old" American stock and of his noncriminal sample. Second, until the social and cultural factors associated with his sample are carefully controlled, we have no adequate basis for assuming a valid or cogent correlation. To mention but one instance, his contention that Nordics tend to one type of crime and Mediterraneans to another is not supported by other data. Thus the work of Stofflet (1935), cited elsewhere, shows that the Italians (Mediterraneans, largely, in Hooton's classification) actually modify the form of their legal offenses the longer they live in this country and become acculturated to American folkways. Another factor to be borne in mind is that the large number of those who break the cultural norms and yet are not sent to prison might distinctly qualify his results, although I suspect this factor to be less telling in the argument than the social-cultural ones.

In the same vein, however, until we have a more adequate understanding of the place of societal and cultural determinants of conduct generally, we must be extremely cautious about accepting these simpler, particularistic theories. This is especially true with reference to the naïve contentions about the causal relations between low intelligence and criminality. (See Sutherland, 1931.) Moreover, while we should not ignore possible constitutional factors which may have some place in the etiology of delinquency and crime, that there are some special aspects of organic life which account for such divergent conduct—with little or no reference to society and culture—is doubtful indeed. (See Tannenbaum, 1938, for a vigorous indictment of these various one-track theories of crime causation.) Certainly those moralists who attribute divergent conduct to inherent "badness," "unregenerate souls," or "lack of moral feelings" simply represent the cultural hang-over of a former demonology, which provided primitive man and our medieval ancestors with a convenient rationalization, which in turn reflected their lack of sufficient objective information as to cause-and-effect relations in human conduct.

As to a classification of crimes, we adopt the same general standpoint with reference to the adult that we did in regard to the juvenile delinquent. (1) We must deal with those who, though they operate in accordance with a norm of their own group, come into conflict with the norms of another, and for the time more dominant, group. (2) We must deal with those who might be imagined to accept the standards of a given society but whose socialization is so inadequate that they fail to make the anticipated moral and civic adjustments, especially under severe

crises. Many of these may be considered intellectually and emotionally fairly well balanced, though some of their acts are labeled criminal. They include those offenders who may be said to be victims of unusual situations for which their previous moral training had not prepared them. (3) There are those seriously neurotic or emotionally unstable individuals whose characteristics, like those of other neurotics, result from a combination of constitutional and social-cultural factors, but who, given a neurotic life organization, from one circumstance or another get into criminal difficulties. (4) Finally, there are those more seriously maladjusted individuals whom we label psychotic and whose mental aberrations take a form of depredations toward property or violence against persons, which brings them into the hands of the police. That is, the last-named group are both psychotic and criminal. We shall discuss some aspects of these four classes of deviant individuals.²

Organized or corporate crime as culture conflict. The first class is neatly illustrated in those more or less organized subgroups of our American society who prey upon other interest groups and upon the community at large, but whose members do not consider their conduct in this matter to be particularly criminal or antinormal. As a matter of fact, so-called organized crime has much in common with the corporate nature of much of our economic life. Under strong and clever leadership, with a sort of feudal organization of members possessing patterns of personal loyalty and division of labor, organized criminal gangsters or racketeers apply the techniques of the entrepreneur in a capitalistic society. As the capitalist entrepreneur aims at the exploitation of natural resources or a potential market with an eye to financial profit, so men like Al Capone, "Dutch" Schultz, and "Lucky" Luciano organize bootlegging, gambling, prostitution, and the like in order to make money. They even follow the monopolistic pattern in driving out their competitors by the use of violence. As a matter of fact, much organized crime has developed in urban society because some features of our complex life lend themselves to this sort of enterprise. Such institutions as prostitution, gambling, and dealing in illicit liquor and drugs have a long history in our urban cul-

² A psychoanalytic classification of criminals may be noted for purposes of comparison. Alexander and Staub (1931), who treat only neurotic criminals, classify the general criminal population into two categories, "chronic" and "accidental." The former they subdivide into (1) "organic criminals," such as idiots who fail to develop any personality in their sense of the term; (2) "neurotic criminals," those compulsives seen in kleptomania or like manias, and those who become criminal through a sense of guilt "where the inner psychological crime is expiated by the less feared objective punishment"; (3) "offenders with the criminal superego (or sociological criminals)," those whose moral code or conscience reflects the mores of a divergent group within a larger society; (4) "genuine" criminals—a more or less theoretical type—who lack any superego or moral self and whose "aboriginal impulses" wreak themselves on society. The "accidental" criminals are those who, because they commit offenses through ignorance of the law or under extraordinary situations, generally receive a certain condonement. Their offenses might be called "situational crimes."

ture. While these activities run counter to the Christian mores of our American life, they nevertheless represent a persistent and convenient provision for certain fundamental desires in many individuals: for sexual outlet, for new adventure, and for indulgence of anxiety-removing and pleasure-giving sensations. These patterns of behavior have existed for centuries in our Western society, but in recent decades they have become more highly organized through a combination of racketeers and corrupt politicians.

In recent decades, moreover, the racketeer has entered the labor movement, and also wholesale and retail merchandising. In relation to the former, cliques aiming at the control of trade-union policies and funds have had the support of the gangster, whose strong-arm tactics are used not only to control the working members of the union but to intimidate employers so that the latter will agree to deal with the unions as to hours, wages, and working conditions. So, too, many wholesale and retail businesses have been invaded by the organized criminal gang, who under the guise of protecting property from depredation have exploited owners and managers by demanding fees for would-be services.

In most of these instances we find a form of feudal organization of control operating outside, or alongside, the political state, or in combination with the corrupt representatives of the state. The high positive correlation between corrupt politicians and organized crime is familiar to every student of criminology. (See Landesco, 1929, and Tannenbaum, 1938, for a good account of these practices.) There is a long history of this sort of culture pattern—for that is what it is. It represents a form of exploitation of the economic order not unlike that practiced by the robber barons of the Middle Ages.

Naturally one asks, what of the personality manifestations of the individuals who operate such a system of extralegal and illegal control? Are these men subnormal? Are they feeble-minded or neurotic or psychotic? And again, how different is this sort of exploitation from that found where the members of a brokerage firm manipulate the stock market so as to fleece thousands of individuals out of their money? The history of the making of large fortunes in this country is replete with instances of success bought in what were essentially criminal ways. Was Jim Fisk or Samuel Insull intellectually or emotionally subnormal? The answer appears obvious. In such matters we are dealing with a whole institutional structure, and the individuals concerned therein differ in their personality manifestations as do people everywhere. They are varied as to role and status. Of course, when we examine the personnel of organized rackets, we find a definite division of labor and of status, and, among the varied persons engaged in these practices, we would doubtless find wide deviations in intelligence and in emotional stability. They

doubtless represent different degrees of integration of attitudes, traits, and habits. They doubtless produce, each in his own way, rationalizations which reflect the norms of the subgroups whose conduct norms they take for granted. But it appears to me to be extremely difficult to make out a case that Al Capone, "Dutch" Schultz, and Luciano represent an aberrant type of personality in contrast to those who rig a stock market or sell fake stocks.

Yet, from the larger view of a dominant though ideal conduct norm of our society regarding the sacredness of life and property and the right to keep the results of one's own toil, the individuals engaged in such forms of depredation and exploitation must be classed as deviants of a criminal sort. From the standpoint of full socialization—that is, internalization of the moral and legal codes of their society—all these men represent deviates. They do, in this sense, represent subnormality or abnormality when these terms are defined as we have defined them. (See Chapter XXIV.) But the reason why we do not ordinarily consider the great financial exploiters as of the same cloth as the gangster or racketeer is that the resistance potential toward the latter is much higher than it is toward the exploiters of natural resources or of the stock market. Put in other words, most of us brought up on the paradoxical combination of Christian morality and the customary business ethics of capitalistic enterprise and money-making have psychologically much more in common with the great captains of finance than we have with the "big shots" of vice, gambling, and organized crime. For this reason we condone the crimes of the financiers the more readily.³

Culture conflict and individual misconduct. Not only may we find institutionalized crime carried on by strong in-groups operating against the larger community, but individuals are often caught up by the law for infractions against community codes which they do not understand or accept. Thus immigrants and their children may get into difficulty with the police and courts for acts which would not be considered antilegal in their own nationality group. So, too, individuals from some of our rural areas, on moving into other sections of the country, either urban or rural, may commit offenses which they do not consider such. For example, in some parts of the country rural men pay no attention to the state game laws, chiefly because they come from a cultural background characterized by frontier folkways regarding the killing of game and do not accept the present-day legal codes in these matters. In some instances

³ It is interesting that during the heyday of the prohibition era, although the police had little success in breaking up bootlegging, the federal income-tax officials were able to convict many rich bootleggers. This reveals the curious fact that prosecution of offenses against the taxing "rights" of the state in some ways has greater public support than the state's "right" to interfere with such services as dealing in illicit liquor or gambling.

these people get into more serious difficulties. The following case illustrates how conflict of cultures may play a part in the induction of crime.⁴

Case of James A. This man migrated twenty years ago from Kentucky to northern Wisconsin, as did several other mountaineer families. He, like his Kentucky neighbors, carried guns, hunted and fished out of season, and had other habits which the older residents did not like or understand.

James had a normal mentality (I.Q. of 95), but had only a fifth-grade education. He first got into difficulty on the charge of carrying a concealed weapon. Later he was arrested following a fight with another man, chiefly over attentions paid by the latter to James's wife. The Kentuckian could not understand why a man should not carry a gun, nor why the law should interfere with a man's family affairs. He had divorced his first wife and had married again, had two children, and worked as a farm laborer during the summer months. He had been brought up in a pious Christian home. Within the confines of his cultural background he would be considered quite normal and well adjusted. During a particularly bad year, when his family had been brought to destitution, he was induced by another man to aid in robbing a country store in order to secure food for their families. He was caught and given a sentence in the state penitentiary. As Gillin puts it, "In no real sense is this man a criminal." But the larger community has so labeled him and has dealt with him accordingly.

There is no end of instances similar to this one, and in a way arrest and imprisonment are themselves to be thought of as devices of the dominant society to bring about more adequate adaptation of these deviate individuals to the accepted conduct norms. That these methods are not highly successful is well known.

Family patterns of crime. Not unrelated to the place of conflicting norms of divergent groups within a larger community or society in inducing criminal conduct are those instances which reveal what might be called a family pattern of crime. In these cases we may find that criminaloid behavior has become more or less standardized—that is, become a culture pattern—for a family over a number of generations. This is frequently seen in milder misconduct such as petty thievery, begging, and more or less institutionalized beggary or vagrancy. Many communities find themselves constantly exploited by whole families that live by preying on their neighbors. Years ago, before the coming of the automobile, the "wagon tramp" was well known; an entire family might migrate season after season over a rather large territory and secure their livelihood by stealing chickens, fruit, vegetables, small farm implements, and the like as they passed by. Today something like this is found in the "auto tramp." Institutionalized begging, of course, is common in many countries. In our own society it is less common, but we do find it on occasion, and

⁴ Summarized from a case furnished through the courtesy of John L. Gillin from his manuscript, *Backgrounds of Inmates of the Wisconsin State Prison*.

it often operates through a more or less integrated family unit. (See Gilmore, 1932.)

Falling in this general category is Shaw's account (1938) of the criminal careers of the five Martin brothers. This is an interesting story of family neglect and stimulation to begging, followed by more serious misconduct, and in four of them by reformation. Each of these brothers was studied rather intensively through an examination of their criminal records, from the collection of data on the family background, from their autobiographies—which they wrote for Shaw—and from various psychiatric interviews and a series of tests and ratings. The following summary, which presents some of the differences and likenesses in traits and attitudes of the Martin brothers, is based on Burgess's analysis of their careers for the Shaw volume:

(1) John's life history is largely an apology filled with attempts to justify his criminal career, chiefly to himself, not to others. Of all the five documents his is most indifferent to the possible effects on his readers. He never places the blame for his criminal conduct upon himself, but elsewhere, first upon his oldest brother, who died, and then in this order upon his father, upon the neighborhood, upon his partner in his last offense, and finally upon women. His life history, which is filled with moralizing and philosophizing, shows him to be the most egocentric of the brothers.

Yet his egocentricity seems to have had no "causal relation" to his entry upon a life of crime, upon his continuance therein, or upon his reform. During the years he spent in the army he was evidently well adjusted, but later, without much resistance, fell back into his old habits. His criminal attitudes and habits do not seem to have been deep-seated, however, but they do persist relatively unaltered although he has had no record of criminality during the last ten years. In sharp contrast with the optimistic plans for the future which characterize the autobiographies of the other brothers, John, in the closing sections of his life story, expresses "feelings of depression and defeatism" which seem to indicate that of the five he is the least well adjusted to life.

(2) In contrast to John's, Edward's autobiography is that of a well-adjusted, normal individual who describes his delinquency, crime, and prison experiences objectively and impartially. Evidently as a child he was as responsive to socially approved as he was to delinquent patterns of conduct. On at least two occasions, he relates, he was especially "susceptible to sympathetic approaches for his reformation." Of the five, he seems the most conscious of the alternatives between approved and criminal conduct. At the time of writing his story he was well adjusted and well oriented toward a legitimate career. He writes, "I am a determined sort of fellow and I am going to succeed somehow."

(3) James is the only one of the brothers who possesses a marked degree of self-consciousness. His awareness of his reader-audience is indicated in the opening sentence of his narrative: "This story of my life is written so that folks may see the inside of my past and not only the crust as I think they see it now." He is interested in revealing his inner thoughts and feelings, especially those related to his years in correctional institutions. He remarks, "I wasn't born tough. The treatment in the institutions made me that way. My heart grew bitter and hard... [from] the

manhandling I received." Also, he was more concerned than the others with analyzing his own mental conflicts as to whether to continue in misconduct or take up a legitimate occupation. He reports that he often tried to keep at work but that "friends lured me back to the racket," that he disliked stealing but went along in order to avoid ridicule. He candidly states his full intention to go straight, if not for his own then for his mother's sake, but includes a reservation, "If given any kind of a chance." At present he seems well adjusted to normal society.

(4) Michael presents a rather matter-of-fact, unimaginative, fairly objective, but somewhat defensive account of his life. Unlike James, he does not expose his inner world of emotions, feelings, and attitudes. But the document does show him to be characterized by self-pity, hypercriticism of law-enforcing officials and agencies, and an inclination to blame society and others for his criminality and for his present predicament. (He was still in prison when he wrote his history.) In fact, he admits that he may continue his criminal career, though he concludes his document with the following implicit bargain to society: "All I need is a good job with a good salary and then the state of Illinois can check another boy off their hands as reformed."

(5) While Carl's autobiography reveals less than any of the others, it does provide some insight into its author. He diverges rather sharply from his brothers in his traits and attitudes. He is the most objective, the least communicative, and, except possibly Edward, the least susceptible to the influence of the criminal culture which surrounded him. He writes chiefly about the environment and less about himself.

In interpreting this particular document Burgess believes that much of this difference from the other brothers may be due to Carl's youth. (He was the youngest.) He appears to be still in a common adolescent state of ambivalent trends, one toward dependence, the other toward independence. He did not run about nights as did his brothers; and he seems more conscious of the disapproval of delinquency by society than they were. He resolved early not to fall into the life of delinquency, and his misconduct arose later when he began going along with his older brothers or companions in their exploits.

A series of six scales were devised to reveal emotionality, independence, social adjustment, and the like. Regarding the results of these tests, Burgess (in Shaw, 1938, pp. 332-333) writes:

"John is markedly below the average in social adjustment; average in independence; somewhat below average in emotional stability and extroversion; below average in self-sufficiency and dominance.

"Edward is average in social adjustment; markedly above the average in independence, self-sufficiency, and dominance; and unusually high in emotional stability and extroversion.

"James is average in social adjustment and independence; above average in emotional stability and extroversion; somewhat above the average in self-sufficiency; and average in dominance.

"Michael is below average in social adjustment; somewhat below average in independence; average in extroversion; below average in emotional stability and dominance; and markedly below average in self-sufficiency.

"Carl is markedly above average in social adjustment; somewhat below average in

independence; markedly above average in emotional stability, extroversion, and dominance; and somewhat below the average in self-sufficiency."

It is worth noting that four of these five brothers have made fairly good adjustments as normal members of society since their release, a fact which Burgess attributes, first, to their own favorable attitudes and determination to reform, and, second, to the favorable and sympathetic treatment which they had received while they were under state control and direction.

Deficient intelligence as a factor in criminality. When we turn to the second broad classification, that of persons within a given community who are more or less adapted to its conduct norms but who nevertheless fall into trouble with the police and the law, we find that criminologists frequently center their attention on the importance of mental defectiveness as a factor. There has been not only a wide variation in the reported findings and in their interpretation as to the frequency of low intelligence among criminals but also considerable divergence in the interpretation as to the significance of this factor in the incidence of criminal activities. When the intelligence test was first invented, it was hailed as a scientific and therapeutic godsend. Scholars and reformers who look for simple and single causes imagined that in this instrument they had a key to unlock the basic "explanation" of crime. In this country a large number of surveys of the intelligence of prisoners were made, beginning about 1912. Sutherland (1931) has made a critical analysis of these findings and has found (as he did with reference to the intelligence of juvenile delinquents) that there is a wide variation in the median or mean I.Q.'s reported by various investigators. Some surveys reported three quarters of the prisoners to be feeble-minded, while others found that less than one fifth could be so considered. Obviously, the type of test, the scoring devices, the determination of the norm for mental age, and the point in the I.Q. range below which an individual is classified as mentally defective are important factors in such interpretation, to say nothing of the invalidity and unreliability of many of the tests applied. Moreover, Murchison (1926) has shown that, as measured by the army group tests, a large sample of American prisoners did as well as, if not better than, comparable groups outside. (See also Tulchin, 1939.)

Then, too, as Sutherland (1934) has shown, the incidence of criminality in the feeble-minded population is no greater than it is in the normal. He has also pointed out—on the basis of a wide series of investigations—that dull-witted prisoners are no more difficult to discipline while incarcerated than are normal; they are about as successful on parole as the latter; they have about the same rate of recidivism. There is, however, some slight support for the popular belief that the weak-minded

are more given to sex crimes than those of normal intellect. For his closing from Illinois penal institutions, Tulchin (1939, p. 155) states:

"For nearly all nativity and race groups the highest median Alpha scores are made by the men committed for fraud, and the lowest scores by men committed for sex crimes."

Yet, as was pointed out in the previous chapter, we must not ignore the importance of mental deficiency as a factor in much of our criminality, for the person poorly endowed with intelligence is not easily and adequately socialized. He fails to develop a moral self (the superego); he is often lacking in comprehension of the world of his fellows and of his proper role therein. But, if the social-cultural environment is favorable in the sense of providing him with economic, marital, and recreational outlets of a normal sort, he may make a very satisfactory adjustment. On the other hand, in the face of crisis, or through the antimoral suggestions of others, or under the impress of strong emotionality, which sometimes, though by no means always, accompanies feeble-mindedness, the mentally defective may fall into difficulties with the law. It should not be forgotten that, just as society and culture define the meaning of constitutional or other deficiencies in the individual (see Chapter XXVI), so, too, it defines the role and status and life organization of those who are lacking in intellectual ability. The feeble-minded criminal operates within the framework of his own society and culture, as does everyone else. But the lower his intelligence the less well socialized he is likely to be, assuming that intelligence is largely the result of heredity or of very early constitutional fixation of the capacity to learn. There is, therefore, some warrant (as also with the emotionally unstable) for Bjerre's statement (1927, p. 4) that "the determining factor in all crime is *weakness*." (Obviously, from our standpoint, Bjerre is considering only those criminals who fall into our second, third, and fourth categories, not those who as members of a strong in-group are actually at war with the larger community, and not those who as solitary offenders commit acts called criminal though their own cultural norms define such conduct otherwise.)

The socially and emotionally maladjusted criminal. In this wide category a variety of specific constellations of habits, traits, and attitudes may be found. So much depends on how one defines social-emotional stability, and so far we lack any adequate objective standards. In the end the matter rests upon the rather broad and somewhat amorphous, but none the less important, cultural norm, even though the norm varies with social class, occupation, and other societal groupings. For our purposes we shall simply select certain illustrative cases for comment.

In this way we may reveal the many facets which enter into the development of patterns of life which lead an individual into certain acts that the dominant groups in our society consider criminal.

We must repeat that only a small fraction of the total acts of any criminal, even those labeled degenerate and vicious, are to be defined as deviant in the proper sense. That is, these persons have a set of basic personal habits not unlike those of the rest of us. They are often capable of great love, bravery, and endurance—all high values in our society. Not infrequently they are pious, and most of them have some sense of guilt and shame for their acts. It usually takes time to make them thoroughly criminalistic. And, despite their unsatisfactory vocational adaptation in many cases, a large number of criminals are not lazy and have pretty well accepted our cultural definition of the importance of a job. In short, in dealing with such a deviant person we place a *general* all-inclusive label or brand on him because more or less specific and segmental acts have brought him into conflict with the law and mores. Yet in time many criminals, in part because of our treatment of them, do develop a more or less persistent *criminal* role and may in some cases make this the central focus of their life organization. These are the professional criminals *per se*.

Such matters as the sense of injustice or of inferiority, the thwarting of self or ego demands, and the frustration of love, with its not infrequent ambivalent turning to hatred—these and many other configurations of emotional and ideational factors in the individual may be important in inducing acts that are considered criminal. In fact, the isolation of the person from active participation in the normal life around him may be an important item. This sense of difference and isolation as one factor, at least, is brought out in the following case of a murder (J. L. Gillin, 1934, p. 552):

"The story [is] of a young man who had come to consider himself outside the pale of society. The members of his family were the only persons he could meet as equals. All others were above him. The standards of conduct and the reaction patterns inculcated in this individual in his childhood were of such a nature as made it impossible for him to adjust himself to life outside the family group. He carried always with him an attitude of rebellion against authority. At the same time he submitted to what he considered the inevitable not of justice but of retaliation. He had come to conceive of society as his natural enemy. He had no sense of a heritage in our social institutions. Revenge and the commission of anti-social acts were his method of asserting the self and realizing his dream of a complete personality.

"His father finally refused to have anything more to do with him. This led to the severing of a tie which hitherto had given him a sense of belonging to a family. After that he felt that the group in which alone he had status had disowned him. As a consequence from that time on his anti-social acts grew in number and serious-

ness. These acts were methods he employed of compensating for the feeling of losing status."

In this instance, as in many others, the frustration of love, the severing of close affectional ties, and the resulting anxiety induced conduct of a violent sort.

Not only may lack of intelligence operate to prevent adequate social-cultural adaptation, but social-emotional immaturity is an important factor in the life organization of many criminals. Numerous cases have shown that the continuation of strong mother attachment, persistence of childish emotionality, and inability to assume adult economic responsibilities are factors in the induction of such deviant behavior.

The place of emotional instability and other factors of the early life in the development into criminal careers is shown by J. L. Gillin (1937a) in his study of prisoners in the Wisconsin state penitentiary. On a number of details as to attitudes, values, habits, and certain external factors he compared them with their noncriminal brothers and found certain significant differences. He writes (1937a, p. 211):

"...In those aspects of the background which we have been able to test—work record, marital status, affection for mother, feeling of favoritism, relationships with wife—prisoners in our sample seem to show greater variability in their reaction to social situations than their brothers. . . . The picture suggests that rather early in life, especially during the period of adolescence, the prisoners developed a pattern of reactions to life's situations which grew into an unstable economic career, an unstable domestic situation, and prevented their striking roots economically and socially which would tend to keep them from a delinquent career. . . . The data with regard to their feeling of favoritism and their affection for the mother, suggests the possibility that early in their lives these prisoners developed a self-centeredness which did not make for social stability."

The effects of a persistence of undue childish attachment of the son to his mother, with all that this implies as to failure to develop normal heterosexual attitudes and habits, is strikingly demonstrated in our society by those criminals who get into difficulties because of their homosexuality. (The cultural factors, of course, play a definite role in canalizing these patterns in terms of acceptance or disapproval. See Chapter XXVIII.) Another of J. L. Gillin's studies⁵ shows that, among the homosexuals of his sample, infantile and childish fixations upon the mother are evidently important items in the life organization. He also shows that heavy drinking is frequently an accompaniment of homosexual patterns, a fact often indicated by the psychoanalysts. Terman and his coworkers, in their study of femininity and masculinity, have come to much the same

⁵ From the unpublished manuscript referred to above.

conclusion. Included in their total sample were nineteen men in a state prison who had been convicted of homosexuality. In summarizing their findings on these men, they say (1936, p. 329):

"If the case-history data supplied by these individuals can be accepted as anywhere near the truth, the psycho-social formula for developing homosexuality in boys would seem to run somewhat as follows: too demonstrative affection from an excessively emotional mother, especially in the case of a first, last, or only child; a father who is unsympathetic, autocratic, brutal, much away from home, or deceased; treatment of the child as a girl, coupled with lack of encouragement or opportunity to associate with boys and to take part in the rougher masculine activities; over-emphasis on neatness, niceness, and spirituality; lack of vigilance against the danger of seduction by older homosexual males. The formula, of course, does not always work. Doubtless many children who grow up in an environment of the kind just described become nevertheless heterosexual; possibly a majority do. In some of these cases the heterosexual adjustment is made only with difficulty; the man may have little interest in sex, he may select a wife much older than himself (a mother surrogate), or if he marries a younger woman she may find it impossible to win first place in his affections."

It would take us too far afield to examine the varied types of crime in which neurotics or emotionally unstable individuals indulge. Rather we shall only select certain illustrations which will show something of the mental life of such criminals. (For a fuller discussion of neurotic mechanisms see Chapters XXVII and XXVIII.)

An interesting instance of neuroticism of a somewhat hysteric sort is witnessed in the swindlers, confidence men, pathological liars, and the like who represent a rather effective capacity to identify themselves with others, or, better, to assume the rôle of being agreeable persons in order so to exploit those who give them a hearing. On this matter Bromberg and Thompson (1937, pp. 82-83) remark:

"... The term 'hysterical-swindler' indicates to us an individual who is self-deceptive, a poser, a counterfeit. He utilizes the same mechanism the hysteric does, but half intentionally and usually not with the same result. He unconsciously takes over the rôle of some person higher in the social scale. The swindler acts out the assumed personality, submerging his own. Like the hysteric he can throw himself into another character, even to the point of half believing in his assumed rôle himself, because of the partial dissociation of the personality. On the surface he appears to have no conflicts and could be considered adjusted and successful. But study shows that his assumption of a pose as a bogus count, a banker, an international figure, a promoter of large business enterprises, and so on, is in response to an inner need to bolster up his ego. In this respect swindlers are neurotic types of a specific kind. Every swindler does not belong here, but those whose life illustrates the constant need for dramatization do belong in this group. The type has been delineated because of the specificity of this kind of personality among many of our swindler cases, whom we have studied in some detail." (See also Bromberg and Keiser, 1938.)

While such individuals usually possess good intellectual ability, they lack a mature moral self or superego. They develop the role of exploiter by remaining at a chameleon stage of identification. (See Chapter X.) (For an interesting account of this type of neurotic criminal see Healy and Healy, 1915.)

An important contribution to the understanding of the neurotic criminal is to be found in Alexander and Healy (1935), who secured the co-operation of a sample of criminals who were willing to be psychoanalyzed. Although some of the concepts and findings may seem bizarre, and while some critics believe that many psychoanalysts ignore the cultural factors in their interpretations, there is no doubt that this particular study marks a genuine advance in the understanding of the deeper motivations of crime, at least in these cases. They show, for instance, that the combination of such factors as early intimidation (fear and sense of guilt), spoiling, and frustration or deprivation of love play important parts in many instances. Against the background of traditional American emphasis upon individualism, aggression, independence, and hyperactivity, many individuals who suffer fear, overcare, and social inhibitions find great difficulty in making the expected adult adjustment. And, unlike the usual neurotic, instead of taking flight into symbolic life and fantasy, these neurotics go off into overt behavior of the sort that gets them into legal difficulties.

The following case, adapted and quoted from Karpman (1935), illustrates some of these important neurotic manifestations.

Case of Albert Thornley. At the time of the study Albert was thirty-three years of age, an inmate of a hospital for the criminally insane. According to the clinical diagnosis, he was a constitutional psychopath without definite psychosis. Certainly he was not "crazy" in the ordinary sense of this term. He had, however, a long record of crimes: theft, extortion, fraudulent enlistment in the army, and many minor offenses, especially repeated drunkenness. In the course of the years he had been in and out of a number of psychiatric institutions. Yet there was nothing deliberately vicious in his conduct. The roots of his difficulty appeared to lie in an immature emotional life, particularly in his ambivalent sexual reactions, in a marked sense of insecurity, and in a certain bitterness toward life.

During Albert's early years the Thornley family was in good circumstances. The mother and father were evidently very congenial, and the five children seemed destined for normal careers. Albert was somewhat weak in constitution and had suffered from such childhood diseases as measles, mumps, scarlet fever, and typhoid fever. His most outstanding personality manifestation was his intense fixation on his mother, expressed by great devotion and willing sacrifice for her. Her death when he was about sixteen years of age proved a great shock to him. The father's reaction to the wife's death was not particularly stable: he became depressed and took to drinking heavily. When he remarried, Albert felt completely at a loss for emotional support and affection and left home to wander about the country.

He was arrested for a petty offense and committed to a reform school. His father did not come to his aid as he might have done. Rather he approved the commitment—an event which left a deep mark on Albert's personality, for where he expected "someone who understood and cared" he got only what he viewed as a betrayal.

At the correctional institution he learned about crime, sex, and women from his fellows, and picked up certain attitudes of indifference and revenge toward those who had "caused" his trouble. During the next two years he was twice paroled and twice broke his parole. He took to a life mixed of casual labor, petty crimes, and wanderlust. At the age of nineteen he enlisted in the army but was discharged within six months for petty theft. Later there were two fraudulent enlistments and subsequent discharges. His commitment prior to Karpman's investigation had been for impersonating an officer.

The roots of this man's difficulties lie in the lack of normal development of his social-emotional life. As an adult he experienced an intense sense of insecurity, loneliness, and craving for love. His criminal conduct was largely of a compensatory character. As Karpman (1935, p. 190) puts it, "The main reason for his social conflicts appears to have been the degradation of his personality consequent upon the breaking up of the home, allowing him to sink lower and lower in his industrial adjustment, often reaching an impasse at which some sort of anti-social activity seemed to him the only avenue of escape." Yet Albert could hardly be classed as "the mercenary type of criminal."

The particular significance of his intense mother attachment appears time and time again in his relations with women. He was indifferent to younger women, but strongly attracted to older women who resembled his mother. Though possessed of a strong sexual urge, his devotion to his mother image was so firm that he was repeatedly shifting from strong biological interests to a sentimental spiritualization of love. Over and over again he began his relations with women, as he put it, in "a beautiful friendship" only to "spoil" it later on by indulgence in sexual relations which invariably induced in him a sharp sense of disgust and guilt. As he said about his first illicit affair with a landlady ten years his senior, when he was nineteen (Karpman, 1935, p. 159): "I had no more intention of having intercourse with her than I would with my own mother. I not only loved her, but I worshipped her. I don't believe I would have ever married her, for I did not love her that way. . . ." His comment on his conflicting attitudes toward women was this: "In later years I regretted this trait in my disposition, but I honestly can't help it. I have always felt that a woman with whom I have had intercourse was not worthy of any man's consideration. From this you can see how much I loved my mother, both while she was living and after her death. (To him she was still living.)" (1935, p. 160)

In short, his whole affectional life was marked by confused dissociation between what he considered pure and profane love and by his inability to fuse the two elements, characterized by "his contempt for any woman who would yield to him physically, his promiscuity, which on close analysis turns out to be an attempt to escape rather than to yield to sex, dissipating in any direction because he can't direct it to the particular goal." (1935, p. 191.) In fact, his alcoholism was largely a retreat to drown his disgust.

In concluding his discussion, Karpman (1935, p. 192) says: "The case demonstrates

that criminality may sometimes arise through sheer loss of sympathetic emotions where the individual has previously been conditioned on such. The degradation of the personality which such a loss often occasions, the variety of vicarious attempts to make up for the loss, and generally the push and pull of the conflicting emotions, often get the neurotic entangled in a maze of complicated mental states from which criminality sometimes offers an immediate, albeit wholly unfit, means of escape."

These mental conflicts of childhood and adolescence were fertile for the development of a neurosis characterized by criminalistic and other maladjustment in adult life. Such compulsive behavior, sense of guilt, and substitutive gratifications are the outcome of both constitutional foundations and an atypical situation which must be understood by those who would deal with such neurotic criminals.

Psychosis and crime. A certain percentage of our criminal population falls more or less definitely into the category of the psychotic or "insane" in the legal and popular sense. (See Chapters XXVII and XXVIII.)

While their number is not large in the total of offenders who are arrested and convicted, they often furnish some of the most difficult and persistent problems for the police, the clinical psychologist, and the psychiatrist. (See Wilson and Pescor, 1939.) Recently Bromberg and Thompson (1937) have made an elaborate analysis of 10,000 convicted individuals brought before the Psychiatric Clinic of the Court of General Sessions of New York City—"the largest criminal court in the country." The following quotation is from their summary (1937, pp. 87-88).

"1. [These psychiatric investigations revealed] that Mental Defectives and Insane (Psychotic) offenders constitute a small proportion of the whole (2.4% and 1.5% respectively). Offenders diagnosed as Psychopathic Personality according to accepted psychiatric criteria comprise 6.9% of the total. The mentally abnormal group, including the psychoneurotics (6.9%) constitutes about 18% of the total. The remainder were found to be mentally normal.

"2. The deductions to be made from our findings are that Psychosis, Mental Deficiency and Psychopathic Personality, play a relatively minor role in the causation of crime. Our studies contrast with the results quoted by other investigators, particularly a decade or two ago, in that we find a low percentage of individuals who evidence mental abnormality. We consider the low ratio of mental defectives and insane prisoners to be especially noteworthy, in the criminal group. It brings out into relief the rather surprising finding that of our total number, 82% comprise the so-called normal or average group, and it is these that constitute the essential problem in criminology."

Some of the psychotic criminals represent individuals of the manic-depressive syndrome who commit acts of violence during periods of heightened excitement or mania. Since these patients usually have a fair probability of recovery from their mental disorder—unless it is qualified by other factors—those who treat these persons might bear that fact in mind. But, since so many of the offenders who fall into this category

are convicted for serious bodily injury or murder—which means that the public reaction is likely to be intense—it often happens that, instead of recovery, long incarceration may produce a whole set of criminalistic attitudes and values which were not present before.

Then there are a certain number of criminals who may be classified in the dementia-praecox category: those individuals marked by loss of normal concern with the external world, given over to elaboration of their fantasy world, who develop a distinct split between their emotional-feeling values and the intellectual and habitual demands of the environment. There is no doubt that a good many vagrants, tramps, petty thieves, and others represent a type of schizoid adaptation. They fail to take over the expected and normal occupational, marital, and civic roles. Instead, they roam about the country, or gradually slip into habits of sloth, neglect of themselves and of their property, and find an adjustment at a rather simple, almost childlike level of thought and conduct. In some instances, more serious crimes are committed by persons who are diagnosed in this general broad category, but they represent, as do many other psychotic personalities, an externalization of their inner life which is not common to schizophrenia.

More serious are those criminals who are recruited from the paranoiacs. Some of the most difficult and dangerous murderers fall into this category. Such criminals usually have a long but more or less typical history of this mental disorder. Often beginning in difficulties in getting along with others, these individuals in time develop extreme self-pity and gradually an increasing tendency to be suspicious of those around them, often including close friends and relatives. Such suspicion increases and develops into delusions of persecution. This is but an exterior manifestation of intense inner conflict and emotional distress. As a rule, the delusion becomes centered on one or two or a few persons or on some given group. It often takes the form of intense conviction that these others are plotting to undo or destroy the individual and all his fundamental values, material or otherwise. This delusion may become so powerful that in a moment of irritation, or from cool deliberation, the paranoiac resolves his fears of the other and his own inner conflict by a homicidal attack. If the death penalty or life imprisonment is not imposed upon such murderers, they may continue to be a potential threat to others. Such individuals often possess high intelligence and great cunning, and, if their homicidal pattern becomes established, they may repeat such a crime in order to gain a given aim. Because paranoiacs are so plausible, often so shrewd in their appeals to others, so clever in rationalizations, and so well oriented in their usual social contacts, their paranoid motivations are frequently well disguised. For these reasons they not infrequently win their freedom from prison only later to become serious problems.

The psychotic criminal, however, makes up such a small fraction of the total criminal population that a consideration of his mentality and conduct might be neglected. Yet the scientific investigation of such individuals not only is important with a view to therapy and reformation, where this is at all possible, but is valuable as a means of throwing into focus the mental and habitual mechanisms in the more normal population.

SOME ASPECTS OF THE TRADITIONAL TREATMENT OF CRIMINALS

The emotional reactions of most people in a community to the criminal are often very direct and severe. We have already noted that the high value put upon the preservation of life, upon private property, and upon sexual taboos in our society makes the noncriminal individual highly sensitive to infractions of the codes by others. As the Freudian psychologists might put it, our own superego or conscience is constantly pushing upon our strong and elemental id, our animal impulses to damage others personally, or to deprive them of their possessions in order to secure power, or to indulge freely in our sex urges. In other words, there is a strong repression of impulses which we should like to express, and, just as our own superego would punish us with the sense of shame and guilt were we to let these impulses go, so by identification and projection operating conjointly we would punish severely those around us who give evidence of having let their primitive urges go. As a matter of fact, the punitive practices of so-called criminal justice are evidence of our strong unconscious emotional reactivity to misconduct tendencies in ourselves as well as in others. In other words, the traditional treatment of our criminal population well illustrates the culturalization of our strong sadistic and revenge patterns.

Punitive revenge patterns in penal institutions. There is no doubt that the usual methods of handling criminals in our jails and prisons do little to reform them and prepare them for more adequate adjustments to life outside when they are released. There is much evidence that the sense of injustice, mistreatment, and the like experienced while "doing time" tends to promote motives to seek revenge through misconduct later, when released. The sadism of the "third degree" is self-evident. Severe prison discipline and the "hard-boiled" attitudes and practices of prison guards are not conducive to recovery from crime on the part of those who suffer at their hands. The following statement from B. Glueck (1934, p. 701) is pertinent to this discussion:

"Man accepts the demands and restrictions which living in association with others imposes upon him not without resistance and protest and only in return for the

promise of the benefits and securities of communal life. When he does repress his egocentric and selfish tendencies in the service of civilized life, he does so with the tacit understanding that society, in its turn, has assumed certain obligations toward him. Among these obligations of society to the individual, one of the most precious is an assurance of a social sense of justice or rightness. A violation of this sense of justice constitutes a vicious betrayal of this tacit understanding and furnishes justification for the unleashing of primitive impulse and instinct which had been held in check."

In short, many ex-convicts are motivated to further crimes because of their overwhelming desire for revenge, itself stimulated in part by the punitive sadistic treatment accorded them in prison. The literature of penology is full of evidence not only that our traditional penal methods do little or nothing to remove desires and attitudes of revenge or to redirect other deviant motivations but that, instead, incarceration actually enhances impulses already established. (See Sutherland, 1939; and especially Tannenbaum, 1938, and the bibliography cited therein.)

But the treatment in prison has other, more serious influences in actually inciting psychoses which may seriously injure the whole subsequent life course of the individual. The factors involved in the development of aberrant emotional life in the prisoner are noted by Root (1925, pp. 29-31) in these words:

"Imprisonment produces marked systematic changes in the emotional and intellectual personality of the inmate. In the beginning, the first offender is in a responsive condition of mind; and as he has usually experienced severe mental shock during his arrest, jail imprisonment, and trial, he would now welcome a constructive plan and is in an attitude to respond to human kindness. Following this there is a period of depression, often marked homesickness, in which life is nearly unbearable. Then there is a period in which any companionship is better than none—a period in which unfortunate friendships are made and criminal education is received from the habitual and professional. Sullen apathy in the end becomes a fixed habit of mind.

"All who have worked with prisoners have noted the exaggerated emotionalism. Their emotional perspective is lost, and the most trivial matters assume great importance. Near-riot is often at hand in the penitentiary over a small matter that would mean nothing on the outside. This seems to be due to two causes, at least: first, when life is reduced to a few insignificant incidents, these become relatively important; second, the feeling of helplessness and suppression creates a vast undercurrent of impotent rage. After weeks, months, years, of suppression, the emotions, like oil-soaked waste, need but a spark to be in blaze. The trouble usually starts with an individual but quickly assumes mob form. It is then known as a prison riot, and the impression is usually given out that the coordination of action indicated a deep-laid plot. Usually this is not so; the only coordination is that of smoldering emotions always close to the ignition point. And outburst calls for further measures of repression; repression brings a more highly sensitized emotional state; and thus is created the vicious circle of repression on the part of the authorities, and emotional-

ization on the part of the convict. A few develop a sycophantic front, others sullen servility, others apathy, others lunacy.

"Another psychic state of imprisonment is the neurosis of monotony. This is exceedingly interesting and needs to be carefully studied. The mental vacuity, the perseveration of a few ideas, the curious dullness that comes with going stale mentally, the dissociation of personality, the increased emotionalization, the suspension of all the aims and motivations of life at large form a very effective punishment—but not constructive reform. And we may take it as a psychological axiom that the emotions aroused by punishment are not the emotions for constructive mental habits of any kind, but tend to vengeance and revenge. Do one or the other then: either attempt to cure him, or permanently institutionalize the man in question. Incarceration can have but two logical objectives: first, permanent protection of society; and second, to call a halt in a man's actions and give, just as a hospital does, time to rehabilitate him physically, morally, vocationally, and emotionally. In one case we have protection; in the other, reform. But in no case is punishment, as such, logically or psychologically tenable. It is similar to kicking the door on which you have bumped your nose in the dark. There are two things to remember: you cannot punish and reform at the same time; and second, the prisoner of today is the citizen of tomorrow, or else he needs permanent cure. If he is ever to be released, reform is the only program possible; and the prison must then be looked at as a *rehabilitation hospital for moral patients*." (Italics in original.)

If failure to grow up socially and emotionally is the central aspect of the criminal's personality—as it seems to be—then the treatment should not be beatings, cruelty, and solitary confinement. This may satisfy the sadistic impulses of the guards and the ever-latent sadism of the "outraged" public outside, but it will hardly induce satisfactory changes in the prisoner. As we have indicated in discussing the child in the home, in the school, and elsewhere, love, sympathy, patience, and, above all, provision of a sense of security, of self-importance, and of scope for activity, are highly important. Further deprivation, physical punishment, and the like only accentuate previously conditioned emotional states, which, though unconsciously motivated, serve to disturb the prisoner. In short, all that we have said about the matter of rational treatment for juvenile delinquents applies equally well for adult criminals. But, unfortunately for the prisoners and for society, by the time the individual reaches chronological adulthood, he is often so fixed in habit, trait, and attitude that little can be done to alter him. If fixity is the despair of the mother or teacher, it is the even greater despair of those who would reform the criminal.

Chapter XXVI

ADJUSTMENTS ASSOCIATED WITH CONSTITUTIONAL DEFICIENCIES

THE PRESENT chapter will discuss certain aspects of the interplay of severe physical defects and social-cultural adaptation. The most common of these defects are found in cases of endocrine imbalance, among cripples, among the totally and partially deaf, among the blind, and in those feeble-minded persons in whom the constitutional, especially hereditary, factors are rather clear-cut. The social participation of these individuals is profoundly influenced not only by their own condition but also by the manner in which other persons define the role and status for these defectives. (See Chapter XXVIII on organic disease and personality.)

Thus the fat child whose condition arises largely from a pituitary malfunctioning becomes the butt of jokes and comments which define and establish his participation in the home, on the playground, in the school-room, and elsewhere. He is certain to be influenced by these social stimuli, for they set up in him an image of himself, derived from others, that will enter into the growth of his conception of himself—that is, into the make-up of that generalized other which is such a fundamental component of the *self*. Or the blind boy may be the object of pity, oversolicitude, and infantile reactions from others; these responses may stimulate him to outward conformity, but may also produce an inner resentment that finds expression either in violent daydreams or in some instances in vicious overt behavior. In similar manner other handicapped persons reveal various kinds of personality traits, attitudes, and reactions—due in large part to the nature of their contacts with others.

Although in the development of these personalities the same mechanisms arising from social interaction are found as in more normal individuals, certain of these mechanisms are accentuated. Compensatory responses are very common; projection of blame on others sometimes plays a great part, or the identification with others in a role of dependency is distinctly infantile in character. Yet we also find many instances of sublimation. The problem of training and education for these constitutional defectives is partly one of controlling as far as possible certain critical situations in which they may be taught to take a healthier view of themselves and also of giving them tools which will make this training more

effective. For example, lip-reading is a great aid to the hard-of-hearing, or the stimulation of a compensatory capacity may help the blind man or the cripple to a higher status in his group than might otherwise be possible.

THE EFFECTS OF ENDOCRINE IMBALANCE ON PERSONALITY

We have already discussed the relation of the endocrines to some of the constitutional foundations of behavior. (See Chapter II.) In this section we shall discuss only certain examples of the malfunctioning of the endocrines which appear to influence personality traits. We must repeat the caution of Hoskins (1933), that wild speculation and fantasy thinking in this field have carried many writers far beyond the verifiable findings of science and medicine. A careful reading of a large selection of recent studies on the mental and behavior manifestations of cases revealing endocrine difficulties must convince anyone that as yet—with few exceptions—no valid conclusions can be drawn from these data. The biggest handicaps in evaluating this material arise, first, from the failure of the investigators in this field to control other factors in the situation, and, second, from the tendency for the enthusiasm of these workers consciously or unconsciously to bias them toward a particularistic explanation of complex personality manifestations.

It must be recalled that scarcely any gland operates independently of others. Although in the following discussion we shall deal with certain defects associated with particular glands, the interrelationship with other glands must be remembered, even though the evidence for such interaction may not yet be clear. We shall confine ourselves, however, chiefly to disturbances of personality that are associated with dysfunctioning of the thyroid, the pituitary, and the sex glands. The clinical and experimental material concerning these glands is perhaps our most adequate source of information.

Thyroid malfunctioning. One of the most common diseases arising from undersecretion of the thyroid in adults is called *myxedema*. In children it is commonly called *cretinism*, but more properly *childhood myxedema*. (See Hoskins, 1933, p. 73.) The myxedematous child is characterized by limp and weak musculature, coarse dry hair, and rough and folded skin. There is general evidence of retardation or subnormality all along the line, in basal metabolism, temperature, pulse rate, blood pressure, dentition, sexual maturation, and mental development. If there is marked thyroxine deficiency in infancy or childhood, the individual remains "a stunted, pot-bellied, bandy-legged imbecile."

In treating those who are less severely affected than such cases, present medical practice has produced some scientific miracles. Often in the course

of a few weeks or months—at least with infants and young children—remarkable results have been reported. Growth is accelerated, bone and dental development is stimulated, intellectual acumen rises, and the individual develops into a normal human being.

Adult myxedema, as a rule, appears in middle years, chiefly between the ages of thirty-five and fifty, and apparently from atrophy or degeneration of the gland. The incidence of this condition is said to be more frequent in women than in men. Its onset is usually gradual. It was first described by Sir William Gull in 1873, who recognized it to be an adult condition similar in general characteristics to the so-called cretinism of childhood.

The most prominent symptoms are an increased sensitiveness to cold, and a tendency to fatigue, chronic headaches, and constipation. Usually there is considerable increase in subcutaneous fat. Sexual vigor is diminished in both men and women. There is a gradual slowing up of mental processes. The face becomes puffy and bloated in appearance.

There is also a nonmyxedematous type of difficulty. These patients are irritable, lose weight, and show rather opposite symptoms to those of true myxedema. But that the condition is probably due to thyroid deficiency has been shown by the fact that the symptoms disappear with proper thyroid medication.

The personal attitudes and habits of the hypothyroid individual naturally will vary with the society in which he lives. Obviously, childhood myxedema prevents the child from developing mentally and physically in the normal fashion. Without doubt the mental inadequacy of many low-grade feeble-minded persons is due to prolonged thyroid deficiency. Such persons will not be able to develop into socialized personalities. In cases of myxedema among adults we observe gradually increasing mental sluggishness, lessened sexual vigor, and changes in physical characteristics. Not only do such persons become objects of attention by those around them, but there results from the patient's awareness of his illness a sense of difference which may easily develop feelings of inferiority, with their attendant compensatory reactions, the assumption of a lowered status, or a retreat into a vegetative existence. In fact, the extreme cases of thyroid deficiency often develop the symptoms of schizophrenia (*dementia praecox*).

There may also arise excessive growth of the thyroid, due perhaps to demands of the body for a larger quantity of the hormone than is normally produced. This condition, called "colloid" or endemic goiter, is at the outset non toxic. It seems to develop in certain fairly well-defined geographical regions—particularly those whose geologic history is one of recent glaciation. The condition is generally attributed to lack of iodine in

the water and foodstuffs of these areas. But, despite personal concern over the appearance of the swollen glands, which show in the neck, there is no great danger unless severe degeneration takes place. If so, the condition may become toxic. (See below on exophthalmic goiter.) Since, however, there is always danger of this toxic condition, prevention by thyroid feeding has been found efficacious.

Marine and Kimball (see Marine, 1933, p. 291) carried on one of the first public-health demonstrations in this country at Akron, Ohio, a community lying in a region of high incidence of endemic goiter. Marine reports that two grams of sodium iodide were given "over a period of two weeks twice yearly" to 1,182 pupils. Out of this total, 773 showed definite and apparently beneficial reduction. In 1924 a survey of school children in Detroit, Michigan, revealed that 36 per cent of them had such goiters. A public program was set up to provide the school children with a proper diet of iodide salt. Within two years the incidence of the goiter was reduced by three fourths. A resurvey seven years later showed that only 2.1 per cent of the school children had endemic goiter. Moreover, toxic goiter was not increased, as some physicians had feared, but actually reduced.

Hyperthyroidism, arising from oversecretion of thyroxine, is also fairly common. The condition may be produced by too great medical dosages of thyroxine or by natural overactivity of the gland itself.

The most common symptoms are rapid and irregular pulse, nervous excitation, sometimes with muscular tensions, more often with muscular weakness, a sense of warmth in the skin, frequent profuse sweating, and shallow respiration. The face shows an anxious, restless expression. The eyeballs are very prominent, often with dilation of the pupils; the eyes seem unduly bright and sparkling. Frequently there are insomnia and alternate crying and laughing. There is a loss of body fat. Mental functions are often speeded up. The cause of this condition is an increase especially in oxygen consumption and in protein metabolism. There is also a loss of calcium.

When overactivity of the gland becomes serious, the disease is known as *exophthalmic goiter*. It is believed that the thyroxine is not only excessive but of different quality from the normal extract. The ratio of incidence of this goiter is 4.6 in women to 1 in men. This apparent sex difference in susceptibility may be related to female sexual changes at puberty and to conditions associated with pregnancy.

Clearly the person with a hyperthyroid condition reveals a constitutional foundation for variations in behavior. His restlessness, his impulsiveness, the speeding up of his mental processes, his tendency to insomnia, his overactivity, all mark him off from those about him. Yet situations which involve emotional stresses may easily set up a hyperfunctioning of this gland, so that one does not always know whether recurrent high emotional tension induced by a series of severe crises may not actually set up such a condition in the first place. Until we know more of the effect of

social and psychological stimulation upon endocrine processes, we must be extremely cautious in drawing our conclusions. It is quite possible that learning, especially when it obviously involves the autonomic system (as it does in emotional responses), may itself affect glandular balance.

Pituitary malfunctioning. The pituitary glands have decided effects upon growth, upon sexual periodicity, and upon cerebral functions, to note only three of the most obvious. (See Chapter II.) *Gigantism* is apparently the result of overactivity of the anterior pituitary during the early years. *Acromegaly*, a condition of increase in bone structure after normal growth has ceased, appears in adults who suffer from a like overactivity. The giants of the circus are good illustrations of gigantism, but no one has made any adequate study of the personality make-up of such individuals. (See, however, Behrens and Barr, 1932, on some traits of the "Alton Giant.")

Deficiency in proper secretion of the anterior pituitary results in a retarded growth, and the midget or dwarf becomes a marked person. He is forced by his lack of physical stature into a position of inadequacy, and he can hardly escape feelings of difference and perhaps of lowered status. But his role and prestige in any given group will greatly affect his conception of himself. Midgets and dwarfs have been the objects of humor, have been the heroes or heroines of folk fairy tales, and have at times even acquired positions of social power. It all depends on how they are received by their fellows. We have certain stereotyped concepts of what these people should do. For instance, a midget who recently graduated from a state university in the field of commerce told of the difficulties he had in securing a place in business. He wanted to go into personnel work, but some of his instructors thought he should have remained on the vaudeville stage, and others advised him to go into salesmanship on the theory that his small size would prove an attention-getting device.

A rather common disorder apparently associated with posterior pituitary malfunctioning is the so-called Fröhlich syndrome or disease, named for the Viennese neurologist who did a great deal in the clinical study of this problem. It is technically called *dystrophia adiposa genitalis*.

The prototype is the fat boy in Dickens's *Pickwick Papers* or the fat lady of the circus sideshow. One of the commonest symptoms is the marked increase in fatty tissue, distributed especially in the region of the mammary glands and over the pelvic girdle. There is marked flabbiness of the muscles. Frequently there is a tendency to drowsiness and evidence of mental sluggishness. Usually there is a high tolerance for sugar. Sexual development is delayed and may remain in abeyance, leaving a distinct condition of infantilism. The female menstruation is irregular and infrequent. In both sexes there is a retarded development of secondary sex characteristics. The pubic hair in the male tends to take on the distribution of that in the female. The female characteristics of the male are not restricted to the distribution

of pubic hair, however. There are usually the broad pelvis, rounded limbs, small hands and feet, slender fingers, and a tendency to mammary development. The skin is smooth and delicate and free from moisture. If this sort of hypopituitarism occurs after adolescence, certain of the above symptoms do not arise. The high tolerance for sugar, the subnormal metabolism and temperature, and a tendency to adiposity are, however, present. There is often a dryness of the skin and a loss of hair. The male tends to change to the female type of distribution of pubic hair, even if the male type has already been established. Often *diabetes insipidus* (marked by excessive discharge of water through the bladder) accompanies hypopituitarism. In such conditions there is usually an abnormal consumption of water. If the patient does not get the necessary liquids, serious symptoms may develop.

There are many people whose excessive obesity does not offer them any great handicap in their life adaptation. They may suffer somewhat from occasional jokes; they may have some handicaps in muscular activity; but they do not appear to us in our culture as sufficiently divergent to warrant the amount of attention which we give to the giants and the dwarfs or to the cripples, the blind, and the deaf. But those who cannot accept their physical condition as more or less normal may and often do develop certain traits of difference and definite feelings of inferiority. There are many instances of faulty dieting and other overcompensatory attempts to correct the condition which sometimes do such harm to the health that these persons are scarcely compensated for any slight gains in self-assurance.

Endocrine imbalance and sex. Malfunctioning of the sex glands has widespread influences on behavior. The most obvious effects on the personality are seen in those males who fail to develop the physical characteristics traditionally associated with masculinity. Effeminate men, in our Western society, are generally considered ineffective and are ridiculed. But in other societies people of this sort may be given a definite status. (See Chapter XXVII.) So, too, the woman with masculine characteristics arising from an endocrine imbalance is likely to be marked as an unusual and not quite normal person. But the cultural definition of masculinity and femininity always determines in large part the role and status of those individuals whose particular endocrine balance gives them a body build which tends toward that of the opposite sex. This is an excellent illustration of the point already made that the constitutional factors operate always within the milieu laid down by society and culture. How much social-cultural conditioning itself changes or alters the constitutional expression of these organic factors we shall not know until we develop an adequate technique for describing and analyzing the variables which go into the make-up of the personality.

Endocrine malfunctioning and personal adaptation. It seems perfectly clear that persons afflicted with marked malfunctioning of the endocrines

easily develop feelings of inferiority, with their consequent various means of compensation or other adjustment devices. The reasons for such feelings of inadequacy are self-evident. The individual with a glandular malfunction often has definite and unmistakable physical abnormalities which are certain to influence his interactions with others. If the defect is apparent in the formative years of childhood, a successful adaptation may be all the more difficult. Even if the child's own family are sensible, other children in the neighborhood, in the schoolroom, or at play may treat him with ridicule, indifference, or even cruelty. He easily develops a "generalized other" of being inadequate and different from his acquaintances. And his role and status are colored at many points by this sense of inferiority. If an adult develops endocrine difficulties, his previous adjustments may be of such a stable character that he can weather the crisis, in his own estimation, with fair success. Yet it is certainly a rare person who is insensitive to the stares, whispers, and altered treatment of himself by his associates.

Physical abnormalities in some endocrine cases are not, of course, obvious to a passerby on the street. But those suffering from these difficulties may nevertheless be harassed by the knowledge that they may be physically or emotionally unfit to compete with normal individuals, even if their defects are not visually apparent. Men who lack sexual potency are not "men" in our culture. Many sterile women feel that their lives have been incomplete because of this defect. General physical weakness, muscular inadequacy, and constant feelings of debility and lassitude incapacitate the individual for taking even an inconspicuous place in the social world, for he is unable to endure a day of constant work. And "inconspicuous" is used deliberately here, because, though an individual may be motivated by a desire for recognition, it is doubtful whether he cares to be known for his structural peculiarities and physical incapacities.

An individual who is thus forced to feel apart from his associates and inferior to them may react in many different ways. Irritability is perhaps the most commonly found personality attribute of endocrine cases. It is manifested particularly by giants, acromegalics, the sexually underdeveloped, women spayed after maturity, and patients with hyperthyroidism and nonmyxedematous hypothyroidism. Such irritability may well be an outlet for mental conflict induced by their contact with other persons who have set them apart. Giants, cases of precocious puberty, and the sexually underdeveloped are clinically described as "hard to control" or negativistic. This is a common reaction in an individual who finds himself unable to cope with a situation. States of anxiety such as are found in cases of exophthalmic goiter and in women deprived of their ovaries or women during the menopause may also be an expression of unresolved mental conflicts in which the physical differences have become

culturally interpreted as unfavorable. Sullenness, moroseness, and antagonistic attitudes as met in the acromegalic, the eunuch, and the giant are other defense mechanisms.

THE CRIPPLED

A crippled person is one whose activity is or may become so restricted by the loss, defects, or deformities of bone or muscle as to incapacitate him for the usual education, for maintaining himself, or for otherwise taking a normal role in society. The crippled condition of the body arises largely from one of the following: (1) congenital factors, such as birth injuries or faulty fetal development; (2) accidental factors, such as injuries to limbs; (3) illness, such as severe rickets, infantile paralysis, and tuberculosis of the bones; (4) defective muscular conditions which make coordinations difficult or impossible.

The crippled child or adult is so obviously handicapped in physical motion that he easily becomes the object of comment by others. Such an individual may retreat from normal social contact, withdraw into the inner citadel of daydreams to find his adaptation, and give only the minimum energy to the absolutely essential overt reactions to others. Or he may take an aggressive, overcompensatory view of his condition and attempt some sort of overt adjustment. This may be a defensive, negative sort, or it may be sensible and fall within normal categories. In any case, there is need for education and training which will help the crippled to become self-supporting if they can work, and above all to make them capable of living in a world of more normal persons without undue injury to their self-esteem. That is, they must, if possible, build up a conception of themselves and of their place in society which will make them capable of free interaction with others and capable of viewing their handicaps in a realistic, not sentimental, fashion. In this training, of course, parents, teachers, playmates, and fellows will play a part. The education of the handicapped child or adult always involves the education of those around him. The handicapped can no more develop a condition of mental health by himself than can any other individual. This always involves interaction with others. The following case, given only in brief summary, presents some of the concrete problems of a crippled child against a family background which reflects certain cultural values unfavorable to such a condition.

Case of Louise B. This girl of fourteen years has a serious hip deformity brought on by tuberculosis in infancy. Louise is a fat, "greasy," unpleasant-appearing child with a distinct sense of inferiority. On the Rogers personality test she showed a high score, indicating marked maladjustment. She feels that life holds nothing for her. She cannot have nice dresses; she cannot go to parties as other children can. At about the age of twelve she attempted suicide and is still chagrined at her failure

to end her life. The father is a junk dealer, an immigrant from Russia who has spent his life in building up a paying business but who is not willing to spend money on the necessary surgical correction and education of the child. To him the child is just a "dirty" nuisance. The mother, a highly superstitious immigrant of little or no education, overindulges the child, is highly sentimental toward her at times, and shows great pity and childish affection for her. The mother has the firm belief that the child's condition is God's punishment of her (the mother) for attempting an abortion while she was carrying the child. Moreover, the social atmosphere of the home is frequently disturbed by conflicts between the parents.

In the face of these factors, the treatment of Louise was not easy. She was finally brought to the state orthopedic hospital, where she received surgical care, was given treatment to reduce her weight, and was taught to keep herself tidy and clean. As a part of the educational program her interest in schoolwork was aroused, and she has begun high-school work with considerable promise. One of the remaining problems, aside from her vocational future, is to teach her parents to take a healthier attitude toward her. Most serious is the persistence of the mother's projection of the sense of guilt upon the child. To play the role of being divine punishment for someone else's folly or "wickedness" is itself a serious handicap without the complication of a physical deformity. The prognosis of a child like this is none too good.

A second case—that of Teddy R.—represents an astonishing capacity for adaptation at a certain level despite a serious physical handicap and a sub-standard family background.

Case of Teddy R. This boy—fifteen years old—had one leg amputated following an injury from being run over by a truck when he was five years of age. Teddy has a long record of truancy, lying, stealing, begging, running away from home, sexual misconduct, and arson. He has recently been committed to the state industrial school for boys, after having been the object of attention by the school and by private and public social-welfare agencies for nearly ten years.

While the crippled condition of this boy doubtless was an important factor in his social maladjustment, his familial and neighborhood background might well have stimulated him to misconduct anyway.

The family background is evidently an important factor. Mary R., Teddy's mother and his father's first wife, had been married and divorced previous to her marriage to Teddy's father. The father divorced her in 1924, shortly before the accident that resulted in the boy's disability. After the divorce both parents married other persons, both were subsequently divorced, and they remarried each other in 1934. The family has a low economic status. The father has had difficulty with the police for infraction of the liquor and game laws. There is a long record of marital conflict, sexual immorality, and family disorganization. Teddy grew up a ragged, dirty urchin in an unkempt household. Just before his accident he had been transferred to a good boarding home as a ward of the juvenile court in the hope that he might make a new start.

Interestingly enough, the boy was pleasant in manner when he wished to be, was ingenious in arousing sympathy, sought the good will of others, and showed a certain leadership ability with his playmates. He developed an amazing capacity for getting around with his crutch. But he also early showed a tendency to lie and to steal, and

his quick temper led him into frequent fights with his playmates. He showed other evidences of emotional instability. He was hyperactive, always on the go. On one or two occasions he tried to set fire to buildings. He developed a certain revengefulness toward those whom he disliked. Complaints also reached the school and juvenile-court officials that he was manifesting abnormal sexual interests.

Over a period of years attempts were made to place him in various boarding homes and in private schools for problem cases, and to exhort and teach him to be a "better" boy. A few months before he was finally committed to the state industrial school for boys, the juvenile-court judge gave him a long and serious talk about being a "good" boy. But he constantly ran away and got into difficulties with the police, usually being sent back to his own community, where repeated attempts were made to correct his habits and attitudes. But, as one social worker put it, "Everyone who flattered himself that he had been able to control Teddy finally despaired."

The boy, however, represents an amazing adaptation to his world and to himself. He learned to exploit others by smiling, by a pleasant manner, by congeniality. He developed great capacity to tell a tall yarn of how he came to his difficulty. He traveled over half of the United States, hitch-hiking to California, to Texas, and elsewhere. In one community he was picked up for vagrancy and made such a good story of his life that one of the businessmen's "service" clubs, learning about him, raised money so that he could purchase an artificial leg. (Later he enjoyed gloating over the social workers in his own community, who had not been able to make arrangements to secure one for him.)

Psychologically considered, this boy, developing habits which culturally are considered "bad" and "wrong"—lying, stealing, begging, truancy, arson, obscenity, and sadistic sexuality—built up a curiously well-integrated personality. True, he lacked a moral role or self. But, as to getting basic satisfactions, as to living in the world—within the limits of his capacities—the boy made a rather remarkable adjustment. This adaptation, of course, failed to secure community approval, and he had in the end to be sent to a correctional institution. Whether Teddy will be reconditioned to moral aims at the institution remains to be seen.

The adaptation of crippled children is clearly affected by their age and social status. As one very successful teacher of handicapped children writes:¹

"Personality studies of 25 crippled children ranging in ages from eight years to twenty, and of varying degrees of disability indicated that they were well adjusted to their handicaps until they entered adolescence. At that time they have to leave the orthopedic schools and must begin to compete with normal children. Then, in time, such problems as being a burden to their families, being unable to marry, and the fear of losing their parents arise to depress them. It appears that the crippled child who has a favorable home environment and who attends a school especially suited to his needs, develops a well-adjusted personality at these levels of adjustment. But he has the greatest need for guidance and understanding when he goes from the special school into the high school with the burden of a crippled condition added to the usual instability of adolescence.

¹ Statement furnished the author by Mrs. Mary Dean Scott Parks.

"The Rogers Personality test was given these 25 cripples. The responses were, on the average, those of normal children. All the children gave as their first wish the desire to be stronger than they are now. Only one out of the 25 showed a well-developed fantasy life. He was the child with the highest Intelligence Quotient. He was given to extensive reading for his recreation."

In short, the major problem of the crippled child, like that of other persons, is that of "confronting" the adult world, as F. E. Williams (1926) puts it in another connection. Society should provide means by which the acceptance of a healthy role and status will be made possible within the limits of the handicap. This involves the basic relations of the crippled to his family, to the community, and especially to the economic order. As we have seen, to have a job and to be able to earn a living is one of the central factors in personality integration. (See Chapter XXIII.) Kessler (1935, p. 264) points this out in saying that "The problem of the crippled and the disabled... is one of vocational maladjustment... due in large part to social prejudice." In short, the employers of labor must change their own views and attitudes—which frequently reflect long-standing cultural interpretations of the crippled—if we are to provide these individuals with an aim or goal in life around which they may center their adult lives. (See also Hathaway, 1928.)

THE DEAF AND THE HARD OF HEARING

The deaf are those who lacked a sense of hearing at birth or who lost their hearing before the establishment of speech. The hard of hearing are those who suffered an impairment of their auditory sense after they learned to talk. The psychological and educational problems of these two groups are somewhat different.

Personality problems of the totally deaf. The *totally deaf* suffer a handicap which makes their socialization extremely difficult. Since speech and hearing are so intimately bound together in the rise of consciousness and the sense of self (see Chapters IX and X), it is apparent that the deaf person's development will be quite different from that of the individual who has normal hearing unless special provision is made very early for some adequate form of communication. The acquisition of speech and of lip-reading by the deaf is a long and trying process. Often so much time and energy are required to master the tools of communication that the child, even with the best of educational facilities, falls behind his normal fellows. And when, as often happens, he reaches school age with little or no adequate training, he has already lost some of the most valuable years of his life—years when social and verbal interaction has brought the normal child into close touch with the world of things and people.

Although they have the advantage of visual experience—which the blind do not have—the higher mental development of the deaf is limited, since concepts and ideas depend so much upon verbal communication. There arises a sense of being left out of activities which they see going on about them. The old proverb, "What the eye does not see the heart does not grieve for," scarcely applies to them, for they must suffer intensely from observing social activities in which they cannot fully participate. Feelings of inferiority, attempts at satisfaction by fantasy thinking, and even perhaps strong resentment are clear evidence of their efforts to make some sort of adjustment to their world. In brief, the deaf suffer most distinctly from mental and social isolation. Unless they are taught adequate methods of speech and communication, their contacts with others must remain at a rather rudimentary level of manual and facial gesture.

Because the totally deaf (despite the best educational facilities) always face a limited outlet for their interests and abilities, their vocational problems are not easy to solve. But there is no reason for leaving these persons absolutely dependent upon either their families or the community.

Problems of the partially deaf. In the total population the *hard of hearing* are much in excess of those who are totally deaf. Their social contacts with others are also distinctly limited by their handicap. Failure to hear what others are saying sets up a barrier to normal interaction. There may result habits of inattention and a tendency to retreat into daydreaming or reverie. The failure to participate with others results in a degree of isolation that retards mental and social development. Such persons go through life ignorant of many everyday events that enter into the lives of their fellows.

However, there is no reason to believe, as some have thought, that the deaf or hard of hearing develop a "sixth sense"—a special capacity or intuition which enables them to overcome their handicap. Haines (1927) has pointed out that the deafened person is often tactless and mistakes the meaning of a social situation for varying reasons. These include (1) misrepresentation of the facial and bodily gestures which accompany the speech of others; (2) failure to catch the modulations of voice and variations in tone which so frequently convey the meaning even more than do the spoken words (the louder sounds, being harsher, are often wrongly taken to indicate anger in the speaker); (3) grasping only fragments of the total situation, which leads to a mistaken idea of what is going on; and (4) loss of the intimate and emotionally toned character of the human voice so important in self-development. Because of their sense of isolation and their inclination to live within themselves, the hard of hearing tend to lack self-confidence and to show many other features of the inferiority complex. (See Habbe, 1936.)

The interaction of the partially deaf with others of normal capacities illustrates well the manner in which one's own attitudes and those of others are closely linked together. The normal person may take an attitude of "tolerance," impatience, pity, or even superiority toward the deafened. The normal often avoid such persons because they find it difficult to converse. Then, as Haines (1927) says, "One cannot shout confidences to the deafened," and there is not that intimacy and mutuality of interaction found in ordinary person-to-person contacts. The primary-group, face-to-face situations in which the fundamental patterns of personality organization are developed thus become the very social situations in which the hard of hearing and the deaf suffer most. This begins to be apparent in the partially deaf child and continues throughout his life. Hence, in a way, the deaf and the hard of hearing may make better contacts in secondary groups. This all goes to enhance and build up the sense of isolation and inferiority of the hard of hearing and often results in certain resentments and a sense of being abused.

Haines (1927, p. 155) notes that "Three courses are open to one who realizes his handicap:

"1. He may ignore it, pretend to understand, and move among men as if nothing were the matter. That is not fair to others, who have a right to know whether they are understood, and it is not fair to the person himself, for it causes him to be misjudged. Besides, no one except the person himself is deceived very long.

"2. He may accept his defect and withdraw within himself, avoid people, become a misanthrope, yield to depression, isolation, and other accompaniments of the disorder. That course renders one unfit to function in society in any useful way.

"3. He may accept the condition, face the difficulties, endeavor to overcome them, and live as nearly as possible like a normal member of society."

It is not always easy for the deafened person to decide how far he should go in attempting to live as if he were not handicapped. It is not always a simple matter to know how such things as making purchases, for instance, may not become an imposition on others which may in turn react on oneself. Then to decide whether to go to lectures and concerts, or to attend church, or to try to enter into conversations going on about one—these are vexing questions. As Haines (1927) writes, "If he does, he may be considered a nuisance; if he does not, he may be thought unfriendly." So, too, if the deafened person tries to imitate the overt actions of others, he may end up in embarrassing situations. As a consequence, he often avoids following such clues. Finally, though he may enter some vocations, many lines of work are closed to him, particularly those dependent on close verbal and overt co-operation with others. All these merely illustrate the cumulative character of handicaps and the more or less inevitable stimulus to give up trying to operate in normal social intercourse.

THE BLIND

The blind are conventionally divided into those who are congenitally sightless and those who have lost their sight from disease or accident. The personality problems of the blind differ from those of the deaf in a number of respects. While they miss the visual world around them, while, therefore, movement in space is more difficult for them, they are not cut off from auditory communication with their fellows, and since, as we noted in discussing the rise of the self, this auditory function is highly important, we may assume that in some ways their handicap is less serious than that of the totally deaf, unless the latter learn lip-reading or have some other device for communication with their fellows. But the visual world has to be translated for the blind into visual imagery (if they have any, as do most of those who lost their sight after some years of normal vision) or into other sense modalities, usually that of kinesthesia. Persons who are blind from accidents often retain a good deal of visual memory and imagery, which are helpful in their adaptation to the world of sight. Yet, because movement in space is restricted, the blind easily develop a peculiar helplessness and dependence on others in relation to those situations that demand walking or other movements in space. They have ample excuse for developing a sense of isolation and inadequacy.

Obviously, these attitudes are definitely related to their interactional contacts. Oversympathy and emotionalism on the part of others are the greatest handicaps which the blind must overcome. In Western society, at least, people seem to have great difficulty in dealing objectively with persons so handicapped. For some reason or other the crippled and the deaf do not seem to face so much oversolicitude from others as do the blind. As a consequence, those who have lost their sight easily tend to avoid adjustment to many situations which they might learn to manage. This self-pity finds its concrete expression in the continuation of infantile dependence of the blind child on the mother and others in the household, or in the retreat, e. g., among those blinded by accidents, to an infantile pattern of interaction with others. One of my students—rendered sightless by an accident shortly before entering puberty—had a rather bitter attitude toward his father. He resented the fact that the father had no adequate conception of the vocational and social possibilities of the blind. "My old man," as he put it, "never encouraged me to go on to school, certainly not to college. His idea was that I should stand on a street corner and sell lead pencils for a living!"

The responses of the blind to such treatment by others, of course, vary. While some remain infantile and dependent, others resist. And their resentment may take the form of overt aggressiveness or fantasies. In the

healthy-minded home the blind child grows up to take his place in the family circle and in the community in as normal a fashion as his handicap permits. Here the self-reliance of the child is built on solid accomplishment, or on compensatory activities of a nature to capture his interests and fit his capacities. (See Fries, 1930, for pertinent illustrations; also Farrell, 1939.)

The emotional disturbances of the blind are largely a product of the definition of the situation and of the role which the seeing determine for them. Very frequently those who become blind through accidents inform us that their first attempts at the reorganization of their habits and attitudes are not marked by undue emotionalism at all. Learning to shave, to find their clothes, and to move about proves interesting and challenging. But their imagined or real loss of role and status may soon enter to disturb them. And even more significant is the intrusion of overanxious relatives and friends into their process of readaptation. Cutsforth (1933, pp. 124-125), himself blind since he was eleven years of age, thus states his view of the problem:

"The seeing members of society and the self-regarding attitudes they induce in the blind are entirely responsible for the emotional disturbances found in the blind as a group. The manner in which seeing friends, relatives, and strangers approach the blind induces one of two forms of emotional maladjustment. The blind must either preserve their positive self-regarding attitudes by resisting emotionally the subtle, and not always so very subtle, suggestions of social and organic inferiority or accept the social and personal evaluation of the seeing, thereby sacrificing their self-esteem. The former retain their self-respect by becoming socially distasteful. The latter gain social approval by selling their self-regarding attitudes for conformity with the attitudes and concepts of the seeing. They become precisely the defectives that society conceives the blind to be. It is the rare blind individual who emotionally treads the middle ground by conforming outwardly, when it is discreet to do so, to the evaluation of the seeing and at the same time preserves his self-respect by emotionally thumbing his nose at those who would love to aid him by unwittingly achieving his complete destruction."

Good physical exercise and health, vocational guidance and placement in a satisfactory occupation, and opportunity for normal love life are the three most important matters for the blind. With these essentials taken care of, good conduct, well-balanced emotional attitudes, and civic participation ought to follow. Failure to attain these goals will usually lead the blind to make their adaptation at other levels: sheer infantile dependence, begging and exploitation, or some other sort of life organization which will permit them to carry on. But there is little or no excuse for these latter sorts of adjustment if the community standards are what we have come to expect in our present-day society. The burden of responsibility, however, rests on the seeing, not on the blind.

One of my own experiences is a good illustration of how a healthy, normal pattern of interaction can be set up by two persons, one seeing, the other blind. It was my pleasure to work for nearly five years with a colleague who was totally blind. This man had made an excellent adaptation to the material and social world, and we worked together in the laboratory, went on hiking tours in the mountains for days on end, and traveled together under all sorts of circumstances. With very little experience as a background I soon discovered that handling situations with this friend should be no different than with others. In short, the moment I forgot that he was blind, we established a basis of friendship that has lasted for years.

Difficulties of the deaf-blind. Cases of deaf-blindness present difficulties of social and personal adaptation more complicated than do either the blind or the deaf. Although this condition is not nearly so common as that of either blindness or deafness, the study of these cases throws considerable light on the problem of the handicapped. Moreover, because of the well-known work of Dr. S. G. Howe with Laura Bridgman and of Miss Sullivan's success with Helen Keller, the topic of the deaf-blind has received considerable public notice. The following summary of a case of the deaf-blind from Merry (1930) is presented because it so clearly indicates the importance of normal and healthy social interaction if persons with such a serious handicap are to face adequately the social world and themselves.

Case of S. This boy, a deaf-blind pupil in an eastern school for the blind, was brought to the attention of Merry in October, 1927, with the request that the latter assist him in improving his work in English. During the next seven months the boy was under careful supervision; various tests were given him and an effort made to help him to readjust himself to the demands of his handicap and of social living.

S. was born June 14, 1909, in a farming community in the Far West. There were four brothers and one sister, all in good health. He is the oldest of six children. Until the death of the father in 1919 the family was in fairly good economic circumstances. The parents had had a very limited education, but the father, in particular, was on most congenial terms with his son. The father combined farming with transporting mail from a near-by railroad station to a small village some miles distant. After the father's death, S. helped the mother to handle the mail job and to carry on the farm work.

Because of the strain of heavy farm and other work and severe and unjust punishment at the hands of the teacher, S., at the age of twelve, suffered from acute cerebrospinal meningitis, which resulted in a complete loss of both sight and hearing. Upon his return from the hospital, his family looked upon him as hopelessly defective; and, while the mother took good care of his physical wants, neither she nor her other children made any effort to communicate with him (except for the barest needs) and thus to keep him in touch with the world.

For two years, in fact, the boy was allowed to vegetate; he spent most of his time

in sleeping and eating. His consequent mental and emotional regression would have been obvious to any trained observer, although his own family seem to have ignored it. Through the interest of friends of the family, however, S. was sent in the autumn of 1922 to the state school for the blind, where he remained, except for short periods, until Christmas, 1925. He made excellent progress, and yet, when he returned home, the family indifference and lack of comprehension of his needs persisted. "He was eager to talk, to exchange ideas, and to learn things about the world. They made no effort, however, to satisfy his intellectual hunger, attending only to his physical needs."

In the fall of 1926, however, through the influence of a prominent worker with the blind who had met the young man, he was taken to an eastern school for training. Because of this experience his family at last became more understanding and sympathetic toward S. and his problems.

Although there were no adequate intelligence tests to measure the ability of this sort of case, Merry undertook a rather elaborate study of the mental equipment of S. From both verbal and performance tests it was clear that S. possessed good intelligence, though not mental superiority.

During the two years when S. was left to himself his speech had practically disappeared. One of the greatest handicaps in relearning was his antipathy for society. His teachers did all they could to encourage him to communicate with others. They demonstrated to him that, if he expected others to talk to him, he must speak so that others might understand him. Although he did not lose all his speech difficulties, he did finally make such progress that others could readily comprehend him.

S. seems honest, frank, truthful, and good-natured. *He resents being considered inferior*, or being treated as a child. Like others with his handicap, he is reticent with those whom he does not trust. He forms strong emotional attachments for those whom he likes. He is very loyal to his friends. He is neat and cleanly in personal habits, and he pays special attention to his hands, since they are so important as a means of communication.

S. does his work well alone but needs much encouragement and guidance. While he cannot be termed lazy, his indolent habits of the years when he merely vegetated still obtain to some extent. He is easily discouraged, and great care must be exercised in correcting his work. In short, the problem is an emotional one rather than one of intellectual equipment.

There is still need for socialization. This, to be effective, involves healthy attitudes on the part of other pupils, who must not regard him as a freak or as inferior. As Merry remarks, "It is apparent that S. needs, above all things, the social intercourse of friends who will enlarge his mental field and make him feel that he is in active touch with the world."

It is apparent from this case and from others that, given normal capacities, the deaf-blind are capable of training. Also, the individual case method of treatment is doubtless preferable to group methods. In commenting on the educational problems of the deaf-blind, among other matters, Merry (1930, p. 148) also mentions the following:

"It seems probable that the deafness of a deaf-blind individual is responsible for a greater share of his mental retardation than is his blindness. Serious dearth of vocab-

ulary and awkwardness in use of language, which are found more commonly among deaf than among blind persons, would seem to bear out this fact."

This recognition of the importance of linguistic handicaps further confirms the view of the importance of language and speech in the development of the normal self. Only in communication with others does one's self-esteem, one's ego-security, emerge. Lacking this, the person fails to develop an adequate personality and must remain at infantile or childish levels of adaptation.

THE SOCIAL AND PERSONAL ADJUSTMENT OF THE MENTALLY DEFICIENT

We may take the view that true mental deficiency or feeble-mindedness rests upon constitutional or organic conditions² without committing ourselves to the earlier but rather too naïve view that feeble-mindedness is a simple recessive genetic character or unit trait of some sort. Until we know more concerning the effect of faulty glands and nutrition upon embryonic and fetal growth, especially upon the development of the higher nerve centers, we must be wary of assuming too much regarding simple and direct inheritance of mental defectiveness. In any case, assuming a fair degree of mental ability, the social and cultural adaptation of the feeble-minded individual, as of other handicapped children and adults, has much to do with the development of his role and status, with the emergence of his *self*, that important core of life organization. In view of this fact of social adaptation we may quite rightly take the position that the only adequate definition of feeble-mindedness for the student of personality, as for the student of social problems, must be in terms of social and cultural adaptability. The British committee of 1911, which made a report on mental deficiency, took this view, and the same view is repeated by Lewis ("London Letter," 1929): "Whatever may be the correct legal interpretation . . . the real criterion of mental deficiency is a social one and . . . a mentally defective [person] is one who by reason of incomplete mental development is incapable of independent social adaptation."

Mere designation of the intelligence quotient of the mentally deficient individual is not sufficient for our purposes. Labeling the child or adult with a certain intelligence quotient will hardly answer our demands when we are concerned with social and cultural adaptability. Unfortunately too much attention has been placed upon scholastic attainment in studies of the feeble-minded and not enough upon their emotional and social training and their preparation for a role and status in the community in which they will be as self-supporting and as self-respecting as possible. Powder-

² Some cases diagnosed as feeble-minded are actually not. They are pseudo-feeble-minded, to use Burnham's (1924) term.

maker (1930, pp. 68-69), reviewing material on the social adaptation of the higher grades of feeble-minded both within and outside institutions, has shown the variety of factors that must be taken into account. She thus concludes her report:

"The essential factor in the adjustment of the high grade mentally defective child to his environment is often that of finding adequate compensation for his sense of inferiority which, unlike the cases of many normal children, arises from a real inferiority. If there are special abilities, they should be recognized and developed; but even if there are none, training adequate for successful accomplishment can and should be given. But providing the means for training is not enough without an understanding of the emotional needs, as is shown by the fact that at least three-fourths of the cases studied presented emotional problems which had given rise to delinquencies. However, it appears that about seventy-five per cent of these problem cases in an institution made an adjustment satisfactory to those in charge of them. Whether the institution routine and discipline lead to repression or to a proper direction of energy is a question which only their future adjustment outside of the institution can answer. Perhaps more important are the facts that, in the institution, they are competing with their peers, that accomplishment and social recognition are experienced, and that at least some measure of understanding and of security is theirs.

"If the situation can be similarly met outside an institution, there will be obvious advantages. The ungraded class does not appear to meet the needs in many cases. Too often it is the catch-all for any child who fails in the classroom, regardless of his ability or type of problem. Usually, no specific training for the future is given. Often, the stigma of being in the ungraded class adds to the feeling of inferiority and prevents adjustment in it. On the other hand, adequate psychiatric study and effective social work, as well as training directed toward a definite goal suited to the individual's capacity, would provide outside of an institution the means for the proper development of these children. The earlier such influences are exerted upon the children, the more effective they will be. That the great majority can be trained for self-support and social adjustment is shown by institutional reports, which also show the need of special psychiatric study of at least a fourth of these cases."

The following summary was prepared from two studies made on the social adjustment of children of low-intelligence quotients. One investigation was made in Minneapolis, the other in an unnamed Massachusetts city. These studies bring out the importance of societal guidance in dealing with this class of handicapped individuals.

The Minneapolis study (see Olin, 1930) consisted of a follow-up of twenty-six dull-normal children having intelligence quotients of 85 or less. The measure of their social-emotional adaptation three to five years after their care at the Minneapolis Child Guidance Clinic was based on six criteria: (1) the situation of the child in the home; (2) symptomatic behavior problems; (3) friends and interests; (4) home duties; (5) school progress; and (6) attitudes in the classroom. On the basis of a rating scheme for these six factors the children were classified into five groups, A, B, C, D, and E, according as they fulfilled these standards. A was the highest, E

the poorest, adjustment. Of these, three were rated A, four fell in group B, five in C, eight in D, and six in E. Although the judgments were subjective in character, they are believed to be fairly reliable.

Among factors related to good adjustment, it is evident, neither intelligence quotient nor chronological age showed any significant correlations. Seventy-five per cent of the girls were found to be poorly adjusted in contrast to 41 per cent of the boys. Mobility from school to school apparently had some bearing on the results. No one with the A rating changed schools more than once, while in the E group the number of school transfers ranged from four to nine. In contrast, regularity of school attendance showed only slight relationship to good adjustment. Placement in special classes for the subnormals evidently had a deleterious influence on many pupils. Economic status had no bearing on the process of rehabilitation.

Miss Olin (1930, p. 158) remarks: "The fact that these twenty-six dull-normal children were 'problems' when first examined indicated their emotional condition. When studied in connection with home and school situations, it was found that the periods of disturbance were associated with specific and observable factors in that environment. A removal or improving of the situation was directly associated with improvement in the adjustment of the children."

The other study (see Blackey, 1930) had to do with the afterschool careers of fifty children who had attended a special class in a Massachusetts city during 1927, 1928, and 1929. There were twenty boys and thirty girls, and the intelligence quotients ranged from 58 to 79. According to certain agreed-upon standards of successful social-emotional adjustment, thirteen children "made an unquestionably acceptable adjustment," sixteen were rated as "satisfactory," twelve as "poor," and nine as "failures." Blackey (1930, p. 178), in conclusion, notes the following important features of her findings:

- "1. Intelligence was not a factor in social adjustment.
- "2. The girls were somewhat more successful than the boys.
- "3. Economic sufficiency of the home, although not an absolute determinant of success, was undoubtedly an aid to it.
- "4. Parental attitudes were an extremely important factor in the degree of adjustment attained by the children.
- "5. Desirable personality traits very definitely contributed to success; and, since economic sufficiency and favorable parental attitudes determine personality to a large extent, all three of these were judged to be vital factors in adjustment."

Though no final conclusions can be drawn from these small samples, the results are suggestive and should engender caution regarding the older view that little or nothing may be done to improve the social-emotional adaptation of the moron and dull-normal types of individuals. A study made years ago by Fernald (1919) of the aftercareers of 646 feeble-minded individuals discharged from the Massachusetts State School at Waverly demonstrated that a very considerable percentage of these men and women made fairly adequate social-emotional adjustments to the outside world. True, some did not make good; but a sound majority of them did.

Another investigation by Fairbank (1933) confirms the conviction that many subnormals may make, on the whole, satisfactory adaptation to the outside world even when no exceptional training and opportunity for self-support are afforded them. This study was a follow-up at the Phipps Psychiatric Clinic in Baltimore of the later life of 166 feeble-minded children who had been first diagnosed as such in 1914. These children lived in a district of low economic status, vice, crime, and community disorganization. At the time of diagnosis it was predicted that they would furnish society an undue share of vagrants, alcoholics, prostitutes, delinquents, and dependents, and furthermore that they would very likely reproduce other mental defectives. Of the 122 living who were re-examined seventeen years later, Richards (1934, p. 7) remarks in summary:

"Ninety-six have married; of this number seventy-four have produced 179 children—seventy-seven of whom are of school age. Only four of the unmarried women have produced children. Among the men who have married there are eight divorces and two separations; of the women who have married there are three divorces and two separations. Only sixteen of the married families are being helped by relief agencies, and seven of these are emergency cases due to the present depression. Thirty-six of these families either own or are buying their homes; thirty-two live with some member of their family and contribute to its support. There are only eight cases of chronic alcoholism: In twenty-three homes there is social drinking which does not interfere with family stability or economic support. Of these 122 cases only thirty-two have court records, twenty-seven of which were Juvenile Court records years ago. These boys and girls had intelligence ages of nine to twelve years in 1914. Of the forty reexamined in 1931 the intelligence age has remained the same as in the tests of 1914. Of their seventy-seven off-spring of school age we have examined fifty-eight. Three show IQ's under 70; twenty-two show IQ's of 90; six seem to be average normals at the present time with IQ's of 107; four have IQ's of 120; and twenty-four average IQ's of 96."

These materials are interesting for several reasons. They show first that intelligence is only one ingredient in the personality and only one factor in making or unmaking a successful adaptation to the social-cultural world. They show also that the earlier assumptions of directly inherited feeble-mindedness—so common, say in 1914, at the time of the first Baltimore study noted above—will have to be revised. While the feeble-minded for the most part may be considered as falling within the category of constitutional divergents, since their neural organization appears to be faulty in comparison with that of the normals, they, like other constitutional defectives, frequently make rather adequate adjustments to themselves and to others. It should, of course, be borne in mind that in at least three of these instances—the Olin, Blackey, and Fairbank studies—the individuals involved would be classified in the moron group. Those individuals diagnosed as imbeciles very evidently need more careful societal supervision, including in many instances institutional segregation. And the lowest grade—the idiots—obviously are incapable of self-care or self-help beyond the most rudimentary sort. There are, then, as

in some other instances of constitutional defectives, certain biological limitations to socialization which cannot be ignored. (See R. L. Thorndike, 1940, for a review of the discussion over the constancy of the intelligence quotient; also McNemar, 1940; and Wellman, Skeels, and Skodak, 1940.)

All the physically handicapped individuals of the sort we have discussed in this chapter represent rather strikingly the interplay of organic and social-cultural factors in the development of personal attitudes, ideas, and habits. The self of these persons is markedly conditioned by the handicap, but chiefly as it is directly or indirectly defined for the child or adult by those around him. While feelings of inferiority and compensation are most apparent in the physically handicapped, the manner in which these characteristics arise is no different in social-psychological principles than in other instances. One of the most important facts for the layman and the normal person to realize is that it is largely *his* attitude that determines the behavior difficulties of the handicapped. As people everywhere change their views and beliefs about cripples, the deaf, the blind, the feeble-minded, the stutterers, and others with organic deficiencies, the personality organization of the handicapped will also change. There is no special psychology for the handicapped. For the most part, they only represent, perhaps, an accentuation of certain responses to the material and social-cultural world around them.

Chapter XXVII

NEUROTIC AND PSYCHOTIC MANIFESTATIONS OF PERSONALITY

It was pointed out in Chapter XXIV that the "normal" individual must be considered not so much in terms of the fundamental psychological mechanisms as in terms of what the society or some particular group with its attendant culture defines as normal. Deviations from the norms of a group tend to be dealt with by various devices of formal or informal social control, the law, the mores, and conventions. As he matures, the individual is provided with a host of patterns or "copies" of thought and action which are defined for him as normal, proper, and good by parents, playmates, teachers, employers, and others. Even mood, temperament, or disposition—whatever term one uses to describe fundamental and persistent patterns of feeling-emotional responses—must be considered, like other behavior, in terms of societal or cultural conditioning. Temperamental qualities fully accepted in one society may be considered pathological in another.

Norms are always relative, so far as the individual is concerned, first to those of the larger community, and second to those of subgroups to which he owes allegiance or toward which he has a sense of solidarity. Put otherwise, the normal in act or thought rests upon general consensus about or acceptance of the symbols of identification in some particular group. Obviously, this "acceptance" does not mean absolute conformity. All societies take cognizance of individual variations. Moreover, deviations in thought and words are often permitted so long as overt conduct conforms fairly well to the accepted and proper patterns. Usually it is only when the number of divergent features in behavior is believed excessive or when some unaccepted activity is so intense or violent as to be considered detrimental to others that it is dealt with as abnormal. Before the rise of modern science, deviations in mentality and conduct were considered from a religious, magical, or moral standpoint. During the past century, modern medicine and psychology have given us a more objective understanding of mental disorders, mild or severe.

The present chapter will consider those forms of divergent thought and conduct which are defined as neurotic or psychotic. The former constitute milder forms of personality maladaptation, the latter those which

are put into the general category of mental disease. We have already given considerable attention to some of the milder forms of maladjustment, but so far we have said little about their extreme forms. But, as we shall see, both mild and severe mental disorders may all be dealt with in terms of adaptive interaction between an individual and his environment. In the past the investigation of neurotic and psychotic behavior and thought has been so highly colored by medical—that is, physiological and anatomical—theories and methods, to the neglect of social-psychological and cultural factors, that we want in this and the next chapter to re-examine some of the traditional concepts and materials in this field.

In the first three sections of this chapter we shall summarize the more or less conventional definitions and descriptions of both the milder and the more severe forms of mental disorganization. This will provide the student with a body of information upon which subsequent criticism may be projected. The final section will discuss the interplay of culture and the forms of behavior which we consider neurotic or psychotic, with our chief attention directed to non-Euro-American societies. In the chapter following we shall take up a social-psychological and cultural analysis of some of the problems of mentally distressed and disorganized persons in our own society and culture.¹

Most of the investigation of mild and severe mental breakdowns has been made in the fields of psychiatry and of abnormal psychology. *Psychiatry* is that branch of medicine which deals with the diagnosis and treatment of mental diseases. *Abnormal psychology*, while it considers treatment, puts its principal attention upon the description and analysis of the mental and behavior mechanisms to be found in the mentally deranged. At its best, its work is always projected against the background of normal thought and conduct. Obviously, these two fields overlap, but psychiatry, though interested in theory, has been, on the whole, more concerned with therapy than with systematic scientific investigation.

Most present-day psychiatry conventionally divides mental disorders into two large classes: the psychoneuroses or neuroses, and the psychoses. A *psychoneurosis* or *neurosis* is a form of mental and behavioral divergence from the normal which tends to make the individual less efficient socially and personally, but which does not completely incapacitate him for social participation in everyday group life. Such persons may express undue worries, obsessive fears, or extreme fatigue, or show hysteric responses which keep them from effective and emotionally and intellectually satisfying lives. With the neurotics there is usually no need for

¹ It will be apparent to the reader that the approach and purpose in this and the next chapter are somewhat different than in the previous chapters in Part II. Together they form a prolegomenon to abnormal psychology and psychiatry from the point of view of social psychology and cultural anthropology. But in doing so they also serve to re-emphasize the fundamental standpoint of the entire volume.

institutionalization. They represent a borderline type of behavior and mentality between the normal and the psychotic. A *psychosis* is a more severe mental and behavioral disorder, involving such divergence from normal conduct as to require medical and even special institutional attention, and often marked by disorders of mind and conduct so far-reaching as to involve the entire make-up of the personality. The psychotic frequently loses his orientation to the world around him. His acts become dangerous to others or are so divergent as to demand severe control by his fellows. He frequently has no objective insight into his conduct. In short, he becomes so unlike those around him that he loses practically all the socially accepted forms of interaction. The word *insane* is applied properly to those psychotics who are considered by legal definition to need institutional care. There are many psychotics, of course, who never get into the hands of the courts and who are not sent to public or private institutions for treatment. The term "insane" should not be used except in the legal sense. It is not a synonym of "psychotic." Strictly speaking, it is not a medical or psychological concept at all. It is to be understood only with reference to our legal machinery. Moreover, the distinction between the neurotic and the so-called normal person is largely one of degree. Most normal people possess some characteristics which might be termed neurotic. The matter is essentially one of the extent and constellation of certain traits and attitudes in the total personality. We may, in fact, conceive of a scale of adaptation or social-personal efficiency ranging from the normal and accepted through the neurotic to the more extreme thought and behavior which we call psychotic.

The terminology of psychiatry and of abnormal psychology is not entirely consistent. The categories into which various forms of mental disorder are placed are not as clear-cut as we might wish. But, since certain descriptive terms and classes of mental disorganization are in common use, we shall present a series of generalized descriptions of the major forms of neuroses and psychoses.²

THE PSYCHONEUROSES OR NEUROSES

The psychoneuroses, or neuroses, together make up a wide range of cases which have been usually grouped into (1) neurasthenia, (2) psychasthenia, (3) hysteria, and (4) the emotionally unstable. Individuals who fall within these classes may be called by the general term *neurotic*, that is, persons who so suffer from the effects of maladaptation as to be

² The review here is drawn from the usual sources in psychiatry and abnormal psychology. For more extended accounts the reader may consult among others the following: Bleuler (1924); White (1925); McDougall (1926); J. J. B. Morgan (1928); E. S. Conklin (1935a); H. L. Hollingworth (1930); and Menninger (1938).

socially and personally below par, below the norms of thought and conduct accepted by a given society and culture. It should, however, be recognized at once that this classification of the psychoneuroses is not entirely satisfactory. It has grown up in terms of medical diagnosis and treatment and is not to be taken as more than a crude empirical device. In diagnosing and classifying mental disturbances—mild or severe—psychiatrists have found the concepts of symptom and of syndrome useful. A *symptom* is a single element or feature of mentality or behavior. A *syndrome* represents a combination or configuration of these into a larger unity. And, following the medical culture patterns, syndromes in turn furnish the distinguishing features of the entity which is called a disease.³ In the field of psychiatry the syndromes furnish a basis for the categories in which the principal disturbances are placed. But the technical worker in this field well knows that there is much overlapping among the many symptoms and syndromes in the disorders classified as disease entities.

Neurasthenia. The chief symptoms of neurasthenia are an exaggerated and constant sense or feeling of fatigue, a diminished capacity for work, and often a marked sensitiveness to light, noises, and other external stimuli. Occasionally, too, there are subjective sensations, or paresthesia. The patients often suffer from severe headaches and other pains. But, as a rule, they complain chiefly of imaginary ailments or else greatly exaggerate the seriousness of any real illness. Insomnia and nightmares are also common symptoms. The attention is easily distractable, and there is frequently loss of memory for particular experiences. On the emotional-feeling side neurasthenics are characterized by irritability, depression, pessimism, and hypochondria. Constant preoccupation with their health is perhaps the most common feature. These persons go from physician to physician or from resort to resort, or from one magic cult to another, in search of health. They fill their household medicine chests with all manner of remedies. Sometimes they even go in for surgical operations, having appendix, tonsils, adenoids, teeth, or other bodily parts removed in hopes of cure. On the motor side there may also be muscular weakness, featured by tics, habit spasms, tremors, and exaggerated reflexes. Often the patients suffer from nervous dyspepsia and constipation. Many features of neurasthenia develop in those individuals who, having been ill or incapacitated through physical injury or accident, persist in ill health long after they are organically sound enough to return to work.

The "anxiety neuroses" described by Freud (1933) have much in com-

³ Of course, the careful student will realize that the concept of disease as an entity is itself open to certain criticism since it so easily misleads the physician or surgeon into considering what is essentially a total organic-mental-behavior complex to be something highly specific. (See Chapter XXVIII.)

mon with what has traditionally been described as neurasthenia. In addition to noting many of the above-mentioned symptoms, Freud points out that there are noticeable fears, of physiological dangers, of locomotion and vertigo, and of moral culpability.

Strictly speaking, neurasthenia is not a disease. It is but a broad group of syndromes which mark a form of adaptation in which the individual finds satisfaction by recourse to ailments and to various related manifestations as a means of getting attention and help.

Psychasthenia. A second broad and loose category of maladaptation is termed psychasthenia, which corresponds in large measure to Freud's (1920) obsessional neuroses, wherein we find imperative ideas linked to anxiety, morbid fears, doubts, and compelling impulses. The individual is characterized by obsessive ideas or questions of metaphysical import which he feels absolutely obligated to solve. There may be distinctive feelings of inadequacy and incompleteness in everything. Some patients report a curious sense of unreality about themselves and about the world around them. There may also be systematized tics and habit spasms. Or there may be inhibiting obsessions: doubts, scruples, fears, and various phobias. These fears or phobias may be so severe as to block many actions which to others seem perfectly normal. Thus, *acrophobia*, fear of high places, so obsesses some persons that they dare not look out from the top of a skyscraper or over a high cliff without fear of falling. *Agoraphobia*, fear of open places, may prevent persons from crossing a street; and *claustrophobia*, fear of closed places, prevents individuals from sitting in a theater or other gathering place inside four walls. (For a list of phobias, see J. W. Bridges, 1925.)

The so-called *compulsion neuroses* are usually considered under the category of psychasthenia. The patient may show obsessive motor impulses or manias. Or he may suffer from suicidal compulsions and along with these develop a phobia of handling sharp tools or firearms or poisons, since he has the strong tendency to take his own life when confronted with these objects. Or a compulsion may take the form of endless doing of some task such as arithmetical sums. Or it may take the form of kleptomania (compulsive stealing), pyromania (compulsive setting of fires), dipsomania (compulsive and excessive drinking of alcoholic beverages), homicidal compulsions, and so on through a long list of acts which the individual reports he cannot help being compelled to attempt or do. (See Stekel, 1924.)

Again, psychasthenia is not a disease or clinical entity but rather a general set of syndromes which mark many people who have not made adequate adaptations to their world. Freud (1920) has pretty well demonstrated that these fears, doubts, and obsessions are frequently (if not always) traceable to inner conflicts regarding sexual matters, and that release from such disturbances takes the outward and symbolic form expressed in the symptoms just noted, just as neurasthenic patterns sym-

bolize an attempted adjustment to inner distress by the use of ailments and worry.

Hysteria. Technically speaking, the term "hysteria" does not refer to the popular notion of excessive or uncontrolled emotion. Rather it is a classificatory concept to cover a series of symptoms, chiefly various forms of dissociation of thought or action which manifest themselves in more or less definite manners, the so-called stigmata. Yet they have no basis in actual neurological lesions or other constitutional disability. Like other neurotic syndromes, it has its roots in mental distress, not in organic breakdown. The hysteric patient may suffer from a partial or total loss of vision or hearing, or from paralysis of various muscles, or from mild or extensive lapses of memory. In the more extreme form we may even get those striking cases of multiple personality.

The stigmata of dissociation are often classified into (1) sensory, (2) motor, and (3) mental. The *sensory dissociations* are evident in various sorts of anesthesia (loss of normal sensitivity) or hyperesthesia (excess sensitiveness). A patient has no tactile or pain sensitivity in his hand, in his arm, in his leg, or even in half or most of his body surface. Or he may suffer from contraction of the normal field of vision or of hearing. These conditions are definitely known to have no relation to organic or neurological distribution of the sensory nerves, the fundamental reflexes associated with these areas remaining intact. Also, through suggestion, these regions may be made to shift to other areas of the body. (See Hurst, 1920.)

The *motor stigmata* may appear in any muscle or group of muscles. The individual may be unable to move his fingers or his arm or his leg or his head. There is often almost complete paralysis of the peripheral musculature. There may be tremors, tics, and "hysterical" coughing, laughing, crying, and the type of action known popularly as St. Vitus' Dance.

The *mental* features of hysterical dissociation are found in amnesia, or loss of memory. This may be for specific events or it may be a complete forgetting of all past experiences. There is also often a loss of motive or will power, an increased suggestibility, a marked emotional instability, an extreme egocentricity, and frequently a noticeable lack of moral responsibility. Sexually the individual is often frigid or, on the contrary, goes in for perversions or excessive sexual expression.

Sometimes episodic manifestations occur in the form of a severe "grand" attack or hysterical "fit." But milder forms are more common in our society. In the former we often find a preliminary or premonitory stage marked by hallucinations, fixed ideas, depression, or exaltation. This is followed by motor activity which often resembles an epileptic seizure. There may be muscular rigidity or alternative contraction and relaxation. Sometimes there is a period of clowning, of contortions, of rage, of fear, or a dramatic period of enacting some particular experience in the past or in going through some imaginary heroic activity. There may be an acute period of delirium with hallucinations. In the milder forms of overt attack there are usually nausea, vertigo, periods of ecstasy or of cataleptic manifestations or of sleepwalking, and many subconscious acts of which the individual is apparently not aware. There may be complete or partial amnesia for these episodes later. In the more extreme

involvement, we get those curious cases of multiple personality in which one finds almost a complete new self-organization alongside the older and more conscious and familiar self. (See Chapters X and XXVIII.)

The emotionally unstable. Finally, there is a rather uncertain class of neurotics called the emotionally unstable, in which are included cases otherwise not easily defined. They often show mixed features of the classical psychoneuroses. Then there are the "constitutional psychopathic inferiors"—that large catch-all term loosely used by so many psychiatrists and social workers to identify neurotics who seem otherwise hard to classify.

In general, this group is marked by extreme emotional instability, by noticeable lack of judgment, by strong egocentrism, and by tendencies to escape normal social responsibility, such as we find in many petty but habitual criminals, in the traditional tramp, in many sex perverts, and in others who show temperamental peculiarities. Sometimes we find certain inclinations to paranoia. These people are apparently not easily adjustable to ordinary group life and make up a large number of difficult social problems in any community. In fact, these milder cases shade off into those persons who, while not truly neurotic, exemplify—at least in some aspects of their daily lives—unhappy, inadequate, poorly balanced thoughts and reactions. These are people not easily adjusted to others, or to some of their own inner values and frames of reference. On the other hand, more serious neuroticism grades over into various more evident mental disorders, especially into the functional psychoses.

THE FUNCTIONAL PSYCHOSES

The psychoses are traditionally divided into two large classes, the functional and the organic. The *functional psychoses* are those for which no obvious and easily detectable constitutional condition can be held responsible. The inception and development are considered to be largely psychological, that is, due to some inability to meet the adaptive demands of the environment. The *organic psychoses*, in contrast, refer to those which have a detectable organic lesion or other physical foundation for the aberrant thought and action. The former have been subdivided into schizophrenia or dementia praecox, paranoia, and circular or manic-depressive. In the latter we find epilepsy, paresis, senile dementia, and some others to be discussed in the next section.⁴

Schizophrenia or dementia praecox. The term *schizophrenia* means

⁴ In a broad sense the psychoses constitute *dementia*, the loss of normal mindedness, in contrast to *amentia*, the lack of normal mindedness. Under the aments would be included the familiar categories of the feeble-minded (the morons, imbeciles, and idiots), which we shall not consider at this point. In dementia, then, we have a derangement or loss of mentality; in amentia we find an absence of mental functioning.

split mind, especially a division between the intellectual and the emotional-feeling components.⁵ But it is at best a loose category including a wide range of symptoms that may be grouped into subclasses: (1) dementia simplex, (2) hebephrenia, (3) catatonia, and (4) paranoid dementia praecox. Yet there remain a variety of symptoms and syndromes common to all forms. The most distinctive feature is the gradual and insidious development of inattention and emotional indifference to the world outside the individual, and growing incoherence of ideational associations, ending in deterioration of normal mental life. Fantasy thinking often blossoms out in a most bizarre fashion. The individual loses his concern with those around him and with many conventional features of his own self, such as attention to his clothes and personal habits. Hallucinations, especially of sight and hearing, are common. Memory is usually good except in the later stages. Judgment becomes progressively defective, and delusions develop. There are often certain somatic changes, and conduct is marked by impulsive, purposeless acts, by stereotyped mannerisms, and by negativism. With these general features in mind let us note some of the more common features of the particular subclasses.

Dementia simplex is a term used to describe those cases which never develop such serious deterioration as necessarily to require institutional care. They become listless and apathetic, and lose their pride, ambition, and interest in the external world. Their conduct is shiftless and neglectful. Sometimes there are mild delusions but no ideas of grandeur. Hallucinations and other evidences of more complete deterioration are absent. The symptoms are to be found in many habitual tramps and in some criminals and prostitutes.

Hebephrenia is a syndrome used to delimit a large group of cases in whom there is a distinct dilapidation of thought. The onset is insidious, as a rule, with change of disposition, including noticeable irritability. Speech is incoherent and silly. Mental associations are fantastic, incoherent, and stereotyped. Delusions are often at first depressive, but later may become expansive, often taking on a sexual or religious character. There is a rather complete lack of insight into themselves or others. The emotional-feeling tone is one of indifference to others and to oneself. Hallucinations are frequent, especially those of hearing, sight, and touch. Behavior itself is purposeless and absurd, and the individual becomes untidy in his personal habits and often indifferent even to his primary physical needs.

Catatonia describes those patients whose motor peculiarities are the predominant aspect. Sometimes there is a period of stupor, characterized by muscular tension, mutism, and negativism. Oftentimes there is a curious cataleptic state marked by a "waxy" rigidity of the limbs, which permits them to be maintained in various positions for long periods. In some cases the patient shows involuntary mimicry of the actions or words of another. In the stupor he may be insensible and unresponsive to normal stimuli. He may lie in this condition for hours, days, or weeks. He may refuse to eat, fail to talk, and show an almost completely vegetative existence. Yet later he

⁵ *Dementia praecox* means literally a psychosis which arises in early life. Both terms are in use and will be employed in our discussion.

may return to more normal reactions and give evidence that he has not been unaware of the events which happened while he was in his stupor. This stuporous state may alternate with periods of excitement, marked by violent and compulsive acts and extreme verbal incoherence. (On the paranoid form of dementia praecox, see below.)

Paranoia. Another classification of personality difficulties is known as paranoia, the symptoms of which usually do not reveal their full growth until the middle years. It is characterized by conceit, extreme suspiciousness, persecutory ideas, egocentricity, and projection of false ideas and purposes onto other persons. The delusional system grows gradually but tends to become systematized, taking the form usually of mistaken interpretations of facts or events. There is often retrospective falsification of memory. Events or ideas which others take as part of the normal course of everyday living are misconstrued, twisted, changed, and falsified unconsciously by the paranoiac to fit his own delusional system. Hallucinations are absent or very rare. Conduct and emotions are apparently normal, or else they fit into the delusions. There is no intellectual deterioration or disorder of the will.

Many paranoiacs never get into mental hospitals. They often constitute potentially dangerous individuals, because they may turn violently upon those whom they hate and fear. As a matter of fact, the paranoiacs do sometimes experience the dislike or avoidance of others. Yet, where a more balanced individual would adapt himself to this situation without undue emotional distress, the paranoid person tends to exaggerate the significance of this reaction of others far out of proportion to its actual meaning. Having "suffered" from real or imaginary wrongs, believing themselves to have been "tormented" by some other persons, the paranoiacs may seek legal redress, or even go so far as to avenge themselves by physical attack on these other individuals.

The delusional system of the paranoiac appears logical to him, and normal persons may on occasion be persuaded to accept it. Many paranoid fanatics illustrate this when they project their delusions upon audiences and followers. The particular features of the delusions differ in content. They often turn to religious, sexual, or monetary matters, depending on the cultural values of the time and place.

Certain cases commonly diagnosed as schizophrenia develop organized delusions of persecution or grandeur and marked hallucinations along with other symptoms. There are often periods of great excitability. These are more properly called *paranoid dementia praecox*. This is a sort of mixed type showing both schizophrenic and paranoid characteristics. Their delusional systems are often elaborately put forth in an amazing flow of fantasy, usually in verbal or pictorial form.

Manic-depressive psychoses. A third class of functional disorders is sometimes called the cyclic, circular, or manic-depressive type, because

there is a characteristic recurrence of mental symptoms, followed usually by recovery from each attack. The classic picture is that of periods of mania or hyperexcitement fluctuating with states of depression or melancholy. In this psychosis—unlike schizophrenia and paranoia—there is no fundamental change in personality organization. On the contrary there is rather an exaggeration of trends already at hand. There is never a loss of sense of self, but there is a marked exaggeration of mood or emotional-feeling characteristics. The circular type is, in fact, a disorder of the emotional rather than of the intellectual or volitional life. In severe cases there may be hallucinations and some impairment of judgment, but orientation to time and place is good except in the delirious states. Mem-




FIGURE 16, showing some possible forms of manic-depressive responses.

ory is not much affected. The patient, however, may suffer from insomnia and dreams, or show marked anxieties.

During the *manic phase* there are distractibility of attention, marked elation, flight of ideas, and a great "pressure of activity" with an absence of fatigue. The individual has apparently endless energy in attempting great tasks, or in talking passes quickly from one topic to another. In extreme cases there may be delusions of grandeur, and disorientation and clouding of consciousness as well as great rage. In the *depressive stage* there are usually inattention or conflict of attention, unpleasant mood, and a gloomy and anxious outlook on life. There are often certain fixed ideas and obsessions. The patient may attempt suicide to escape his worry or sense of guilt. Activity is cut down, and fatigue is associated with even mild effort. Melancholy may be so extreme as to be marked by delusions and hallucinations, sometimes paranoid in character.

In both of its two phases the attention is weakened, associations are retarded, and voluntary activity tends to be inhibited. But the central

feature lies in the field of the emotions and feelings. In some cases the disorder is marked by recurrent manias, with, however, no corresponding depressive episodes. Sometimes there is just the opposite, unrelieved recurrent depressions. In others, there is the alternating sort, first one and then the other. (See Figure 16.) Unlike schizophrenics, who are difficult if not impossible to cure, manic-depressive patients usually have good prospects of recovery. But they also face the high probability of suffering breakdowns later.

Related to the depressive stages of circular psychosis is the so-called *involutional melancholia*. This is really a mixed type in which there is a condition of agitation, restlessness, sleeplessness, intensive depression, worry, and despair. While this condition is usually protracted in time as compared with the usual manic or depressive episode, the percentage of recovery is high, barring the high proportion of deaths from suicide, or from pneumonia and tuberculosis, which set in largely as a result of loss of vitality.

THE ORGANIC PSYCHOSES

Mental disorders for which there is a more or less detectable constitutional foundation are called organic psychoses. We shall note only the most common of these.

Epilepsy. Under the term *epilepsy* are grouped a number of somewhat divergent sets of symptoms. The most common feature is the epileptic "fit." The seizure may be of the *grand mal* sort. Such an attack comes suddenly with marked and violent tonic contractions of the muscles; the patient falls unconscious, often emitting a peculiar cry. There may be foaming at the mouth, and the changes in respiration may give rise to a temporary cyanosis (blue coloration due to lack of oxygen), in the face especially. After a minute or two of tonic contractions there usually follows a clonic stage, lasting from one to five minutes, in which there is rhythmic relaxation and contraction of the muscles. As a rule, the patient then goes off into a deep coma or sleep. The *petit mal* is a mild and incomplete attack. It is marked by giddiness, momentary loss of consciousness, and perhaps a mild muscular disturbance, but the patient rarely falls down.

Epilepsy, despite decades of study, remains one of the least understood of the psychoses. While many assume it to be entirely due to constitutional factors, others consider it a "borderline" disorder in which both organic and functional conditions are mingled. As a matter of fact, the epileptic characteristics of daily behavior as well as attacks of *grand mal* or *petit mal* appear in connection with so many different conditions that it may well be that epilepsy is not a unitary disease but really a variety of disorders. The traditional clinical picture of the epileptic attack has been found in persons otherwise diagnosed as hysterics, in those who have suffered from multiple

less specific infections which induce extreme fever. These infections evidently influence the neurological system. There may be deliria, hallucinations, flight of ideas, incoherence of associations, and the development of anxiety and irritability, or in some instances states of euphoria (heightened sense of well-being) and erotic manifestations. There are frequently mental disturbances closely associated with extreme endocrine imbalances and with various organic disorders. Some illustrations of these were discussed in Chapter XXVI. (See Rosanoff, 1938, for extended consideration of some of these psychoses.)

In concluding this rapid review of classical psychiatry, we need once more to caution the reader about the danger of accepting labels and classifications as valid typifications or explanations. At best these traditional categories represent attempts to group together certain major symptoms and syndromes. The cautious student of mental disorders is always aware of the fallacy of assuming such classifications to be more than they are—mere descriptive concepts which may fail to apply to the actual patient under medical care.

With this résumé of the rather conventional classification of the psychoses and psychoses as a point of departure, we are in a position to discuss the problem of neurotic and psychotic personalities as forms of adaptation. We are not concerned at this point with these mental disorders as problems of disease and treatment. Rather our purpose in this chapter and the next is the study of the person's adjustment to his social and cultural world, on the one hand, and to himself, on the other. And, when we examine the ideas, attitudes, and habits of individuals in societies other than our own, we discover that, while we might label some of these as abnormal or pathological, they appear quite otherwise to the people in these societies. To provide a sounder orientation for our later discussion of certain features of divergent mentality and conduct in our own society, we shall now turn to discuss some of these manifestations of mind and behavior in other societies and cultures.

NEUROTIC AND PSYCHOTIC MANIFESTATIONS IN PRIMITIVE AND ANCIENT SOCIETIES

In considering mental deviations in non-Euro-American societies from the point of view of social psychology and cultural anthropology we must bear in mind that our classifications and symptoms of mental disorders reflect the scientific and medical concepts of our own culture. With few exceptions psychiatrists and psychologists have tended to universalize the mental and conduct features which they find in their patients who come from present-day Western societies. For example, the very items which characterize hysteria in the traditional textbooks of psychiatry do not always appear elsewhere. Thus echolalia and echopraxia are found, for

instance, in some of the cases of hysteria reported for Siberian tribes, but are not reported from other areas. And in certain South African tribes catalepsy is common, but other symptoms of hysteria are not evident. In discussing some of these matters Hallowell (1934) points out that our conventional differences between illusion and hallucination break down. An individual in a primitive tribe which has a highly emotionalized belief in malevolent animals of strange and unusual shapes and actions may actually see in some living plant or animal what his mind is "set" to perceive. Though we would call such an experience an hallucination, from the standpoint of that particular society it might better be called an illusion. Certainly the hysterical or maniacal behavior in running amuck in Malaysia resembles the action of a manic-depressive in a violent mood, but there it represents a sort of device for securing public attention, ending traditionally in death at the hands of neighbors or fellow-tribesmen.

Another important matter to bear in mind is that there are no adequate records of observation among primitive and ancient peoples by persons trained in cultural anthropology and psychiatry. It is necessary to depend upon the reports of missionaries or travelers, and at best on traditionally trained anthropologists whose fundamental interest, at least until very recently, has been directed to other aspects of behavior and culture. In this connection it is also important to take account of the mentality and bias of the observer himself. (See Chapter XI.) Thus a man who was himself paranoid might easily misconstrue the mentality of a primitive society in which extreme person-to-person hatred and suspicion were common. Or a woman anthropologist with a strong unconscious attitude of protest against the traditional low status of women in Western society may give a romanticized and faulty interpretation of a society in which there is apparently much more sexual freedom for women than in her own society.

Bearing these limitations in mind, let us review some forms of deviant mentality and conduct in various societies outside our own. For convenience we shall first discuss the milder forms of disorder before taking up those which we label psychotic.

Psychasthenic manifestations. Hallowell (1934, 1938) has described a case of mild zoophobia (fear of animals) in an Indian belonging to the Berens River Saulteaux of Manitoba and Ontario, Canada. He writes (1934, pp. 4-5):

"W. B., an Indian, sixty five years of age, was subject to toad-fear. . . . One night, after settling down to sleep he found a toad hopping towards him. He became so panic-stricken that it was difficult for him to kill it. But he finally managed to do so. Then he went outside the tent with a flash light in order to discover if there were more toads about. He killed several with a stone. Then he collected a number of large stones and, carefully examining all sides of the tent, weighted down the canvas here

and there so that there was no possibility of any more of them crawling in. He slept hardly at all the rest of the night. After this experience W. B. always took special pains to see that the front of the tent was closed at night and weighted snugly to the ground with a line of stones. We jokingly called this our 'toad-dam.' It must be emphasized that this man had spent most of his life in the bush, was an excellent hunter and accustomed to handling all sorts of animals."

The writer then goes on to discuss whether we should, from the standpoint of this tribe, consider such behavior abnormal. Among the Berens River Indians the toad is a loathsome animal, associated in some vague way with evil forces, especially with their malevolent magic. Hence toads are avoided, and their presence in a camp bodes no good. There is also in this tribe a strong taboo upon telling tribal stories during the summer; it is believed that, if this restriction is violated, toads will come and crawl up one's clothing. W. B., who had become a Christian, imagined himself emancipated from many of the tribal customs, and he had been telling Hallowell, during the latter's summer field trip, a number of tribal stories. There were, then, at least three major factors in the case: (1) the general belief in the evil influence of toads; (2) the fact that a taboo had been broken, clearly indicated in the Indian's mind by the appearance of the toads; and (3) the further fact that W. B. apparently was in a certain state of mental conflict brought about by his contact with Christian culture.

There is an additional important fact in W. B.'s history. When he was a youngster, a toad had on one occasion crawled up his trousers, and he had crushed it against his bare skin. This personal experience doubtless added to the general fear of toads engendered by his culture. In fact, Hallowell reports that other Indians, knowing of W. B.'s excessive fear of toads, sometimes teased him by putting them in his vicinity.

In W. B. we have a form of obsessive fear for which parallels might be found in our society. He combines certain accepted elements from his culture with some features added from his personal experience. Even within his own society, despite the powerful influences of the fear of toads and other animals in their emotional patterns, he was considered a deviant. If we define the neurotic as one who expresses fears, anxieties, and emotional distress "which in quantity or quality deviate from those of the cultural pattern" (Horney, 1937), we should have to put W. B. in this class of divergents. Hallowell (1938) cites another Berens River Indian, J. D., who, though having a good deal of prestige as a medicine man, was nevertheless ridiculed because of his absurd fears—absurd and silly to his own tribe. In his instance, although the culture offered him some approved outlets for his inner conflicts, he did not find these institutionalized compensations and provisions sufficient for his needs. In our own society intense but culturally accepted fears of disease, of Satanic

powers, and of future punishment are even now only gradually being dissipated by the advances of science. Many of our own neurotics are not unlike W. B. or J. D.; they simply represent a combination of culturalized fears and certain exaggerations of fears derived from their own personal experiences.

Sexuality and neurotic symptoms. The meaning given sexuality in different societies varies greatly and well illustrates the problem before us. What is accepted as quite normal and correct in one society may in another be under a powerful taboo. Thus conversation among relatives, which we consider thoroughly proper, is looked upon as a serious infraction of the moral code by some peoples. Among the Yukaghir of Siberia these taboos on contact between various gradations of kinship seem so absurd as to strike us as almost pathological. To quote Lowie (1920, p. 97):

"... In addition to the son-in-law and daughter-in-law prohibitions as met elsewhere we find rules barring speech between the elder brother or male cousin and the younger brother's or cousin's wife; between the elder brother (cousin) and the wife of the younger brother's (cousin's) son; between the elder brother and the wife of his younger sister's son; between the elder brother and the younger sister's husband.... Brothers should not converse unrestrainedly with one another, nor brothers with sisters, nor sisters with one another, and this rule extends to cousins.... They must not address one another directly nor look at one another, must neither call one another by name nor by a kinship term."

Among the Crow Indians of North America there is also a wide range of taboos controlling contact and conversations in various kinship groups. These seem thoroughly silly to us. And Lowie relates that a Crow interpreter of his once reprimanded him about the indecency of the whites in daring to reproach the Indian with looseness of morals while they were themselves so shameless "as to speak freely with their own sisters."

We find patients in our mental hospitals who have developed similar excessive *self-imposed* taboos. They may refuse to converse with relatives or old friends because of such a self-imposed inhibition arising out of imaginary fears of the serious consequences of so doing. So, too, patients may develop other personal taboos which prevent their shaking hands or using the conventional forms of greeting. When they are asked why they thus avoid their relatives and friends, they produce a host of "reasons" (rationalizations) which closely resemble the sort of justification which natives give for their own culturalized taboos. In short, a habit which is culturally accepted in another society may be labeled pathological because it does not fit into the culturally anticipated framework of interaction in our own.

In our society, strong Christian taboos on premarital and extramarital

sexual congress make it difficult for us to understand variations in these matters considered quite normal among other peoples. Not only are we offended morally, but some of the behavior of primitive peoples, if found in our own society, would be labeled pathological. A minor deviation is illustrated by nudity, which is accepted in many societies as quite proper, whereas with us it is considered either immoral or pathological or both.

Among the Sioux Indians transvestitism (the wearing of the garments of the opposite sex) is accepted for men. Such men have the role and status accorded women of the tribe. They are not considered as high in prestige as the male warriors, but they are not ostracized or driven out of the group. In our society we permit only mild variations in matters of dressing and bodily decoration. A woman may wear mannish clothes, and a man may primp and go in for what we consider feminine attention to his person, but aside from mask balls and other occasional forms of recreation the donning of the garments of the opposite sex is not permitted.

The role and status of the homosexual is an excellent example of variation in cultural norms. In Christian societies generally homosexuality is both a sin and a crime. Only in recent decades have psychiatrists come to consider it worthy of treatment. While these experts may consider it neither a sin nor a crime, most of them do look upon it as pathological, at least in its more overt form. Yet in many non-Christian societies there is often quite another view of such behavior. Among many primitive peoples the homosexual individual has a high status, especially among certain Asiatic and American Indian tribes, in which such individuals are found among the medicine men or shamans. They frequently wield a tremendous power. Often the culture provides an elaborate period of training and discipline in the preparation for the role of wizard, and homosexuality is often a well-recognized phase of their character. (See E. Carpenter, 1914, for a discussion of the homosexual in primitive and in civilized societies; also Falk, 1923; W. W. Hill, 1935; and Devereaux, 1937, 1939b.)

But the acceptance of homosexuality as normal and even as evidence of superior powers is not confined to primitive peoples. In the ancient religions of the Near East and Egypt, bisexuality and homosexuality were generally recognized and accepted. Thus, when the Hebrews entered Syria, they found that Astoreth (the prototype of the Greek Aphrodite, moon goddess and queen of heaven and of love) was worshiped by men dressed as women, and vice versa. There was evidently a good deal of homosexuality associated with these rituals. The Hebrew leaders, seeing that their own people were becoming infected with these strange religious practices of the out-group, tried to prevent them from being influenced by such conduct. (See, for example, *Deuteronomy*, 22: 5; *I Kings*, 14: 24 and 15: 12; and *II Kings*, 23: 4.)

In the Greek temple of Delphi, Apollo was considered to possess both feminine and masculine traits and was the special god of the Dorian Greeks and special divinity of Uranian (homosexual) love. In fact, among many Greek nations of classical times, homosexuality was a recognized form of human relationship. Among the Dorians, especially, this took the form of deeply emotional companionship of two warriors, one older, one younger. But both bore arms. The relationship was somewhat analogous to that between a medieval knight and his squire. The younger man had to be able to bear arms effectively, and he was designated by a term which may be rendered into English as "stand-by" or "stander-by"—a good indication of his role. As E. Carpenter (1914) points out, this kind of love "was apparently always conceived as having an *element* of physical passion in it," which might be quite slight or dominant in its importance. Throughout the course of Greek history the meaning of homosexual attachments varied. This comradeship became idealized in other walks of life than the military. Plato adapted it in his commendation of the spiritual relationship between the philosopher and his students.⁶

In medieval Japan among the Samurai practices similar to those of the Dorians were common. The Samurai were the ruling élite of Japan for nearly 700 years. The highest military and political ideals were in the minds of these warrior knights associated with comradeship in arms. A Japanese writer, Iwaya (1902), remarks:

"From 1200 A. D. onwards the Samurai became prominent in Japan. To them it seemed more manly and heroic that men should love men and consort with them, than to give themselves over to women. For several centuries this view had sway far and wide. Almost every knight sought out a youth who should be worthy of him, and consolidated with such youth a close blood-brotherhood. . . ."

In sharp contrast to this cultural acceptance of homosexuality elsewhere, in Christian history the practice has been rigidly tabooed. It was linked up to the whole religious interdict on sexuality which became so central to Christian morality.

While today we find a growing understanding of homosexuality among the medical profession and a growing tolerance in certain Bohemian circles, most persons in present-day Western society still regard homosexuality as sinful, criminal, and pathological. It still lacks the cultural recognition necessary to enable our society to give to homosexuals a role and status such as obtained in classical times, in preindustrial Japan, and today among certain primitive societies.

Not only is homosexuality considered pathological in Western society today, but the traditional Christian taboos on heterosexuality remain. Conduct of men and women which is considered proper and normal in other societies is labeled either sinful or pathological in our own. In fact, we frequently find a close correlation between the pathological, the criminal, and the sinful. The whole relation of Western taboos on heterosexuality to mental breakdown has been made clearer to us by the work of

⁶ See Plato's *Symposium* and *The Laws*. See also Aristotle, *Politics*, Book II, Sec. 10, where he remarks on male "companionship" as a way to restrict overpopulation. In addition to Carpenter (1914) the reader may consult J. A. Symonds (1883) for an enlightening discussion of the whole problem in classical Greece.

modern psychiatry, especially at the hands of Freud and his followers in psychoanalysis. Without accepting the full Freudian contention that repressed and undeveloped sexuality is a major cause of functional mental disorders, especially of hysteria, neurasthenia, and psychasthenia, there is no gainsaying the fact that this, one of the most severe taboos in Christian society, has a definite place in inducing pathological behavior. (See Horney, 1937.) The beneficial effect of the removal of these taboos in some areas of the Western world, for example in present-day Russia, has been described by F. E. Williams (1934), who contended that the disappearance of the traditional sexual prohibitions in Soviet Russia produced much healthier attitudes and habits in regard to sex and hence lessened neuroticism there.

Hypersuggestibility and hysteria. Judging from anthropological literature, the most widespread forms of mental disorder among primitives are those which show hysterical features and the closely allied symptoms of heightened suggestibility. None of these manifestations have been adequately studied by psychiatrists, and the descriptions of symptoms are not complete. But the instances reported do reveal such features as hysterical dissociation, increased suggestibility, and both sensory and motor symptoms common to our own culture. A. A. Brill (1913, p. 515) quotes Donald B. MacMillan, the Arctic explorer, who thus describes *piblokto*, a form of so-called Arctic hysteria found among the Greenland Eskimos:

"A woman will be heard softly singing and accompanying herself by striking the fist of one hand with the palm of the second, making three sounds, one long followed by two short ones. The rhythm and motion continues to increase for some time, during which she usually tears off her clothing, and ends in a fit of crying or screaming in which the woman may imitate the cry of some familiar animal or bird. No two women act alike; there is a certain individuality to every attack. Some drop down on their hands and knees and crawl around barking like a dog. One woman used to lie on her back on the snow and place some ice on her breasts. Some jump into the water and wade among the ice cakes, all the time singing and yelling. Others wander away from the houses into the hills, beating their hands as if demented." (Apparently this disorder is more common in women than in men.)

A variety of hysterical manifestations has been reported for various Siberian tribes. One of these, called *āmūrakh* by the Yakuts, is marked by great impressionability of the patient, by intense feelings of fear, and often by echolalia (involuntary repetition of the words or statements just spoken by another) and echopraxia (involuntary mimicry of the gestures just made by another). Also, the patient will not infrequently rush madly at the alleged cause of his terror, whether it be animate or inanimate. S. Pallas, a traveler in Siberia in the late eighteenth century, writes that many of the tribes of this region are easily panic-stricken. Czaplicka (1914, p. 313) quotes Pallas as follows:

"An unexpected touch, a sudden call, whistling, or a fearful and sudden appearance will throw these people into a state of fury. The Samoyed and the Yakut, who seem more to be affected in this way, carry the matter so far that, forgetting what they are about, they will take the first knife, axe, or other offensive weapon that lies in their way, and would wound or kill the object of their terror if not prevented by force and the weapon taken from them; and if interrupted will beat themselves about the hands and feet, scream out, roll upon the ground and rave. The Samoyed and the Ostyak have an infallible remedy to bring such persons to themselves; which is, to set fire to a reindeer-skin, or a sack of reindeer hair, and let it smoke under the patient's nose; this occasions a faintness and a quiet slumber, often for the space of twenty-four hours."

Sometimes an entire group of natives will be affected by something they hear or see. Czaplicka (1914, p. 313) repeats an instance originally observed by a physician at one of the Russian army camps:

"...Once, during a parade of the 3rd Battalion of the Trans-Baikal Cossacks, a regiment composed entirely of natives, the soldiers began to repeat the words of command. The Colonel grew angry and swore volubly at the men; but the more he swore, the livelier was the chorus of soldiers repeating his curses after him."

Another difficulty, brought on by shock or sudden pain, is called *menerik* by the Yakuts. This disease is characterized by spasms, falling into a trance, howling, or dancing, and sometimes ends in what we might today call a hysterioepileptoid seizure. (It is doubtful if this can be called true epilepsy.) The attacks are frequently followed by sleep lasting for several days.

The Yakuts consider these cases as pathological. They usually explain the disorder as caused by some evil spirit entering the body of the victim. Yet they recognize a certain kinship between some of these manifestations and the mental and behavioral characteristics of the shaman or wizard—a person of great prestige and influence among them. But the deviations from the norm which mark the shaman fall within their cultural definition, within the expectancies of behavior. It is interesting to note that these Arctic peoples make a crude distinction between the pathological and the normal religious experience. A boy who has suffered from *menerik* has a better chance of becoming a shaman than one who has not. In all cases this illness is attributed to evil spirits, but for the shaman it represents a struggle with these forces permitting him to learn how to appease them. On the other hand, an ordinary individual is only the victim of *kelet* or *abassy*, that is, he is "a sick person." But, if the shaman cannot control *menerik* and learn to invoke the proper spirits at the right time, he ceases to be a shaman. Thus a youth preparing to be a medicine man may suffer from *menerik*, but one suffering from *ämürakh* has no social status at all.

Not unlike the *āmūrākḥ*, but existing in a quite different culture, is the *latah*, found in Malaysia. The sudden onset of this curious behavior evidently arises from some kind of shock. The individuals completely lose their poise and self-control. There is a state of hyperimitativeness, often an outpouring of obscene, tabooed language, vocalizations of repressed erotic wishes, and a heightened suggestibility, but of a quite involuntary sort. It is said that these symptoms occur almost entirely among women. The disease is rarely or never found among children. Although it occurs in all classes, it is found rather more frequently in women servants and others in socially subordinate positions. Sometimes persons known to be susceptible to *latah* are victimized by others, who would amuse themselves by making a sudden noise and then gesticulating or speaking in absurd ways, thus setting off a curious stereotyped round of imitative actions in the victims. (On *latah* see Czaplicka, 1914; and van Loon, 1927.)

In our own society the role of the hysteric has varied greatly. In Christian history many religious mystics presented symptoms of hysteria and heightened suggestibility, but their behavior fell within certain limits which were tolerated at the time. Today, in the light of modern medicine and the growing loss of religious faith, such persons would be considered subjects for psychiatric advice or perhaps institutional care. Yet even now in Christian countries hysterical persons belonging to certain religious sects may acquire acceptable roles and status as mystics.

The dancing mania of the late Middle Ages and early modern period had many features in common with the hysteria and great suggestibility found not only among Arctic peoples but elsewhere. With our Christian ancestors the dancing manias were accepted as evidences of an outpouring of the divine spirit. In the same manner many hysterical manifestations appeared, and still appear, in Protestant revivals. These may be considered within the cultural norm, at least among those groups who have the general pattern of revivalism as an accepted manner of religious experience. Nearly all the hysterical symptoms noted among primitive people or in modern hospitals are paralleled here: dissociation, amnesia for the episode, echolalia, echopraxia, mimicry of animals, such as barking like dogs or crawling on all fours, jumping up and down, cataleptic and hysterioepileptic features, speaking in tongues, and the like. (See Cleveland, 1916). Such behavior may be found today among certain of our more divergent sectarian groups.

More violent hysterical behavior is witnessed in the *amok* among the Malays. This maniacal outbreak has given rise to our expression "running amuck." For no apparent reason a man will be seized with a sudden frenzy and take up his creese or other weapon and attack, wound, and frequently kill anyone who happens to stand in his way. Often his family and neighbors are among his victims. This rage usually lasts until the maniac himself is killed. Such seizures are not unknown in other

societies, but in Malaysia *amok* has become somewhat culturalized. It is recognized as a form of pathology, apparently amounting to a form of suicide, since the maniac is usually himself brought down.

Psychotic manifestations in other cultures. Those types of mentality and behavior found in other societies which we label psychoneurotic are rather difficult to compare with neuroticism among us. The symptoms are not always clearly set forth in the accounts, the observers themselves vary in their ability to detect mental disorder, and, most important of all, the cultural definition of behavior varies tremendously in the different societies. What to us is obviously a serious hysterical or otherwise unstable emotional expression may be culturally accepted behavior in another society. While the comparison of psychoneurotic manifestations in various culture areas with our own is difficult, with the psychoses—as we define them—the matter is somewhat different, at least in so far as the disorders prove to be so serious as to warrant attention in order to preserve group solidarity and safety. Out-and-out violence which endangers the lives of others, as with *amok*, may be dealt with in summary fashion. But, doubtless, deteriorative senile psychotics (unless obviously dangerous) might well be permitted to continue their vegetative existence. So, too, cases like our harmless schizophrenics or involuntional melancholics might survive with a little care from others. Yet the cultural definitions do vary, and certain behavior and attitudes which we easily define as psychotic apparently pass as normal in other societies.

Manifestations which we call schizophrenic, such as seclusiveness, isolation of the self from others, and marked retreat into fantasy thought or action, do appear in some primitive societies but always within a particular framework. Interestingly enough, for example, among the Manus people of the Admiralty Islands (Melanesia), the wives sometimes show the regressive, introvertive tendencies associated with our definition of dementia praecox. M. Mead (1930b) has pointed out that these women are taken into their husbands' villages from other communities and that they are never considered strictly bona-fide members of the husband's family and neighborhood. They remain outsiders. Their schizoid trends are evidently related to their sense of difference and isolation.

A number of writers have pointed out suggestive instances in which schizophrenia in primitives arises in situations where the native peoples have been exposed to European culture. In other words, they come to take on a second set of habits, attitudes, and ideas—new roles and a new status, and hence a new self—which are in conflict with the old. They become akin to what Park (1928) has designated as the "marginal man." These individuals represent a curious paradox of isolation and difference coupled with mental conflict. And, if not only isolation but conflict also be considered a predisposing cause of dementia praecox, such break-

downs might be expected to occur where there is exposure to two different cultures. (See Devereaux, 1939a, for an extended defense of this particular theory of schizophrenia.)

One observer (Lopes, 1932) in Brazil reports that the natives there who have been exposed to European culture in the cities develop schizophrenia, whereas the peoples of the Brazilian interior, outside the range of Euro-American culture, have few if any psychoses, and these few rather of the circular sort. It has also often been said that dementia praecox occurs more frequently in India in those communities where the population has been in longer and more intimate contact with European culture.

Even though data on schizophrenia among primitive or non-Euro-American cultures are scarce, apparently the grosser forms as we know them occur very infrequently. And, when they do, they appear to be related to two important background factors: sense of isolation and mental conflict.

Paranoid behavior, on the other hand, is reported in many societies. In some it is definitely culturalized. Yet on examination of the evidence one has difficulty in fitting some of the features of such behavior into our traditional categories.

Among the Ekoi of West Africa, the practice of black magic, with its attendant belief in malevolence among even close relatives, produces a frame of mind which resembles that of the paranoiac in our own society. The fear of such magic is so great that any untoward event is likely to be laid to sorcery. And there is a maniacal dread that even the nearest kin may secretly practice sorcery on one. Talbot (1912) cites a number of cases. One of these, Chief Nenkui, suffered from a paranoid fear of sorcery to such an extent that he drove two of his own wives and their children into horrible tortures and inflicted great misery on many of his subjects. As widespread as this fear is, as often as its consequences appear in overt acts, it still remains in terms of Ekoi culture an act demanding prescribed treatment. A system of ritualistic procedures has grown up for dealing with the sorcerer who stimulates others to this violent behavior. But among the Ekoi the paranoid violence is evidently not considered pathological in our sense.

Another illustration of the importance of cultural definitions for understanding individual behavior is found among the Dobu of New Guinea, where the entire society is dominated by an amazing paranoid fear of sorcery. A white man in our own society who believed and acted as a Dobuan does would be put down as definitely insane. (See Fortune, 1932.) Some aspects of the life and culture there are as follows:

Among the Dobu, exogamic groups regard each other as manipulators of the dread black magic; hence on marriage one always comes into an enemy group whose members continue through life to be one's deadly and unappeasable foes. Almost every ordinary act is colored by the fear of evil magic which may operate against one. Thus

to possess a good garden is a confession of theft in a way, since all try to use magic to transfer the productiveness of a neighbor's garden to one's own. There is almost a constant preoccupation with protection against poisoning. A person dare not leave a pot unattended lest someone drop poison into it. Each one prepares and eats his own food; there is little communal life around a festive board. The proper phrase on the receipt of a gift from another is: "And if you now poison me, how shall I repay you this present?" To the Dobuans the entire world is peopled with evil spirits, and every man fears that his fellows may employ these forces against him.

In such a society the nature of social interaction is evidently very different than in our own. To indicate how a man whom we would consider normal may be regarded in Dobu we may quote from Benedict's (1934a, p. 66) summary of Fortune's narrative:

"... In this society where no one may work with another and no one may share with another, Fortune describes the individual who was regarded by all his fellows as crazy. He was not one of those who periodically ran amok and, beside himself and frothing at the mouth, fell with a knife upon anyone he could reach. Such behavior they did not regard as putting anyone outside the pale. They did not even put the individuals who were known to be liable to these attacks under any kind of control. They merely fled when they saw the attack coming on and kept out of the way. 'He would be all right tomorrow.' But there was one man of sunny, kindly disposition who liked work and liked to be helpful. The compulsion was too strong for him to repress it in favor of the opposite tendencies of his culture. Men and women never spoke of him without laughing; he was silly and simply and definitely crazy. Nevertheless, to the ethnologist used to a culture that has, in Christianity, made his type the model of all virtue, he seemed a pleasant fellow."

Benedict (1934b) cites an instance among the Zuni Indians of our own Southwest, who considered one of their members who showed great individualism, aggressiveness, and a certain aloofness to custom to be a witch and hung him up by his thumbs as a punishment. Evidently the kind of aspirations which white Americans would regard as praiseworthy, the Zuni believed to be aberrant and evil.

Somewhat related to both paranoia and epilepsy, as we have defined them in our society, was the development of a veritable megalomania among the rich chieftains of our Pacific Northwest Coast Indians. Among the Kwakiutl the individual's craving for high status dominated almost his every act. Self-glorification and delusions of grandeur went hand in hand. Benedict (1934a) remarks of them that "all of existence was seen in terms of insult," that is, in the sense of susceptibility to shame. The individual's emotions always swung in the orbit of triumph over his fellows or shame and disgrace at their hands. These particular grandiose attitudes, ideas, and practices, which we would regard as paranoid, were for the most part standardized into accepted patterns. This was most evident in the institution of the potlatch, when rival chieftains attempted

to outdo each other in gifts or in the destruction of costly blankets, furs, and copper tokens (similar to our money in representing wealth). They fought with wealth for prestige and glory. The potlatch was a great occasion for humiliating one's tribal rivals and vindicating one's own greatness.

So, too, the pattern of self-glorification appears in periods of bereavement. Among the Kwakiutl, no matter what the cause of a relative's death, his passing was considered a personal affront, to be wiped out by the death of another person. It did not matter who the victim might be. This affords a neat illustration of the differences in what we label paranoid behavior. In our own society homicidal tendencies among paranoiacs are not uncommon, but they are usually directed toward a specific individual who is believed to have injured one or who is thought likely to do so. Among the Kwakiutl Indians, however, the murderous impulse is culturalized into another outlet—anybody who happens to be handy to kill. In fact, though Benedict, in discussing these Kwakiutl practices, refers to them as paranoid, it may be that what we have are some sort of hysterical-epileptoid symptoms as we would describe them. Certainly it strikes me that the behavior of this tribe is quite unlike that of the Ekoi or Dobu. It should be clear that the application of our own traditional categories of psychoses to behavior in a different society may be thoroughly meaningless..

The literature of anthropology is strikingly barren with regard to those disorders which we call manic-depressive. Lopes (1932) does mention some few instances among the native peoples of Brazil. And some of the more severe behavior like running *amok* might be considered akin to the manic states, although the evidence rather supports the thesis that this behavior is what we term hysterical.

Seligman (1929), who for many years worked in Papua in New Guinea, found little evidence of affective (manic-depressive) disorders, but he does point out that the Papuans are characterized by impulsiveness and marked suggestibility, and that suicide not infrequently follows extreme excitement. To illustrate he cites a case of a woman who killed herself after prolonged bickering with her mother-in-law. In other situations men have occasionally committed suicide from jealousy, despair, or disappointment. But the interesting thing for us is that the natives themselves consider such conduct abnormal, since for them it is not the same as the approved and culturalized ceremonial suicide practices in Papua. In the latter to take one's life falls within certain cultural expectancies. Seligman notes a case of a young girl who, having come to feel herself to be wronged, dressed up in her best finery and then killed herself by jumping from a lofty tree. Such ceremonial suicide is also practiced among the Trobriand Islanders. Malinowski (1926, p. 78) describes the case of

Kima'i, a boy of sixteen who had had an intrigue with his cousin, a daughter of his mother's sister, hence a member of his own clan and so forbidden to him by the taboo on incest:

"This had been known and generally disapproved of, but nothing was done until the girl's discarded lover, who had wanted to marry her . . . took the initiative. . . . Then one evening he insulted the culprit in public, accusing him in the hearing of the whole community of incest and hurling at him a certain expression intolerable to a native. For this there was only one remedy; only one means of escape remained to the unfortunate youth. Next morning he put on festive attire and ornamentation, climbed a coco-nut palm and addressed the community, speaking from among the palm leaves and bidding them farewell. He explained the reasons for his desperate deed and also launched forth a veiled accusation against the man who had driven him to his death, upon which it became the duty of his clansmen to avenge him. Then he wailed aloud, as is the custom, jumped from a palm some sixty feet high and was killed on the spot. There followed a fight within the village in which the rival was wounded; and the quarrel was repeated during the funeral."

Malinowski explains this behavior on two psychological grounds: first, it arises always from some wrong, sin, or crime which requires expiation, such as adultery or infraction of the rules of incest; second, it serves as a protest against those who exposed the offense, insulted the culprit in public, and forced him into an unbearable situation. Often the accused publicly admits his guilt and takes the consequences, but also declares that he has been shamefully treated, and, if those who brought his conduct to light be his friends or relatives, he appeals to their sentiment, or, if it was an enemy who exposed him, he appeals to the solidarity of his own kinsmen, asking them to avenge his death.

In Papua also Seligman found some scattered instances which resembled the depressive period of the circular psychoses. He writes (1929, pp. 197-198):

"Another instance which might be labelled reactive depression with hysterical features in which a missionary element entered was that of a Motu (Western Papuo-Melanesian) youth of about twenty-five from Port Moresby, whom I saw at the Mission station at Vatorata in 1898. Although well-developed and healthy looking and in spite of being long employed about the house, the patient was obviously nervous on entering a room; his thyroid cartilage worked up and down in his throat, he spoke in a lower voice than is usual among Papuasians and with something of a thrill in it and his conjunctivae were glistening and suffused with moisture. His illness began about five years before, when he lost a small trading vessel belonging to the mission, taking her out after being warned not to do so as there was a heavy sea on. On his return he was angrily remonstrated with by a very forcible and outspoken missionary, but he was not struck nor was physical violence threatened. He returned to his village, where he would sit for a long time with his head bent and his hands lying idle in his lap. Before this there was—according to his brother—a period of talkativeness. He

abandoned cohabitation and took little notice of his child. He was not dirty in his habits, and, as far as could be learnt, took his food well. The melancholy condition lasted for about a year, getting gradually worse, until he never left his hut and seldom spoke; at this time he believed, or at any rate stated, that he could not walk. It may be assumed that his condition was undoubtedly fostered by the too sympathetic and pessimistic remarks of his neighbours. About this time he was discovered by Dr. Lawes, who had him carried to his residence, where, on being quietly reasoned with, it was found that he could walk, stand, and talk. His condition slowly improved and in 1898, when he came under observation, he had begun to do light work about the house, but if left alone too long he was even then liable to fits of depression in which he would assume his old melancholic attitude."

This is a case not unlike the type of depressive episode found in our own society—the onset being apparently due to a sense of guilt, shame, and accompanying anxiety and mental conflict.

Little attention has been paid to the organic psychoses among primitive peoples. Seligman reports a few cases of epilepsy among the Papuans. He also saw some pathological cases which resembled paresis; a few seemed to be the result of malaria, and one or two were similar to our senile dementia.

Toxic psychoses have been reported among many primitive and non-Euro-American peoples. For example, in India there is found what is called "Indian hemp insanity," a psychosis induced by the use of a drug made from hemp. The active substance is either taken in a drink called *bhang* or inhaled by smoking *charas* or *ganja*. (*Charas* is also prepared in the form of pills.) The effects in any case are similar. Dhunjibhoy (1930, p. 261) thus describes them:

"Effect of a moderate dose.—The intoxication varies from moderate to dead drunk. Some become drowsy or semi-comatose, rapidly passing into a dreamy state, with a rapid flow of ideas, often of a sexual nature, ending in a deep sleep. Others go through a phase of increased psychomotor activity before passing into the dreamy state.

"Effect of large doses.—These produce excitement, delusions, hallucinations, rapid flow of ideas, a high state of ecstasy, and violence, to be followed by deep sleep and forgetfulness of all but the initial symptoms."

In view of recent attention in this country to the ill effects of smoking marijuana—a variety of hemp—it is interesting to note further some of the psychotic symptoms of the Hindu cases. According to this author, three types of psychosis may be produced by this drug: (1) an acute mania, marked by visual and auditory hallucinations, usually of a pleasant sexual nature, complete amnesia, certain eye difficulties, and dare-devil demeanor and impulsiveness, but with fair recovery if the drug is not habituated; (2) chronic mania, with symptoms much like the above but less intense, and a general sense of well-being and a tendency to

boasting; and (3) dementia, marked by complete breakdown. In Hindu society the excessive or prolonged use of hemp drugs is frequently found among the criminal population. It obviously predisposes some of its victims to crimes of violence: "unpremeditated murder, running amok, grievous hurt, rape, etc." (Dhunjibhoy, 1930.)

Among the North American Indian tribes the use of peyote, commonly but incorrectly called "mescal," produces symptoms which we would label pathological. It overstimulates the heart, produces muscular lassitude, and appears to enhance the intellectual faculties, giving rise especially to visual images of a kaleidoscopic nature. In some persons it produces an intense depression, in others a quiet but impressive sense of exaltation. (See Buchanan, 1929; Fernberger, 1932.) In some instances the use of peyote has been culturalized. Among some of our American Plains tribes a whole religious cult was developed around the use of this drug, which became a device for securing intense religious experiences. Thus, behavior which might well be defined by ourselves as abnormal becomes with the proper cultural support a normal means of securing a form of experience that has significance not only for the individual but for his group as well. (See Radin, 1914; and Bartlett, 1923.)

Culture norms and abnormality. It is apparent from the illustrations above that what we consider mental disorders appear in many other societies within the accepted and even expected framework of culture. The cataleptic seizure of the Zulu or of the Shasta Indian of California, considered so important as a preparation for supernatural gifts in those societies, is with us defined as distinctly pathological. In our society the homosexual is at best regarded as queer if not definitely neurotic, which would not be the definition put upon his behavior in some other societies. The megalomania of the Kwakiutl chieftain seems to us "insane." Yet the unbridled egotism of many military and political dictators in Western history gives evidence that we not only tolerate but even foster attitudes and behavior which in other societies would be labeled insane. So, too, the overemphasis upon extroverted attitudes and conduct in present-day Euro-American culture might seem pathological to people outside its influence. The obviously fantastic mentality of the Mohave Indian, whose dreams become significant for the religious life of his group, and the introverted mental life of mystics in both Euro-American and other societies indicate other instances of acceptability of what modern psychiatry designates as abnormal.

It should be clear, therefore, that the normal is but a variant of the concept of the good and the proper. It rests upon what a given society expects and approves. And so, too, variability in mentality and conduct itself depends for its significance upon the accepted limits of divergent

behavior. How the personality or life organization is bounded by these norms is brought out by Benedict in these words (1934a, pp. 72-73):

"... Most of those organizations of personality that seem to us most incontrovertibly abnormal have been used by different civilizations in the very foundations of their institutional life. Conversely the most valued traits of our normal individuals have been looked on in differently organized cultures as aberrant. Normality, in short, within a very wide range, is culturally defined. It is primarily a term for the socially elaborated segment of human behavior in any culture; and abnormality, a term for the segment that that particular civilization does not use. The very eyes with which we see the problem are conditioned by the long traditional habits of our own society."

Yet, in this connection, there is an important matter which is sometimes overlooked. If a particular segment of thought or overt behavior is culturalized—that is, if it represents an accepted, approved, and expected pattern—its very quality and meaning are different than similar thought and action would be in a society and culture where they were defined as abnormal or divergent. Thus the Polynesian taboo on touching a king, or the Crow's taboo on conversation with his near kin, or the grandiose, suspicious, and paranoid behavior of the Kwakiutl, or the homosexuality of the Samurai, would, for an individual in those respective societies, be a part of his normal experience. He would not be disturbed by them; they would represent no inner strain or distress, no escape from a conflict-producing situation. As Wegrocki (1939, p. 170) well states it: "The delusions of the psychotic and the delusions of the Northwest Coast Indian can not by any means be equated. Mechanisms like the conviction of grandeur are abnormal not by virtue of unique, abnormal qualia but by virtue of their function in the total economy of the personality. The true paranoiac reaction represents a choice of the abnormal; the reaction of the Haida chief represents no such choice—there is but one path for him to follow." This distinction between what a society considers pathological and what it considers normal needs emphasis since there is a growing interest in comparing and contrasting the mentality of primitive and civilized man. The "normality" of many manifestations among primitives which we term neurotic in our society is ably demonstrated by Kardiner (1939).

If we recognize that thought and action are qualitatively different, depending on how they are defined, then the essentially statistical concept of normality, namely, that it represents the *modal* thought and behavior of a society or group, does have some limitations. (See Skaggs, 1933; Foley, 1935.) From the standpoint of comparative studies of culture and society "the relativity of normality" may be accepted; but we must not fall into

738 SELECTED PROBLEMS OF PERSONAL ADJUSTMENT

the error of believing that these parallels in thought and conduct indicate that psychologically they are identical in meaning for the individuals concerned. Neurotic or psychotic behavior in any case represents an inability of the individual to meet or to handle the demands of a given society and culture. Thus the fears of malevolent magic among the Berens River Indians or the Ekoi are from their standpoint not irrational; these are real dangers as defined by the culture of those societies. But individuals like W. B. and J. D. among the Berens River Indians were looked upon as neurotics in that society because their fears deviated in quantity and quality from those laid down by their culture. The deviant, therefore, must be considered as an individual who fails to meet the stresses and demands imposed on him by a given culture, and his failure to adapt himself may have, and usually does have, constitutional and also social-psychological and cultural foundations.

With these matters in mind we shall in the next chapter consider neurotic and psychotic thought and conduct as we find them in our own society, indicating the interplay of various factors in producing these aberrant manifestations.

Chapter XXVIII

THE NEUROTIC AND PSYCHOTIC IN OUR SOCIETY

IN WESTERN and Christian history the psychotics were long looked upon as individuals possessed of evil spirits. Sometimes, by magic or miracle, these malignant spirits or demons might be "cast out" of the sufferers. But often the individuals were locked up in dungeons or driven out of the communities as unworthy of any human care whatsoever.

With the rise of scientific medicine, the mentally diseased came to be viewed as individuals suffering from disorders of bodily structure or function. It was gradually recognized that they could be treated as sick persons rather than as possessing evil demons. Yet even in the history of medicine two factors retarded a broader and, from our point of view, more satisfactory consideration of these cases. The first was the growth of the scientific stereotype of disease as some sort of morbid entity. This notion itself may well be a certain psychological "hang-over" from the older belief that disease was due to some foreign element lodging within the person. This notion of disease—mental or physical—as an entity continues, even in our present-day medical thinking and practice. Modern bacteriology and toxicology lend further support to this view. But the more truly objective-minded physicians consider organic disease as a manifestation of the total organism, or of some particular part of it, which changes its physiological make-up and balance.

The second handicap to a sounder view of the neurotic and especially of the psychotic arises from the conception that all mental disorders must develop from some material "cause." The ordinary physician still believes that the mentally deranged must have, of necessity, some infection, some toxin in the body, some injury to the brain or other nervous tissue—otherwise, he argues, the individual could not show such curious and divergent mentality and behavior. But, as Campbell (1934, p. 170) well puts it, "A patient is said to have a psychosis but he does not have a psychosis in the same sense that he has a bullet in his leg. A psychosis cannot be extracted from the patient for study. . . ."

While some mental disorders are distinctly related to obvious organic changes, others, the functional disorders, are not. It is not that the hysteric, the dementia praecox patient, the manic-depressive, or the paranoiac

would not show deviation from the normal in brain and other somatic functions—if we had the devices for observing these—the point is that there is seldom any specific evidence of infection, toxin, or neurological injury to account for these changes in behavior in the first instance. Yet in some quarters the emphasis upon the constitutional factors has been so great that we shall devote the first section to a discussion of their place in the neuroses and psychoses. This will be followed by sections on the interrelation of social-cultural factors and the psychoses and the neuroses as forms of human adaptation.

CONSTITUTIONAL FACTORS AND DISORDERS OF PERSONALITY

The adaptation of the individual to his material and social-cultural environment is always predicated upon the basis of constitutional stability and a certain range of variation. As we pointed out in Chapter II, the foundation of adaptive changes lies in the interplay of fixity and flexibility in the organism. In particular this involves the maintenance of a constant state in the internal environment, which condition—as Claude Bernard noted—makes possible a “free life,” that is, adaptability to the external world. In order to keep going, the organism at the physiological level must maintain a certain constancy of temperature, hydrogen-ion concentration, water, sugar, oxygen, and other biochemical constituents. This general function is covered by the concept of *homeostasis* (“the stable state of the fluid matrix”; see Cannon, 1935, 1939). There is, of course, a certain permissive range of variability in these matters, but the essential function of the physiological processes—in which the autonomic nervous system and the endocrines play large parts—is to produce a steady balance among these forces. A living organism can maintain its integrity only by the operation of an intricate series of adaptive mechanisms. When any stress is imposed upon the organism, this tends automatically to set into function mechanisms which counteract the impinging stress and preserve the internal liquid milieu in a “steady state.” Moreover, in nearly every case of extreme variation in these organic constants the most striking effect is on the central nervous system and hence upon external adaptability. We might, as a matter of fact, arrange individuals along a scale of physiological adjustability to the demands of internal and external changes.

In the study of personality, however, we are fundamentally concerned with other aspects of adaptation, namely, those at the psychological and social-cultural levels. There is, of course, some interrelation between the physiological and these two other levels, but so far the precise degree or extent of this correlation has not been determined. As yet we do not have any adequate methods of equating the various processes of adjustment at these levels with one another. (See suggestive paper by Lasswell, 1935.)

The "causes" of the correlations between physiological and psychological processes are not irreversible and in one direction only, that is, from the former to the latter covert and overt adjustive reactions. Yet this view has too long dominated general medicine, and psychiatry in particular.

The autonomic nervous system, abetted by the glandular, no doubt plays a large part in the mechanics of this entire relationship. A condition of fear, anxiety, anger, love, or grief may alter quite sharply the functions of the nervous system, on the one hand, and of the internal vegetative processes, on the other. It has, however, been difficult in the past for the run-of-the-mill medical practitioner to appreciate the place of these emotional factors in the field of organic disorders. Imbued as the average physician is with ideas of toxic or bacteriological foundations of disease, he is apt to pooh-pooh or neglect any consideration of possible psychological distress in inducing, contributing to, or at least accompanying these altered bodily conditions. As we have so frequently noted in our previous discussions, there is increasing evidence that emotions and feelings, habits, and ideas—acquired in human experience—may profoundly influence the physiological functions and hence the homeostatic balance of the body. As McFarland and Goldstein (1937, p. 1090) in their review of studies in the biochemistry of mental disorders remark: "Recent research is tending to clarify the way in which ideas and emotions can upset these [physiological] constants. The chemical and physical processes associated with mental and emotional processes are of an exceedingly delicate character and apparently intimately interconnected." (See Hoskins, 1936, for a suggestive paper on the possibilities of combining endocrine with psychoanalytic interpretations of mental disturbances.)

We owe a debt to psychoanalysis for having made us aware of the close interplay of physical and mental processes. Very early in his career Freud began to realize that many of his neurotic patients who had physical symptoms of disease were by this means finding an outlet for their emotional conflicts. He interpreted this as an unconscious "conversion" of these mental disturbances into organic symptoms. As Alexander (1939a) puts it, such a "conversion neurosis" indicates that "bodily symptoms develop from chronic emotional conflicts." Of course, Charcot and Janet had much earlier found that hysterics "suffer" from various functional paralyses of muscles or sensory processes for which there is no obvious neurological source. (See Chapter XXVII.) But Freud extended this view in line with his own practice and theory to show that there might be a variety of organic conditions associated with mental distress.

There are two reasons for our paying attention to this whole problem: (1) the data at hand indicate in a very clear way that the bodily and mental processes are fundamentally unified and must be discussed together if we are to get an adequate naturalistic view of human thought

and behavior; (2) they also demonstrate the tremendous importance of social-cultural stimulation in setting up emotional responses which in turn induce or influence the somatic disorders themselves. The physician and the psychologist can no longer ignore the function of thought and emotion in treating organic disturbances, which is to say that they cannot neglect the place of social interaction and of the patient's subjective states, the latter being—as they are—so profoundly influenced by the social-cultural stimuli.

There is growing evidence of a rapprochement of physiology and psychology with respect to many of these problems.¹ The interplay of ideas, emotions, and overt activities with the biochemistry of the organism is so subtle that it may well be that some of our norms of the physiological constants are none too sound, and more careful students of physiology now stress the importance of environmental, especially ideational and emotional, factors in determining organ inadequacy. All too frequently we do not know where the normal ends and the abnormal begins. In other words, the constitutional factors are themselves profoundly influenced by social-cultural learning. For example, emotionality, which is so closely linked to social interaction, depends upon the operation of the sympathetic nervous system in conjunction with the functioning of the adrenals. But we also know that emotional expression is modified at every point by social-cultural experience. Thus a child who develops a habit of emotional impulsiveness is laying not only a psychological but a physiological background for a weakened capacity to maintain that "steady state" of the internal functioning which is so important to adequate adaptability to the external environment. Applying this to the present matter, we may say that a given emotion of the mentally disturbed is not a reaction deriving directly from an independent factor, the biological organism, but may well be a response into which has entered previous learning in the social and cultural world.

The matter is further illustrated by the evident difficulty in securing the indexes of biochemical variations in normal persons or in mentally disorganized patients. The apparatus of the laboratory, the insertion of hypodermic needles, or the taking of a blood sample may serve to modify the whole physiological as well as psychological response system of the individual. (See Chapter V for notation of the effects of such matters on experiments in conditioning.)

Biochemistry in mental deviation. With these cautions in mind let us note briefly some of the findings in the biochemistry of the mentally dis-

¹ The establishment in 1939 of the periodical *Psychosomatic Medicine* is but one instance of this trend. See current issues of this journal for new data and reviews of pertinent literature elsewhere; also Dunbar (1938) contains a useful compendium of material in this entire field. See Jelliffe (1939); also G. C. Robinson (1939) for "a study of the social aspects of illness."

ordered population. (For good reviews see McFarland and Goldstein, 1937, 1938, 1939, 1940.) While there have been a large number of studies of possible physiological factors which might account for psychoneurotic manifestations, on the whole the findings, as McFarland and Goldstein (1937, p. 1088) say, "do not reveal extreme enough deviations or lack of deviations from the normal to account for the abnormalities in behavior." On the other hand, despite the physiological margin of safety and the great adaptability at the social-cultural levels, every individual is subject to deterioration, depending upon the nature and intensity of the environmental forces and his general constitutional susceptibility to these forces. The fatigability of the neurasthenic, for instance, may really result from the very "conversion" of his mental distress into certain physiological symptoms. (See Freud, 1920.) The common nervous irritability, fatigue, and susceptibility to shock in these patients may well be linked up with their shallow breathing, the fatigue of the respiratory system, the exaggeration of their circulatory reflexes, the tendency to sweating, and the occasional instability of temperature. (See Haldane and Priestley, 1935, for their comment on these conditions observed in neurotic soldiers during the World War.) So, too, Janet's theory that the organic foundation of hysteria is "cerebral exhaustion" may represent an interplay of psychological and cultural factors and a certain constitutional instability. (See Janet, 1901.) In the light of such facts we must realize that some of these patients do represent, on the whole, a certain divergence from the expected constitutional constants, although the biochemical tests of neurotics fail to reveal statistically significant differences which would serve to distinguish them from their normal fellows at this level of adjustment.

On the other hand, with respect to the schizophrenics, investigations into the carbohydrate and lipoid metabolism and into the internal variability of biochemical constituents have shown that these patients do depart rather sharply from the norms. Yet there is much contradiction in the findings. Attempts to discover a specific glandular malfunctioning as a "cause" of dementia praecox have so far failed, though no one doubts that the endocrines play a distinctive part in the establishment and maintenance of the proper physiological balances. (Hoskins and Jellinek, 1934.) So, too, the studies of oxygen content and capacity in the blood do not indicate any clear-cut differentials between dementia praecox patients and normal persons. All too frequently other factors—both physiological and psychological—are not controlled. Likewise, the studies of lipoid metabolism have not been highly satisfactory. As McFarland and Goldstein say (1938, p. 541), "Some have found that no single cholesterol test has any value in diagnosis because of the great variability in the same schizophrenic from day to day as well as the wide range from patient to patient."

Part of the difficulty lies in the fact already noted (see Chapter XXVII) that schizophrenia is not "some unitary disorder," as Campbell (1928) well remarks. It is at best a rather heterogeneous grouping. In fact, the very inadequacies of physiological findings raise serious doubts of the soundness of the older psychiatric classification of these syndromes. Nevertheless, despite these contradictions, many schizophrenics are marked by sharp deviations from the normal in oxygen consumption, venous oxygen, blood pressure, and certain other items. As Hoskins and Jellinek, 1934, pp. 229-230, remark regarding their research on this problem: "Especially striking were the evidences of lack of fineness of adaptive co-ordination of functions—of prompt responsivity of the controlling (sympathetic) mechanisms. . . . As a group the subjects showed *physiologic clumsiness*." Put in other terms, the dementia praecox patient appears to possess more highly variable and unstable homeostatic capacity than do normal individuals, which in turn influences his adaptability to the external world. (See Thompson, Corwin, and Aste-Salazar, 1937.)

The physiological reactions of the manic-depressive are of somewhat different character. As we have noted, this disorder is characterized chiefly by fluctuations in the feeling-emotional states and is not usually marked by such striking general mental deterioration as dementia praecox and some of the organic psychoses. In summarizing the physiological concomitants of the circular disorders, Hoskins (1934, p. 574) writes:

"The body functions tend to correspond with the mental picture. In the exalted phase, the appetite is good and the metabolism effective. In the depressed phase, the appetite is poor and gastro-intestinal functions sluggish. Pulse and respiration accord with the mood. Menstruation often disappears during the depression, to be restored as the attack passes."

Other physiologic factors which have been noted are increased blood pressure in the melancholic and anxiety states and normal or depressed body temperature in the depressive phases. Salivation and sweating appear to be lessened in the depressions, as is sexual activity. In summarizing a large number of research studies in the biochemistry of manic-depressives, McFarland and Goldstein remark (1939, p. 49):

"There appears, in general, to be evidence of a tendency for the manic-depressive to have slightly increased blood sugar, for the cases of acute depression and melancholia to be defective in their sugar tolerance, for the manics to have a slightly increased blood calcium, and for the lipid values to be rather high in the manic depressive. The disturbed carbohydrate and lipid metabolisms are perhaps the most striking findings."

On the whole, says Hoskins (1934, p. 575), "The basal metabolism rate is less definitely affected in the cyclothymic [circular] than in the schizophrenic psychoses."

When we come to the organic psychoses, we are dealing with such a wide range of diseases that no simple or single biochemical factor can be noted for the group as a whole. In the toxic and infectious disorders the introduction of bacteriological or inorganic elements upsets the usual homeostatic functions. So, too, the changes in the central nervous system in cerebral arteriosclerosis, or in paresis, or in senile dementia, are clearly so profound as to disturb the normal functioning of the brain, especially the higher cerebral centers. The many symptoms, including delirium, confusion, irritability, depression, and loss of mental associations or of motor co-ordination, all give evidence of internally determined effects upon the central nervous system. But precisely how toxic or bacteriological elements influence endocrine functioning and in turn influence the biochemistry of the blood and tissues is extremely complex. Probably no distinction should be drawn between the effects of drugs or other chemicals taken into the body and of toxins which originate from bacterial action in the body itself.

The biochemistry of epilepsy is a complicated matter into which we need not go. But there is some evidence of a close relationship between water metabolism and epileptic convulsions, which in turn would seem to predicate the function of the pituitary gland. The limitation of water intake has been shown to reduce or eliminate epileptic attacks. (See Hoskins, 1934, and McFarland and Goldstein, 1940.)

The discussion of the biochemistry of mental disorders raises also the question of the use of various organic compounds in the cure or amelioration of these pathologic conditions. The employment of malaria as a cure for paresis has been successful in about one third of the cases, and has tended to arrest the usual advance of serious symptoms in another third. (See Roberts, 1939.) So, too, insulin treatments have been reported successful—at least temporarily—in from 60 to 70 per cent of cases of dementia praecox. (See McFarland and Goldstein, 1938, for a review of recent literature; also Cobb, 1937.) Metrazol, a general convulsive agent that affects the central nervous system, has been used on both manic-depressive and schizophrenic cases with fair success. (The latter group were helped only if they were treated within six months after the onset of the psychosis. See Low *et al.*, 1938; and Cohen, 1938; and D. C. Wilson, 1939.) These two latter types of treatment involve what is essentially a distinct shock to the organism, and no one yet knows how permanent the cures or partial cures may be, nor do we know about the *possible* long-time effects from injuries to the neural or other tissues of the body. But the clinician and the biochemist are often highly impressed by their results, and they present some difficult problems to any psychologist who would emphasize the social-cultural and general environmental factors in discussing the etiology of and recovery from the psychoses, organic or functional. (For a review of the literature, see Shipley and Kant, 1940.)

Yet the problem does not seem insuperable. It may well be that the use of organic compounds alters the internal physiological balances in such a way that more normal mentation and behavior are made possible. Nevertheless, after biochemical treatment

one would hardly expect the restored patient to be in such a role or status that his subsequent adjustment could take place without reference to social interaction with his fellows.

In summary, then, we may say that most individuals operate within what we consider the normal range of physiological function. But the internal conditions of the body may be modified by infections, toxins, tissue injury, induced endocrine imbalance, or the interplay of emotion, idea, or habit with these other factors. If and when these alterations occur, we may expect some variations in the adaptation of the individual to his external environment and some modifications in the nature of his inner subjective life as well. And within the social-cultural norms of conduct—that is, within the range of acceptable or expected behavior at the social-cultural level—changes in behavior may be labeled neurotic, psychotic, or sinful, criminal, or what not, depending upon the current cultural definition of the particular situation and conduct. Yet it is also evident that the milder disturbances—the psychoneuroses—involve only minor modifications in the inner life or in the overt conduct. In the functional psychoses, on the contrary, these modifications are usually so striking as to demand special attention and care from others. In the more serious organic psychoses, such as arise from a severe brain injury or from a toxic or infectious condition, the somatic variables loom so large that the psychological and social-cultural factors pass into relative insignificance. That is, in terms of the degree of deviation from constitutional normality there is a corresponding scale of social-cultural adaptability: the neurotic is less deviant than the functional psychotics, while among the so-called organic disorders the divergence from the social-cultural norms is most evident, though even here there must be some modicum of social interaction if the patient is to continue to live.

But, before going on to examine the social-psychological and cultural elements in deviant mentality and conduct, let us see how physiological and psychological processes operate together in certain types of disorder ordinarily considered to be purely or largely somatic in origin and therapy. To illustrate the matter, we shall discuss some features of personality found in cases known to suffer from tuberculosis, cardiac-circulatory disturbances, gastrointestinal disorders, and the effects of encephalitis.

Social-emotional reactions of tuberculars. In patients suffering from active tuberculosis, emotional disturbances are often apparent. The worry about the disease itself is enhanced by the loss of economic security, or, if there are no financial anxieties, by loss of professional activity and hence of prestige. Those who were formerly economically self-supporting but are forced to become inmates of public sanatoria may easily acquire distinct feelings of humiliation. Segregation and the enforced life in bed

also cause anxiety. The individual may get into the habit of brooding upon his difficulties, and this, in turn, may lead to such irritability or marked depression that recovery is retarded. The patient may, of course, indulge in rich fantasies of a more pleasant but infantile sort, but excesses of wishful thinking may lead ultimately to pathological symptoms unless physical recovery takes place despite these regressive habits. Sometimes the tubercular individual, as he moves toward recovery, develops unusual euphoria and an emotional intensity that may actually retard his ultimate recovery. As a matter of fact, all too frequently this hopefulness is but a compensation for a deep-seated anxiety. (See Eyre, 1932.) On the other hand, individuals of great activity and vigor have from an experience in a sanitarium come to take a much calmer and more deliberate view of life. Learning that they must guard their health, they are often able to marshal their energies more effectively and to accomplish more with less energy than they did in the hectic days before their illness.

In all these instances, again, social interaction will play its part. In some instances oversolicitude or a return to infantile dependence during the more severe periods may bring about a more or less permanent regression of the individual to a childish state that persists long after the physical difficulties have begun to clear up. Physicians and nurses who have dealt for years with tubercular patients are well aware of these problems in an empirical way. Unfortunately, little or no adequate work has been done on the personality manifestations of a good sample of such patients before, during, and after their hospitalization. (See Burhoe, 1934.) It may well be that many of the effects just noted are related to the situational adjustment in the sanatoria rather than to any peculiarity in the reactions of the tubercular patients as a special class of diseased individuals.

Certain cardiac-circulatory disorders. Since the action of the heart and circulatory system is largely under the control of the autonomic nervous system, it has long been recognized that emotional disturbances, particularly fear, rage, and love, greatly affect the operation of the heart and the fluctuation of the blood pressure. (See Caughey, 1939, for a review of literature on cardiovascular neurosis.)

The matter is well illustrated in the anxiety set up in persons with slight heart lesions. Very often these conditions at the outset are not severe at all; the heart develops certain compensatory functions, and the individual may continue to carry his daily routine with no serious danger to his health. Not infrequently, however, the individual, on learning that he has such a disorder, distorts its importance and seriousness far out of proportion to the facts. Occasionally physicians themselves are at fault in these situations, for they may give the patient an incorrect impression of his condition. Worry sets in, and this influences the autonomic controls of the heart. Even slight momentary muscular exertion may induce an awareness of increased heart action which the patient

easily misinterprets. And his very fear may serve to set up further cardiac response for the time being—all of which acts to enhance the anxiety.

In order to avoid such fearsome and painful experiences, the patient, instead of undertaking healthful exercise and a program of sane living, may take to his bed and in time become a confirmed invalid, giving over his life interest to the immediate preservation of his health. In fact, he may and often does regress to a state of complete dependency on others and settles into a quiescent, almost vegetative adaptation. The function of such dependence on others, especially close relatives, often becomes a power device enabling the invalid to keep these persons bound to him for years on end.

High blood pressure, or *hyperpiesis* (often called "essential hypertension"), may be induced by a combination of physical, chemical, and nervous influences which "initiate and maintain an abnormally high peripheral resistance" in the capillaries and related terminal blood vessels. (Katz and Leiter, 1939; see also Weiss, 1939, for a review of data on this topic.) And there is no doubt that emotional distress, particularly irritation and aggression, often plays a major part in setting up the enhanced blood pressure in the first instance. In the course of time, this may and often does become chronic, manifesting a variety of physical as well as psychological features. According to Ayman (1933) this hypertension is accompanied by such personality traits as "increased psychomotor activity...large and steady output of energy," and quick temper. These individuals are different from the manic-depressives, however, in that fluctuation of mood is not an especially important feature of their life organization. (See Chapter XXVII.)

Some attempts have been made by psychoanalysts to discover the probable unconscious elements in the etiology of high blood pressure—at least in certain cases. Saul (1939) reports for seven individuals with essential hypertension a background of four factors: (1) marked dominance by the mother during the early years of the patient, with submissiveness and oral (mouth) dependence transferred to others later; (2) a masked inhibition of heterosexuality; (3) strong hostility patterns; and (4) an unresolved conflict between passive dependence and hostile impulses, resulting in a severe emotional blocking or conflict. Alexander (1939a, p. 18), in his discussion of this entire problem, goes so far as to remark, "Inhibited rage seems to have specific relationship to the cardiovascular system." (See also Alexander, 1939b, 1939c.)

Gastrointestinal disorders. There are probably no organic disturbances in which the psychological effects are more apparent than in those involving the stomach, the intestines, and associated digestive functions. Common-sense observation and such scientific work as that of Cannon (1929) amply prove the inhibiting effects of fear and anger upon the gastric processes. And there is a substantial body of material on the social-emotional components in various gastrointestinal disorders. We shall take brief note of only a few of the findings as illustrative of the growing recognition of the close relationship of the psychological and

the physiological processes involved in these dysfunctions. (For a review of the literature on this topic, see Brush, 1939.)

In the emergence and persistence of gastric ulceritis, the emotions often play a major part. Patients with these difficulties show marked emotional instability, a rapid expenditure of energy leading to feelings of lassitude and fatigue, fearfulness, and a quick adaptability to alterations in the external environment. (See Draper and McGraw, 1927; Draper and Touraine, 1932; and Brown, Preu, and Sullivan, 1938.) In contrast to these characteristics, Draper and McGraw (1927) report that the gall-bladder cases in their sample presented another personality profile: stable mood, lack of fear, and slow reactivity.

Many dysfunctions of the colon also seem to have their roots in social-emotional experiences. Wakefield and Mayo (1938, p. 1628) found that in a considerable number of cases of colitis the basic predisposing factors were unpleasant social stimulations, such as illness, accidents, "unexpected loss of money, property or job, or death of a member of the family, betrayal of confidence by a friend," or changes in political affiliation, in church adherence, or in occupation. In fact, Wittkower (1938, p. 1359), on the basis of a study of a sample of patients with ulcerative colitis, remarks, "If we assess the relative significance of emotional and psychological factors in the aetiology of ulcerative colitis, very little can be said in favour of a primary bacteriological or dietetic origin."

A rather ambitious attempt was made by Alexander (1934) and his collaborators to uncover the dominant psychoanalytic factors in a group of cases suffering from three kinds of gastrointestinal disturbances: gastric ulcers, colitis, and constipation. The patients were analyzed and the results interpreted as forms of conversion neuroses, each type with its own peculiar personality manifestations.

(1) The cases with gastric ulcers were marked, at the conscious level, by independence, activity, and efficiency. These traits were interpreted as arising from repressed and denied fulfillment of impulses to be fed and to eat. Unconsciously the patients were motivated by inclinations to secure food, and by transference (conditioning) to get help from others. Yet this impulse was repressed and ambivalently replaced by a conscious sense of independence of others. Nevertheless, they could not escape their insistent desire for symbolic sustenance, which served as a chronic stimulus to the stomach "independent of the process of nutrition" itself. (2) The patients with colitis were featured by a strong sense of having fulfilled their obligations to others; hence they gave freely through the eliminative functions. They did not sense any feelings of guilt or of inferiority toward others. According to Freudian analysis, their excessive elimination was an aggressive symbol of their strong desire to demonstrate their independence. Their giving was a kind of token restitution for what they had received. (3) In contrast, the instances of chronic constipation had consciously the attitude that they did not take or receive; therefore they did not need to give. But unconsciously these individuals feared giving anything away lest they suffer a loss of power (the castration complex). Their failure to defecate symbolized a retention of their potency.

While these interpretations, like those noted above regarding cardiovascular disorders, may strike the reader who is unsympathetic to Freud as absurd and farfetched, they are certainly suggestive and should stimulate further and more complete clinical and statistical studies of the relation of physiological symptoms to deeper underlying personality characteristics. Obviously, in all these studies made by psychoanalysis, the complications are many and the mixture of organic and psychological conditions are too great to warrant quite such a particularistic interpretation. Nevertheless, the evident trend toward a fuller realization of the dynamic interplay of the physiological and the psychological processes against the background of the all-essential factor of social-cultural interaction is sound and worthy of increasing attention from students of personality everywhere.

Personality changes in postencephalitis. Another series of personality changes is evident in adults and children who have suffered from *encephalitis lethargica* (inflammation of the brain). They usually show—upon recovery from the period of fever and prolonged sleep—decided changes in conduct. Not only are there the peculiar physical features of tremors, loss of proper flexibility of the arms and legs, and development of curious stereotyped facial expressions, but behavior tends to be characterized by extreme irritability, loss of sense of social responsibility, all sorts of bizarre behavior, and even homicidal tendencies.

Just what particular organic changes are wrought by this disease are not fully known. It is clear, however, that the neurological system is profoundly altered. In view of this fact re-education and retraining become imperative if such individuals are not to continue difficult to manage after the disease has spent its course. And in connection with the latter, social interaction is basic. How the individual is treated by others quite as much as how he responds to others must be considered. Individuals formerly gentle, mild, and well adjusted often become extremely irascible and difficult to get on with. The physical peculiarities of the postencephalitic person are noticed and commented on by those around him. He is different from his fellows, and the responses of others will be unconsciously altered in view of this fact. Resentment and irritation are easily set up if this treatment is not kindly. Then, too, because of organic changes, receptivity to stimuli may be changed, the former emotional balance may be disturbed, and the hyperactivity may represent a release of energy which formerly the individual did not dream of having. Very often children formerly quite normal become disobedient, unduly restless, cruel, given to tantrums and even homicidal impulses. (See Strecker, 1929.)

In a number of studies of re-education it has been shown that by patience and care many postencephalitic children may be reconditioned to

more normal conduct. (See Bond and Appel, 1931.) The following summary gives some of the major features of this difficulty and some comments on the manner in which it is dealt with:

The onset of behavioral changes may begin to appear soon after the acute attack has passed, or may first appear even years later. Such changes may be rather mild and minor in form, or they may be extreme. As Molitch (1935, p. 845) remarks, "Every conceivable act, occasional or habitual, and all of the different psychic and emotional states are displayed by these patients."

Sherman and Beverly (1923), in a lengthy survey of the data, summarized the chief mental changes as the following: (1) deterioration of intelligence; (2) definite disorders of attention; (3) deterioration of memory; (4) emotional disturbances. T. R. Hill (1929), in a study of postencephalitic children who had become delinquent, goes so far as to maintain that these children lose their acquired inhibitions and revert to more "instinctive" levels of response, living in continual and restless pursuit of crude emotional gratifications which often take on outrageous features. They are impulsive, defiant, and disobedient, lack self-control, and have no powers of concentration. Russell (1929), on the other hand, believes that, since adult cases of postencephalitis rarely if ever manifest such bizarre behavior, this conduct in children arises because they have not previously learned sufficient inhibition, and that the organic lesion or whatever it is that "causes" encephalitis itself must have impaired those areas of the brain having to do with the development of inhibitory functions. (See also Cruchet, 1929.)

Molitch (1935, pp. 859-860), after summarizing the literature on chronic postencephalitis and giving some of his own cases, writes:

"1. The early diagnosis of chronic post-encephalitis may be made by the detection of changes in posture, tonus, associated movements (synkinesia), and ocular signs.

"2. The change of behavior may occur at any time from a few days to a number of years after the acute attack. The traits exhibited by these children may include every conceivable act, occasional or habitual, and all of the different psychic and emotional states. From an institutional standpoint their impulsive behavior has retarded their adjustment because of frequent escapes.

"3. Their behavior appears to be impulsive in nature, and of such great intensity as to often overwhelm their resistance.

"4. The mentality of the patients is impaired and to a greater degree if the acute attack occurred during the first few years of life.

"5. Re-examination, psychologically, suggests that the mentality does deteriorate in a small proportion of cases.

"6. The school work is in keeping with the mental level.

"7. Forensic responsibility should be determined by individual and not group study:

"8. Treatment essentially consists of individualization of the program of training. . . ."

Most of the medical studies of postencephalitis do not clearly distinguish between basic and early organic changes resulting in altered perceptual and motor organization and the particular overt behavior which

is *interpreted* as wild and "antisocial." It is worth noting that Strecker (1929), in citing the traits of such cases, combines both trait and attitude names or characteristics, and terms descriptive of disapproved social conduct. Such items as "marked restlessness," "tantrums," and "irritability" are mixed with such concepts as "truancy," "lying," and "sleeping in parks." From our standpoint the meaning or definition of the latter—if not the former—falls definitely within or without the cultural norms accepted by any given society. (See Chapter XXIV.) Only when we make careful notation of the manner in which such divergent conduct arises and try to discover its meaning to the postencephalitic person shall we be able to interpret it adequately. It is very doubtful if even children suffering from this organic disorder commit acts which are, strictly speaking, "meaningless." And Cruchet (1929) points out that in some instances such children do show kindly and gentle responses. It may well be that these children in particular represent a regression to a more infantile constitutional make-up and that with careful and patient training many of these so-called bizarre and irrational activities will not appear or at least will be checkmated in the process of relearning. We need a reanalysis of much of the literature on postencephalitis and further study of current cases in order to disentangle the organic-reactive changes inside the individual as a result of the disease itself from the overt manifestations in conduct apparent after the acute phase is past. The direction and nature of the latter doubtless are influenced more or less by the social situation and the cultural definition that accompanies it.

THE SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL AND CULTURAL APPROACH

Obviously, in many instances, mental disorganization does not involve the entire personality but reaches only into certain aspects of the self, into particular areas of the life organization. Such a condition would be illustrated by many hysterics, psychasthenics, and emotionally unstable persons. In the victims of the more serious disorders, the organic or functional cases, the entire life organization tends to be involved. Thus in dementia praecox there is often a regression to an infantile or rudimentary self which again comes to dominate thought and action. In turn, new patterns begin to arise during the psychosis. One might say that a distinction between the neurotic and the psychotic could be made in terms of the degree of involvement of the core of the personality—that is, the basic, inner life organization. As a matter of fact, in the psychotics one may often trace a continuous course of gradual intrusion of some fixed idea, some practice, some symptomatic behavior, into other areas of mind and behavior until the inner citadel of the self is more or less completely involved.

This is virtually another way of stating once more that both neurotics and psychotics must be viewed as instances of divergent personalities in a given social-cultural world. In a sense there are no neuroses or psychoses; there are only neurotics or psychotics. Campbell (1934, p. 174) has put the matter well in the following words:

"... The *personality* and the *psychosis* are not independent concepts: the psychosis is the personality; it is the individual in action. This may seem to conflict with the familiar fact that the behavior of the individual in a psychosis is often the very opposite of the behavior of the individual before the psychosis. The crude, infantile, erotic, egoistic, aggressive behavior of the patient may contrast with the official personality, self-effacing, modest, submissive. This official personality, however, represented merely those expressions which were allowed to be manifest and which were tolerable to the official consciousness of the individual; beneath the surface were repressed trends. The personality if adequately conceived represents the total system of forces, including both those conscious and expressed and those subconscious and repressed. The formulation of the personality must do justice to the behavior and utterances of the individual on week-day and on Sunday, in church and in saloon, at play and at work, at home and abroad, sober and intoxicated, sane and insane.

"In the analysis of the psychosis one may be able to follow step by step the transition from the condition of personal and social equilibrium to the condition of the psychosis. One may be able to see how the breaking point is reached through increasing tension or gradual relaxation of effort, through the stimulation of urges or the withdrawal of resources, through a physical ailment which disturbs the general equilibrium so that the normal adaptation can no longer be maintained."

Interaction within a social-cultural milieu. It should now be evident that from the point of view of social psychology we must consider the mentality and conduct of the neurotic and the psychotic in relation to their personal-social and cultural learning within a given framework of interaction with other persons. Such a standpoint, in fact, is gradually appearing in psychiatry itself. We owe a distinct debt to Freud for having stimulated this new approach. He indicated very early in his work the great importance of early training of the child, particularly in the family. But Freud himself never saw the limitations of his instinct theory or of his acceptance of a faulty thesis of cultural recapitulation, nor did he escape his own unconscious adherence to his particular culture. Although our debt to him is great, the present trend is toward the gradual *rapprochement* of psychiatry and psychoanalysis with social psychology and cultural anthropology.²

² There is a considerable literature indicating this *rapprochement*. Consult Rivers (1916), E. Jones (1924), Seligman (1924), Bartlett (1923), Lasswell (1930), Benedict (1932, 1934a, 1934b), Sapir (1932), Cooper (1934), R. E. L. Faris (1934b, 1939), Hallowell (1934, 1938), Mekeel (1935), Opler (1935), M. Mead (1936), Warner (1937), Maslow (1937b), Linton (1938), Ford (1939), Devereaux (1939c), Dollard *et al.* (1939), J. Gillin (1939), and Kardiner (1939). (*Footnote continued on next page*)

The following case, summarized from Dollard (1934, pp. 637-647), while not complete in details, affords a strikingly suggestive analysis from the social-psychological standpoint. It shows that the psychotic continues to respond to his culture and social order, and that, although he may reject the accepted and expected patterns and substitute his own, which others may consider bizarre, he is nevertheless trying to bring about some sort of adaptation.

The patient A. is a twenty-one-year-old male, the oldest of four living children (the second a girl, the last two boys). The father is engaged in business, and the financial circumstances are good. The parents had indulged in premarital intercourse, and the forced marriage a few months before A.'s birth was not desired by the father, who looked down on his wife's social status. The family lived in almost continuous conflict from the start, and there was a divorce six years before A. was committed to the mental hospital.

Without doubt the patient's breakdown was predicated upon a long series of thwartings and disappointments, arising chiefly from his milieu. The effects of these experiences may be detected, in part, by noting some of his remarks during his psychosis—remarks which did not make sense to the uninformed observer, but which, considered against the background of his previous life, did. One of his repeated comments was: "It makes me feel terrible that I have not had a nickname." From interviews a number of facts developed which make this statement intelligible. In school he did have a nickname, "Molasses," but it was most unpleasant to him, having been given him as a reaction to his intellectual retardation. What he really wanted was a nickname which would indicate group approval. Another determinant was his jealousy and envy of the brother who had been named after the father. He had a strong identification with his father and greatly resented his brother's advantage over him in having his father's name and for using the latter's nickname. In fact, when he first learned to write, A. often used his father's nickname as his own signature.

The last-named has attempted to use a modified Freudian psychology to interpret the varied personality manifestations among selected tribes of primitives. While Kardiner deals specifically with the topic of what he terms "the psychodynamics of primitive social organization," his discussion of neuroticism and normality against the background of culture constitutes a major contribution to the larger problem of the interplay of culture and personality. In his treatment he departs from the "party line" of the *echs* Freudian disciples, who still hold the view that culture is a product of the repression of fundamental instincts. His basic view is (1939, p. 17) "that the individual stands midway between institutions which mold and direct his adaptation to the outer world, and his biological needs, which press for gratification."

Such a standpoint gives a greater place to the interplay of institutions "in creating" the expected or permissible "adaptive systems" of the individual, a viewpoint not unlike that of this book. On the other hand, he fails to catch the full implication of the dynamics of social interaction in the rise and operation of the self which we have tried to stress, and he does not seem to reckon with the noncultural aspects of interaction which we have called personal-social conditioning. Nevertheless, his use of the "Freudian" mechanisms enables him to present in considerable detail many significant features in the gradual growth of the self or ego organization within the social-cultural milieu.

Kardiner's book is in part a joint enterprise, since Linton contributed most of the anthropological materials which Kardiner has so ably interpreted, as well as an important cultural view point. The volume is a tribute to the all too infrequent collaboration of two scholars approaching a common problem from two different intellectual disciplines.

Another frequent remark of the patient was: "I have a great feeling that I am the cause of storms." Such a comment might be easily put down as a nonsensical delusion; but it was discovered that at eleven years of age A. had suffered a great shock during an electric storm and for months had dreamed about the experience in terror. Moreover, there was some evidence that "being to blame for storms" had become entangled with the worry over his role in the family conflict situation. The experience with the storm had taken place about the time that A. had first discovered that his mother and father had been obliged to marry and that his true birthday was other than he had been told. This proved a great emotional shock to him and was clearly a factor in the development of his psychosis.

Two other comments of the patient are interesting. He often said, "Two mistakes count as one," and "I am alive to be punished for what I have done." When these remarks are linked to another, "The sin was masturbation and stealing from my mother's purse," the meaning of these otherwise trivial statements begins to be clear. One of A.'s most persistent problems was his autoerotic compulsion. He recalled the warnings of his mother about the dangers of autocroticism, an item confirmed by the mother herself. Also, he seemed full of guilt for having engaged in petty thefts of money from his mother. He had evidently equated these two experiences together, and was still reacting to anticipations of punishment.

During the collection of additional material on the case, it was found that just previous to the outbreak of his psychosis A. had spent four or five hours a day learning the poetry of Edgar Allan Poe. This did not seem to have any bearing on the case until it was discovered that Poe was also a favorite of his father's. When A. was four years of age, the father had begun teaching the boy to recite many of Poe's poems, and the father took great pride in A.'s ability to perform well. Perhaps his return to Poe was a device for again trying to please his father. In his disturbed periods A. constantly hallucinated the appearance of his father. Also, in the two years preceding the acute outbreak of the disorder, the patient had taken up a correspondence course in engineering at the father's suggestion. In fact, A. became so compulsive and anxious about his studies that he often refused to eat.

Related to this situation is another remark often repeated: "I thought I was standing higher up than I was." At the time his parents were divorced, his father had quarreled with him. A. had taken this to mean an almost complete rejection. The boy had been obliged to give up his plans to go to college—a plan which his father had earlier promised him—and to take up manual labor in order to support himself. The patient's tone of bitter frustration revealed the emotional importance to him of this enforced change in his life goal. (At the time of the break with his father, however, there had been little or no emotional outburst.)

In the course of psychiatric examination the patient also explained that he believed the whole difficulty arose from the family situation, though he blamed himself for his breakdown. When asked, "What are you in this world for?" he replied, "It is an old sad story of the person that would like to have been a better boy. Given such a high step he couldn't jump to reach it. I believe that what I have gone through was rather painful." Again at first sight this all sounds irrelevant, but, when it is realized that what he was really explaining was how he got into his present state, the answer does make sense. The world had been too much for him; he had failed; and now he blamed himself. That he had considerable insight into himself and into his previous difficult

environment is shown in the following statement: "I feel I ought to start over growing up again and see if I can grow up right the next time."

There are many other apparently senseless remarks which take on sound meaning when analyzed against the background of his experience. Thus his constant query to the nurses and attendants, "Can't you trust me?"—repeated without any regard to the immediate situation—takes on some significance when it is found that this is the very remark he made to his father on an emotionalized occasion when the latter had accused him of seeing his mother on the sly after the divorce. The family members had been definitely split into two opposing camps, and his father had expected the patient to stand by him. As a matter of fact, the father had used, among other things, this argument of his disloyalty for disowning him. To quote Dollard, "The phrase may, therefore, carry a considerable part of the affect of this past tormenting situation and be evoked again in trifling circumstances that suggest the old situation." Another item—ironical in character—appeared when he was asked what the date was. He replied that the newspapers said that particular day was June 10, 1929, but that to him it was April 1, "and it's been that way for a long time." By this symbolic use of April Fool's Day he conveyed the idea that fate had played him a grim joke.

The details of this case indicate clearly the necessity of taking into account the social and cultural background of the individual if we are to understand him as one who is making, through the psychosis, an attempt to strike a balance between his inner life and the demands of society. Thus trivial and apparently meaningless remarks become significant when their sources are uncovered. In like manner also, the more autistic gestures, drawings, and verbalisms of the schizophrenic may be used as a means of comprehending his motivations and mechanisms of thought. (See Prinzhorn, 1923.)

The importance of considering social and cultural factors in getting at the genesis of mental breakdown is very well demonstrated in M. Sherman's survey of the social backgrounds of 500 white patients from a selected group of mental hospitals, half of whom were between the ages of seventeen and twenty-one years. The social backgrounds of 300 Negro patients were also studied. The data from hospital records were supplemented by conferences with relatives and intimate friends of the patients. The chief items selected for study were age, sex, nativity, race, residence, economic status, religious affiliation, and education. The following summary is drawn from Sherman's report (1935):

(1) *Age* was shown to be a differential with reference to the object of delusion. The younger patients more frequently showed delusions regarding money, education, and literary attainment.

(2) *Sex* is an important differential in somatic delusions, with eight times as many women as men experiencing this type of delusion. The object of delusion also varies with sex. To a far greater extent than men, women patients reveal delusions of money and of religion.

(3) *Nativity* influences the object of delusion. Foreign-born patients suffer from de-

lusions of money more frequently than do natives. Northern-born Negroes experience delusions regarding professional status, while among their southern-born brothers delusions about money and religion are much more common.

(4) *Race* (which is largely cultural in effect) is a differential, bearing on the object of delusion. The Negro frequently has grandiose ideas about educational and literary attainments, while white patients seldom show these symptoms. Racial background also seems to influence the relation of sex to delusions. Whereas white women, as indicated already, greatly exceed white men in experiencing somatic delusions, the ratios for colored men and colored women approximate each other closely. But Sherman points out that hospitalization itself is related to race, since Negroes are present from all economic levels, while the whites come almost entirely from the lower economic strata, at least in the sample which he investigated.

(5) Even the legal *residence* of patients is a differential of importance. The rates of insanity in a given community or part of a community vary according to conditions therein. It is interesting to note that areas of high frequency in insanity coincide with areas of high incidence of juvenile delinquency, illegitimacy, charity cases, and other indices of community disorganization. (See R.E.L. Faris and Dunham, 1939.)

(6) *Economic status* is apparently closely related to paranoid tendencies. The lower the economic level the higher the incidence of such symptoms. Economic level is also related to delusions. The lower the economic status the fewer the delusions, especially those pertaining to money.

(7) *Religious affiliation* is correlated with religious hallucinations. In the Protestant group, 57 per cent of the church members show religious hallucinations. The corresponding percentage for the Catholics is 27; for the Jews, 3.

(8) The greater the amount of *education* the more frequent and more grandiose are the illusions.

It is apparent from this survey that any study of the present adaptive patterns of the insane must, to be properly understood, be related to the social and cultural backgrounds from which the patients come. Sherman, in concluding his report of this survey, comments (1935, p. 3):

"The general conclusion of the study is that social background bears a significant relation to symptomatology, the latter reflecting frustrations of attempts to gain that which carries high prestige value in the individual's social, *milieu*. Certain clues are thus suggested for treatment: (1) a change in the culture of the community so that the unattainable does not become the criterion of success; and (2) a shift in educational procedure whereby the developing child is taught to meet frustrations successfully and shielded from such unattainable ideals of success as that embodied in the common myth that every boy may become President of the United States."

Limitations of traditional neurotic and psychotic classifications. In the previous chapter we reviewed the traditional medical concepts of the neuroses and psychoses. But, as psychiatrists and clinicians have come to view their cases as persons who are attempting some kind of adaptation to their world, it has become increasingly evident that the older categories of mental disorganization are limited in their usefulness for diagnosis and

treatment. Certainly, to label a person as a neurasthenic or as a schizophrenic is not to describe or explain the manner in which he arrived at that state.

In this connection there is also the exasperatingly difficult task of attempting to relate the neuroses to the psychoses. In fact, some contend that little effort should be made to equate the milder symptoms of the neurotic to those of the psychotic. It is quite evident that the majority of neurotics do not become more seriously disordered in the course of time. Clearly, most of them, having made a certain form of adaptation, continue to operate at that level. Yet in many features there are striking similarities. Thus some neurasthenic symptoms resemble those of melancholia and depression in the psychotic, and hysterical "attacks" simulate the manic stages of the circular disorders, or are like the "fits" of the epileptic. Unfortunately we lack sufficient data regarding the prepsychotic behavior of the more serious disorders. When we have more facts, we shall doubtless be in a position to trace in the individual life history the preliminary stages of mental disorganization. Fortunately, however, certain studies have thrown some light on the problem before us. It is apparent from these investigations that persons vary greatly along a scale of adaptation, and in the process of adjustment individual differences in constitution and in earlier adaptation must be recognized. The neurotic and the psychotic are not a species distinct from ourselves. In one sense, the patients in mental hospitals and sanatoria are just like ourselves *only more so*. That is, they represent forms of adjustment not unlike those of normal persons, except in terms of cultural acceptances and in terms of effectiveness in that balance between the inner and the outer orientation of the self which makes for acceptable participation in society. These variations rest, then, upon the meaning which persons give to their experiences in social life. And as we have emphasized throughout this book, these meanings are a social-cultural product,—the outcome of the individual's response to acceptable and expected forms of thought and action laid down by others.³ (See Chapter X.)

The overlapping of symptoms in various classes of mental disorder is well known to every clinician, who has long recognized certain "mixed types" involving features of both. The so-called "pure types" of mental disorder are perhaps less frequent than we imagine. This is evident in the two major classes of functional psychosis: the schizophrenics and the circulars. Thus catatonic excitement has much in common with the manic phase of the affective or manic-depressive psychosis. And often the de-

³ This is another reason for objecting to Shaffer's (1936) discussion of the neuroses as "personal non-adjustive reactions." The neurotic's conduct is adjustive within the framework of his own definitions, and, even if it falls somewhat outside the expectancies and acceptances of a particular culture, there is nevertheless much of his behavior which is fully within the cultural frame of reference. (See Chapter X.)

pressive episode resembles at least superficially the quiescence of some of the dementia praecox cases. It is easy to assume, too, that dementia praecox represents the "shut-in" type of personality, while the manic-depressives do not. But the schizophrenics do not always appear so. (See below.) Yet there are certain broad differences in the prepsychotic mentality and behavior of these two groups of psychotics. This fact is brought out by the study of Bowman (1934) of 322 cases of mental disease diagnosed chiefly as schizophrenic and manic-depressive psychoses. (After eliminating cases wherein the diagnosis was not clear, there remained 125 schizophrenics and 73 manic-depressives.) Forty personality traits were coded, and the frequency of these traits was tabulated according to the diagnosis given in the record. A group of 96 women social workers were likewise rated and coded on this same list of traits. They served as a control group.⁴ Bowman (1934, pp. 208-209) thus summarizes the prepsychotic characteristics of the patients in relation to their later disorders:

"The schizophrenic tends to be a model child, to have few friends, to indulge in solitary amusements, to be a follower, to feel superior, to be close-mouthed and uncommunicative. As a child, he is not oversensitive and daydreams less than the normal. He smokes and drinks less. He is less continent sexually but his sex life is less harmonious. As he grows up he becomes more seclusive, has fewer friends, becomes more uncommunicative, utilizes humor less, becomes much more sensitive as compared with the normal since he does not lose his childish sensitivity. There is an increase in his tendency to daydreaming so that it equals that of the normal. He shows less sportsmanship.

"The affective group [manic-depressives] as compared with the normal tends to be a model child, he has sometimes more, sometimes fewer friends, he tends to be a leader, considers himself superior, is less frank and communicative, is extremely sympathetic, daydreams less and is less absentminded. He shows less sportsmanship. He tends to show more initiative, to be more ambitious and a more valuable worker. He smokes and drinks less. He usually is less continent sexually and has a less harmonious sex life. As he grows up, he indulges more in recreations with others, becomes less self-assertive, a little more jealous, has a greater energy output. Although no more sensitive as a child, he preserves his childish sensitivity and hence becomes more sensitive than the normal.

"As compared with the schizophrenic instead of the normal, the affective group shows the same percentage of model children, has more friends, indulges more in recreation with others, tends to be a leader, shows no difference in self-estimate or in ability to bear pain well. He is very much more sympathetic. There is no difference in sensitivity during childhood; in adult life there is possibly a little less sensitivity. He

⁴ There are many obvious objections from a statistical standpoint to be raised regarding Bowman's investigation, but it does represent an important step in the direction of securing statistical data on the genetic—that is, historical—foundations of mental disorders. It is especially unfortunate that his "control" group was so highly selected as to sex, occupation, and background. (See Chapter XI.)

daydreams less and is less absentminded. There is a greater energy output, a little more initiative, a little more ambition and a slightly higher work ability. Habits of smoking and drinking are similar and the sex life shows nothing of significance.

"Since it has been pointed out that certain changes do occur in the pre-psychotic personality during the change from childhood to adult life, the question may well be asked if such a change is not the actual beginning of mental disease. Kraepelin has raised this same question without attempting to answer it. It does not seem that we can answer it but it does appear to us important and worth further study. Since we have found that certain traits such as sensitivity are about the same in the pre-psychotic personality and in the normal during childhood but with a marked change occurring in adult life, it may well be that functional psychoses start with a slow, insidious personality change which continues for years and which is an integral part of the psychosis. It is also possible that many descriptions of pre-psychotic personality are based on the individuals' reactions at this period and are really a description of the early symptoms of the psychosis rather than of the pre-psychotic personality."

In another study, made at the Danvers State Hospital, Bonner (1931) attempted to discover the more immediate social and psychological backgrounds in a sample of 100 manic-depressives, 63 women and 37 men. In addition to using the hospital records, he interviewed members of most of the patients' families for additional information. The records indicated "strongly positive" hereditary factors in 30 cases, and "mildly positive" hereditary evidence in 20 others. The author also believes that this sample confirms the usual contention that women are more liable to this disorder than men, and that heredity is a definitely important predisposing factor. While no immediate psychogenic factor could be discovered for 17 cases, for the 83 remaining the author found that 154 items of psychogenic sort were significant. In classifying these he attempted to discover what appeared to be the primary precipitating factor in each instance. His findings may be summarized as follows:

Twenty-five cases indicated that friction or family discord was the principal predisposing situation; 15 cases showed it to be reaction to financial difficulties; 16 to be serious anxiety for some member of the family; 9 to be a recent death in the family. In 6 cases the immediate factor was disappointment in love; in 7 others it was some "severe emotional stress from other cause"; and in 5 it was listed as "undue reaction to unavoidable situation."

Most of the 83 cases were in middle life, the average age being forty-five years. In some instances the onset was marked by a manic attack; in others it took the form of a depressive episode. Of the 25 cases in which domestic discord was given as the chief factor, 21 were in a manic phase at the time of admission. In contrast, of the 15 who had severe financial troubles, 13 had lost money in the stock market or were unemployed. Of these latter, 11 were in a depressive state at the time of admission. Of the 16 who suffered intense anxieties, all but two were depressed. In the other classifications, the number in each group was about equal.

Another study was made by Witmer and her students (1934) in which the records of forty manic-depressive and sixty-eight dementia praecox patients from five hospitals were examined. The data were collected by questionnaires and from interviews, from the patients and from relatives and others. (With few exceptions, at least four persons were interviewed regarding each case.) The chief findings may be summarized as follows:

The purpose of this study was to discover if functional psychoses occur "chiefly in individuals whose personality is different from that considered normal and who grew up under unusually irritating or handicapping emotional conditions." There was no nonpsychotic control group, but the manic-depressives were compared with the schizophrenics. On the theory that the former conditioning is predetermined chiefly by heredity, it was hoped that the study might show if there were differentiating factors in the prepsychotic periods of these two groups.

Comparisons of the questionnaire ratings showed that two thirds of the patients of both classifications "were considered to have been unusually sensitive and close-mouthed both as children and as adolescents." Half of them were rated as average in flexibility, mood, temper, and obedience. "Important differences between the two groups were found in the traits: output of energy, reaction in the social group, number of friends, and type of recreation, a larger proportion of manic-depressives being outgoing in these respects, and in absentmindedness, which characterized a larger proportion of the dementia praecox patients." In the other traits there were no differences in the two groups, but on the whole the schizophrenics were "markedly introverted" while the manic-depressives were more out-going and emotional. Regarding typology, from one third to one half of the patients in each group "conformed to the classical descriptions of the corresponding prepsychotic personality types." On the other hand, one third of those in the affective group had traits traditionally linked to schizophrenia.

The family relations of between one third and two thirds of the two groups were rated as harmonious and "close-knit." One fourth, on the other hand, came from families with marked friction. As the authors remark, however, it may be that children in such harmonious homes may have been "over-protected." Certainly, too, in one third of these the mother was the dominant spouse and the father weak and passive. On the whole, these family situations might be called easygoing though occasionally trying. (For other studies see Irons, 1935; Myers and Witmer, 1937; Page, Landis, and Katz, 1934; and Amsden, 1928.)

These statistical reports confirm the need of uncovering the cultural and psychological factors which lie behind the final breakdown of the psychotics. Without this knowledge it is difficult to develop either a consistent theory or a satisfactory therapy. In this connection the study of milder disorders has been of great help. The success of psychiatry, especially of psychoanalysis, in dealing with neurotics has greatly influenced the standpoint and approach of the workers with the more serious disorders. But the probability of recovery from the functional psychoses is none too high. Traditional treatises on these diseases indicate that about

three quarters of the cases of manic-depressive psychosis recover, although there is a high percentage of recurrence. On the other hand, estimates on recovery from dementia praecox range from 18 to 25 per cent. There are some writers, in fact, who give the impression that the "true" schizophrenics are incurable, but such an extreme position is hardly tenable in light of the available evidence. Yet recoverability from dementia praecox does seem related to certain factors, especially to age and to the nature of the onset. (See Sullivan, 1931, for a report showing a 60 per cent recovery for a sample of schizophrenics whose disorder had developed rather rapidly.)

It is clear that our whole conception of mental disease is bound up with our definition of symptoms and our classifications of syndromes which have been used for describing and dealing with them. It is only when persons become burdens to their families, employers, or the community that psychiatrists and clinical psychologists begin to put labels on them and to classify them into the traditional categories of disorder.

Strecker (1931), in a study of recoveries from dementia praecox, has admirably shown the need for sympathetic understanding and friendly interaction in aiding patients to return to normality. The following summary of data from one of twenty-five cases which had been followed up over several years reveals the place of social and cultural factors in the onset and also in the recovery.

C.A., the patient, was a native single woman of twenty-nine years, of apparently sound family stock. The case record reported that the maternal grandfather and one maternal uncle were "alcoholic," but this is little indication of any defective strain. Her mother, though deaf, was well balanced. Her father was quick, clever, but inclined to be "nervous." Her three brothers and one sister were entirely normal and well adjusted.

The patient was quiet and not unsocial and in general good health. Her personal characteristics seemed chiefly the result of environmental factors. She had done only fair work in the elementary school and had got the equivalent to a high-school education largely through self-teaching. For a time she had tried to do private tutoring but had failed to make good. When she later took up work as a saleswoman, she was thoroughly ashamed of her low social status and developed a marked sense of inferiority toward her more successful sister and brothers. The intensity of her emotional response in these matters is symbolized in her complaint during the height of her psychosis: "I didn't want to sell stockings."

The onset of the disorder was insidious, lasting at least two and a half years. During this time she tried to improve her mind by "deep reading" and she constantly strove against a situation which she said "caged" her in. But her aspirations were frustrated. Two particular events seemed to have driven her more deeply into herself. The first was the death of her father and her consequent grief. Two years later the passing of her favorite minister set up in her emotional reactions "out of all proportion" to the situation. During the year preceding her commitment she became increasingly de-

pressed, taciturn, and forgetful, lost interest in her surroundings (though she continued to work), sought solitude, and began to show incoherence in her letters. Finally the depression was augmented, crying spells developed, and she developed some hebephrenic features of silliness. She developed ideas of self-blame and personal unworthiness, and showed some somatic symptoms, such as "coldness in the body," which she feared she would transmit to her family.

The actual psychosis was of a mixed type. Along with a restriction of consciousness went persistent self-accusation, which involved a firm belief that she had telepathic powers which, against her will, led her to harm others. But she showed the usual schizophrenic loss of emotional responsiveness. She said there was "no emotion left."

Her recovery was rapid, and after a period of thirteen years there has been no recurrence. She was placed in a fortunate social situation where she found sympathy and congeniality. A year after her release she had graduated from a course in home management at the Pratt Institute and found a suitable position. In a long letter which she wrote to her physician she pointed out many of the factors which aided in her recovery and in the establishment of what McDougall called the "self-regarding sentiment." The following paragraph from this letter describing her contacts while attending school indicates how she established a satisfying role and status (1931, p. 160):

"The Institute has no dormitories and as a consequence, all the houses in the vicinity, most of them at least, are filled with roomers or boarders. I am a roomer here, with three other girls, the mother of one of them, a school teacher, and another woman. Our two maiden landladies take a kindly interest in their 'family' and the place is quite homelike in its atmosphere. They tell me I just fit into the place of a former student in my course, of whom they became very fond. The young Art student rooming next to me says she has adopted me as a sister and some of my classmates are glad to come to my room or to invite me to theirs for help in their studies. They think I know a great deal. In fact, I am tutoring one of them. I was one of four out of forty who passed the preliminary examination in arithmetic. The results were not made known for three or four weeks, when we were somewhat acquainted, and I received a real ovation from the class when it was known that I had passed. I have gained a reputation of having Chemistry before, which I never did, and have received notice from two of the best educated women in our division, of twenty students, that I must never again dare answer correctly a question that has passed them, on penalty of meeting them some dark night!"

While this case illustrates the common difficulty of placing patients in the traditional categories, since her condition represented some features of affective as well as of schizophrenic disorder, the most striking features are her struggles against a great sense of inferiority about status and intellectual incompetence, and a disgust with an occupation which was unpleasant. Also, the importance of sympathetic interaction with others is well demonstrated. This individual, bruised in self-esteem by situations which she could not handle, finds her recovery in a primary-group situation among friends and acquaintances who give her every opportunity for success rather than failure. In G. H. Mead's terms, she was able to build up a set of roles or "me's" which gave rise in time to a gen-

eralized other quite unlike the former one, which had been marked by a deep sense of inadequacy and incompetence. (For accounts of recovery from psychoses, see Beers, 1907; Hillyer, 1926; "Inmate Ward 8," 1932.)

THE PSYCHOSES AS FORMS OF ADAPTATION

At this juncture we may conveniently restate our standpoint in regard to the neuroses and psychoses. For our purposes we must take into account the following matters: (1) The effect of constitutional factors must be recognized. Variability in neurological make-up and in endocrine functioning is doubtless of great importance. So, too, are individual differences in strength of drives and sensory-perceptual capacities. These result from hereditary predispositions, from embryonic and fetal growth, and from the profoundly important conditioning of the early months and years of life. (2) But, no matter what particular predisposition to activity the organism possesses, the patient is to be understood always with reference to his material and social-cultural environment. (3) As to the form of adaptation which he makes, we must take into account (a) the early personal-social adaptation in the pleasant intimacies or antagonisms of the child-mother, child-father, and child-sibling relations; (b) the early cultural conditioning, especially to moral demands and disciplinary routines—the rise of the superego—held essential for continuity of the group, both familial and others; (c) the manner in which the individual meets particularly difficult situations or crises—whether, for instance, he tends to retain infantile patterns, or to develop the culturally accepted forms of adjustment; and (d) the more immediate precipitating factors or social-cultural situations in which the breakdown itself occurs. (In relation to crises, of course, constitutional factors will loom large in many instances, particularly in the organic psychoses.)

Obviously, one might adopt a variety of approaches to the problem of personal adaptation. This might be put in terms of behavior at the physiological level, involving the distribution of energy into various outlets determined by constitution, as modified, of course, by experience. It might be considered in terms of the manner in which the libidinous and ego impulses of the individual find expression, as in the Freudian interpretation.⁵ But we prefer to place the discussion within a social-psycho-

⁵ The psychoanalytic interpretation of various classical forms of neuroses and psychoses is most suggestive. Thus the Freudian considers hysteria as a form of conversion neurosis in terms of childhood fears of castration, neurasthenia as representing maladjustments of sexual intercourse, dementia praecox as a regression to an early "oral" stage of libido fixation with an aim of retreat even to intrauterine life, the cyclic psychosis as a regression to a late "oral" stage with marked anxiety and guilt, and paranoia as a regression to a late anal stage, perhaps with strong but repressed homosexuality expressing itself in narcissism. But, since so much of this interpretation is still a matter of controversy, and since there is still a striking failure to take the cultural factors into account, we shall not attempt here to present the psychoanalytic viewpoint on neurotic and psychotic forms of adaptation. (For an excellent

logical and cultural framework, though obviously we shall not neglect the organic factors or Freud's contribution.

The relation of inner and outer life in functional psychoses. From our standpoint we may consider the problem of adjustment in relation to the manner in which the individual correlates his inner life with his overt conduct. We have already indicated that there is always a dual orientation in behavior: one toward the inner, the so-called subjective, organization, and the other toward the outer or overt conduct toward other persons or things. We have also seen that the inner life itself is a combination or synthesis of physiological or original impulses, wants, needs, desires, wishes—call them what you will—which set off cycles of activity and the various desires and forms of adaptation and of satisfaction which have been learned in the course of experience. It is also apparent that the inner organization grows and changes in terms of overt activity—that is, that the quality of the interaction with others is an essential item in an adequate adaptation. It is in this manner that social and cultural forces operate.

This relation of the inner and the outer life depends upon social and cultural definitions. The central problem of personal adjustment is, in fact, a matter of the correspondence of the inside life with the expectancies of those outside us which we have learned to manage in terms of ideas, traits, attitudes, and habits. That is, the normal person, as we define him, is one whose inner life, at least as it expresses itself overtly, corresponds roughly to what others anticipate of him. Any person whom others call "normal" may have and does have numberless wishes, impulses, daydreams, ideas, and attitudes that do not agree or coincide with those of others—that is, his private world; but, so long as these remain inside him, or are not overtly manifest in culturally disapproved fashion, he is not considered pathological or abnormal.⁶ And our culture in its religious, artistic, and recreational aspects—to mention three only—does permit at least sublimated forms of many otherwise abnormal inner desires to find approved expression.

When the incipient or overt action of the individual is defined as bad or evil or pathological, it is blocked or inhibited and the individual must make some other sort of response. Now this substitute response may take a variety of forms—for example, retiring from overt interaction with others—that is, may be repressed or suppressed and may manifest itself only

survey of the whole relation of psychoanalysis to the study of the psychoses, see Rickman, 1926, 1927; also Alexander, 1930; Hendrick, 1939; and Horney, 1937.)

⁶ This whole matter is illustrated in the following incident. A physician during a clinical demonstration of psychotic patients once remarked to a schizophrenic, "John, so long as you just imagined that this girl [a person who was the focus of a most elaborate set of delusions or fantasies] was in love with you, you were all right. But the minute you *acted* on those beliefs, than you were crazy." (From the author's notes taken at the Mendota State Hospital, 1930.)

in dreams, fantasies, or somatic symptoms. It may take the form of more complete identification with others, as in the heightened attachment to a parent or a parent-substitute, such as a religious or political leader. Or it may take an aggressive turn of violent reaction to the threatened blocking of response by others, illustrated in direct physical or verbal attack on another, or in violent revolt against some form of institutionalized authority like the state.

Thus out of a welter of such specific experiences, the individual comes to develop certain somewhat standard or habitual forms of reaction—the “generalized other” of G. H. Mead or the “character” in the Freudian sense. Moreover, there are apparently stages or levels in this standardization. Thus in infancy and early childhood the retirement into fantasy life may provide at least a working relation with the world around, but later, this failing, the individual may develop another pattern or level of response. Or the aggressive, temper-tantrum sort of adjustment at home may not “work” in the kindergarten or school, and in these latter environments the child acquires some other device for getting his satisfactions. But on the whole we believe that the fundamental patterns and levels of adaptation are determined in the early years. It is upon this evidence that the hypothesis or theory of personality types is built. (See Chapter XIII.)

The functional psychoses in our social-cultural milieu. With this review of our standpoint in mind, then, let us look at the functional psychoses especially, to see if there are any general features which distinguish them from each other. In other words, do these psychoses represent or reveal certain fundamental types of adaptation? In considering these matters we shall bear in mind the importance of the social and cultural as well as constitutional factors.

In schizophrenia, delusions are considered an important feature. In some instances they tend to be highly systematized, especially in paranoid dementia praecox. A delusion is frankly a cultural definition of someone else’s belief. We so label the beliefs of the psychotic because they do not correspond to those generally accepted by others around him. If a patient in our society believes in devils, we call him insane, but other societies have had similar beliefs and certainly did not consider themselves pathological for doing so. (See Chapter XXVII.) It is largely a matter of consensus. If a schizoid religious leader convinced his followers that the moon was made of green cheese, it would be so considered, all the astronomers of another era or society to the contrary.

In the affective (circular) psychoses delusions seldom have any such elaborate inner organization behind them as in the paranoid or schizophrenic cases; but they may take the form of a sense of guilt, or may

serve as the foundation for revenge upon someone for an imagined or real wrong, as in the following example.

Case of Albert O., sixty years of age. In a manic phase at the onset of his second breakdown as a manic-depressive, Albert broke up a picture of his father and a group of professional associates. His father had long been an object of a certain jealousy and envy and was the basis of the son's sense of inferiority. To Albert, in fact, the house in which he lived, filled as it was with furniture, pictures, and valuable household objects of his prominent father, was a sort of prison; and in his maniacal attack he set out to destroy the objects which symbolized to him his enthrallment to his father as a superior—a man for whom consciously he had great love and admiration.

In this episode a strong but suppressed antagonism to his wife was also apparent. She was his wife by a second marriage, the first marriage having been broken by the unfaithfulness of the wife. But through all the years he had remained really in love with his former wife. He had always believed that his second wife had married him largely to gain the wealth and social prestige accruing to the son of a prominent father, so that in his violence he was not only attacking his father, but also taking revenge on his present wife, who valued the family antiques as material evidence of her status.

The emotional responses of the psychotics, then, are to be defined as aberrant because they are not understood by others. These persons often reveal forms of impulsive reactions to crises which we consider infantile and ineffective. The inner foundations of these, what they are trying to express, escape us. Yet the violence of the manic doubtless has a meaning for him, and in one sense any normal person in a state of great anger is reacting not unlike those whom we see in states of mania and excitement. On the contrary, the apparent apathy or lack of emotional expression in the schizophrenic is considered to be evidence of the lack of the normal interrelation of the emotional and the intellectual processes. But the lack of such an emotion is often itself a form of adaptation, perhaps a dissociation developed to prevent painful memories or painful acts.

We must look upon the conduct of the psychotic as activity which to him has a reason or cause, no matter how absurd it appears to us. Even the silliness of the hebephrenic, his stereotyped manual gestures, his postural tensions, his fantastic verbiage, do have significance for him though not for us. Hence the mutterings, the autistic language, of the psychotic might serve as clues to his inner life, if we could only develop some means of communication with him. (See the case of A., p. 754, for illustrations of possible meanings to be placed upon apparently nonsensical expressions made in the height of a psychotic state.)

A good deal has been written about the "shut-in" personality in schizophrenia. Some writers, in fact, have considered this the central symptom of dementia praecox, but clinical and statistical studies show that this characteristic is not confined to this disorder. (See above.) The "shut-in"

characteristics really result from a long period of isolation from communication and other overt contact with others. In one sense all psychotics are isolated from their fellows, some in more extreme fashion than others. This shut-in feature, moreover, can scarcely be considered as due to some innate constitutional defect. Innumerable clinical and statistical reports show that many schizophrenics were at one time sociable and fond of companionship.

As R. E. L. Faris (1934a) remarks, the seclusiveness of the dementia praecox patient is usually the result of a long period of struggle against enforced isolation which in the end is resolved by accepting his solitude. The effect of this isolation, this loss of normal interaction with others, becomes in time evident in the individual's unconventional and aberrant conduct. Such a condition involves an "indifference to communication," a failure to participate with others in the expected life around them. This departure from the norms of conduct means that the order and control which cultural forms of interaction impose on the person are dissipated. It is not that the dementia praecox patient lacks any mental organization but that it so deviates from the conventional and accepted organization of other minds that contact or communication is impossible.

The inner life of the seclusive individual is likely to be elaborated at the expense of contact with others outside. The self continues to be fed and built up from imaginary roles, from relations with imaginary characters who frequently symbolize some real person in the patient's past life. In contrast, in normal people the self is always kept under control by communication and other forms of obligatory interaction with those around them. The "I," as G. H. Mead says, is normally altered by the socialized "me's" that are taken up from around us, and out of this a healthy self is born and kept alive. In the schizophrenic person, however, the self gets fed from repressed wishes and from the more primitive, biological roots of the "I." The "me's" that are introduced are modified not by the character of another self or individual, but by those which are invented to suit or to satisfy the primitive impulses. Here truly, if anywhere, the wish is father to the thought. In time the orientation becomes so distinctly inward that the outward relationship is almost completely lost. In other words, the schizophrenic has a social world, but it exists inside him and does not correspond with that of the persons around him. There is a kind of intrainjection of the self into these imagined selves until a whole inner social world may arise with no relation to the outside. And then the individual, if he responds to the outside by overt movement, or if he communicates through speech, writing, or graphic method, acts *as if* this inner world were actually the only one in existence. Such confusion of private fantasy with the reality accepted by others as normal is a common feature of early childhood. (See Piaget, 1926.) In the schizo-

phrenic it represents a phase of regression. Not that the latter becomes a child again, but his mental life and behavior do take on many infantile characteristics.

Faris and Dunham (1939) have examined the incidence of dementia praecox and certain other psychoses against the background of nationality and other minority-group cultures, population mobility, and other environmental factors. They demonstrate the place of isolation and lack of primary-group communication in furnishing the social-cultural settings for the occurrence of schizophrenia in certain large urban communities. Except for cases of catatonia they found high rates of schizophrenia to be related to areas of high population mobility and in a lesser way to neighborhoods composed largely of the foreign-born and Negroes.

In contrast, the manic-depressive, while he may have delusions and fantasies, is much more likely to try to solve his inner problems by some sort of overt gesture toward the outside or by some sort of flight into the reality of others, as he understands it. It is not that the manic-depressive does not have an inner life; it is not that he does not worry or fret or have a sense of guilt; but apparently his orientation is outward. In the manic stage this is apparent in overt conduct. In the depressive stage it is perhaps not so obvious, but his thoughts and feelings, often dominated by a sense of guilt and shame and a desire for atonement, tend on the whole to be directed to the problem of adaptation with those around him—though obviously his interpretation of his role and status in relation to others may not correspond to what others believe about these matters.

There is finally the problem of mental conflict and the psychoses. The importance of mental conflicts among neurotics, especially the psychasthenics and neurasthenics, is evident. In the schizophrenics there is often a long struggle to make some sort of adequate adjustment to a situation which is defined by the individual or by others as difficult. (See Strecker's case, pp. 762-763.) The appearance of schizoid cases among primitive peoples who have been exposed to white culture is another instance of conflict. (See Chapter XXVII.) In the manic-depressive conflicting emotions play an important part. The self-pity, the sense of guilt which troubles the patient, the feeling that blame should rest upon one's own shoulders—these symptoms often reflect long periods of worry and conflict over role and status, and over capacity to gain ends or goals which seem important. (The Bonner study cited on p. 760 showed that conflict and friction were precipitating causes in at least one quarter of the manic-depressive cases in his sample. Moreover, mental conflicts and worries doubtless entered into the situation among patients classified under other categories, such as loss of money or employment.)

In a broad sense the schizophrenic symptoms are correlated in a general

pattern which resembles the introverted type of personality described by Jung and others. The manic-depressives, in contrast, resemble in a general way the extroverted type. But at best these are very general likenesses, and, as we have already seen, considerable doubt has been thrown upon attempts to divide all personalities into two classes, assuming for the moment that the concept of type is valid. Certainly, other psychotics reveal other forms of life organization; hence easy generalizations as to type behavior are fraught with difficulties. (See Chapter XIII.)

But, the matter of types aside, in dealing with both neurotics and functional psychotics we must always bear in mind social and cultural factors. Only when we view these individuals as members of social groups with certain habits, attitudes, and ideas acquired from cultural and personal-social conditioning shall we be in a position to understand and hence to control their behavior. To consider the neurotic or the functional psychotic as the victim of some mythical disease entity without regard to the meaning of the attendant manifestations is to neglect the very standpoint which seems most fruitful in our approach to their personality problems. Until psychiatry and abnormal psychology recognize this, we shall be limited in the development of more adequate means of preventing these disorders or of dealing with them once they have arisen.

The organic psychoses and limitations of social-psychological factors. We have already pointed out that, when we consider those who suffer from organic breakdowns, we are obliged to reckon with the effects of profound internal physiological and neurological changes upon the personality. These are of such a character as not only to influence the reception of new stimuli, but also to affect the depositions of past experience (the apperceptive mass, the engrams, or however we may term these modifications) and finally to influence motor or overt activity. As we put the matter in a previous section, in the neuroses and functional psychoses the effects of social-cultural learning still operate largely within the constitutional limits of fixity and flexibility, whereas in the organic psychoses the matter is more or less reversed. That is, in the latter, the effects of disease on the organism are such as to reduce, greatly distort, or even destroy the influence of previous learning. Thus the life organization is temporarily or permanently altered, many roles disappear, and in particular in many cases the "generalized other" concerned with moral conduct (what Freud calls the superego) tends to break down or disappear altogether.

Since the concept *organic psychosis* is a catch-all for a wide variety of disorders, in order to do justice to the personality modifications one should treat each subclass separately. Since any extended discussion of the wide variety of such disorders would carry us too far afield, we shall comment but briefly on a few of the particular disorders.

sive fantasies about sex, or inadequate sexual attitudes and habits. One of the commonest examples of mild neurasthenia is seen in adolescent and other young persons who develop a host of worries and a distinct sense of guilt from the habit of masturbation. Popular superstition about autoerotic practices, such notions as the loss of manhood or of the likelihood of becoming feeble-minded from overindulgence, and the belief in the sinfulness of such acts lay the groundwork for serious anxieties.

Neurasthenic patterns. The symptoms of neurasthenia, chiefly fatigue, imaginary bodily ailments, digestive disorders, general nervousness, insomnia, and hypochondria, in the more severe cases, all illustrate a *social* orientation on the part of the patient. In other words, excessive self-reference with its talk of symptoms—illustrated in the person who continually tells his acquaintances about his sleeplessness, his lassitude, his aches, pains, and operations—reveals a strong craving for attention from others. This attention serves as a means of bolstering up a weakened sense of self, of supporting a feeble self-esteem. These persons frequently have a distinctive sense of inferiority in their social adjustments. The symptoms are external evidences of a lowered form of adaptation—lowered in part because others do not readily accept the patient's definition of his position. He tries, in other words, to secure some measure of security in his social world by arousing sympathy and care from others. There are numberless instances of whole families who have had to build their lives around the whims and neurotic demands of a parent or child who has come to exploit others in order to remain secure. This is obviously not a normal adaptation; yet it is not sufficiently divergent, in most cases, to demand special hospital care. But these individuals, when possessed of sufficient wealth, crowd our sanatoria and health resorts, where they continue to seek the return of their vigor, without, of course, really wanting to get well. The cultural setting of neurasthenia is witnessed by the fact that it is apparently closely correlated with the good economic status and availability of leisure found in our middle and upper bourgeois classes. In fact, in the last quarter of the nineteenth century it became something of a fad among the wealthiest classes, which led Europeans to refer to it as "the American disease" (Rosanoff, 1938). Neurasthenia well illustrates the interplay of psychological and constitutional features. For example, W. A. White (1925) points out that idleness rather than overwork often produces fatigability and other neurasthenic symptoms. Overattention to oneself, excessive care in preserving one's strength, or anxiety about any sort of strain may easily lead to fixed ideas about health, and in the end bring about a diminution of that physical activity which is necessary to keep the constitution in normal condition.

Psychasthenic patterns. The psychasthenics reveal other sorts of adaptive devices. Their obsessions, excessive fears, compulsive acts, which often

take on a ritualistic form, their elaborate intellectual exercises, marked by doubts, scruples, or perhaps philosophic fantasies about the nature of reality, are self-protective devices. In certain alterations of mood the psychasthenic somewhat resembles the variation in affect found in the manic-depressives.

While the symptoms of the neurasthenic are predominantly of a physical or somatic nature, those of the psychasthenic are of a mental character. But there are other differences. The former are aware of their fatigue, of their physical indisposition, but there is lacking any sense of compulsion about the matter. It is simply there. The latter, however, seem compelled to attend to their ideas, doubts, or impulses. These often seem to intrude upon them from outside. In this sense there is a feature of dissociation about psychasthenia not present in neurasthenia. (Actually many neurotics show symptoms of both types.) But in any case both represent lowered social adaptability. The sense of inadequacy is very evident in the psychasthenic. His obsessive fears or compulsive acts reveal his attempts to overcome his anxiety and sense of insecurity. In a way, he is marked by a kind of fantasy thinking which makes unnecessary a demand for attention from others as direct and obvious as that found in the neurasthenic.

Most neurasthenics and psychasthenics, of course, get through life without serious breakdown, but their efficiency in social participation is constantly being interrupted by overattention to themselves. Both represent a childish seeking of safety and security in place of the more normal struggle and attainment, upon which, in our society at least, we have come to place so much reliance as a measure of success.

Adjustment through hysteria. The hysteric represents still another form of adaptation which we do not consider adequate in our society. This neurosis is characterized by marked dissociation of mental and behavior processes, thus showing lack of basic integration of impulses, habits, and roles toward socially acceptable goals, and, according to Rosanoff (1938), by indolence and a tendency to follow the morality of expediency, that is, merely external adjustment to the moral demands of his society.

It is obvious that the dissociative processes represent unconscious attempts on the part of the individual to escape roles which involve unpleasant memories or present obligations. These may take the form of physical stigmata such as were described in Chapter XXVII, or they may involve extensive amnesia or loss of memory for episodes which have been unpleasant. Sometimes these forgotten experiences reappear in periods of somnambulism or in hysteric trances. Sometimes during these dissociated states the individual dramatically re-enacts the previous experience. The classical case of Irène, given by Janet (1907), is known to every student of abnormal psychology.

This young girl, who had gone through a harrowing experience at the deathbed of her mother, later became to all appearances completely indifferent to this episode. She

denied that her mother was dead, but did say that her relatives had often told her about it. She could not recall anything whatsoever about the event and naïvely asked why she had not been called upon to care for her mother. In short, the accounts by others of her mother's decease seemed completely foreign to her emotionally.

Yet during her hysteric attacks or "spells" Irène relived minutely all the details of her mother's demise: sometimes she talked extensively of the experience; at other times she seemed to see her mother before her (hallucination), and she would make pantomimic movements of grief, taking care of her, and the like. On still other occasions, she combined hallucination, speech, and action in a dramatic rehearsal of the whole episode, including going through again her own plans to commit suicide so as to join her mother in death.

After an attack the girl would return to her more or less normal behavior but remain again completely amnesic regarding this experience.

In certain instances there actually develop dual personalities, each rather complete and self-sufficient but ignorant of the other. The case of Ansel Bourne, a New England clergyman of the last century, is a good illustration. He disappeared from Providence, Rhode Island, and settled as A. J. Brown in Norristown, Pennsylvania, where he opened up a small business. In the latter role he was a very different man than he had been as a minister. In the sense of any personal memory Mr. Brown never knew of the existence of the Reverend Ansel Bourne. (See W. James, 1890.)

Perhaps the most famous case of dissociation—certainly the best-known to English readers—is that of Miss Beauchamp, described by Prince (1905). This girl, a patient of Prince's, manifested at different times four rather distinctive personalities: B₁, who resembled Miss Beauchamp in her normal state; B₃, known as "Sally"; B₄; and B₂, developed from B₁ under hypnosis. During certain periods two personalities alternated in dominating her life. At other times two personalities seemed to exist side by side. During the former states there was a more or less complete domination of one life organization over the alternate self. In the latter there seemed to be a coexistence: two "souls" in a single body. In some instances one of Miss Beauchamp's personalities knew of the existence of the others. In other situations the various personalities knew nothing of each other. Some of the striking details may be summarized as follows:

During one period, lasting nearly a year, B₁ and B₄ alternated in supremacy, each self showing continuity of memory for the time it was in control. B₁ was a shy, humble, weak invalid, very religious, highly suggestible, submissive, and altruistic. She was easily fatigued and led a life of retirement. In contrast, B₄ was markedly aggressive, given to outbursts of anger, intolerant, quarrelsome, vain, and distinctly irreligious, and, though in a manner sociable, thoroughly despised children and old folks. She was energetic and constantly on the go. Both B₁ and B₄ were emotional, but, whereas the former was easily swayed by her emotions, the latter kept them well in hand. In short, the two personalities were as opposite as one might imagine two individuals could possibly be.

The role which B₃, or Sally, played is an interesting aspect of this curious case. For six years she moved in and out of this human drama. At first nameless, she soon dubbed herself "Sally Beauchamp." She was a mischievous, childish person who showed a remarkable consistency of conduct throughout, there being no evidence of any maturation during the entire period.

Although Sally first appeared during hypnosis, she was not the same as B₂. (The

latter appeared only when Miss Beauchamp was under hypnosis.) But Sally existed alongside B1 and B2. She herself claimed, for example, that she had a coexistence along with B1, that she knew what B1 was doing and thinking and yet could on occasion occupy herself with her own thoughts. Moreover, she disliked and despised B1.

In time Sally was able to gain—for given periods—complete domination over B1, especially when the latter was tired or “run down.” When Sally gained monopoly, she often indulged in all sorts of impish activities aimed at embarrassing B1. She would write her impudent notes and leave them about for B1 to find when she, in turn, had returned to dominance. Or she would play practical jokes on B1, as on the occasion when she unraveled B1’s knitting and wound the yarn all over the furniture of the room.

All during this period there was, in a way, a struggle of two wills for supremacy. For a long time, Sally not only had the ascendancy, but often compelled B1 to do things she did not wish to do. (For a convenient summary of this case, see McDougall, 1926, pp. 497-501.)

Under the able hands of Prince, “the normal personality” was restored, largely by the synthesis of B1 and B4. Sally began to feel herself “squeezed out” during this period. Whether, in this synthesis into a normal person, Sally remained as an unconscious (or, to use Prince’s term, subconscious) self depends upon the interpretation which we put upon these data. But the striking fact is not only that the cases of multiple personality demonstrate attempts at adaptation, but that any adjustment may take a variety of forms and directions. Dissociated personalities represent extreme instances of tendencies that are incipient in all of us.

In a sense we all possess a variety of selves. (See Chapter IX.) We commonly speak of a man’s being one person in one set and another person in another set of circumstances. A stern employer may be a sweet-dispositioned father; a boy at home may be quiet and reserved, and with his playmates swear and swagger like a pirate. Robert Louis Stevenson’s familiar story of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde illustrates the alternating type of self which reminds one of the cases cited in psychiatric literature. The extent to which these separate selves are integrated into a common focus or central self depends upon a number of factors, including, as we have shown, the co-ordination of impulses, habits, and attitudes—a generalized other—oriented toward some central goal or aim in life. But few of us completely attain this state. The whole series of roles which we play in various social situations should convince us without argument that we do have various selves. And in many persons these are held together only in a loose organization, depending upon constancies of recognition and demands or expectancies of us by others and by the attendant introjection of this constant factor back into one’s inner life.

Emotional instability. The so-called emotionally unstable are a miscellaneous array of neurotics who are not easily classified into other categories: those persons who in our society and culture have not found a sufficient status to be considered entirely normal, but who are nevertheless

not considered sufficiently divergent to demand formal social control, unless, as often happens, they fall into beggary, crime, vagrancy, or poverty. They are individuals who because of emotional and social traits are unable to manage their affairs with that degree of prudence and success which we consider proper in our society. In times of political and economic crisis such persons frequently are the first to fail to meet on their own responsibility the unexpected pressures for survival. They fall easily into pauperism, chronic illness, vagrancy, or crime. The factor of social status here is not to be overlooked. Evidently those who fall into these particular deficiencies or show general occupational inadequacy are psychologically not unlike many of those incompetents in the upper economic strata whose neurotic manifestations may take other forms.

What psychiatry has designated as pathological lying is an outstanding feature of another group of persons usually classified under the general rubric of emotional instability. Such individuals reveal an amazing facility for spinning tall yarns about their families, their exploits, their travels, or any situation which suits their fancy at the moment. They are perhaps the real masters of the art of rationalizing their way out of difficulties or of obtaining their ego security by elaborate myth-making. They apparently do not distinguish between what is normally considered truth and falsehood. Such persons resemble children who are unable to draw any sure line of demarcation between fantasy and logical thinking, between what one has overtly experienced and what one imagines he has done or seen or heard. In discussing the place of fantasy thinking in children we commented upon the gradual growth of the recognition on the part of children of the distinctions which adults draw in our society and culture between wishful and more directive, verifiable thinking. (See Chapter X.) In the pathological liars there is apparently a retention of this childish confusion of these two forms of thought. The individual who has had no experience with this sort of falsification is likely to take the stories at their face value, or to look upon the narrative, when exposed, as an intentional falsehood. As a consequence, pathological liars often go through life shamelessly exploiting those whom they meet. Actually, such individuals are often quite unconscious of their lack of veracity. I am convinced that in the more serious cases we are dealing with a form of dissociated behavior which has much in common with hysteria. There is, for these people, actually an inability to distinguish between what they have actually done and what they imagine and relate to others.

We have in pathological lying, as in other overt expressions of fantasy thinking and acting, a good illustration of the importance of the social and cultural definition in relation to personal role and status. Yet, as we have previously noted, fantasies may have a significant function with reference to cultural acceptances, or they may but serve one's private purposes. In a creative artist like Lewis Carroll or Lord Dunsany, fantasies become accepted as a means of aesthetic satisfaction for themselves and others. In the paranoiac, fantasies—the foundation of his systematic delusions—may become the basis for a violent and criminal attack upon an

alleged enemy. In the schizophrenic they may become the source for building up an inner world of daydreams to which he gives his attention, with the result that he progressively neglects the culturally expected responses to others. In the religious mystic, fantasy becomes important as a means of bringing him closer to the supernatural forces in which he believes; and, if others accept his account of these experiences, he may become an important religious leader. If they do not, such a person, like the pathological liars, schizophrenics, or hysterics, may be dealt with as abnormal.

Neurotic symptoms and aging. Everyone is aware that alterations in behavior accompany the advance in years. But just when does old age set in? The answer to that question is not entirely clear. True enough, anatomical and physiological changes occur as people grow older; so, too, elderly individuals show certain losses in mental acuity, certain fixities of attitude; they are considered to be more conservative in economic and social matters than youth. Yet an examination of the data on aging indicates that there is wide variation not only in the social-cultural definition of old age, but in the anatomical and physiological substrata as well.

In our day the increase in the relative proportion of people in the upper age brackets of our population has made us conscious of the problem of aging and of old age, especially since the prolongation of the period of economic depression, the uncertainties of political changes, and the whole unsettling of former ways of life generally have brought on a great deal of public attention to this entire topic, in both its politicoeconomic and its psychological aspects.⁷

Our concern with this problem at this juncture arises because the personality manifestations of many older people in our society tend to take on neurotic features. In order to expose some of these, however, we must discuss briefly the larger topic of aging with reference to three pertinent aspects: (1) the cultural, (2) the somatic or constitutional, and (3) the psychological.

(1) There are wide variations in the definition and meaning of old age among primitive and civilized peoples. Among primitive tribes the treatment of old persons ranges all the way from the killing of the aged and infirm through indifference and neglect to extreme care and solicitude for their welfare. Of course, the chronological definition of old age differs greatly: in some societies a man or woman is old at the middle forties; in others the lower limit of agedness is much higher. Moreover, despite some exceptions, older people tend to dominate primitive society, which

⁷ The economic and political aspects of the problem are discussed in Epstein (1928) and in summary form in J. L. Gillin (1937b). There is a considerable literature on the sociological and psychological aspects: see the symposium edited by Cowdry (1939) and the symposium edited by Lawton (1940); also Martin and de Gruchy (1930, 1933); Kardiner (1937); Randall (1937); C. M. Morgan (1937); Lawton (1939); Cornell (1940); and the earlier but stimulating volume by G. S. Hall (1922).

in the main "is an old man's world," as Wissler (1939) puts it. The gerontocracy usually constitutes the top élite of these tribes, serving as the conservative elements in the community. In our Occidental world the elders for the most part also maintained a dominant status, but in an open class system marked by strong individualistic competition the aged and the youthful at times fall into conflict over the locus of societal power. (See Ross, 1938, on the conflict of age groups.)

But in any case the culture will set the definitions of role, status, and power of the older as well as of the younger members of a particular society, and these cultural expectancies and permissibilities will play a distinctive part in providing the framework in which the personal sense of importance and security will operate.

(2) The somatic or bodily changes which take place with advancing years are obvious to common sense; and there is a large number of research data on this matter. (See pertinent chapters in Cowdry, 1939.) There are alterations in the heart and circulatory structures and functions, the sexual potency declines, and all along the line there is a gradual decrease of organic activity.

Yet the physiological and anatomical changes are probably not entirely independent of modifications in idea and attitude. In the words of Frank (1939, p. xvii): "In no other aspect of medicine and health-care is the concept of the psychosomatic unity of the organism more important than in the care of the aged, since the older individual faces life with all the emotional patterns of his past. . . . If just the feeling of being old can lead to a diminution of functional activities, is it possible to delay ageing by continuing life activities and maintaining a feeling of competence for life?"

(3) Therefore, when we turn to the psychological aspects of aging, we have to deal not only with the patent facts of decline in perceptual-motor capacities and in general intelligence, but with modifications in the social-emotional patterns as well. There is ample evidence that age and psychomotor speed are negatively correlated. In one extensive investigation, W. R. Miles (1939, p. 540) found a correlation of $-.53$ between speed and age "for the period from 20 to 95 years." Similar coefficients were found for other motor performances in this age and span. There is also a decline in visual ability, in the perception of bodily pain, and in learning functions. (See, however, Thorndike, Bregman, *et al.*, 1928, on the prolongation of learning capacity into the middle years.)

It is perhaps with reference to the social-emotional characteristics and total ego pattern that the changes occurring with aging are most evident. It is with reference to these that many neurotic features appear. One of the most clearly recognized is the decline or loss of sexual potency. In the woman this is physiologically linked with the coming of the menopause; in the man it is associated with a gradual decline in sexual powers. There is little doubt that the nature of the life organization, determined as it is in the early and pubertal years, will have much to do with the manner in which these somatic changes are met. To women in our society and perhaps in most societies it is a symbol of the loss of their femininity; to men it is a token of their loss of masculine vigor. (See Hamilton, 1939; and Kaufman, 1940.) These conceptions in turn are reflected in the total picture of the self or ego. There is a loss of sense of self-sufficiency and of independence. There is often a growing feeling of dependency on others which may be consciously or unconsciously resisted in a variety of ways. In short, men and women may look upon their aging as a form of frustration and reveal various methods of overcoming it. Grotjahn (1940) cites a case of a mild senile

dement, whom he studied as showing strong "castration" fears, that is, anxiety over loss of potency which took a number of forms: fears of being kidnaped, fears of losing his modest fortune, compensatory fantasies of still being sexually competent, and the like. Sometimes women past the climacteric go in for external demonstration of their persistent youthfulness by the route of the beauty expert and the clandestine affair with younger men.

As the years advance, of course, the fear of death itself looms large in the interest of men and women. And once again the cultural patterns will provide the customary frame of reference. The belief in immortality furnishes a socially accepted fantasy of great importance in maintaining personal balance and integration. (See Chapter XXIX.) But, of course, the individual variation from the cultural norm—induced by a wide variety of ideational and emotional depositions arising in the early years—may make for sharp anxiety about impending death in one person, while it may make for calmness or resignation in another.

The manner in which persons meet this crisis of old age will be qualified by their whole value system, attitudes, traits, and habits, in short, by their life organization. And the present-day concern with the problem of social security for those in the upper years may well indicate that throughout the decades of intense individualism and expansive economic opportunities people were not furnished with the psychological devices for meeting these difficulties when they arise. Variations in such patterns are shown in C. M. Morgan's study (1937), contrasting the attitudes of old-age pensioners in upstate New York with those of a sample of metropolitan New York City. The former retained a feeling of the need to keep busy, to retain personal self-sufficiency and independence; the latter tended to accept their decline more as a matter of course and to expect others to care for them.

Lawton (1940) has developed the concept of pseudo senescence to describe those individuals in our society who, though not of advanced age, have, because of loss of employment or wealth, or because of latent neurotic or prepsychotic patterns, taken on many of the neurotic symptoms associated with traditionally expected senescence. Anxiety about their future welfare, despair, resentment toward younger people, compensatory efforts at demonstrating their potency, economically and otherwise—these and other symptoms are not uncommon. (See Chapter XXIII on the psychological effects of prolonged unemployment.)

Of course, expectancy and acceptability of a given status are highly important in all these adjustments. The transition to senescence may be a severe crisis, or it may be an easy step. I have been interested in observing the manner in which older men in business and the professions meet the inevitable day when they must retire from active service. With particular reference to men in college or university teaching, two instances may be briefly noted:

The first man, who had been very active in teaching, research, and administrative work connected with graduate training, reacted to his retirement from his university with a number of neurotic symptoms which few had anticipated. He felt that he was more or less of a failure. He gave up any serious interest in his research. He developed suicidal compulsions which took the form of wishes that he would meet with a fatal

accident while driving his automobile over somewhat hazardous roads. In short, he retreated to a rather childish pattern combined of resentment and dependence.

The second instance is a man of great physical strength who never thought of himself as growing old at all. He is extroverted in interest and behavior, has been eminently successful in his career, and has had amazing self-confidence and self-assurance in his professional and everyday contacts throughout the years. His failure to anticipate his retirement from active duty was exemplified in the fact that he never would meet this issue with his colleagues or the administrative dean. As head of a department he continually neglected to make any effort to provide for his successor. Rather, when the matter was brought to his attention and his retirement was about to be forced upon him by the administrative officials, he secured an extension of his appointment through his powerful political friends. He felt completely capable of carrying on his work and took this round-about method of ensuring himself such a continuity. The fact that there had, in the past, been occasional exceptions made in matters of retirement provided him an easy rationalization for his own desire to stay on.

Nevertheless, when—in the light of departmental plans for the future—one of his colleagues boldly discussed with him the fuller implications of his continuance in active service, he was not long in seeing the point. He acted at once to withdraw his name from the faculty roster for the following year. Now that he is retired, he continues to use his old office in the department, he offers an occasional advanced course without compensation, he sits in with his colleagues in departmental meetings, and has continued his writing. He is in better health than he had been for some years, and though he tends—as do so many aged people—to live in the world of past memories, he is still vigorous in thought and participates in his world on many fronts. His self-assurance tends to take the form of certain Olympian dicta about the present world, drawn from his vast storehouse of knowledge and experience. Thus does the human ego maintain itself!

In those relatively few cases of the aged which deteriorate into actual senile dementia we may find that they end up in a world of childish wants and fantasies. Their dependence on others is more or less complete; they no longer have to compete for role or status; they may live on for years in a state of vegetative existence with only a modicum of the former ego organization and social participation. But such cases represent only a small minority of the total number of people of advanced age, and the growing recognition of the need for healthy activities for these persons is evidence of the high values which we give in our culture to those who have passed beyond their full economic and community usefulness. We may expect to see increased attention given to this problem by educators, psychologists, and sociologists during the coming decades.

In short, the manifestations of mentality and overt action must be understood in terms of social participation and consensus. Ideas, attitudes, and habits which receive support from others—that is, which arouse in them expected interaction—are considered normal and proper both by others and by ourselves, since meaning itself is a social-cultural product.

782 SELECTED PROBLEMS OF PERSONAL ADJUSTMENT

Those which do not fit the anticipated patterns of others get labeled as evil, improper, or pathological. I am convinced that the continued normality of personal life depends upon this acceptance by others, and that the problem of treating the neurotic and the psychotic, as of treating the delinquent, the criminal, and the physically and culturally handicapped, depends upon the development and acceptance of normal—that is, expected—forms of interaction. Only in this interplay of our own self with those of others whom we consider normal can mental health itself be maintained. We must never forget the wise comment of St. Paul: "We who are many are severally members one of another."

Part Three

CERTAIN WIDER IMPLICATIONS

Chapter XXIX

INTEGRATION AND BALANCE THROUGH RELIGION, ART, AND AVOCATION

NO INDIVIDUAL, at least in any complex societal order, ever seems completely satisfied at all times and in all situations. Human wishes or wants appear to be greater in number than are the means of satisfying them. As we have noted, it is important and necessary for us to develop many substitutes to satisfy our desires. While the fundamental, though culturally qualified, requirements concern economic adaptation—chiefly through the occupation, marital and family adjustments, and civic participation, which provides protection and sense of belonging to the wider community—there are also other wishes which are fulfilled through religious, artistic, avocational, and recreational means. These latter enable us to secure considerable satisfaction over and above the more basic needs. In this chapter our attention will be centered on the place of religion, art, and avocation as devices for providing a certain satisfying integration or balance in the personality.¹

Though the integrative and balancing processes in human behavior are closely bound up together, some distinction between the two functions may be made. *Integration* refers to the co-ordinated working of the total organism toward the attainment of some end, goal, or purpose. It is seen in the neuromuscular-glandular co-ordination of an animal toward a wanted food object, or of a human skilled act aimed at accomplishing some end, or in the control of attention and thought to the end of solving some intellectual problem. The process appears in relation to cycles of activity and particularly to the interplay of wish and its fulfillment. *Balance* is the process of restoring equilibrium to the organism through the development of additional, substitutive, or ambivalent activities. A simple illustration is the undertaking of something novel or different when one is fatigued and bored by rather continuous performance of another response. (See Chapter XXIII for illustrations of the importance of this sort of change in the mechanized process of work.) At more involved levels many of our compensatory interests and reactions may be considered balance-producing devices.

¹ We omit the place of recreation in our discussion, but many of the same integrative and balancing patterns arise in this field—especially in spontaneous play—as we find in creative art and in the avocations.

RELIGION AS AN INTEGRATING OR BALANCING FACTOR

In many primitive tribes and in many primary-group societies of the Western world in the preindustrial era, the basic value systems of people centered in religious-moral ideals and practices. Religion was the focus or hub of life's activities. This is illustrated in the various quasi-communistic sectarian groups in this country during the nineteenth century, wherein, under the idealism of love of mankind and the desire for a rich salvation, men organized for the more "perfect" life. These communities were of the primary type, and in them economic, political, recreational, and family relations were idealized or focused in religious and ethical purposes. Such rather divergent sects as the Dunkers, the Mennonites, the Amish, the Amana, and the early Mormons were of this sort.

So, too, during the Middle Ages, the Roman Catholic Church typified much of this same kind of integrative focus for life for the western European. But, as the Renaissance of Learning came in the late medieval period, as the Commercial Revolution of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries took place, as the nationalistic states arose, and especially as the Protestant Reformation tore away from Roman Catholicism a large section of the Christians of northern Europe, this dominance of the primary societal organization dwindled in significance. The Industrial Revolution of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries further disintegrated the old patterns and replaced them with increased emphasis upon secondary-group activities. As a result, the role of religion today has been restricted. It has not so much an integrative function in the lives of most persons as it once had. This is not to gainsay its importance as a balancing factor, and in this connection we shall discuss briefly its significance for the individual in our society.

Religious attitudes and ideas grow out of childhood. In order to indicate the manner in which fundamental religious-moral ideas and attitudes arise in the child, let us retrace briefly some features of the early experience of the child in Western society. The three most significant items concern, first, the place of authority, of discipline, and of punishment, and the attendant sense of guilt; second, the power of God—his omnipotence and supernaturalism; and, finally, the place of fantasy thinking as a phase of adaptation.

The mother represents to the child his first love object. In relation to her he develops his own egocentric characteristics, his sense of importance and independence. The mother waits upon the child; she showers sympathy and love upon him. Then, too, it is she who seems capable of an almost magical power, since she can accomplish things which the child cannot.

From his first identification with the mother, the child, in time, passes

on to a fixation upon the father. The latter becomes another source of love interest and also the exponent of power and authority. (Also, the child may be divided in his attitude toward the father, since he may love him and yet be jealous of the father's relation to the mother. This is the basis of the Freudian concept of the Oedipus problem in personality development. When this occurs, it may also divide the child's fixation on the father. (See Chapter XIV.) In short, as the child grows up, his relations to the parents take on an ambivalent nature; they love him, wait on him, and care for him; but they also punish him for infractions of the family rules. His world is not entirely one of love and sympathy; it is, in part, the land of the "thou shalt not's." To the child, then, the parents, together or singly, possess qualities which are not pleasant but painful. And the inhibitions which parents in our society put upon the child concern his most powerful original drives, those regarding food, excretory functions, and sexuality. The parental regulation of these processes or cycles of activity, in conformity with the cultural standards of the dominant society, certainly tend to repress strongly motivated self-expression at infantile levels. The verbal definition of the early physiological cycles illustrates the matter. Thus any undue curiosity or interest in sexual or excretory activities is labeled by the parents as "nasty," "evil," "sinful," and "vile." Then, too, as the child grows older, he must give up his toys or other pleasure-giving objects to his little brother or sister or to the neighbors' child. He learns that he cannot always have his own way. But this learning does not mean that he easily relinquishes his original impulses or desires for his selfish expression.

In short, out of the frustration of his sexuality and of his other bodily expressions, and out of the balking of his growing egotism, grow the ideas of sin, badness, and evil. The parents play such an important role in this inhibition that the child's image of the parent is split or dissociated: one image that of the good, sympathetic, and loving parent, the other of the harsh disciplinarian and wielder of authority and punishment. This dissociation fits very well into the religious-ethical teachings of Euro-American culture. Satan, the devil, or evil forces, come to possess, by means of projection, the same qualities as those phases of the father and mother images when they are unpleasant, and when the parents deny their love to the child or discipline him. The child's conception of God, Jesus, and the Savior, on the other hand, carries the idealistic image of the loving, kind, and gracious parent.

Not only is there a splitting of the child's image of the mother and father—in terms of their goodness and sympathy and love on the one hand, and in terms of their discipline and punishment, from which arises the child's sense of guilt, on the other—there is also possible to the child an outlet from direct control through fantasy thinking. From his own

confusion of thought processes and overt action and from the cultural patterns put before him, the child easily assumes the attitude which accepts what Freud has called the "omnipotence of thought." That is, he comes to replace overt adjustment with wishful thinking. To him, these "thoughts" are powerful. They make possible a replacement of or compensation for coveted things denied by the parents or other authoritarians. Fantasy thinking of infancy and early childhood lays the basis later for ideas and beliefs about miracles, divine powers, and omnipotences outside human beings—all features of ideas and beliefs about God and supernatural powers. In fact, society, through its rituals, its creeds, and its theologies, furnishes the individual with socially approved forms of dereistic thinking.

We must recall again that such subjective activity is not to be considered necessarily pathological, unessential, childish, "bad," or "evil." (See Chapter X.) It is as much a part of all of us as is logical thinking, and doubtless plays a larger part in individual thought than most of us would like to admit publicly! Therefore, when we discuss religion in terms of wishful thinking, we are not trying to discredit either fantasy thought or religion. We are attempting to deal with it in understandable terms. Religion, art, avocations, and much of recreation all represent a culturization of phases of such thought and action as particular means of adaptation. The existence everywhere of religious forms of behavior, of art, of recreation, and of nonutilitarian activities which we call hobbies or avocations is witness to the profound psychological roots of this whole field of behavior. And we know from our study of prejudice, public opinion, and crowd behavior, as in fashion or mob action, that fantasies also have their place there. They even play a part in the stimulation of buying in the economic world by emphasizing beauty, luck, fads, childish self-expression, and so on.

For this reason I cannot accept the easy assumption of Freud (1928) and his followers that the mysticism and emotional and wishful thought generally found in religious experience constitute an "escape from reality" or exemplify but a "mass neurosis" or a mere "illusion." Rather it is my belief that cultural reality, as it may be called, should not be regarded as something material or as made up out of biological reactions to food, drink, and sexual objects. It is at heart mental or psychological. It is a question of beliefs, attitudes, ideas, and meanings. It exists in the minds of men. One cannot, therewith, with Freud, blandly dismiss religious experience as an unfortunate illusion without at the same time raising the question whether art, philosophy, and most of the fundamentals of social organization and family life are not likewise "illusions." Faithfulness to a mate, loyalty to a country, and belief in a banknote can be shown by

this logic to be illusions too. Even material culture disappears without the support of its subjective meaning.

In the light of cultural approval of religious experience—that is, acceptance of this by one's fellows—and in the light of our broader definition of culture as mental or psychological, religious behavior cannot be considered "an escape" from something superior or better or more real so much as a movement from one aspect of cultural reality to another. To deny the importance or significance of this other phase of reality is tantamount to denying the whole field of subjective thought and action based on personal wishes and fantasy. As Benedict (1933, p. 43) puts it, "The world man actually lives in—in the sense of his inescapable necessities and the inevitable conditions of life—always bulks very small in relation to the world he makes for himself."

At the adult level, then, we have expression of these infantile and fantasy formulations in culturally accepted forms. The Savior of the world, the Lamb of God, the Master, all bespeak the clear-cut imagery of the good father. "Rock of Ages cleft for me, let me to your bosom fly" may carry both mother and father associations. Likewise, the egocentric trends find enormous satisfaction in the principles of the creed laid down by the religious community. One must be born again by the water and the spirit. The rebirth into spiritual nobility is itself an infantile notion. So, too, the miracles of the church are the primitive magic-making of the omnipotent father who can do things which are impossible for us.

A confirmation of the place of the family pattern in our religious ideology is demonstrated in an analysis of the content of over 3,000 Protestant hymns. (See K. Young, 1926.) It was shown that over 57 per cent of these religious songs dealt with topics symbolizing parenthood and familial situations, especially indicating a return to God or heaven as to a safe refuge or as to a place where some future reward would be forthcoming. The motif of "return" is shown in the rather complete identification with God, the Father, as an image of the parent. Such phrases in these hymns as "the Holy Family," "Sons of God," and "in His arms He'll safely fold you" are common. The future reward as a motif is also a distinctly childish pattern. Our greatest joys will come when we join in God's family "up yonder," and when our sinfulness will be wiped out. The summary is in point (1926, pp. 405-406):

"Psychologically the persistent *motif* in these hymns of symbolic co-ordination of unrequited infantile wishes with adult living is noticeable. The simple themes, their constant repetition, the use of stereotyped phrases, and, in practice, the use of musical accompaniment, all make for a ceremonial usage of first-rate significance in stabilizing the personality. While the student of social ethics may maintain that the highest form of individual and social living is not attained by the continuation of these infantile symbolizations and their expression under cultural approval, the fact remains that by this very method the individual finds a socially acceptable means of ridding himself of the otherwise burdensome weight of unsatisfied infantilisms. The present

author can not fully agree with Martin (1924) that in the future we must more or less consciously set out to determine our religious ideals and symbolisms and thus outgrow by conscious control the appeal of the more puerile and primitive in our natures. It seems to me that while we may hope for a development in our symbols and religious formulations generally, these improvements will grow out of the more adequate unconscious adjustment of our wishes, emotions, and intellect to the world of reality which surrounds us. This is the only adequate method by which art develops. How can we hope to better or improve on that method in the case of religion?"

So, too, at the adult stage, the Evil One serves as the scapegoat for our forbidden thoughts or our temptations. On him are projected these notions and wishes as if they originally came into us from this being, so that we not only get rid of sin by projection, but actually are free from responsibility for it in the first place, since it comes to us always from the outside, from the tempting mouth of the serpent. The egocentric and pugnacious tendencies find expression in the "church militant." You hate the devil, you fight in the army of the Lord for righteousness. Such rousing songs as "The Fight Is On" and "Onward, Christian Soldiers" are typical examples. Your peaceful, loving, and kindly disposition is integrated toward your religious fellows. On the contrary, your vicious, aggressive, hateful tendencies are fastened on Satan, on the heathen, on the sin and worldliness about you. In this manner synthesis of divergent trends is accomplished, as in art the same trends are brought together in creative or re-creative activities.

Although in the lives of many people today religion does not serve as the focus or integrative principle, it still offers a core or center around which many fundamental attitudes and values may be built. In a world dominated intellectually by materialistic and deterministic philosophies, it still affords an expression of hope and visions of something better and more congenial to deep-laid wishes for completeness and harmony and unity with the world around us. A. N. Whitehead, the mathematician and philosopher (1926, p. 274), puts it thus:

"Religion is the vision of something which stands beyond, behind, and within, the passing flux of immediate things; something which is real, and yet waiting to be realized; something which is a remote possibility, and yet the greatest of present facts; something that gives meaning to all that passes, and yet eludes apprehension; something whose possession is the final good, and yet is beyond all reach; something which is the ultimate ideal, and the hopeless quest." (By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers.)

Mysticism and emotional thrill are two essential features of religious experience for the individual, but they may find their expression in his life organization in varied ways. In fact, the culture of our society offers outlets for people along a certain continuum of religious experience. We permit wide latitude in religious practice. We may have standardized our

economic and political behavior, but in art and religion, at least, we allow considerable flexibility. As in the relation of the masses to standards of art set by sophisticated critics, so in religious experience, the upper classes may easily fall into the error of assuming that religious experience for all should conform to the highly intellectualized forms suitable to themselves. No one is prepared to say *what* kind of religious experience or church affiliation is *best* for people outside one's own social clique. This is a matter of life organization, social status, and role, affected by a host of factors touching on other phases of life, physical, economic, political, and familial. For example, some may object to the emotionalism of revivalistic churches, such as the Holy Rollers or the Nazarenes. Such critics fail to understand the meaning of religious experience for the communicants of these sects. In turn, members of the latter might well disdain the more thoroughly rationalized, aesthetic, and intellectualized views of the educated Roman Catholic or Episcopalian. There is in our Western culture a sort of scale of permissible religious experience running from the extreme of emotionalism, sentimentalism, and fantasy to the highly aesthetic, intellectualistic, or theological expressions suitable for educated minorities. Just where the individual in our society will find himself depends largely upon his own cultural background and upon his personal choice.

One may find the greatest satisfactions in otherworldly contemplation; another may find it in contact with the everyday world in an effort to make it a more desirable place in which to live. Certain religious groups favor the ethical, mundane interests, departing considerably from more elementary supernaturalism. They put little emphasis upon otherworldly interests and concentrate directly upon problems of social reform. Whether such a field of activity, just because it is sponsored by a church and becomes slightly emotionalized, is religious in a strict sense, depends on our definition of religion. I prefer to keep the definition of religion within the narrower limits of an emotional, worshipful, or reverent reaction toward supernatural powers. If ethical concern, cut off from concepts of a divine plan or will, becomes synonymous with religion, then religion may embrace such interests as communism, fascism, and socialism. From one standpoint, so to broaden the definition of religion is to make the concept meaningless. Yet only the future trends in culture can determine what will be the accepted definition.

We may say, then, that religious experience, operating in a society in various approved ways, offers the individual a balance or outlet for unrequited wishes, for unfulfilled hopes, for desires to be at peace and harmony or in mystical unity with the universe. God, no matter how defined, serves as an ideal, as a source of comfort and perhaps of punishment, at least if we regard religion as closely linked to morality, as Chris-

tians do. The image of God gives a wider meaning or significance to our mundane behavior. God is a sort of "generalized other" serving to balance and even to integrate our activities in a world where the complex calls of everyday life are often confusing, distractive, and even disorganizing.

Again, whether art, novel political and economic ideals, or other means of balance and integration may in time replace traditional religious formulations remains for the future to answer. Certainly today religious experience still constitutes a significant feature of most men's life organization or personality. At present, the appeal of the symbolic or of fantasy formulations, and the organization of thought and conduct along socially acceptable but nevertheless emotional lines, are of great significance for the personality in offsetting the materialistic, objective, scientific world of everyday affairs. In religion we replace the world of predictability of events with a world of indeterminate satisfactions—wish fulfillments without work, joys contemplated from infancy but denied us by the exigencies of earning a living—in short, of comforts without pain or hardship. The following statement on the function of religion is in point (K. Young, 1926, pp. 391-392):

"Social pressures in the form of negative attitudes surround us from infancy. These attitudes are what the psychoanalysts call the 'censor' or superego. They leave very much in the way of infantile and primitive impulses in the background of the behavior patterns. Often these impulses and habit trends take on the form of vague wishes and attitudes which come only to the margin of consciousness, but which continue to affect the personality in its choices and conscious behavior much more than is obvious at first sight. Thus, even though the culturally inducted negative attitudes repress overt responses, the emotionally toned attitudes of the infantile mind are not so easily eliminated from our lives. They may lie dormant for years to appear in some adult crisis such as produces a neurosis. Or if they come to the surface in normal living it is in the form of dreams, daydreams, witticisms, in fanatical social reform programs or emotional social conservatism, as the case may be. Hates, antagonisms, childish egocentrisms, sadistic impulses, desires for superiority, wishes to 'get something for nothing'—these and many other trends are held in check by social-cultural pressures. If, therefore, these are not rather fully worked over into adult substitutions and sublimations, they may result in complexes or emotionally toned groups of attitudes which may become more or less dissociated from the main course of the personality and lead to inefficiency in living or to actual disease.

"The outward meanings of religion are highly symbolic. Although the basic emotional-instinctive appeal of these symbols is usually lost on the naïve worshiper, this fact does not make the functions of the symbols any the less significant. It is the present contention that religious rituals and ceremonials function to give an outlet for many of these crude and selfish impulses upon a rather socially acceptable level and thus feed the individual with a substitute experience which removes the emotional surcharge that might otherwise damage his social responses to his fellows. . . ."

ART AS AN INTEGRATING OR BALANCING FACTOR

When we turn our attention to the place of art in relation to personality—either artistic production or the aesthetic appreciation of the art of others—we find that it has much in common, as to function, with play and recreation and even with religious experience. It is not our intention to discuss the nature of art, theories of aesthetics, the question whether art should not merely entertain but instruct, or whether there are absolute standards of beauty or only those relative to culture. We shall treat very briefly the place which art may play in personality balance or integration.

There are three factors in art: material, form, and meaning. The first has to do with the media of expression—wood, stone, metal, sounds, words, color, or other medium; the second with structure or mode of presentation; and the third with meaning or associated images and ideas, dependent obviously upon communicability to others. Obviously, artistic enjoyment is largely defined in cultural terms, and what is pleasing or beautiful to one society may not be to another, but everywhere we find that men do express themselves in an aesthetic manner. Over and above securing food, shelter, protection from the physical world or from human enemies, and other satisfactions of utilitarian needs or wants, men in all societies spend some time in decorating themselves and their utensils and tools, or in creating objects for purposes of satisfying what may be termed an aesthetic interest or wish. Boas (1927, pp. 9-10, 12) has indicated the universality of art and its significance in the following words:

"In one way or another esthetic pleasure is felt by all members of mankind. No matter how diverse the ideals of beauty may be, the general character of the enjoyment of beauty is of the same order everywhere; the crude song of the Siberians, the dance of the African Negroes, the pantomime of the Californian Indians, the stone work of the New Zealanders; the carvings of the Melanesians, the sculpture of the Alaskans appeal to them in a manner not different from that felt by us when we hear a song, when we see an artistic dance, or when we admire ornamental work, painting or sculpture. The very existence of song, dance, painting and sculpture among all the tribes known to us is proof of the craving to produce things that are felt as satisfying through their form, and of the capability of man to enjoy them. . . .

"What then gives to the sensation an esthetic value? When the technical treatment has attained a certain standard of excellence, when the control of the processes involved is such that certain typical forms are produced, we call the process an art, and however simple the forms may be, they may be judged from the point of view of formal perfection; industrial pursuits such as cutting, carving, moulding, weaving; as well as singing, dancing and cooking are capable of attaining technical excellence and fixed forms. The judgment of perfection of technical form is essentially an esthetic judgment. It is hardly possible to state objectively just where the line between artistic and pre-artistic forms should be drawn, because we cannot determine just where the esthetic attitude sets in. It seems certain, however, that wherever a definite type of

movement, a definite sequence of tones or a fixed form has developed it must become a standard by which its perfection, that is, its beauty, is measured.

"Such types exist among mankind the world over, and we must assume that if an unstandardized form should prove to possess an esthetic appeal for a community it would readily be adopted. Fixity of form seems to be most intimately connected with our ideas of beauty. . . .

"Many works of art affect us in another way. The emotions may be stimulated not by the form alone, but also by close associations that exist between the form and ideas held by the people. In other words, when the forms convey a meaning, because they recall past experiences or because they act as symbols, a new element is added to the enjoyment. The form and its meaning combine to elevate the mind above the indifferent emotional state of everyday life. Beautiful sculpture or painting, a musical composition, dramatic art, a pantomime, may so affect us. This is no less true of primitive art than of our own. . . ."

Psychologically, both artistic creation and artistic appreciation are bound up with fantasy thinking. Aesthetic productions and aesthetic enjoyments afford an outlet for wishful impulses and ideas. But art is not undisciplined fantasy, nor is it fantasy so remote from its cultural setting as to lack a reasonable communicability with others. Art, like religious experience—which also rests on fantasies—finds its significance in the fact that it uses materials and forms of expression which have meaning for the creator and for others. The discipline comes from all three factors noted above—material, form, and the need of meaningful communication. Since we have already discussed some features of fantasy as related to art, we need not repeat that material. (See Chapter X.)

We may mention, however, two features: art as related to the personality organization of the artist or creator, that is, the meaning of aesthetic experience for him; and art as a stimulus, that is, the appreciation or enjoyment of art by others than the creator.

Creative art and the artist. There is little systematic and well-analyzed material on the psychology of the artist. From autobiographies, biographies, essays in aesthetics, and some other sources we know something of the manner in which artists work, something of the play of fantasy, and something of the meaning of aesthetic production for them. We shall note here only a few broad general features. It is apparent that artistic production often affords an outlet for inhibited and blocked impulses. The compensatory nature of art has often been the subject of comment. It is thus obviously a balancing factor.

Lewis Carroll, the author of the charming tales *Alice in Wonderland*, *Through the Looking-glass*, and others, whose real name was Charles L. Dodgson, is a good illustration of the balancing factor of fantasy life as expressed in artistic form. In his "official" personality, to use Campbell's (1934) apt term, he was a tutor in mathematics at Christ Church, Oxford—a typically sedate, conservative bachelor, a

middle-class English don of the mid-Victorian era who illustrated many of the class prejudices, inhibitions, and emotional repressions of his time. Moreover, he was rather neurotic. He had many obsessions, fears, doubts, worries, and compulsive habits. His life was highly regimented and budgeted as to time and activity. This was the Reverend Dodgson.

In rather sharp contrast stands Lewis Carroll—almost another personality. In fact, Dodgson would never admit when asked by strangers or chance acquaintances that he was the author of the "Alice" books. He usually replied to such queries that Mr. Dodgson neither claimed nor acknowledged any connection with the books not published under his name. This *alter ego*, this other personality, if you please, was given to rich fantasies, to making up games and forms of recreation for children and adults.

Dodgson himself confessed that he found emotional release from melancholy and anxiety by means of what we would call fantasy thinking. At night, when he was troubled with what he called "bad" thoughts, he found surcease not only by applying his mind to the solution of problems of mathematics but also by constructing puzzles, acrostics and stories. Apropos of a small book of his which he called *Pillow Problems*, he says that his chief motive in its publication was to show that the mind "can be made to concentrate itself on some intellectual subject (not necessarily mathematics) and thus banish those petty troubles and vexations which most people experience, and which—unless the mind be otherwise occupied—*will* persist in invading the hours of night." And in elucidation of this point he remarks further, "There are mental troubles much worse than mere worry, for which an absorbing object of thought may serve as a remedy. There are skeptical thoughts, which seem for the moment to uproot the firmest faiths; there are blasphemous thoughts, which dart unbidden into the most reverent souls; there are unholy thoughts, which torture with their hateful presence the fancy that would fain be pure. Against all these some real mental work is a most helpful ally." (See Collingwood, 1899, pp. 321, 322.) This is good mental hygiene; and it is from this phase of the man's life that his other self was born.

He was a great maker of puns and parodies. He went in for rude but effective sketching and caricatures. He got on well with children, especially little girls, but he was stiff and reserved with adults. In short, his artistic productivity—which originally he never intended for publication—represents an ambivalent organization of interests and talents quite unlike those associated with his role and status in Oxford University and in the larger community.

In other artists one finds the expression of philosophic interests, the depiction of human suffering and human happiness in architecture, in sculpture, in painting, in the dance, in music, in poetry or prose. But to know the more precise significance of such activity for the artist himself would require a careful analysis of his life history in a particular society and culture. But art must appeal in terms of certain more or less universal or widely accepted features of culture and human experience. In Western culture, the classical writers and Dante, Chaucer, Shakespeare, Milton, and Goethe, to mention only a few names in literature, described facets of human life in terms which have remained meaningful for large

masses of mankind through the centuries or decades since their death. Yet, even so, how people define good art or bad depends upon their interests, education, and class status.

Some values in aesthetic experience. The appreciation of artistic work, whether in literature, music, sculpture, painting, dancing, or some other medium, depends upon the capacity of the person to identify himself with the meanings of the artistic product. Not that the appreciation of art is identical with the appreciation which the creator of art himself had for it. But art, to be significant, must rest upon its communicability. It must arouse in those who experience it emotions, feelings, and ideas associated in their minds with what they consider beautiful. Aesthetic standards, of course, are culturally determined, but within a wide range of accepted patterns the individual may find his own satisfactions. He may find release for emotional tensions, release from his difficulties, or expansive, joyous freedom and uninhibited activity. Zanzig (1935, p. 288) has thus described what artistic products do for him:

"For beauty has a way of bringing a man to himself, humbling him before its revelation of a larger and greater life, but at the same time exalting and stimulating him greatly by its intimation of his power to enter into that larger and greater life. Then all fears, petty schemes, meannesses, selfish gain and self-pity or adulation are seen in their littleness and the great things of life—courage, idealism, generosity, loyalty and real happiness—find their proper place. Emerson must have had such an experience one day when he wrote in his journal: 'Best of all is the admonition that comes to me from a natural demand of beauty, so naturally made, wheresoever her eye rests, that our ways of life, our indolences, indulgences and want of heroic action are shamed. Yet I love the "reproof." When that which is so fair and noble passes, I am enlarged, my thoughts grow more spacious, the chambers of the brain, the loves of the heart, are bigger.'"

The appeal of all art lies in the fact that persons find vicarious and substitutive reactions. The degree to which a particular aesthetic product will satisfy an individual depends obviously upon his own experience. The emotional satisfactions of art are well expressed in the following comment about music from the same writer (1935, p. 287):

"But it is a common experience that even apart from any sense of skill, music of fine, expansive feeling and excellence, though it be but a simple folk tune, gives us a sense of inner worth and well-being. We say that it is fine and expansive, gay or serene, noble, deeply joyous, heroic, free, romantic or aspiring, but these feelings are in ourselves, not in the music. Were we not ourselves endowed with these qualities, they would not exist for us in the music. It is thus ourselves, our own good qualities, that we are finding in the music."

The individual caught up in a mass of irritating obligations or the exasperating routine of work may find in a novel or in a motion picture

or in music a release from the tensions of everyday living. A person loses himself for an hour or so in the experiences of others or has aroused in him by music or dancing or a picture a set of daydreams or a world of emotions and meanings that bring him intense pleasure or temporary forgetfulness of unsolved problems. The pianist Harold Bauer (1934, p. 464) writes thus of the appeal of music as a recreational activity:

"... For music can give forgetfulness as well as joy. In its power to stimulate the imagination it can transmute trouble into something like detachment. Its appeal is equally to the head and to the heart. It is a humane occupation and a social activity in which there can be no loneliness. It has many forms which adapt themselves to all varieties of personalities."

This comment from a professional musician might be considered a case of special pleading were it not obvious that, for purposes of recreation and balance, aesthetic activities are found in all walks of life. The point is well illustrated in the lives of such prominent businessmen as Charles G. Dawes and the late William H. Woodin. Both men are well known for their avocational interests in music. Mr. Woodin described the function of music in his own life in these words:

"Precisely as the boy whistles instinctively to keep up his courage, so are we all crying for something to bring about confidence and to displace the absurd hysteria of fear which in the last few years has made men and women avoid the great human responsibilities which these dynamic times demand. Vibrations of fine music put a mysterious initiative, resolution, and courage into the normal individual. . . .

"It has been my experience in business life that after a very strenuous day—beautiful music. The effect can be described only as a kind of psychological bath. I feel cleansed mentally, and my mind is enormously rested." (Quoted by Zanzig, 1933, pp. 184, 185.)

In contrast to a person of high prestige like Mr. Woodin but similar in meaning to the individual is the experience of an old scrubwoman who won a second prize in a contest conducted by the New York Philharmonic Symphony Orchestra for the best story on the subject "The Spirit of the Stadium Concerts." The following account indicates what music meant to her:

"She had a sense of shame as she stood in line 'with all those young people to listen to the same music.' But she has been doing it 'just the same' for the last five years. When, however, the concert begins with the first faint sounds of the violin, she forgets all her years of sorrow and struggle and her seamed face and red, rough fingers:

"It brings me back into childhood, the large estate in my native land where we children roamed and played, unaware of the tragedies our future kept for us in storage. My youth, with its dreams of unusual things; then the years of crude reality. The births and deaths of my children.

"As the concert goes on, I see my little Emma like an aspen tree in her white

confirmation dress; my tall, agile Fred, so stately and proud in his soldier's uniform. We play, we sing together, we go to parks, museums. Oh! How happy we are with one another.' At the end of the stadium concert the children say to the scrubwoman: 'We must leave you now, but do not worry, we'll return next Sunday.' So she adds: 'It is on Sundays only at the Stadium that I am once more young, happy, and weep with sorrow and joy.' " 2

It must not be imagined that music and the other arts stimulate only the moral and finer aesthetic feelings. Art may arouse impulses and passions the overt expression of which a given society would consider immoral or violent. But the vicarious satisfactions of art must not be gainsaid. Even though a musical selection or a painting or a novel or a piece of sculpture may arouse sensuous impulses of a somewhat repressed sort, within the limits of imagination and mild overt expression our society does not attempt to taboo such art.

Some of the most interesting effects of music on the personality are witnessed in the use of music for therapeutic purposes. Recognizing certain individual differences among psychopathic patients, Boguslawski tried out music at the Chicago State Hospital for the Insane as a means of assisting patients to get well. He divided his musical selections into four classes, to which each patient was subjected. He thus describes his work (1932, p. 469):

"My theory was based upon finding one melody to which the patient would respond, believing that, within everyone, a certain melody entwines the romance and tragedy of the individual's life. I first began with the melodies of the nursery. The second group was devoted to melodies of childhood, ranging between the years of eight and twelve. I called those the 'Melodies of the Primary School Child.' The third group was limited to melodies of adolescence, ranging from twelve to twenty-two, the period of romantic manifestations. And the last group, the fourth, concerned itself with national songs and dances and music of the popular and classical type.

"The first case subjected to the experiment was that of a young Italian mother, age twenty-two, who became mentally deranged at childbirth, would have nothing to do with her baby, and was unresponsive to the happenings in her surroundings. Her condition developed into a psychosis, in which she considered herself unworthy of humanity and pleaded that she be treated like an animal. The three classes of melodies were presented, to which she showed no reaction, having to be held down in the chair by two nurses. When the fourth group of melodies was presented, such as Italian folk songs and Italian peasant songs, there seemed little or no success, and then *The Miserere* from 'Il Trovatore' was played. She broke down into a severe weeping spell, calling for her baby. When asked why it was she called for her child while this melody was being played, she said that this was the melody her father sang to her when she was a small child. In being led from the room she manifested a keen interest in the activities of the ward and asked when she could see her child.

2 Quoted in "The Scrub-woman's Music," *Literary Digest*, Sept. 10, 1932, Vol. 114, p. 19.

"The next type experimented with was a German girl, who was a catatonic, one of the severe types of mental derangement. She had not conversed with anyone for some three months and had shown no emotional display during that time. As the regular groups of melodies were presented to her, there were no reactions until the fourth group was applied and she responded to an old German song entitled *Du, du liegst mir im Herzen*. She gave vent to an extreme weeping spell, and, when asked why this melody brought tears, she said that it brought back to her memory a romance of her earliest girlhood. This patient was thirty-eight years of age and seemed to show considerable response to human activities in the ward.

"Another case of interest was that of a Belgian woman who displayed a very child-like silliness in her general conduct and seemed to dislike most music played to her of her nation until she heard the Belgian Hymn. Whereupon she recalled vividly her early experiences of prayer in the sanctuary of the church of her home town.

"An outstanding case was that of an American woman of thirty years of age whose derangement was due to childbirth and whose response to certain types of music was intensely interesting. It was my great desire to find not only such music as would soothe the patient, but also a particular type of music that would arouse the extreme emotions of the patient and to note the extent of her agitation. In trying numerous pieces, it developed that the Rachmaninoff *Prelude in G Minor* aroused the most hideous shrieks from this woman, and all through the performance of the composition she pleaded with the doctor and nurses that they have me stop playing this particular piece. I carried on the performance until I concluded it was the agitated rhythm that produced her condition, and then I played the *Spring Song* by Mendelssohn which developed a most serene mood in the patient and calmed her completely." (See also van de Wall and Liepmann, 1936.)

The possibility of arousing emotional states by music is also evident in the work of Dr. Walter Kluge, the German psychiatrist, who used music as a device for breaking down the resistances of his patients. Brandt (1932, p. 25), reporting on Kluge's work, states:

"Dr. Kluge noticed that his patients were sometimes struck with some particular melody. By repeating this air he could cause the patient to abandon all resistance and to act freely. Sometimes melodies, or even simple sounds, coming from other rooms, would be heard, and the patient, who had been struggling with all his strength against all attempts to make him 'let himself go,' would forthwith forget to use his mental weapons.

"Dr. Kluge then made experiments with difficult patients by playing to them certain tunes, or even successions of sounds—cadences that expressed different emotions, sometimes quite violent, fear, for instance. This was indicated so vividly that the patients felt again the emotions of their youth in all their original force. The sounds were repeated until the patient was quite unable to resist their influence."

Music, like other arts, serves as a release for pent-up impulses and emotions. It can arouse love, rage, fear, and any other emotion. As the English poet John Dryden puts it in describing the power of music:

“Thus, long ago
Ere heaving bellows learn'd to blow,
While organs yet were mute,
Timotheus, to his breathing flute
And sounding lyre
Could swell the soul to rage, or kindle soft desire.”

When we turn from creation to appreciation of art, we are concerned with other meanings, that is, its communicability in symbols of significance to those who see it, read it, or hear it. In our own day there are few topics, unless religion or politics, which arouse more vigorous discussion than the question, “Is it art?” Among people visiting art galleries showing futuristic sculpture and painting, for example, this sort of question is frequently overheard. And Curtiss (1931, p. 634) has thus described the debate between two house guests, who, up to the time the subject of art was broached, had got on excellently together:

“... We were sitting around in most perfect peace, Sunday evening, until casually Ralph happened to speak of somebody's ‘art.’ Whose art it was I cannot remember. In fact, I doubt whether, after fifteen minutes, it was remembered even by the contestants themselves; but the minute that that word had been mentioned our two guests were at each other like a couple of terriers. As nearly as I can recall it, Bee, in those days, had a theory that the one true subject for really great art was mankind's eternal struggle with the forces of nature, while Ralph stuck out for the conflicts of the individual with his own baser self. The result was that by midnight Ralph was telling Bee that, according to *her* theory, the world's greatest poem would be ‘The Wreck of the Hesperus’, to which Bee was retorting that, according to *his* ideas, it would be ‘The Face on the Barroom Floor.’ At a quarter of one they had somehow drifted into a stand-up fight on whether it took more genius to write *Pickwick Papers* or *The Stones of Venice* which they kept up until quarter of three, when Ralph suddenly clamped his hat on his head and strode into the darkness, while Bee burst into tears and went up to bed. Nor, to tell the truth, have I ever seen a discussion on art that ended very differently.”

For the man in the street, the aesthetic objects of the specialists and sophisticates may not be beautiful and pleasant at all. As in religious experience, people vary in their choice of experiences which may be labeled aesthetic, the art critics to the contrary notwithstanding. If the masses today get their artistic enjoyment from the motion picture, from billboard and other advertising, from the so-called cheaper novels and stories, or from swing music, we must realize that to them these values are as pleasant and perhaps as satisfying as the novels of Marcel Proust or Beethoven's *Fifth Symphony* is to a limited minority. While one must not gainsay the possible advantage of introducing all children to the opportunity for aesthetic creation on their own part, or to an understanding of

the delights of "better" art, we must not forget that, if art has a place in the individual life, it must touch that life at the vital point, that is, through the emotions and feelings. It can never do so in the purely intellectual sense, even for the critic and highly cultivated person, unless this intellectual concern is coupled with emotions and feelings. It is probably unwise ever to attempt to impose on the masses the higher and more logical foundations of aesthetics. These things, if they are to come at all, must grow slowly out of daily contact with good art, from creative education, and from other everyday activities of men and women in the world of economic, political, religious, recreational, and other social behavior. As Stein (1926, p. 143) well remarks:

"I have all my life been looking for some good reason why one *ought* to be interested in art, or should prefer good art to bad, but beyond such reasons as that art does less harm than alcohol or gambling, I have found no reason whatever within the limits of the usual discussions. What is commonly said, though often disguised in pseudo-profundities, is that the best people do so-and-so, and that every one should do the same. In short, the appeal is to authority."

The appeal to authority is but the appeal to the sense of class superiority and to prestige and has little in it to catch the imagination of the man in the street, who, as soon as he has heard the lecture on aesthetics, visited the art gallery, or listened to the symphony, is likely to sneak off to the first motion picture at hand, or to find himself a racy lover, or to enjoy an evening of modern ballroom dancing with his wife or sweetheart.

AVOCATIONS AND HOBBIES AS BALANCING FACTORS

An avocation is a form of nonutilitarian activity dependent upon personal interest. It is a form of behavior carried on parallel to one's usual occupation. It does not result in monetary reward or compensation. We ordinarily describe this sort of behavior with the word *hobby*. The hobby or avocation may express itself in aesthetic production, in recreational activities or games, in collecting objects, in amateur photography, in handicrafts, or in any number of other ways. In fact, avocations are usually activities which to other people are vocations. It is their parallel or supplementary character which makes them hobbies. The avocation is first of all closely linked with the individual's wishful thinking, with his more intimate interests. Collecting or creating objects or being successful at games is fundamentally not directed to the public acclaim or prestige so much as to personal satisfactions. Yet hobbies must and do receive certain public approval, as witnessed by interest in hobby shows,

and as evidenced in the fact that there are certain broad fields of activity which do represent avocational outlets in a given society. It has been found, too, on investigation that not infrequently hobbies themselves are closely related to the major occupation or profession. Thus, mechanics often continue at home with inventing machines, making models, or something not remote from their regular vocation. Yet psychologically these may be thought of as nonutilitarian interests.

On the other hand, many people get their greatest satisfaction from avocations which are quite remote from their own specialty. One well-known biologist is a competent literary critic. Many businessmen have taken up the fine arts. (Note the reference to Woodin and Dawes above.) I know a professional painter whose spare time is taken up with hunting and fishing and with making trout flies, fishing rods, hunting knives, knapsacks, and the like.

The appeal of and satisfaction in more private avocations and creative activities doubtless rest upon early psychological conditioning. If we accept G. H. Mead's view that our relations to material objects really derive their meanings from our relations to persons, and if we recognize that these first social contacts are of an intimate nature, involving not only visual and auditory interstimulation but the important though more rudimentary senses of touch and smell, and if we realize that what W. I. Thomas calls the desire for intimate response is an outgrowth of these early interactions, then it is easy to see that personal hobbies may provide a great deal of emotional satisfaction. They become sublimated intimacies with material things or language products which reach back for their pleasurable results to the more primary person-to-person contacts. In other words, just as we get release from mental conflicts and suppressed wishes in intimate comradeship or in the small congeniality group, so here in actual overt contact with material objects or through intimate writing we get a similar sense of personal touch, of close relationship, of a chance to do just what we wish to do without let or hindrance from others.

In this connection it is interesting to observe that people's most satisfying avocations are often considered to be so personal that they are known, at best, only to their closest friends. In fact, sometimes the most satisfying hobbies are considered too private to be shared with anyone else. People often keep to themselves their collections, their intimate diaries, their lyric poems, or the paintings, sculpture, or other material objects which they have produced. But the basis of these satisfactions, I suggest, rests originally upon person-to-person contacts in the early years. They give pleasure because to the individual they symbolize or represent an overt expression of his deeper self, a self which is, after all, a social product. As obvious evidence of the social character of these surreptitious activities, it is interesting to note that many persons in working at their

hobbies talk to the objects as if they were persons, or else do what is much the same, talk to themselves about them.³

These instances typify the balancing function of hobbies in the lives of these people. They provide an outlet for deep and otherwise unsatisfied wishes. Another person whom I know clearly represents the function of a strong avocation in the face of a professional career—a successful one, both financially and in prestige—which was projected on this man by an overdominant father. The man is a physician and surgeon, but after twenty-five years of practice in medicine and surgery he retains an intense interest in civil engineering and draws sketches, plans engineering projects, and reads widely in this field. He can never forget, he says, that he *really* wanted to be an engineer. The cartoons labeled “Our Secret Ambition” illustrate the popular recognition of this sort of interest.

An incipient hobby which might have developed but never did is well illustrated in the following comment of a professional man:

“As a youngster I spent hours drawing plans for houses, barns, laying out grounds of estates I daydreamed about. I have never had a course in drafting, architectural drawing, or read a history of architecture in my life—yet I still retain an interest in buildings and in styles of architecture. My reading in history, some casual attention to articles and books on art, and my observations in travel are the basis of what little I know about my secret interest. My ambition is not strong enough to lead me to give hours of time to it, but it might have become an abiding hobby. It is my own belief that when people’s major work commands their deeper interests and wishes, hobbies or avocations are not so likely to develop. They are not necessary, one might say, for the personality. The man whose vocation serves as an integrating or focusing principle in his life, who enjoys his work and effort in this vocation, may find that he does not need the balancing hobby that another may. Or he may find his recreation in other lines—in activities which would not be called hobbies.”⁴

The variation in expression of interests is an involved matter, and, when most of one’s fundamental drives are directed toward an all-absorbing profession or job, the usefulness of hobbies—or of religion or of art also—may not be very evident. In such individuals there is often a sort of hierarchy of interests, some dominant, others subsidiary, but all directed to the major aim or task or goal. But few, if any, of us are fortunate enough to be in such circumstances. Hence, religion, artistic expression, hobbies, or play life may provide balancing items in life organization.

³ It would be worth knowing if and how people differ in the degree to which they verbalize, and hence socialize, their intimate experiences. My observation leads me to believe that many people talk a great deal to themselves, either inwardly—that is, in so-called thought—or more vocally, but that others have only emotions, feelings, and un verbalized impulses in regard to such private matters. It would be enlightening to know whether extroverted individuals indulge in such private dramatization of their own experiences as extensively as introverts. I doubt that they do.

⁴ From a personal communication.

If the societal order, as in the communistic or totalitarian state, aims to provide the citizen with a central core for integration, the other items in the behavior matrix may easily fall into a pattern of relations coordinated to this major focus. This would produce an integration. In a diffuse and highly variable society like that of present-day America, we lack this culturally approved aim. One of the challenges today is, of course, to provide a focus, an ideal if you will, which will serve to integrate the wishes and interests of the citizen. Whether we Americans can do this for ourselves remains to be seen.

Chapter XXX

PERSONALITY, SOCIETY, AND CULTURE

AS A RESULT of the difficulties arising from current changes in culture, we are all concerned with the problem as to what kind of world we wish or may be obliged to live in during the future decades. More particularly, we ask: What influence will the form of society and culture have upon the personality? For example, what effects are implied for individuals when the culture is rigidly planned out for them in advance by policy makers who do not consult them? Or, in contrast, what may be done within the framework of co-operative initiative to guide and shape the culture without at the same time losing certain values of initiative, individualism, and freedom which we prize so highly? The aim of the present chapter is to discuss some of the implications of this broader but basic topic of the relation of the individual to the society and culture in which he lives.

TWO FUNDAMENTAL FEATURES: FIXITY AND FLEXIBILITY

In examining the relation of the organism to the environment and more specifically of man to his social-cultural milieu, we have had occasion to indicate the interplay of two important aspects of this process: fixity and flexibility. We have noted that the human constitution is marked by these two features; and that in some ways the environment may also be described broadly in these two concepts. In other words, fixity and flexibility may be said to characterize both the human organism and the social-cultural world in which it operates.

Fixity relates to order, stability, and rigidity of structure and function. It provides the basis for consistency, certainty, and hence prediction and control. It is evident in many of the underlying physiological activities of the individual; in the social-cultural area, in the highly standardized forms of law and ritual. *Flexibility* has to do with changeability and variation, with certain instabilities. It furnishes the foundation for freedom of operation, for uncertainty, novel adaptation, and uniqueness. It does not contribute to ease of control or prediction. At the organic level it is seen in the variability of adaptive reactions, in the wealth of associational possibilities of the cerebral cortex; at the level of society and

culture it is witnessed in individual deviation from norms, in relatively free choice as to interest or action, in invention, novelty, and individualized thought and action.

From this standpoint, then, personal and group life might be described as a combination of the interplay of the factors making for rigidity and those making for variety or flexibility. Within this broad framework we are concerned, in relation to the constitution, with the manner in which drives and learning operate; and, on the environmental side, with the place of fixity and flexibility in the social-cultural planning of expectancies, that is, obligations and permissibilities.

Elaboration of motivation and satisfaction within society and culture.

The biopsychic unity of mankind is exemplified in the universality of an individual's basic urges, drives, impulses, needs—call them what you will—and in the simple direct manner of their satisfaction. In a sense they typify a biological stability, although there are, of course, certain limited deviations as to their strength or intensity. Yet in man these motivations and satisfaction goals are highly modifiable as to form and content. In contrast to the lower animals, man is characterized not only by a prolongation of infancy but by a much greater flexibility, expressed in our terms as learning capacity. In the adjustment of the infant and growing child to the social-cultural-material world, his capacity for training, for facilitation, inhibition, and organization of sensory-motor processes, plays a large part. Thus nature not only furnishes us with certain fixed wants or impulses at the outset, but also provides us with a means for qualifying and extending both the drive and the manner of its satisfaction. And the character and direction of these modifications and extensions are determined by social and cultural factors. As fundamental demands are blocked or redirected, variations in adaptability become evident. Let us review some of the essentials of cultural and societal influences in this process.

Culture provides the individual with his basic value systems (ideas, attitudes, frames of reference, social myths) and his basic patterns of practice (habits, overt and linguistic). Together these make up the fundamental expectancies of thought and conduct. If the basic drives typify certain fixities, and learning ability certain flexibilities, so, too, some aspects of culture are rigid in contrast to others which are much more loose and varied in form and content. The former are represented by the *obligatory* or mandatory features, illustrated in the mores, laws, and rituals which concern the deeper values—usually including the food and shelter needs, those having to do with reproductive and familial life, those dealing with community or civic protection and stability, and finally those related to devices for ensuring the continuity of culture itself. Actually, of course, varying degrees of fixity may be found with reference to any

item or cluster of culture patterns. It often happens, in fact, that we find an elaboration of inflexible features of culture which have no rational utilitarian justification. For example, ceremonials, rituals, and conventions of a rather rigid sort may be found intertwined with others more directly related to individual or group survival. So, too, such standardized patterns of activity may operate in areas of conduct which in another society might be marked by high individualization.

Second, there are *permissive* patterns in which there is much individual choice, much flexibility. These may be limited to dual or at best a few selections—the “alternatives” of Linton’s theory—or they may cover a wide range of choice. But it should be recognized that both the mandatory and the permissive patterns persist with broad cultural limits. For that matter, one society may permit, expect, and encourage wide deviation and freedom while another does not.

Then, too, there are always those areas of interaction which cultural dicta do not reach—those which we have labeled personal-cultural. These, however, will be somewhat restricted by the culture, although it is doubtful if culture ever acts to eliminate or control all of these completely. If it does not, flexibility and divergence, at least in this dimension of inter-individual contact, cannot be prevented or entirely destroyed.

Moreover, with respect to balancing and integrating principles, culture tends to provide, on the whole, some basic ethos or core of values. This may, and does, reveal wide variation. The Christian life of complete renunciation of the flesh may mark one; the puritanical, Spartan ideal of valor, courage, and power manifestations another; and the zealous adherence to a “party line” or a divine or undying universal “principle” still another. In our own recent past a high degree of individualistic attainment has been considered such a fundamental value. But in any case culture, unless in a process of great change or of decay—usually a reflection of profound shifting of the locus of power and value systems—tends to provide a focus for the person’s thought and action, permissive as well as mandatory.

These obligatory and permissive forms and values, however, always operate within a framework of human interaction, that is, within the social act. That is to say, these cultural factors have no significance unless we take into account the nature of the associational configuration as well. In this matter our familiar dichotomies are of help: first the contrast between primary and secondary groups; and, second, the oppositional contacts of in-group and out-group.

The primary group, especially the family, furnishes a matrix for intimate, face-to-face identification, involving both co-operative and antagonistic responses. We know that the early contacts with the mother, the father, the siblings, and others in the household color the whole sub-

sequent personality history. The spontaneous play group affords an important extension of such intimate contacts. So, too, the community relations are represented in the close-knit neighborhood and small village. At the outset these identifications are largely of a totalistic, all-or-none nature; only later do the segmentalization and differentiation of role begin to reflect themselves in the varied "me's" of the self.

In these primary group contacts, moreover, both rational or logical and irrational or fantasy elements play a part. Love, fear, and aggression get in their play, as does rational learning, in the acquirement of motor skills and ideas that help us in our utilitarian adaptation to the environment. But all these are relatively circumscribed within the limits of the familial, play, neighborhood, and village relations, and the result is that the mental-emotional horizons of children and adults are correspondingly restricted.

By way of contrast the secondary-group organization of society is characterized by expansion and segmentalization of interest and action, by voluntary associations in terms of special interests, by a considerable amount of rational choice, and by an impersonality and transitoriness of relationships that ramifies through almost all contacts.

In the economic field this is indicated by the minute division of labor, by the monetary nexus of person-to-person dealing, wherein money replaces the personal loyalty and personal service found in the older primary-group world, by separation of employer from employee in work, by the impersonal yet legally personalized corporate form of business association, and by the whole drift toward a rationality of operations in which the logic of the machine and the financial market dominate men's occupational role and status. With regard to civic affairs, complexity and impersonality are revealed in an extensive bureaucracy and in the extension of rules and laws covering an increasingly wide range of daily activities—in short, by a continued intrusion of the political state into everyday matters, economic, communal, recreational, and otherwise. Education has not escaped this same impress, as witnessed in mass pedagogy and lock-step curricular expectancies and indoctrination. Then, too, recreation has become largely depersonalized, commercialized, and more and more mechanized, with the result that active participation gives way to passive vicarious entertainment. Religion and the arts also tend to reflect the institutionalization and complexity of secondary life patterns.

In due course these impersonal, special-interest, and highly differentiated relations, and their accompanying cultural values and practices, influence the family and neighborhood to a point where we can see the disappearance of many of the intimate and comprehensive interactions in these groups also. The decline of economic, educational, civic, recreational, and religious functions in the home is an evidence of these altered values.

The participation in secondary associations represents for the individual divergent forms of motive and satisfaction. Put into the terms of G. H. Mead, the person builds up a set of "me's" with reference to specific groups or their members, and sometimes the antagonistic interests and forms of overt conduct inhibit the development of a rounded, integrated, and focused "generalized other," which is the ideal of the philosophers of ethics. What one finds, in fact, is a variety of "generalized others" or general traits and attitudes representing these external specialized group contacts; and at times these patterns may come into conflict with those built up in other associational contacts, especially in the primary configurations. In many ways, widespread societal groupings such as we experience today tend to produce a dissociated and conflicting mental organization within the individual. There is a loss of *integrity* because the demands of these many and devious interests do not harmonize with each other.

In other words, individuality comes to mean not rounded identification with family, play group, or primary community members, but an attenuated form of identification with partial aspects of life, with impersonal symbols, with diffuse associations and activities that are often schizoid in character. The *anomie* of which Emile Durkheim wrote is all too evident in societies marked by such strong emphases on secondary interactions. Integration, if it be attained, then, is likely to be tenuous and at best focused on some kind of symbol which has somehow been pulled out from our primary experiences. In our own society, the stress on individualism and rationality means that warm and personal emotional support and security are easily lost or frequently absent. Security tends to be sought in externalized contacts and by assurances of the institutional order around us, not by face-to-face family and primary contacts. The loss of this familial pattern, in truth, is illustrated in the evident frustration of many people today who are starved for want of outlets into intimate responsiveness on the part of others.

To turn to the other dichotomy of group relations, the personality function of the in-group versus out-group contacts and symbols has been indicated at many points throughout this book. The in-group, either primary or secondary, affords the foundation for close identification in sympathy, affection, and co-operation. In contrast, the out-group gives one a culturally approved outlet for rivalry, envy, hatred, aggressiveness, and other frustrated tendencies. These strong emotionalized attitudes and habits built up toward various out-groups, therefore, provide a means by which the person may integrate the ambivalent trends of love and hate, of inclinations of approach and withdrawal, of co-operation and conflict. And the adequate understanding of the problem of opposition or mutual aid, be it between nations, between laborers and employers,

between sectarians, or between any other groups, depends upon the recognition of these ambivalent patterns within the individual.

CULTURAL DETERMINATION OF PERSONAL LIFE ORGANIZATION

In the light of our present-day personal and societal distress, anxiety, uncertainty, and insecurity, we hear much of planning, of prearrangement of the society and culture, aimed at providing individual satisfactions and a stable social-cultural order. And at once the obvious question arises: Can a cultural framework be produced which will mold personality into a more satisfactory form? That is to say, if we had a perfect cultural order—values, institutions, and patterns of practice—would we remove distress and disorganization? This question cannot be solved in the light of our present knowledge and skill. Of much more immediate and practical concern is the matter of how present-day divergences in cultural value systems may modify, direct, and control the life organization of men and women in our own time. A number of different schemata for inducing a better life have been propounded, and I should like to comment briefly on the two most sharply contrasted patterns extant today. I refer to the contrast between the life philosophy represented in various totalitarian systems and those typified in representative democracy. The former is illustrated in the totalistic, completely organizing schema of economic-political-social life under the aegis of some powerful party or association. The best examples are found in Nazi Germany, in the Soviet Union, and to some extent in Fascist Italy.¹ As examples of representative democratic countries, we are familiar with Great Britain, the Dominions, France, this country, and a scattering of certain other countries, chiefly in continental Europe. Let us take up a sketch of totalitarianism first.

The totalitarian way of life. The basic theory of totalitarianism is that the state is coterminous with the society of individuals and groups within a given national boundary. Second, it rests upon an essential belief in aristocracy—innate or culturally determined by party affiliation. That is to say, it operates on a firm conviction that the state and hence society, to be effective, must rely on a rigid class structure. At the top of the power pyramid is the ruling élite—the chosen group whose god-given function is to manage, direct, and look after the rest of the populace.

As to the significance of the ordinary individual, this thesis is essentially one which takes a derogatory view of the nature of man, a sort of man-the-fallen-angel conception. There is implicit if not explicit in this theory the idea that the ordinary people are not fit by nature to rule

¹ Despite much talk and the over-all character of the Fascist government, it is doubtful if Italy has been brought as completely under the totalitarian system as have Germany and the Soviet Union, at least to the period of this writing.

or control themselves, politically, economically, or otherwise. They must be protected, directed, and "saved" by the dictates of an ascendant class who know what is "good" and "proper" for the masses.

In addition to a more or less fixed class system, there is found some sort of central integrating focus around which the state—which is the whole society—must revolve. This may be some eternal cause or principle of proletarian rule, symbolized in Marx, Lenin, and Stalin. It may be the personalized expression of the theory that *Der Staat ist Macht* ("The state is power") symbolized in a *Führer* (leader, guide, friend) named Hitler. But in either case the myth of divinity soon arises—or is deliberately fostered—and becomes an essential core of the entire totalitarian movement. This personification of leadership is significant, as is the intimate form of organization of the dominant party itself into small "cells" or units, co-ordinated into larger groups on up to the headmen of the entire movement. As a matter of fact, the symbols of small intimate associations and of a protector and *Führer* are effective because they draw upon two basic primary-group symbols—intimacy of the family, and the role of the benevolent but protecting, hence obedience-demanding, father. This carry-over from primary to secondary grouping of fundamental family symbols constitutes one of the most powerful and telling appeals of the totalitarian dictatorship.

In such a state-society all activities are fixed in advance, all values are predetermined for the individual. His identifications are prepared for him without his participation. He is expected to accept and follow these objects and interests. There are to be no doubts, no questions, and no equalitarian interaction in policy-making or execution of programs. In short, the configuration is one of superordination and subordination throughout. It is a rigid and closed social-cultural system. At the top are the rulers, at the bottom the robots whose function and duty are to obey. There are no variabilities in civic, economic, religious, or other activities; there is only mass conformity. There are, ideologically or in practice, no "ifs," "ands," or "buts"; no asking of "why" or "wherefore," only the asking perhaps of "how." In linguistic analogy it is a world of the imperative and declarative sentence with no qualifying phrases or clauses.

Psychologically the ruling élite present a deliberate program of rationality with adequate techniques of accomplishment at hand, coupled, however, with irrational, fantastic appeals which arouse but nevertheless aim to control the emotions and deeper values. There is a great stress on action. There is no stress on public thinking or discussion. In the words of Mussolini, symbolizing the attitude, "We are done with talk." Or, in the sarcasm of a Hitler, democratic leaders are weak because they would confer, discuss, and compromise rather than threaten and strike with force and certitude when their interests are at stake.

In this connection totalitarianism attempts a complete control of the stimuli which reach the masses—young and old alike. Since there are to be no alternate ways of thought or action, it is necessary for the élite to make sure that no extraneous or disturbing stimuli reach the populace. Such a cultural program leaves nothing to chance or flexibility of individuals or groups, at least outside the dominant class. There is a complete censorship of news, a taboo on discussion, and a potent agency, such as the secret police and informers, to keep the people in line. Moreover, a rich fantastic propaganda fills the masses with the "right" emotions and rationalizations. Then, too, the populace tends to be kept at a high pitch of hysterical and paranoid fervor in support of the regime by stories of the threat of war from other countries, or of the dangers from secret enemies within the community—the role of the scapegoat at home, be he Jew, bourgeois banker, or resistant kulak. Coupled with great promises as to the future happiness, this mythology of the vicious out-group also helps to keep the masses from doing any serious thinking about alternative forms of life.

In short, there is a distinct narrowing of the range of interaction; there is an omnipresent and omnipotent rigidity in the nature and direction of social and cultural contacts. There results, of course, a restriction of the possible "me's," of the variability of traits and attitudes we might find elsewhere. One's roles and status are fixed, limited, and predetermined.

Yet one may ask: Can such a system prevent the rise of uniqueness in personality; can it entirely inhibit, or block the consideration of, alternative forms of life organization? Will there not remain areas of subjective thought and emotion and of personal-social conditioning which the state cannot reach? Will not certain divergent culture patterns arise as a result of deviant thought, and will not these in time spread and offer to other individuals that very opposing or divergent form and content of thought and action out of which variant consciousness, individual difference, and perhaps counterrevolution are born? Or is it possible to mold the personality into a rigid, limited, more or less completely predictable robot that will always do the bidding of the élite? There is no doubt that such a fixed pattern of life offers an integrating principle and an organization of ideas, traits, and attitudes which leave no room for dissociation, for doubts, distresses, or emotional insecurities. But it is not the sort of life which will result in personal choice of adventuresome enterprise, in more or less personally directed growth, in the emergence of novelty and variation that make not only for personal satisfaction but perhaps for a more healthy co-operative or group existence as well.

The democratic way of life. Representative democracy as a value rests essentially on the thesis of the sacredness and personal integrity of the individual, and of the acceptance of various involuntary and voluntary

associations which man may form with his fellows. Second, according to this theory, the state is the servant, not the master, of society. In fact, the society is larger than and ultimately dominant over the state as a functioning source of political power. In addition to the traditional separation of political roles (legislative, executive, and judicial), in addition to the essential reign of law rather than of individual whim, and besides the legal protection of the minority against the majority and of the latter against the militant, violent-minded minority, representative democracy has set up further safeguards in the way of assurances of the rights of free speech, free press, and peaceable assemblage—essentially designed to express the will, the criticism, and the final source of control over the political state itself. And, despite the fact that a class structure or pyramid of power exists in democratic countries today, on the whole, political and societal power tends to rest in the last analysis with the general citizenry which expresses its will in public sentiment and in stipulated and legalized forms of election of its representatives.

Yet it should be noted that these forms of control arose under primary-group organization and are still largely fashioned upon the simpler village and rural society of the preindustrial era. The rise to dominance of secondary-group forms of interaction has put a great strain upon the older representative system of politics. Bureaucracy, extension of law, impersonality of legal relations—all these, we noted above, have come into civic life, and many feel that the older forms are no longer applicable to present complex society and culture.²

The sacredness of the person, which is the key value of democracy as we are using the term here, has been ably defended in the social-psychological theories of John Dewey, Charles H. Cooley, and George H. Mead. The crucial interactional configuration in democracy is that of a more or less equalitarian give-and-take which permits of variability, freedom of choice, and voluntary participation in group activities. Here individual selection of role has a place, ideally in terms of merit chiefly; here freedom is linked to individual responsibility in work, in policy-making, and in social action generally. But again there is always danger lest undue emphasis on individualism may lead to extreme segmentalization, to excessive impersonality of relations, and to lack of integrity. One of the basic problems in a diffuse democratic society is how to retain variability, uniqueness, and flexibility without losing co-operation, sympathy, and certain essential fixities in the social order that are necessary to complex culture and all that it may mean for individual security and satisfaction.

² The spread of economic co-operatives in Europe and America may be thought some indication of the persistence of the democratic pattern; the revival of public forums and the rise of adult education (see below) may be considered another; and the attempts to induce rural people to participate in community and county planning indicate that the representative value system is not as decadent as some critics imagine it to be.

The greatest challenge to representative democracy is how to co-ordinate collective force to preserve order or fixity and yet ensure freedom or flexibility to the greatest number of individuals.

The preservation of the belief that society is larger than the state may well be considered fundamental. Another value is the hope not yet realized that the school—interpreted broadly to include child, adolescent, and adult education—may become not only the means of intellectual and vocational training and of indoctrination of essential values but also the institutional framework within which the ideology and the practice of democracy itself may be worked out more fully. In truth, the contrast of totalitarianism and representative democracy is nowhere more sharply demonstrated than in reference to education. Let us comment on some of the more significant differences in the conception of education under these two ideologies.

Education under totalitarian and democratic cultures. The school is fundamental to the continuity of culture and to the training of the young in the expected and acceptable forms of social participation. If the aim is to fix and mold the personality into rigid forms, this must be done in the earliest years, beginning in the nursery and continuing until the proper rigidity is so established that there can be no turning aside or deviation from the predetermined patterns. The totalitarian state has always seized upon the educational system as crucial to its success. Through the schools fixed social myths and legends are perpetuated; the curriculum is devised to furnish the wonted skills, knowledge, and indoctrination in the fundamental philosophy. If there is to be any freedom at all, it is narrowly restricted to devices to further the fixed cause and program. It has no place in policy or plan, except among members of the élite.

In contrast, the schools of representative democracy—though still smacking of class distinctions and still bound to certain outmoded forms—retain the essential freedom of the society which makes them possible. Moreover, under the stimuli of men like Dewey, Kilpatrick, Washburne, and other educational leaders, there is a growing awareness that the school itself may and should play an ever larger part in the total civic process. That is to say, the fundamental standpoint of the newer education seems to be not only that the school is to transmit the past culture in as effective a manner as it can, but that it should also come to take a more active part in criticizing and even directing the whole societal-cultural ideology and practice in a representative democracy. When such a theory is applied only to children and adolescents, it may strike one as being absurd and impractical; but when adult education is included in the plan it does not. That is to say, the school may come to replace the disappearing neighborhood and village primary group as the center of

civic life. But for the present this program remains more a dream than a reality.

At present the school is not equipped to carry such an obligation. So-called progressive education is still confined to the upper bourgeois classes. Adult education has hardly got its stride as a vital force in community affairs. And there is not yet at hand, in our own country at least, a fundamental ideal or philosophy which will serve today as a rallying cry, as a symbol of co-operation and democratic participation. Constructive criticism of public affairs we are beginning to get in the schools and through such educational devices as the public forum. But a rounded program of democratic procedure operating through the schools awaits a central focus and a feasible plan of co-operative action. Yet in our educational training it is possible to lay the groundwork for this type of control, first by stressing individual initiative directed to a common or group goal, and, second, by training in the all-important realization that mature responsibility may accompany individual choice and individual action. The promise is there; whether we can fulfill it remains to be seen.

Conclusion. Finally the matter comes down to the kind of personality which we wish to have, to a value system as it concerns itself with the personal life organization. From the democratic point of view the aim of personality training is the maximum individuality or uniqueness within the framework of necessitous group obligations. That is to say, we want the greatest degree of flexibility and variation compatible with that degree of fixity which will ensure the social order. But this is a grave problem in a complex secondary world such as ours. The loss of primary-group ideals and patterns is all too evident; the strain on integrity in the highly segmentalized society is all too apparent. Just how to synchronize the two—the primary face-to-face intimacy and idealism with the advantages of a detailed division of labor and a complex societal structure and function—remains to be discovered. We need an integrative principle in democracy, and we need identification with group activity which will operate at the sympathetic primary level. We should have a sound economic security which will operate without causing individuals to lose their sense of personal responsibility. But in addition we need a training which will give the individual an internal value system which will function to stimulate freedom of choice and a sense of responsibility. In totalitarianism security of a kind is purchased at the expense of choice, and the degree of responsibility is narrowly fixed to the role and status determined for individuals by those at the peak of the power pyramid. Moreover, among the latter there so easily emerges a kind of freedom with little or no check of public responsibility—an aspect of ascendancy in these societies which is fraught with serious consequences, as witness the unconscionable exploitation of the masses for the selfish ends of those at the top.

Then, too, on the wider front we ought to have some co-ordination of our attachment to locality and nation with the recognition of the rights and expectancies of other nationals. Can we, in the terms of G. H. Mead, develop a "generalized other" which will include these outsiders and yet permit the retention of a self comprised chiefly of the identifications nearer home? This is a problem which has not yet been solved.

It is easy to see that we should get an enrichment of the personality by the stimulation of a variety of selves which are centered in one general ideal or self. But where should one's fundamental public loyalty lie? In the locality, the nation, the social class, or the international order, as tenuous as the last is? This query puts before us a severe test. We do not know if or how this ideal may be attained. Perhaps men do prefer a fixed security, a fixed role and status—though a lowly one—to an adventuresome, dangerous, and somewhat uncertain one. In other words, do men essentially prefer fixity to flexibility? Will they, especially in the face of prolonged economic and other hardship, sacrifice individual initiative, choice, and responsibility for settled security and predictability? Or would it be possible to get a minimum of economic security—linked to responsibility for occupational career—which at the same time would permit free outlets in other dimensions of activity and thought? Can we get variation established as a high cultural value without at the same time losing solidarity, certainty, and co-operation with our fellows? Those who have faith in the democratic values believe also that individuality is a basic value and that man is capable of a combination of free choice and responsibility.

Those who follow the totalitarian philosophy would degrade man to an automaton who will find his security—economic and emotional—in compliance with a state-society cultural patterning that demands of him rigid obedience, but allows little or no free choice or personal responsibility.

There is a struggle of ideology and practice going on in the world today, and men's futures are bound up with this conflict. And the implicit tragedy is that all too often, in fighting to preserve the democratic values, men may find that they have lost them and have taken on the very regimentation, the very fixity, which those on the other side of the struggle have been standing for and practicing all along. This itself constitutes the greatest challenge of war and peace in the present disorganized world. What dare the individual expect in the face of this dilemma? Perhaps he may at least find some comfort in the ancient proverb that "hope springs eternal in the human breast" and in the fact that there are still men and women willing to sacrifice all in order to preserve some modicum of the principles of individual liberty and the self-determination of peoples.

APPENDIX: AN OUTLINE FOR WRITING
A CASE HISTORY

BIBLIOGRAPHY AND INDEX OF NAMES

INDEX OF SUBJECTS

Appendix

AN OUTLINE FOR WRITING A CASE HISTORY

BEFORE preparing a case history, it may be well to reread the discussion on the life-history method in Chapter XI, especially pages 250-258 and 265-268.

This outline may be employed as a basis for a case record or life history prepared from interviews and from data obtained from various institutional records, such as those of the school, the hospital, the social-work agency, the clinic, the business or industrial firm, and the correctional or other public or semipublic institution designed to care for delinquent, neglected, or dependent children or adults. Or the outline may be used as a guide in the preparation of an autobiography. If it is used for this latter purpose, the writer of his own life story should not consider the outline as a modified questionnaire, but rather as an aid to guide him in going over the significant features of his life. While attention should be given to an accurate recording of the major objective facts such as ages, occupations, places of residence, schooling, and the like, the chief aim of the autobiography is to secure a more or less free narrative of the personality development and function. A convenient procedure is to familiarize oneself with the major divisions of the outline before beginning to write, perhaps making notes as memories or ideas occur to one during the reading of the various topics listed. But the details of the outline are at best suggestive "leads." One should not go through the outline as if it were a formal set of questions. Moreover, many matters in your own experience may not fit into the scheme suggested here. The individual should by all means feel free to follow his own conception of writing and presentation. It is often a good practice to write the life story at one sitting, or at least to work at the job continuously for extended periods rather than to do it in small segments of work. Naturally, one should write under conditions favorable to quiet concentration on the task. Be specific; present concrete events and actual incidents rather than abstract comments. Frequently items that by themselves seem trivial may in the total context be of considerable significance; for example, little injuries to self-esteem, happy experiences on particular occasions, or thwartings in childhood or adolescence that would not affect one as an adult may have meant much at the time and may have left some residue of trait, attitude, or habit that has a place in one's present life. Trifles, in fact, are often important clues to underlying significances.

I. DATA ON FAMILY

INDIVIDUAL'S OWN FAMILY

1. Age, sex, and names of all family members: parents and children.
2. Residential history: rural, small-town, urban; also immigrant background, if pertinent.

3. Health history of each member (brief).
4. Occupation of chief wage-earner—and prior vocation, if pertinent.
5. Religious affiliation of family, and degree of participation in church activities.
6. Political affiliations of family members, and participation.
7. Educational attainment of family members.
8. Status of family in community: reputation, role, and leadership.
9. Other persons in household than own immediate family: sex, age, numbers, function, relationship.

HISTORY OF FATHER'S FAMILY

Record essential data as listed above under A, 1-9, if available.

HISTORY OF MOTHER'S FAMILY

Record essential data as listed above under A, 1-9, if available.

DESCRIPTION OF THE FAMILY CULTURE PATTERNS

A narrative of the history of the family as a unit, its traditions, aims, ideals. The place of old memories of family legends of events long past. Family "get-togethers"; what is talked about at these times. Intimate intrafamily secrets; sense and degree of solidarity. Rivalry patterns; co-operative patterns. What family members and relatives do for one another: The story of the rise or decline of the family in social-economic status. The patterns of ambition set before the children by parents and other relatives.

II. DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE INDIVIDUAL

Since the basic matter in the life history is the interplay between the person and his social-material environment (the situation: group, individuals, material things), it is wise to combine (if possible) the description of the social interactions and external situations with the individual's own responses—overt and covert—to these situations.

CHILDHOOD AND PREADOLESCENCE

A. SITUATIONS

1. **Mother-child contacts.** Nature and extent of fundamental habit training: feeding, sphincter controls, sleep, play, etc. Nature and degree of consistency in habit training. Nature and extent of discipline imposed. Dependency patterns, and stimulation of child's independence and self-control by others. Favoritism; rejection. Any projection of aims on child. Mother as ideal.

2. **Father-child relations.** Nature and extent of father-child contacts in early years: imposition of demands for obedience, loyalty, and compliance. Nature of any conflicts. Play relations with father. Projections of father on child respecting aims. Rejection; favoritism. Father as ideal.

3. **Intersibling contacts.** Affection, rivalry, envy, jealousy, indifference; situations giving rise to these.

4. **Other household members.** Nature and extent of contact with relatives living in home, with servants; reactions to visitors—children and adults.

5. Playmates, companions, friends, enemies. Nature and extent of early play contacts; interference from parents or other adults; types of status relations developed: dominance or submission. Place of comradeship, congeniality groupings, gang experiences, in early years. Place of rivals, enemies, oppositional patterns.

6. Relations to neighbors and community. Nature and extent of contacts: friendly or avoidant; rise of notion of we-group—of our family and neighborhood as against other groups. Reaction to the policeman and other community authorities.

7. Early school contacts. Initial adjustments at school: fellow-pupils, teachers. Nature and extent of any difficulties in adaptation to the educational regimen.

B. INDIVIDUAL'S RESPONSES

1. Reactions to fundamental training. Frustrations and other reactions, aggression or avoidance, resistant behavior; fears and anxieties; compulsions and demands for attention.

2. Dependency functions. Role of mother, father, siblings, playmates, teachers, and others: meaning of, to child.

3. Sense of emotional security. Sources and meaning of same.

4. Inferiority feelings. How set up, with reference to what situations; means of handling same—avoidance, compensation, overcompensation, daydreaming.

5. Fantasy life. Nature and extent of; objectification of, in play; accommodation of, to culturally accepted outlets—reading, motion pictures, listening to radio fiction and drama.

6. Growth of self-confidence. Self-assurance and self-reliance; willingness and readiness to assume more and more responsibility for own acts.

7. Rise of conscience (moral self; superego). Sense of guilt and shame, about what situations. Growth of tendency to blame others.

8. Fundamental interests and aims (aspirations). Externalized or internalized play; hobbies; rise of vocational aspirations.

9. Development of appropriate social roles with reference to individuals and groups. Emergence of moral self, of "generalized other."

10. Emerging status or prestige value in relation to groups and individuals.

11. Degree of satisfaction or happiness in the early years.

ADOLESCENCE

A. SITUATIONS

1. Parent-child. Parents' preparation of child for pubertal changes; new relations with coming of puberty and adolescence: conflicts, aids from mother and father in meeting difficulties; stimulation to become freed from home ties or insistence on continuation of earlier dependency patterns. Degree of understanding by parents of adolescent's attempts at emancipation from home, of the rise of heterosexual interests, of the growth of a sense of responsibility and self-control. Rejection; favoritism. Projection of parents' aims on children. Ideal of parent.

2. Intersibling contacts. New conflicts with approach to maturity. Spread of affection from family members to others.

3. Contacts with friends, companions, and groups. New social configurations: dancing, recreation; parental objections to friends. Adolescent romances. Stimulation of

new ideals and aims of youth. Stimulation of sense of age differences between youth and older groupings.

4. **Extension of relations to adults in community.** New contacts with secondary groups: vocational, recreational, religious, political. Favorable or unfavorable reactions of parents to these new relations.

B. INDIVIDUAL'S RESPONSES

1. **Meaning of pubertal changes.** New frustrations, anxieties, and mental conflicts; items such as physical growth, attitudes, and habits associated with sexual functions.

2. **Alterations in dependency.** Struggle to emancipate oneself.

3. **New problems of emotional security.** Being misunderstood, or seeking new sources of strength and self-reliance.

4. **Inferiority feelings.** Enhanced or reduced by adolescent problems.

5. **Fantasies.** Related to sexual adjustments, to desires to escape home ties, to growing demands to assume responsibility and self-control. Aims and hopes in fantasy life and degree of making them work out.

6. **Self-confidence and self-control.** Retention of dependencies—degree of.

7. **Extension of moral self.** With respect to sex, to future marriage, to vocational and civic obligations.

8. **Modification and extension of interests.** Vocational, marital, recreational, etc.

9. **Degree of happiness and satisfaction.**

III. ADULT LIFE

A. SITUATIONS

1. **Occupation.** Nature of work; conditions of, relations to fellow workmen. Income and socioeconomic status resulting from vocation.

2. **Premarital sexual adjustments.** Nature of, degree of satisfaction in these matters. Sense of guilt, or integration to other life aims.

3. **Family adjustments.** Sex life, conflicts over, satisfaction in. Extramarital relations and their meaning. Adaptation to spouse, to children, to household routines: co-operation, conflict, indifference with respect to home and family members.

4. **Civic participation.** Nature and extent of community and political activity: what groups; role in groups. Leader, or more or less passive follower of others?

5. **Participation in religious life.** Nature and extent of participation in church activities; role and status, and leadership, if any.

6. **Recreational life.** Nature and extent of leisure-time activities; hobbies; active or passive games; solitary or gregarious patterns in leisure-time interests and conduct.

7. **Aesthetic interests.** Nature and extent of interest in, and activity related to, aesthetic matters. Forms of art enjoyed; degree of creative activity with reference to art.

B. INDIVIDUAL'S RESPONSES

1. **Degree of intellectual and social-emotional maturity.** With reference to each of these major areas of adult action: vocation, marriage, community life, religion, recrea-

tion, and aesthetic interests. These may be measured or estimated against the norm (or cultural expectancy) of one's society, community, and social class.

2. Integration or emotional conflicts. With respect to these areas of life activity, how well has individual co-ordinated his major role or "generalized other"?

3. Degree of personal satisfaction. How much does individual "feel" forced or obliged to participate in these major activities, and how much is it willing and desired participation? Any sense of frustration with respect to any of these activities? What substitutive activities tend to offset frustrations or inferiority feelings which may accompany any of these areas of behavior? In particular, what place have æsthetic and religious activities in offering balance to one's life course?

IV. THE NATURE AND MEANING OF THE INNER (SUBJECTIVE) LIFE

The purpose of this section is to present the fundamentals of the inner or subjective life of the person and to get a picture of the basic value systems or frames of reference. Since it is here that the uniqueness of personality is most apparent, any outline of topics is to be considered, at best, suggestive. Each person will have his own scheme of values and his own manner of arranging and discussing them.

1. Emotional stabilities. Nature of basic emotional-feeling (disposition): calm, fluctuating, tendency to dissociate intellectual from emotional values and aims. Extent of integration of impulses. Expansive or narrow contractive personality: extent of preference of one's own inner life to active participation? Nature and extent of deep-lying anxieties, fears, and sense of frustration. Nature and extent of aggression patterns: anger responses to situations, manner of expressing aggression. Dominance patterns—overt or covert only.

2. Sense of self-confidence. Assurance, and capacity to meet crises; what are your limits of facing difficulties, how react to severe situations? Devices to avoid meeting tests of self-assurance? How much, if any, self-deception do you practice? Nature of, and extent of, "fooling" others about your interests, abilities, attitudes, and habits.

3. Power devices. Nature of the means used to influence or control others: flattery, overt aggression, negativism, appeals for sympathy and attention, kindly and cooperative habits, etc. Satisfaction at successful use of these power devices?

4. Sense of self-pity. Do you feel sorry for yourself often, seldom, never? What emotional-social support do you crave, especially when you feel abused, injured by circumstances, misunderstood?

5. Basic inferiorities. What are these, if any, and how do you manage to meet them, to disguise them from others?

6. Self-insight. Ability to view yourself as others do (objectively). Ability to criticize yourself. Tendency to blame others or circumstances for failures (projection). How well do you take criticism from others?

7. Fundamental aims, ideals, aspirations. What do you really want most in life? Manner of integrating conflicting aims in overt conduct as well as in imagination. What are basic vocational, marital, civic, and religious aims? What sacrifices will you make to achieve these aims?

8. Work as a value. Meaning of work to you, enforced obligation or voluntary and well-integrated habit system which provides positive (pleasant) satisfactions. Do

you have to drive yourself to work, or do you need urging or forcing from external circumstances? Any sense of being thwarted because work done does not bring the anticipated results?

9. Recreation and avocation. Meaning of play in your life: for relaxation, balance; how integrated to work habits? What types of recreation do you like best? What hobbies have you and what significance or satisfaction do they have for you?

10. Conception of maturity. What is it and what standards for determining it: sexual potency, money-making, sound civic participation, good health, leadership, moral responsibility to others—near and remote from personal relations?

11. Self-control. How do you meet difficulties: deny them, escape into fantasy, blame others, carry through plans for changing habits and attitudes which you intellectually realize are inefficient and conducive to inadequate social adaptation?

12. Basic satisfactions or happiness in life. Fluctuations in sense of satisfaction; what real meaning has life to you? Tendency to retreat inwardly for greatest satisfactions, or to find them in contact with world of other persons or things? What is your basic outlook on life: optimistic, pessimistic, etc.? How do you conceive your place in the world today?

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<i>AJPs</i>	<i>American Journal of Psychiatry</i>
<i>AJS</i>	<i>American Journal of Sociology</i>
<i>Annals</i>	<i>Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science</i>
<i>ASR</i>	<i>American Sociological Review</i>
<i>CD</i>	<i>Child Development</i>
<i>CP</i>	<i>Character and Personality</i>
<i>GPM</i>	<i>Genetic Psychology Monographs</i>
<i>JASP</i>	<i>Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology</i>
<i>JSP</i>	<i>Journal of Social Psychology</i>
<i>MH</i>	<i>Mental Hygiene</i>
<i>PB</i>	<i>Psychological Bulletin</i>
<i>PM</i>	<i>Psychological Monographs</i>
<i>PMe</i>	<i>Psychosomatic Medicine</i>
<i>PR</i>	<i>Psychological Review</i>
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INDEX OF SUBJECTS

- Adient drives, 65-66; and co-operation, 114-15
- Adjustor (central) neural processes, 20
- Adlerian theory of personality, 283-85, 389-94
- Adolescence, 402-27; emotional factors in, 407-08; individual differences in, 404-05; intelligence differences in, 406-07; problems of, in our society, 410-11; psychological factors in, 406-08; sex differences in, 405-06; social-cultural factors in, 402-03; social-sexual development and, 411-15; variations in meeting problems of, 402-03
- Adrenaline, effects of, 29-30
- Aggression, Adler's concept of, 283-85; ambivalent to co-operation, in rise of self, 182-83; as social act, 378-80; child development and, 378-80; conflict and competition, and, 116; criminality and, 378; delinquency and, 378, 633; directionality in, 116; interaction and, 115-16; social-cultural conditioning and, 298; sympathy and love, ambivalent to, 184-85; teacher-student relations and, 474-75; various forms of, 378-80
- Aging, physiological, psychological, and cultural factors in, 778-81
- Alcoholism, 720; psychological features of, 771-72
- Ambivalence, 334; aggression and, 379; feelings of childhood and, 348-49; in cultural value and self, 182-83; in in-group-out-group relations, 128-29; in patterns of activity, 116-17; Jung's concept of, 308
- Ambiversion, 308
- Antagonism, as phase of interaction, 115-16; conflict and competition, and, 116; directionality in, 116
- Anticipatory reactions, 9-10; abstract thought and, 197-98; attitudes in, 104; fantasy and, 203; identification and, 165-67; in child-parent relations, 345-46; symbolic, induced by learning, 432-33
- Anxiety, as form of withdrawal, 399-401
- Anxiety neuroses, 711-12; *see* Neurasthenia
- Aphasia, 21, 193
- Application of personality studies, 232-33, 272-75
- Art, appreciation of, varied, 800-01; as integrating or balancing factor in personality, 793-801; creative, 793-96; fantasy and, 398-99; personal values in, 796-801; social-cultural framework of, 793-94; sublimation for single woman through, 588-89
- Art of handling people, 233, 274-75
- Ascendance, *see* Dominance
- Aspiration, as end or goal, 62; basic to drive, 108-09; phase of internal and external activity, 109-11; role, status, achievement, and, 181-83
- Aspiration and achievement, 359-61; competition and, 363; discrepancy between, and adolescent difficulties, 410; discrepancy between, and inferiority, 390; discrepancy between, and learning in school, 433-34; discrepancy between, in moral realm, 623; discrepancy between, produces distress, 359-60
- Attitude, as anticipatory response, 104; generalized, and self, 173-74; indicators of, 103; nature of, 12, 103-04; opinion and, 105; specific *vs.* general, 286-89
- Attributes, nature of statistical, 236; various devices for dealing with: paired-comparison, chi-square, contingency, biserial correlation, tetrachoric correlation, 246-47
- Autoeroticism, among college students, 486-87; among single women, 576-80; self-centered nature of, 580
- Autonomic nervous system, 18, 22-23, 741; emotions and feelings and, 69; interplay with cerebrospinal, 23-25; parasympathetic section of, 22-23; sympathetic section of, 22-23
- Avocation, as balancing factor in personality, 801-04; intimate nature of, 802-03; relation to vocation, 801-02; varied types of, 802-03
- Avoidant drives, 66; antagonism and, 115
- Balance, nature of, in personality, 785; religion and, 786-92
- Behavior, constitutional foundations of, 15-57; covert, 165; glands and, 25-34; internalization of, 8-9, 89-97, 102-13; neural aspects of, 17-25; overt, 5, 165; symbolic, 165, 188-229; variations in, with reference to situations, 6-7
- Bereavement, children and, 539-41; readjustment following, 536-39
- Bilingualism, 162
- Blind, personality problems of, 699-701
- Cardiac-circulatory disorders, effects of, on personality, 747-48
- Case-history method, *see* Life-history method
- Catatonia, 715-16
- Central nervous system, 18, 20-22; interplay with autonomic, 23-25

- Cerebral cortex, functions of, 21; place of, in language, meaning, and higher thought processes, 192-93
- Character, Freudian concept of, 281-82
- Child-parent relations, 343-49; discipline and, 350-62; exhibitionism and, 364-65; favoritism in, 365; fundamental features of, 350-68; overattachment and, 351-52, 362-63; oversolicitude and, 352-53, 362-63; projection in, 362-63; rejection in, 354; training in security feelings, responsibility, and independence, and, 350-62
- Child training, aggression in, 378-80; comradeship in, 375-76; congeniality group and, 374-75; discipline and, 361-62; family and, 339-68; fantasy and, 394-99; fear and anxiety in, 399-401; fundamentals of, 350-68; gang and, 376-77; goals and ideals, and, 357-61; leadership and, 380-85; maturity and, 354-57, 361; need of consistency in, 345-46, 358; overattachment to parent and, 351-52; oversolicitude of parent and, 352-53; play life and, 370-74; psychological background of, 339-43; rejection of child in, 354; resistant behavior and, 385-89; sense of responsibility and, 354; sense of security and, 350-54; status and, 356-57
- Children, effect of divorce on, 552-58; effect on, of working mothers, 567-68
- Circular psychosis, *see* Manic-depressive
- Circular reflex, 53-54
- College students, adaptation to academic demands, 468-76; adaptation to college housing, 480-81; effect of economic depression on, 482; individual differences in ability among, 469-70; mental hygiene for, 468-501; personality traits of, 492-95; radicalism among, 489-90; religious and ethical adjustments of, 487-89; self-support, problems of, among, 481-82; sexual adjustments of, 483-87; social-emotional problems of, 482-90
- Common features of personality, 297, 300
- Community, primary, 125; secondary, 126
- Communication, 5; as one level of activity, 109-10; cycles of activity and early, 143-44; evolution of, from gesture, 139-44; forms of thought and, 204-05; levels of, and interaction, 228-29; nonlinguistic forms of, 207-14; nonlinguistic gestures and, 211-14; prehuman, 141-42; relations of, to language and meaning, 188-201; thought and, in conduct, 227-29
- Compensation, 393; among college students, 470; nature of, 119-20; overcompensation, special case of, 119
- Competition, aggression in, 116; ambivalent to co-operation, 182-83; as element in rise of self, 182-83; as social process, 116; in-group and out-group relations and, 192; in learning, 87; school and personal, 436-38
- Comradeship, 375-76; as outlet for affectional life of single woman, 585-86
- Compulsion neuroses, 712-13
- Co-operation, ambivalent to conflict and competition, 182-83; aspect of, in in-group, 128; nature of, 114; school and, 436-38
- Concept, formation of, 196-98; nature of, 195-97
- Conditioned response (or reflex), as basic to identification, 113; as phase of learning, 79-81; in language development, 148-55
- Conflict, aggression in, 116; ambivalent to co-operation, 182-83; as social process, 116; in-group and out-group relations and, 129; modern culture stimulates, 809-10; processes of, in marriage, 519-21
- Congeniality group, 374-75; as outlet for affectional life of single woman, 585-86
- Conscience, *see* Super-ego; Self, moral
- Consciousness, and overt adjustment, 100; and meaning, 192; false dichotomy of social from individual, 198; Freudian concept of, 279; motor nature of, 192-93
- Consistency, 10-11, 217; in child training, 345-46, 358; induced by integration of co-operation and opposition, 182-83; in role-taking, 174; lack of, in child training, 346
- Constancy of organism, *see* Inflexibility
- Constitution, internal and external factors in balance of, 740-41; place of emotions in, 741-42
- Constitutional defectives, cultural definitions of, 686, 707; personality adjustments of, 686-707
- Constitutional factors in personality, cultural definition of place of, 746; in mental disorders, 740-52; leadership and, 381-82; pubertal changes and, 403-06
- Control, predictability and, 178-80; symbols in, 191-92
- Correlation, 241-46; limitations of, as method, 261-65; multiple-factor analysis and, 245-46; nature of, 44; various devices of: rank-order, product-moment, partial, multiple, 244-45
- Covert activity and adjustment, 99
- Courtship, 506-09; exploitative aspects of, 506; romantic aspects of, 507-09
- Creative interests, machine work and, 594-95
- Cretinism, *see* Myxedema
- Crime, changing and conflicting norms and, 662-65; classification of, 667-68; culture defines, 662-65; defective intelligence and, 674-75; family patterns of, 671-74; neuroticism and, 675-81; organized, 668-70; particularistic theories of causation of, 665-68; psychosis and, 681-83; punitive attitudes in treatment of, 683-85
- Criminals, culture and, 662; intelligence differences and, 665-66, 674-75; morphological studies of, 665-67; personality of, 661-85; psychotic, 681-83; resistance potential of, 663-64; social-emotional needs of, and

- treatment, 683-85; social-emotional traits of, 675-81; treatment problems for, 683-85; variety of personality and social types among, 671-74, 677-81
- Cripples, adaptation of, 694-95; psychological characteristics of, 693-96; social-cultural factors and, 695-96
- Crisis, function of emotions and feelings in, 75; function of endocrines in, 30
- Cultural conditioning, 4-5, 132-36; rise of self and conflicting forms of, 182-83
- Culture, abnormality defined by, 736-38, 781-82; adolescence, and effects of, 402-03; as framework of personal development, 130-32; basic factors in, 4-5, 130; child-parent relations and, 344; college student and his background of, 476-80; conflict of, and delinquency, 627, 647; conflict of, and crime, 665-68, 670-71; defines social-sexual maturity, 414; deviant and norm of, 622-24; divorce and American, 542-43; effect of, in drives, 66-68; effect of, in fixing sibling relations, 368; effect of, on aims of child, 357-61; effect of, on child training in responsibility, 357; effect of, on memory, 97-98; effect of, on play, 374; effect of, on sense of monotony, 602; emotions and feelings affected by, 72; expectancies of, and college life, 475-76; extroversion and introversion and, 311-12; factors in, and delinquency, 627-31; importance of job in our, 591; individual differences and, 296-300; influence of, on Freudian mechanisms, 282; influence of, on motive and morale in industry, 602-13; influence of, on personality tests, 262-63; interplay of, and psychoses, 753-57; learning and, 4-5, 97-98; logic and fantasy, and, 205-07; low status of women in our, 559-61; neurotic and psychotic behavior defined by, 721-38; norms of, and sublimation, 120; norms of bereavement and, 536-37; organized crime and conflict of, 668-70; patterning of, 130-31; personality and social types, and, 324-28, 334-36; related to groups and personality, 132-38; resistance and, 386; role and status of single woman in our, 572-90; school as influenced by, 428-31, 439, 449-50; sexual development defined by, 412-15; standards for teachers' role and status, and, 463-67; symptoms and syndromes defined by, 762; universals, alternatives, and specialties in, 135; variations in background of, and delinquency, 627
- Culture, society, and personality, 805-16
- Curriculum, adjustment to in college, 471-72; changes in, in elementary and secondary education, 447-48
- Cycle of activity, 8, 64-68, 234; drive and, 64-66; emotions and feelings, and, 74-75; goal and, 64-66; in child development, 341-43, 349-50; pattern of, in learning, 433-34; stages in, 8, 65; unconscious factors in, 100-02
- Cyclic psychosis, *see* Manic-depressive
- Deaf and hard of hearing, personality problems of, 696-98; psychological isolation of, 697
- Deaf-blind, personality problems of, 701-03
- Definition of situation, *see* Situation
- Dementia paralytica, *see* Paresis
- Dementia praecox, *see* Schizophrenia
- Dementia simplex, 715
- Democratic way of life, 812-15; education in, 814-15; sacredness of person basic to, 813-14
- Desertion, 541-42
- Development, child, factors in, 339-43; extrinsic and intrinsic factors in, 38-43; fetal, 47-50
- Deviant, as influenced by physiological factors, 742-46; constitutionally defective as, 686-87; criminal as, 661-62; culture and the, 622-24; delinquent as, 624-25; failure to meet crises and, 737-38; nature of, 622-24; neurotic and psychotic as culturally defined, 722-38, 752-53; neurotic as, 708-09; physiological factors and, 742-46; psychotic as, 708-09; social-cultural factors and, 296-97; varieties of, in our society, 622-24
- Dissociation in parent image and duality of good and evil, 787-88
- Dissociation of personality, 218-20; hysteria and, 713-14
- Divorce, 542-58; alienation process and, 543-46; alimony and, 551; children of, 552-58; psychological effect of, on spouses, 547-51; public reaction to, 546-47; reorientation following, 547-51; symptom not cause of family disorganization, 542-43
- Dominance, childhood training and, 363; gang and training in, 377; masculine, affected by emancipation of women, 563-64; social-cultural conditioning and, 298-99, 382-84
- Drives, *see* Motives
- Education, basic aims of, 429-30; college, and mental hygiene, 468-501; curricular changes in, 447-48; extracurricular effects and leadership, 449-50; social-cultural setting of, 445-46; student guidance, 446-47
- Effectors, 20
- Ego, Adlerian concept of, 283-85, 389; expansion of, and identification, 114-15; extrovert and introvert, 311-12; Freudian concept of, 179, 281-82; *see* Self
- Ego-security, expectancies of others and, 183-84; importance of consistent training and, 183-84; self-assurance and, 183-84; sympathy *vs.* aggression and, 184-86
- Elite in society, 298-99; teachers' accommodation to, 465-66

- Emergence of new patterns of self, 178; theory of, 38-39
- Emergency theory of adjustment, 30
- Emotional instability, 714; social-cultural factors in, 776-78; varied manifestations of, and class distinctions, 777
- Emotions, 68-75; cycles of activity and, 74-75; development of, 73-74; effect of culture on, 72; James-Lange theory of, 69; nature of, 68-71; place of, in adolescent development, 407-08; physiological factors in, 740-42; relation to feelings, 68-74; social-cultural influences on, 740-42
- Empathy, 113, 184, 199; *see* Sympathy
- Endocrine system, 25-34; adrenals in, 29-30; drives and, 59; gonads (sex) in, 32-33; interrelations of glands in, 33-34; pancreas in, 27-28; parathyroids in, 27; personality types and, 321-24; pineal in, 27; pituitary in, 31-32; thymus in, 27; thyroid in, 28-29
- Endocrines, imbalance of, and personality, 687-93; social-cultural definitions of imbalance induced by, 692-93
- Engram, *see* Neurogram
- Environment, 35-57; definition of, 35; external, and heredity, 35-37; internal, of cells, 25; interplay with heredity, 35-57; part in organic development, 39; social-cultural, and development, 57
- Epilepsy, biochemical factors in, 745-46; psychological features of, 718-19, 771
- Ethos, 131, 135, 311; college education supports American, 489
- Exhibitionism, 364-65; as power device, 365
- Expectancy, 9-10; cultural, and acceptance or rejection of the aged, 780; factor in developing responsibility and self-control, 424-26; identification and social, 165-67; images of other and, 166; in child training, 345-46; inferiority and, 391-92; patterns of, in learning, 89-90; place of, in aggressive reactions, 379; self-imposed, and training in responsibility, 359; social, 138
- Experimental methods in study of personality, 233-36; critique of, 258-59
- Expressive movements, 316; judging personality by, 211-14
- Expressive reactions, unlearned, 62
- External factors in personality, 7-11; drives and, 59-60; in relation to internal, 7-11, 109-13
- Extroversion, 305-12; among college students, 494; constitutional foundation for, 310-11; Jung's subtypes of, 306-07; manic depressive traits and, 770; nature of, 305-06, 309; tests of, 309-11; tests of, among delinquents, 638-39; types and, 333-34
- Eugenics, limitations of, 46
- Failure, effects of, in school, 434-36; motivation and, 435-36
- Family, adolescence and, 410-11; bereavement in, 536-41; democratic pattern of, 364-65; desertion, effects of, on, 541-42; dissolution of, 536-58; divorce and, 542-48; effect of, on college adjustment, 477-78; effect of, on criminality, 671-74; effect of, on delinquency, 629-31; effect of, on leadership, 384; emancipation from, in adolescence, 415-19; induction of child into, 339-68; influence of, on single woman, 573-76; major functions of, 502; parenthood and interspousal relations in, 523-26; position in, and leadership, 383-84; resistant behavior and, 385-89; responsibility, in part, for delinquency, 658-59; varied roles of spouses in, 513-15; *see* Child-parent relations; Husband-wife adjustments; Marriage
- Fantasy thinking, 394-99; art and, 398-99, 794-96; as form of thought, 201-07; as phase of pupil maladjustment, 441-42; culture and, 202; form of withdrawal and, 394-95; foster-child, 395-96; in emotionally unstable, 777; in paranoiacs, 777-78; in schizophrenics, 204, 778; personalistic theory and, 292-93; religion and, 787-89
- Father-child relations, factor in emotional adjustment of single woman, 574-76; interspousal relations and, 526
- Fatigue, correctives to industrial, 597-98; nature of 595-96; psychological aspects of, 596-98
- Favoritism to children, 365
- Fear, adjustive and nonadjustive aspects of, 400; as form of withdrawal, 399-401; inferiority feelings and, 393
- Feelings, 68-75; cycles of activity and, 74-75; development of, 73-74; duality of, in childhood, 348-49; nature of, 68-71; personalistic theory of, 293; relation to cycles of activity, 74-75; relation to emotions, 68-74
- Femininity, endocrines and, 32-33
- Fetal development, 47-50; of sensory and motor capacities, 49-50
- Fixity of organism, 16-17; effects of habit on, 67; genes as determinants of, 37-38; gradients, polarity, and symmetry, and, 42; heredity and, 40; internal environment and, 25, 41; *see* Inflexibility
- Flexibility, as ideal of personality, 427; basic feature of personality, 805-10; inflexibility and, 805-10; mutations and, 40-41; organic, 16-17, 67; psychological factors in, 108; under totalitarian and democratic ways of life, 812-16
- Foreconscious, 279
- Foster child, fantasies of being, 395-96
- Foster children, heredity and, 44-45; intelligence of, 45
- Frame of reference, in personality, *see* Value system
- Freedom, closely linked to mature responsibility and self-control, 422-23, 425-27; place of, in learning process, 433-34
- Freudian theory of personality, sexual development and, 411-12
- Frustration, aggression (antagonism) and,

- 115-16; among college students, and radicalism, 489-90; and rise of inferiority, 281, 284-85; modern culture stimulates, 809-10; of libido and aggression, 280; place of, in child development, 342-43, 348-49; place of, in juvenile delinquency, 809-10; sublimation and, 120
- Functional psychoses, *see* Psychoses
- Gang, 376-77
- Gastrointestinal disorders, effects of, on personality, 748-50
- General paralysis, *see* Paresis
- Generalization of experience, in learning, 94-95
- Generalized other, 170-73, 195, 222; built up in childhood, 355; difference in, in extroversion-introversion, 311-12; self-control and, 425-26; team play and rise of, 170-73; *see* Self
- Gestalt, insight and, 82-83; learning, 81-83, 115; personalistic theory and, 292; theory of personality, 289
- Gesture, autistic and personality features, 214; basis of anticipatory reaction and meaning, 189-91; communication and, 139-44; cycles of activity and human, 142-43; facial, manual, and other, and communication, 211-14; nature of, 140-41; indicators of oncoming acts, 144; prehuman, 141-42
- Goal, place of, for child, in early training, 357-61; task or aim as, in child training, 359
- Gradient, 39-43; development and, 47-48
- Graduate students, social-emotional problems of, 491-92
- Group, 4; as framework of personality development, 125-29; related to culture and personality, 132-38
- Guilt feelings, autoeroticism among single women and, 577-79; extramarital relations and, 584-85; homosexuality among single women and, 582-83; place of, in personality, 186-87
- Habit, 11, 99; accessory and basic training, 346-48; consistency and stability of early, 345-46; interaction and early, 345
- Hebephrenia, 715
- Heredity, 35-57; definition of, 35; environment correlated with, 45-46; fixity and, 40; genes and chromosomes and, 36-37; human, 43-47; limitation of, on learning, 38; mechanisms of, 36-38; mutation and, 37, 40-41; twins and, 43-44
- Heterosexuality, college students and, 483-85; development of, during later adolescence, 419-22; early features of, 413; false ideas about, 420-22; problem of, for single woman, 583-85
- Hobby, *see* Avocation
- Homosexuality, among single women, 580-83; cultural definitions of, vary, 725-27; cultural taboos on, 580-83; early features of, 413; guilt feelings and, 582-83; mother-fixations and male, 677-78
- Husband-wife adjustments, conflict and, 519-21; courtship and subsequent, 506-09; effect on, of wife's working, 569-72; factors making for harmony in, 521-23; honeymoon and, 512-13; initial problems of, 512-13; money, religion, politics, etc., and, 517-19; sex and, 515-17; successful or unsuccessful, 526-35
- Hysteria, 713-14; among certain criminals, 678; definitions of, vary with culture, 721-22; multiple personality in, 775-76; social-cultural factors in, 774-76; types of, among primitives, 727-30, 733
- I and the me, child development and, 343; in relation to control, 224-25; prediction and control, and, 178-80; role-taking and, 174-78; self in relation to, 174-78
- Id, Freudian concept of, 281; related to rudimentary I, 179
- Idea, nature of, 11
- Ideal aim, culture influences, 357-61; discipline, responsibility, and, 361-62; job as an, 594; place of, for child in early training, 357-61; projection of parents and, 362-63; status and, 360-61
- Ideal types, Spranger's, 314-15; Weber's, 333
- Ideals, as drives and ends, 108-09; phase of value system, 107
- Identification, child-parent, 344; group, self, and, 220-21; nature of, 113-15; patterns of expectancy and, 165-67; place of, in social-sexual development, 413; play and, 370-71; social participation dependent on, 114-15
- Imitation, as phase of identification, 113; in language development, 150-51; in learning, 88-89; *see* Identification; Introjection
- Incentive, *see* Motive
- Individual differences, in intelligence in adolescence, 406-07; in pubertal changes, 404-05; in social-sexual development, 415; learning in school and, 431-33; personality and, 296-300; typological constants and, 332-33
- Individuality, style of life as basic to, 107-08
- Inference, nature of, and use in science, 268-70
- Inferiority feelings, 389-94; college students and, 493-94; constitutional defectives and, 707; devices for handling, 393-94; family effect on, 392; fantasy and, 395; juvenile delinquent and, 638-41, 647; neurotic and psychotic aspects of, 393-94; relation to frustration, 281; teachers and, 452-53, 463-64; traditional, of women, 559-61
- Inflexibility, basic feature of personality, 805-10; basic in many delinquents, 651-52; expectancy and, 167; extrovert and, 306-07; flexibility and, 805-10; organic, 16-17, 68; organic psychoses and, 770; psychological factors in, 108; types of personality and,

- Inflexibility** (*continued*)
 332; under totalitarian and democratic ways of life, 812-16
- In-group**, antagonism to out-group and personal integration to, 809-10; ethnocentrism in, 129; nature of, 128; rise of self with relation to, 182-83; sympathy *vs.* aggression and, 185-86
- Inhibition**, function of, in learning, 91-93; retroactive, 97
- Insanity**, a legal concept, 710; *see* Psychosis
- Insight**, as phase of configurational learning, 82-83; as phase of interview, 257-58
- Instinct**, 58-60; Freudian concept of, 278-80
- Integration of personality**, among delinquents, 650-51; art and, 793-801; childhood and, 358-59; cultural framework for, 804; in-group and, 221-23; lack of, in secondary society, 808-09; morale, job, and, 603-10; nature of, 217-18, 785; religion and, 786-92; social-cultural determinants of, 182-83; sympathy *vs.* aggression in, 184-86; under totalitarian and democratic ways of life, 812-16; work as aid to, 594
- Intelligence**, effect of sound environment on persons of low, 704-07; language development and, 159-60, 163; place of, in criminality, 674-75; place of, in delinquency, 634-38, 640; quotient, 45; variations in, and college success, 469-70
- Interaction**, 113-23; accessory habits and, 346-47; aggressive, antagonistic forms of, 115; basic habits and, 345; basic to understanding of morale in industry, 606-11, of morale among delinquents, 650-53; child-parent, 343-49; compensation and, 119-20; dual reference of, 122-23; expanded under democratic way of life, 813-14; factor in neurotic and psychotic behavior, 753-57; identification and, 113-15; important item in life history, 253-54; in interview, 254-58; language development and, 150-55, 161-63; pattern of, in school, 430-31; place of, in learning process, 432-33; primary-group, other than family, 369-77; projection and, 118-19; rationalization and, 121-22; restricted under totalitarianism, 812; rise of self and, 164-87; sense of responsibility and independence and, 354-57; sublimation and, 120-21; universal character of, 122
- Internal factors in personality**, 7-11; aims and ideals in, 108-09; as phase of development of self, 165, 168-78, 183-87; attitude, as phase of, 103-04; conflicts, as phase of, 112; conscious and unconscious elements in relation to, 99, 100-02; importance of, in understanding others, 112; in relation to external, 7-11, 109-13; place of drives in, 59-60; trait as phase of, 105-06; value-system as phase of, 106-07
- Interview**, device in life-history studies, 254-55; formal and informal, 254-55; psychology of, 255-58; role of interviewer in, 257-58; training for, 270
- Introjection**, 113-14, 165, 194-95, 593-94; *see* Identification
- Introversion**, 305-12; among college students, 494; constitutional foundation for, 310-11; Jung's subtypes of, 307-08; nature of, 306, 309; schizoid traits and, 369-70; tests of, 309-11; tests of, among delinquents, 638-39; types and, 333-34
- Intuition**, 295; nature and use of, in science, 268-70
- Irradiation**, 20
- Jung's theory of personality types**, 305-12; critique of, 310
- Juvenile courts**, 654-56
- Juvenile delinquency**, as forms of escape mechanism, 648-49; culturally defined, 624-26; ego organization in, 650-53; feelings of insecurity and inferiority and, 638-42, 647; frustration and aggression and, 642-48; intelligence and, 634-38; introversion-extroversion tests and, 638-39; motion pictures and, 628; multiple causation of, 626; nature of, 624-26; neuroticism and, 639-41; not psychologically a unique form of conduct, 626, 632-33; personality problems in, 622-60; psychological aspects of treatment of, 653-60; psychological factors in, 631-53; punishment, effect of, on, 642; radio and, 629; sense of guilt, desire for punishment, and, 649-50; social-cultural backgrounds of: urbanism, deviant culture, schooling, leisure-time, family, 627-31; social-emotional factors in, 641-53; varied classifications of behavior and, 631-34
- Juvenile delinquent**, aids in restoring to normal society, 654, 656; dynamic social-emotional factors in personality of, 641-50; ego organization of, 650-53; implications of, for community, 658-60; perseveration and suggestibility as personality features of, 651-52
- Kretschmer's types of personality**, 318-22; critique of, 320-22; psychological characteristics of, 319-21
- Language**, anticipatory reactions, meaning, and, 189-91; babbling stage and, 148-50; bilingualism in development of, 162; difficulties in analyzing stages of, 145; ejective use of, sign of maturity, 204-05; grammar and, 216-17; imitation stage and, 150-51; intelligence and, 159-60; meaning and, 193; meaning and communication, and, 188-201; memory and, 95-96; motivation and, 85-86; motive, goal, and plan in, 433-34; motor skill and, 160; organization of, 89-95; overt response and, 214-17; parts of speech in development of, 158-59; personality development and, 139-63; praise or blame and, 87-88; prelinguistic stage of, 145-48; redintegration and, 96;

- retroactive inhibition and, 97; self-centered nature of early, 204-05; social aspects of, 76-98; social interaction in development of, 150-55; socioeconomic status and, 156, 160-61, 163; special abilities and disabilities in college, 470-71; spectators and, 87; stages in growth of, 144-55; suggestion and, 88; sympathy and, 89; thought and, 191-94; trial and error, and, 78-79; true speech stage in development of, 151-55; two forms of thought related to, 201-07
- Leadership, aggression and, 379; constitutional factors in, 381-82; culture and, 384-85; dominance and, 380-85; extracurricular training for, 449-50; gang and, 377; headship and, 380-81; social situation and, 382-84; submissiveness and, 381
- Learning, association and, 83-84; canalization and fixation of, 95; cerebral cortex and, 21; competition and, 87; conditioned reflex and, 79-81; configurational, 81; consciousness and, 100; coworkers and, 87; cultural factors in, 4-5; discrimination and, 93-94; expectancy and, 89-90; forgetting and, 96-97; general forms of, 76-83; generalization in, 94-95; group discussion and, 88; hereditary limits of, 38; imitation and, 88-89; individual differences in, 431-33; inhibition and, 91-93; in language development, 139-63; integration of patterns in, 89; internal and external factors influencing, 84-85; language and motor factors in, 214-16; law of effect in, 86; law of exercise in, 83; maturation and, 77
- Levels of activity, covert and overt, 109-11, 165; symbolic, 165
- Life-history method, criteria in, 253-54; critique of, 265-68; data of: formal and informal, 251-52; difference between statistical and, 265-66; generalization in, 271-72; inference and intuition in, 268-70; interview as phase of, 254-58; nature of, 250-51; reliability of, 266-67; sources of, and collection of data in, 251-52; validity of, 265
- Life organization of person, 108; common features in, 297, 300; democratic forms of, 812-14; effect of occupation on, 592; effect of puberty on, 427; extroverted form of, 311-12; flexible or inflexible forms of, 815-16; introverted forms of, 311-12; psychological and social types and, 328; totalitarian forms of, 810-12; variations in, and social-cultural training, 296-300
- Machine work, effect of, on personality, 594-95; fatigue and, 597
- Maladjusted worker, social-emotional problems of, 613-16
- Manic-depressive psychosis, 716-18; among primitives, 733-35; biochemical factors in, 744; childhood backgrounds of, 759-60; definitions of, vary with culture, 722; family backgrounds of, 760; prepsychotic manifestations of, 759-60; relation to schizophrenia, 758-59; social-cultural factors in, 766-67, 770
- Marriage, adjustment in, 502-35; adjustment to children and, 523-26; art of love, essential to happy, 527-28; Burgess-Cottrell, study of, 531, 533-34; conflicts in, 519-21; courtship and, 506-09; early adjustments in, 512-23; Hamilton study of, 530-31; money, religion, politics, etc., and, 517-19; primary and secondary groups and, 505; satisfaction, degree of, in, 529-35; sexual factors in happiness of, 515-17; sexual selection and, 504-06; successful, factors in, 526-35; Terman study of, 530, 532-33; various studies of success in, 526-35; wedding and honeymoon, 512-13; *see* Husband-wife adjustments
- Masculinity, endocrines and, 32; sense of potency and, 284
- Mass activity, 47-49, 54-56, 167, 217; individuation and, 47-48; limitation of, theory of, 55; specific reactions and, 55, 61; theory of, 54-55; word partakes at first of character of, 156, 192
- Maturation, definition of, 35; learning and, 77
- Maturity, growth of, in adolescence, 415-27; growth in, of child, 354-63; influenced by college, 487-90
- Mead's (G.H.) theory of I and the me, 174-78, 225; *see* I and the me
- Meaning, anticipatory responses and, 189-91; communication and language in relation to, 188-201; denotation and connotation in, 193; expressive movements and, 211-14; future projection in, 190; language and, 192-94; language, anticipatory responses and, 189-91; language development and, 150-58; nature of, 192-93; objective and subjective reference in, 193; of physical thing arises after emergence of social self, 199-200; of physical world and interaction, 198-201; role-taking in relation to vocalisms and, 207-11
- Memory, 95-96; social-cultural factors in, 97-98
- Mental deficiencies, social-cultural influences on, 703-07; social-personal adjustment of, 703-07
- Mental disease, not a morbid entity, 739-40; social-cultural factors in, 752-64
- Mental hygiene, for college students, 468-501; school program and, 429
- Mental life, conscious and unconscious factors in, 99-102; influenced by interaction, 99-123
- Methods, critique of, in personality study, 258-72; experimental, in study of personality, 233-36; life-history or case-history, 250-58; of studying personality, 230-75; projective (play) technique, of studying child personality, 396; statistical, in personality study, 236-50

- Monotony, attitudes and, 599-600; fantasy and, 601-02; intelligence and feeling of, 599-601; nature of, 598-99; psychological factors in, 599-602
- Moral conduct, inner forum, communication and, 227-29; moral knowledge and, 225-26; rights and duties and, 228
- Morale, Hawthorne plant study of, 606-10; loss of, during long unemployment, 619-21; nature of, 602-03; place of, in work and industry, 603-10; place of interaction among workers and, 606-11
- Morality, influenced by college, 487-90; knowledge *vs.* conduct in, 225-27
- Mores, 130; teachers and compliance with, 464-67
- Morphological types, 317-22; Berman and, 322-24; Kretschmer and, 318-22; Naccarati and, 317-18
- Mother-child relations, 345-49; following death of father, 539-41; interspousal relations and, 525
- Motivation, 8; learning and, 85-86
- Motives, 58-64; acquired and organized, 62-64; aims and ideals as, 108-09; child and, 341-43; classifications of unlearned and acquired, 62-64; directionality of, 341-42; effects of learning on, 66-68; emotions and feelings and, 74-75; endocrines and, 59; financial, in work, 604-05; in work, 602-10; incentives as, 62; industrial under Russian socialism, 611-13; nature of, 60-62; satisfaction and, determined and elaborated by society and culture, 806-10; unlearned aspects of, 61-62
- Multiple-factor analysis in personality study, 245-46; limitations of, 264
- Multiple selves, 218-20
- Music, as aesthetic outlet, 796-98; as therapeutic device, 798-99
- Mutation, 37, 56; experimental induction of, 40-41
- Myxedema, in adults, 31; in children, 29, 31
- Nervous system, 17-25; development of, 50-57
- Nervousness in children, *see* Anxiety
- Neurasthenia, 711-12; constitutional instability and, 742-43; fatigability and, 743; psychasthenia and, 774; social-cultural factors in, 773
- Neurobiotaxis, 52-53
- Neurogram, 21, 155, 193
- Neuroses, limitation on traditional definition of, 757-64; mental conflicts and, 769; nature of, 709-10; old age and, 778-81; relation to psychoses, 758; social-cultural influences on, 772-82; types of, 710-14
- Neurotic and psychotic personalities, 708-82
- Neurotic traits, among college students, 493-95; *see* Emotional instability
- Neuroticism, among criminals, 675-81; among delinquents, 638-41
- Normality, abnormality and, differentiation between, 742; culturally defined, 661-64, 708-09, 736-38, 781-82; the good and proper, and, 736-37
- Obsessional neuroses, 712-13
- Occupation, factor in determining status, 299; personality adjustment and, 591-621; psychological aspects of, 592-602; *see* Work
- Oedipus complex, 279-82
- Old age as a personality problem, 778-81
- Oppositional behavior, *see* Antagonism and aggression
- Organic psychoses, 718-21; biochemical factors in, 745-46; relative inflexibility in, 770; social-cultural factors in, 770-72; *see* Psychoses
- Organism, fixity of, 16-17, 40; flexibility of, 16-17; gradients in, 39, 41-43; mass activity and, 47-49, 54-56; order and unity of, 41-42; polarity and symmetry of, 39; sustaining systems of, 16-17
- Others-group, *see* Out-group
- Out-group, aggression with reference to, 129; nature of, 128-29; rise of self, with relation to, 182-83; sympathy *vs.* aggression, and, 185-86
- Overattachment of child to parent, 351-52, 362-63; effects of, on adolescent emancipation, 417-18; effects of, on development of heterosexuality, 419-20
- Overcompensation, 393; *see* Compensation
- Oversolicitude of parents for child, 352-53, 357, 362-63; effects of, on adolescent emancipation, 417-18
- Paranoia, 716; criminal outlets of, 682; culturalized in many primitive societies, 731-33
- Paranoid dementia praecox, 716
- Parent-child relations, adolescent emancipation and, 415-19; inferiority feelings and, 392; resistant behavior and, 385-89
- Paresis, 719-20; psychological features of, 771
- Participation, play as training in, 370-74
- Particularism, dangers of, 54
- Pavlov's theory of types, 303-05
- Perseveration, 66; a factor in delinquent attitudes, 651-52
- Personal-social conditioning, 5, 132-36; in love life, 484
- Personalistic theory of personality, 291-95; related to psychology of *Verstehen*, 293-95
- Personality, *see* under appropriate topics relating thereto
- Personality, society, and culture, 805-16
- Personality tests, 245-46, 249-50, 262-64; of college students, 492-95; of delinquents, 638-41
- Personnel work in college, 495-501; organization of, 496-97; personal qualifications for, 499-501; teacher's role in, 499-501; types of service provided by, 497-99
- Physical thing, concept of, as phase of social act, 593

Physiognomy and types of personality, 316
 Physique and personality, 316-24
 Pituitary imbalance and personality, 690-91
 Play, aggressiveness in, 373; child training and, 370-74; dominance in, and leadership, 384; identification and, 370-71; interaction and, 371-72; juvenile delinquency and, 627-28, 658; personal-social contacts in, 370-71; sex differences and interests in, 373-74; stages of development of, 371-72
 Postencephalitis, effects of, on personality, 750-52
 Power device, aggression as, 378-79; changes in, with maturity, 403; child-parent relations and, 347; responsibility and, 423; restriction of industrial output as, 605-06; symbols as, 191-92; temper tantrum as, 387; words and, 202-03
 Predictability of behavior, 167, 178-80; control and, 178-80; the I and me in, 175-76, 178-80, 229; thought, communication, and, 228-29; typification of personality and, 335-36
 Primary group, basic value-systems laid down in, 807-08; child-parent relations in, 345; nature of, 125-26; related to self, 125-26; school influenced by, 428-29; training in, for secondary groups, 349; training in, outside family, 368-77
 Probation, place of, for delinquents, 657-58
 Projection, 365; mechanism of, 118; nature of, 118-19; of ideal aims on child, by parent, 362-63, 470; of thwarted ambitions, 110
 Protoplasm, attributes of, 15; extrinsic and intrinsic factors in, 38-39; order, unity, and fixity of, 41-42; uniform character of, 48
 Psychasthenia, 712-13; among primitives, 722-24; neurasthenia and, 774; social-cultural factors in, 773-74
 Psychoanalysis, 277-78; critique of, 278, 282-83; theory of, 276-83
 Psychomatic factors in personality, 740-52
 Psychoneurosis, *see* Neurosis
 Psychosis, among primitive and non-Christian peoples, 730-36; as form of adjustment, 764-72; functional, 714-18; inner and outer factors in functional, 765-66; limitations on traditional definition of, 757-64; not a morbid entity, 739-40; organic, 718-21; relation to neurosis, 758; social-cultural factors in functional, 766-70
 Puberty, 402-08; constitutional factors in, 403-06; cultural variations in defining, 408-10; individual differences in, 404-05; sex differences in, 405-06
 Pupil adjustment, clinical aids to, 446-47; curricular changes and, 447-48; effects of competitive or co-operative pattern on, 436-38; effects of failure on, 434-36, 439-41; emotional life and, 446; factors in sound, 438-46; lack of interest and, 442-43; learning process and, 428-49; mental retardation and, 443-44; poor ability and

fantasy and, 441-42; social-sexual problem in, 442-43; speech difficulties and, 444-45; superior ability, lack of interest and, 442-43; teacher-pupil relations and, 451-62; teachers' views *vs.* mental hygienists about, 460-62
 Purpose, *see* Ideals; Aspirations
 Questionnaire, as device in personality study, 247, 249-50; limitations of, 260-61
 Rating scale, in personality study, 249-50; limitations of, 260-61; nature of, 237, 247
 Rationalization, cultural norms and, 122; in ambivalent (conflicting) value systems, 182-83; nature of, 121-22; societal devices for aiding, 185-86
 Receptors, types of, 19
 Recreation, sublimation for single women through, 588-89
 Reflex arc, 18-20, 55
 Reflex-circle principle, 53-54; in linguistic development, 149-50
 Rejection of child by parent, 354
 Religion, as integrating or balancing factor in personality, 786-92; dissociation of parent image and, 787-88; emancipation from backgrounds of, among college students, 487-89; frustration of wishes and, 787; parent-child relations as background of, 786-90; personal values in, 790-92; psychological factors in, 788-90; social-cultural framework for, 788-89
 Resistant behavior in children, 385-89
 Responsibility, discipline and, 361-62; expectancy a factor in, 424; freedom and, 422-24; goals or ideal aims and, 361; growth of, in adolescence, 422-24; independence and, 354-57, 423-24; maturity and, 354-57, 361; related to culture and group demands, 424; sense of, in childhood, 350; variation in degree of, 424-25
 Rheme, 156
 Rigidity of personality, *see* Inflexibility
 Role, aspiration, achievement, status, and, 181-83; consistency and continuity in, 174; ego-security and, 183-84; general, and general attitudes, 173; general, and rise of self, 170-73; me as a, 174-78; nature of, 138; relation to status and participation, 137-38; self and the taking of a, 168-73; specific, and rise of self, 169-70; status and, 180-81; sympathetic or aggressive, 184-86; varied, in psychotics, 763-64
 Role-taking, egocentric *vs.* socialized, and two forms of language development, 205; varied, and group relations, 220-21
 Romantic love and marriage, 503
 Satisfactions, basic, and motives determined and elaborated by society and culture, 806-10
 Schizophrenia, 714-16; among primitives, 730-31; and mild forms of criminality,

Schizophrenia (*continued*)

- 682; arises from isolation and mental conflict, 730-31; biochemical factors in, 743-44; childhood backgrounds of, 759-60; family backgrounds of, 761; fantasy of, 204; prepsychotic manifestations and, 759-60; psychological isolation and, 768-69; relation to manic-depressive psychoses, 758-59; social-cultural factors in, 766-70; types of, 715-16
- School, clinical guidance in, 446-47; competitive pattern in, 436-38; curricular changes and, 447-48; factors in success of, 445-46; interactional pattern of, 430-31; juvenile delinquency and, 627; primary-group patterns and, 428-29; pupil adjustment to learning in, 428-49; responsibility, in part, for delinquency, 659-60; rivalry for status in, 436
- Science, inference and intuition in, 268-70; nature of, 231; predictive and practical use of, 272-75; theory and application of, 230-33
- Scientists, attitudes of, toward inference and intuition, 268-69; differing abilities in types of research, 269-70; personality of, 269
- Secondary group, college life and, 478; impersonal character of interaction in, 808-10; nature of, 126-27; related to self, 127; value-systems elaborated in, 808-10
- Security, need for, in childhood, 350-54
- Self, as object to oneself, 168; conflicting cultural values and rise of, 182-83; dramatic plays and rise of, 169-73; fantasy in rise of, 396-98; forms of play and rise of, 169-73; general role-taking and, 170-73; growth of, in adolescence, 410-27; growth of, in college, 483-87; I and me, and child development, 343; I and me as components of, 174-78; identification and, 114-15; interactional patterns always basic to, 122-23; integration and dissociation and, 217-20; integration of, in in-group *vs.* out-group relations, 221-23; integration of, through co-operation and opposition, 182-83; moral, and sense of shame and guilt, 186-87; organization of, in constitutionally defective, 686-87; organization of, in delinquent, 650-53; primary and secondary groups and, 220-21; reflex circle and language in development of, 149-50; relation of language and thought to, 188-229; rise of, and interaction, 164-87; rise of, in child, 343; self-control and relation of, to others, 426; self-reflection, interaction, and, 432; sense of security and, 180-87; social act, and rise of, 167-80; social control and, 223-29; social organization and, 220-23; specific role-taking and, 169-70; status and, 180-83
- Self control, as phase of maturity, 425-27, 485
- Senile dementia, 720, 772
- Sense of security, influenced by loss of work, 616-21; morale, job, and, 603-10
- Sense of shame, place of, in self or personality, 186-87
- Sex differences, changes in concept of, in modern world, 571-72; culture and traditional, 559-61; in puberty, 405-06; in social-sexual development, 414-15; role and status of women and, 550-61
- Sex mores and marriage, changes in, 509-12
- Sexual selection, in marriage, 504-06
- Sexuality, deviations from norm of, culturally defined, 724-27; endocrine imbalance and, 691; influence of, on marriage, 515-17; interaction in, in marriage, 527-28; neurotic manifestations of, in primitive and pre-Christian societies, 724-27; persistence of, as background of men-women relations, 562-63; problem of, for single woman, 572-85; problems of, among college students, 483-87; stages in maturation of, 411-15; sublimation of, in single woman, 585-90
- Sibling relations, 366-68; conflict and rivalry, 366, 368; jealousy in, 367
- Single woman, adjustment of, 572-90; auto-eroticism and, 576-80; extramarital relations and, 583-85; homosexuality and, 580-83; social-emotional problems of, 573-76; sublimations of love life for, 585-90
- Situation, as stimulus, 4; defined morally for people, 224-25; definition of, 111, 136-37; leadership and social, 382-84; personal (hedonistic) definition of, 111, 136-37; social or cultural definition of, 111, 136-37
- Social act, learning takes place in, 432; limits of competition in, 437-38; nature of, 164-65; phase of child-parent relations, 344-45; rise of self in, 164-87; *see* Interaction
- Social classes, 299
- Social control, nature of, 223; self and, 223-25; symbolic and overt, 224-25
- Social expectancy, 138; and development of one's values, 181-82; identification and, 165-67, 183; meaning as related to, 189-91; rise of self affected by, 168-69; symbols in, 191-92
- Social-interactional theory of personality, 295-96
- Social participation, place of, in personal life, 127-28; role and status, and, 137-38
- Social situation, *see* Situation
- Social type, 324-28; illustrated among teachers, 455-58; personality type and, 324-28; Spranger's ideal type as, 315
- Society, 4; culture and personality, 805-16; ethos and, 131-32
- Sociological theories of type, 324-28
- Soviet Russia, use of differential wage incentives in, 611-13
- Speech, *see* Language
- Stages of personality growth, Freudian, 279-81

- Statistical method in study of personality, 236-50; attributes, 236, 246-47; cautions in using, 244; comparisons of distributions, 240-41; correlation, 241-46; critical ratio device, 241; critique of, 259-65; different from experimental, 241-42; inadequate features of, 259-64; probability and measures of change in, 242-43; questionnaire as aid in, 247; rating schemes, 237, 247; reliability, factor of, in, 248-49, 261; sampling, 238; test as aid in, 247; validity, factor of, in, 248-49, 261; variables and, 236, 238-40
- Status, class system and, 299; development of responsibility and independence and, 356-57; nature of, 137-38; relations of role and participation to, 137-38, 180-81; role, aspiration, achievement, and, 181-83; self and sense of security, and, 180-87; social-cultural conditioning and, 298-99; teachers and low social, 463-67
- Stereotypes, 301
- Style of life, 107-08, 112, 283-84, 293, 314
- Sublimation, 280; advantages of, in single woman's adjustment, 589-90; biosocial limits to, of sex, 589-90; cultural acceptances, and, 120; frustration and, 120; nature of, 120-21; single woman and, of sexuality, 585-90
- Submissiveness, relation to leadership, 381
- Suggestion, in learning, 88
- Superego, critique of, 282; rise of, 281-82; shame and guilt, and, 186-87
- Symbol, and social control, 223-24; as power device, 191-92; growth of meaning and, 191-94; nature of, 191-92
- Symbolic activity, 165
- Symbolism, natural, in sounds, 208
- Sympathy, and love versus aggression in rise of self, 184-86; as phase of identification, 114-15; in learning, 89; role of mother and, 184
- Symptom, 711; culturally defined, 762
- Symptomatic psychoses, 720-21
- Syndrome, 711; culturally defined, 762
- Teacher, anxieties of, 452-53; classroom, role of, 454-58; college, 473-75, 489, 499-501; mother, role of, 451-52, 454; neuroticism and, 453-54; personality of, 451-54, 473-75, 489; pupils' reactions to, 458-60; role and status of, in community, 462-67; social control of, 464-67; views of, toward pupils and curriculum, in contrast to mental hygienists', 460-62
- Teacher-student relations in college, 472-76, 489
- Temper tantrum, as power device, 386
- Tests of personality, extroversion-introversion, 309-11; in personality study, 249-50; limitations of, 260-63; made of college students, 492-95; nature of, 247
- Theories of personality, 276-300; Adler and, 283-85; doctrine of elements and, 285-89; Freud and, 276-83, 314; Gestalt, 289-91; personalistic, 291-95; psychoanalytic, 276-85; psychological, 285-96; social-interactional, 295-96; topological, 289-91; typological, 301-36
- Theory, nature and function of, 230-31; predictive and practical use of, 273-75; science, application and, 230-33
- Thinking, anticipatory nature of, 196-98; as inner forms reflecting external interaction, 194-98; as self-reflection, 195; fantasy, 201-02; fantasy and logical, culturalized, 205-06; objective, 201; private world of, and fantasy, 207; related to self, 194-98; rise of logical and fantasy, 202-04; role-taking and, 194-95; two forms of, and language, 201-07
- Thought, as internalized activity, 9
- Thyroid malfunctioning and personality, 687-90
- Thyroxine, effects of, 28-29
- Topology, 289-91
- Totalitarian way of life, 810-12, 814-15; degradation of unique personality under, 811-12; education in, 814-15; parent-child pattern in, 811; person-person interaction controlled in, 812; rigid class structure in, 811-12
- Toxic psychoses, 720, 772; among primitive and non-Christian societies, 735-36
- Trait, atomistic theory of personality and, 285-89; specific *vs.* general, 286-89
- Traits, attitude and, 105-06; nature of, 12, 105-06
- Transvestitism, 725
- Tuberculosis, effects of, on personality, 746-47
- Twins, heredity and, 43-44
- Types of personality, 301-36; Berman and, 322-24; Bleuler and, 312-13; classic theory of, 302-03; concept of, 328-36; constitutional foundation of, 305; endocrines and, 322-24; Freud and, 314; the Jaenschs and, 313; Jung and, 305-12; Kraepelin and, 312; Naccarati and, 317-18; Pavlov and, 303-05; psychological theories of, 302-16; Rosanoff and, 313-14; sociological theories of, 324-28; Spranger and, 314-15; Wertheimer and Hesketh's, 313
- Typology, 301-36; classic theories of, 302-03; critique of, 328-32; Freud and, 314; generalization and, 332-36; Jung and, 305-12; Pavlov and, 303-05
- Unconscious, adjustment and, 99-102; concept of, 101; cycles of activity and, 100-02; in dissociative and integrative phenomena, 218-20; meaning and, 192; place of, in Freudian theory, 277, 279, 282
- Unemployment, effects of prolonged, upon personality, 616-21
- Uniqueness of personality, 12-13, 293-94, 297, 300

Unity of personality, themata and, 106-07
 Universality of basic psychological processes, 282

Value system, 106-07; aims and ideals in, 108-09; changes and extension of, in college, 487-89; competitive, influences delinquency, 659-60; conflict in, and rise of self, 182-83; cultural determination of a, 806-10; differences between extrovert and introvert, 311-12; flexible and inflexible, 815-16; high importance of work in our, 591; obligatory, 806-07; of others, internalized into self, 221-25; permissive, 807; pupil adjustment affected by, 438; rational *vs.* irrational in a, 808-09; themata or unifying factors in, 106-07; variations in a, and culture, 297-98, 806-16

Variability, *see* Individual differences

Variables, central tendency, measures of, 239; dispersion of, measures of, 239-40; nature of statistical, 236

Vocabulary, associates and, 161-62; bilingualism and, 162; cultural status and, 160-61; development of, in child, 155-59; intelli-

gence and, 159-61; socioeconomic status and, 156, 160-62

Voice, judgment of personality by, 210-11; nonlinguistic, features in, 208-10; personality characteristics and nonlinguistic features of, 209-11

We-group, *see* In-group

Woman, adjustment problems of modern, 559-90; effect of work on married, 568-69; gainful employment of married, 564-66; history of the low status of, 559-60; recent changes in role and status of, 561-64; sex differences and role of, 560-61

Work, dissociative nature of machine, 594-95; effect of long unemployment on attitudes toward, 619-21; fatigue and, 595-98; handicaps to women who, 566-67; incentive in, 602-10; influence of, on personality, 591-621; married women and, 564-66; monotony and, 598-602; morale and, 602-10; objectification of, and single woman, 586-88; objective nature of, 586, 593-94; play different from, 591; resurrection of output in, 605-06; social factors in, 593

